SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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PERSIAN GULF WAR VETERANS
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 16, 1997
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Health, and
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Committee on Veterans' Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 334, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Cliff Stearns (chairman of the Subcommittee on Health) presiding.
Present: Representatives Stearns, Smith, Bachus, Moran, Cooksey, Hutchinson, Chenoweth, Gutierrez, Kennedy, Brown, Doyle, Peterson, Everett, Stump, Buyer, Clyburn and Snyder.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN STEARNS
Mr. STEARNS. Good morning, everybody.
Let me welcome everybody to a joint hearing of the Subcommittee on Health and Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. I will proceed with my opening statement, and then we will go to the Chairman on the Oversight Committee and then the Ranking Members.
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm was a brilliantly executed operation. We have celebrated the success of that encounter. We must also acknowledge that brief as it was, the war took a toll on a number of its combatants. The Veterans' Affairs Committee is all too familiar with the tragic human dimensions of war, through our efforts to restore, compensate and care for its wounded and disabled.
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In this hearing room, which is devoted to veterans' affairs, certain phrases are uttered time and time again: Agent Orange, PTSD, service-connected disability. These words are the sad legacy of modern warfare. The obscure name of Khamisiyah now seems likely to enter that lexicon. It may be too early to make lasting judgments about it, but the word has already come to have meaning well beyond the coordinates on a map. It has come to represent a dark hour of our war effort.
Clearly the defense establishment has thrown extensive resources into understanding what happened. That effort started very late. Much has been learned. Yet there is much we still don't know.
While new information regarding this story emerges on what seems at times almost a daily basis, we must take account of certain perceptions. First, we must consider the perception some hold that exposure to chemical warfare agents is the sole or primary cause of Gulf War veterans' illnesses.
Second, we must consider the perception that the government has been engaged in a cover-up regarding the entire story.
I believe this hearing will help us grapple with both of these perceptions. This is a most timely hearing, particularly in light of the disturbing revelations published by the CIA last week. The Agency's disclosures come very late, but it is important that its findings have been brought to light.
There are hard questions we need to ask our witnesses about the possibility that chemical weapons exposure may be implicated in some veterans' health problems. But we should avoid the mistakes of the Intelligence Community. We should guard against tunnel vision and remain open regarding the cause or causes of Persian Gulf war illnesses.
The one thing we do know is that thousands of our fighting men and women who have served with valor and dignity in the Gulf are suffering from chronic illnesses, and as our veterans who are testifying today remind us, we must and will, in a subsequent hearing, focus on the effectiveness of the VA treatment efforts.
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As much as Persian Gulf War veterans want to understand the causes of their health problems, they are most concerned about getting better.
I want to thank my friend from the great State of Alabama, Terry Everett, the Chairman of our Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, for agreeing to cochair this hearing. There is a lot to be done on this subject, and I am pleased to have your assistance in this effort, Terry.
Let me turn to you for an opening statement and invite you to introduce the Ranking Member of your subcommittee. Then I will introduce the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee On Health, Mr. Gutierrez.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TERRY EVERETT, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION
Mr. EVERETT. Thank you very much, Cliff. I would like to strongly associate myself with your opening remarks. This hearing could not be more timely in light of the recent revelations of the Defense and Intelligence Communities. It is clearly evident that our government was aware of the presence of chemical weapons in Iraq since at least 1986.
The CIA's and the Defense Department's long denial of the possibility of chemical weapons exposure was a great disservice to thousands of Gulf War veterans whose tour of duty in the Persian Gulf has adversely affected their health.
Mr. Walpole has admitted that the CIA should have had better sharing of sensitive and yet vital information, and he said, I am thinking about sharing internally as well as externally.
I have to tell you, I find that very disturbing, since internal and external turf issues at the CIA and the Defense Department may have seriously put the VA behind the power curve in its ability to diagnose and develop effective treatment protocols and to compensate our suffering war veterans.
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I welcome all of our witnesses today. I look forward to your testimony. There will be some hard questions. And at this point I would like to introduce my Ranking Member on Investigations and Oversight, Mr. Jim Clyburn.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. CLYBURN
Mr. CLYBURN. Thank you very much, Chairman Everett. I want to thank you and Chairman Stearns for calling this very timely hearing this morning.
I think all of us agree that the evidence is overwhelming that American troops were exposed to chemical agents during the Persian War.
I think that the revelations that are now coming out, some as recent as this morning, tend to underscore what many of us have been led to believe before, and that is that our efforts to get at the bottom of this very disturbing incident have so far been inadequate.
And so I think that the fact that we are here today hopefully will ''help'' to clear the air, if I might use that term, on something that's very, very important to the men and women who have made such significant sacrifices for all of us.
I am hopeful that by the time we are finished here today, we can all begin to make the kind of effort that is necessary to restore faith and confidence in the efforts of our great Nation. Thank you so much.
Mr. STEARNS. Thank you, Jim.
Let me also welcome my colleague and friend, Congressman Gutierrez, the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Health. I know he has worked hard on behalf of Persian Gulf veterans throughout his tenure on the committee, and I look forward to working closely with him on this and other subjects.
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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LUIS V. GUTIERREZ
Mr. GUTIERREZ. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Stearns, and Chairman Everett, for convening this important hearing to address new developments in the ongoing investigation of the illnesses afflicting our Persian Gulf veterans.
I am particularly encouraged that in my first health subcommittee hearing as the Ranking Democrat, we will be considering Gulf War issues. Persian Gulf illnesses have always been a priority for me on this committee, and they will continue to be so until they are resolved.
I am pleased that this committee has started to reassert its authority over issues related to Gulf War, and I am hopeful that our efforts will continue throughout this session.
This hearing comes at an opportune time. We now know that more than 20,000 Gulf War veterans, members of the 24th Army Infantry, were probably exposed to chemical nerve agents after they demolished the Khamisiyah arms depot in southern Iraq.
We also know that this devastating event may have been avoided had our intelligence services better reconciled their computer databases and disseminated their information in a more direct manner. The CIA has acknowledged its mistakes. However, while our government and this committee are now armed with more information, we are also beset by more pressing questions that must be addressed.
I believe that the Veterans of Foreign Wars Commander James Near said it best when he stated, quote, ''I can't help but wonder, as these revelations and events continue to unfold, how many other Khamisiyahs are out there waiting to be uncovered.''
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Unfortunately, this remains a distinct possibility. Despite the thorough preparation of our military and our extensive intelligence capability, it remains feasible that during a massive deployment of the nature of Desert Storm, these worst-case scenarios did occur.
Do we know for sure that our allied carpet bombing campaign that precluded our ground attack did not similarly destroy Iraqi chemical storage facilities throughout?
As the CIA report demonstrates, analysts focused their efforts on S-shaped ammunition depots as their main repositories for Iraqi chemical armaments. This proved wrong in Khamisiyah. Was this concentration on S-shaped facilities wrong elsewhere? This remains conceivable until proven otherwise.
The onus is now on our government to demonstrate what really happened, to provide as many answers as possible, to do our best without holding back. That means disclosing all of the information needed to rectify the concerns of our Gulf War veterans and providing these American men and women with the health care and services that they require as a direct result.
We have started to acquire more details about what happened in the Gulf, and we have begun to commit adequate resources to this cause. The Department of Defense has allocated more than $25 million to Gulf War illness research for this year alone.
I do want to mention another concern I have: bureaucratic inefficiency. We have seen what this can do to the dispersement of information in the Intelligence Community. Khamisiyah is that example.
Today separate investigations into Persian Gulf illnesses are being conducted by the CIA, the Department of Defense, the four armed services, the Presidential Advisory Committee, both Houses of Congress and the General Accounting Office. And I am probably forgetting some government agency. I am also leaving out the many nongovernmental organizations that have conducted credible studies on this issue.
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I believe that coordination is required. Cooperation is necessary, and the government agencies should work with their nongovernmental counterparts to get to the bottom of this.
In addition, let us not forget that we have at our disposal a resource that may provide our government with the best answers. That resource is the brave veterans that served our Nation during the Gulf War. Let's communicate with them clearly and succinctly.
Once again, I thank the Members of this committee and our distinguished witnesses for joining us today, and particularly thank the Chairman of this subcommittee Mr. Stearns.
I would just like to say that, Mr. Stearns, you look a year younger, not a year older today. I wish to wish you a happy birthday.
[The prepared statement of Congressman Gutierrez appears on p. 62.]
Mr. STEARNS. Thank you very much. I thank my colleague.
And if the Members will provide deference to me, I would like to make their opening statements part of the record so we can get right to this hearing that we have all been waiting for.
But I would like to give the Ranking Member of the full committee, Lane Evans, an opportunity to say a few words. Lane.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LANE EVANS, RANKING DEMOCRATIC MEMBER, FULL COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS
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Mr. EVANS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you holding this important hearing along with your Chairman of the subcommittee, my good friend Terry Everett, who has worked with this issue in the past. I want to associate myself with all the remarks made by my colleagues.
The major focus of this effort must be directed toward ensuring that our sick veterans are being cared for. We must also be doing all we can to ensure that our Gulf War veterans receive the benefits that they are rightly owed. We cannot fully accomplish these two objectives, however, unless we try to understand what happened during the war itself that may have led to the illnesses we collectively now call ''Gulf War Syndrome.''
Some of you have seen an article in the Washington Post over the weekend about the importance of understanding history. One only needs to remember how our country treated veterans exposed to Agent Orange in Vietnam to understand why an immediate and concerted effort needs to be undertaken now to attempt to unravel the mystery of Gulf War Syndrome.
It took years for our government to do as much as acknowledge the concerns of Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange during the war. It was an even longer and more difficult journey before the Federal Government finally began to fulfill its obligations to Agent Orange victims.
As an enlisted Marine during the Vietnam War, I am proud to have fought in Congress for Agent Orange victims, but I am sorry that it took so long to provide any relief for long-suffering veterans. I am unwilling to let another generation pass before we find answers and give some assistance to our Gulf War veterans who now suffer or who may suffer in the future, for that matter, from Gulf War Syndrome.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your work. I look forward to working with you and your colleagues on this issue in the future.
Mr. STEARNS. Thank you very much, Lane.
