BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND

THE WORKFORCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, OCTOBER 6, 1998

Printed for the use of the Committee on Education

and the Workforce

Tuesday, October 6, 1998

House of Representatives,

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,

Committee on Education and the Workforce,

Washington, D.C.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PETE HOEKSTRA, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE *

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL KANTOR, FORMER U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE *

TESTIMONY OF RONALD CARVER, COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC AND CORPORATE INITIATIVES, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS *

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM CUFF, FORMER PRESIDENT AND CEO, DIAMOND WALNUT GROWERS, INC. *

TESTIMONY OF JENNIFER O'CONNOR, FORMER WHITE HOUSE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT *

APPENDIX A- WRITTEN STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PETE HOEKSTRA, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE *

APPENDIX B- WRITTEN COPIES OF ALL EXHIBITS *

APPENDIX C- WRITTEN STATEMENT OF RON CARVER *

APPENDIX D- DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF RON CARVER *

APPENDIX E- SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS SPECIAL INVESTIGATION, DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF JENNIFER O’CONNOR *

APPENDIX F-DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF STEVE ROSENTHAL *

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:03 a.m., in Room 2175, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Peter Hoekstra [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Hoekstra, Norwood, Hilleary, Ballenger, Schaffer, Parker, Mink, Scott, Payne, and Owens.

Staff Present: Robert Borden, Professional Staff; Rebecca Campoverde, Professional Staff; Jay Diskey, Communications Director; Patrick Lyden, Staff Assistant; Bill McCarthy, Press Secretary; Mark Rodgers, Workforce Policy Coordinator; Dan Anderson; Michael Bopp; Jason Hopfer; John Loesch; Nathan Muyskens; William Outhier; Jean Pirak; Jim Pittrizzi; Joseph Potter; Michael Quickel; Michael Reynard; Lisa Rich; Fred Smolen; Rob Sterner; August Stofferahn; Dan Sullivan; Matt Tallmer; Brian Kennedy, Minority Labor Counsel; Brian Compagnone, Minority Staff Assistant; Jim Jordan, Minority Director of Communications/Special Counsel; Cassandra Lentchner, Minority Special Counsel/Investigations; Michael Berlin, Minority Counsel; Gregory Jefferson, Minority Counsel; Patrick Dugan, Minority GAO Detailee; and Darryl Change, Minority GAO Detailee.

Chairman Hoekstra. [presiding] A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations will come to order.

Under Rule 12(b) of the committee rules, any oral opening statements at the hearing are limited to the Chair and the ranking minority member. This will allow us to hear our witnesses sooner, and help members to keep to their schedules. If other members have opening statements, they will be included in the hearing record. Without objections, all members' statements will be inserted into the hearing record.

Good morning. The focus of today's hearing is slightly different from the others we have held on the Teamsters. Previous hearings have focused on allegations of wrongdoing within the Teamsters. Today we are going to learn about the relationship between the Teamsters and the White House.

I would like to begin by displaying two charts. The first chart shows a high level Labor Department appointee, possibly acting on the instruction of a senior White House official who wrote a memo before the 1996 elections telling presidential advisors how much money the Teamsters had contributed to the Democratic Party coffers in 1992.

The Labor Department official wanted the White House to know the value of the Teamsters to both the President and the Democratic Party. The chart displayed the memo telling White House aides that the President needed the Teamsters support during his reelection campaign and that the Teamsters needed White House help settling a strike of Diamond Walnut.

And we will hear today, around the time this memo was written, the administration brought pressure to bear on Diamond Walnut. In fact, as we'll see today, the administration officials privately used that very word, ``pressure,'' to describe the full court press that was put on Diamond Walnut, perhaps by the White House, the United States Trade Representative, the Labor Department, and the Agriculture Department.

The administration's efforts involved perhaps implicit threats to exclude walnuts from trade talks involving the European Union, to remove company products from the school lunch program, to revoke payments to the firm under an initiative marketing U.S. agricultural products overseas. It may also have involved attempts to bar the firm from receiving any Federal contracts.

After that pressure was brought to bear, the Teamsters contributed millions to the coffers of Democratic Senatorial and congressional campaigns, as well as State Democratic parties. An analysis done by the subcommittee staff indicates that the Teamsters contributed some $1 million to the national and State Democratic parties and another $2.5 million to Democratic candidates across the country during the 1996 election cycle.

My colleagues on the other side of the dias likely will say this hearing is much ado about nothing. They will note that no action was taken as a result of the White House pressure, walnuts were included in the trade talks, Diamond Walnut kept its Federal contracts, the company's products stayed in the school lunch program, and it received assistance from the marketing promotion program.

They may also suggest that Diamond Walnut is a bad corporate apple. They may note that the company permanently replaced 600 mostly Hispanic female strikers and that a former Diamond Walnut executive was convicted in the scandal surrounding former Agricultural Secretary Mike Espy.

All of that has been the subject of other proceedings. In this context, it misses the point. We are not here to debate the merits of the strike or allegations involving an ongoing criminal trial in Federal court. What we are here to do is to determine whether the White House pressured a company to settle a labor dispute in an attempt to lure the Teamsters back into the Democratic fold.

