Segment 2 Of 2 Previous Hearing Segment(1)
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THE STATUS OF AVIATION SECURITY EFFORTS WITH A FOCUS ON THE NATIONAL SAFE SKIES ALLIANCE AND PASSENGER PROFILING CRITERIA
THURSDAY, MAY 14, 1998
U.S.House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Aviation,
Committee Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Duncan (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. DUNCAN. We will go ahead and call the subcommittee to order.
First of all, I'd like to say good morning and welcome everyone to our hearing today on what is certainly a very important issue, aviation security at our Nation's airports.
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Let me, first, thank each of the witnesses who are seated at the table and all of those who are seated in the audience who will be on the second panel for being here and for taking time out of what I know are very, very busy schedules.
I want, also, to inform the members of the subcommittee and other interested observers that after this hearing is concluded, we will go into a closed session with the FAA and the Department of Transportation IG's office. The closed session will begin at two o'clock in room 2253, and we will discuss issues related to this hearing and further details at that time.
It is our intent this morning to not only focus on the general state of aviation security but also on a few key aspects including the Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening Program, or CAPS as it is commonly referred to, and also the National Safe Skies Alliance.
We are very pleased to have one of the finest and most respected experts in aviation security here with us today, this morning, Admiral Flynn. Admiral Flynn has been and continues to be a tremendous asset for the FAA and for this Nation and has provided this subcommittee with outstanding testimony in the past.
I very much appreciate the fact that Admiral Flynn and Administrator Garvey came to my hometown of Knoxville last October to sign the Memorandum of Understanding with the National Safe Skies Alliance, and I'm very pleased that this effort is moving forward in a very positive direction. I feel confident that this public-private partnership has the potential to develop into a very useful tool and resource for virtually every airport in the Nation.
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We also look forward to hearing from our other witnesses to learn more about their views on aviation security and what we can do better as a Nation to improve what is already a very good system, but because of the explosion in air passenger traffic and air cargo traffic, we need to constantly be seeking ways to improve our system. Also, as all of us know, terrorists continually change and improve their methodology.
I think it is fair to say that the foundation for much of today's explosive detection technology for airline use rests with the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, which I know many members of this subcommittee and especially the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Oberstar, played a significant role in developing. And Mr. Lipinski and I also served on the subcommittee at that time, and that legislation, I think, has been a very good product of this subcommittee. This law was a direct response to the Pan Am Flight 103 tragedy and mandated that the FAA develop standards for certifying explosive detection equipment. We look forward to learning more about the current status of procurement and deployment of explosive detection systems in our airports and to learn how this equipment is performing in the field.
We, on this subcommittee, certainly, want to do all we can to help ensure that for the traveling public our airports and airlines remain as safe and secure as possible, and when you look at all of the events that are going on in Asia and other countries around the world today, it is certainly fair to say that we have many potentially unsafe situations that can have an effect on aviation safety and security in this country.
So, again, we look forward to hearing from our witnesses on these very important issues. I now yield to my very good friend, the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Lipinski.
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Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As usual, Mr. Chairman, I think you've covered everything extremely well in your opening statement, and, without objection, I'll submit my opening statement for the record, and I yield back the balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lipinski follows:]
[Insert here.]
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much. I yield now to vice-chairman Blunt.
Mr. BLUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm just grateful to you for having this hearing, and I look forward to the opportunity we've got this morning and then I think later today, and that's really anticipating the testimony and the opportunity for questions are what I'm here for this morning.
Mr. DUNCAN. All right, thank you, Mr. Blunt. Mr. Lahood.
Mr. LAHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I have a statement that I'd like to insert in the record, and I'd also like to express my thanks to you. Several months ago, when I approached you about the issue of profiling and asked if we could have a hearing, you were very gracious to allow us the time to do that, and I was really approached by the Arab American Institute who will be testifying as a part of this second panel here today.
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I had the pleasure, yesterday, of being briefed by Admiral Flynn who will be testifying during the first panel and really was brought up to date to a great extent on what the current situation is and current procedures, and, again, I think this is an important hearing so that the flying public can have a better understanding of what the responsibility of the Government is but also what the new procedures really mean in terms of what the flying public will be going through as they fly across the country or across the world. So, I think this is an important hearing, and you deserve the credit for stepping up and agreeing to hold it, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. LaHood follows:]
[Insert here.]
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Lahood. Mr. Pease.
Mr. PEASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also am grateful for the hearing today and your willingness to discuss some potentially sensitive subjects. I have a series of concerns and questions that I will share with the panel if I'm still here. I'm in a markup in another committee, and in the event that I'm not here, I would like permission to submit those questions. They deal, primarily, with complaints about discriminatory or overly intrusive security screening, and they deal with privacy-oriented standards for invasive EDS devices, particularly, those that can project an image of a passenger's naked body, and I'm concerned about how the regulations are proceeding in this area. I do understand the need to balance security interests v. personal privacy interests, and I know this is a very difficult area, but if we have time I'll get into those questions. If not, I would request permission to submit them later.
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Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you very much, and I want to say that I appreciate—Mr. Blunt, Mr. Lahood, and Mr. Pease are three of the more active and involved members that we have on this subcommittee and always participate to the fullest extent that they possibly can, and, certainly, Mr. Pease, if you have to go to the markup, we will submit your questions—the questions will be submitted and included in the record.
[The prepared statements of Mr. Costello, Mr. Poshard, and Mr. Rahall follows:]
[Insert here.]
Mr. DUNCAN. We will proceed, at this time, with the first panel, and we have a very distinguished panel. It consists of Mr. Keith O. Fultz who is Assistant Comptroller General for Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division of the General Accounting Office; Ms. Alexis M. Stefani who is Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Aviation for the U.S. Department of Transportation; Admiral Cathal L. Flynn, Association Administrator for Civil Aviation Security of the FAA, and he is accompanied by Mr. Dennis DeGaetano who is Acting Associate Administrator for Research and Acquisition, and Mr. James E. Orlando who is Advisor to the Aviation Mail Security Committee of the U.S. Postal Service.
We thank each of you for being here, and we proceed always in the way the witnesses are listed on the call of the hearing, and that means, Mr. Fultz, we will proceed with your statement first. Thank you very much.
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TESTIMONY OF KEITH O. FULTZ, ASSISTANT COMPTROLLER GENERAL, RESOURCES, COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; ALEXIS M. STEFANI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AVIATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; ADMIRAL CATHAL L. FLYNN, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; AND JAMES E. ORLANDO, ADVISOR TO THE AVIATION MAIL SECURITY COMMITTEE, U.S. POSTAL SERVICE
Mr. FULTZ. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to testify on efforts to improve the security at our Nation's airports, and I also would like to commend you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing.
The threat of terrorism against the United States has increased, and civil aviation is and will remain an attractive target. Aggressive and strong congressional vigilance on this issue is very important.
Following the crash of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988, recommendations were made by a presidential commission to reduce vulnerabilities in the aviation system. However, GAO and others have continued to report that nearly every major aspect of the security system has weaknesses that terrorists could exploit. Vulnerabilities include the screening of passengers; screening of baggage, mail, and cargo, as well as gaining access to restricted areas of the airports. For example, for those bags that actually are screened, we reported in March 1996 that conventional x-ray screening systems have performance limitations, and they offer little protection against a moderately sophisticated explosive device.
The July 1996 crash of the TWA 800 again focused national attention on aviation security issues. It created, what I would call, the impetus for a widespread discussion of what is needed to improve the system.
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[Pause.]
Mr. DUNCAN. I'm sorry, go right ahead.
Mr. FULTZ. That's quite okay; I'll continue. Following this tragedy, the Congress mandated specific actions that FAA should take to improve aviation security and substantially increased funding for this area. In February 1997, the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security issued its final report and made 31 recommendations on aviation security. I would just like to briefly summarize the results of our review on the status of some of those key recommendations that were made by the Commission and mandates enacted by the Congress.
Our work shows that FAA has made progress, but at the current pace, it will take years for full implementation by the FAA and the aviation industry. FAA has already encountered delays of up to 12 months for the five complex initiatives that we reviewed. These delays were caused by the new and relatively untested technologies, limited funds, problems with equipment installation, as well as some problems with contractors.
I think to illustrate the impact of these delays, I'd like to discuss the deployment of the equipment designed to protect the public from explosives concealed in both checked and carry-on baggage. You may recall that in the 1990 Aviation Security Improvement Act, the Congress set a goal of November 1993 for deploying new explosive detection equipment at airports. This goal, obviously, was not met.
Following the recommendations of the most recent White House Commission report, FAA established a new goal of deploying this equipment by December 1997. Currently, FAA is about 1-year behind schedule in its initial deployment of this equipment. Consequently, at the end of April—just this past April—only 38 percent of the certified equipment for screening checked baggage and about half of the equipment for screening carry-on bags had actually been deployed throughout the system. This is a total of only 21 pieces of equipment for checked baggage and about 250 pieces for carry-on baggage.
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Now, I understand that FAA plans to have all the equipment installed by the end of this year and also plans to spend all the funds that Congress appropriated for the equipment. However, Mr. Chairman, for Fiscal Year 1998, the administration did not request additional funding for this equipment. Although the commission that I mentioned earlier had recommended an annual appropriation of $100 million.
Our report also discusses delays in implementing and automated method to screen passengers beginning a system for matching passengers to their bags, and certifying screening companies and improving screening performance.
With regard to the fifth initiative that we reviewed—and that's the area of vulnerability assessments—FAA and the FBI plan to complete their joint assessments pretty much on schedule, and I think that's excellent. These assessments are important, because they can determine which airports and which areas within the airports present the highest risk. This information can then be used to determine how best to address the seriousness of the vulnerabilities within the system.
Strengthening the Nation's aviation system will involve long-term efforts by both the FAA and the aviation industry. Completion of current initiatives will require additional financial resources and a sustained commitment by the Federal Government as well as the aviation industry. It is important to stress, Mr. Chairman, that current funding is sufficient to protect only a limited percentage of the flying public at selected major airports. To provide full protection, additional equipment will be needed, and, of course, depending upon the funding, this process could take several years.
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In closing, Mr. Chairman, as I have said before, vulnerabilities in aviation security still exist. While FAA has made some progress, and to its credit I think they're doing a much better job, it is crucial that the Congress maintain vigilant oversight of the agency's efforts, and, of course, GAO will provide whatever assistance that you or other Members of Congress would ask us to do.
When I testified before several committees nearly 20 months ago following the crash of TWA Flight 800, I drew a parallel between actions taken following the Pan Am Flight 103 and TWA Flight 800. In both cases, presidential commissions were formed; vulnerabilities were identified; and there was a period of heightened activity by the Government, the aviation industry, and the media. Regretfully, in the first instance, activity waned without enough progress being made. Frankly, Mr. Chairman, I'm sure you and other members of this subcommittee do not want this to happen again. We must ensure that the momentum we now have is not lost. This concludes my summary. I'd be pleased to respond to questions after the other witnesses summarize their statements.
Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you very much. We have been joined, also, by Mr. Boswell. Do you have any statements? All right, the next witness will be Ms. Alexis Stefani. Ms. Stefani.
Ms. STEFANI. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. We appreciate the opportunity to testify today on the status of aviation security. The Office of Inspector General has been active in reviewing the effectiveness of aviation security, including the deployment of explosive detection equipment.
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Today, we'll discuss three areas: first, the challenges FAA faces in providing oversight of the cargo industry; second, the progress and problems experienced in deploying explosive detection equipment, and; third, observations on actions needed to improve and enhance aviation security.
First, recent tests have shown that the air cargo industry must increase its compliance with FAA security and dangerous goods regulations. Passenger aircraft now transport approximately 60 percent of all air cargo. The air cargo industry, however, is diverse and FAA faces challenges in overseeing this industry. It includes about 7,000 airlines and freight forwarders, 4,000 repair stations, and over 70,000 shippers of dangerous goods. FAA has made progress in developing an oversight program that addresses these various industry segments. A key to its success, however, is industry's compliance with FAA's regulations.