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[The prepared statement of Congressman Evans appears on p. 68.]
[The statements of Congressman Smith, Congressman Kennedy, and Congressman Doyle appear on pp. 61, 66, and 67.]
Mr. STEARNS. To the committee, I would like the staff to give each of you a Khamisiyah historical perspective of related intelligence. We received this report just recently. It was made public last week, but we want each of you to have this, and this is the important document that we wish we could have gotten it to you sooner, but this is the CIA report.
So we hope you will take this, study it. And this will be the report that we will be referring to during this hearing.
I think before we even start—and we are going to have the panel in order of their seniority, Dr. Rostker, Robert Walpole and Colonel Leavitt and Colonel Huber—but I would like to say personally to Dr. Rostker how much we appreciate him coming to the hearing today. All the Members should know that you had a prior commitment to go to Europe, but that you were kind enough to come here. And, as the Chairman and for the other folks here, I would like to say how much we appreciate your coming here.
As you know, we are going to put this in the perspective of putting you under oath. So if you will please all rise and raise your right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. STEARNS. Without further ado, Dr. Rostker, we will allow you to go first, and then we will proceed in order.
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TESTIMONY OF BERNARD ROSTKER, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR GULF WAR ILLNESS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; ROBERT D. WALPOLE, CHIEF OF PERSIAN GULF WAR ILLNESSES TASK FORCE, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; COL. THOMAS P. LEAVITT, CHIEF, INSPECTIONS DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY INSPECTOR GENERAL; AND COL. JOE HUBER, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY FOR OPERATIONS
TESTIMONY OF BERNARD ROSTKER
Dr. ROSTKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the subcommittees to report on the progress that the Department of Defense is making in terms of its investigation of Gulf War illnesses. In previous testimony presented before the full committee on February 11, I outlined the mission of my office and described the full extent of the commitment of the Department.
We are truly committed to finding out everything we can to determine the possible causes of illness while providing the best possible care for all those who are ill. We also have an eye towards the future as we learn from our Gulf experiences and make the necessary changes in policies, doctrine, technologies to protect our forces in the future.
Before reviewing the progress my office has made in our investigation, let me first highlight the recent Presidential decision to extend the presumptive period for compensation for Persian Gulf veterans with undiagnosed illnesses.
As you know, the government compensates for disabilities, not exposure. In the case of the symptoms that may be attributed to Gulf War veterans' illness, the benefit of the doubt regarding service connection would be in favor of the veterans.
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We welcome this because it completely eliminates any argument that our actions are driven by concerns over government liability. Our inquiries never have been and never will be directed to such concerns. Our only interest is to support our veterans by vigorously searching for the cause of illness among Gulf War veterans.
Having said that, let me now review with you very quickly some of the significant progress we have made since I last appeared before the full committee.
We have embarked on a comprehensive medical research program that has resulted in many proposals being received to examine the consequences of possible exposure to low-level chemical agents. Those proposals are undergoing internal and external scientific review.
We have eliminated the backlog of calls from veterans who contacted our 1–800 Incident Reporting Line. Approximately 90 percent of the people who have called have been fully debriefed by trained investigators.
We have launched our outreach effort in January, mailing surveys to approximately 20,000 Gulf War veterans who have been within 50 kilometers of Khamisiyah. To date, more than 6,000 veterans have responded. Of that number, approximately 300 commented that they experienced illnesses, and approximately 300 provided information on their observations.
This latter group is receiving follow-up calls from our investigators for a full debriefing of their experience.
GulfLINK, our home page on the Internet, is now interactive. Veterans can now e-mail their concerns to DOD and get replies. We have strengthened our relationships with VSOs with monthly roundtable meetings. We have scheduled a series of nationwide town hall meetings in nine cities beginning next week so I can hear firsthand from our veterans and to discuss their concerns one on one.
The recent release of the Khamisiyah narrative, that is the narrative that the Defense Department released, is an interim report and does not represent closure of our investigative efforts. It describes the destruction of the Iraqi ammunition storage facility after the war, subsequent UNSCOM inspections of that facility and the later public inquiry into the incident.
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Given the controversy—given the information that has been uncovered about the demolitions at Khamisiyah, it is prudent to rely on only the confirmed demolition that occurred on May 10. During that demolition operation, there were no reports of chemical munitions, nor were there reports of anyone experiencing symptoms consistent with exposure to chemical agents. Subsequent inspections by the U.N. in late 1991 and early 1992 and then again in May of 1996 suggest there were chemical munitions stored at Khamisiyah during the time in which U.S. forces destroyed the depot. It wasn't until 1995 that the evidence led the CIA and later DOD to begin investigating the possibility that U.S. forces could have destroyed these munitions and possibly been exposed to chemical agents. This was confirmed after a U.N. visit in May 1996 and announced by the Department of Defense in June of 1996.
Since then, DOD has expanded and intensified its investigation into these events. In addition to the extensive investigation my organization is undertaking, the DOD IG, the Army IG and the assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight are all reviewing various aspects of the Gulf War and Khamisiyah.
The effects of our investigations include continuing to search out and interviewing veterans who were in the Khamisiyah area at the time of the demolitions; working with the CIA to estimate who may have been exposed to chemical agents and the extent of the exposure. This includes working to reduce the uncertainty associated with modeling the so-called pit area demolitions by conducting a series of small-scale tests that will help us in our efforts to determine possible exposure.
We are also conducting an analysis of participation rates from the combined CCEP and VA medical registry programs with regard to time and location of units relative to Khamisiyah. All of these efforts are directed towards the single purpose of determining what is our cause of Gulf illness. While doing what we can—by doing that, we are ensuring that the Gulf War veterans are receiving the best possible care.
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Finally, we then must take—make certain to apply the lessons learned from the Gulf experience for future deployments. You have my commitment that no effort will be spared to determine the cause of these illnesses and to respond to the health needs of our veterans.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Rostker, with attachment, appears on p. 74.]
Mr. STEARNS. Thank you, Doctor.
For the Members' benefit, we are under the 5-minute rule with the witnesses, but I have asked that Mr. Walpole be allowed 10 minutes because he is going to be explaining for us the Khamisiyah historical perspective, the CIA document which has been handed out to all Members, so at this point we will allow him 10 minutes to explain it. Mr. Walpole.
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT D. WALPOLE
Mr. WALPOLE. Thank you, Chairman Stearns, Chairman Everett, and Members of the subcommittees. I am truly pleased to be able to appear before you today to discuss CIA's and the Intelligence Community's efforts on the issue of Gulf War veterans' illnesses and the possible exposure of some of those veterans to chemical weapons agents.
To keep within the 10-minute guideline, I will summarize my remarks, but I ask that the full statement be included in the record.
Mr. STEARNS. So ordered.
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Mr. WALPOLE. I would also ask that the Khamisiyah paper you passed out be included in the record along with the 41 documents that that paper was written to accompany.
Mr. STEARNS. So ordered.
[The attachments appear on p. 122.]
Mr. WALPOLE. Okay. We know how important this issue is to our veterans, and that our intelligence is essential to understanding some of the events that occurred during the war. In response to President Clinton's tasking to his advisory committee, and after determining that the issue required additional resources, George Tenet, the Acting Director for Central Intelligence, appointed me his special assistant on the 27th of February and asked that I have a task force up and running on the 3rd of March. Since that time we have made every effort to keep staff of these subcommittees, as well as numerous other committees on the Hill, advised of our progress.
The focus of our efforts has been to help find answers as to why the veterans are sick. We are supporting numerous government efforts on this issue, and we are searching our files for any intelligence that can help.
Before I describe our mission, let me emphasize that one of my primary responsibilities is to set the record straight, and I must do that from the outset of today's hearing, regarding our public release last week about Khamisiyah.
In reporting the Intelligence Community's admission about missing some important intelligence prior to the Gulf War, some have missed a very important point of our story. It has been correctly reported that the Intelligence Community did not list Khamisiyah as a suspect chemical weapons storage site prior to the war, even though we had a report that identified it in 1986 as forward-deployed CW storage site during the Iran-Iraq war.
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But some have missed a more important point, suggesting that our error in not listing it before the war equated to a failure to provide warning before U.S. demolition activities. On that point the record is clear. CIA and DIA provided multiple warnings to our military forces. I will go into more details later in my statement.
The mission of this task force is to provide intensive, aggressive intelligence support to the numerous U.S. Government efforts currently investigating Persian Gulf War illnesses issues. Fifty officers are serving on this task force, drawn from across the Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. In addition, we have officers from the Department of Defense's Offices of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses and the Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence Oversight.
An example of our group's efforts was released several weeks ago in Salt Lake City. It is a one-page paper concerning the release of chemical warfare agent at Khamisiyah during March of 1991. The day after that meeting, the Department of Defense received 80 phone calls on the 1–800 number, some from veterans who recalled being at Khamisiyah. This is an important step forward in trying to determine exactly what happened at that place and to address veterans' concerns about possible exposure to chemical agent.
Let me mention briefly some of our modeling efforts. We are continuing to try to reduce uncertainties in order to move—to more accurately identify the extent of the release from the demolitions I just mentioned. We are helping the Department of Defense develop tests to destroy rockets containing CW agent simulants. We expect this to provide us invaluable data on how the agent would react in open-pit demolition. We had that information on what happens inside a building and were able to model events in that regard.
We are also working with the Department of Defense to talk to veterans who are providing some knowledge about the demolition activities at the pit. In Salt Lake City, we reiterated our uncertainties but indicated that we believed, on the basis of limited and often contradictory data, that two demolition events were more likely than one. These data included the military log entry for destruction on March 12, the contradictory stories of two different soldiers and an UNSCOM videotape. We also indicated that if we could find one more soldier who recalled being in the pit, we would increase our knowledge by 50 percent.
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DOD has recently found other eyewitnesses, and we joined with them in interviewing these individuals. We had four of them together, including the two original soldiers. The interviews called into serious question the log entry. We learned that it was prepared after the fact and that we should not put credence in the March 12 date. Even with four soldiers together, we still obtained several contradictory statements.
Just this week DOD located another witness who might be able to shed light on some of these contradictions. Even so, with the log's entry—the credibility of the log's entry in question, the prudent approach would be, and will be, for us to model one event on March 10. This would be true from a modeling perspective, even if there were two events done at the same time.
