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75–671 PS












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OCTOBER 10, 2001

Printed for the use of the

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure


DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Vice-Chair
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
STEPHEN HORN, California
JOHN L. MICA, Florida
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SUE W. KELLY, New York
JOHN R. THUNE, South Dakota
RICHARD W. POMBO, California
JIM DEMINT, South Carolina
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut
HENRY E, BROWN, JR, South Carolina
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SAM GRAVES, Missouri
MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
ROBERT A. BORSKI, Pennsylvania
BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of Columbia
BOB FILNER, California
FRANK MASCARA, Pennsylvania
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
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JAMES P. MCGOVERN, Massachusetts
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
RICK LARSEN, Washington



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JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee

STEPHEN HORN, California
SUE W. KELLY, New York
RICHARD W. POMBO, California
HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South Carolina
DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana, Vice-Chair
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
  (Ex Officio)

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GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
FRANK MASCARA, Pennsylvania
ROBERT A. BORSKI, Pennsylvania
BOB FILNER, California
BILL PASCRELL, Jr., New Jersey
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
  (Ex Officio)



    Danneels, Jeffrey J., Department Manager, Security Systems and Technology Center, on behalf of Sandia National Laboratories
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     Dick, Ronald L., Deputy Assistant Director, Counter Terrorism Division, and Director, National Infrastructure Protection Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation, accompained by Todd Davis, Assistant Section Chief, Federal Bureau of Investigation

     Horinko, Hon. Marianne, Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

     Karney, Patrick T., Director, Metropolitan Sewer District of Greater Cincinnati on behalf of the Association of Metropolitan Sewarage Agencies
     McCullough, Hon. Glenn L., Jr., Chairman, Board of Directors, Tennessee Valley Authority

     Moreau, JoAnne H., Director, East Baton Rouge Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness, and Local Emergency Planning Committee
     O'Neill, Beverly, Mayor, City of Long Beach, California
    Parker, Hon. Michael, Assistant Secretary of the Army, Civil Works, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

     Speight, Randy G., Jr., Director, Chemical Transportation Emergency Center on behalf of the American Chemistry Council
     Sullivan, John P., Jr., Chief Engineer, Boston Water and Sewer Commission on behalf of the Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies


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    Blumenauer, Hon. Earl, of Oregon
    Millender-McDonald, Hon. Juanita


    Danneels, Jeffrey J
     Dick, Ronald L

     Horinko, Hon. Marianne

     Karney, Patrick T
     McCullough, Hon. Glenn L., Jr

     Moreau, JoAnne H
     O'Neill, Beverly
    Parker, Hon. Michael

     Speight, Randy G., Jr
     Sullivan, John P., Jr


     Karney, Patrick T., Director, Metropolitan Sewer District of Greater Cincinnati on behalf of the Association of Metropolitan Sewarage Agencies, responses to questions

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     Moreau, JoAnne H., Director, East Baton Rouge Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness, and Local Emergency Planning Committee, reponses to questions

    Parker, Hon. Michael, Assistant Secretary of the Army, Civil Works, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, responses to questions


    National Ground Water Association, Stephen Ragone, Ph.D., statement


Wednesday, October 10, 2001
House of Representatives, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment, Washington, D.C.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m. in room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John J. Duncan, Jr. [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

    Mr. DUNCAN. I am going to call the subcommittee to order. Unfortunately, we have the very controversial contest for the second leadership position in the Democratic Party and so the Democrats are meeting in their caucus now to vote on the race between Steny Hoyer and Nancy Pelosi.
    Also, we have been having a Republican conference but we will be joined by other members hopefully shortly.
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    Also, we understand the FBI witness is having a parking problem at this moment but should be here shortly.
    I want to welcome everyone to our hearing on ''Terrorism, Our Water Resources and Environment at Risk.''
    Before the tragic events of September 11, the security of water resources and our environmental infrastructure was not a very high national priority. However, on that day, our Nation learned that our own equipment and structures can be used in a war of terrorism against us.
    Hijacked airplanes can be used to collapse buildings and kill thousands of people. We have to consider whether chemical plants, dams and water supply systems can in a similar way be turned into weapons through destruction or contamination.
    Some Federal agencies, local governments and industries already have developed plans for preventing and responding to different types of acts of terrorism. Others are just beginning to conduct threat assessments.
    There has been a lot of speculation about our vulnerability to terrorist attack. Not all of that speculation is well founded but to be prudent, government agencies and the private sector must review the security of all the critical infrastructures they operate and where appropriate, take steps to increase that security.
    One of the worst things we can do would be to exaggerate the threat that is out there or help create some type of panic situation. On the other hand, we need to look very seriously at the situation that we now have before us and do whatever is reasonable and responsible. I think one of the messages that will come out of this hearing is that many departments and agencies are doing quite a bit and really are doing more to make sure that our water resources and water infrastructure and our various environmental facilities are safer and more secure probably than ever before.
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    We also must establish information-sharing networks so that the FBI and other Government agencies can provide information to local governments and the private sector about actual threats of terrorist attack. The thousands of tragedies that occurred on September 11 were certainly among the worst and saddest things that have ever happened in this country. Also, much good has come out of it. I have said before, I have never seen an outpouring of love, compassion, kindness and patriotism in my lifetime such as we have had over these last few weeks. One of the many good things I think has occurred in the last few weeks is a greater cooperation among departments and agencies in all these areas than perhaps we have ever had before.
    The purpose of this hearing is to make sure governmental agencies and the private sector are taking all the steps necessary to ensure the Nation that the critical infrastructure under our jurisdiction is safe and secure. This subcommittee has oversight responsibility for all the civil works projects of the Corps of Engineers. The new Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, our former colleague, Congressman Mike Parker, is here to let us know what steps the Corps is taking to secure its dams, reservoirs and other infrastructure. Mike, we want to welcome you and say congratulations to you on your new position.
    This subcommittee has oversight responsibility for the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority. The Chairman of the Board of Directors of the TVA, Glenn McCullough, a good friend of mine, is here to let us know what steps the TVA has taken and is taking to protect its dams and reservoirs and power plants, including its nuclear power plants. The TVA is the largest public power agency in the country, supplying power to almost 8 million customers. This is a very significant and important agency.
    The subcommittee has oversight responsibility for programs under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, the Clean Water Act and the Superfund law that give the Environmental Protection Agency authority to prepare for and respond to emergencies involving oil and chemicals. Under these programs, the EPA works with State and local governments to make sure they have established plans and procedures for responding to these types of emergencies.
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    The new EPA Assistant Administrator for the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Marianne Horinko, is here to tell us how the EPA is carrying out those responsibilities. I would like to welcome and congratulate her on her new position.
    To keep other agencies, local governments and the private sector aware of threats to critical infrastructure, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has established a National Infrastructure Protection Center. The flow of information is a critical weapon against terrorism.
    Local governments and the private sector need to know who to turn to if they become aware of suspicious behavior and need to know if a credible threat against their infrastructure has been detected. We have the Director of the FBI's National Infrastructure Protection Center, Mr. Ronald Dick, here to tell us how far along we are in establishing those information networks. We want to welcome Mr. Dick.
    We have several witnesses on a second panel: The Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies and they volunteered to set up an information network for the water sector; representatives of local governments, including the Mayor of Long Beach, California. Long Beach has taken the lead because they have the largest port in the Nation and various other facilities. They have three special grants from various departments. The EPA, the Department of Justice and others, to set an example for cities across the Nation on the safety and security issues we are dealing with this morning.
    We have a witness from the Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies who will tell us what steps they are taking to protect local water supplies and other local infrastructure.
    We will also hear from a witness from Sandia National Laboratories which has completed a vulnerability assessment for Federal dams and now is conducting a vulnerability assessment for public drinking water systems.
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    Finally, we will hear from representatives of the local emergency planning committees and the chemical industry about steps being taken to secure communities from the threat of terrorist attacks using hazardous chemicals. I hope to hear that the local governments and the private sector are getting the cooperation and assistance they need from all the Federal agencies. If that is not the case, we can call the Federal agencies back to explain how they are going to correct that situation.
    After September 11, no one who has responsibility for critical infrastructure can ignore the potential for terrorist attacks. Security is now a paramount concern that must be balanced against other considerations like public access. We are permanently changing the way we do business.
    We will start with the first panel. We will hear from the Federal witnesses and the members will have opportunity to ask questions. After completing the open session, we will then go to executive session for one hour at the most to hear from the Assistant Secretary of the Army and other witnesses from the Corps of Engineers in a classified, executive session. Following that closed session, we will reconvene in this room for the second panel.
    I would like now to recognize my good friend, the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, Mr. DeFazio, for any statement he has.
    Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for convening this critical hearing on our water infrastructure and its exposure to risk.
    I would say I am one who believed even before September 11 that considerable risk existed, not only the risk we will talk about today in terms of terrorism and intentional acts, but we had a pretty creaky system of water supply in many of our cities and it was at risk. I have cities with water supplies totally open adjacent to highways and other things that have been exposed for years, or railroads with chemical risk, petroleum risk and they could lose their water supplies very easily. That has been a major concern and why I have been working toward a major water infrastructure package.
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    I believe we will make the case today and in subsequent hearings that one of the most vital parts of an economy recovery package for the United States of America could be an investment in the future of our water supply, not only to protect it against terrorism and unknown risk but to protect it against known risk and see that we have an adequate and safe water supply into the future. It has been internationally recognized that one of the areas of future struggle around the world is going to be water. We are blessed in good times with an ample supply in this country or almost ample where we run, even in good years, up against it in the West, but in bad years like this where we have a drought, we have problems allocating that scarce resource. So even in good times before September 11, additional investment by the Federal Government was more than warranted. Even in the East, I understand New York City has water mains that are made out of wood 120 years ago but every once in a while, they burst and that is a problem. This is an area that requires attention and investment.
    I also look forward to further discussion of the newly identified and as yet unknown risk that could be presented by intentional acts of terrorist groups, so I am pleased we are here today and look forward to hearing from the panel both in public and in private. I hope the committee begins to knit together a response, a thoughtful response from this committee that could be part of a national infrastructure initiative, part of a national economic recovery plan.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. DeFazio.
    Governor Rehberg?
    Mr. REHBERG. No.
    Mr. DUNCAN. You have no statement.
    Governor Otter?
    Mr. OTTER. No.
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    Mr. DUNCAN. We are ready to proceed with the witnesses. We have an outstanding panel. The first panel consists of the Honorable Michael Parker, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, representing the Army Corps of Engineers; the Honorable Glenn L. McCullough, Jr., Chairman, Tennessee Valley Authority, Board of Directors; the Honorable Marianne Lamont Horinko, Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response from the Environmental Protection Agency; and Mr. Ronald Dick, Director, National Infrastructure Protection Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
    We always proceed in the order witnesses are listed in the call of the hearing and that means Congressman Parker, we will start with you. You may begin your testimony.

    Mr. PARKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    For the last couple of weeks, I have been serving as Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works and I want you to know how much I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today. I feel very much at home in this room. I have been in this room many times in the past and I look around and see some friendly faces and people I have known for a long time.
    I want to thank you for the opportunity to provide information on the Army Corps of Engineers' activities to address the issues resulting from the events of September 11, 2001. First, allow me to say how proud I am to be associated with the Corps of Engineers. Its record and the manner in which it has begun to move to protect the large part of America's water infrastructure that is our responsibility. I want to assure you that the Corps will prove itself worthy of the trust which that responsibility conveys.
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    Within two hours of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, Corps employees were at Ground Zero lending assistance. Thousands of New York residents were evacuated on Corps civil works vessels from lower Manhattan. We provided expert structural assessments, emergency power to get the stock market up and running, and oversight for removal of what will likely be one million tons of debris. Within hours of the attack on the Pentagon, Corps structural engineers were on-site providing expert advise. We are presently conducting a comprehensive force protection analysis to make the rebuilt Pentagon safer from terrorist intervention in the future. We continue to support local and military leaders with every asset the Corps can muster.
    In conjunction with its military construction mission, the Corps has developed in-depth, antiterrorism force protection expertise. The Corps serves as the DOD lead for public works under the Critical Infrastructure Program established under Presidential Decision Directive No. 3.
    The Corps' laboratories and technology transfer centers are instrumental in the development of the Department of Defense's Antiterrorism Force Protection Standards now used by all Services in military construction, major repair and other programs. The standards and the underlying technologies are being widely used by the State Department in their embassy program. For example, we have world class antiterrorism force protection applications engineers at our Protective Design and Electronic Security Centers who are supported by the best available research assets within the Engineer, Research and Development Center's network of six laboratories.
    Expertise available there to the Corps and others includes, among other things, survivability and protective structures, sustainment engineering, battle space environment, military and civil infrastructure and environmental quality. We have hundreds of employees trained by them and experience borne of work on the Khobar Towers, Murrah Federal Building, World Trade Center, the Pentagon and other sites, some well known, others not so well known.
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    The Corps' centers and labs are supported by some of the leading Antiterrorism Force Protection Engineering and Construction firms through effective contracting vehicles. We are in the process of leveraging the expertise gained in the Corps' military mission areas to protect the Corps' critical water resources infrastructure from terrorist activities. Fortunately, we are not starting from scratch. Over the past few years, the Corps has been working diligently with other agencies including the Bureau of Reclamation, the Department of Energy, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to develop a comprehensive security assessment process to identify risk to critical facilities such as locks, dams and hydropower facilities.
    As the security assessments are completed, we will apply the Corps' and others Antiterrorism Force Protection expertise site by critical site to mitigate security risks uncovered. Today, temporary protection measures are in place, including restricted public access, increased standoff distances to critical structures, increased patrol activities, contracted additional guard support, increased coordination with local law enforcement and establishment of early warning telephone procedures.
    The Civil Works Infrastructure Management Team has been established at Headquarters and in the field and the Corps has begun the task of assessing the need for more specific, effective protective measures. The centerpiece of this effort is the risk assessment and protection of dams methodology called RAM-D developed by the Interagency Forum on Infrastructure Protection from the efforts earlier mentioned.
    I have with me a copy of the training material and workbooks that teams will be using over the next several months to complete this comprehensive civil works security assessment. By using this risk assessment methodology for dams, security risk to dams and other Corps infrastructure can be assessed quickly in a structured, systematic manner even though the structures to be assessed have been built at different times to meet specific set of criteria and sited in unique environments.
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    The Corps of Engineers has already put in place, a plan to conduct these assessments on our critical dams and other infrastructure and to cooperate with other agencies on still more dams. We will also cooperate on other types of structures as requested. The lack of standardizing tools may make for a slower process but the assessment should be no less accurate.
    We are also actively involved with the Nation's leading engineering and construction industry associations, professional societies and standard writing organizations to improve the security and survivability of public and private buildings throughout the country.
    The subject of this hearing has been posed in the form of a question: ''Terrorism, Are America's Water Resources and Environment at Risk?'' The answer can only be a reluctant, sobering yes. Risk is everywhere and impossible to eliminate entirely. However, there are many forms of risk, many ways to minimize and manage it. The Corps of Engineers has already begun the process of protecting the resources entrusted to it and the people who work and visit there. I am proud of the Corps and confident of its ability to achieve and maintain the results demanded by the American people and their representatives in this August body.
    The President, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary of the Army White and I are committed to providing leadership and resources for the Army Corps of Engineers in carrying out its vital military and civil works mission in these difficult times.
    Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement and I would be pleased to address any questions you or the committee may have.
    Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Parker.
    I think it has to be a little unusual that out of four witnesses, we have the first two from the great State of Mississippi. We are pleased to have Chairman McCullough with us and you may begin your testimony.

    Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Thank you and good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee.
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    I am honored to appear before the subcommittee this morning and take this opportunity to express TVA's appreciation for your leadership as our Nation unites to recover from the recent attacks and to protect our citizens from future threats.
    All of us at TVA are particularly mindful of the need to protect TVA facilities in the seven State region we serve. Strong security measures have always been a part of our daily operation and our commitment to protect our employees, our facilities and the public is among TVA's highest priorities. In light of the September 11 attacks on America, our security efforts are more stringent than ever. Heightened security measures are in place throughout our system and the value of our security program has never been demonstrated more clearly.
    At TVA, our vision is to achieve excellence in our business performance and public service for the good of the people throughout the Tennessee Valley. TVA's mission is to improve the quality of life in the Tennessee Valley through integrated management of the Tennessee River system and environmental stewardship while supporting sustainable economic development in the region.
    Through local power distributors, TVA provides an adequate supply of affordable, reliable electricity to 8.3 million Americans over an area stretching across 80,000 square miles. TVA receives no federally-appropriated funds and finances 100 percent of its programs with power revenues. To give you a sense of TVA's scope within the Valley, we manage and operate 49 dams with 14 locks on the Tennessee River and its tributaries and 11 coal-fired powerplants that produce 60 percent of TVA's annual power generation, and three nuclear plants in east Tennessee and north Alabama which make up about one-third of TVA's generation capacity.
    Additionally, the TVA transmission system includes 17,000 miles of transmission lines, 240,000 right-of-way acres, and 850 individual delivery and interchange points. The Tennessee River is the fifth largest river system in the United States. In managing the river system, TVA balances the demands for navigation, for flood control, for electric power production, water quality protection and outdoor recreation. About 4 million Valley residents depend on the Tennessee River system for their water supply. TVA monitors water quality at 60 sites for a number of substances, including PCBs, metals and naturally occurring chemicals that indicate pollution.
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    When the attacks on America occurred on September 11, we at TVA immediately implemented our emergency response plans. We activated our major emergency operations centers. The System Operations Center for our power system was placed on full alert. We activated our backup Systems Operations Center to protect the Tennessee Valley's power supply. We dispatched uniformed TVA police officers to protect critical TVA facilities and we took several other additional actions. TVA employees did walk-downs at our 500 kv substations near major cities and critical communications centers. We implemented rigorous access control requirements for anyone entering the TVA offices or facilities. TVA police boats were stationed on the river immediately adjacent to the emergency cooling water pumping stations at our nuclear plants. Most of these security measures are still in place.
    At our nuclear power plants we have taken additional security measures and we will maintain this level of security for as long as necessary. At each plant we have a security plan that meets the Federal regulations approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
    TVA contracts with Pinkerton Government Services to provide armed security at each TVA nuclear facility. These officers are well trained and highly skilled.
    Since September 11, we have identified the need for more comprehensive, overarching plans to better integrate all of TVA's emergency plans and emergency operations centers. This comprehensive plan will help us carry out our emergency efforts even more effectively throughout the Tennessee Valley.
    I am proud of the speed and skill with which TVA employees acted to ensure that our facilities were safe as we saw danger and destruction elsewhere. I am confident TVA employees are taking action to ensure that our security measures are made even stronger.
    Thank you for the opportunity to share TVA actions with you. I commend the leadership of each of you and your colleagues in the Congress, the leadership that you have provided to ensure that freedom prevails over fear. You can count on TVA's full cooperation as we continue forward together.
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    I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
    Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Chairman McCullough.
    Administrator Horinko.
    Ms. HORINKO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman DeFazio and members of the subcommittee.
    Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Environmental Protection Agency's role in domestic terrorism preparedness and more specifically, the agency's role in the protection of the Nation's water resources. I am the Assistant Administrator confirmed last week by the Senate for the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response. Also here with me today are Diane Regas, Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Office of Water at EPA and Jim Makris, Director of the Chemical Emergency Response Program in my office.
    The tragic events of September 11, 2001 have raised valid concerns over our Nation's vulnerability to terrorist attack. As a Nation, we are scrutinizing our efforts to prepare for and to prevent terrorist events. Recognizing we must always remain vigilant to new threats and must always be ready to respond, the agency welcomes the opportunity to examine these issues.
    With your permission, I would like to make a brief oral statement and submit more detailed testimony for the record. I would like to spend this time discussing four major areas: the Federal partnership on counterterrorism; EPA's role in responding to the events of September 11; EPA's overall protection of our Nation's drinking water; and the critical Federal coordination needed to meet the counterterrorism challenges ahead.
    Concerning the Federal role, the National Response Team, established under the National Contingency Plan, consists of 16 Federal agencies with responsibilities, interests and expertise in various aspects of emergency response to pollution incidents. EPA serves as Chair of the NRT and Coast Guard serves as Vice Chair. This partnership includes such Federal agencies as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Department of Defense, including the Army Corps, the Department of Energy, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and key, non-governmental organizations.
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    The Federal partnership sprung into action on the morning of September 11. Before the second plane had struck the World Trade Center in Manhattan, EPA Headquarters, had already begun coordination with our Region 2 office to address the crash of the first plane. Ten minutes later, our EPA Headquarters had linked all of our East Coast regional offices to begin coordination and support of the New York response effort. EPA's Emergency Response Program was present on-site in New York, Virginia and Pennsylvania within hours of the four plane crashes.
    Throughout the response effort, EPA worked in coordination with our Federal partners to monitor and protect human health and the environment from potential hazards associated with the three crash sites. At both the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, EPA provided monitoring for various air contaminants. In addition, at the World Trade Center, EPA assisted in debris removal and cleanup of dust and debris from the street using vacuum trucks.
    EPA has provided rescue workers and others on site with protective gear, washing stations and health and safety recommendations for the difficult conditions that they face. While EPA has found no evidence of a general threat to public health, on-site rescue and recovery workers should still take appropriate precautions.
    With respect to water concerns associated with the crash sites in Manhattan, EPA collected and tested drinking water at several distribution points. Following several days of heavy rain in New York, we collected water samples from storm sewers and surface runoff to determine if potential contamination from the site was entering the Hudson or the East Rivers. EPA has also collected water samples from the pump station which transfers wastewater from lower Manhattan to Brooklyn.
    Recognizing the need to ensure appropriate coordination of these many activities, EPA has established a Water Protection Task Force that will not only keep an eye on these drinking water related projects but will also guide efforts on longer term drinking water infrastructure protection as well as wastewater treatment infrastructure protection.
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    Last Friday, Governor Whitman announced some specific projects to protect America's drinking water. The Sandia National Laboratory of the Department of Energy in partnership with the American Waterworks Association Research Foundation is developing a tool kit to assist drinking water systems in conducting vulnerability assessments and identifying remedial action. This resource will be available in early November 2001. As an interim measure, EPA has disseminated a fact sheet that outlines measures utilities can take immediately to protect their drinking water supplies. This document should now be in the hands of every State drinking water program manager who in turn will send it to a public water system in his or her State.
    As this tool kit is being developed, the American Water works Association Research Foundation is concurrently drafting training materials that will provide step by step guidance to drinking water utilities while conducting vulnerability assessments, identifying remedial actions and strengthening their emergency operations plans.
    Training others to conduct vulnerability assessments will be an integral component of this effort. The Agency envisions that a significant cadre of professionals will be available by the end of 2001 to assist systems of all sizes, especially small systems, in doing these vulnerability assessments. These activities and projects will bolster the existing methods for responding to emergencies. Currently, a drinking water utility would activate its existing emergency response plan with their State emergency officials. If needed, these provide for shutting down the system notifying the public of any emergency steps they might need to take and providing alternative sources of water. EPA's extensive network of expert emergency response personnel can be dispatched to the scene immediately to support local communities.
    As EPA continues to strengthen its counterterrorism program by building on the existing National Response System for Hazardous Materials, Prevention, Preparedness and Response, the Agency is involved with a variety of activities with Federal, State and local officials. These include responding to terrorism threats and predeploying for special events such as next year's Olympics in Salt Lake City; planning coordination, outreach, training and exercises.
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    In the ten EPA regions, the agency's first responders are the on-scene coordinators. The OSCs have been actively involved with local, State and Federal authorities in preparing for and responding threats of terrorism. EPA's OSCs located throughout the United States have broad response authority and a proven record of success in responding rapidly to emergency situations.
    We are also working with State emergency response commissions and local emergency planning committees to develop emergency response plans for hazardous materials releases to encourage them to incorporate terrorism response issues into their existing emergency plans. We are also working closely with other Federal agencies to develop interagency response plans for terrorism attacks.
    Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to emphasize that the Administrator, Governor Whitman, has made it very clear to the entire Agency that there is no higher priority than ensuring EPA's mission to protect the environment and public health is a broad umbrella that encompasses homeland security. The expertise and experience the agency has developed over 31 years is poised to exist and support the hard work that Governor Ridge and this Congress will be doing. Clearly, the Administrator's adamant that the EPA's efforts to help secure the safety and integrity of America's water supply infrastructure must be undertaken with great speed, energy and attention. Deadlines that were established before September 11 for such action are no longer appropriate. We have no time to waste in completing this work and we intend to devote the resources necessary to make certain it is done quickly and properly.
    Governor Whitman, myself and our professionals throughout EPA welcome the opportunity to work with you, your colleagues in the Congress, your staff and with Governor Ridge in the Office of Homeland Security to protect and preserve the health and well being of every American citizen.
    Thank you.
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    Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Dick.