As a result of a HAZMAT accident involving a courier, a joint effort was started with the IG and the FAA to review both air carrier and air courier compliance with FAA regulations. In this particular incident, the air courier was transporting pesticides as checked baggage, and one of the 10 bags leaked. In the first round of our tests, neither air carrier or air courier compliance was acceptable. We conducted a second round of expanded tests which showed that while the air carriers have improved, air courier compliance continues to be unacceptable.
FAA must be more aggressive in inspecting and testing this segment of the air cargo industry. They must require air couriers to strengthen their training programs and take appropriate enforcement action, including withdrawal of its approval of the air courier's approved security program if there's a pattern of non-compliance.
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Mr. Chairman, the second area is the progress and problems experienced in deploying explosive detection equipment. Congress authorized over $144 million to purchase new security technologies. This includes equipment to screen-check bags for explosives. FAA expects to spend approximately $100 million each year through 2004 on this effort. Our review showed that the air carriers are underutilizing the equipment already deployed. We looked at usage for a 10-week period this past winter. We found that for 10 of 11 machines in operation during that period, the machines were actually screening less than 200 bags per day. According to FAA certification standards, these machines were certified up to 225 bags per hour.
Usage must be increased. These machines represent approximately $1 million each in Federal funds. They offer a very high potential for improving aviation security, and I will add, safety as they have resulted in hazardous materials being identified before the bag got on the aircraft. Equally important, is that low usage may affect operator performance and proficiency, and, also, low usage may prevent FAA from effectively determining whether these machines will be reliable for continued use in the airport environment.
We also looked at actual operating data that showed that the machines had high false alarm rates and slow baggage processing speeds. The false alarm rate was up to 169 percent higher than FAA standards. One of the reasons that this is occurring is that the test bags used during the certification did not include items commonly found in baggage, such as food, that are causing the false alarms at airports. Also, the baggage processing rates may be lowered because the testing procedures did not include the alarm resolution or the time it takes the operator to determine if the alarm is real.
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FAA has a goal to use the explosive detection systems to screen 100% of all checked bags. This goal is not attainable in the near future, and FAA will need to continue to rely on passenger screening to identify passengers requiring additional security measures.
The third area is effectiveness—aviation security relies on a systems of systems and it includes a variety of efforts. In our opinion, effective security relies on a careful blend of technologies, procedures, inspections, as well as a trained work force. While different groups in FAA have plans in various stages of completion and detail, all addressing their own future efforts and their own sources of funds, we did not identify anything that pulled it all together. In our opinion, FAA needs an integrated strategic plan that includes goals; where it wants to be and when; timeframes, and; funding priorities to guide its future efforts. Working with industry, this plan should include a balanced approach; it should cover basic research on new technology and human factors; it should collect data and analyze data on actual equipment and operator performance; it should look at different operational tests of different equipment, as well as deployment of the equipment.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, that concludes my statement. I'll be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Ms. Stefani. Our next witness will be Admiral Flynn.
Admiral FLYNN. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. It's my pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the FAA civil aviation security programs. I'm accompanied by Dennis DeGaetano, the FAA's Acting Associate Administrator for Research and Acquisition.
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In my written testimony, I have highlighted some of our recent accomplishments and provided a status report on several of our security initiatives, many of which respond to the recommendations of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. With your permission, I would like to submit that for the record.
In my remarks this morning, I will focus on some of the programs that I feel are particularly important to the security of our Nation's civil aviation system. Without question, civil aviation security is a serious issue, and the FAA is giving it very serious attention, and although we believe the current threat from terrorism to civil aviation in the United States is low, it has incresed, the FAA is committed to implementing a strengthened baseline program of aviation security.
Safety and security of the traveling public are paramount, and we intend to ensure that our skies remain the safest and most secure. Therefore, with this Committee's invaluable support and oversight, the FAA is engaged in a far-reaching improvement of the United States' aviation security system. We are acquiring and deploying an unprecedented number of effective devices; expanding the amount and scope of our enforcement activities, and developing new and effective partnerships with air carriers, airports, and the rest of the aviation industry.
With regard to these partnerships, I would like, first, to discuss our research and development efforts in conjunction with the National Safe Skies Alliance. Mr. Chairman, we want to acknowledge and thank you for your efforts in the creation of this consortium. We have the good fortune and opportunity to work with the Alliance on a number of important R&D efforts. In particular, the Alliance has been instrumental in the creation of an airport testbed at McGhee Tyson Airport in Knoxville. The willingness of an airport to have a succession of new security equipment installed and tested in an operational setting contributes importantly to developing the checkpoint of the future. Research efforts by Alliance members have been a welcome addition to FAA's research in security technologies. Based on our successful joint endeavors over the past year, we hope to continue this partnership with the National Safe Skies Alliance over the next several years.
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Now, I'd like to talk about the Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening System, or CAPS. Not only is this system faster than the current manual profiling, it also affords greater protection of the integrity of sensitive information, and, most important, it eliminates any potential bias of individuals applying passenger screening criteria. We're aware of the sensitivity of people with regard to intrusions on their privacy. We're aware of the civil liberties concerns, and we are dealing conscientiously, and, I believe, effectively with them, but we're aware of those, and we're sensitive to those concerns.
Using information available in airline reservation systems, CAPS can screen out passengers for whom additional security procedures are unnecessary. If the reservation system lacks sufficient information regarding passengers to screen them out, then additional security measures will be applied to their checked baggage. Any analyzed results of passengers screened on a particular flight will be automatically deleted soon after the completion of the flight. There is no database, no dossier, and no file on individuals or groups established for the purpose of CAPS. There is no distinction as to ethnicity, race, gender, or religion of any person nor as to the national origin of U.S. citizens, and I'm pleased to report that the Department of Justice recently confirmed that CAPS fully complies with constitutional standards and does not involve any invasion of passengers' personal privacy, but more than that, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, in addition to this nondiscriminatory design of CAPS, we in FAA are committed to continuing vigilance to ensure that CAPS will never have a discriminatory effect on anyone.
Finally, I'm pleased to report that the FAA has made much progress in the certification, implementation, and deployment of explosive detection systems (EDS) and other advanced security technologies. The integrated product team responsible for this initiative has planned, certified, and purchased 76 explosive detection systems and other advanced technologies for checked baggage screening since December 1996. This is the major ticket item of the $144 million appropriated by the Congress to begin the large-scale of deployment of high technology security equipment in airports across the country. We are pleased to report that 20 of the explosive detection systems are now installed at airports nationwide. We expect all 76 machines to be installed by the end of September.
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I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. Ensuring civil aviation security is a significant challenge for the FAA as well as for the aviation community. In the past, Congress has supported the agency extensively in its efforts towards ensuring the security of the civil aviation system. I look forward to continuing that working relationship. That concludes my remarks, Mr. Chairman. Mr. DeGaetano and I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Admiral. Our final witness on this first panel is Mr. Orlando.
Mr. ORLANDO. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for giving the Postal Service the opportunity to participate in today's hearing. I've been asked to represent the Postal Service today, primarily, because of my long-term involvement in aviation security matters as a postal employee.
I'd like to give you a brief description of our postal network to give you a feeling for some of the problems we may encounter. On any given day, the Postal Service transports 9 million pounds of mail by domestic airlines. In addition, international mail is transported by air to every country in the world along with military mail to our troops stationed overseas. Indeed, the Postal Services' transportation network is a huge and complex one which is heavily dependent on the Nation's air carriers, thus, any major interruption in air service will immediately cause severe disruptions in mail service. Because of our dependency on the airlines for expeditious air service and to respond to increasing concerns for airline passenger safety, the Postal Service has been and will continue to remain a strong supporter and advocate of aviation mail security especially as it relates to mail.
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This resolve is clearly illustrated by the decision of former Postmaster General Frank during the Gulf War when he voluntarily discontinued transporting packages over a certain weight on passenger airlines due to the increased threat of terrorism at that time for using the mail system to attack an aircraft.
This by no means is the only action taken by the Postal Service to improve aviation security. The list is long, and it ranges from Postal Service's voluntary suspension of one of its major products which was vulnerable to being used by terrorists to attack a specific air carrier or a specific flight, to more recent postal decisions to go beyond the FAA's August 16, 1996, security directive. The Postal Service prohibited mail bearing stamps weighing 16 ounces or more and deposited it in collection boxes from being transported by passenger or all-cargo aircraft. Both FAA and the Postal Service agreed that this mail presented the greatest risk and that it could be anonymously deposited in neighborhood collection boxes and was of sufficient weight that it could bring down an aircraft if it contained a mail bomb. I mention these examples only to further point out that the Postal Service has and will continue to make those difficult, moral decisions when necessary even when its quality of service or its costs are at stake.
Despite my letter of January 10, 1997, to the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security and Postmaster General Runyon's letter of January 29, 1997, to Vice President Gore, the Commission's final report of February 12, 1997, contained two recommendations which appeared to have given little consideration to our previously expressed legal and operational concerns if mail screening were to be required. The Commission's recommendation 3.3 requires the Postal Service to inspect all packages weighing 16 ounces or more for explosives prior to them moving by air. Recommendation 3.4 seeks to provide the Customs Service legislative authority to open and inspect all outbound international mail. Implementation of either of these recommendations would require legislation to remove over 200 years of mail privacy the public has enjoyed and continues to expect. Supporting mail privacy are a Supreme Court decision, constitutional case law, criminal statutes, and Federal regulations protecting the mail from warrant searches and delay. Even if mail privacy were to be revoked, there would be the real practical problem of how to screen mail on any given day when in excess of 1 million packages weighing over 16 ounces are tended to at the Nation's commercial airlines. Certainly, this would not be feasible manually and would require the use of explosive detection technology.
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Aside from the privacy issues I've just mentioned, the Postal Service has for the past 18 months been reviewing and testing various explosive technologies and systems in use to determine if any of those systems could be applied should mail screening be required. We especially looked forward with high expectations to testing the CTX 5000, because it is the only system thus far to meet the rigorous requirements of FAA for use in screening passenger bags. Unfortunately, that system did not work nearly as well on mail as it did on baggage. The combination of detection capability and operational throughput speed were not adequate to meet the needs of the Postal Service. Whereas, detection could be increased, it was at the expense of reduced throughput and vice versa. Thus, after reviewing this and other systems, it appears, thus far, there is no single system available today capable of detecting the wide range of explosives necessary while operating at throughput speeds and mail processing operations that would prevent mail service from quickly grinding to a halt. Nevertheless, our search is continuing with an increased focus on determining if there might be some combination of technologies or systems that could meet our needs.
Recommendation 3.4 of the Commission allowing the Custom Service to open and inspect outbound international mail would also require legislation that would revoke 200 years of mail privacy for citizens, and I'd like to emphasize, in our opinion, without measurably improving aviation security. In addition to this, the Postal Service is opposed to recommendation 3.4, because it would duplicate postal efforts designed to achieve the same goal of increasing aviation security. Also, the proposal makes no sense if the reasons for Customs to search mail at international airports is the detection of explosives as much of that mail will have already flown on domestic flights from the origin city to the international gateway airport where it's then tendered to international air carriers for overseas transportation.
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We believe there are far more effective methods and processes which add more security and can be used under current law rather than the extremely slow process of manually opening and inspecting what will only be a few of the parcels traveling aboard international passenger airlines. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit copies of the correspondence between the White House Commission on matters pertaining to aviation mail security.
With that, Chairman Duncan, my thanks to you and the other members of the subcommittee for allowing me to appear before you today, and I'll be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Orlando and that correspondence will be included in the record.
[The information follows:]
[Insert here.]
Mr. DUNCAN. I am going to yield my time, at this time, to Mr. Lahood since he was one of the first to request a hearing on some of these issues. Mr. Lahood.
Mr. LAHOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Stefani, in your testimony, it appears that you have some serious concerns about even the current system that's in place for checking individuals and bags. Is that correct?
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Ms. STEFANI. Our concerns dealt with the false alarm rate and the baggage throughput rate. The machine is very good at detecting explosives, and so it does improve aviation security.
Mr. LAHOOD. Do you have some recommendations in terms of what needs to be done in order to improve the current machinery, I guess, is the best term?
Ms. STEFANI. The FAA should continue to deploy explosive detection systems. What we were going to be recommending to FAA is that they get a plan together to figure out where they need to be at certain time periods. They must continue to work with basic research on new technology; explore other types of machines in addition to the existing one certified. I might add that it would be important to get other machines certified; that competition will be appropriate in this area in order to improve things like throughput and also maybe to get the machines smaller.