We are trying to see if the Teamsters used members' dues money from the union's political action committee to effectively purchase negotiating power from the White House. We will hear from all sides of the story today. Our first witness will be former U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor. In fact, we started this hearing a little earlier than usual and changed the order in which the people will testify in an effort to accommodate Ambassador Kantor's schedule.

Our other witnesses will be Ron Carver, a current Teamsters official who led the union's effort to get the Diamond Walnut strike settled; Bill Cuff, who is a former chief executive officer of Diamond Walnut; and Jennifer O'Connor, who served as labor liaison for the former White House Deputy Chief of Staff.

At the end of the day, I suspect many questions will have been answered and more will have been raised. But the fundamental question is, to what length did the White House and the Clinton Administration pressure Diamond Walnut into settling with the Teamsters and why.

Chairman Hoekstra. Mr. Scott, do you have an opening statement?

Mr. Scott. No, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to Mr. Kantor's testimony, and we are delighted to hear him so he can answer some of the questions that you have raised.

Chairman Hoekstra. Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman from Georgia for the purpose of a unanimous consent request.

Mr. Norwood. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the chairman and the ranking minority member of the subcommittee be permitted to question each witness for one hour, with that time to be equally divided between the majority and the minority, and that they further be permitted to yield all or some of that time to counsel for questioning.

Chairman Hoekstra. Without objection, so ordered. Thank you.

Our first witness this morning is Mr. Michael Kantor, the former United States Trade Representative. I will ask you to summarize your testimony, and I think you indicated you maybe don't have testimony, or you do have a statement.

Mr. Kantor. Well, I hope I have testimony. I have no statement, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Hoekstra. All right.

Mr. Kantor. But I want to thank you for your accommodating my schedule. It was very nice of you and I appreciate it.

Chairman Hoekstra. Not a problem, we are glad you are here. It is a practice of this subcommittee to swear in witnesses. Therefore, you should be aware that it is illegal to make a false statement to Congress while under oath. In light of this, will you please rise and raise your right hand.

[Witness sworn.]

Please be seated. If there is no opening statement, we will go directly to counsel questioning. Mr. Bopp.

Mr. Bopp. Good morning, Ambassador Kantor.

Mr. Kantor. Good morning.

Mr. Bopp. Sir, you have been an important part of this administration serving both as United States Trade Representative and Secretary of Commerce. Can you please tell us when you served as the United States Trade Representative.

Mr. Kantor. From January 21, 1993 to April 12, 1996.

Mr. Bopp. And after that, you became Secretary of Commerce.

Mr. Kantor. Yes, sir.

Mr. Bopp. Are those both Cabinet level positions?

Mr. Kantor. Yes, sir.

Mr. Bopp. You reported directly to the President, sir?

Mr. Kantor. Yes, sir.

Mr. Bopp. Would you please tell us generally what your responsibilities were as United States Trade Representative.

Mr. Kantor. It covered a whole host of activities, but in the main, I was the President's chief advisor on international trade policy and chief negotiator for trade agreements and other matters relating to the U.S. interaction with other countries with regard to the movement of goods, services, and investment with regard to international trade agreements, bilateral, regional, and multilateral.

Mr. Bopp. And as part of your job, did you ever meet with anyone from the Teamsters to talk about issues important to the Teamsters?

Mr. Kantor. I may have had two meetings during the course of my tenure as U.S. Trade Representative. I don't think I had any as Secretary of Commerce. You'd have to ask the Teamsters whether it was important to them; I can't speak for them. There were meetings mainly on NAFTA.

Mr. Bopp. And whom did you meet with?

Mr. Kantor. Both times with Mr. Carey, I think. He was head of the Teamsters at the time.

Mr. Bopp. I see. And did anyone from the Teamsters ever talk to you about their strike of Diamond Walnut?

Mr. Kantor. I don't believe, in either of those meetings, I don't recall Mr. Carey ever raising with me in either of those meetings, the Diamond Walnut strike. However, he could have, but I don't remember it. Frankly, the first meeting we had, as you know, the administration and the Teamsters did not agree on the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement through the Congress of the United States. That was, I think, in 1993 we met.

And then we met later--I can't even remember the year--and he was much concerned about trucking and the movement of trucks from Mexico into the United States, into the border States.

Mr. Bopp. How did you first find out about the Diamond Walnut strike?

Mr. Kantor. I either received a call from or had a meeting with--I can't recall at this point, this is over three and a half years ago--with Harold Ickes, who was then Deputy Chief of Staff for the White House.

Mr. Bopp. I see.

Mr. Kantor. However, let me add that at the time we talked, either by phone or in a meeting, he described it as a Sun Diamond strike, which I think is somewhat significant, because there was some confusion in the White House as to what the issue really was.

Mr. Bopp. I see. And Sun Diamond is the parent company of Diamond Walnut.

Mr. Kantor. Sun Diamond is a cooperative. And maybe you can ask Mr. Cuff, who comes later. I am not sure of the relationship. I think Diamond Walnut was a company, a member of the cooperative, but I'm not certain of the legal relationship.

Mr. Bopp. How long have you known Harold Ickes?

Mr. Kantor. Twenty-six years. I'm getting older.