    Mr. DICK. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Congressman DeFazio, and other members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our Government's important and continuing challenges with respect to critical infrastructure protection and water resources.
    In my written statement, I address our role in protecting the Nation's critical infrastructures and our progress relating to water infrastructure issues and the need for the continued trust and cooperation. Two weeks ago, while appearing before the subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Reform, I heard a compelling testimony from Mark Seaton, the Vice President of the New York Mercantile Exchange, an eyewitness to the attacks on the World Trade Center.
    Although the computer systems and records of the Exchange survived the attack, their communications, transportation and power systems were devastated. Working through contacts and their emergency plans, the Exchange opened only three days after the attack, helping to stabilize energy markets both here and abroad. In this case, diesel generators provided the power, boats provided the transportation, law enforcement and first responders provided a secure environment and the telephone company provided new lines.
    His experience proved three things: our Nation's various infrastructures are interdependent and vulnerable; how an entity that organizes for an emergency and plans for redundancy can operationally survive a major attack and how the private sector, working together with Federal, State and local agencies can succeed in mitigating the damage in the time of crisis.
    Are the Nation's water resources safe? Let me answer this, will your car be stolen tonight? If you thought there was a chance, you would lock the doors, lock the steering wheel, take any valuables from the car and engage the alarm. Still, the car might be stolen. So too with the water supply of this great Nation. Could our water be poisoned? Can the distribution system be shut down? Can biological agents be placed in the system?
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    As you know, our water supply can be affected by a number of malicious enemies. With the signing of the new Executive Order, the Office of Homeland Security will be responsible for conducting a wide variety of Federal, State and local security activity to combat terrorism. At the FBI and the National Infrastructure Protection Center, our mission is to prevent such acts and to investigate any threats to our critical national infrastructures.
    The FBI currently manages a number of programs in order to enhance real time, and I emphasize real time, information sharing, intelligence gathering and provide timely dissemination of threat warnings. For example, the NIPCs Watch and Warning Unit provides strategic analysis and warnings. The NIPC's Infraguard Program gathers information from Infraguard members, creates a sanitized report and disseminates it to other members, including members of the water sector.
    The NIPCs Key Asset Initiative has identified over 5,700 entities vital to our national security. The FBI Domestic Terrorism and Counter Terrorism Planning Section works to enhance operational cooperation and information sharing with the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement community. Representatives from 20 Federal agencies participate in this action. The FBI currently heads joint terrorism task forces in 35 field offices across the United States. The JTTFs integrate the resources of Federal, State and local agencies in combating terrorism at the State, local and regional levels. The FBI manages the National Threat Warning System to ensure that vital information regarding terrorism reaches those in the U.S. counter terrorism and law enforcement communities.
    If the threat information requires nationwide dissemination to all Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies, the FBI transmits messages via the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System which reaches over 18,000 agencies.
    Finally, the FBI disseminates appropriate threat warnings to over 40,000 companies in the private sector via an unclassified system known as the Awareness of National Security Issues and Response Program.
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    As a result of the NIPCs work with the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Perspective Information Sharing and Analysis Center for the Water Sector, the Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies, we feel that a cornerstone of protection for the water sector is in place. Because our water supply consists of many systems, it would be difficult for a terrorist attack to have a broad, long term impact. Further, contamination of a water reservoir with a biological agent would probably not pose a large risk to public health because of the dilution effect, filtration and disinfection of the water. To contaminate a water supply with a hazardous industrial chemical would take truckloads of chemical to have any effect.
    Based on available intelligence and investigative information, there are currently no specific credible threats to any water distribution networks. We cannot rest on that information though. Water supply networks also rely on computers and electricity both of which have vulnerabilities. A letdown in security could lead to physical attacks on the water infrastructure. At the National Infrastructure Protection Center, we are working with the Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies to assess threats and vulnerabilities, to share information about potential threats and to provide assistance and coordination between the public and private sectors. We do this with the assistance of the Department of Defense and more than a dozen agencies who are represented in the NIPC.
    Continued freedom of our country rests on our ability to work hand in hand with multiple agencies and the private sector. The eight infrastructures set forth in PDD 63 have recognized that although they are independent, they are interdependent and that we must work together in order to reduce or eliminate their own vulnerabilities and the impact one infrastructure may have on another. Only when Federal and local agencies work closely with the private sector can we succeed in mitigating damage across the critical infrastructure spectrum in times of crisis.
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    The FBI and the NIPC will continue to provide timely and credible warning information, law enforcement, counter intelligence and counter terrorism support to all our partners in order to fulfill and perform this vital mission. We are proud of the work of your committee, the Executive Branch and the private sector to ensure that water, the Nation's life blood, continues to be safe for all Americans.
    Thank you very much.
    Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Dick.
    I am going to yield my time for questions at this point to Mr. Rehberg who was here first on our side. Do you have any questions?
    Mr. REHBERG. No.
    Mr. DUNCAN. Then Mr. Otter was here next. Mr. Otter?
    Mr. OTTER. Thank you very much.
    Mr. McCullough and Mr. Dick, I apologize in advance. I am not going to spend a lot of time asking you folks questions because my questions really, as far as the West goes, as far as Idaho goes, we deal a lot more with the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers in that region.
    I would guess that September 11 did change an awful lot. No matter how much we are urged or encouraged to get back to normal, I don't have any idea what normal is ever going to be again because you can already see the character and the complexion of your missions have changed substantially. What happened on September 11 or even what didn't happen, nothing happened to a dam; nothing happened in major waterway pollution or things like that.
    I am concerned about a couple of things. In the West, we count an awful lot on the facilities of the Army Corps of Engineers—the water for shipping our goods overseas; obviously for irrigation; for recreation and I am concerned, Mr. Parker that with everything else that now is going to be coming your way, the Corps mission of keeping those channels open to commerce at a 14 foot depth which we are already in trouble on the Columbia and Snake River drainages, how are you going to be able to accomplish the new responsibilities you are looking at along with your Corps mission which is terribly important to us to be normal?
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    Mr. PARKER. First of all, let me say, Congressman, we are already doing risk assessment in the Northwest now; that is occurring as we speak because it is one of the most pivotal parts of the country as far as infrastructure.
    To say that it is going to be easy to solve all these problems nationwide, I cannot say that. We know it is going to be difficult and it is not something that just the Corps is going to do. The Congress is going to have to make some basic decisions on just how important is this. In all the threats we face, how important is this? I feel it is of paramount importance. We are going to have to join together, you are going to be making the tough decisions as far as what is going to be needed, what is going to have to be done, the type of capabilities we will have as far as protection and the level of protection that is there. It is not going to be easy.
    Mr. OTTER. Ms. Horinko?
    Ms. HORINKO. I have the same response basically as my colleague from the Army Corps. We already faced a full plate of statutory mandates in my program, the Superfund and the RCRA Hazardous Waste Program, the Underground Tank Program and in the Emergency Response Program. Balancing those priorities was not going to be an easy challenge before the events of September 11.
    I would only echo my colleagues that we will work with you to present those options and those priorities and try to make some sense of what the country's needs are and how we can best assure the protection of the public health in a way that not only responds to these new threats we all face but also ensures our Corps programs are protected and that we go on about the business of protecting human health and the environment.
    Mr. PARKER. We are doing what is necessary in the short term. The Corps is actively doing what they have to do right now. It is an emergency but we have to look to the long term. The long term is where the hard decisions have to be made. That is where we have to have the type of consultations to get guidance from you as far as how you want to handle this and at what level do you want to handle it.
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    Mr. OTTER. I certainly understand the urgency for protecting the metropolitan and populated areas. If you look down the long list of experts like yourselves we are going to have here today, most of them are addressing those sorts of things but there is a conclusive gap as far as I am concerned that most of these major facilities of the Corps are not in town. It takes a long time to get to the Hells Gate, Snake River Canyon from anywhere and there isn't anybody out there when you get there. So it is difficult for me to understand.
    I certainly understand the emphasis we are putting on the populated areas and the critical mass but I am also concerned that to our own peril, you take out one of those dams, you take out them all and there are quite a few as you go down the river.
    I do want to ask Mr. Dick a question. You referenced the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System. Is that secure from invasion by others? Can I look at that like I listen to a police radio?
    Mr. DICK. No, not at all. That is a telecommunications network wherein we send electronic communications to the 18,000 law enforcement agencies. It is specifically directed to State and local law enforcement agencies as well as the other Federal agencies.
    Mr. OTTER. One last question to all of you. How do we deal with the sensitive stuff that we have to deal with? I would hate to take a look at your report, Mr. Parker, and you say, we have a lot of problems and hate to have some newspaper go to your office and say under the Freedom of Information Act, I want that information and then publish it and do a 60 Minutes spiel on it or something.
    Are we going to have to change the character of the Freedom of Information Act relative to some of the reports and some of the assessments that all of you are making?
    Mr. PARKER. I am not familiar as far as what would have to be done. I do know the information we will be covering later in Executive Session is classified. There are some things that people don't need to know. I think we have gotten away from that in the past but it is a different world since September 11. We don't look at anything the same way. I take some responsibility personally as a member of Congress. I served in this body for ten years, I sat where you are sitting. I voted to automate a lot of these locks. I said, let us automate them and do with less people.
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    The problem is, when you do with less people, you do with less eyes and right now we need eyes out there and they are in rural areas. I take some personal responsibility as a member of Congress in making some of those decisions, but I didn't think about the terrorist activity we are having. It never entered my mind. Nobody ever talked about it. I don't think we could conceive it. It is so inhuman that none of us could conceive it.
    Now, all of a sudden we are faced with it and the paradigm has changed. We are looking at things in a totally different context, every one of us.
    Mr. OTTER. I would ask you all to respond to how much information do we dare get out there?
    Mr. DICK. The mission of the FBI has somewhat changed. Obviously we still investigate crimes, still conduct investigations involving counter intelligence and terrorism but our primary mission now is, particularly on critical infrastructure protection, to prevent and deter acts before they occur.
    One of the things we have done for the last three years in the National Infrastructure Protection Center is build a partnership with the private sector and the other Federal agencies by which to share information. There are several mechanisms that have been put in place in the private sector, for example. They are called information sharing and analysis centers owned and operated primarily by the private sector which is what we were talking about with the water works.
    One of those sectors, talking about information sharing, is you want to provide value added intelligence to the private sector that tells them something they don't know. If you can't do that, the private sector is not going to respond and not going to see the impact upon its bottom line and therefore, take action, whether that is dollars or in reduction of risk.
    One of the things we have done with electrical power, for example, is we have been able to get a limited number of people within the North American Electric Reliability Council security clearances so that on a limited basis, we can share classified information so as to sanitize it, so as to provide that value added to the private sector and the other government agencies because it does no good to sanitize stuff that doesn't provide any value.
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    In that process, we have learned over the last two years an ability to share information that provides value but doesn't cause risk.
    Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you.
    Mr. DeFazio?
    Mr. DEFAZIO. I have a high level of concern for a number of areas and it would be difficult to cover all of them. First, the statement by the FBI on affecting a city size population by hazardous industrial chemical attack on drinking water supply is not credible.
    I can think back to an accident in the western US on the Sacramento River involving a train and methamsodium which devastated many, many miles of river and then down into the reservoir. Should that happen in a key area in a city's water supply, I think there is a potential credible threat here.
    The key thing to me is that these people didn't bring anything with them except knowledge and a little bit of money. They used something that was here. They used our vulnerabilities and an airplane as a weapon of mass destruction. We have to think differently. We have to think about what is here, what can they use, because they haven't shown tremendous logistical capability, although I am very worried about that too. The Coast Guard and others are trying to deal with that, but that is not the jurisdiction of this committee.
    For this committee, following up on Mr. Otter's concern, thinking about what is here and the point he made about dams, not at this time of year but in the middle of the winter when those dams are full, if you take out one dam, you could take out a series of dam and cause a devastating flood. That would require explosives. I still think there is a risk there we have to be looking at and I know our dams need more security.
    Beyond that, I would think things that are already here, I could zero in on TVA and the nuclear plants. That is the most devastating thing I can think of. The then Interior Committee had jurisdiction over this issue a number of years ago. I can only hope but what I read in press accounts, I am not assured that security is much better than what we heard then.
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    What we heard then was, we have the same level of crack private security that we have at the airport gates. I don't know if that has really changed from what I read in press accounts. I am hoping I hear in the briefing it really has changed. I am very worried about that because there is something that is there. We have almost had meltdowns because of accidents. An intentional act by a not particularly large group of suicidal people could key such an event. That is the most devastating thing I can think of with long term impact. I am not reassured to see that the Pinkertons are at their highest level of security.
    Could you address that? Whatever you don't want to address publicly, we can talk about it privately.
    Mr. MCCULLOUGH. I will, Congressman. I visited Sequoyah Nuclear Plant about 9:30 p.m. on September 12. About 500 yards from the plant I was stopped by armed security, TVA police, federally accredited officers. They made me prove my identity. Then I got to what was previously the guard gate. Again, same procedure, armed guards, TVA police and Pinkerton security.
    The perimeter of that plant, the TVA property, is secured by TVA police officers regularly on foot and other surveillance measures. The water, the intake for the water of that facility, is patrolled by boats with officers armed. We are working, TVA police and other agencies, to make sure that is the case.
    Once I entered the plant, I was fingerprinted, it took about half a hour for me to actually gain entry to what is the administrative complex. This is far before you get to any of the control room facilities. So there were tremendously heightened security measures taken, not only the government Pinkerton security guard but also TVA police.
    The scenario that you outlined is one that I am not totally satisfied with but I would tell you that we have to form a network of Federal agencies—Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Defense, our military resources—because these are the people that have great technological capacity to understand a potential threat.
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    In fact, we identified that fairly early after the tragic events in the World Trade Center, that there were potential other threats. Mr. Dick referenced a more advanced communications network that needs to be put in place.
    We, at TVA, are committed to working with all Federal, State and local organizations to secure not only the land but as best we can, the water and the air against the possible scenario that you described.
    Mr. DEFAZIO. I am assured to hear about the TVA police but in many other cases, we have totally private nuclear plants with totally private security. Mr. Dick, would you care to address that at all?
    Mr. DICK. If I indicated in my testimony that I didn't believe there was risk, that there were potential threats and that isn't a need for us to do our due diligence in protecting those assets, I apologize because there is that threat or potential threat. However, what I was trying to indicate is that we have no specific, credible threat that we are aware of directed against any of our water supply systems at this time.
    Mr. DEFAZIO. From the last attack, that is part of the problem, not knowing where they are going next.
    Mr. DICK. That is exactly right. One of the things the FBI does in partnership with other Federal agencies as well as State and local law enforcement agencies is a continual threat assessment process. When we receive information regardless of the source, whether intelligence information from one of those partners or State and local law enforcement, one of the things we begin the process of doing with the 20 partners of the Center is doing an interagency determination of that threat. Is it credible, meaning do the facts as we know them indicate there is even the possibility, the feasibility, technically to deliver the threat as indicated. Is the will of the identified organization consistent with what they have done. So we go through a process of trying to identify is this credible or not.
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    If it is, then we go into action, sharing that information with our other partners, developing contingency plans with the appropriate agency whether it is law enforcement response or a prevention measure with EPA or the Corps of Engineers and put things in place so as to prevent those acts or to deter them. So there is an ongoing process continually of doing that.
    Do we hit the mark 100 percent of the time? I would like to say we do but obviously with the events of September 11, we didn't have the information to do that kind of threat assessment or we would have taken different actions.
    Mr. DEFAZIO. I guess the key point I wanted to make was back to the idea that there are threats with things that are important, whether chemical, biological or nuclear devices and we need to guard against those. In particular, I think we need to turn our attention to ways they can use our own infrastructure against us in very devastating ways and most permanent and most devastating being a nuclear plant, pipelines not as devastating, the hazardous chemicals from existing sources being trucks or trains being another. Those are the concerns I have.
    If we have one nut in Alaska who can cause such devastation with his hunt rifle, obviously we have some vulnerabilities here.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. DUNCAN. I have many nights up here with six members of Congress, two of whom are what we sometimes refer to as cardinals, senior members of the Appropriations Committee. One of those senior appropriators last night estimated that over the next five years, we will spend $1.5 trillion on security measures we probably wouldn't have spent had it not been for the events of September 11. I thought that was extremely high but one other member who is chairman of one of the full committees basically agreed.
    In the Wall Street Journal last week in a lead editorial on the Farm Bill, they said, ''We would like to suggest a new post-September 11 rule for Congress. Any bill with the word 'security' in it should get double the public scrutiny and maybe four times the normal weight lest all kinds of bad legislation become law under the phoney guise of fighting terrorism.''
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    What we are finding now is every department and agency is coming to us telling us they need a lot more money because of the extra security precautions they are having to take. I am sure much of that is very legitimate.
    I also know if we spent the entire Federal budget, if we stopped paying social security and doing everything the Federal Government does and spent everything on security, we still couldn't make the country 100 percent totally and completely safe.
    I would like all four of you to respond to this. One, I would like to know have you had meetings in your various departments or agencies talking about the money and how much extra you are going to need or request because of what is happening? Secondly, how do we balance that? How do we do all the other things that the Federal Government is doing and needs to keep doing but we do all this extra security everyone wants? There is a pretty difficult balance we need there.
    Secretary Parker, I will start with you.
    Mr. PARKER. The Corps of Engineers is in the process now of assessing all critical facilities, all infrastructure throughout the country that we handle. We have an estimate but that would change either going down or up depending on what the findings of the assessment are. That would be done within the next few weeks.
    The estimate we have, just going in and seeing basic things, would be $267.3 million initially for the first year and $65 million every year thereafter on those particular structures.
    Mr. DUNCAN. Chairman McCullough?
    When this $1.5 trillion estimate was made over the next five years, he was talking about not increasing Federal spending by that much but part of it would be an increase in Federal spending, part would be diverting resources from other programs within a department or agency.
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    Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Consistent with our Presidential Decision Directive No. 63, TVA had already identified the critical infrastructure and put a risk analysis on all of those infrastructures throughout the Tennessee Valley.
    In specific response to your question, relating to the price of security, we have 192 sworn TVA police officers. The cost of overtime TVA is incurring right now is $60,000 per week. Many of these officers are working 12-hour days, oftentimes 7 days a week.
    TVA Police Director, Jim Carver, who is here with me today, and our Manager of Nuclear Security, Jim Setliffe is here, and we are taking a look at our procedure because obviously our procedure will have to change and we will have to improve.
    We have been in communication with Governor Sundquist in Tennessee, Governor Seigelman in Alabama, officials in the State of Kentucky because we think it is going to require collaborative efforts at the Federal, State and local levels to ensure appropriate security measures are in place. There should be some sort of appropriate resource sharing, a manner in which the people of the country can be made as secure as possible, a way that the infrastructure, the water, the nuclear facilities, the coal plants, the dams of this country can be made as secure as possible but be done in a way that reflects the proper priority in terms of the national security.
    Mr. DUNCAN. Besides your overtime, and that is a significant cost, have you found there is a need to reinforce any of the dams or nuclear facilities in some way?
    Mr. MCCULLOUGH. We think there are some technologies that are available that perhaps now that our priorities are realigned in light of September 11, that can be employed. There is an obvious investment that will have to be made, technologies coupled with perhaps more manpower, and there are ways to do that, to make our critical infrastructure, the dams, the water supply, the nuclear plants, more secure and safe.
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    Mr. DUNCAN. Administrator Horinko?
    Ms. HORINKO. We are already spending millions in this area and have worked with the Office of Management and Budget and the Appropriations Committee to request significant additional funding. I want to briefly mention the three categories that we see as a critical need, particularly in the wake of September 11.
    The first are funds to carry out our preparedness and response and coordination issues, primarily training for our on-scene coordinators who are well versed in chemical threats because of our existing Hazardous Materials Response Program, but need additional training on biological threats, other threats that may be out there, data, information, response activities and that area.
    The second are funds to protect all of our facilities, our laboratories, critical infrastructure so that if the Government or part of it can be incapacitated, we can still function effectively.
    The third area are funds to better secure the oil and chemical and water infrastructure we are charged with protecting and guarding.
    As you see our budget request, and we will provide you with specifics in terms of numbers, those are the critical activities you will see us asking to be beefed up.
    Mr. DUNCAN. You say you have already spent millions in these first weeks?
    Ms. HORINKO. No, annually, I meant.
    Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Dick?
    Mr. DICK. Obviously we go through the normal budget process with the Department of Justice and OMB but in light of the events of September 11, we have submitted a supplemental proposal to DOJ and OMB which would expedite our ability to reach maximum capacity, to detect, assess, warn of, respond to and investigate acts of terrorism whether physical or cyber.
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    We are hopeful that these proposals will be received well by OMB but we are waiting for that to go through the process.
    Mr. DUNCAN. What was the amount of that request?
    Mr. DICK. I do not know offhand.
    Mr. DUNCAN. I do know you have a difficult job. I read recently that the FBI had 24,000 tips to sort through. That was a few days ago and I am sure there have been more now.
    Mr. Mascara?
    Mr. MASCARA. Thank you for appearing before this committee and thank you for calling these hearings.
    I come from a part of southwestern Pennsylvania where part of my district includes Allegheny County which is adjacent to the City of Pittsburgh which has major problems as it is. I come from a small community which has a very small water company. I have a couple of questions.
    To the FBI, we happen to have an FBI office in our community. Should they be working with our water authority to basically tell them how they can help protect that water system? A lot of these systems just have a reservoir and someone could dump something in those things. Are they currently asking the water company to come in and discuss major problems as relates to security?
    Mr. DICK. There are two questions there? Are they? I am not sure. I would have to discuss it with our field office in Pittsburgh. Hopefully the answer to that is going to be yes because that should be occurring, either through our Joint Terrorism Task Force efforts or through our Infraguard Program because one of the issues that Director Muller is adamant about is to be working with other government agencies, both State and local as well as the private sector, to deter these acts of terrorism. That only comes about by what you just described.
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    I don't know definitively that is occurring but I assure you I will find out and make sure it does.
    Mr. MASCARA. I spoke to the Mayor of the City of Pittsburgh on Sunday and to several mayors in these small communities and they are asking me how we are going to finance the security which leads me to the next question. Are your agencies prepared, you have a sufficient amount of funding now that if you are contacted by some local water authorities to provide them with some information on what they should do and how they should do it, Mr. Parker?
    Mr. PARKER. For example, the Corps of Engineers and the FBI are working in conjunction on the water supply for New York City now. The Corps is doing the assessment along with the FBI so there is interagency work occurring now.
    In the short term, the Corps is doing what it needs to do and has to do to make everything work now.
    When you look at the long term, you are talking if you broaden that scope from the emergency we have at this point, then the costs are going to go up. That is a decision that Congress has to make on how they will fund all these things and these interagency discussions.
    Let me point out one other thing. One of the problems you have with agencies, they are like a black hole. You have all kinds of information going in but they don't like information coming out. When Governor Ridge talked about there can't be turf battles, that is where the turf battles are going to occur. I am very concerned about that.
    I pledge the Corps is going to share information but we have been at this place a long time and know how it works. That is something Congress has to watch closely.
    Mr. MASCARA. I come from a region where we have three rivers—the Monongahela, the Ohio and the Allegheny. There is a lock and dam project going on there now, a $700 million project and I don't need to tell you how important it is to secure the locks along those three rivers. Is there any special attention being paid to those locks and dam systems that terrorist might attack and disrupt the flow of goods and commerce on those three rivers?
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    Mr. PARKER. The Corps of Engineers is doing everything we can be doing at this point in doing assessments and making sure all infrastructure is protected. In the Executive Session that will occur shortly, we will give more information to the committee as far as exactly what is being done in all areas.
    Mr. MASCARA. Thank you.
    Mr. DUNCAN. Ms. Kelly.
    Mrs. KELLY. To put my question in perspective, I represent three nuclear plants within 35 miles of New York City. One is inactive; the other two are active and sit on a large stretch of the Hudson River which I also represent. I also represent the lower third of the New York City water system.
    Ms. Horinko, you talked about monitoring the water system. My concern with that is when you find something in the water, it is after something has happened. I would ask the EPA to focus on prevention and work very carefully with the other two agencies here today to make sure what you are focusing on is prevention so your monitoring doesn't come up with something that you haven't tried to guess about beforehand.
    I would like to speak with the Army Corps later on in the closed session about what they are doing. My job is to keep my people safe and I have a lot to keep safe. I am going to hold my questions until the closed session.
    Mr. DUNCAN. Ms. Millender-McDonald?
    Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. I would like to welcome the Mayor of the City of Long Beach today. She will be testifying on the second panel and it is indeed a pleasure to see her here.
    As we talk about water resources in the region, in my district we have the West Basin Municipal Water District, the Central Basin, reclamation, replenishment throughout that Southern California region and they are the largest ones throughout the Nation.
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    We are certainly concerned about threats, impending threats and lack of security when it comes to the events of September 11. I am told we will go into a closed session to talk with you about some of the things I am concerned about. I will hold those questions until that time.
    Thank you so much, all of you who are here, and look forward to questioning and finding some answers to some of the concerns that my region has in terms of the threats given September 11.
    Mr. Chairman, I do have a statement for the record. May I submit that?
    Mr. DUNCAN. Yes, you may.
    Mr. Brown was next on our side.
    Mr. BROWN. Thanks for coming. It gives me great comfort to know that you are here and are willing to talk to each other about this problem.
    My concern is we sit around thinking about the missile defense system and spending billions of dollars to address that problem. At the same hour the event took place, there were 2,200 planes flying around. I don't know whether we had an agency address that or even a concern that planes could be used as a weapon.
    We have to think outside the paradigm as we deal with the terrorists. Security is not stopping at a checkpoint and opening your trunk to see if something is there. I think we have to go beyond that, become more protective of our borders, more protective of our employees, more scrutiny to those working for us.
    We know how these people came to America. Mr. Dick, I understand the FBI probably had some leads on some of the ones involved in the tragedy of the 11th. I think we have to be ready to take action. We have to deport more people. Our land of the free and comfort we have always enjoyed has been threatened, so somehow we have to be able to gain back that security--whatever it takes. Maybe our borders have been too open. We have to stop those people before they come.
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    It is almost like being raised on a farm when they said you have to close the gate, you can't keep chasing the horses. That is what we have to do. We have to think outside the paradigm and become more proactive in trying to detect those that will bring harm and keep them from coming.
    Mr. Dick, I was curious about your testimony about the hazardous waste, particularly hazardous materials getting into the water systems. Did I understand correctly you said the purification of the water would somehow screen out those impurities? Is that correct?
    Mr. DICK. It is my understanding from a technical standpoint, that is correct. The purification process that water goes through would dramatically limit the damage. The chemical process?
    Mr. BROWN. Yes
    Mr. DICK. Chemically, it is the dilution. It would take a lot of chemical dropped into a reservoir or a facility to cause any significant impact because of the dilution effect that occurs.
    Mr. BROWN. Somehow we have to condition our thought process to think like the terrorists. I had dinner at the top of the World Trade Center the Friday before the incident on Tuesday. I felt very secure, although it was 110 stories up and felt a bit dizzy about that. The point being nothing in my imagination—we saw the planes flying around--but there was no connection in my thought process that a plane would ever destroy those two towers.
    I just think we have to start thinking outside of our normal thought process as we deal with the events that will take place.
    Mr. DICK. I couldn't agree more. I know the FBI agrees. As you indicated, the events of September 11 reflect the absolute need for that kind of thinking. I believe we are doing that. I am not going to say we are going to think of them all, but we are going to give it our best effort.
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    Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Gilchrest is next.
    Mr. GILCHREST. There has been a lot of discussion about sharing information which I realize is important. I know we have under Governor Ridge a new prospect for an entity called Homeland Security in which there will be some structure, I would assume, to coordinate various Federal, State, local and maybe even the private sector for a response to disasters, the training in anticipation of that happening, the evaluation and all those things which would require sharing of information.
    Not knowing exactly how that will be structured, is there now some type of structure in which the various agencies, whether the Department of Transportation, the FBI, EPA, Corps of Engineers, Health and Human Services, Department of Defense, some of their counterparts at the State level, local level, the private sector, where that sharing of information meets on a regular basis, where there are individuals from the various agencies to coordinate this. If that does happen, which is the lead agency or is there a head person that oversees this rather extraordinary bureaucracy?
    Mr. PARKER. In 1977, the President issued a Presidential Decision Directive, No. 63. I don't know what caused him to issue that directive. Whatever it was, it was a good idea.
    They brought all these agencies together and they started talking about threat assessment, terrorism and that report was just completed on August 21 of this year. The Chair of that goes from agency to agency, a rotating Chair. It is in place, we are not starting from zero. It is in place now and the agencies are talking. How effectively they are talking, I don't know.
    Mr. GILCHREST. That report, is there a lead agency, an entity—does that report now lend itself—
    Mr. PARKER. No. They got together so they could discuss things.
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    Mr. GILCHREST. Who makes the decision as to what information an agency is going to share with another agency?
    Mr. PARKER. I have to tell you, I don't know what Governor Ridge and the President have discussed and what Congress is discussing with them as far as how this is to be set up, but it will have to be modeled something after what we have in place already because the agency is already there.
    My view is that Governor Ridge would now be the head of that task force or something like that because it is the information they all have individually, each of the agencies that can be brought together to make sure the decisions can be made properly. Everything is in place for all of that to occur.
    Mr. GILCHREST. Is there a need for Congress to pass legislation to help that process or is this something the President can do through the executive order? We can't forget the guy on the ground who responds from a volunteer fire department perspective to have some training and some tools to deal with a biological entity that may have been part of a horrific explosion or contamination of a port or some training in the initial chemical response so you wouldn't have to wait four or five hours for a Federal entity to do that.
    Mr. PARKER. The Stafford Act comes into play anytime you have a major disaster. When the first plane hit, the Corps was on the phone automatically, so was FEMA, it was all activated.
    Mr. GILCHREST. The local fire department, local public works people, local health department, would know. They have in place, on the ground in this country a number to call so they can respond to that.
    Mr. PARKER. When the Corps saw it on television immediately started the process. They saw it on CNN before they got any calls. That is the way every Federal agency was, they knew it was happening.
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    Mr. GILCHREST. The people in Miami or New York or Missoula, Montana or Annapolis, Maryland now have the tools and training to respond to biological contamination or chemical contamination?
    Ms. HORINKO. If I could answer, the way things work under PDD 63, different agencies have the lead for different sectors of the national response capability. For example, EPA has the lead for water supply protection and is actually providing information to local water suppliers and will shortly be providing advanced security tools to these water suppliers.
    Mr. GILCHREST. Does EPA have some access on a regular basis to potential terrorists that might contaminate that water supply?
    Ms. HORINKO. We work closely with the FBI and with FEMA, with the Department of Justice on potential threats and provide information as we believe is appropriate to potential targets in order to alert them. Similarly, the folks on the ground in Miami, New York and other cities, the fire departments and local responders are well tied into our local emergency planning committees and our State Emergency Response Committees. We maintain 24-hour hotlines for them to call in any national responses. Many tons of thousands of these calls of local hazmat incidents, hoaxes, threats of biological contaminations, things of that nature are reported annually and EPA responds with the local departments to provide the appropriate expertise to get on the scene immediately.
    Mr. DICK. Part of the coordination effort identified in PDD-63 was the reason that the National Infrastructure Protection Center was created. We came into existence in February 1998 and then Presidential Decision Directive came out in May of 1998. What we have built is what you have described, an interagency center composed of currently 12 or 14 agencies that have people on staff, full time working to identify issues associated with not only cyber but now physical infrastructure issues. In that process, we have learned a lot about cultures of the different agencies, we have learned how to work together and produce products that provide value added.
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    The thing to keep in mind is most of the crown jewels of this country are not owned by the Government or State and local, they are owned by the private sector. So we have a huge partner now in providing the kind of information that provides assurance there is value added in working with us. I think we are making that kind of progress.
    Mr. McCullough. My understanding of how Secretary Ridge's Council on Homeland Security will be structured is Governor Sundquist in Tennessee has appointed Brigadier General Wendell Gilbert as the Chairman of the Council on Homeland Security for the State of Tennessee. It will be Chairman Gilbert's responsibility to coordinate all these agencies, public and private, in the State of Tennessee. That will be replicated throughout the Nation.
    Mr. GILCHREST. Thank you.
    Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Shuster is next.
    Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you for coming here today.
    My question is directed to Chairman McCullough and Director Dick concerning your private/public security forces. I want to try to understand how our infrastructure is being secured and also many in this body are clamoring for Federal takeover of security in airports. I think from what I have read we have here a successful model on how private/public can work together.
    Could you comment on the structure of those security forces and your view of its effectiveness?
    Mr. MCCULLOUGH. TVA police officers are part of our 13,388 TVA member team. We have 192 federally-sworn officers, highly trained, skilled and dedicated. They patrol the perimeter of the property surrounding one of our nuclear facilities, for example.
    We contract with Pinkerton Government Services, an ordained process, approved by Congress through the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. These government services officers actually secure our nuclear plants. So we have the private sector, the Pinkerton Government Services we contract with, which secures the plants themselves. The perimeter, whether it is land or water, is patrolled by TVA police officers.
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    The requirements to be employed by Pinkerton are requirements actually approved by Congress. There is a five-year background check in terms of employment history, there is psychological testing, an FBI background check that is required and a number of other very stringent requirements have to be met before a candidate would be considered for employment by Pinkerton at a nuclear site.
    We also coordinate that with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. They monitor this process to ensure that sites are as secure as possible. We are working with agencies right now, organizations public and private, that have nuclear generation capacity, working with the Nuclear Energy Institute, with the Electric Power Research Institute, EPRI, to take a look at the procedures and perhaps find some suggestions for how the process might be improved. Basically, that is how it works.
    Mr. SHUSTER. What was that breakdown again?
    Mr. MCCULLOUGH. We have 192 sworn TVA police officers. As far as the number of contracted Pinkerton Security officers, it is in the 200 person range. For security sensitivity reasons, I don't know that we want to be very specific but we are doing everything we can to make sure it is an appropriate level of manpower and also technology. There are so many technological ways to enhance security, not only at nuclear but at other critical infrastructures.
    Mr. DICK. The only piece I can add to that is the second piece. What was described goes to the day to day security which is vitally important insofar as deterring and preventing acts because the harder the target is to hit the less likely there will be one. However, if there is an act, one of the things the FBI has worked on very closely with the TVA is in exercising, knowing where to stage, how to respond to an incident, who to call, having a contingency plan in place that is practiced in the event of some sort of crisis, whatever that might be. That is the second piece. Prevention, detection and deterrence is the goal, but you still have to respond if there is an incident.
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    Mr. SHUSTER. It sounds to me from what I have read that it has been successful, so it can be used as a model to provide security for other assets we have in this country.
    Thank you.
    Mr. DUNCAN. Chairman Horn?
    Mr. HORN. Let me ask this panel one or two questions.
    To what degree have you sent papers to OMB as to computer security? Has that gone in based on what your computer security problem is? Some of the inspector generals are kind of worried about that. Mr. Parker, how are you doing on that?
    Mr. PARKER. All our computers were destroyed at the Pentagon, so we are sitting in temporary offices trying to get a fax machine.
    I will check on that. I have not addressed that issue at all.
    Mr. HORN. I know about the FBI. They have done a splendid job and you have worked with our subcommittee, so I am well aware of it.
    EPA, what is happening with the computers there?
    Ms. HORINKO. We were very fortunate that with the exception of our EPA regional office in New York that was taken down for several weeks because of their proximity to the World Trade Center, the rest of our EPA servers and computers have been operating.
    What we are looking at is the whole continuity of operations in terms of if there was another incident, would we have sufficient replicability of data, ability to get information out to our folks in the field; if something were to happen to the EPA mainframe, could we still have on-scene responders who were able to get the key data needed to respond to an incident. We are taking a careful look at that right now.
    Mr. HORN. Mr. McCullough, the TVA is pretty independent. What about the computer security? Have you looked at that situation?
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    Mr. MCCULLOUGH. We are operated independently but accountable to you. I will work with Director Daniels of OMB to ensure that our computer technology, we have an interface with OMB and that we are secure and have backup systems in place. I will follow up with Director Daniels to make sure that is the case. That is a great point.
    Mr. HORN. Ms. Horinko, one of the most necessary private sector things that needs to be looked at, and you are the agency to look at it, is laboratories that could work rapidly if there is various types of ''flu'' whether it is flu or anthrax or anything else. Have you a fairly able list of those laboratories throughout the Nation so that could rapidly be solved, and get panic put in the trenches?
    Ms. HORINKO. We work very closely with the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta which has the lead on that portion of the Federal Response plan for responding to an incident. They maintain the laboratories. Our folks are the on-scene responders and we work very closely so that we can get the data we need from them and the samples we need to get to them to respond very quickly in the case of an incident.
    Mr. HORN. The Results Act, you have those to submit under the law. How is that coming? Has it been sent to the Hill yet in terms of the so-called Results Act that we put on the books about ten years ago to look at performance and to set up a way to find not just human performance but what is the real measurement of going ahead and meeting that particular situation. Has that happened with EPA?
    Ms. HORINKO. I assume you are referring to the Government Performance and Results Act and EPA's specific goal in this area is to respond effectively to all of our incidents that occur. I think we are meeting or exceeding all of our GPRA goals in the emergency response area.
    Mr. HORN. I won't be here for the second group but I did want to note that Beverly O'Neill, the Mayor of Long Beach is at the top of the list. That is certainly a good place for her because she is a leader in both the State mayors and the national mayors. She also has the largest port in the United States in Long Beach. Next to her is the Los Angeles Port and they both juggle each other around each week as to who has more containers coming in.
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    I am particularly interested in knowing what, if any, and I won't be there because I have to run back to my own committee where we have debt collection today, dull but this is exciting, and hopefully Mayor O'Neill will tell us what if any she has had in terms of Federal resources given those ports right under the nose and easy to have its problems.
    Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Horn.
    Mr. Blumenauer?
    Mr. BLUMENAUER. I apologize for the delay. We are in a hearing across the way in International Relations dealing with communications in the Middle East.
    I appreciate your having the hearing and the opportunity for the witnesses to come forward.
    I am interested in two areas. Forgive me if this has already been discussed but I am keenly interested in the capacity we have for working with smaller communities, local government, city, county, regions, that are now scrambling to look at different contexts.
    Since I have been in Congress, we in this and other subcommittees have been troubled by problems with the Federal Government getting its act together. We have legislation moving forward but the critical connection with the tens of thousands of local jurisdictions is something I would be interested in discussing in terms of what new initiatives we are going to have for strengthening existing provisions to make sure they have that capacity.
    Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Our TVA Police Director, Jim Carver, with the concurrence of Director Skila Harris, is initiating a valley-wide security initiative based on the fact that security in America is not just the responsibility of the Department of Defense or the FBI, the CIA or the National Guard, or the local police officers. Security is all our responsibility. It is the responsibility of 280 million Americans to ensure this Nation is as safe and secure as it can and should be.
    We want to work with local officials, with mayors, with county executives, with people at the State level to ensure that we have the right kind of communications procedures in place. It goes back to neighborhood community oriented policing. I think that is the best security for the Nation, to take it to the local level and that is what we plan to do in the Tennessee Valley.
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    Mr. BLUMENAUER. I appreciate that. I am curious about the capacity the local governments have in your assessment and what if anything the Federal Government needs to do to help beef up their response. We agree on the philosophy. There is some question I think about the ability of State and local governments to respond in kind.
    Mr. MCCULLOUGH. I think it begins with Secretary Ridge at the Federal level and you are going to have some mayors of great cities in here in a little while and they can give you a response to the capacity.
    Mr. DICK. If I may comment on that, one of the things we can do in the FBI and within the National Infrastructure Protection Center is to share information associated with those threats. We are doing that in two ways. As pointed out, one of the best ways is on a grassroots level for which we have an initiative that is called Infraguard that has regular meetings through our 56 field offices and I think we have 60 chapters now.
    Also, we are working closely in helping to create what we call our Information Sharing and Analysis Center which was talked about in PDD-63. That is sector specific, water being one of the sectors. I think what is being considered now is the Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies is going to be the vehicle by which to reach back to—I saw the number in the paper—168,000 water entities to work with them. Obviously the 56 field offices of the FBI will have contact with those water entities but it is difficult to work with them in the context of filling the holes of the threats. That is what the Information Sharing and Analysis Center will do.
    Mr. BLUMENAUER. One of the things I would leave with you and be very interested in subsequent assessment you may have is what needs to be done to make sure the capacity is there at the State and local level and if any changes in Federal policy are necessary to make sure the resources are there for the extraordinary demands we are going to be placing on people, not second guessing whether or not they have done it in the past.
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    Let me put a question to the EPA. I was interested this last week when we had some drunk with a rifle shooting the pipeline in Alaska, hundreds of thousands of gallons of oil, 800 miles long. Some suggest that ought to be the basis for our future energy security. I would be curious about what steps we are taking, EPA in particular, so that we don't get an 800 mile long candle by some concerted act of terrorism in this area.
    I know my time is close to expiring. If you have some initial reactions, I would be interested but I would like to have part of the record what is going to happen with your notion of the pipeline security?
    Ms. HORINKO. We are working closely with our partners at the Department of Transportation as pipeline security is part of their mandate as well as ours and working with our private sector partners to beef up security and see what in terms of infrastructure they need to do to make sure incidents like this don't happen again.
    Apparently the pipeline gets shot at all the time but it has never been breached until now. We were as horrified as you when we learned of this incident.
    Mr. BLUMENAUER. I appreciate your courtesy, Mr. Chairman. I guess my concern goes beyond some drunk with a high powered rifle but what happens now if somebody has a concerted effort? The vulnerability of that facility gives all of us pause.
    Ms. HORINKO. Absolutely right.
    Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Culberson?
    Mr. CULBERSON. No.
    Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much. You have all been outstanding witnesses.
    Now we are going to have a classified briefing primarily by the Army Corps and also by the FBI. I am told that will take about a half hour. We have to move to a secured room and that will be 2253.
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    Secretary Parker told me yesterday he had some information the members really need to hear. So we will proceed to 2253 and reconvene for the second panel in approximately a half hour.
    Mr. DUNCAN. We have just had a very informative, interesting classified briefing with indications of how serious these considerations are.
    I apologize to the witnesses. We did have quite a few members at that classified briefing. Some of them will be joining us in the next few minutes.
    We are pleased to have with us today the Mayor from the City of Long Beach. I mentioned earlier Long Beach has long been a leader in preparation for the problems we are discussing today. We have the Honorable Beverly O'Neill, the Mayor of Long Beach, California.
    We have Mr. Jeffrey J. Danneels, Department Manager, Security Systems and Technology Center, Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
    We have Mr. John P. Sullivan, Jr., Chief Engineer, Boston Water and Sewer Commission from Boston, Massachusetts, representing the Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies.
    We have Mr. Patrick T. Karney, Director, Metropolitan Sewer District of Greater Cincinnati representing the Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies.
    We have Ms. JoAnne H. Moreau, Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness of Baton Rouge, Louisiana on behalf of the East Baton Rouge Parish.
    We have Mr. Randy G. Speight, Jr., Director, Chemical Emergency Transportation Center from Arlington, Virginia on behalf of the American Chemistry Council.
    We are very honored and pleased to have all of these witnesses with us. We always proceed in the order the witnesses are listed on the call of the hearing. Mayor O'Neill is temporarily out, so Mr. Danneels, we will proceed with you.
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    Mr. DANNEELS. Thank you for inviting me here today to testify. My name is Jeff Danneels and I lead the effort at Sandia National Labs to improve or help improve the security of the water infrastructure.
    Sandia is the DOE's Office of Safeguards and Security lead laboratory for physical security, research and development. In the past 25 years, the DOE has invested over $500 million in Sandia security programs. We have three organizations at Sandia working on national and international security programs with over 600 staff.
    Mr. Parker of the Corps spoke earlier about the Interagency Forum for Infrastructure Protection, the IFIP as it is known. IFIP members include the Corps, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Bonneville Power Administration, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation amongst others.
    Sandia led the IFIP project that developed a comprehensive security risk management methodology for large Federal dams, a training program on that methodology, and a train-the-trainer program.
    Sandia is presently developing a security risk methodology and trading program for the water infrastructure under a project funded by the Environmental Protection Agency and the American Water Works Association Research Foundation. We have completed two water utility assessments and developed a preliminary methodology that will be refined in the coming weeks.
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    In a parallel effort, we are developing a comprehensive training program for the methodology. The national water infrastructure affects every single citizen of the United States. Across the U.S. over 27 billion gallons of water are pumped on an average day. Much of the water infrastructure in our large urban areas is extremely old and is subject to both natural and malevolent threats. An attack on the water infrastructure does not require high tech tools, well organized teams or exotic chemicals.
    The first component in the water system to be assessed for security risks are the sources or supplies of water which include the reservoirs, lakes, rivers, streams, and groundwater wells. Contamination of large volume water supplies such as reservoirs is considered difficult because of significant dilution. However, the risk of contamination increases with decreased water volume.
    The United States has over 6,800 public supply drinking water intakes on rivers alone. To protect against the risk of natural and intentional contamination upstream of water intakes early warning systems with real time monitoring sensors are needed.
    For the majority of the water utilities the next component to be assessed for risk is the water treatment facility. In this system, damage to the physical assets or hacking into the supervisory control and data acquisition computer systems that control the water utility are of concern.
    Many contaminating agents may be immobilized or deactivated by filtration and other treatment processes commonly employed in today's treatment plants. These processes are particularly effective in removing biological agents and biotoxins. While the filtration and other disinfection barriers operate as deterrents for many of the biological agents, chemicals exist that could pass through the system.
    After being treated, the water either enters the distribution system directly or enters temporary storage. Numerous reports have highlighted the fact that the distribution system is easily contaminated and is the most vulnerable water utility component.
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    From the distribution system waste water is collected and sent on to the waste water treatment plant. This part of the system has largely been overlooked in the security efforts to date but the waste water component must be included as an integral part of the overall system. Damage to the waste water treatment facility not only prevents the waste water from being treated but also can have significant impacts on down river water intakes.
    As noted earlier, the water infrastructure is highly interdependent with several other infrastructures. Many of the large municipal systems rely heavily on the electrical power grid to move water through the system. The chemical industry and the transportation system are also very important to water utilities.
    Security is built from the combination of policies, procedures, people and technology. The performance based security risk assessment methodology employed by Sandia begins with a clear statement of the performance requirements for the security system. Based on available threat information, the water utility must decide what threat or spectrum of threats they want a reasonable probability of defeating. The methodology will identify critical assets, system vulnerabilities, consequences of malevolent acts and provide a decision support structure for making security improvements.
    It is important to note that to date many of our recommendations are not traditional security systems but instead operational changes that will enhance security. Those involve protecting the water infrastructure have developed a private/public partnership as called for by the PCCIP. The Water Sector Critical Infrastructure Protection Advisory Group was formed in 2000.
    Both of the project managers from AwwaRf as I mentioned earlier and the EPA directing the work of Sandia to develop the security risk assessment methodology for water utilities are members of this advisory group. We have been asked by AwwaRF to develop a comprehensive training program on the security methodology for water utilities and that will be delivered in December of this year and January of next year.
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    Sandia, the EPA, the FBI, the CDC, industry associations, and several major water utilities have developed a methodology, a framework that has subsequently been tested and refined through risk assessments of water systems in the United States. These assessment tools are being further tested on additional large municipal systems and will soon be available to other water utilities.
    One issue that was brought up earlier is the control of information and we share the same concern. The last thing we want to do is detail a report that shows every vulnerability of a water system and have that subject to be put into a newspaper.
    A quick method to improve water security is to provide awareness training. The goal of the awareness program is to educate the utilities on the importance of protecting their infrastructure and the beginning steps on how to accomplish this protection. Research and development projects are needed in several areas to enhance the security of the water sector. Further development of the security risk assessment methodology, enhanced security systems specifically designed for water utilities, operational research into inherent security designs, real time sensing of water quality and advance treatment methods are all areas requiring investment.
    Sandia and the DOE's Chemical-Biological Nonproliferation Program has invested over $11 million to design and prototype hand-held chemistry laboratories. Experiments with the prototype liquid analysis system have demonstrated complete analysis of biotoxins in less than four minutes.
    The gas phase microchem lab unit successfully collected, separated and detected trace levels of various nerve agents and blister agents in only two minutes.
    I do have the working parts of a micro chem lab in my pocket if anyone would like to see them. This is mainly filled with air. There are three components in here that are about the size of a postage stamp and this will actually detect aerosol agents. It has been tested on live agents.
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    Research into advance treatment methods like nanofiltration may eliminate the hazard posed by many of the potential biological contaminants.
    In conclusion, the public/private partnership initiated last year is a good model to collectively put the right programs in place. The efforts underway such as the development of the risk assessment methodology for water utilities will require refinements to provide a solid foundation for improving security.
    The public/private partnership model developed for the water supply and distribution systems should be extended to the source water and waste water communities. Throughout the water infrastructure, but especially in source water and distribution systems, early warning, monitoring capabilities have to be developed and installed. We must know what is in the water and have time to react before it is consumed. Advance treatment processes at both treatment facilities and point of use applications could render many of the contaminants harmless.
    We may need to rethink the way we treat and deliver water. Distributed treatment systems or other more secure methods may be needed. Our collective goal is to make the water infrastructure an unattractive target for terrorism.
    Mr. DUNCAN. Previously when I announced the second panel, I introduced Mayor O'Neill. We always proceed in the order the witnesses are listed on the call of the hearing. Mayor O'Neill, that meant you were first but you were momentarily out which I understand. I am going to call on Ms. Millender-McDonald for a special introduction of this next witness.
    Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD. Thank you so much for your sensitivity, Mr. Chairman.
    I am indeed pleased on behalf of my friend, Congressman Steve Horn who is now chairing one of his subcommittees, and myself who share the City of Long Beach to really welcome the Mayor of Long Beach, the Honorable Beverly O'Neill.
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    Steve was correct that you had her at the top of the list of persons and that is not to diminish anyone else who serves on this panel today but she is indeed a world class mayor from a world class city.
    While we have so much in place in terms of security, seaport security, citywide security, there is a need for increased funding of resources so that we can sustain those things we have put in place. It is because of her leadership that we have begun to look at the security that is so vital to a large city such as the City of Long Beach.
    We welcome you, Madam Mayor.
    Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Ms. Millender-McDonald, an outstanding member of this committee.
    Mayor O'Neill, you may begin your testimony.