Mr. LAHOOD. Admiral Flynn, yesterday, you were kind enough to come by and give me a briefing on the current procedures, and one of the reasons that I had asked to have this hearing was because of concerns that were expressed to me, particularly, by the Arab American Institute about people being profiled because of a name or because of an appearance. Could you just briefly outline for the members and for the record kind of what the new procedures are now and how people are really profiled as they move through?
Admiral FLYNN. Passenger screening or profiling applies to the security of checked bags. In order to make this system effective and efficient what we want to do is to exclude from the implementation of either baggage match or baggage screening those passengers about whom we should have no concern; about whom we could say with very high confidence are not associated with threat to the aircraft.
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There are two ways of doing that: one is by what is called manual profile, which requires the passenger service representative at the counter who is accepting the checked bag to review the ticket and the ID of the passenger to ensure that the passenger and the ticket match, and then there are certain characteristics regarding the itinerary of the flight; the way that the ticket is bought; the form of travel; whether the passenger is accompanied by other people; and whether the passenger is known to the airline through a longstanding membership, for example, in a frequent flyer program. That is done manually, and it is being replaced by a much more sophisticated means of doing it called Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening (CAPS), which draws from the reservation system and from the frequent flyer record information that, at the time that the passenger comes to present the bag, is scored. There are some two dozen criteria, each with different weights. The computer scores those having to do, again, with an itinerary and how well is that passenger known.
Terrorists want anonymity. They do not want to be known, so that the more that we know people, the greater confidence that we have that they are not associated with threat. None of those criteria, none of them, have to do with ethnicity of people; none have to do with association with names, with ethnic groups; none have to do with race or religion.
Mr. LAHOOD. So, the notion that—we're going to have to run and vote here, but so I can finish this—the notion that the color of somebody's skin or their name is a reason to profile, in your opinion, simply does not apply?
Admiral FLYNN. It does not apply; absolutely, does not apply.
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Mr. LAHOOD. And people are now trained that they cannot be profiling people because of the color of somebody's skin or because they have a peculiar mideastern name or some other name that maybe——
Admiral FLYNN. The airline people are required to be trained, and the airlines are sensitive to that, too. Now, can people do bad things even though they've been trained not to?
Mr. LAHOOD. Of course.
Admiral FLYNN. Yes.
Mr. DUNCAN. Let me just stop right here.
Mr. LAHOOD. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. We've got 6 minutes left. Unfortunately, we have two votes going on right now, so we will have to be in recess while we complete these votes, and we'll start back in just as soon as we possibly can. Thank you very much.
[Recess.]
Mr. DUNCAN. All right, we'll proceed back with the hearing. I apologize for the delay, but I thought it would be best to go ahead and get both of these votes out of the way. Before we proceed with further questions, I'd like to let Mr. Lahood make a statement for the record.
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Mr. LAHOOD. Mr. Chairman, again, I want to thank you for this hearing, and as I indicated to you several months ago when I asked if we could hold this hearing, I had been approached by Jim Zogby, the director of the Arab American Institute about some very important issues he was concerned about, and I thought by the time of 11 o'clock we'd get around to having that panel here, and I have a glowing introduction because Jim is such a good friend, and he does such a marvelous job at AAI. I'm going to have to leave here at 11, and I hope to get back in time for his testimony, but in the event I'm not here when the panel comes up, I have an introduction I would like to enter into the record, because I feel so strongly about my friendship with Jim and the work that he has done, so I want that to become a part of the record, and then if I'm not here, I know you will adequately give him an introduction. So, thank you for allowing me to do that.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Lahood. Mr. Lipinski.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Stefani—did I get it right?
Ms. STEFANI. Yes, you did.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Oh, terrific. You mentioned in your testimony about at the locations where they have these very sophisticated machines that they're only checking about 200 bags a day and that in the laboratory tests they did check up to 225 a day. What is the reason—I understand some of reasons, but I really don't understand why they could do 225 an hour, and they're only doing 200 a day. Could you elaborate on that?
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Ms. STEFANI. Part of the reason that we think the low usage is occurring is because there has not really been an agreement reached between FAA and the airlines on how these units will be used. One of the hopes is that as more airlines use the computer-assisted passenger screening process that the numbers of bags screened will increase, but we don't know for sure on that. But the fact remains that FAA and the airlines have to come to an agreement on how these units will be used.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Right now, these units are operated by the airlines or the security firms that the airlines employ. Is that correct?
Ms. STEFANI. Yes. A carrier agrees to install the unit in a particular station, so only one carrier at this time has access to the unit. There are a few situations where it's shared, but most of the time, it's just a single carrier.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Now, you used the figure that there are only about 200 bags a day being put through, is this an average for the entire system or was this one location? Was this a high location, a low location? I mean, it just seems to me that if you have a machine that can do 225 an hour and you're only 200 a day, there's something radically wrong.
Ms. STEFANI. We have detailed information that we were going to provide at the closed session of what we found at each location, and the 200 per day is an average based on the hours of operation and the number of bags screened at the different locations.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Admiral, I see you moving around over there, and it would appear to me as though you would like to answer these questions also, so I'll be happy to give you an opportunity right now.
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Admiral FLYNN. Thank you very much, Congressman Lipinski. Alexis Stefani said in her statement that the audit was done last winter. The equipment——
Mr. LIPINSKI. I'm sorry, I didn't hear you.
Admiral FLYNN. The IG's audit was done last winter.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Okay.
Admiral FLYNN. And the equipment was starting to be put in place. There are other things that are going on. The airlines are transitioning from a manual profiling to CAPS; they are also moving from a bag match regime to a baggage screening regime. As of the 27th of April, at the CAPS sites the average usage of the explosives detection systems is over 1,900 bags per day. Now, at one of the sites that the Inspector General report mentioned that had a very low usage, that usage is up over 2,000—sorry, those—I'm sorry, I said per day; that's per week. So, the average is 300 or 400 with many of them being up in the range of 800 or 900 bags a day.
Mr. LIPINSKI. That's 300 or 400 a day?
Admiral FLYNN. Yes, and going up to 800 bags or 900 bags per day. An interesting aspect of it is that the peak rate at which the bags are coming in as people are going to flights reaches a rate of 250 bags per hour. So, it's at the peak capacity of the machines. During the day, there are periods of very low usage because not many people are boarding aircraft, and then at five o'clock in the evening, it picks up, and the machines have to be able to screen bags at that peak period.
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Mr. LIPINSKI. And they are screening 250 an hour?
Admiral FLYNN. They're reaching that rate. For several minutes at a time, they're at that rate; at their maximum automatic screening rate. So, there are a number of things that are going on that are increasing the use of those machines and will further force an increase in those machines' usage.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Admiral, right now, the FAA pays for these machines entirely, correct?
Admiral FLYNN. We pay entirely for their purchase and installation. The operation, the airlines pay for.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Do you think there's ever going to be a time when the FAA is going to try to shift the burden of buying these and installing these to the air carriers or to the airports, for that matter?
Admiral FLYNN. I think that this matter of civil aviation security is a national security issue and that the Nation, the Government, ought to pay for at least the first round of installation of the equipment. That's going to take several more years to get the amount of equipment into airports that are needed to screen the bags of selectees from the CAPS system.
Mr. LIPINSKI. I see my time is up. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
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Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Lipinski. Admiral Flynn, as we were starting this hearing today, we have a small T.V. screen monitor down below here that's tied into C–SPAN, so we can watch what's going on on the floor and the timing of the votes and so forth. So, just before we started the hearing, they flashed across a picture of that keychain gun that has gotten so much publicity. Is that a realistic threat or a serious threat or a problem that a terrorist can buy—I think I read someplace—for $20 that type of gun? Are you concerned about that type of weapon?
Admiral FLYNN. Yes, we are. We sent an information circular to all of the airlines to be passed on to all of their screeners at the screening checkpoints many months ago when we first became aware of that. These weapons are a threat to potential hijacking of aircraft, and when they're disguised like that, it isn't that they can't be detected by the metal detectors or by the x-ray, because they can; it requires attention on the part of the screeners. When people take something like that and put it in the basket as you're going through the metal detector, they need to look in there and be aware of what that so-called keychain pistol looks like and to be able to, if they see anything like that, to x-ray it. We haven't found one yet. Fortunately, there doesn't seem to be all that many of them, and they join a family of disguised weapons that has been of concern for some time.
Mr. DUNCAN. How many weapons are you finding each year at your checkpoints?
Admiral FLYNN. The screening checkpoints find some 2,000 firearms per year at the screening checkpoints in the United States; none of them—last year, for example, not a single one of them being carried by someone who had criminal intent toward the aircraft.
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Mr. DUNCAN. Some people are concerned about the people who are chosen as screeners. There have been some complaints that possibly the people have qualifications that aren't very high and that there is—I've read or heard—that there is a very high turnover rate. Is there a high turnover rate? And, also, what do we do—these people have a difficult job. They have to check so many people through so quickly and so many bags, and I'm sure that it gets kind of repetitive or boring at points, and what do you do to keep them alert and improve the qualifications or the alertness of the screeners?
Admiral FLYNN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for noting what a hard job it is, and there are an awful lot of very good people who are doing a conscientious job at the screening checkpoints. High turnover rate is a problem, and it's a particular problem with regard to the ability to detect more sophisticated threats. What are we doing about that? We will have a regulation to regulate screening companies that will require that they have stronger training programs. It's going to be a performance-based rule that we will introduce, and their technology counts. Threat image projection is a computer generated ability to create artificial images of bags with threats in them: bombs, weapons in them, and it both trains and tests the operators. They're not aware that this is an artificial image. They think it's another bag that's being screened, and maintains their alertness, and it's a way to reward those who do a good job if they're scoring well in detection of those things. Further, the FAA has very much increased its surveillance, its testing, and it's training, actually, at the screening checkpoints, and we're requiring and encouraging the airlines to maintain their level of testing and auditing of those procedures.
Mr. DUNCAN. Let me ask you this on another point: a little over a month ago, about a month ago, William F. Buckley described the security questions that all of the passengers get asked at the airport as idiotic, and the airline personnel are now, some of them, apologizing for having to ask; they're getting bored with asking those questions over and over again. Are those questions—do you still feel they're important? Are they doing any good, and, if so, what are they accomplishing?
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Admiral FLYNN. They are very important, because bombs get aboard aircraft because people don't pay attention to their bags. They leave them unattended, and that can create an opportunity for people who see that the bag is going to go on the flight to put a bomb in the bag. The other question about ''Have you received anything from anyone that gives you any concern?'' is a protection against people being duped into carrying things, something that turns out to be a bomb, and that has happened. Attempts have been made that way, and they've been foiled by that form of questioning.
Clearly, we need to do a much better job of explaining to the flying public why those questions are asked, and we will take some initiative with airlines to ensure that if passengers have been briefed and understand the importance of the questions and why they would be asked, to exclude passengers who have so been briefed—we have reminders for them, signs and the like—but to exclude a substantial number of passengers, frequent flyers, from having to be asked those questions, that would permit the counterpeople to ask the questions with greater eye contact and listening more acutely to the answer of those people of the remainder of passengers. It's very important that we do it, but we need to work better about how it's done.
Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Fultz, I understand there were a little over 1 million bags that were screened last year through the regular screening, but, of course, we've heard these very, very low figures about the number of bags that were actually checked by the explosives detection systems or devices. Yet, the FAA has a goal of 100 percent—of checking 100 percent of the bags with the explosives detection machines. Do you think that's a realistic goal, and do you think there's something that the FAA is not doing now that they could do to check more of these bags or speed up the process some?
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Mr. FULTZ. First of all, I think the goal is very good, but the concern that several parties have raised including the General Accounting Office for a number of years, I think involves two key issues: one, we've recommended since the early nineties for field testing of the equipment so we can ascertain the type of problems that will be encountered, so that when you have widespread usage of these pieces of equipment throughout the entire system, that it's doing much better than the results the Inspector General has reported today. I do believe that in the laboratory testing where you have people very familiar with the equipment in very controlled conditions, you're going to get much different results than when you put them into the field. Second, where the people can see lines developing because they're inspecting the bags—and there's been studies that have shown that when they see people getting angry or getting frustrated, then things go through that should not be going through. I think that's important.