Mr. Bopp. I take it he is a friend of yours.

Mr. Kantor. Oh, of course, yes, sir.

Mr. Bopp. Did your job as U.S. Trade Representative cause you to have frequent contact with Mr. Ickes?

Mr. Kantor. I don't know how you define frequent. Of course, we saw each other often. I was in the West Wing many times, as you know, in 1993, 1994, and 1995, especially. Trade was on the front burner of the administration issues, everything from NAFTA to the Uruguay Round to APEC to the Transatlantic Marketplace. We did 200 trade agreements in less than four years. So I was there frequently, and I would see Harold frequently, or Mr. Ickes frequently.

Mr. Bopp. So you talked to Mr. Ickes about trade issues?

Mr. Kantor. Trade issues and sometimes even political issues, God forbid.

Mr. Bopp. Why did Mr. Ickes speak to you about the Diamond Walnut strike?

Mr. Kantor. I think you ought to ask Mr. Ickes. I can tell you what I can recall he said to me. He said Sun Diamond was in the middle of a strike with farm workers and he asked me if I could make a call and determine two things: one, the status; and two, the prospects for settlement.

I asked Mr. Ickes why me? I thought the Secretary of Labor or Secretary of Agriculture would be a much more appropriate person to ask, since they probably knew much more about the strike. I knew nothing about it.

He indicated that because I was a Californian and had spent 20 years practicing law in Los Angeles and had some minor involvement in California politics, and second, because I had spent a number of years representing farm workers, I understood the issues, understood California, and that I might be able to assess the information more adequately.

Mr. Bopp. And why did you think that Labor Secretary Reich would be a better candidate to call Diamond Walnut?

Mr. Kantor. Well, I would think, given the Labor Secretary's responsibilities when strikes occur, to play a positive role, as this administration has in the American Airlines strike or the Northwest strike, that that would make some difference. It just occurred to me that--I just asked, and when Harold explained it to me, it made perfect sense that I should make a call.

Mr. Bopp. So when you spoke to Mr. Ickes, did he let you know what he thought about the strike?

Mr. Kantor. I don't think so. I don't recall any characterization by Mr. Ickes, since what I gathered from the conversation--remember, this is forty-three months ago, was that he wanted an update, a status, what are the prospects for settlement. And so, therefore, there wouldn't have been any reason to get into that subject.

Mr. Bopp. But one of the reasons he explained to you he chose you or asked you to make this call was because you had experience as a legal aid attorney out of law school, is that right?

Mr. Kantor. Yes, I had spent a number of years representing farm workers, yes, sir.

Mr. Bopp. Mr. Kantor, I would like to show you some documents contained in the binder in front of you. First, if you would please turn to Exhibit 1.

Mr. Kantor. Yes, sir.

Mr. Bopp. Exhibit 1 is a memo from Harold Ickes to you dated March 6, 1995. In the memo, Mr. Ickes requests a meeting with you on the Diamond Walnut strike. I would like to show you Exhibit 2 at the same time.

Exhibit 2 is a copy of your schedule for March 24, 1995. At 3:30 p.m., your schedule lists a meeting with Mr. Ickes regarding the ``Diamond Walnut Growers'' in room 209. Do you see that, Mr. Kantor?

Mr. Kantor. Yes, I see it.

Mr. Bopp. Where is room 209?

Mr. Kantor. Room 209 could be anywhere in Washington, but I think room 209 is my conference room next to--not mine anymore. It's the conference room next to the United States Trade Representative's office.

Mr. Bopp. I take it that you do believe that you met with Mr. Ickes to discuss the Diamond Walnut strike, is that correct?

Mr. Kantor. Well, there was confusion. If you look at Exhibit 3, which you have given me, which I have never seen, it says Sun Diamond in California. There was obviously great confusion as to where this strike was occurring and what it involved. Therefore, I think it speaks to the point I made at first that it is my memory that he spoke of the Sun Diamond strike, not the Diamond Walnut. Although, frankly, it's of no moment of your concern. It's just that there was some confusion over this issue.

Mr. Bopp. But you do believe you had a meeting with Mr. Ickes?

Mr. Kantor. No, I said I can't recall. Obviously, when you show me these exhibits, it looks like I had a meeting. I can't recall 43 months ago whether it was a phone call or a meeting, I really can't. I'm sorry, I'm just trying to be as accurate as I can be.

Mr. Bopp. Sure. If we could go back to Exhibit 1 for a minute. Attached to the memo Mr. Ickes sent to you, he attached a few things. We've included one here in the exhibit book. It's a two-page document entitled Background on the Diamond Walnut Strike. I think we can get the gist of the attachment by looking at the last two sentences on the second page. That would be the last page of the exhibit.

They state, ``A company's labor practices should be considered before it is offered government assistance in expanding its foreign markets. Diamond should receive no further assistance, financial or otherwise, from U.S. agencies until it negotiates an end to the strike.''

Now, this attachment--which, by the way, may have been written by the Teamsters, we will hear later--is pretty clear on who is to blame for the strike. I take it that after receiving this document, you understood Mr. Ickes' position on the Diamond Walnut strike, is that correct?