We will proceed jointly with the Department of Defense to complete that modeling once the test data are obtained. If we receive further information on exactly what happened in the pit, of course, we will modify that approach.
I would mention something briefly about document searches. We are continuing to go over whatever material could have possible bearing on this. We have extended our searches from previous efforts to earlier time frames. But I need to mention today's Post article because that was raised earlier.
There are several errors in that article and I want to point some of those out. The analysts referred to have been working in the chemical weapon issue for many years. They were part of the review in 1995. They were part of the 1996 efforts. They have been interviewed by the IG; have been interviewed by numerous people.
Now, since my task force, as of last week, had been running for only 35 days, and that was the first time I got into this issue, of course I interviewed them 35 days ago. But they have been interviewed many times and have been involved in the process. And finally, many of those analysts are on my task force. We talk daily about what their thoughts were during the war.
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Now, during the war, they decided that they wanted to have some time with their families and wanted to have some time to sleep and decided that 15-hour days wasn't working for them. They decided amongst themselves they would arrange their schedules so that they could have 24-hour coverage and still do the other outside activities. In order to keep each other apprised of what was happening while the others were off, they kept in a computer file informal working notes. They titled these ''a log,'' but they really were informal working notes.
We reviewed those notes as part of our Khamisiyah effort, and, in fact, one of those notes was released. It happens to be document 11, I think, in the package. We will indeed review those notes for any other releases for declassifications that will have pertinence to the Gulf War illnesses, and we will also make all of those notes available, which are classified, to cleared government officials to review and see if there's any relevance in them. There's a lot of information, as you can imagine, in informal notes, that is completely extraneous to this issue or any other issue of intelligence value, that's talking amongst themselves.
I would make one other point about that article. We are trying hard to get to the bottom of some of these questions, and whenever issues come up that divert our attention about whether analysts were talked to or not talked to, that it diverts our attention from what has caused the veterans to get sick, and we are trying to run that to ground.
Let me finally turn to the Khamisiyah paper you passed out. During our initial efforts on Khamisiyah, we determined that certain intelligence documents were critical to answering the questions, what did the intelligence community know when? What did we do with that information internally, and what did we do externally?
We began briefing those documents to the President's Advisory Committee and appropriate Congressional committees. We also began simultaneous efforts to declassify those documents and to search for any other information relevant to the questions.
We determined in the process of that effort that a paper, unclassified, that would walk through the historical perspective would help the recipients of these 41 documents understand the context of the documents. The paper, which was released on the 9th of April, provides details of the Intelligence Community's knowledge about Khamisiyah before, during and after the war.
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Some highlights of the paper relevant to recent coverage include in 1986 the Intelligence Community knew Khamisiyah had been a chemical weapons storage site during the Iran-Iraq war, specifically during 1984 and 1985. Subsequent analytical assessments began to focus on S-shaped bunkers as future forward-deployed storage locations for chemical weapons. Since Khamisiyah didn't have one of those bunkers, it was not on our list. Nevertheless, the Intelligence Community warned that Iraq had forward-deployed weapons, and was likely to use them.
On February 1, the Defense Intelligence Agency warned that chemical weapons could be stored anywhere, even in the open.
I have just a couple more minutes, if you would like me to walk through these bullets on this paper.
Mr. STEARNS. Sure. Why don't you go ahead.
Mr. WALPOLE. Okay. On the 23rd of February, before the ground war and 9 days before the U.S. military performed demolition at Khamisiyah, CIA passed to CENTCOM information pointing to Khamisiyah as a potential chemical storage facility. While the information did not mention Khamisiyah by name, it included geographic coordinates indicating the area and noted a specific storage area on the military's Joint Operations Graphics map. I have copies of that map if we want to go into that later.
On the 25th of February, CENTCOM tasked National Technical Means to determine if Iraqi troops were present at several places of concern, including the coordinates we had passed. National Technical Means would have been able to provide information on Iraqi troop presence before anyone was sent to check on special weapons.
On the 28th of February, at least 4 days before demolition occurred, DIA had sent a message to CENTCOM indicating that biological and chemical weapons could be stored at Khamisiyah and other facilities.
Also on the 28th of February, CENTCOM requested the Army Central Command to determine by noon on the 4th of March whether chemical or biological weapons were present at Khamisiyah and 16 other sites. The response, which was not received until the 1st of April, indicated that no chemical weapons were found. The rockets in bunker 73 were destroyed after noon on the 4th of March, and those in the pit were destroyed on the 10th of March.
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On the 6th of March, CIA passed to CENTCOM a reiteration of its warning that Iraq did not mark chemical munitions. While this warning was 2 days after the demolition in the bunker, it was 4 days before the demolition in the pit. Both demolitions were unknown to CIA at the time.
The 6th of March cable further advised CENTCOM that opportunities to identify chemically filled munitions could be missed, and that while caches of unmarked munitions were destroyed, there was a possibility that individuals could be exposed to chemical warfare agents.
The documents released and the Khamisiyah paper written to accompany them do not change our judgments that Iraq did not use chemical munitions before the war. They do show us that our support before the war could have been better.
That said, the Intelligence Community did not warrant charges that it did not provide warning before U.S. post-war demolitions. As already indicated, CIA and DIA provided multiple warnings. Recent coverage on this issue actually highlighted the difficulties inherent to dealing with intelligence. We who report intelligence indeed missed some important opportunities to draw accurate conclusions about Khamisiyah before the war. In focusing on that part of the story, however, some reporters who received our briefing and related information missed the opportunity to report other important details on the issue, especially that warnings were given before demolition activities were conducted.
The paper that you were passed out is also on GulfLINK, and if anyone needs that GulfLINK site, I have got that address. I won't read that here.
In conclusion, I want to reiterate George Tenet's and the Intelligence Community's commitment to the men and women who served this country in the Persian Gulf. We owe them a full and accurate accounting of what happened during the final days of Desert Storm and in the following days and weeks before their returning to the United States. To that end, the intelligence material we released on Khamisiyah, including the paper outlined in the related historical perspective, gives the veterans and the American citizens a clearer understanding of what we knew and how we used the material.
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We stand behind our contributions to national security and are working to enhance our support for the future.
Thank you for the additional time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Walpole, with attachments, appears on p. 115.]
Mr. STEARNS. Thank you, Mr. Walpole.
Our next witness is Colonel Thomas Leavitt. Colonel.
TESTIMONY OF COL. THOMAS P. LEAVITT
Colonel LEAVITT. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank you for this opportunity to update you on the Department of the Army inspector general's inquiry into the destruction of Iraqi ammunition at and around Khamisiyah by U.S. Army ground forces in March of 1991.
My comments today will address the focus of the inquiry as directed by the Secretary of the Army, a short review of the methodology, the current status of the inquiry, and a summary of our future plans.
On the 25th of September, 1996, the Secretary of Army directed the— —
Mr. KENNEDY. Colonel, would you put that microphone a little closer to your mouth.
Colonel LEAVITT. Yes, sir.
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Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you.
Colonel LEAVITT. Does that catch it?
Mr. KENNEDY. Yes.
Colonel LEAVITT. On the 25th of September, 1996, the Secretary of the Army directed the Department of the Army inspector general to determine the facts surrounding the demolitions at Khamisiyah. The inquiry was to focus on the following questions: Was the presence of chemicals detected when the ammunition was destroyed? Was its presence reported, and to what level? Were appropriate force protection measures taken during the ammunition demolition operation?
On the 18th of October, 1996, the Secretary issued a supplemental directive. The Department of the Army inspector general was also to address the weapons destroyed; the personnel who participated in the destruction; the potential exposure of these personnel; the potential exposure of other personnel who, taking into consideration the amount of agent possibly released and the applicable wind patterns, might have been exposed; any other significant factors about the incident; and any other sites where the same or similar operations were conducted.
Our inquiry team proceeded with a train-up by developing an action plan and methodology. We initially spent about 30 days screening classified and unclassified historical logs, reports, and records for records of demolition operations, reports and reconnaissance of expected chemical storage weapon sites, reports of activities around Khamisiyah. This effort is still ongoing.
The team also sought to determine the focus on chemical weapons before, during, and after the Gulf War, asking such questions as: Were chemical weapons designated as a priority intelligence requirement? What actions were taken by commanders and intelligence officers regarding the presence, use, or destruction of chemical weapons and munitions? Was anything found and reported?
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Lastly, we planned to take sworn and recorded testimony from all locatable commanders, soldiers, veterans, and civilians involved in the destruction of the Khamisiyah facility.
The DA IG inquiry team has gathered information and documents from the Gulf War Declassification Project; the Investigation and Analysis Division of the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses; various Army commands and agencies; the CIA; the DIA; and individual soldiers, veterans, and civilians.
After screening thousands of historical files and records, we have collected over 2,000 documents, 300 photographs, 4 videotapes, and an audiotape. Some of these documents and the vast majority of the photographs and tapes came from soldiers and veterans actually involved in the demolition operation. Cooperation and assistance from all individuals and agencies across the spectrum has been superb.
To date, we have talked to over 350 soldiers, veterans, retirees, and civilians. This includes 23 chemical officers and NCOs at levels from company through CENTCOM; 10 operations officers and NCOs from battalion through CENTCOM; 14 intelligence officers and NCOs battalion through ARCENT, which is the Army portion of Central Command; five generals.
We have talked to approximately 150 soldiers, veterans, and civilians who actually participated in or were present at the destruction of the Khamisiyah ammunition facility. This includes the company commanders, operations officers, command sergeants major, battalion commanders of both the 37th and 307th Engineer Battalions, the units most directly involved in the operation.
Of the 350 interviews conducted to date, over one-half have involved sworn recorded testimony. The remainder were documented with memorandums of record.
Members of the team, as we speak, are conducting interviews with soldiers stationed in Europe and are working on some other leads involving veterans in the United States.
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This will largely conclude the interview portion of the inquiry. Our focus will then shift to analyzing and crosswalking the data that are available and coordinating the possible results and conclusions with the various agencies and individuals involved.
There is also work remaining regarding the technical aspects of the inquiry primarily involving the modeling efforts.