Any system is as good as its weakest link, and I think you touched upon an issue dealing with the people who operate this equipment, and I think that's very important. Here, again, there needs to be additional research, better computer-based training of these individuals, and checking on the individuals periodically to make sure that they're trained properly and that they're identifying bags for further identification. Again, I would just stress the need for field testing. We now have a very small number of these pieces of equipment throughout the system, but soon we're going to have hundreds, and it's going to be very important that the American taxpayers dollars are spent wisely, and that's only going to be assured by having people doing their jobs properly and the machines operating at the rate that they're certified to do.
Mr. DUNCAN. Well, you really covered what was going to be my next question to you or Ms. Stefani about why there was so much difference between the lab and in the field, and I'm pleased that you do recognize and mentioned the importance of in-the-field testing, because that's what we're attempting to do with this National Safe Skies Alliance.
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Ms. Stefani, you mentioned at one point that even food can trigger a false-positive alarm, and the fact that there have been an awfully high rate of false-positive alarms. Could you tell us a little more about that?
Ms. STEFANI. One of the things that we noticed was that FAA— because they're doing the certification at the tech center and were having to store their test bags outside for safety and sanitary reasons FAA had bought the lost bags of passengers. They then pull out things such as food or hairspray or whatever else that might present a danger, and thay also remove this material—because they had to store the bags outside. So, they made a practical kind of decision, and, as a result, a lot of what you see in a bag as it's going through this equipment will set off the false alarm. I'm not really sure how much I can talk about how the machine works, but that's basically what happens.
Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Orlando, we've all read all the publicity about the una-bomber and mailing. How frequent are explosive devices or guns or things—contraband, let's say, sent through the mail? Is that something that's growing or is it a minute-type problem or what can you tell us about that type of thing?
Mr. ORLANDO. Let me start off with something that, perhaps, receives a great deal of notoriety and that's letter bombs. As you will recall, we had 12 of them from Egypt that came in not too long ago. When that occurs, generally, not only the public-at-large but air carriers, obviously, become greatly concerned. Letter bombs, really, we do not consider to be a major threat to aviation, primarily, because they're designed not to destruct an aircraft; they're designed to detonate by the recipient, so they're targeting a recipient, and, for the most part, letter bombs even inadvertently detonated on an aircraft would not bring it down. So, after discussions with FAA, although we are concerned about them and although technology may change the statement I just made, we've kind of said that that's not the major threat to civil aviation today.
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Now, as far as parcel bombs, there's only been one parcel bomb in history that I'm aware of that was designed to detonate on an aircraft, and that was believed to have been deposited in the mail collection box in 1979 by the una-bomber. It did go on an American Airlines Flight 727 from Chicago to Washington D.C., and, fortunately, the una-bomber, at that point, was a young man and not all that experienced, and when he packed the explosives, he didn't pack them tightly, so when the bomb detonated it detonated primarily as a fire and not as an explosive device. So, no damage—or there was some damage to the aircraft and the mail, but no individuals were harmed. That's been the only incident of a mail bomb that was designed to target the destruction of an aircraft.
We do have an effective program in place, and as I mentioned earlier, we tried to cut off the most obvious route that a terrorist might introduce a bomb and that is anonymously through a collection box, and, therefore, we discontinued putting any mail that weighs 16 ounces or more deposited in a collection box that bears stamps—because we can't trace it if it bears stamps—we've just not elected to put that on any type of aircraft: commercial aircraft, passenger aircraft, our own fleet, anything, and we think that's been the most effective means to deter terrorists from using the mail system.
The other thing that makes it very, very difficult for a terrorist to use the mail system to target a carrier, a specific flight, is just the randomness of how mail is handled through the system. It depends on where it's deposited; it depends on the type of day it's deposited; it can even depend on the weather that day, and, domestically, of course, a great deal of that mail never sees an aircraft; it's transported by highway. So, if a terrorist is looking for any degree of certainty to target an aircraft, it's very, very difficult to do through the mail system. In fact, it would be very difficult for a postal employee to predict whether a given piece of mail will go by air; will go by surface, and if it does go by air, on what flight it would go on. So, we've not had a lot of experience with bombs in the mail other than letter bombs.
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Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you very much. I've gone far too long. Mr. Poshard.
Mr. POSHARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Flynn, I suppose I should direct this to you. We haven't seen a successful terrorist attack in the U.S. since the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. Have there been unsuccessful attempts, thwarted efforts, that the public is not aware of at this point in time?
Admiral FLYNN. No, Mr. Poshard, there hasn't been an attempted bombing in the United States. The last bombing that we know of in the United States was back in 1985, and it was a fairly amateur effort, and no one was hurt. There have been, similarly, amateurish attempts to hijack aircraft. The last one was in 1991, and passengers said that he was holding a bomb and wanted the aircraft to go to Cuba, and he wanted $13 million, and they landed the aircraft, and he said he was only kidding.
So, there haven't been, but we are aware of, if I might point out, that Mr. Ramzi Yousef who is now been sentenced in the United States, he both attacked the World Trade Center and attempted to bring it down, but he also—had a plan to attack 12 U.S. aircraft, flying in Asia. So, we had in the United States earlier someone who knew a great deal about how to attack aircraft, and he elected to go after a big building when he was here, rather than attempting to attack aircraft. There's a potential threat in the United States that has increased somewhat even though the overall level of threat is low.
Mr. POSHARD. Thank you. I'm noticing in one of the testimonies here by the General Accounting Office, they make the statement that regardless of advances in technology, the people who operate the equipment are the last and best line of defense against the introduction of any dangerous object into the aviation system. If that's true, I don't want to sound petty here or anything, but I go through three or four airports a week generally, and my impression of people operating the equipment is that they're not always paying a lot of attention to be honest with you. Are these employees, for the most part, employees of the airlines? Are they employees of private security companies that have been certified? And I just wonder, how much are they paid?
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Admiral FLYNN. The employees are employees of security companies nearly always. There are some screeners who are direct employees of airlines, but there are a very small number of them, and these security companies, in turn contract with the airlines to provide that security service. The regulated party with regard to their performance is, however, the airline. The airline is responsible for having that job done effectively. I think in this afternoon's closed session I could deal more fully with the question of how well are they doing. They're not unalert; we know that from their finding 2,000 weapons, firearms, per year. We do not certify those security companies, but we are introducing a regulation to certify, and that will be a performance-based regulation in which we will measure the performance of the screeners using x-rays, metal detectors, and the like to detect dangerous objects.
Mr. POSHARD. You understand my concern that I see too many occasions in Government today where to save money we contract out various services, and some of my experience has been that when we contract those services out, we end up getting very low paid people and people not very highly motivated by a job that helps them sustain themselves and their families, and, therefore, their productivity is not very high and the expectations are not very high, and I'm concerned about that.
Admiral FLYNN. Indeed. We're not able to show scientifically that there's a correlation between pay and performance, but we do know that the turnover of the people has to change. It's a demanding job and one that's got both aspects of tedium and hard work, and it seems to me, that the remuneration, the pay, of screeners is almost bound to go up as the demands that are put on and our ability to measure their performance improves.
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Mr. POSHARD. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Poshard. Vice Chairman Blunt.
Mr. BLUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just following along that line of questioning that Mr. Poshard was on, if these screeners were not representatives of private security firms contracted by the airport, they would still be paid by the airlines, is that right? Haven't the airlines——
Admiral FLYNN. That's correct. The airline pays for them.
Mr. BLUNT. So, really, this is not an effort of Government not to hire more Government employees to do this job. This was never envisioned to be a responsibility of a Government employee.
Admiral FLYNN. That's correct, Mr. Blunt.
Mr. BLUNT. I think you said earlier, Mr. Flynn, in your testimony, you indicated that you did think it was appropriate that the Government begin to pay more of the cost. Does that relate just to the million dollar bomb-detecting x-ray machines? Am I right in those assumptions?
Admiral FLYNN. There's more to it than that. We have long paid for the research and development both of explosives detection equipment, hardened containers—containers that you put in aircraft that can withstand the detonation within them of explosives, the computer-based training and threat image projection to improve the performance of the screeners. We should pay, I believe, the capital investment costs for introduction of new hardware and systems, and we should subsidize that. The costs of operation: paying the people and, after the first year of use, the maintenance of the equipment is an airline cost.
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Mr. BLUNT. Now, you think all taxpayers should pay that as opposed to taxpayers who use airports?
Admiral FLYNN. I agree with the statement of the White House Commission that the threat to civil aviation is not something that's brought on by the airlines and anything intrinsic to the airlines but is brought on as—a threat of terrorism is a threat to the United States that manifests itself in attack against these fragile targets, aircraft. It's a national security issue, and this very large cost of acquiring the equipment, I believe, should be seen as a general part, just like defense is a general charge to the people of the United States.
Mr. BLUNT. Do you have any estimates, Admiral, of what that very large cost, as you described it, would be?
Admiral FLYNN. Yes, we are refining them, because there are a lot of things that are still uncertain: the throughput rates of second generation equipment and the like and the number of bags that have to be screened, but a very rough estimate of cost over the next 4 years to implement all aspects of—sorry, it's over more years than that, but the cost is some $800 million.
Mr. BLUNT. And that would be costs that the taxpayers hadn't really borne in the past.
Admiral FLYNN. Yes, but we have been seeking appropriations, and we are proposing an appropriation for $100 million in Fiscal Year 1999 to continue the program, and I think expenditures at that level for several more years are going to be required, and those funds are appropriate.
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Mr. BLUNT. Does that anticipate that the Government-bought equipment would be maintained and replaced by the Government or do then we turn it over to the current security funding apparatus to do that?
Admiral FLYNN. After the first years use, the maintenance should be a charge to the air carriers, to the airlines, and its use. The 10-year cost of the systems even though that capital cost is huge—the capital cost is less than half of it; the operation of it is the greater part of the cost.
Mr. BLUNT. Yes, I guess the point I want to be sure I'm clear on is that you are proposing that we go down a different path than we have in the past by going ahead and funding the capital portion of the cost.
Admiral FLYNN. Right.
Mr. BLUNT. And that is a change, right?
Admiral FLYNN. That is a change since 1986.
Mr. BLUNT. Okay. Just one final question, Ms. Stefani. You may have to—maybe later today we'll find this out, but in your comments about the CTX 5000, you mentioned the things that are in bags at airports that apparently weren't in bags when this system was begin checked that lead to this high positive rate of checking that wasn't apparent in testing. What are they doing about that? Are we going to continue to have this much higher rate of false-positive indications on bags or is there some way to regear the machines so that it is more appropriately sensitive to explosive devices?
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Ms. STEFANI. Well, we're going to be recommending that FAA look into changing the certification process so they would be changing the test bags for future generations of this type of equipment. Admiral Flynn may be a better person to say what FAA intends to do in the near term.
Admiral FLYNN. The work and development is directed towards reducing the alarm rate. Now, we need to have a standard set for certification of machines, and it's a bit analogous to establishing the braking distance of vehicles. Do you test them all on dry pavement? You know that the braking distance is going to be longer on wet pavement and even longer on ice, but we need to have a standard set, and it is logistically and, indeed, hygienically, impossible to have a standard set of food to put into bags. We just will have to recognize that depending on the food content of checked baggage the alarm rate is going to be higher, and we have general estimates of what that higher amount is. It depends a bit on the technology that's used in the particular screening device.
Mr. BLUNT. I think I have some more questions on this, but I think I'll ask them later today, Mr. Chairman. My time is up, thank you.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Blunt. Mr. DeFazio.
Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess this would be directed to the FAA or anyone else who wants to address the question. There's been—in fact, a photograph and a press clip was distributed—a lot of hysteria about the gun that looks like a keychain and fools security x-rays at airports issue. I'd like to go back to a longstanding concern I've had and want to find out if it ever got addressed, because I tried for several years and finally gave up. When the FAA simulates or sends people to airports to try and check on the security screening, has the FAA ever finally received permission to carry and use real guns as opposed to guns that are encapsulated in plastic and placed in a bag with no more than one or two articles so that anybody except the stupidest, sleepiest idiot could see it on the x-ray screen. Any terrorist worth his or her salt would disassemble the weapon; put the parts in different parts of the luggage, and put lots of other distracting things in the luggage. Have we ever gotten to the point where the FAA is allowed to do that or are we still doing the good old, ''Here's my .45, and it's in a piece of plastic in one piece right in the middle of the luggage.''?