Mr. Kantor. To be accurate, I don't remember receiving this memorandum or reading it. I am not saying I didn't; I just don't recall it. But I think it's important to say that the United States Trade Representative's Office before and after this memo and the one phone call I made as a result of my meeting with Mr. Ickes, took no action whatsoever adverse to the interests not only of Diamond Walnut, by anyone in the agricultural industry of any shape.

We were very vigorous in pursuing, in effect, market-opening measures, not only that would have helped Diamond Walnut, but others as well.

Mr. Bopp. Right above the paragraph I just read, the attachment states, and I quote, ``Walnut exports have been a continuing subject of interest at USTR, which is now trying to negotiate tariff concessions for walnuts with the European Economic Union.'' I think you just referred to that.

Is it true that in early 1995, your office was handling international negotiations that would have been important to Diamond Walnut?

Mr. Kantor. Well, at the time, I was not aware. It was grains that were the most important on that list. It may help for the committee to understand that USDA gives USTR its priorities in terms of what to negotiate in the agricultural area. Those priorities can shift from time to time based upon what is most important to American farmer and the American agricultural industry.

I really don't recall at that point during the so-called enlargement discussions, whether walnuts were on the USDA list or not on the USDA list. I just have no idea. If you have a document to show me, it might refresh my memory. But those discussions were being carried on by my staff, and I was not directly involved, except on the grain issue with Sir Leon Britain, the Trade Minister for the European Commission.

Mr. Bopp. So you personally were not directly involved in the walnut negotiations?

Mr. Kantor. No, not at all. I wouldn't have known at that point, or frankly, any point after that, because it was the grain issue which was a major issue and had large implications for U.S. agriculture.

Mr. Bopp. Okay. If we can turn to Exhibit 3. Exhibit 3 is another memo from Harold Ickes to you. This one is dated March 27, 1995. Now, in the memo Mr. Ickes thanks you for meeting with him and says he ``trusts you will follow up.'' He is referring to you calling Diamond Walnut, is that correct?

Mr. Kantor. He does what? I'm sorry, I didn't understand. I was reading the memo, I apologize.

Mr. Bopp. No, I am sorry. At the end of the first paragraph, Mr. Ickes writes, ``I trust you will follow up.'' He is referring to you calling Diamond Walnut, is that correct?

Mr. Kantor. I assume that's what he was referring to, yes, sir.

Mr. Bopp. Now, this memo also had an attachment from Harold Ickes and a copy of it can be found at Exhibit 4. The attachment is a memo from Teamster lobbyist Tony Podesta sent to Harold Ickes and White House Political Director Doug Sosnick. As you can see in the memo, Mr. Podesta is complaining that Diamond Walnut is receiving subsidies from the Department of Agriculture and assistance from your office.

Now, do you know why Harold Ickes would have sent you a copy of this memo?

Mr. Kantor. I think you ought to ask Mr. Ickes. I don't know. I don't remember reading this. As you know, any Cabinet official gets quite a few documents, as members of Congress do. I don't remember reading this. But I probably did receive it at some point. But you would have to ask Mr. Ickes.

Mr. Bopp. Do you know who Tony Podesta is?

Mr. Kantor. Oh, sure, I have known Tony for a number of years.

Mr. Bopp. Did you know that he was a Teamster lobbyist?

Mr. Kantor. No, I did not.

Mr. Bopp. Now, Exhibit 5 is another memo. This one is from Chris Marcich to you, dated March 22, 1995. Who is Chris Marcich?

Mr. Kantor. He worked for me at USTR. He ran, at one point, European Affairs.

Mr. Bopp. Now, the memo talks about the Diamond Walnut strike and at the bottom of the first paragraph states, ``The Teamsters would like,'' ellipses, ``The Teamsters would like USTR to indicate we will not pursue our rights on walnuts in the soon-to-begin US-EU enlargement negotiations.''

Did you ask Chris Marcich to draft a memo to update you on the Diamond Walnut strike?

Mr. Kantor. I don't recall asking him to draft any memo with regard to the Diamond Walnut strike?

Mr. Bopp. Do you recall seeing this memo?

Mr. Kantor. No, I don't, but again, this is 43 months ago, and I may have. It also indicates, of course, that the rate increases on walnuts were fairly insignificant.

Mr. Bopp. You know, it strikes me that all of a sudden in early 1995, Diamond Walnut became something of a hot topic around your office. Do you know why that is?

Mr. Kantor. We had a number of much hotter topics, not only enlargement, we had a little negotiation with the Japanese over auto imports into the United States and their failure to open their markets to U.S. auto manufacturers. We also had a major issue on intellectual property rights with China at the same time.

Therefore, it may loom large right now in terms of your committee's responsibility and jurisdiction, but I can assure you, it was not one of the major issues we were facing in the spring of 1995.

Mr. Bopp. Eventually, you did call Diamond Walnut, correct?

Mr. Kantor. Yes, sir, I did.

Mr. Bopp. Who did you talk to?

Mr. Kantor. I talked to Mr. Cuff, Bill Cuff.

Mr. Bopp. And was it your understanding he was the president and CEO at the time?

Mr. Kantor. Yes, I was told that after--well, go ahead, yes, sir.