Mr. Chairman, this short synopsis provides a snapshot of where we are with regard to the SECARMY's directed inquiry into the demolition of Iraqi ammunition at Khamisiyah. We expect to brief the Secretary of the Army late this month or early next month on the results of this inquiry and anticipate that specific results will be released shortly thereafter.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Leavitt appears on p. 247.]
Mr. STEARNS. Thank you, Colonel Leavitt.
Colonel Joe Huber, I understand, does not have an opening statement.
TESTIMONY OF COL. JOE HUBER
Colonel HUBER. That's correct, sir. I am here prepared to respond to your specific questions about NBC, defense training, as I assist Dr. Rostker.
Mr. STEARNS. So you are the designee from the Secretary of Army?
Colonel HUBER. Yes, sir.
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Mr. STEARNS. Okay.
Well, let me open up with just a question, a simple question, a yes or no from each of you. I would like to ask each of you on the panel whether there are any unclassified documents which have not now been made public and available to Congress; just a yes or no.
Dr. ROSTKER. None that I know of, sir.
Mr. STEARNS. Okay. Mr. Walpole.
Mr. WALPOLE. None that I am aware of.
Mr. STEARNS. Colonel Leavitt.
Colonel LEAVITT. None that I am aware of, sir.
Colonel HUBER. Sir, I am not aware of any.
Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Walpole, Persian Gulf veterans have been alarmed by the possibility that they were exposed to deadly chemical warfare agents as a result of the detonations at Khamisiyah. You recently released a previously classified January 1991 Defense Intelligence Agency analysis which assessed Iraq's chemical weapon threat.
In that document, the DIA expressed the view that although Iraq is likely to have significant chemical weapons stockpiled, quote, its nerve agent stocks are being reduced by spoilage and probably will be militarily ineffective after the 31st of March. Iraq is not able to make good quality chemical agents. Technical problems have reduced their purity. This is a particular problem for the sarin type nerve gas, GB and GF. These both contain hydrofluoric acid, HF, and an impurity that causes nerve gas decomposition. Lower purity significantly reduces shelf life and reduces toxic effects. The nerve agent recently produced should have already begun to deteriorate, and decomposition should make most of the nerve agent weapons unserviceable by the end of March 1991.
Now, as we know, the Khamisiyah detonations took place in March of 1991.
Now, this information was interesting to us, and we would like your assessment. Was that assessment right or totally wrong? And how do you square it with the agency's model of the released sarin from Khamisiyah Storage Bunker Number 73 where you assumed 100 percent pure agent?
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Mr. WALPOLE. There are actually several questions built into your question. I am trying to figure out what order to actually go in on these.
The UNSCOM sampled the rockets that they found there in October/November 1991 and elsewhere, and the samples indicated that the purity of agent ranged from 10 to 70 percent. There was only one example that was up at the 70 percent point.
So there is degradation in the agent, and that part of the DIA paper is accurate.
They left what we would consider to be material foreign to trying to develop a pure agent in, and that caused the degradation of the Iraqis'.
The fact that there was still purity in the agent as late as November raises the questions of what was meant by ''militarily significant'' on the 31st of March 1991 in the DIA statement, and we are going back to the analysts on that to discover how they had determined that relative to the new information.
On the point of modeling, we have attempted in our modeling efforts to develop releases that leaned more on the worst case side of the equation, simply because the data is not there to determine exactly what happened. And if we are trying to determine what the potential plume extension was, we want to err on the side of the worst case. That's why we used 100 percent agent for that, even though we knew that was high.
Mr. STEARNS. So can I say safely then you agree with the Defense Intelligence Agency in their assessment, or do you feel that in the Storage Bunker Number 73 there was 100 pure agent?
Mr. WALPOLE. We agree that the agent degraded. I think the samples show that it did not degrade completely by the 31st of March 1991, and we stand by using the higher values of purity in our modeling efforts for the purposes that they were generated.
Mr. STEARNS. You feel comfortable.
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Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. STEARNS. We have called the supervisor on this.
Mr. KENNEDY. This is the CIA putting a— —
Mr. STEARNS. We have called the supervisor about that, and we are assuming that they are looking into it.
But can I assume then that you are going to say that you stand by the 100 percent or 80 percent? Could you give for this committee what percent that you venture to guess? Is that putting you on the spot too much? Can you venture?
Mr. WALPOLE. I don't remember exactly what percent we ran through the model at Bunker 73. As I indicated earlier, I started the job 40 days ago. I will take, for the record, the question of what percent we ran through that model. It was published in the paper on Bunker 73. It is all unclassified. It is just that I do not know the answer.
I know that in our modeling efforts we have tried to lean on the upper end of the sample purity, just so that we don't minimize the plume without any evidence to do so.
Mr. STEARNS. Thank you.
My time is up. I will now call on the chairman of the oversight committee, Mr. Everett.
Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Walpole, while the facts certainly haven't changed, the tone of your testimony differs markedly from that of your report last week, in my opinion. Your former report seemed a candid, critical, tough analysis. The admitted sharp reporting and commentary the agency received afterwards appears to have changed your report or your position.
I now understand you to say that while the intelligence community missed a few things, it fundamentally got solid intelligence to DOD which the military should have acted on with far greater caution. Is that an accurate statement?
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Mr. WALPOLE. I won't judge what the military should and should not have done. The— —
Mr. EVERETT. But is it an accurate statement that you got the information to the military?
Mr. WALPOLE. That is an accurate statement.
Mr. EVERETT. Okay.
Dr. Rostker, I wonder if you would please comment on the extent to which you agree with what Mr. Walpole has said in his testimony. Given the warnings that the intelligence community provided during February and early March 1991, shouldn't military commanders have assumed as a matter of prudent caution that all the rockets found at Khamisiyah were chemical ordnance and treat it accordingly rather than to assume the exact opposite?
Dr. ROSTKER. The history of the Gulf War and the documentation that has been published on GulfLINK and is in the public domain is replete with warnings, procedures for dealing with chemical sites. In every case, the commander stressed that safety was paramount, that the units were to lead with their Fox vehicles, their chemical reconnaissance vehicles, and to go in MOPP. It is very clear that is what happened at Khamisiyah. The unprotected troops only went in after they got it all clear from the chemical disposal folks.
One of the great mysteries of Khamisiyah still is why we have not seen acute exposure given the presence of chemical there; why we have pictures of Army personnel, trained demolition personnel, standing next to stacks of blown up Iraqi munitions 1 and 2 days after the munitions were blown up, unprotected troops that had never had any health impacts. Khamisiyah, in this regard, still is quite an enigma.
But it is quite clear that safety of the troops was paramount, that the troops were instructed to go in with the chemical vehicles and in MOPP gear, and that's exactly what they did do.
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Mr. EVERETT. Help me understand something. You say that the troops only went in after they got the all-clear for those who had tested for chemical—I don't understand why they got the all-clear.
Dr. ROSTKER. We don't understand either. If you were to, for example, talk to the company commanders of the 37th Engineers that blew up Khamisiyah, they would tell you, as they did in the press conference just a number of weeks ago, that to this day they do not believe there were chemicals at Khamisiyah.
Mr. EVERETT. And yet we have all of this evidence that there were chemicals at Khamisiyah.
Dr. ROSTKER. What we have is the evidence of U.S. troops blowing up munitions at Khamisiyah, and we have the evidence of the United Nations finding chemicals at Khamisiyah the following October.
Mr. EVERETT. You are talking about the UNSCOM?
Dr. ROSTKER. The UNSCOM.
Mr. EVERETT. Let me ask you in that regard, or somebody in the Army, who was notified at Army Central Command by the CIA of the United Nations Inspector Command finding the presence of chemical munitions at Khamisiyah?
Why wasn't this information evaluated to the highest levels of Army Central Command? This is not information of a routine nature.
Dr. ROSTKER. The issue is covered in our—in the Khamisiyah narrative. The CIA contacted someone unknown at Central Command, who indicated that the 24th Division was in the vicinity of Khamisiyah, but it was the 82nd Division that actually blew up the depot.
We know the CIA contacted a captain at Fort Stewart and inquired whether they had been involved in the demolition at Khamisiyah. The captain has no recollection of ever receiving a phone call. The answer he could have only given was no, because the 24th Division was not engaged at Khamisiyah.
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We do know the messages that Mr. Walpole talks about were received on the 28th of February and were passed to the 24th Division and the 101st Division, which were the lead divisions of the 18th Airborne Corps attacking Khamisiyah.
So we know that as the forces went into Khamisiyah, they had the warning of—and it is in their logs, quote, possible chemicals on objective gold, which was Khamisiyah.
We know that they went in with their protective gear and their vehicles, but they did not detect any chemicals, and in the days after the munitions were blown up in Khamisiyah, the U.S. troops on the ground did not detect any chemicals.
Let me say that this is also the inquiry that the Army IG is going through, so we are checking and double-checking with independent assessments as to what I am just telling you, but that is the facts from the people on the ground, sir.
Mr. EVERETT. In other words, the CIA contacted somebody, and we don't know who they contacted.
Mr. Chairman, I recognize my time is up, but the same question—could I ask just the Army to respond to the same question: Why wasn't this passed up the Army command to high levels?
Colonel HUBER. Sir, I am not prepared to answer that question. That would be an operational question that would have to be addressed from Central Command.
Mr. EVERETT. Could you get us an answer?
Dr. ROSTKER. If I might, that is exactly what the Army IG is charged with, to get an answer to that question, sir.
Mr. EVERETT. Thank you.
Mr. STEARNS. Colonel Huber, I just suggest if you could give a written answer to Mr. Everett for the record.
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Colonel HUBER. Yes, sir, we will.
Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Gutierrez.
Mr. GUTIERREZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Doctor, as you know, the Defense Department has been called before this committee in the past. The Department of Defense stated before this committee in 1993 that there was no evidence of chemical weapon exposure to our veterans in the Gulf War. As we know today, that was not true.
In addition, this committee was informed by the Department of Defense that the medical conditions afflicting our Gulf War veterans, in their opinion, were not connected to chemical agents that they may have encountered during the Gulf War.