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Admiral FLYNN. We are doing much more sophisticated and much more demanding tests, and in this afternoon's closed session I can show you in detail the x-ray images and, indeed, the bags and the way that we do this testing.
Mr. DEFAZIO. I'm pleased to hear that. I worked with the FAA for several years trying to get that resolved, and I'm pleased to hear that it's finally resolved. So, that's my only question at the moment, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. DUNCAN. All right, thank you very much. Admiral Flynn, let me ask you just one brief question. We got into the passenger profiling a while ago. Have there been any recent complaints about people who feel like they've been treated badly or have you had a large number of complaints about discrimination?
Admiral FLYNN. The number of complaints received by the Consumer Relations Office of the Department of Transportation related to security and with the possibility that discrimination was in effect, last year, was 73, and, so far, this year, 8. Now, that low figure doesn't mean that we shouldn't be concerned about the possibility of abuse of people's rights and the Department looks into those allegations very carefully. We are also aware, for example, that the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee gave to the Department last year a number of complaints, some 30 complaints from members of that organization and from others that they were aware of, and we look at those also.
Frequently, in the majority of cases we have found that the criteria were properly applied and that racial bias—or ethnic bias was not a fact, but every one of these things needs to be looked at carefully.
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Mr. DUNCAN. All right. Thank you. Ms. Millender-McDonald hasn't had a chance to ask any questions yet.
Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Part of my questioning would be the profiling. And, clearly, it has been a concern by the ethnic minority communities as to how you do engage in the security profiling? And as I read the information, I am not sure whether I am reading this correctly to say that the factors that the airlines use are a secret, and yet you are outlining that some of the factors include frequent flier programs and whether the tickets were bought with cash or credit card. Can you expound on that, and is that, indeed, some of the factors if, in fact, these are some of the outside secrets?
Admiral FLYNN. Some of the secrets have, indeed, with the manual profile, have gotten out of the bag. And, so it's an incentive to us to proceed with the Computer Assisted Passenger Screening system. And for reasons of security, so that potential attackers do not figure out how to overcome that system, we treat the elements, the criteria of the CAPS system as security sensitive information and we do not make it public.
Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. I have had incidents, and I do travel frequently—every weekend—and I have never been able to do curbside service. Every time I go there, they have me going on the inside. Now, I could readily think that there's something wrong with that, and I do feel that there are some problems that I cannot do curbside service and then go right to the gate. And that is a concern that I have. And, clearly, I have not put that in the realm of anything that there is something wrong with the computer, but I would like to think that that will be resolved soon.
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Admiral FLYNN. Well, yes, it should be resolved soon. What happens is at curbside, they don't have the computers yet installed. But what we really need to do, and I would like to do, is to see your ticket, how you are ticketed, and see if——
Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. Whether it's cash or credit card?
Admiral FLYNN. No, no, particularly, what shows on the ticket. There may be something there that caused the sky cap to say, ''Gee, I just don't know enough about this, I need to refer the passenger inside.''
Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. I certainly would like for you to look into it because it's annoying.
Admiral FLYNN. I gladly will do that.
Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. Mr. LaHood?
Mr. LAHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I have an article that appeared in the Detroit Free Press dated June 25, 1997, and I'd like to enter it into the record if we could.
Admiral, this is an article about an 18-year-old young man who I think is going to appear here today if his airplane is on time, who is an honor student, who was detained in an airport in Cincinnati. He was on his way, I believe, to some kind of a rowing contest, a national rowing—he was on the national rowing team. He was a high school student at the time this occurred and he was pulled aside and, what I believe, unfairly for some unbeknownst reason, pulled aside. And he actually missed his flight. He missed the rowing. And it turns out he's just an outstanding young man, an outstanding student.
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My question, I want to put this in the record because I know things have changed. And I know that you, when you brief me, I believe things are—you're trying to change the system but it becomes very clear, if you read this article, that there was no other reason than this young student looked peculiar to the gate agent who was taking his ticket. And when he tried to explain what he was doing, that didn't suffice. My question is what happens to people who are pulled aside who miss their flights, are they taken to another area of the airport and questioned? And then when it's found out that they are no threat or harm, what recourse do they have?
[The information follows:]
[Insert here.]
Admiral FLYNN. The security measures, Congressman LaHood, have to do with their belongings, their carry-on or their checked baggage. In the program, as it is today and has been for all this year and the latter part of last year, the measures apply to checked baggage. So there's no need for further questioning of the person. They just need to ensure that the checked bag is taken off the aircraft if the passenger isn't aboard when the aircraft is leaving, or that that baggage has been effectively screened. Taking people aside, I'm puzzled by it and I would need to know more about it to——
Mr. LAHOOD. Well, I don't know if you can stay for this young man's testimony because we invited him for that very reason. This has nothing to do with his bag unless there was something that the gate agent saw on the ticket. And I think it had to do more with his appearance.
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Admiral FLYNN. I would really be reaching and guessing to find out and I deplore——
Mr. LAHOOD. But your claim today is that people are not screened or profiled because of their name or their appearance or anything like that?
Admiral FLYNN. Absolutely not. I mean, other than appearance of being drunk, shall we say, or something like that. I'm not at all saying that that's the case in this thing. But appearance of active——
Mr. LAHOOD. Because of the color of their skin——
Admiral FLYNN. Not at all.
Mr. LAHOOD. ——because of their name?
Admiral FLYNN. Not at all, not at all.
Mr. LAHOOD. Well, I'll take you at your word and the fact that you only have 8 complaints this year, I think is a significant decrease from the 73 you had in the previous year. I hope the new system is working but I can tell you that there are people who——
Admiral FLYNN. And everyone of those should look into to see if there was abuse, if some airline employee was being abusive or racist or otherwise improper.
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Mr. LAHOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. Mr. Chairman, just one question, please?
Mr. DUNCAN. Yes, ma'm?
Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. Are we privy to get the report that the Justice Department will do, the post, what is it the post and implementation review within 1 year and, if so, I would like to have a copy of that so that I can review that as to how you have done your profiling?
Admiral FLYNN. That will be done next year.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much. For final questions of this panel we'll go for final questions and closing comments to Mr. Lipinski.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, getting back to the screeners, has it ever been considered by the FAA that the screeners become employees of the FAA?
Admiral FLYNN. We recently have done an analysis of that and looked at precedents and what goes on in other countries. We did that in response to a Congressional request, and we have come to the conclusion that we ought to maintain the present division of responsibilities between airports, airlines, and Government with regard to screening. In other words, that the passenger screening and screening of bags ought to be an airline responsibility.
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Mr. LIPINSKI. Why did you come to that conclusion? Can you give me some of your rationale on that?
Admiral FLYNN. Because the airline is the aircraft operator and has responsibility for the safety and integrity of that aircraft, and everything that goes into it. And you have questions of divided liability and divided responsibility if that is divided. There are some airports in the world where central screening is done by the airport authority. There's a considerable reluctance on the majority of airports to engage in that. We, in principle, would not be averse to an airport, with the consent of the airlines that operate there, doing the pre-board screening. It's just that most airport authorities are reluctant to do that.
Mr. LIPINSKI. You're talking about the dual liability?
Admiral FLYNN. I think it's questions of liability. Yes, I think that's one of the concerns of the airports.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Isn't there a question in regard to the screening, though, of these new machines in regards to the explosives. Since the FAA purchased these machines, pays for the installation of the machines, is there any possibility of dual responsibility there as far as liability?
Admiral FLYNN. Well, those machines need to be sited, need to be installed, need to be operated in a way that is most efficient from the point of view of the passengers who are involved. And generally speaking it's the airline that's in the best position to be able to determine that. And then there is the question of responsibility. There's nothing inherently that says an airline shouldn't be able to do that job as well and hire people to do that job competently. And the other aspect of it is that we're dealing with a nationwide, indeed, a global system, but certainly within the United States, it's nationwide, and there needs to be an approach on a nationwide basis. Airlines need to know what is the status of bags. And they can know that best if they are having the responsibility for all aspects of security.
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Mr. LIPINSKI. Well, it seems to me though, in regard to the screeners, we're talking about it being something that the airlines or the airport ought to do. And it sounds like it's a local problem. We're talking these machines, and the purchasing of these machines, and the installation of these machines, it's a national responsibility so the FAA should do it. Either I'm missing the story or there is some conflict here between the philosophy as it deals with the screeners, and the philosophy that deals with the machines that screen for the explosives. But you've been here a long time and we have to move on to the next panel.
Let me just say, in conclusion, though, that I myself think that it would be advantageous to everyone involved in the aviation industry, if the FAA was responsible for hiring the people, training the people, assigning the people, and supervising the people. Now, we could still—it wouldn't necessarily have to come out of the FAA funding. It could come out of the airlines. It could come out of the airports. I mean, right now the aviation industry is doing enormously well and it would seem to me that if we are going to improve the caliber of the screeners, have them be more highly trained, have them be more highly sensitive to security issues, now is the time to move the jurisdiction for hiring, training, assigning, supervising to the FAA and we'll find the funding out of the airports or the airlines.
Thank you, Admiral. If you have anything you'd like to say, go right ahead?
Admiral FLYNN. No, thank you, Congressman Lipinski.
Mr. DUNCAN. All right. Well, thank you very much. This has been a very informative and helpful panel, and we appreciate your contributions to this hearing and we'll now move to panel number two.
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The second panel consists of Mr. John Meenan who is senior vice president for industry policy for the Air Transport Association; Mr. Tom Jensen who is president of the National Safe Skies Alliance; Mr. Kenneth S. Wood who is president and CEO of Barringer Instruments, Incorporated; Dr. James J. Zogby, president of the Arab American Institute; and he's not here yet but apparently we have a young college student on his way, flying in at this time, Mr. Nabil Shurafa of Detroit, Michigan who will testify if he arrives on time.
Gentlemen, we're honored to have all of you here with us. I particularly am honored to have one of my most respected constituents, Mr. Tom Jensen, who is one of my 600,000 bosses in east Tennessee. Mr. Jensen was the Republican leader of the House of Representatives in Tennessee; and was the national president of the National Association of State Legislators several years ago, and was one of our most respected legislators in Tennessee, and is now one of our most respected business leaders and community leaders in Knoxville. And I'm certainly pleased to have Mr. Jensen here.
We will proceed, as usual, in the order in which the witnesses are listed on the call of the hearing. And that means that Mr. Meenan, who's been with us before, that you will testify first and you may proceed with your statement.
TESTIMONY OF JOHN M. MEENAN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, INDUSTRY POLICY, AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION; TOM JENSEN, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SAFE SKIES ALLIANCE; KENNETH WOOD, PRESIDENT AND CEO, BARRINGER INSTRUMENTS, INC.; DR. JAMES J. ZOGBY, PRESIDENT, ARAB AMERICAN INSTITUTE; AND NABIL SHURAFA, DETROIT, MICHIGAN
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Mr. MEENAN. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you very much. On behalf of our 26 member airlines, I'd like to thank you for the opportunity to appear here this morning to report on the progress we have made on enhancements of the aviation security system.
In a word, that progress has been significant due in no small part to the willingness of the committee and your Senate counterparts to take the lead in providing funds that have been necessary to meet the Governmental aviation security commitments and responsibilities to the traveling public. Your efforts have shown that the Government's role in assuring the security of the aviation system is more than simply rhetoric and regulation, and we applaud the record.
My testimony will cover three central components of our efforts:
First, the essential and successful role of Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening and related bag matching and screening techniques;
Second, the major effort to deploy and manage that new security equipment that's going into the field;
And, third, and most importantly, the essential role for true cooperation between industry and Government on both research and strategic planning.
Before getting into the specifics of these points, I would like to make a general observation on our experience over the last 20 months. While we have noted significant progress, it's also true that there have been, and remain, difficulties to overcome. In general, these difficulties have arisen where we have not taken optimum advantage of the distinct skills and resources which the Government and industry partners bring to the table.