Mr. Bopp. And if you would, just tell us again, what was the purpose of the call?

Mr. Kantor. The purpose of the call was twofold. One, to assess the status of the strike, what was going on, make an inquiry. And second, is there any prospect for settlement. That's what I was asked to do. And I am sure you are going to get to Exhibit 6, I hope, because my notes certainly reflect that exactly.

I didn't have a copy of this until I was shown this, because the committee, of course, and other agencies later found it. What's interesting is I can't remember this, but on the same memo, it says Larry Busboom, the president and CEO of Sun Diamond. There was still confusion. I think I may have, or may not have, called Mr. Busboom first and found out it was Diamond Walnut having the strike.

Clearly, I was not exactly clued into what was going on nor had any detail, nor was it necessary for me to call.

Mr. Bopp. Now, let's look at Exhibit 6 then. It is an e-mail from your chief of staff, Peter Scher to another aide in your office, and it is dated April 4, 1995. The first line reads, ``Jeff, Mickey told Ickes that he would call the Diamond Walnut folks and put some pressure on them vis-a-vis the strike.'' Now I take it from your testimony, that is not an accurate statement, correct?

Mr. Kantor. Which part of it? I'm sorry, I don't mean to--you mean the pressure? I'm sure that's what you were referring to.

Mr. Bopp. The pressure, yes.

Mr. Kantor. The answer is I put no pressure. You've got Mr. Cuff here. I am sure you will ask him the question. That wasn't the nature of the call. It was, I don't know, it couldn't have lasted more than five minutes. It could have been as short as three minutes. You can see my notes which I am happy to read to you, as to what Mr. Cuff, A, B, C, and D, said to me. And those are my contemporaneous notes, certainly reflecting what I asked him, and I am happy to go over them, as much as I can remember.

This refreshes my memory. Frankly, if you had asked me before I saw this, I wouldn't have remembered anything except I was just inquiring as to what was going on with the strike.

Mr. Bopp. Let me just represent to you that the USTR's office sent us these documents after we spoke to you, and I am glad you have had a chance to look at them.

If you would, tell us what on this page you wrote, and if you could read it to us, we'd appreciate it.

Mr. Kantor. Many have asked me to read my printing. It says, ``A, strike three and a half years, tried to work John Calhoun Wells, Federal Mediation and Conciliation.'' I assume they tried to work with, I didn't put the word ``with.'' I assume Mr. Wells was working for the Federal Government trying to--you can tell me. I didn't know the name at the time; I don't know it today.

And then second, it says ``met with Ron Carey a year ago.'' I assume that's what Mr. Cuff told me. Mr. Cuff said, ``like to settle union strong stand, nothing done-take back strikers, no choice/replacement workers, be willing to meet,'' and then I can't read. It's over slash C-A-S--I don't know--something background. I don't know what it says, I'm sorry.

Mr. Bopp. Okay. On the top of the page where it says, ``talked to Ickes,'' is that your handwriting?

Mr. Kantor. Yes, talked to Ickes, yes, sir, it is.

Mr. Bopp. Do you know if you talked to Ickes again after you met with him and prior to making this call?

Mr. Kantor. I think what that means--I have no memory of this--it seems to me this would be typical of me to say after the phone call, I called Mr. Ickes and told him what was said.

Mr. Bopp. Do you know what his response was?

Mr. Kantor. No, I don't, because I don't remember the phone call. But it would be typical of me to go ahead and make another note on the piece of paper and then throw it in my out box after I talked to whoever it was. And it looks like I talked to Mr. Ickes. But that would have been after.

Mr. Bopp. Do you know why you took notes of your call to Mr. Cuff on this e-mail?

Mr. Kantor. It was sitting in front of me and I had been asked to make the phone call. I assume Jeff Nuechterlein came in and said you've got to make this phone call or you should make it, and so it was sitting there and I made notes. I typically make notes on pieces of paper. Like most people who have the unfortunate aversion of being trained as a lawyer, I take notes.

Mr. Bopp. Sir, you said earlier that the first time you really heard about the Diamond Walnut strike or Sun Diamond strike was when you talked to Mr. Ickes. Now, subsequent to talking to Mr. Ickes and prior to making this call to Bill Cuff, did you take time to sort of bone up on the issue?

Mr. Kantor. Embarrassingly, no.

Mr. Bopp. So all you knew about it is what Harold Ickes had told you?

Mr. Kantor. Or what I may have or may not have read in any memo that you have cited, although I cannot remember at this point reading those memos. But I am not saying that I did not. The fact is I just can't remember. But for the purposes of this call, it was benign, so therefore, it wouldn't have mattered. I learned from Mr. Cuff what was going on.

Mr. Bopp. All right. And Mr. Ickes, just to be clear, just told you to get a status report, is that right?

Mr. Kantor. He what? I'm sorry.

Mr. Bopp. He asked you to get a status report on the strike.

Mr. Kantor. It was two things. No, two things, to be fair: status and the prospects for settlement. And you can see, I probably went into that in C and D, where Mr. Cuff says, ``like to settle, willing to meet,'' and so on.

Mr. Bopp. Let me ask you, you already said that the reference in the e-mail to pressure you think is inaccurate, correct?