Given the information that we have to date and the knowledge that you have to date, do you still believe that the illnesses afflicting our Gulf War veterans have no relationship to any chemical agent exposure during intervention in the Gulf War?
Dr. ROSTKER. I would first refer you to the President's advisory committee on that point, because that is a conclusion that they drew, that they could not find a connection between chemical exposure— —
Mr. GUTIERREZ. Doctor, but I would like you to answer the question.
Dr. ROSTKER. We are holding that as an open question. I removed from GulfLINK a paper that had drawn a conclusion because it was not a conclusion that I had drawn in my efforts, and so that is an open question.
We have review research and we have put out RFPs to encourage additional new research because the research base is thin. So we at this point have not drawn that conclusion.
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Mr. GUTIERREZ. So would it be fair then to say that you are not as solid as you were in 1993 and 1994 when the Department of Defense came before this committee and said that there was no relationship between exposure in the Gulf War and their illnesses, that is just not your position today, though?
Dr. ROSTKER. Our position today is that this is an open question, and that is why we are encouraging and funding additional research on that point.
Mr. GUTIERREZ. Well, I am happy to hear that it has changed, because I remember sitting here sharing this panel with other members here when I joined Congress in 1993, and I remember the hearings in 1993. I remember the hearings in 1994. I remember that the information that we were receiving was—I mean, there were people who suggested that, you know, veterans were just kind of making this stuff up, that this was psychological, that there was no evidence that there were any medical determining factors to their illnesses.
And they said, well, you know, there are always malingerers trying to get a free government handout. Well, at least today we don't have the same kind of evidence being presented before this committee. So I think that that is certainly a step in the right direction, because it always seems that the veterans have to fight—after they have fought, have to fight for their credibility when they raise issues before our Government for due compensation for their service to the Nation.
I would like to ask, Mr. Walpole, to thank you for joining us here today. I want to commend you on your efforts to deal candidly with the issues surrounding Khamisiyah, and I am hopeful that the intelligence community will continue to work in such a forthright manner.
To date, our Government, and particularly the CIA and the Defense Department, have stated that there is no evidence, no evidence suggesting further chemical agent exposures from sites in the Gulf War, excluding Khamisiyah.
I certainly want to believe that, but of course they told us nothing had happened a couple of years ago at all. And so I have been assured by the Department of Defense, while sitting here on this dais, that there was no chemical exposure of our troops at all. Now we know that is not the case.
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So, Mr. Walpole, in your opinion, are there other Khamisiyahs that Congress, this committee, and the American people, and, most importantly, our troops, have not been informed of? And can you answer that question for me this morning?
Mr. WALPOLE. To date, we have not discovered any other facility like Khamisiyah, another Khamisiyah. We have learned a lot in our investigation, our review of the information on Khamisiyah, and we have expanded our search to see if any other documents would come forward that would suggest any other sites.
And since I focused most of my remarks on Khamisiyah, it ignores that I have a large volume of people doing this document search, and we have extended much of that search back to 1980, so we uncover the 1986-like documents that we may have missed before. But to date we have not found anything.
If and when we find anything else, that information will be made publicly available to help on this question.
Mr. GUTIERREZ. So you do not exclude or suggest that there won't be any other Khamisiyahs? They are possible?
Mr. WALPOLE. We have seen no other indication of that, but I am not going to exclude that possibility.
Mr. GUTIERREZ. You are not going to exclude it. And you are studying and reviewing and looking at documents to find any others?
Mr. WALPOLE. Absolutely. We have to address this with an open mind.
Mr. GUTIERREZ. Thank you so much. Thank you to all the members of the panel.
Mr. STEARNS. I thank my colleague.
Since this is a joint committee hearing between the oversight and us, the next gentlemen will be James Clyburn, who is the ranking member on the oversight committee.
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Mr. CLYBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I don't know who I should address this question to, but I think that we are a little limited here in our knowledge of exactly how a CIA analyst operates. So I want someone to explain to me, provide me sort of an outline, as to how you evaluate the work of analysts?
Mr. WALPOLE. That obviously would come to me. In terms of—are you talking about day-to-day evaluation of analysts' work?
Mr. CLYBURN. Yes.
Mr. WALPOLE. Okay. I want to first point out that the paper that you all received, some day when the heat is off this issue, people will be able to look at that document and get a very critical insight into how analysis works at CIA and elsewhere, because you see as you walk through that document the type of information that is received and how analysts view it and then might later review it.
But in answer to your question, documents are written, and let's refer in this particular Khamisiyah paper to a document in 1986, November 1986, that cited the May 1986 information and said that we conclude that chemical munitions would be stored at Tall al-Lahm, which was another name for Khamisiyah.
That document also pointed out that S-shaped bunkers appeared to be the indication for where forward deployed storage would be for chemical munitions in the future. That was analysts' judgments. Managers reviewed that. It was at the time viewed as a sound, logical judgment.
In hindsight now, we know that that misdirected some attention. But it was a review. It wasn't some analysts getting together without any review, peer review or management review, and writing that paper. It was experts looking at that and evaluating that on the information they then had.
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And we could walk through any case of how that works, but there is a general review, both a peer review and a management review.
Mr. CLYBURN. I think that is where my real problem is. The S-shaped bunkers—I mean what led to that conclusion, only S-shaped bunkers? It would seem to me, with my limited ability, that is a dead giveaway. I mean, who would—it is so easy for any amateur to look at that if it is only S-shaped and say, if it is a Z shape, we don't have to worry about it. I don't see anybody making it that easy for us.
Mr. WALPOLE. Intelligence is not easy, and, in fact— —
Mr. CLYBURN. Well, I mean, coming to the conclusion that only S-shaped bunkers would have chemicals, that is easy.
Mr. WALPOLE. The correct answer for that question is truly classified. I would have to walk through all of the indicators that analysts obtained, what we call signatures that they obtained, that led them to that conclusion.
That would reveal—and I certainly wouldn't mind revealing it to you, but it would reveal to all of the other countries that we are trying to monitor what signatures we look for, and they would hide those signatures, and then we would have other problems.
Mr. CLYBURN. Well, if that is—if that is classified, I would ask you to give that to one of the chairs here. I don't want it, because I represent a Congressional District is number 16 in the Nation as far as the number of veterans receiving benefits, and I am an advocate for those people, and I don't want to have any information that I cannot use to advocate for them.
So I would love to have that information given to one of the chairs here, but keep it away from me.
Mr. WALPOLE. We can provide that.
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Mr. CLYBURN. I think we may need that, really.
Mr. WALPOLE. Yeah. It was based on sound analytical thinking, but we have since learned that there were other things that we should look for.
You know, I would point out in our paper—you mentioned candidness—in the paper that we released, and a much quoted phrase was my statement about tunnel vision. That was not a management statement. In fact, the paragraph in the paper wasn't in the original draft of the paper until an analyst came to me and said: We need a paragraph in this paper about tunnel vision. The analysts are being very candid about this issue.
Mr. CLYBURN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.
Mr. STEARNS. I thank my colleague.
We will now proceed in the order of their arriving, and we start with Spencer Bachus. Spencer.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SPENCER BACHUS
Mr. BACHUS. Thank you.
Gentlemen, I know the CIA has said that it has over 50 investigators working on this issue of exposure to chemical weapons and Gulf War illnesses, and I read there is some testimony about the Department of Defense that said that dozens of agencies are involved in this investigation, millions of dollars are being spent, literally hundreds of researchers are actively seeking answers.
Knowing that you have that many people in the field looking for answers, how about these missing headquarters chemical logs. First of all, do you agree that those are essential and critical to any investigation?
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Dr. ROSTKER. Let me, if I may address those?
Mr. BACHUS. Yes.
Dr. ROSTKER. At this moment, the inquiry on the CENTCOM chemical logs has been turned over to the DOD IG. My office had taken the investigation to a point where it was clear that, to make sure that we had followed every possible lead, some additional resources would be needed.
We have traced the surviving logs to the preparation of testimony for the Defense Science Board in 1994. The 30-some-odd pages that survive were those pages that were pulled out because they were the most significant pages and used to prepare the briefings for the Defense Science Board.
Almost every major chemical event that we know of, from the Czech detections to the marine breaching operation to the ammunition supply point identified by the Marines in Kuwait, all of those events are entered into the logs.
The main question— —
Mr. BACHUS. Let me ask you this: You are talking about 224 days.
Dr. ROSTKER. Yes.
Mr. BACHUS. Essentially. And you have—of those, 24 you have?
Dr. ROSTKER. And my point is, as best we can tell, those particular pages that have survived did so because they were the most significant pages.
Mr. BACHUS. Let me just interrupt you. You are saying there are 224 days where there ought to be a log. Of those—and we may be off.
Dr. ROSTKER. Sure.
Mr. BACHUS. 24 logs we have. There are 200 missing logs. But you are saying that the 24 we have are the pertinent dates.
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Do we have March the 4th, Khamisiyah?
Dr. ROSTKER. We don't have Khamisiyah, but we do have, if I might— —
Mr. BACHUS. Do we have—let me just ask you, do we have March the 10th, where another— —
Dr. ROSTKER. We do not.
Mr. BACHUS. Are those critical dates?
Dr. ROSTKER. May I finish my answer, sir?
Mr. BACHUS. Let me just ask you if those are critical dates.
Dr. ROSTKER. If I may, we have the subordinate logs from the 18th Airborne Corps, and those logs as well as the testimony of the people who would have initiated the log entry because they were the officers on the ground at Khamisiyah, they did not view it as a chemical event. The intermediate logs do not point up the explosions at Khamisiyah.
Mr. BACHUS. Let me ask you this because I only have limited time and I am not interrupting, but when you tell me there is 224 days and you only have 24 of those and among the days you don't have are the 10th and 4th of March, it is hard for me to accept the fact that you are saying that we have all the logs from the critical days. I mean, is that what I am hearing you say?
Dr. ROSTKER. I am trying to explain that the log dates we have capture the critical events. But that is why we have asked the DOD— —
Mr. BACHUS. That is all I want to ask.
Dr. ROSTKER. That is why we have asked the DOD IG to take a further look into this.
Mr. BACHUS. Legally, how long are these records supposed to be maintained?