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The best example of success to date has been the development and deployment of Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening which functions through a review of the reservation record to determine if an additional security measure, either passenger bag matching, or use of explosion detection equipment, would be of value.
The beauty of CAPS, of course, is its adaptability and its indivisibility. Modification of screening criteria in the computer program can focus on changing security issues while screening measures deployed or brought to bear behind the scenes. The carriers using CAPS are extremely pleased with its performance to date, and based on an informal survey, we understand there have been no complaints registered as a result of a CAPS selected passenger.
As to CAPS implementation, it's entering the system on a phased basis with the full ATA membership targeting system-wide implementation in the fourth quarter of this year. Until that time, passenger selection will be conducted in both an automated and a manual format.
And, finally, I'd like to mention that CAPS has been voluntarily developed and deployed by the ATA carriers who have taken advantage of the industry skills and the FAA has funded the initial development work which was performed by Northwest Airlines in close conjunction with law enforcement and the intelligence communities. It's a true example of partnership working in the public interest.
This brings me to the second area of note—the ongoing effort to deploy explosive detection systems and other new security technologies. The story here is generally good but it's somewhat more cautionary. September 1998 is the target date for the first phase deployment of the 57 CTX 5000 machines at airports identified by the FAA as appropriate for the use of this equipment. Key difficulties in reaching this goal has stemmed from a lack of a clear strategic plan by the FAA at the outset and a mid-deployment course change that resulted in some further delays.
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And compounding this problem has been a one-size-fits-all approach to the installations which led the FAA to award some site survey work to various contractors which, again, has slowed the deployment effort.
What we're dealing with here is the fundamental cultural difference between Government and industry. The Governmental approach has been to try to standardize and give detailed directions from above with the assumption that that will produce a standard result. The industry approach would be to favor a more results oriented technique. Tell us precisely in clear terms what you want us to accomplish and then let each carrier individually determine the best way to reach that goal.
At this point, it's really too early to evaluate the EDS deployment, let alone give it future direction. To date, 19 of the planned 57 machines are installed and not all of those are fully operational. As we've heard, operating procedures, alarm resolutions, staffing, training, testing, and high maintenance costs, as well as the possible tax implications of a carrier accepting this equipment, remain issues to be resolved.
I want to be clear that even with these problems, the progress has been very significant and this has been a major development for the Government and the industry.
Another area that we believe holds great promise is that of joint industry Government research and development projects. We're looking for real world solutions to advance aviation security. It's our understanding, for example, that the Safe Skies Alliance will be concentrating its first efforts on improving the effectiveness of passenger screening checkpoints. This is an area of keen interest to our members and we're committed to offering our assistance and support to the Alliance.
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One area we also know the Alliance is concerned about is the failure in the past to factor in adaptability to Government test bed programs. Just as we saw with the EDS deployment, we know that new equipment and techniques must be tested with an eye toward the very different conditions under which they will operate.
Finally, I'd like to emphasize the importance and imperative for improved strategic planning. As the FAA and the industry, with your support, move forward in implementing the recommendations of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, we need to be asking, ''Where do we go from here?'' We can't afford a simple rote implementation mentality. Exactly what that strategy will comprise remains to be seen. For our part, the strategy must encompass the following:
It must be flexible enough to respond to ever-changing threat conditions;
It must recognize the reality of ever increasing passenger and cargo demands;
It must be based on a cooperative and prioritized Government industry approach to aviation security; and
It must not be driven by simplistic, rhetorically based pseudo-solutions to complex problems.
Mr. Chairman, once again, I'd like to thank you for inviting me today on behalf of our member carriers and following the statement, certainly would be pleased to answer any questions.
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Thank you.
Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Meenan. We certainly always appreciate the contributions of your association in the work that we do here. Mr. Jensen?
Mr. JENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate having this opportunity to be here today and to testify on this subject. I'd like to introduce before I begin my remarks those people from the National Safe Skies Alliance who are here with me. Terri Rose, the technical director of National Safe Skies is here; Dr. Jerry Wald who is from Honeywell and chairman of our board is present; Dr. Gillilard of Oak Ridge National Laboratory who is a member of our board; David deMouplied who is a member of our board of directors from American Science and Engineering; and Admiral Carl Seiberlich who is the alternate member on our board from Innova International and I appreciate much their being here to help with this presentation.
Mr. Chairman, it is a fact that technology now exists that could have discovered the flaming hold of the ValuJet that burned and crashed in the Florida Everglades. It's a fact, too, that technology exists that could have discovered the explosive that brought down the Pan Am jet at Lockerbie. It's a fact, as well, that technology exists that could have monitored the conditions and the fuel tanks of the TWA 800 flight.
There's a virtual avalanche of technology that continues to pour out of the industries of our Nation and out of our laboratories and other facilities that are looking for answers to problems. The concern seems to be that we need to find ways to use affordable technology to apply that technology and make it work with myriad of systems, many of which are old and which have to be used by methods of integration that make those systems work in today's enivornment amid concerns about more people flying, more aircraft in the air, greater use of a limited number of airports.
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We started the National Safe Skies Alliance with a small group in East Tennessee who began to meet and talk to you, Mr. Chairman, about how we could use the efforts of Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the McGhee Tyson Airport at Knoxville, work from such organizations as Honeywell and bring those together in a collaborative effort that would be in response to what the Gore Commission suggested was needed. That is, for work together from various areas of our society to bring about the needed result.
As a result of that, we decided that an organization was necessary and we formed a 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation called the National Safe Skies Alliance and that group, that organization set about to find funding to begin to do work at McGhee Tyson. As a result of that early collaboration, we then had a public presentation of what we were all about on October 4, 1997, when we had Administrator Jane Garvey to come to Knoxville with you, Mr. Chairman, and with Admiral Flynn and with others and we, in a sense, cut the ribbon on the National Safe Skies Alliance and on that day I signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Administrator Garvey to set in motion what we were going to do.
Since that time, in January of this year we signed with, and received from, the FAA Tech Center a cooperative agreement that put in place about $1 million for us to spend in this current year on doing the things that we had described that we wanted to do in that Memorandum of Understanding.
In the packet that the members have, there is a set of view graphs that really sets out very succinctly what those beginning efforts were. First of all, to have a cooperative agreement whereby we would undertake to do work in aviation security, research and development, and testing for the FAA and to do that at the McGhee Tyson Airport, primarily in Knoxville.
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The second graph expresses what our purpose would be and that is to be established to assist the FAA and other U.S. Government agencies in meeting the evolving needs of safety and security by supplying affordable verified solutions to problems identified by the aviation community.
And next I wanted to point out to you who are founding members are, found on page number four of those view graphs, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Honeywell, Incorporated, Metropolitan Knoxville Airport Authority, the University of Tennessee, American Engineering, Incorporated, Tennessee Air National Guard, Metropolitan Airports Commission of Minneapolis, and Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.
Since starting in business about 7 months ago, we have been adding new members. And the next page, number five, lists the seven new members we've added that's Innova International, Micron Communications, American Science and Engineering, Sandia National Laboratories, DPRA, Incorporated, and Auburn University, our newest member, and SAIC.
We receive funding, as shown on graph number six, which amounts to just slightly over $1 million. The period for which this funding is in place is for January 1998 to January 1999 and what we're doing with those dollars, about $600,000 or about 60 percent of those dollars are for the operation of the test bed at McGhee Tyson.
Now what's special about this test bed is that it's a continuing test bed. That is, that we're undertaking to test numerous devices at the same airport, rather than having tests done at different airports on different devices. The idea being that we can develop a body of knowledge, a sort of baseline about testing of various devices and can be an honest broker in this testing process. The other thing that we're doing is we're spending about $200,000 on some kind of mini-grants, primarily to Oak Ridge National Laboratory for such things as explosive detection systems enhancement and explosive detection systems technology. The last $200,000 of the $1 million we're spending on aircraft hardening because there's material with which Oak Ridge is experimenting that very likely could make a cheaper container that would be a stronger container than those that are presently used in wide-body jets, and so we're expending some money on panels this year to test that material with the idea in mind that in our 1999 program, that we would actually build one of these containers.
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I'd like to point out that we have good support from people at the FAA. That Dr. Tony Fainberg has helped us on many occasions to understand and appreciate what the needs of the FAA are and what their concerns are about the kinds of programs in which we're involved. We also have Dr. Susan Hallowell at the FAA's Hughes Technical Center that has worked very closely with us as the staff person responsible for interfacing with us. Finally, we have here in Washington, Mr. Armen Sahagian who works in the Office of Security Policy and Planning and he has worked very closely with us making several trips to Knoxville to be involved with the setup of the test bed, and helping us to understand how we need to operate the test bed to make it the most efficient that it can be for what we're attempting to do.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would point out to you that we're spending the dollars that we're spending very frugally. You have a reputation for frugality and I think you would even be proud of some of the things that we're doing. The folders that we passed out to you are being provided by one of our members as a contribution to us. We're using a facility at Knoxville that's an old FAA flight service station that we've pressed into service as a headquarters operation for Safe Skies, and Ms. Terri Rose who's the technical director of our organization is borrowed from Oak Ridge and so we're doing our very best to use the dollars that we have very wisely.
And we do appreciate having this opportunity to be with you today.
Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Jensen. I think you have really gotten off to a great start with the National Safe Skies Alliance and we've even had great interest shown by other nations, such as Great Britain, and Norway, and others. And I'm very proud of what you've done and I think if you continue to do the good work there that you're doing that this is something that will help to improve aviation safety and security for many, many years to come.
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Dr. Zogby, we're pleased to have you with us today. Welcome.
Dr. ZOGBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of the Arab American and American Muslim communities. I particularly want to thank Congressman Ray LaHood and you yourself, Mr. Chairman, and the subcommittee staff for allowing us the opportunity to participate in the hearings today to speak on an issue that's of great importance to us.
I also want to commend the American Civil Liberties Union and its legislative counsel, Greg Nojein, for the extraordinary work that they've done on this issue, and I urge every member of the committee to read the submission that they've made to this committee and to especially look at the recommendations that they make.
As president of the Arab American Institute, I've become very familiar with the problem of passenger profiling and the negative and disparate impact that it has had on my community. I should also add that both my son and I have on a number of occasions experienced the painful humiliation of being singled out for discriminatory profiling. And so I speak to you from personal experience as well.
I want to begin by stating that, like all of you, Arab Americans strongly support the improvement in security and safety for air transport. We, in fact, support many of the proposed changes under consideration. I want to stress that while we support many of these changes and many of the recommendations for new technology, we do so only if their application is non-intrusive and non-discriminatory.
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I'm going to speak about profiling but I also want to mention the proposed body search scanners which project an image of the naked body. I mean, I've seen what they show and, frankly, it is extremely intrusive and very invasive. It is so clear that basically it's conducting a strip body search. It's unacceptable.
We want to be secure as we travel but we do not want to become victims or targets of enhanced security. When we check our bags at the airports, we do not check our civil and Constitutional rights.
We first became engaged in this issue of profiling at the end of 1996 after receiving a number of complaints from people around the country. In early 1997, as part of our enhanced public education campaign, I hosted two programs on this subject on a weekly live call-in television show that I do on A & A TV network. My guest on the program was Dr. Jerry Kauver who is staff director of the Gore Commission.
During two 1-hour programs, we listened to testimony of over 30 Arab Americans from around the country. Their stories were shocking. Doctors, professionals, women in their 60's, young pregnant mothers, all being singled out by airport personnel for searches that oftentimes left their belongings on the floor and their rights violated. In most instances, those who complained reported that they were singled out for special searches or questioning before they were allowed to board aircraft. And, in many cases, security personnel pulled them out of line even before they had shown their tickets, even before they'd shown their identification. If was this fact that led us to conclude that they were targeted even as they waited in the ticketing line because of their appearance—Arab or Middle Eastern. In fact, women in higabs covering, men with beards. In fact, the only characteristics that we found that these disparate group of individuals had in common was their Arabic appearance, or Middle Eastern appearance, or, at some point, their names. In fact, the current U.S. Ambassador to Morocco, Mr. Ed Gabriel was at one point targeted because he looks Arab, pulled out of line and given this kind of scrutiny.