    Mayor O'NEILL. Thank you. I am pleased to be here. I was two doors away when you started. I came on the redeye so I would be here on time.
    Mr. DUNCAN. We appreciate that. It is unusual that we have these classified briefings interrupt things like that and I apologize to each member of the panel but it is just the way it had to be done.
    Mayor O'NEILL. Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify before you today.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you for your kind words about Long Beach you started the hearings with this morning. It is a pleasure for me to be here to testify to a committee that has my two congressional representatives who represent us so well.
    I am the mayor of a large city, the City of Long Beach, California with about half a million people but also I am involved with the League of California Cities. I will be President next year and the National Conference of Mayors may provide a special perspective to this subcommittee.
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    I am pleased to present to you today my city's security concerns that are under the jurisdiction of this distinguished committee. Talking about citywide security, the City of Long Beach has in place in coordination with the State of California, an emergency response plan with hazardous material response plan which comply with the standardized emergency management system.
    In 1998, Long Beach was selected under the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Terrorism Protection Act as one of the largest cities in the Nation to focus on antiterrorist training and equipping for local responders. We carried out a Department of Defense grant program. Then Long Beach was awarded a second grant from the Department of Health and Human Services, an antiterrorism grant geared to responding to a chemical and biological event.
    Lastly, the Department of Justice also provided the city with a demonstration grant to purchase equipment required in dealing with a terrorist event.
    While we are preparing ourselves we haven't had to use these trainings that have happened through the grant program.
    The Federal investment in Long Beach is not misplaced. We host America's largest port, Boeing Company, the C-17 aircraft production, as well as other aerospace industry such as Gulfstream Aerospace. We are an example of a city that has major responsibility to have secure infrastructure.
    To fully benefit from the three Federal antiterrorism grants mentioned, we find ourselves in a position of having insufficient resources to sustain the programs in the out years. Talking about seaport security, the Port of Long Beach, a department of my city, along with the neighboring Port of Los Angeles, comprise the largest seaport complex in the United States, and the third largest in the world. This complex handles over one-third of all U.S. cargo.
    Several aspects of the Port of Long Beach operations are under the jurisdiction of this subcommittee and represent significant national security relevance which is the focus of this hearing.
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    On September 11, the Port Security Task Force was promptly activated. It coordinates national, State and local vessel security and disaster response functions. We work together with the Coast Guard, with Customs, Port Authorities, port security as well as the local police and fire departments.
    As a national port readiness port, to assure defense related cargo throughput, the Port of Long Beach stands ready to serve emerging deployment demands. The port's general infrastructure improvement needs to take a new national security importance. We need a new bridge over a Federal waterway, the I-710 Federal highway needs reconstruction to continue. It carries 35 percent of America's trade cargo, as well as increased aid to the Coast Guard and to Customs.
    On September 11, we instituted a procedure to provide security for the port as all the ships were left behind the breakwater before they could enter the port, they entered by the Coast Guard, looked at the cargo, the manifest and for awhile the ships outside the breakwater looked like a parking lot for major vessels.
    Senator Hollings' port security legislation is indeed welcome but we are concerned that it may bring unfunded mandates which would require ports to perform functions without accompanying Federal appropriation.
    The port's proposed intelligent transportation system appropriations request which is now before the conferees here is meant to efficiently schedule truck travel and intermodal travel is becoming increasingly difficult over limited interstate roadways. This new innovative system also serves as an efficient port security monitoring system that we need and thankfully it is ready to build.
    Talking about our water resources security, I would like to turn to the subject of how Long Beach is protecting its own water supply and also assuring its delivery expressly under these emergency circumstances. Accompanying me today is Kevin Wattier who is the General Manager of the Water Department. We have a municipal water department. Mr. Wattier has overseen operations at about five of our Nation's largest water treatment facilities.
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    The Long Beach Water Department has built and operates the Nation's largest groundwater treatment facility. We deliver an uninterrupted supply of quality water to our citizens and industry through a reservoir system of 33 fully enclosed tanks containing over 110 million gallons of water, 900 miles of pipeline, 18,000 gate control valves, and more than 6,000 fire hydrants. We have operated these facilities in a manner that is efficient and environmentally responsible.
    Nonetheless, since September 11, we have taken a critical look at protecting our water supply and the way in which it is delivered throughout the city. For example, we limit access to treatment and supply facilities, we eliminated information on filtration and water treatment supplied to the public through Internet and other publications, we also intensified water sample testing for all 26 of our department wells.
    While we made significant investments in new water infrastructure, due to the events of September 11, we must now balance the need to replace old infrastructure with the immediate need for security-related infrastructure improvements. Our security upgrades to facilities include new cameras, intrusion alarms, perimeter maintenance. We are evaluating increases in security-related staffing levels. We are assessing new water quality monitoring systems that give the earliest possible warning of water contamination.
    Fortunately, for some time now by capitalizing on emerging technology, the Long Beach Water Department found solutions not only to meet current needs but also to fully anticipate future water security infrastructure requirements. We have completed the third year of a 20-year program to replace and reline the city's entire old, unlined cast iron pipe at the cost of $10 million per year. We are reaping the benefits of this program as the water main breaks have decreased by over 50 percent and water quality, fire flow and water pressure are significantly improved. These actions certainly support our needed water source protection and water delivery priorities.
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    It is no wonder then that the gap between available funding and the costs incurred for infrastructure improvements is widening. It is evident that this funding gap will increase due to the added demand occasioned by new national antiterrorism priorities. Certainly municipal water utilities like Long Beach need assistance.
    A few words on environmental security. The City finds that its attention to environmental security now more compelling than ever. The city hosts the Los Cerritos Wetlands located immediately adjacent to our downtown and is therefore subject to degradation pressures, if not the threat of terrorism. We are working with the Corps of Engineers and other local and Federal agencies to enhance and protect these wetlands.
    Los Cerritos Wetlands could have future relevance to the new Long Beach water supply initiative such as the new generation of desalinization.
    Fiscal year 2002 appropriations will enable those wetland initiatives as well as continue Federal water reclamation programs that have been underway for three years to protect the groundwater supply.
    In conclusion, congressional consideration of new security related critical infrastructure funding is extremely appropriate at this time. However, if you ask me what my immediate Federal assistance needs were for Long Beach, I would urge first that the appropriations conferees accept Congressman Horn and Senator Feinstein's request to fund the advanced transportation information management system. That system provides dramatically heightened port security especially necessary now at $7.2 million.
    Secondly, in the spirit of demonstrating how to improve national infrastructure security, I would recommend that a fourth Federal antiterrorism grant be made available to be used specifically to prove out water and environmental infrastructure security measures of significance to America.
    Thank you for this opportunity. It is the first time I have been here to do this and I appreciate the opportunity.
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    Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you.
    Mr. Sullivan?

    Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you for hosting this important hearing.
    My name is John Sullivan, Chief Engineer of the Boston Water and Sewer Commission, and President of the Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies, a nonprofit organization representing the Nation's largest publicly owned water agencies. These large systems provide drinking water to approximately 160 million Americans.
    Boston Water and Sewer Commission provides retail water and sewer services to residents and businesses in the City of Boston and is the largest of the 46 communities served by the treatment and transmission system operated by the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority.
    I would like to discuss the activities AMWA has undertaken to enhance security at the Nation's water supply systems as well as our local water system security activities.
    Since September 11, the Nation's drinking water utilities have been on a heightened state of alert to protect against potential disruption of water service and biological and chemical contamination of drinking water supplies. Fortunately, before September 11, the water supply community was already at work with EPA, the FBI and other Federal agencies to develop methods and tools to protect water system facilities.
    This unique partnership was established in response to Presidential Decision Directive 63 where EPA was identified as the lead Federal agency for water supply and AMWA subsequently appointed as the water sector's liaison on infrastructure security.
    To coordinate efforts among the various national associations, AMWA established a Critical Infrastructure Protection Advisory Group. The EPA, FBI and Department of Energy provide liaison to the advisory group to ensure we coordinate our efforts with the appropriate Federal entities as well.
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    Several water supply organizations and the EPA are currently sponsoring research and development projects addressing water system security issues. AMWA through a grant from EPA is developing a water information sharing and analysis center which will be a web-based tool providing threat alerts and information on potential vulnerabilities to water and waste water systems. This system also provides a mechanism for utilities to report incidents for analysis.
    The American Water Works Association Research Foundation is in the last stage of developing a vulnerability assessment tool to help utilities conduct assessment of physical vulnerabilities.
    In addition, EPA has begun a project to evaluate emergency operation plans. They are sponsoring a project to develop two containment transport models and have started a project to develop a cyber vulnerability assessment tool.
    Finally, EPA is compiling information on potential chemical agents that can be used to intentionally contaminate water systems.
    On the local level, MWRA is primarily responsible for safeguarding delivery of water to customer communities serving 2.2 million people in the Boston area and responsible for developing contingency plans to deal with emergency and catastrophic events that may interrupt or otherwise threaten the water supply.
    MWRA performs daily water testing and physical measurements before and after treatment. On a 24/7 basis, MWRA staff constantly watch water chemistry on computer screens linked to real time testing devices. Alarms are set to notify operators when certain parameters move outside specified ranges. All treatment chemicals are tested for purity before delivery.
    Almost the entire MWRA system is located underground in tunnels, covered storage tanks and pipelines. Access is limited. MWRA has redundant tunnels and pipes as well as backup water supplies and regularly trains staff on emergency response actions.
    Before September 11, MWRA had been carrying out clearly articulated written strategies in its business plan related to emergency readiness and responsiveness, along with system security. Over 250 staff have been trained, critical facilities identified, and emergency response plans developed.
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    The unprecedented events of September 11 obviously brought a sense of urgency. MWRA's executive director appointed a task force on security and emergency preparedness and charged it with a 30-day timetable to reassess MWRA's current efforts and to develop immediate, short and long term recommendations in response to the recent events.
    State police complemented by the National Guard patrol key facilities and sites. The events of September 11 have caused utilities to review their emergency preparedness plans, to step up discussions with their State and Federal agencies, and to communicate with their customers.
    Members of the subcommittee, Congress can help in this effort in a number of ways. It is essential that vulnerability assessments be conducted for the Nation's largest water supply systems. Once the assessments are completed, water suppliers can implement their recommendations, adding to the security of the Nation's water supplies.
    AMWA is requesting that Congress appropriate $100 million for the Nation's water systems so that these assessments can be largely completed by next year. Currently, all large water systems and many small water systems have emergency response or operations plans in place. Typically, these plans don't specifically address intentional acts of terrorism, although aspects of the current plans would be invoked for any type of emergency.
    AMWA is requesting that Congress appropriate $55 million for emergency response plan enhancement and development. A substantial investment is needed for water infrastructure security, research and development to address potential vulnerabilities of our Nation's water systems. Research is needed to address three fundamental areas of vulnerability for water and waste water systems.
    Physical vulnerabilities including disruption of flow and contamination by chemical, biological or radiological agents. Second is cyber vulnerability, including process control. Third are vulnerabilities associated with interdependencies with other critical infrastructures sections such as energy, telecommunications, transportation and emergency services.
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    We are asking Congress to authorize funding for water infrastructure research and development into understanding threats, methods and technologies to prevent and respond to attacks. We would like to request that you immediately appropriate these funds for this purpose.
    Infrastructure funding assistance is also critical. Infrastructure rehabilitation helps national security by providing better treatment, better storage, better transmission and better distribution. In the economic stimulus package we are asking Congress to provide $5 billion for water and waste water infrastructure to not only improve our infrastructures but to also create many new jobs.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. We look forward to working with you on these important issues. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
    Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Karney?