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Dr. ROSTKER. I don't know the answer to that question. These were war records, and they should have been maintained. In fact, they should have been archived on several earlier archival exercises.
Mr. BACHUS. Let me ask you one final question, if I could. And really, to try to get as much information out, that is why I would like some succinct answers. You all commissioned before the Gulf War a study by the Livermore Labs on the possible effect of bombing chemical weapons sites?
Dr. ROSTKER. I don't know that, sir.
Mr. BACHUS. Are any of you all aware of that? Any of you gentlemen?
Mr. WALPOLE. No.
Mr. BACHUS. I am told that you did, and that—but that these studies didn't—they were supposed to—they were studies of geographical distribution that would result from a bombing of a chemical weapons site. And that those—and what I have been told is that they are of not much use here because the studies didn't ask that they study particular types of chemicals or particular quantities, and that seems to me to be totally preposterous, that you could commit—I would like to know how much that study costs and maybe what it concluded.
Dr. ROSTKER. We will provide that for the record.
(The information follows):
On October 5, 1990, the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Atmospheric and Geophysical Sciences Division, responded to an Air Force (Tactical Air Command, Intelligence) request for some generic atmospheric release advisory capability calculations.
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No specific document has been identified that tasks the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory to perform this study. It is entirely feasible that, in the post-invasion and pre-war atmosphere of late 1990, the laboratory was responding to a verbal request for general information.
Indeed, the memorandum for record which transmitted the study to the Air Force stresses the fact that several assumptions had to be made during the calculations because of the ''paucity of data regarding source terms.'' For example, some of the assumptions pertained to source material and particle size distribution.
The final product was a series of calculations which led analysts to a conclusion as to what would be the optimum strike time from a dispersion viewpoint. This report is currently classified at the secret level and has been passed to the Department of Energy for security review. Based on that review, additional coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense may be appropriate. The exact cost of the study cannot be determined but a review of the modeling tools used in its preparation and the graphics produced lead to an estimated cost of approximately eight thousand dollars.
Mr. BACHUS. And why it didn't—why it didn't examine specific types of chemicals. It seems to me like from the explanation I have received from the Department of Defense, it would have been a totally useless study.
Dr. ROSTKER. We will provide it for the record, sir.
Mr. STEARNS. Thank you, Doctor. Just provide it for him.
Next is Mr. Lane Evans.
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Mr. EVANS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Walpole, obviously The Washington Post story today raises disturbing questions as to whether the CIA is doing a thorough job or is dedicated to seeking the truth coming out of our Government's handling of this incident.
Reports that the CIA has only recently interviewed analysts handling Gulf chemical weapons intelligence and that a desk log of their activities existed are problems that this committee must thoroughly review.
Can you tell us when the desk log will be declassified and the status of your interviews of the analysts assigned to the mission?
Mr. WALPOLE. Yes. I mentioned some of this in my opening remarks, but I will hit the major points again.
There are several errors in that article, and my biggest concern is, erroneous articles like this divert our attention from getting down to the real questions of what has made the veterans sick.
The analysts in question got together during the war, when it became very clear to them that they were working too many hours, and determined they needed to rotate their schedules so that they would be able to have some time at home and time to sleep.
When they did that, they determined they needed to keep notes for each other so when somebody else came on they could know what happened. They did this partially during the air war and then during the ground war which, of course, was short.
Mr. EVANS. That was done in a spiral notebook?
Mr. WALPOLE. No. No. That was done on a computer file. It was very informal, chitchat type stuff and mentioned, you know, information that—a lot of it was completely irrelevant to the war effort. It was just talking to each other. But some of the elements were helpful, and, in fact, one of those entries—two of those entries were released last week because it pertained—even though the word ''Khamisiyah'' wasn't in that particular entry, it pertained to the Khamisiyah issue. So we released it.
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Now, as to the analysts and our discussions with the analysts, first off, they have been working the issue since the late 1980s and many people have talked with them, but particularly on this investigation effort, they were part of the 1995 review. They not only were talking to each other, they were part of the review. They were part of efforts in 1996. They were interviewed by the IG. They are part of my task force.
So when somebody from my public affairs component asked me, when did you talk to the people that kept these notes? I said, well, I guess the answer to that is 35 days ago; they are part of my task force and we started 35 days ago.
Mr. EVANS. How many people were involved throughout the course of the war, before and after the war actually, in analyzing Iraqi chemical weapons programs? How many analysts were involved in that, and how many have been interviewed at this time?
Mr. WALPOLE. Well, I will have to take that for the record. You are talking about interviewed just—by any task force, and IG included, everything that we have done up to this point?
Mr. EVANS. Well, I— —
Mr. WALPOLE. I will have to take that for the record.
Mr. EVANS. I am trying to get at if all the analysts presently in the employ of the CIA or those that have left, all of them that were involved in the so-called informal working group, they have all been interviewed at this point, both past and former?
Mr. WALPOLE. To my understanding, that is correct; by someone they have been talked to.
Mr. EVANS. Can you check that and get back to me?
Mr. WALPOLE. I will check that and confirm that.
Mr. EVANS. Can you briefly describe the role that these analysts play? I think some of the committee members are unfamiliar with the role they have. And what was your evaluation of their work during the war?
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Mr. WALPOLE. You are talking about the specific analysts mentioned in the article today?
Mr. EVANS. The informal working group.
Mr. WALPOLE. Yes. Page 1 of the paper that you just got describes what they did in brief. These were analysts that were working at the time, before the war, the chemical and biological warfare programs throughout the world. It is on the bottom of the left-hand column of page 1. We mention their 24-hour effort.
They wanted to ensure that senior officials at the agency and policy officials that called and asked questions would have the answers to their questions in a timely manner. That's one of the things that we have to do at the agency.
So these were experts in the chemical, biological warfare field that were trying to analyze whatever information they had coming in at the time and determine if they had anything that could be helpful in the process.
Mr. EVANS. Do you know exactly when we can expect the remainder of these—of this log to be released—to be declassified and released?
Mr. WALPOLE. Yes. What I said in the opening remarks is the—again, I would refer to them as working notes. Really, it wasn't a log as we normally think of. But we released the one that related to Khamisiyah last week. Others that have information that pertain to this issue will indeed be released, and the entire package of these notes will be made available to cleared government officials to review and see if there is something in there that helps them in their efforts.
Mr. EVANS. Finally, how would you assess the quality of the information that the analysts were provided? Was it adequate for them to do their job?
Mr. WALPOLE. Intelligence analysts would always like to have more information. I would always like to have more information.
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The comment was made earlier that we had shifted our story from last week. I think anyone that reads the paper you have passed out will find that we haven't. It is all in there. Everything I said today is also in the paper. Some of that important information was missed.
You will see there that there were gaps in our knowledge, and it would also be nice to fill those gaps. But intelligence analysts will never get 100 percent information on any question and we know that when we go into the job.
Mr. EVANS. Mr. Chairman, I know a number of members would like to submit follow-up questions, myself included, to the witnesses, and we would ask that those answers and questions be printed in the formal hearing record.
Mr. STEARNS. So ordered.
Mr. EVANS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
(See p. 279.]
Mr. STEARNS. I would like to point out to the members, and particularly Mr. Bachus, we received just today testimony from Eleanor Hill, inspector general of DOD, with regard to the missing chemical warfare logs.
Now, we had requested that they come forward so that we could ask them questions. This testimony was embargoed. We received it yesterday. It will be made available to all the members of the committee.
Essentially, she has indicated that they are pursuing criminal investigations, and you are welcome, each member is welcome, to see this testimony. I think it is important that this be made a part of the record, and it shall be.
Mr. KENNEDY. A criminal investigation of what?
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Mr. STEARNS. Of the missing logs over at Khamisiyah.
Mr. BACHUS. CENTCOM chemical logs, headquarter logs.
Mr. STEARNS. In fact, I was told by staff that each member has this as part of your packet. So you can look for it.
[The statement of Eleanor Hill appears on p. 249.]
Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Snyder is next.
Mr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Walpole, if I understood you correctly, just repetition, you stated very clearly that you feel that adequate notification was given to the military prior to—when there was some indication that there might be chemical weapons at Khamisiyah. Is that a fair statement of what you said?
Mr. WALPOLE. I said that notification was given. I would leave to others to determine adequacy. I have copies of the joint operations graphic map, two copies for each of the subcommittee.
When I reviewed the cable from the 23rd of February 1991—and it does not mention the name Khamisiyah, but when I reviewed that cable, that cable provides two pieces of information. One is a set of coordinates that were obtained from someone in the Iranian Air Force or Iranian Air Force industry. And I plot those coordinates on the joint operations graphics map, which is a military map. Those coordinates are very, very near the town of Tall al-Lahm, which was the official U.S. Government name for that site.
The other thing that 23 February cable mentions is that there is a storage site near those coordinates east of Juwarin on that map. I look at that map and there, indeed, is a storage site east of Juwarin. The storage site is not named, but the storage site we know to be Khamisiyah, and halfway across—let me phrase it this way: The name of Khamisiyah appears on the map noting the town, and half of that name appears across the storage site.
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So there is information in that cable to point to Khamisiyah as the storage site being identified.
Mr. SNYDER. So put that in perspective for me. Are you saying—so that information is transferred. In the course of however many days this was going on, the several months, I guess, the troop buildup and I suppose prior to that—how many times—how many similar type notifications might a unit have gotten?
I mean, would that have been a rare event to have gotten that kind of notification from the intelligence community? Or could we anticipate that, well, it's time for our twice-a-day transfer of intelligence information as things have changed?
If I was the person that answered the phone and you called me, would I look at that and say this is a big deal, or would I put it in my other stack of intelligence information?
Mr. WALPOLE. Having not followed intelligence support during a war effort before, I don't know rare or not. We had a very short—very short ground war.
Mr. SNYDER. Sure.
Mr. WALPOLE. And I went through several warnings that had been provided during that period of time, numerous warnings from different directions. I mentioned the 23 February 1991 from CIA. The Defense Intelligence Agency in the month of February had looked at the issue of nonrefrigerated 12-frame bunkers—they were thought to be for biological warfare storage—and determined that, you know, they might use these for chemical warfare storage as well.