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After hearing these complaints, Dr. Kauvar had come to believe, as we did, that there was a serious problem and so he recommended we meet with the FAA. In preparation for the meetings, we began an intensive process of collecting affidavits and complaints and ultimately produced over 100. We collected them into a document which I want to submit and it will be submitted to you for the record, and I'd like it to be a part of the record.
As we were collecting the affidavits, we also had a group of young Arab American lawyers who conducted site checks at a number of U.S. airports. In case after case, they found that there was a clear targeting of people who had Arab or Muslim appearance. For example, in some instances, they set out of a flight of 300 or so passengers boarding a plane, only three or four were taken out of line for special security scrutiny. And all of them ended up being Arab or Muslim.
And so in April 1997 with this evidence in hand, Arab American leaders met with FAA officials. After several meetings, it became clear to us that there was a barrier to even beginning to understand the problem. At first the FAA denied that there was a problem. When we presented documentation, they insisted that it was a problem created by the airlines and not by them. When we informed that in every instance the airline said they were simply following FAA guidelines, the FAA went silent.
Our position was that it is clear to us that a pattern of discrimination exists. We don't want to see the profile. We don't want to know what the criteria are. But when we get as many complaints as we get and the only thing that emerges as a common factor is this Arab, or Middle Eastern, or Muslim appearance or surname, well then, you know what, I know what the profile is. I know that that characteristic is there. A clear enough pattern emerges to make it clear.
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So we said that we wanted something to be done. Either the FAA was at fault, or the airlines were at fault. If the FAA was right and the airlines were in violation, someone had to act to correct the problem. When the FAA indicated that it had no authority to do so, it was recommended that the Department of Transportation or Department of Justice be brought into the discussions. It is my understanding that at present, the DOJ and Department of Transportation are, in fact, now reviewing this practice.
We spent the better part of the last 2 years dealing with this problem. During this time our major concern has been with subjective profiling. And even now that the automated CAP system is in place, it's not universally in place and so problems continue to exist. The problem has not been solved.
During hearings held by the White House Commission on Aviation Safety, the civil liberties panel that they formed recommended that an independent panel be formed to monitor implementation. It is essential that such an independent monitoring panel be established to provide an oversight role. In addition, immediate efforts are needed to educate and sensitive airline security personnel regarding discriminatory targeting of Arab Americans. Frankly, Mr. Chairman, when I'm stopped and I am asked where my father was born, that is not an appropriate question. It is unacceptable and it is indication to me that there is a discriminatory pattern at work here.
Efforts should also be made to hire more Arab Americans and American Muslims in these positions. We also believe that Congress should explicitly demand in the form of legislation that the FAA and airlines conduct their aviation security screening procedures in a non-discriminatory, non-intrusive way. Given the lack of resources available to passengers, it is also essential, we believe, to establish and clearly post a grievance process so passengers can be made aware of how to file a complaint of discriminatory treatment and how these complaints can be tracked. A passenger's bill of rights should be established, should be published, and should be posted at airports.
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At present what you have is an agent saying to a passenger, ''Call you, Congressman,'' or calling a police officer to the scene who then tells the passenger, ''I can't get involved. It's a Federal matter.''
As I said in the beginning, it's one thing to check your bags when you board a flight, it's another thing to be asked to check your rights.
I want to thank you all for the opportunity to testify before you, and I urge you to act to help end this problem once and for all.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much. Now, Dr. Zogby, it's your brother that does these very accurate national polls, isn't it? Is that right?
Dr. ZOGBY. Mr. Chairman, it is my brother.
Mr. DUNCAN. That's what I was thinking.
Dr. ZOGBY. Do you like his polls?
Mr. DUNCAN. Well, I think——
Dr. ZOGBY. If you do, it's my brother for sure.
[Laughter.]
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Mr. DUNCAN. I think that, if I remember correctly, he had the closest most accurate poll in the last national elections.
Dr. ZOGBY. And a number of State elections as well.
Mr. DUNCAN. Right, right. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wood, thank you very much for being with us. And you may begin with your statement.
Mr. WOOD. Thank you. Chairman Duncan and ranking member Lipinski and other members of the subcommittee, it's a pleasure to be here this morning to talk to you about technology.
My name is Kenneth Wood. I'm the president of Barringer Instruments. Barringer is located in New Providence, New Jersey, the garden State, is principally engaged in the development of analytical instruments for high sensitivity detection of explosives and narcotic substances. The IONSCAN, which you see off to my right here, is the latest and most advanced explosive detection device manufactured by Barringer and was developed in the late 1980's—going back a ways—in response to growing demands for technological solutions to explosive detection requirements.
Significant advances have been made in aviation security in this country over the past year as state-of-the-art explosive detection has been successfully deployed at our Nation's largest and most vulnerable airports. The key to enhancing security, I think, is now very universally recognized to be the development of an integrated systems approach, implementing an array of technologies that, together, offer our best defense against a terrorist event. There is no single technological solution to the terrorist bomb but there is not a security system in the world that will exceed the effectiveness of that which is being implemented here in the United States.
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The task today of detecting an explosive device primarily involves two approaches: looking for large amounts of an explosive material which is commonly known as ''bulk detection,'' and, on the other hand, looking for very small amounts which falls into the category of ''trace detection.'' The visual imaging technologies using dual energy x-ray and computed tomography techniques are addressing the bulk detection requirements. This is the type of technological approach that equipment such as CTX 5000 is addressing. The other very essential technological component of any aviation security system is trace detection, which is the technology that allows the operator to detect minuscule amounts of explosive materials in samples taken directly from a suspect item.
Barringer has been engaged in the explosive detection instrumentation business for the past 10 years, and today there are more of our IONSCAN detectors deployed around the world than all other detectors combined. We have approximately 850 now worldwide serving a wide variety of applications. The point is this is very stable and field proven technology. Virtually every Federal law enforcement agency in this country, and their counterparts around the world, utilize IONSCAN on a daily basis to assist in their operations. For example, the FBI has deployed the IONSCAN in this country since 1991, utilizing the instrument in a wide variety of drug interdiction missions as well as in the post-blast analysis of the World Trade Center, the Oklahoma City, Atlanta Olympics, and TWA incidents. Other United States users include the Coast Guard, DEA, National Guard, and the Department of Defense, and, of course, the FAA. Of further interest is the fact that the IONSCAN has been used to perform all the trace detection work at the Eurotunnel since it opened in 1993, and the fact that aviation security agencies in numerous other countries also rely on this detection equipment.
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This trace detection technology is extensively deployed, and is very clearly serving a critical role in anti-terrorist and law enforcement activities. Trace detection technology works by taking advantage of the fact that microscopic amounts of a target substance, such as an explosive material, will typically be present on exterior surfaces of the packaging. These traces can be quickly collected and analyzed in a few seconds to provide the operator with real time information about the item that was sampled. For example, it is extremely difficult to manufacture a bomb inside a piece of electronics, which is where the bomb is going to be in all likelihood, without leaving traces on the exterior surface—explosive residue on the exterior surfaces that can be quickly collected and analyzed. A simple wipe of a target item will collect the residue, followed by a very quick five second analysis.
The IONSCAN, that you see to my right, functions in exactly this fashion. For the entire concept to work, the trace detection to work, you must have technology that has the analytical sensitivity to detect these microscopic amounts of explosive materials. Instruments such as the IONSCAN can detect a few trillionths of a gram of an explosive substance. That's a hard concept to get your hands around, you try to conjure up in your head what is a trillionth of a gram. I'll give you a little analogy that helps puts this into perspective. A trillionth of a gram is like a second of time in a 100,000 years, and that's the level of sensitivity that equipment such as the IONSCAN can detect. So you now try to imagine a bomb maker making a bomb without leaving a few of these particles around that can be readily detected.
The IONSCAN utilizes technology known as Ion Mobility Spectrometry, which is certainly not new, it's been around for a considerable period of time. In approximately six seconds, we look for the presence of six or more explosive substances. And if a detection is made, the operator is alerted with an audio visual alarm, and the specific explosive substance is identified.
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In this country, we now have about 160 IONSCANs deployed at our Category X and Category 1 airports. Pursuant to the FAA's deployment strategy, these instruments are being installed at the security checkpoints where they are used to screen suspect items, such as various electrical apparatus, like computers, cellular phones, and radios, and items that the x-ray determines to be suspicious and items that can be screened randomly. Since the trace detection equipment is installed at the checkpoint, it is highly visible and has the added benefit of demonstrating to the public the enhanced security measures that are currently being implemented. To date, we have in excess of 3 million IONSCAN samples that have been made with over 350,000 on-time hours. Alarm rates, total alarm rates, false and real alarm rates, are running at less than four hundredths of 1 percent. So you can see we are not out there suffering by any interpretation from false alarm rate problems.
Barringer also has implemented a remote monitoring capability on each deployed IONSCAN that automatically provides statistical and parametric data on each instrument. This data is transmitted back to our facilities every single day and allows us to monitor the proper functioning of every piece of gear in the machine from our own offices in New Jersey. Important information such as the number of samples run, the number of alarms, the specific explosives that are alarming, and certain other parametric data is monitored on a continuous basis. This capability maximizes instrument on-time, and provides powerful statistical data on the equipment and the alarm use and the alarm rate data at every single airport.
IONSCANs are priced about the $47,000 range and installed in a few hours. Literally, take it out of a box, plug it in and you're ready to do your training. Operational training is straightforward. Screening personnel are quick to pick up on sample collection and analysis processes, and in our discussions with screeners indicate they are very comfortable with this instrumentation and enjoy using advanced technology to assist in their responsibilities. And they truly believe trace detection facilitates the job that they've been tasked.
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Additionally, our trace detection technology, and specifically the IONSCAN, is being assessed for other important detection applications, such as screening airline passengers. Under FAA grants, Barringer has developed instrumentation that will quickly check boarding passes and other documents for traces of explosives. In fact, we have equipment currently with Mr. Jensen down in Knoxville for initial deployment in cooperation with the National Safe Skies program. And as we continue to bring new technologies on board, we expect that relationship to expand. We are also developing an automated trace based system that will look and function somewhat like an x-ray, and that is a belt-driven system, but utilizing this technology to automatically screen baggage.
Along with others, Barringer has worked very hard in developing detection technology that meets the needs of the various user organizations. We are proud of the capability we have developed, and we are proud to see our equipment serving security needs of the United States. We applaud and support the efforts of the Aviation Subcommittee to identify deficiencies in our airline and airport security systems, and to enhance security through the deployment of trace detection technologies. With the right detection equipment, security can be provided to the American public effectively, sufficiently, economically, and with minimal inconvenience to the traveler.
We do have our equipment here, Mr. Chairman, if anyone would like to see it work, we're certainly willing to provide some demonstrations on it.
Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Wood, let me ask you first of all, we just heard about the CTX 5000 equipment not being used very much in airports, and I think the FAA has purchased 160 of your machines, are they being used? Are they being used very often or are we running into the same situation as with the CTX 5000 machine?
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Mr. WOOD. It's being used everyday and I have exact data on that because we monitor these, we have over this wireless modem link the data coming every day. I can tell you with assuredness. Also, the equipment is physically on 24 hours a day and I would say, on average, instruments are using—are being used to run somewhere between 500 and 1,000 samples per machine per day. Collectively, we have over 3 million measurements already taken on this equipment. I think that's fairly significant use.
Mr. DUNCAN. Right. And they can detect explosives but I also understand they can detect narcotics and other substances. Are they being set up—have they been set up just to detect explosives or are they being used to detect other things as well?
Mr. WOOD. No, that is a good question, Mr. Chairman. They are really being set up in the airport environment for explosive detection only. The mission is, of course, security and not necessarily the interdiction of other contraband. Although, quite a large segment of other customer base is using this equipment actively. The U.S. Coast Guard seized almost 10 million metric tons of cocaine last year using this equipment in the Caribbean. But in the airport environment, it's certainly geared to look for explosives.