Mr. Kantor. I know it's inaccurate, because that's not what happened.

Mr. Bopp. Do you think it would have been appropriate for you, as the U.S. Trade Representative, to pressure Diamond Walnut to settle its strike with the Teamsters?

Mr. Kantor. Oh, I don't know. You know, any administration, Republican or Democrat, has an obligation to try to keep the U.S. economy going and if a strike is having an adverse effect on a particular area, to be involved. I don't know what pressure means in any particular situation.

If you ask me, should anyone take action in order to punish someone because of a strike, the answer is of course not. And we didn't. And, in fact, with South Korea, Israel, and other areas, we continued to fight for access for walnuts into other markets, and in the Uruguay Round, we fought for and got very large tariff concessions for walnuts.

That didn't happen. That would be one area. I am just trying to help. If you say that anytime anyone in the Cabinet calls any company and says, gee, I'd like to know what's going on, there is some sort of pressure there, well, of course, there might be some. It's in the eyes of the beholder. But certainly, I considered this call benign, part of my job, and of no great consequence.

Mr. Bopp. I guess I wasn't clear. I am not talking about this call specifically. I am saying would you feel it would have been appropriate for you to have pressured Diamond Walnut to try to settle the strike with the Teamsters.

Mr. Kantor. Oh, it would have been appropriate for me to urge them or to try to help, if I was asked to do so; or to do things that were within my jurisdiction, which would not have been inappropriate. But I wasn't asked to do that.

You are asking a speculative question. I really don't want to get into that, because that didn't happen. This is the sum total of my involvement in this entire situation.

Mr. Bopp. Now, did you or your chief of staff check with counsel's office at the USTR before you called Diamond Walnut?

Mr. Kantor. I didn't. I don't know if my chief of staff did. It was Peter Scher, as you know. You might check with Peter. I just don't know the answer to the question.

Mr. Bopp. Okay. Let's please turn to Exhibit 14 for a minute. Now, this is a memo dated March 27, 1995, and it talks about a meeting that same day with Ron Carey, Harold Ickes, and others.

About two thirds of the way down the first page is a paragraph about the Diamond Walnut strike. Now, it says, ``Diamond Walnut, Ickes said he met face-to-face with USTR Mickey Kantor last week and that Kantor agreed to use his discretionary authority to try to convince the CEO of that company that they should settle the dispute.''

Now, that does not sound like a status call, but let me ask, were you aware at the time you made the call that Mr. Ickes was touting your call to the Teamsters prior to--

Mr. Kantor. No. First of all, let me make it clear, I have never seen this memo. I was not involved in the meeting, as you know. We have talked about this before. And I was unaware of what Mr. Ickes may or may not have said. And I am not sure--this is from Bill Hamilton to List, not from Harold Ickes, so I am not sure that correctly reflects Mr. Ickes' statement. You would have to ask Mr. Ickes or Mr. Hamilton or whoever was in the meeting. I was not in the meeting or involved in that.

Mr. Bopp. Now, did you make just the one call to Diamond Walnut?

Mr. Kantor. Yes, sir.

Mr. Bopp. And you had never spoken to Mr. Cuff prior to that call?

Mr. Kantor. Or since, except shaking his hand this morning, the first time we've ever met in person.

Mr. Bopp. Did you talk to anyone else at Diamond Walnut or do anything you can think of to help settle the strike?

Mr. Kantor. Ask it again, I am sorry, I apologize.

Mr. Bopp. Did you talk to anyone else at Diamond Walnut or do anything you can think of to help settle the strike?

Mr. Kantor. No, sir.

Mr. Bopp. Do you recall, for example, talking to Diamond Walnut lobbyist, Richard Douglas, about the strike?

Mr. Kantor. No, sir. In fact, I thought Richard Douglas at one point worked for Sun Diamond, not Diamond Walnut, but I am probably mistaken. You could probably tell me; I don't know.

Mr. Bopp. Do you have a sense of to what extent the Diamond Walnut strike affected the economy?

Mr. Kantor. I am not a labor economist. I know that any strike in the Central Valley of California is particularly difficult socially and politically with a little P, not partisan politically. They tend to be fraught with emotion and difficult on all sides, farm workers among the most poor and powerless in our society. Agriculture is a tough business to make a profit, and so both sides tend to be very emotional about these issues.

So I don't know what the natural results would be as a labor economist, but if you look at it from just a common sense point of view, any strike in the Valley is of some concern.

Mr. Bopp. Concern largely to the Valley?

Mr. Kantor. Yes, California is the largest agricultural exporting State in the United States. California is the largest exporting State in the United States. It exports well over $100 billion in goods. Agriculture is a major part of that, and the Central Valley is literally the largest agricultural exporting area in the world.

So therefore, any kind of problems there, whether it's water on one hand or labor on the other, would get many people's attention and it should, both in the administration, Congress and so on.

Mr. Bopp. And Diamond Walnut has exported a lot of walnuts, as far as you know?

Mr. Kantor. Well, as far as I know. I don't know the numbers, of course.

Mr. Bopp. Let me ask you this. Do you feel it would have been appropriate for you, when you called Bill Cuff, to make reference to the EU negotiations that the USTR's office was helping to conduct?