They sent a cable to CENTCOM saying just what I said and said one of these is—they listed six sites where these were found. One of those was at Tall al-Lahm.
So we had a cable on the 23rd from CIA and a cable on the 28th from DIA pointing, for different reasons, to this site. Now, I honestly don't know how rare that is in a war effort, to get that kind of information.
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Mr. SNYDER. I wanted—shifting gears now to the whole issue of post-war declassifications—you know, the old thing about, I can keep a secret; it is the people I share it with that I worry about—it seems to me I remember having some discussions with some atomic veterans a few years ago that had been exposed, and I guess, Dr. Rostker, I will direct this to you. They were apprehensive, 45 years later, after having been at Alamogordo, about going into VA doctors and saying, ''I think I may have been exposed,'' because they had top secret clearances. This is the same time when you could find out how to make a nuclear bomb out of a washing machine in magazines.
Are we satisfied that our effort to protect old secrets is—declassify old secrets is adequate, or is that still an obstruction?
And Colonel Leavitt, if I could ask you a question: You mentioned 2,000 documents. How many of those are classified versus unclassified?
Dr. ROSTKER. Well, at this point, I know of no classified document that is being withheld because of classification. I mean, we get a lot of documents. As soon as we see it as a relevant document pertaining in any way to health or the operations that we are investigating, we ask it to be declassified and posted on GulfLINK.
And I think, as the CIA has said in their press conference last week, one of the reasons for standing up this committee—their committee, their working group, was that we had come across the warning, ''possible chemicals on objective gold.'' It had been researched back by the analysts, both our analysts and CIA, to the 23 February cable, and we asked CIA to declassify it. The CIA looked at that cable, has declassified it, and has declassified many other documents also relevant to the inquiry.
So I know of no document that we are holding because of classification that is relevant. Again, any document that we find that is relevant we immediately declassify. We ask that it to be declassified and we share it with the President's advisory committee in classified form immediately.
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Literally, the sun doesn't set before I bring those documents to the pack and we start the process of declassification.
Colonel LEAVITT. Sir, I would say that about one-third of the documents are classified, about two-thirds unclassified, and I believe a significant percentage of those that were classified when we got them have been declassified since.
Mr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. STEARNS. Thank you. Mr. Mascara.
Mr. MASCARA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
While most of what we are dealing with here today seems to surround Khamisiyah, people from my District were killed in the Gulf War. In fact, one young lady named Mary Rhodes, from my District, was in the barracks that was hit by a SCUD missile. I think you will—I can't recall the name of the town that that occurred in, but I believe it was in Saudi Arabia. She was given 100 percent disability.
That's beside the point that I am trying to make here today, that these people are really sick. In fact, I was able to help another young lady from Congresswoman Karen Thurman's District in Florida to obtain a disability. I appeared with them in front of the President's Commission on the Gulf War Syndrome to give testimony to that commission. And we lost several soldiers in that war. So I am very concerned about where we are going with all of this information.
But, Dr. Rostker, could you please outline your efforts to identify and contact those service personnel who may have been exposed to chemical munitions because of the demolition activities at Khamisiyah?
And while you did make some statements earlier and stated some numbers, do you know how many service personnel you believe might have been exposed to chemical weapons and how many you have contacted and how many have provided information?
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Dr. ROSTKER. Yes, sir. First of all, let me say that we invite any service member who has any concern for their health to register with either the Department of Veterans Affairs or the Department of Defense. That's our primary concern, and we have repeated that at every public opportunity, and notices have been sent out.
We have notified some 20,000 veterans that were within a 50-kilometer range of Khamisiyah. The notification is, frankly, not more than, ''You may have been exposed,'' and reiterating the availability of the health—the availability of health services.
At this point the analysis that we and the CIA are undertaking, in terms of who may have been exposed, at this point has so much uncertainty to it that we are not inclined to extend that direct notification any further. We really don't know who might have been exposed beyond that range or the dosage of those exposures.
When that analysis is completed, we will follow through again with a more direct mailing and contact people who may have been exposed. But the information that we have at this point is very uncertain.
Of the 20,000 questionnaires that we have sent out, we have received back 6,000 questionnaires, and only 300 of the 6,000 have indicated particular health concerns.
Mr. MASCARA. Given the concentration of resources from your office to deal with the issue at Khamisiyah, do you have sufficient funding to continue to pursue all other avenues regarding the Gulf War illness?
Dr. ROSTKER. And that's why it's important to stress the support we get from the DOD IG on the chemlogs, the Army IG on Khamisiyah in terms of the operational aspects of it, and looking further at the intelligence issue by the assistant for intelligence oversight.
We are structured to look at not only other possible chemical events but also environmental contamination and possible medical issues. So we are covering a full range of things and not letting ourselves be bogged down with Khamisiyah.
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Mr. MASCARA. I have more questions than I have time. I would like to propose some of those questions in writing and then later on get a response from some of these gentlemen.
Mr. STEARNS. That would be fine. I am thinking that if the members want, we could do a second round at 3 minutes apiece, if people want to wait it out before the next panel. But are you finished?
Mr. MASCARA. Well, I have one quick question for Mr. Walpole, picking up on my colleague, Mr. Snyder's question about the information that you provided in 1986 in the Iran-Iraq war to the military. And while I don't suggest that you say that it is the military's fault, who is culpable?
I mean, the information was provided to the military. Did the military somehow ignore that or overlook it?
Mr. WALPOLE. The 1986—we are talking about 1991, the information provided.
Mr. MASCARA. But at that time you suggested in certain coordinates— —
Mr. WALPOLE. Yes.
Mr. MASCARA (continuing). You talked about Tall al-Lahm that ended up being Khamisiyah and so on and so forth.
Mr. WALPOLE. Yes.
Mr. MASCARA. But they had that information. I mean, they had the coordinates.
Mr. WALPOLE. They had that information. And in working with Dr. Rostker, as we put together the paper you have, there are some releases in that and there is some discussion in that paper about——
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Mr. MASCARA. You are talking about this paper?
Mr. WALPOLE. I am talking about that paper.
Mr. MASCARA. I just received that.
Mr. WALPOLE. And the 41 documents I mentioned at the beginning of the hearing that I would like to be part of the record include cable traffic, the 23rd February 1991 CIA traffic, but also some CENTCOM taskings that may be related; one of them in particular that used exactly the same coordinates our 23 February cable had used in their tasking. That was all declassified as part of this package, on the part of the Department of Defense, to illumitate this story.
Mr. STEARNS. That will be part of the record. We will make that part of the record.
(See p. 122.)
Dr. ROSTKER. May I—Mr. Chairman, may I just quickly?
Mr. STEARNS. Sure.
Dr. ROSTKER. We know of very specific things that CENTCOM did. They tasked national assets to investigate the site. They—the warning of possible chemicals were sent to the corps involved and the two divisions that were engaged at that site, and a general inquiry to the 18th Airborne Corps to investigate a number of sites. So that the military did not sit on this information. It was an active part of several follow-on actions.
Mr. STEARNS. Okay.
Your time has expired.
Mr. MASCARA. Yes.
Mr. STEARNS. Dr. Cooksey.
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Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Colonel Leavitt, Colonel Huber, were either of you ever in the proximity of Tall al-Lahm during the Gulf War?
Colonel LEAVITT. No, sir.
Colonel HUBER. Sir, I was with the First Cavalry Division but not close to Tall al-Lahm. We were part of the 7th Corps, so we were in the area but not within that zone.
Mr. COOKSEY. Do either of you know of anyone that waded into this crater after the bunker was destroyed or was there— —
Colonel HUBER. No, sir.
Colonel LEAVITT. We have interviewed soldiers that were there, sir.
Mr. COOKSEY. Did they have symptoms of Gulf War illness?
Colonel LEAVITT. Not that I can recall, sir.
Mr. COOKSEY. Let me ask you another question to the two colonels. Has anyone been there to try to determine if there is any type of residual chemical in this area?
Dr. Rostker?
Dr. ROSTKER. Yes. The United Nations has been there three times.
Mr. COOKSEY. Have they identified any residual?
And my second question is: What is the half-life of the chemicals that are reported to have been involved there?
Dr. ROSTKER. Their evidence is the physical evidence of roped-in canisters. To the best of my recollection, they did not get readings at the bunkers.
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Mr. COOKSEY. How soon after the detonation of these weapons did this occur?
Dr. ROSTKER. It was blown up in March, and the U.N. was there in October.
Mr. COOKSEY. Okay. The question, as a physician, I still have is what is the cause, what is the ideology, of Gulf War illness? What has been the cause—I feel like we can, as physicians, come up with a treatment. I have the feeling that, you know, we are spending a lot of time maybe even not really finding the cause when we need to know the cause, and until we find the cause, we can't find the treatment.
I was in the military in the late 1960s, and some of you were. Colonel Leavitt, your hair is darker than mine but you are not but about 4 months different from me in age. I was in a combat situation in late 1992 in East Africa, but things are hectic in a combat situation. For those that have been lucky enough to avoid those situations, they don't realize that a lot of times you don't know anything that's going on, and there are a lot of things that are a higher priority on your mind other than keeping this up.
I still feel that we need to find the cause of Gulf War illness, and then once we find the cause of Gulf War illness, then we can do the treatment, because I am more concerned about the welfare, the health of the veterans, being a veteran myself, than whatever else we are trying to find out. That's the issue, as I see it.
I have been in the military, and I was in the military longer than I have been in the Congress. I have the feeling that the military was more focused, more efficient, and more effective in getting its job done than this current body, with all due respect to my colleagues. And I feel that probably you could find the solution quicker than we can; not that I don't have undying faith in politicians, now that I am one.
But anyway, those are my sentiments, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
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Mr. STEARNS. Thank you, Dr. Cooksey.
Ms. Brown, my colleague from Florida.
Ms. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Question, and I am not sure to whom: The CIA and military have produced weather models to determine how many troops were exposed. When will we get a solid answer how many troops were exposed?
I know the doctor mentioned something about 20,000. Is that the number?
Dr. ROSTKER. 20,000 of those that were within 50 kilometers. We do not know whether they were or were not exposed., We do not know, if they were exposed, to what extent they were exposed.