Mr. DUNCAN. Dr. Zogby, let me ask you this. The Department of Justice evaluated the computer profiling system and they said that they found it does not discriminate on the basis of race or ethnic problems. Do you think that the Department of Justice just missed something? And also we heard that, Admiral Flynn say the number of complaints was very, very low so far this year. Do you think that this is a problem that we are solving? Or do you think that, as I say, the Department of Justice and others are missing something?
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Dr. ZOGBY. Well, I can't intelligently comment on that for one reason and that is I haven't seen the report. I can't see the report, and I don't know what's in the profile so that, in a sense, this has all taken place in a situation in which we are not privy to all the information. But I would say the following, we have enough evidence from the 1996, 1997 period to conclude a serious problem existed. We also know that we are receiving some complaints. Now, although I would add that not everyone, and I must say, unfortunately even myself, who experienced personal problems necessarily files a complaint with the Department of Transportation so that the number received do not automatically equal the number of complaints that actually occur. Some people either don't fill out the form or find other ways to express themselves or simply swallow the, you know, the situation and let it go. So that I think that CAPS may provide an improvement over the situation. It appears to me that a significant amount of the problem occurred because of the subjective nature of the system. That's one part of it.
The second thing I think I would say in this regard is that we would hope that the computerized program would eliminate all of these problems, but the proof is yet to be determined. And I have not seen whether or not the problems that currently exist are the result of the computerized one or the subjective one. So I think it will take us yet until the end of the year to determine whether or not the problem has been solved. The CAPS system is not universally in place. I understand it will not be universally in place for a while yet. So that the problem of subjective profiling still does exist and troubles us.
Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Meenan, on a typical flight how many passengers fit into the profile and what is supposed to happen? Are they supposed to be pulled out and subjected to all sorts of searches and questions? Or is it just supposed to be their bag that's supposed to be checked?
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Mr. MEENAN. Absolutely not subjected to searches and questions. The whole purpose of this is to, as I mentioned in my testimony, make the security process basically invisible to the passenger. The screening that goes on goes on behind the scenes. It's done through EDS equipment, or we utilize bag matching. In terms of how many passengers, I would respectfully request that you raise that with Admiral Flynn this afternoon. It's not something that we'd like to discuss.
Mr. DUNCAN. All right, all right. Mr. Jensen, you've given us a good report about the National Safe Skies Alliance, and you've added on several companies and institutions from around the United States, a very impressive list. Are you receiving additional inquiries from other companies or institutions around the country about the work that's going on.
Mr. JENSEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that question because we have about a half a dozen other people who have inquired, companies, and airlines, and airports, who have inquired about membership in the National Safe Skies Alliance. We think very shortly we'll have additional members and we think that will be an ongoing prospect that National Safe Skies Alliance will grow at quite a rapid rate. And we have done nothing to try to advertise for or seek out members. We've really reacted to people who have come to us and said they'd like to be a party to National Safe Skies Alliance.
Mr. DUNCAN. All right. Mr. Lipinski?
Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Zogby, you mentioned that you yourself were detained at an airport. Could you elaborate on that a little bit and tell us exactly what did take place and how it took place?
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Dr. ZOGBY. It's actually happened a few times. Most recently, it was returning on a flight where I brought a number of your colleagues on a Congressional delegation to the Middle East. And flying back through the airport in Amsterdam, it was a Northwest connection, all the members of Congress boarded the plane. In fact, all the passengers boarded the plane. And I was kept back for about 45 or so minutes. I received questions about where my father came from, what he did, why he came to America. Questions that I thought were—especially because Arab Americans have a serious problem about this anyway. I mean, we want to be included and fully respected as American citizens. When someone, and I'm boarding an American flight, and someone who is not an American citizen is questioning me about why my father came to America and what right I——
Mr. LIPINSKI. Let me interrupt just for a second. Who was this that was questioning you at that time?
Dr. ZOGBY. It was an airport screener who was doing it. The fact that he was an Israeli national partly troubled me because I felt that there was a clear discrimination going on here. But the fact that this questioning continued to go on and then he continued to discuss in another language with another person details about questions, answers I was giving him. And, in fact, until Congressman Rahall, who is a member of this committee, got off of the plane and said, ''I will not get on the plane unless you let him go and let him on,'' I'd probably still be there taking questions from these guys. And, frankly, I think that the kinds of questions I was being asked, my father's reason for immigration, what employment he had in America, what I did, what I was doing on this flight, even though I showed them the documentation, the Members of Congress who were with me who were on the plane, et cetera, the questioning persisted.
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Mr. LIPINSKI. Who did this person work for?
Dr. ZOGBY. I do not know that.
Mr. LIPINSKI. The airline or the airport, you don't know?
Dr. ZOGBY. I don't know that.
Mr. LIPINSKI. How do you know that, excuse me, that he was an Israeli citizen, Israeli national?
Dr. ZOGBY. He spoke Hebrew. I asked him that in return when I was asked a question, I asked him in return and he spoke to another person who was he said his officer who might have been simply an official over him in the security arrangement. When he asked me where I was from, I said Washington. He said, ''No, where are you from?'' I said upstate New York, Utica, New York, that's where I was born and educated. And he said, ''No, no, no, where are you from?'' And I said, ''I'm from America. I'm an American citizen.'' And he persisted and so I think, I mean, I knew all along what he wanted. But I think it's an inappropriate question to ask someone. He said, ''Where's your father from?'' And that's when he got into the Lebanon. And I said, ''Where are you from?'' And he told me the country of his origin.
I think in all cases this conversation never should have taken place at all. It is not a part of what we ought to be doing when we get on planes.
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Mr. LIPINSKI. And where did this conversation take place?
Dr. ZOGBY. In the airport right before the boarding of the plane.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Did they take you to a room on the side?
Dr. ZOGBY. No, actually they did not. Although they had several posts set up and, as I said, every single passenger was on the plane. We were in line. Every single passenger was on the plane and I was there by myself still answering questions long after——
Mr. LIPINSKI. Were there any other Arab Americans or Arabs on that flight that you noticed?
Dr. ZOGBY. Congressman Rahall.
Mr. LIPINSKI. They didn't stop him though?
Dr. ZOGBY. No.
Mr. LIPINSKI. What about in this country. Have you run into this problem?
Dr. ZOGBY. Yes, I have.
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Mr. LIPINSKI. Could you elaborate on that? Tell me where that occurred?
Dr. ZOGBY. Actually, I did a number of projects with Vice President Gore and with former Secretary, the late Secretary of Commerce, Ron Brown. And went with them on missions to the Middle East. I headed, with a former colleague of your's, former Congressman Mel Levine, a project the Vice President began called ''Builders for Peace,'' to promote private investment to support the peace process. And on that basis, I went to join the Vice President or the Secretary to Israel and the West Bank and Gaza on a number of missions. On a couple of them, I didn't join them on the flight, Air Force 2. Rather, I took a commercial flight and joined them. It was flying Tower Air, leaving from New York Kennedy Airport that I was subjected to one, two, three, four sets of questioning before I was allowed to board a plane in the presence of other passengers and felt, again, that I was treated quite in an insulting way. Even though I had with me a letter either from the Vice President's office or from the Secretary's office and documentation as to what I was doing on the trip, et cetera, none of that seemed to matter. Questions again pertained to where was I from, and what was my ethnicity, and questions I felt were wholly inappropriate to a passenger attempting to board a plane. And these questions, and this line of questioning compares with reports we've received from others.
Mr. LIPINSKI. I was just going to say with your obvious connections to certain people in this country, such as the Vice President, have you ever brought up to him this questioning that has occurred?
Dr. ZOGBY. Yes, actually it was my discussion with the Vice President that led us to a meeting with Dr. Kauver that brought Dr. Kauver to my TV show, that brought Dr. Kauver to set up discussions for us with the Department of Transportation, et cetera. So that I felt that the Vice President is aware of the concerns and feels that they are inappropriate, that profiling should not be discriminatory but the question of how we get action on this, how we get some agency of Government to assume responsibility to say these things should not take place, and to do so publicly, and to do so in the presence of the airlines. Because we still have not determined where the problem is. Again, I tell you that the airlines say to us, they're simply following FAA guidelines. The FAA says that their guidelines are not being followed if these practices occur. No one will admit actually that any real problem exists. And so we don't quite know how to get the problem—Mr. Shurafa is here now and he can testify to a very personal experience that he as well had in this regard.
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Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Lipinski. We'll go ahead and hear at this time from Mr. Shurafa. Mr. Shurafa, you may begin your statement.
Mr. SHURAFA. Thank you. On the day of May 10, 1997, I had received word from the National Rowing Foundation that I had been selected as one of 11 coxswains in the country to compete for a seat on the junior national rowing team. This team was to represent the United States at the world championships in Belgium that August.
The rigorous selection process was to begin in Cincinnati on Monday, June 10 and end on the following Saturday. So it was finally my chance to shine. The opportunity I had been waiting for since I started rowing in 1994. After delivering a speech which ended the after graduation ceremonies on the morning of the 11th, I rushed home to pack my bags and begin my 5-hour trek to Cincinnati with my father by car.
By the time everything was packed, we realized I wouldn't make it on time to my first scheduled practice so my father called Northwest Airlines and booked a plane ticket for me on the next available flight which was to leave at 1:30 p.m. Traffic had held my father and I back that day so when we got to the airport we were inside of 1 hour before my plane was to leave. The line being too long at the ticket counter indicated that it would be more efficient if we went straight to the gate and carried the luggage on. After passing through the security x-ray machines and upon arrival at the gate, we were greeted with extreme calm and courtesy, there was still 10 minutes before the first boarding call.
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Once the attendant asked for ID though, things took a sudden turn. After reading my name on the driver's license, she stopped, looked at me, and then told me that my luggage had to be opened and checked in a special security checkpoint located half way down the terminal at another gate and that she would not hold the plane for us. In an obvious attempt to show our urgency, my father and I ran to the checkpoint as fast as we could. Once we arrived there, a security person took my luggage apart and asked about almost everything in the bags. Personal things such as my Hemophilia medication were opened and laid on the table in plain view as I was questioned about them.
After my luggage was dissembled, the security person now placed what he called ''special security tags'' to the handles of all my bags and said that if I were to remove the tags, I would be arrested. Embarrassed, my father and I rushed with my bags to the terminal where I was to board. The attendant at that time was on the phone and did nothing to acknowledge my presence. Once she had completed her conversation, she took me down the gate only to find the plane backing away and heading to Cincinnati without me.
When my father asked the attendant why she sent us back to security, she replied by telling us that I fitted a top secret profile issued by the FAA. The disaster was far from over. We now had to walk all of my luggage back to the ticket window, had to wait in line, and had to explain to the agent why I had missed my plane. In an honest effort to show sincerity, the agent apologized, told me the value of safety, and discreetly placed yellow tags labeled, ''selective luggage'' on all of my checked baggage.
I finally reached my destination, but my luggage did not. In Cincinnati, it turned out that one of my bags did not make the trip with me. I was told by a ticket agent there that it had been held for further inspection and that I would receive the bag by that evening. The bag which was filled with bed linens, blankets, towels, and toiletries didn't arrive until 2 days later.
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My father immediately wrote to the CEO of Northwest Airlines telling him the incident demanding that something be done about the treatment of its customers. A reply came almost immediately with a sincere apology from CEO John Dasberg as well as a $50 travel voucher to make up for the inconvenience.
It's made quite clear in the letter where the blame fell: ''We appreciate the opportunity to explain that under the current aviation security level mandated by the Federal Aviation Administration, it appears your son's luggage was subject to additional security, scrutiny in accordance with the Government selectee criteria. We assure you it is not Northwest's practice to single out individual passengers for discriminatory treatment. While carriers are not at liberty to divulge the specific criteria involved, certain ticketing issues can result in the need to have luggage hand searched.''
The FAA was then contacted on July 14th. A reply was received August 28th only to state that the letter had been forwarded to the correct department. My father and I are still awaiting a response.
Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Shurafa. And we're certainly sorry that you had to go through that experience.
Mr. Lipinski, do you have any comments or questions?
Mr. LIPINSKI. No, Mr. Chairman.
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Well, gentlemen, thank you very much for coming in and testifying and we certainly appreciate the contributions that you've made to this hearing this morning and we will break at this time and reconvene at 2:00 in Room 2253.
Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 12:37 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]
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