    Mr. KARNEY. My name is Pat Karney, Director, Metropolitan Sewer District of Greater Cincinnati and a member of the Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies' Wastewater Infrastructure Security Task Force.
    MSD's 650 environmental professionals serve 800,000 users in Hamilton County, Ohio. AMSA represents more than 260 publicly owned treatment works that treat 18 billion gallons of wastewater every day serving the majority of the United States' sewered population. On behalf of AMSA and MSD thank you for your support for the wastewater community by calling today's hearing and inviting us to testify on infrastructure security.
    To answer the question posed by the title of this hearing, yes, America's wastewater utilities, water resources and environment are at risk from future terrorist attacks. The past month has revealed how little our industry knows about terrorist threats and how we can prepare ourselves for the uncertain future.
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    MSD has been reviewing its security procedures for the past two years. We now realize we will have to plan on the unimaginable if we are to fully protect our city employees and public assets from a broader array of risks. Most disturbing to public utility wastewater managers is the scarcity of resources to assist us in conducting vulnerability assessments and the rarity of security expertise in the wastewater infrastructure sector.
    I will begin with a review of how Cincinnati conducted readiness exercise prior to September 11 and our response since the terrorist attack on our country. I will close with an overview of what AMSA is doing to assist the wastewater treatment industry to prepare for the future.
    Cincinnati felt it was well prepared with completion of annual exercises on weapons of mass destruction. Our first responders spent days in training and practiced drills during each week's program. To conclude the week, city department heads, hospital, military, law enforcement—local, State and FBI—and FEMA State and Federal participated in day-long, tabletop scenarios.
    The first year revealed a lack of coordination between agencies and in many cases a complete ignorance as to which agencies participate in preparedness response and recovery from disaster. The second year helped to focus on enhancing our communications and coordination of efforts.
    The most recent of these annual events was a full scale, mock chemical attack, sniper and bomb exercise conducted at MSD's Mill Creek Water Reclamation Facility. They included treatment of exposed victims in National Guard decontamination tents.
    Cincinnati has long maintained its own emergency operations center, wired for phone and computer communication and equipped with emergency backup power in the event of power outage. The city manager activates the EOC in the event of an imminent emergency situation or in response to an incident such as the 1997 Ohio River flood.
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    MSD has played a major role in chemical spill response and investigation whether accidental or intentional in origin. This role enhanced MSD's partnership with emergency and law enforcement personnel.
    In addition to the recognition that MSD receives as an organization, two of the district's supervisors received award citations from Ohio's 25th Annual Inland Spills Conference this past week for their efforts in the past.
    MSD recently formed a security task force, has assembled a list of major security threats and potential disruption of operations at water reclamation facilities and our underground collection system. Cyber interference and the use of our facilities and collection systems for negative purposes were also considered.
    On September 10, we were reasonably comfortable with our level of readiness. MSD went into an immediate lockdown condition just before noon on September 11. We doubled security personnel at all staff facilities. All personnel passing through our gates had to state the purpose of their presence at the facility. These heightened security conditions remain in effect today.
    The swipe card locks on exterior doors are no longer turned off during the work day but remain in an active mode. Perimeter security has been tightened. We immediately reviewed all process controls and chemical feed systems to ensure their safety and to eliminate any possible risks.
    A heightened state of awareness advisory was issued requesting employee cooperation during this time of shifting procedures. MSD employees have accepted these changes readily and have made a few of their own by decorating every one of our facilities with numerous small American flags.
    We have changed the way we conduct our business and will continue to add new security and process measures as needed. While AMSA members comply with regulations that require emergency preparedness plans, wastewater utilities need to perform comprehensive vulnerability assessments in response to potential terrorist activities. As you know, the water supply sector was included as critical infrastructure under the May 1968 PDD-63. Until a month ago, our wastewater treatment collection systems were viewed as a subcategory of water supply and received little attention. Today, law enforcement agencies clearly consider wastewater utilities as possible terrorist targets.
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    Immediately following September 11, AMSA's board of directors took decisive action to support wastewater utilities nationwide by forming a Wastewater Infrastructure Security Task Force. Funds were allocated to begin exploration of security. The Association established a link between the FBI and its members for distribution of advisories and managing and protecting water infrastructure assets was identified as a theme for AMSA's February 2002 conference.
    Once vulnerabilities are assessed, our efforts and resources must be focused on upgrading infrastructure security as well as ensuring continuity of service. Such essential undertakings to establish the security of our Nation's aging infrastructure will clearly require Federal support.
    AMSA is uniquely qualified to gather information and develop the necessary materials programs to support utilities across the country. AMSA and its members will need your help to secure our future and public safety, public health and the environment.
    AMSA looks forward to working with you and the subcommittee to address these important needs. We will not run from this threat.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify and I will be happy to answer any questions. God bless America.
    Mr. DUNCAN. Ms. Moreau?