Mr. Kantor. Depending how it was done. I don't remember ever mentioning those negotiations to Mr. Cuff at all. My notes don't reflect that; I don't remember it. But even if I did, it must have been a passing reference.

Let me say it again. The priorities on those and every other agricultural negotiation came from USDA. Number two, we'd follow those priorities very closely. Number three, we did a lot of market opening, not just for Diamond Walnut, but the whole industry before and after this matter.

We took no action before, during, or after that phone call that had anything to do with Diamond Walnut.

Mr. Bopp. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Hoekstra. Ms. Mink.

Mrs. Mink. Thank you very much. Welcome, Mr. Ambassador, to these hearings. I have read the depositions of all the witnesses that are to appear here today, and your deposition and your comments today. I really see nothing in anything I have read that comes anywhere near to the suggestion of impropriety on your part. So I am somewhat startled that the suggestion is there.

So I think the only real question that needs to be emphasized over and over in the record is that following your phone call to Diamond Walnut, did you in your capacity as a government official, take any steps whatsoever to harass, intimidate, or cause a negative decision to be rendered by yourself or any other agency of the Federal Government against Diamond Walnut?

Mr. Kantor. Absolutely not.

Mrs. Mink. Was there any followup discussion with any other agencies of government, such as Commerce, Agriculture, at the time that you were the Trade Representative to suggest to them that actions ought to be taken against Diamond Walnut because of their inability to settle this strike?

Mr. Kantor. No, not by me. No, ma'am.

Mrs. Mink. By yourself. I mean my question is directed to you in your capacity as the Trade Representative.

Mr. Kantor. No, ma'am.

Mrs. Mink. Is there anything in your function during this period that is under question where you served as the Trade Representative that in any way was use of your authority to urge actions by any other party to indicate displeasure with Diamond Walnut or to urge them to take action against Diamond Walnut because of the strike?

Mr. Kantor. Absolutely not.

Mrs. Mink. I yield the remaining time to our minority counsel.

Ms. Lentchner. Thank you. Ambassador Kantor, not only is the case, as you've testified, that there were no negative actions taken against Diamond Walnut, during the period that you were U.S. Trade Representative, there were in fact steps taken by you and the U.S. Trade Representative's office that would benefit the walnut industry and Diamond Walnut, isn't that right?

Mr. Kantor. I recall some, not all, but there certainly were steps taken, frankly, to promote the entire agricultural industry. But Diamond Walnut would have been the beneficiary of a number of our actions, yes.

Ms. Lentchner. And I think you mentioned before that during the pendency of this strike, the administration negotiated concessions on walnut tariffs as part of the Uruguay Rounds, is that right?

Mr. Kantor. Yes.

Ms. Lentchner. Would this have benefitted the walnut industry?

Mr. Kantor. Yes.

Ms. Lentchner. And during the pendency of this strike, the administration also benefitted the walnut industry by expending Federal monies on marketing and promotion programs, is that right?

Mr. Kantor. That comes under USDA, so therefore, I wouldn't be aware of that. I'm sorry, I can't testify to that.

Ms. Lentchner. And are you aware of the fact--I think you actually indicated before that during the pendency of this strike, the United States and you in particular were key in opening the Korean market for the importation of walnuts, is that right?

Mr. Kantor. Yes.

Ms. Lentchner. So overall, the record appears to indicate that there were, in fact, steps that would be beneficial to the walnut industry undertaken by the administration during this strike, and we can also ask Mr. Cuff about that, who I think knows.

Going back to your conversation with Mr. Cuff, I think you reported the results of your conversation to Harold Ickes.

Mr. Kantor. If you had asked me before I saw this memo, I would have said I couldn't recall. I called someone to report the results of the phone call. It says at the top, ``talked to Ickes,'' therefore, I have to assume that I did, although I am not certain. If you asked me without this memo, I can't tell you whether I did or I didn't.

Ms. Lentchner. And without a specific recollection of such a conversation--I know you can't say for sure, but assuming that you did report it, what you would have told him would have been that the status for settlement looked bleak, as you indicated to us earlier.

Mr. Kantor. I don't recall the phone call, but from my notes, I would have just read him my notes. And of course, that was the only call I ever made and the last time I had any involvement in this.

Ms. Lentchner. Mr. Ickes never raised the subject of Diamond Walnut with you again?

Mr. Kantor. I can't remember any conversation with Mr. Ickes or, frankly, anyone else about the Diamond Walnut strike. In fact, I just learned from the committee's letter that the strike is still going on. I received a letter yesterday or the day before, whatever it was.

Ms. Lentchner. And other than the one conversation we talked about, you are not aware of any other administration efforts to settle the Diamond Walnut strike?

Mr. Kantor. No, I am not.

Ms. Lentchner. On the table, we put a couple of memos there that are dated in 1997. One is a memo from Bill Hamilton to the Department of Labor, written in March of 1997, that complains about the administration's continuation of business dealings with Diamond Walnut.

The second is a 1997 letter from Ron Carey to the Department of Agriculture that similarly complains about the government's failure to debar Diamond Walnut in 1997. You haven't seen these documents before, have you?