Ms. BROWN. What is the status of the weather model and that investigation?
Dr. ROSTKER. If I could ask my colleague from the CIA to respond?
Ms. BROWN. Yes.
Mr. WALPOLE. Yes. We had modeled the bunker, and the main reason we were able to model the bunker was we had had testing—we, the United States Government, had had testing in the 1960s that showed us what happened to a chemical agent that's destroyed inside a building, how rapidly it degrades with the heat buildup and things like that.
We have nothing like that with an open pit demolition. So we don't know what happens to the agent. So on top of the uncertainty of the purity of the agent that we discussed earlier, we didn't have a clue on what the agent would do in an open pit demolition.
On top of that, we had contradictory statements from soldiers on which stacks they worked through, and I have got a photograph here if we need to go through all the details. But the bottom line is, they seem to be claiming they were there at the same time but working on different stacks but didn't see each other and didn't see each other's work. You can imagine that didn't track.
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In the interview last week, it became very clear that the log entry from March 12 was wrong, so we decided the only prudent thing to do was model everything at one point on March 10, unless we get any other information otherwise.
The individual that was found just this week, we had a telephonic discussion long enough to determine that he thinks these two may not remember seeing each other but that they were all doing it at the same time. That seems to focus us on March 10.
So we are getting a better understanding of the events that transpired in the pit.
We will model all 13 stacks being detonated in the pit, using what information we can gather from some test simulations that we will do some time in the near term at Dugway that would give us an indication, if you place detonation charges on the wooden crates—the rockets were all in crates—in the manner the soldiers say they did it, what happens? Does the chemical cylinder crack? Does it burst? Does the internal fuse burst and throw the chemical agent all over the place, or does it drip and then slowly disperse? These are questions we have to know the answer to before we can model.
Once that testing is completed, we will be able to run that information through several different models, including models that are—that focus heavily on the source, the agent, and models that focus heavily on the weather and the changes in the weather, so that we will be able to come up with information, as good as possible, of what the exposure limits would have been.
Since we will not ever be able to replicate all 13 stacks going at the same time and in exactly the same manner that the soldiers placed the charges with exactly the same age of agent in each rocket, we will never be able to show exactly what happened. But we will model this to the best of our ability to give some semblance of what might have happened.
Ms. BROWN. And do you have any time certain when these experiments will be complete?
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Mr. WALPOLE. We would be able to complete that probably within 10 days to 2 weeks of getting the data from the ground tests. And I don't think we have a date for ground tests yet.
Ms. BROWN. I just have one other question, because it seems to be two sides to this, and the other side is, what is the status of those Gulf War veterans who you say we have contacted, the 20,000, only 6,000 have followed up? I mean, how are we handling their claims, the treatment?
Dr. ROSTKER. This is a screening questionnaire. We asked them for help in understanding what went on in Khamisiyah. So it's completely independent from those who have made claims or not made claims. We are doing a second mailing to the 20,000 to see if we can gain more information.
We do not believe that this is a definitive list of who may have been around Khamisiyah. That's part of the problem. So we would view this much more as a very large sample of those who were around Khamisiyah and try to use this to gain intelligence rather than a definitive account of who may have been there or the health consequences for who may have been there.
Ms. BROWN. I guess the last thing I want to say is, how can Congress be more responsive to the Gulf War veterans? And you can put that in writing.
Dr. ROSTKER. Okay.
Mr. STEARNS. I thank the gentlewoman. Mr. Buyer.
Mr. BUYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My compliments to you and to the ranking members for holding the hearing.
I am trying to put this one together. One question I would like to know is, what coordinations, if any, are we having in our investigations with the British?
Dr. ROSTKER. I have a counterpart in Great Britain. We talk frequently. They were scheduled to be here about 3 weeks ago and had to cancel, and we are in the process of standing up a team to visit them. We have very close cooperation with the Brits.
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Mr. BUYER. I would pass a recommendation on to you, and perhaps—I don't know if—you explained the methodology, Colonel. I noted in one of the readings that I had that Time Magazine reported in the March 4, 1991, issue that Iraqi soldiers captured by British units stated that before the start of the air war, substantial numbers of chemical weapons were distributed along the front lines to be used in the event of an allied ground invasion of Kuwait. That was a long time ago.
At both of the prisoners-of-war camp, our own, we had our JIF, the Joint Interrogation Facilities, many of those reports were sent to the intelligence community. Are those part of your record of analysis?
Dr. ROSTKER. Yes, they are. They are currently being assessed by the special assistant for intelligence oversight.
Mr. BUYER. I would ask of you to gain access also to the British records from their joint interrogation facilities.
Dr. ROSTKER. Yes, sir.
Mr. BUYER. I would also—there are so many disconnects, it just boggles my mind. One of the disconnects deals with the actual markings.
I take it, Colonel, you are our expert? Are you a chemical corps?
Colonel HUBER. I am in the chemical corps, yes, sir.
Mr. BUYER. In the chemical corps. Were you in the Gulf War?
Colonel HUBER. I was in the Gulf War, yes, sir.
Mr. BUYER. What was your job there?
Colonel HUBER. I was the chemical officer for the First Cavalry Division, sir.
Mr. BUYER. You are a First Cav?
Colonel HUBER. Yes, sir.
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Mr. BUYER. So you went into Iraq?
Colonel HUBER. We were in Iraq, sir.
Mr. BUYER. When you deployed with your troops into Iraq, did you have knowledge at the time that the Iraqis had chemical munitions that were weaponized, that were not marked? Did you have that knowledge?
Colonel HUBER. Sir, we had knowledge that the Iraqis did have a chemical capability. The exact markings of chemical munitions are really the expertise of explosive ordnance detachments, teams of specialists who identify chemical munitions.
The average—what I am saying is, the average chemical soldier would not be an expert in recognizing all types of chemical munitions.
Mr. BUYER. Right. Apparently you would not have—I would think that you would be one of the experts in chemical munitions. The question is: Did you know at the time that the Iraqis had chemical munitions that were not marked?
Colonel HUBER. Sir, I personally do not recall being aware of that.
Mr. BUYER. Right. And a lot of different reports then, when they are placed in logs or subordinate commands, you know, the Department of Defense is always quick to dispel the credibility of subordinate command, yet if CIA or upper levels of echelons never get the word to you that there are, in fact, such munitions that are unmarked, how in the hell are you supposed to know?
I mean, that's part of the difficulty in the intelligence community. And I am not going to come to the defense of the Army here, but I can also know and recollect that in the intelligence community you are spewing thousands of things into the theater of operations.
Now, there are a lot of people that have got a lot of work to do and a lot of jobs, but I just wanted to make that note.
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One of the things that I also would like to know, and ask of you, Dr. Rostker, for you to look into, was the Air Force decisions of targeting when they did their bombing. I know that An Nasiriya is where they also dropped some bombs, and there were detections of mustard agents at An Nasiriya.
I also recall some testimony that Iraqis were fearful because we had bombed An Nasiriya and there were chemical munitions at An Nasiriya, that perhaps they needed to start moving chemical munitions out of Khamisiyah. So obviously, we have got to be watching some of this stuff happening.
I would like for you to make some comment on that about the Air Force and their targeting.
Dr. ROSTKER. The— —
Mr. BUYER. My time is about up, and then I am going to allow you to finish, if that's all right, Mr. Chairman.
The other is on the detection equipment. There is the other disconnect. All right? If our soldiers don't know that the munitions aren't marked, they go in and they are going to then use the detection equipment, and then they say, ''But our detection equipment didn't detect chemical munitions.''
The CIA is testifying here today that the chemical agents were deteriorating. Well, if they are deteriorating, why didn't our detection equipment pick it up? What a tremendous disconnect.
Dr. ROSTKER. Okay.
Mr. BUYER. Let me turn it over to you for a moment for your comments.
Dr. ROSTKER. Okay. The first question is on the bombing.
Mr. BUYER. The Air Force targeting decisions.
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Dr. ROSTKER. Yes, sir. The destruction of chemical and biological warfare sites, plants, storage areas, was a high priority and the decisions were made with full understanding that there could be leakage. The targeteers had access to the Defense Nuclear Agency which did studies for them on possible fallout. But with the full knowledge of those effects, obviously decisions were made to carry out a bombing campaign.
I am sorry, the second one was, sir? The second question was, were the detection?
Mr. BUYER. Yes.
Dr. ROSTKER. Again, one of the confusions about Khamisiyah is that when the UNSCOM got to Khamisiyah the first time, they were told that the munitions were removed from Bunker 73 and placed in the pit because they were leaking.
Now, if they were leaking, the gear we had should have detected it leaking, and there were no such detections.
We have a number of—in the 20,000 questionnaire response, we have a number of people who said that they had or saw a Fox vehicle detection or 256 kits. These are the means of detecting it. Every single one of those claims are being researched. We are debriefing the people who have made that to see if we can find some additional information.
At this point, I can only go to the company commanders who were there and the demolition people who were there, who were trained to do this, and they did not come up with chemical detections.
Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Hutchinson.
Mr. WALPOLE. Can I add just one thing briefly, please, on that?
My comment about deterioration earlier was not about leakage, it was about internal deterioration inside the tube. I will make sure in my answer for the record on purity that I cover anything about deterioration. I am not an agent expert.
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Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, the only reason I made the point on the unmarkings is that never in discussion in the last 4 years have I ever heard discussion about inadvertent deployment nor of firing. So I just wanted to make that statement.
Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Hutchinson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ASA HUTCHINSON
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I want to express my appreciation to the gentlemen for their testimony today and the frankness in which they have presented their testimony. I know this is a very difficult issue for all of you, as you review this matter in the best interest of the veterans.
I also particularly want to say, Mr. Walpole, I appreciate the CIA, in which they frankly admitted that they could have done a better job, and that's the way I understand your testimony. And I think that what is so important here is credibility, and I hope all of you—I think you do understand that with the veterans, with the American people, you are overcoming a credibility problem. Because of the slowness of disclosures, the—what appears to be clear misrepresentations that have been—have come forward in regard to what was known, and the lack of information, there is a serious credibility problem, and so it is critically important that what you do is thorough, what you do is straightforward and honest, and if a mistake was made, to acknowledge it, and that's the way I take y