    Ms. MOREAU. Thank you for the opportunity to address this distinguished committee and guests regarding the important and immediate issues facing local jurisdictions across the Nation following the tragedies of September 11.
    It is truly an honor for me to speak on behalf of my community and the local emergency planning committee as well as East Baton Rouge Parish, its responders, public officials and elected officials and citizens. It is our collective belief from personal and frequent experience that all government begins and ends at the local level. Local governments have the initial and most intimate responsibility, authority and accountability for all events affecting the safety of American citizens and when all others have returned to where they came from, we alone remain to contend with the lasting consequences.
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    I would like to share with you the status of my community's domestic preparedness efforts prior to September 11, what transpired in the days following, where we ultimately wish to be, and to make some recommendations with respect to how Congress and Federal agencies can further prevention, preparedness and response capabilities for local and State governments.
    No one community or government entity can prepare completely for every conceivable circumstance. Our community for years has promoted partnering programs between government, business and industry stakeholders as well as resource providers. Our LEPC directed the collaboration of emergency managers, police, fire, public works, emergency medical providers, neutral aid systems which included business and industry representatives and public and elected officials. Our LEPC embraced EPA's risk management program as another opportunity to focus on chemical release prevention with our industry partners.
    We strongly supported the EPA and FBI controls which prevented our industries worst case scenarios and related off-site consequence information from being posted on the Internet. In fact, I wish to suggest that perhaps public access to the most sensitive Tier II data collected under the Federal Emergency Preparedness and Community Right-to-Know Act should be revisited with a view toward striking a balance between public privilege and security of industrial assets.
    Our community placed its LEPC template squarely over potential threats posed against us by domestic and transnational terrorists. In 1996, we developed terrorist awareness training forums for our first responders, followed by those for public officials and next for business and industry interests. In 1997, a Weapons of Mass Destruction Coordinating Council was created and implemented additional forums for joint training and secured enhancements for communications systems to link together first responders in all tiers of government and fields of service and industries.
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    A Health Care Alliance was formed through the LEPC to promote partnering and better communications with the hospitals, physicians and health care providers and for the purpose of advancing hospital capability assessments and local administration of the national pharmaceutical stockpile.
    We recognize that public health information and sources and support is often difficult to obtain and addressing these issues head on, alternate sources of information and data collection was established and identified. With assistance from the Department of Justice, a medical training schedule was developed and implemented. So far to date we have been able to train over 130 physicians and nurses.
    Our committee continues to set goals and implement a community medical information system responsible for addressing pertinent medical information with all sectors of government as well as industry.
    Our community has taken the lead to develop the metropolitan medical response task force. In Louisiana there are four Nunn-Lugar-Domenici communities that have been identified and we will take the lead to make sure we can form this task force so we can share our resources with smaller communities and jurisdictions that do not have the resources afforded to us.
    We dropped the LEPC surf model for our State and chose not to reinvent the wheel but to use the wheel to advance our State. Baton Rouge has derived direct advantage from two congressionally mandated Federal programs—the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act as well as the Metropolitan Medical Response System Initiative.
    The direct lines of communication that have been established between the Federal Government and the local jurisdictions has been enormously helpful and have sponsored and supported the successful delivery and oversight which have allowed our communities an opportunity to advance our programs.
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    We have not had to suffer through the intervention of the unnecessary impediments which so often result by adding additional layers of government and program interpretation.
    On September 11, we experienced validation for our existing systems through the execution of crucial communications and operations at critically heightened levels of alertness and readiness. Prepositioned mechanisms facilitated collaboration within Federal, local and State law enforcement agencies specifically the airport security as well as university and campus police systems. These systems augmented key asset identification including the water systems and related security intensification for the petrochemical and nuclear sites as well as transportation infrastructure and public utilities, including energy and drinking water providers.
    The direct link of agencies from both public and private sectors responsible for continuity of government and critical infrastructure support were never more critical.
    Where we would like to be. First, the local jurisdiction's levels immediate access desperately need immediate access to training, equipment and information absence prolonged studies and processes. Personal protective equipment and emergency operations tools should be made immediately available to all first responders so personnel will not have to breathe fresh air through their hats as those demonstrated in the tragic events of September 11. The assignment of counter terrorism equipment and training should be made to localities based on direct input from the communities themselves.
    It is essential that Federal assets and resources be committed for planning, modeling and practical implementation for an adequate public health response to W&D events. Public health must come to the table before the incident.
    Please strip away all impediments to the sharing of intelligence information by Federal law enforcement and national security agencies. It is paramount to public safety and citizens' peace of mind that Federal intelligence information be exchanged with local and State law enforcement.
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    I appreciate sensitive information may not be relevant to every community and certain matters may be safeguarded in the interest of national security. However, Federal attention and energy must be applied to preventing terrorist acts in our communities.
    We are encouraged by the Homeland Security and urge Congress and Federal agencies to protect this office from the pitfalls that have doomed similar initiatives to failure in recent times. It is vital that the President's vision does not become diluted by beltway contracts and selfish agendas of public and private enterprises. The President's inclusion of local and State agencies must be integral in this organization and the body of Federal knowledge, experience and assets and their value to national security is self evident but when it comes to homeland security, the experts after all are back at home.
    Thank you for the great privilege for me to meet and address you.
    Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Ms. Moreau.
    Mr. Speight, you may begin your statement.

    Mr. SPEIGHT. I am Randy Speight, Director of the American Chemistry Council's Chemical Transportation Emergency Center.
    On behalf of the Council and its members, thank you for inviting me to testify on critical infrastructure protection. I was asked to comment on SARA Title III and in particular provisions relating to emergency preparedness and response.
    Our industry supported reauthorization of Superfund in 1986 and our support included support of Title III. Title III is one of the more important and most effective laws on the Nation's books.
    Safety is a fundamental part of our industry's culture and our support for Title III has a lot to do with the fact that it fits well within that culture. This attention to safety has made our industry one of the safest in the country and indeed one of the safest in the world.
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    I will briefly mention some of our industry's safety initiatives, programs that complement SARA Title III. One of these is the Center I have the privilege to lead and that is the Chemical Transportation Emergency Center. CHEMTREC is a 24-hour a day emergency communications center that has operated as a public service of the American Chemistry Council since 1971, providing emergency responders with round the clock resources for information and assistance, for spills, leaks, fires, exposures and other emergencies involving chemicals and hazardous materials. CHEMTREC provided information to emergency service workers who responded to attacks at both the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
    Another service our industry provides, with others, is the TRANSCAER Program which is an acronym for Transportation Community Awareness and Emergency Response. TRANSCAER is an example of how our industry and a national network of LEPCs work and plan together. TRANSCAER is a national effort and involves not only the chemical industry but also transportation organizations and local emergency response services.
    It is designed to assist communities that have major transportation routes within their jurisdictions respond to transportation incidents involving hazardous materials. Through TRANSCAER the industry assists communities in planning, preparing, assessing, testing and revising their emergency response plans.
    The Emergency Response Network in this country is world class and we are proud to say that our industry has played a key role in making it so, but others have also played a major role. The most important of these are the thousands of firefighters, police officers, rescue squad members and other first responders all across the Nation who have worked hard and at times sacrificed their lives to make our system the world class system it is.
    For decades, even before Title III was enacted, our companies worked closely with these dedicated men and women in developing and implementing and, when necessary, revising emergency response plans and crisis management plans for towns, cities and counties around the Nation. We were involved with emergency services and with conducting regular drills to make sure their plans work and are effective. We are involved with them in developing training programs and identifying special skills and equipment needs. We are involved with them in setting up and running LEPCs across the country.
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    Indeed, the creation of the LEPCs has been one of the more important steps taken in the last two decades to further improve and strengthen the National Emergency Response Network.
    Finally, Congress has also played an important role in making this network the best in the world. Title III, a product of Congress, has contributed enormously to the Nation's high state of preparedness to respond to emergencies.
    I would like to point out that I was asked to discuss preparedness and response. I would like to add there are details regarding the prevention aspects of this issue, the manner in which the chemical industry works with others in the prevention of terrorist attacks that is contained in my written testimony.
    I would like to extend an open invitation to you and the members of the subcommittee and your staff to visit us at CHEMTREC located in Arlington. We would be happy to give you a tour of the emergency center and to explain to you how we do work with these communities, how we work with the Federal agencies and the memoranda of understanding we have with the Chemical, Biological and Defense Command of the U.S. Army, with the Department of Defense and Department of Transportation.
    Thank you.
    Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you and I would like to come visit your facility at some point.
    Let me ask you this, in 1999, two years go, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease issued a report that suggested that security at chemical manufacturing facilities was lax. All of us have a heightened awareness and concern now but do you think enough has been done or is being done at these chemical manufacturing facilities and has that been speeded up since we had the tragic events of September 11?
    Mr. SPEIGHT. I would suggest enough has not yet been done to address the current threat identified since September 11. However, a lot has been done and a lot was done before September 11. Our industry has an ethic of risk based, risk management and risk assessment that goes from risk reduction in the products we use to assessments of the carriers we use. Those tools that were provided and have been developed over the last couple of decades, even though they were not specifically addressed in the threat that hit us on September 11, did address other threats, cyber terrorism, economic espionage, and internal issues that may arise from disgruntled employees. Those kinds of threats have been addressed by our industry now for quite some time.
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    A lot of the things we did before September 11 translate to address the threat we currently have. Is that enough? The answer is no. Since September 11 our facilities have been hardening. There have been a lot of things companies have done depending on the products they manufacture, the location, looking at the risk involved and trying to determine the best place to focus our activities.
    There is more that can be done and there are several things we will look to the Federal Government to help us do. One is to take a look at the Department of Justice assessment that has yet to be completed, looking at the vulnerability of chemical facilities. We are proposing that be completed. We could use that information to identify the weaknesses that exist within our industry, the study will help us identify how to plug those gaps.
    Another thing we would look for from this committee and other members of the government are some of the things Ms. Moreau identified. We need the ability to exchange information among our member companies, between our companies and other industries and with law enforcement agencies with some level of confidence that the information we exchange would be confidential, and there are obstacles to our exchanging that information right now that do serve as an impediment. I know Mr. Davis and Mr. Moran have introduced a bill that would provide some additional assistance in sharing this information.
    We need the ability to partner with the law enforcement agencies and national security agencies that can help us identify what is a credible threat. We need that partnership with these law enforcement and security officials at the national level but also at the local level. Many local plant facilities do have those in place.
    Mr. DUNCAN. Ms. Moreau, we are hearing what government agencies and departments are doing and yet these attacks in New York City were on private sector buildings. In your duties are you trying to work with private sector companies as well? Do you think they understand the seriousness and are they doing as much as reasonable or as much as the government agencies are doing?
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    Ms. MOREAU. I can speak for our community in Baton Rouge. We have a very proactive business and industry group. Under my jurisdiction as Coordinator for the Parish, the events of September 11 have certainly heightened everyone's awareness. We are focusing on public notification. Fortunately for us, we have a public notification system that consists of an auto dialer and a siren system.
    Mr. DUNCAN. Everybody has heightened awareness, I know. I am saying because of this heightened awareness, I see this resulting in action in the public sector. Are you seeing that throughout the private sector as well?
    Ms. MOREAU. Absolutely.
    Mr. DUNCAN. Mayor O'Neill, you have these leading grants to lead the way. Will you describe has the cooperation with Federal agencies been easy or difficult? What level of cooperation have you seen and are your findings being disseminated to other cities, the information you are obtaining?
    Mayor O'NEILL. Yes, we are surrounded by other cities. We are landlocked and waterlocked. That information has been communicated for the cities surrounding us for the Terrorist Protection Act.
    Mr. DUNCAN. But your grants are Federal grants, so the things you have developed we need to get out to other cities across the Nation.
    Mayor O'NEILL. I agree with you. We weren't the only city that got this type of grant, these were throughout the Nation. I think each area was taking care of the area surrounding it.
    The other grants we have, there is some difficulty sometimes in going through the bureaucracy of getting the money that was allocated to you for use either in the study of bioterrorism or the resources granted by the Department of Justice. It is a little slow and some of it we haven't yet.
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    Mr. DUNCAN. We have a vote going on. I am going to let Mr. DeFazio as a question.
    Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Danneels, on page two of your testimony, you talk about recent R&D on a walk through explosives detection portal recently licensed and ready for deployment. You go on to describe its capabilities, nothing sensitive. Is this just for individuals? Does this apply to baggage, carry-on baggage, checked baggage? What could this be applied to? We heard a lot about the limitations of the CTX-5000 which is what we use for baggage screening now in terms of its throughput. This seems like it has much quicker throughput.
    Mr. DANNEELS. The portal was designed as it is today for personnel, people going through the airport. It has been tested in the Albuquerque Airport and typically takes about 8 to 10 seconds, so there is a delay time to go through the system. The system can be used for baggage and other items as well, so there is no restriction there.
    What we are developing now are handheld sensors. This is a walk through portal, it is large and therefore somewhat expensive. There are several other devices under development with the same sensitivity as that portal that are handheld and those should be available soon.
    Mr. DEFAZIO. In terms of using it for baggage, with the CTX-5000, we are doing a computer-assisted radiographic scan going to different molecular densities and trying to piece together threats. This is something that works off vapor technology?
    Mr. DANNEELS. Yes, it is.
    Mr. DEFAZIO. Could someone contain an explosive that doesn't off gas very much, which I think a lot of plastics don't, in such a way they could get past this thing?
    Mr. DANNEELS. There is always a risk that you could. These things pick up molecules in the parts per trillion range. We are talking very, very sensitive equipment, so I am sure there is a way you could do it but it would be extremely difficult.
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    Mr. DEFAZIO. Are you familiar with the CTX-2000 and that technology, kind of a CAT scan, MRI based thing.
    Mr. DANNEELS. I am only somewhat familiar with that.
    Mr. DEFAZIO. Would these work in tandem, work exclusively if we were to apply it to baggage?
    Mr. DANNEELS. I would think you would want to work them in tandem because they are looking for different things, so yes, I would say in tandem would be the right use.
    Mr. DEFAZIO. In terms of throughput, you say there is a delay, so something has to sit, the air goes across it and it sniffs the air?
    Mr. DANNEELS. Exactly. It puts out a puff of air and runs it through a preconcentrator and then through the system. Right now it is an individual person walking through. There is no reason that system couldn't be modified for a throughput type system.
    Mr. DEFAZIO. If it is eight to ten seconds per person, I can do the math and figure out how many bags we can put through in a hour.
    Mr. DUNCAN. Chairman Boehlert, Chairman of the full Science Committee.
    Mr. BOEHLERT. I have a couple of questions I will submit to the panel in writing with a request that there be a timely response. I also have an observation.
    The question isn't whether our water and environmental resources are at risk. The real question is what degree of risk do we face and the follow-up question is how should we as a Nation respond? We are all engaged, every committee of the House, in a vulnerability analysis. The Science Committee which I chair has just concluded a very important hearing on cyber security. We expect to have another hearing on computer security next week and intend to follow up with legislation.
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    In addition, the Science Committee will hold a hearing later this month examining security issues regarding our Nation's physical infrastructure including water supplies.
    I am encouraged, Mr. Chairman, that our two committees are focusing on these issues and are working so well together. Water infrastructure faces not just physical threats but also cyber threats. I believe there is a need for increased water infrastructure research and development to help prevent or reduce the risk of attack.
    Here are my questions which I will direct to Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Karney and Mr. Danneels and once again, in writing with the request that you respond. What are the most promising new technologies to help assess vulnerabilities and reduce the threat of terrorist attacks against water infrastructure? Should more Federal assistance be directed towards the development of these technologies. Would legislation help in the effort?
    Again, I ask for a timely response. I know how busy you are.
    With that, let me thank you, Mr. Chairman, and these expert witnesses for being resources for this committee. We are all about some very important work.
    Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Chairman Boehlert. We have had a great interest in this hearing. Eighteen members have been here to participate although we have had many competing things.
    We have a vote going on and we have to conclude at this time. We do have some additional questions we are going to submit to you in writing and would appreciate your cooperation because we do want to put these in the record of this hearing along with your full statements and your testimony.
    Thank you for being with us today. It has been a honor and privilege to have you here with us.
    That will conclude the hearing.
    [Whereupon, at 1:32 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]
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