Mr. Kantor. I don't seem to have the memo you referred to from Bill Hamilton, I'm sorry. I've got the letter from Mr. Carey to Secretary Glickman. I've got a letter from--I guess it's Secretary Glickman, yes, to Mr. Carey, but I don't have the memo you referred to. I'm sorry.

Ms. Lentchner. I'm sorry. We are bringing it to you right now.

Mr. Kantor. Wait, I have just been handed it. Now I have it. From Bill Hamilton to Bill Samuel.

Ms. Lentchner. Correct.

Mr. Kantor. Dated March 7, 1997.

Ms. Lentchner. Correct.

Mr. Kantor. I have it in front of me now, thank you.

Ms. Lentchner. Could you take a look at those documents for a minute. I see that, yes.

Mr. Kantor. Now, even though you have not seen these documents before, reading them now, would you agree with me that these documents seem to indicate that through 1997, the Teamsters were dissatisfied with the administration's efforts with respect to the Diamond Walnut strike.

Mr. Kantor. I think that's clear from this memorandum, yes, ma'am.

Ms. Lentchner. Would you agree with me that the Teamsters appear to believe that the government should have been doing more to help settle the Diamond Walnut strike?

Mr. Kantor. I think this memorandum makes that very clear.

Ms. Lentchner. And I think you indicated that you recently learned that this strike is still ongoing, is that right?

Mr. Kantor. Yes, from a letter from the committee.

Ms. Lentchner. Are you aware of any action taken by the administration that was motivated by a desire to increase Teamsters contributions to the Democratic Party?

Mr. Kantor. Absolutely not.

Ms. Lentchner. Were you ever present in a conversation in which administration officials discussed shaping policy so as to increase Teamsters contributions?

Mr. Kantor. Absolutely not.

Ms. Lentchner. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mrs. Mink. I yield such time as the gentleman from New Jersey might take.

Mr. Payne. Good morning, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. Kantor. Good morning, Mr. Payne. How are you, sir?

Mr. Payne. Fine, thank you. I am just not on this subcommittee, but saw that you were going to be here. I am a member of the overall committee and was a little interested, because I just want to frame in my own mind where this is going.

Let me just ask a couple of questions. First of all, is it unusual for the Federal Government to attempt to keep things moving in the country on a normal level whether it's problems with the airlines, problems with miners, problems with truckers, just problems in general where there is a difference between labor and management. Is this an unusual situation?

Mr. Kantor. No, sir.

Mr. Payne. We've seen that, as a matter of fact, in some instances,such as with, the UPS Teamsters strike, the Secretary of Labor actually got involved directly in the negotiations, isn't that correct?

Mr. Kantor. Yes, sir.

Mr. Payne. The question of imports and exports, as you've indicated--and you've been a person dealing tremendously with the whole question of trade. As a matter of fact, we were in touch with you about the banana problem with the Caribbean countries because of the new agreement in South America that has made it difficult with Lomay 1 and Lomay 2 with Europe. We felt that could you somehow help to allow the Caribbean countries that have seen a tremendous amount of their economics pulled away from them because of the new WTO regulations. And we talked to you about it, is there anything that can be done, what do you think, give us some suggestions on how we can go. Is that true?

Mr. Kantor. Yes, sir.

Mr. Payne. The reason I asked those question is I am kind of perplexed here about this hearing. To find it unusual for a person in the administration to try to accommodate both sides to get things moving back on the right track just seems sort of looking for straws in some gigantic barn full of hay.

So I just wanted to ask you--and I'm glad you clarified it--whether I have been off the track for the 40 years I've been in government to try to have people that have skills and have influence and that are prominent in an administration to simply help--strikes help no one; no one likes a strike. The owners don't like it, the workers certainly don't like it. And to have a hearing here with reams and reams of paper to talk about someone trying to move things along, to me, just seems like a waste of U.S. taxpayers' money. So I don't have any questions. I just wanted to get a little recollection, because the gray is not premature and maybe I am missing something. But I have no further questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mrs. Mink. I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman Hoekstra. Thank you. Do any members on this side wish to be recognized? Mr. Norwood is recognized.

Mr. Norwood. Just briefly, Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. Kantor, I don't believe from what I've read that you personally probably had anything much to do with this, but make a telephone call at the request of your friend. But it's pretty clear that Mr. Ickes had some good reasons that he'd like to have this strike settled.

Perhaps it was for the good of the country, but part of it was pretty political too. And since he is your good friend, did you and he ever talk about this any, or did he just say, hey, Mickey, make this call?

Mr. Kantor. As I said, Mr. Norwood, we either talked by phone or in a meeting, I can't remember which. If the schedule is correct, we had a meeting. It was a very brief conversation, as much as I can recall. And I've tried to reflect, as I did with the counsel, as to what happened. He asked me to check on the status, prospects for settlement and that's all I was asked to do.

And I inquired why me, and he said because of my experience in California, my experience with farm workers, which made some sense to me.

Mr. Norwood. Did you understand why he wanted you to make the call?

Mr. Kantor. No, sir, he didn't, but I assumed it was important. Understanding, as I said before, how emotional these strikes can become and how adverse an impact they can have on both labor and agriculture in the Central Valley, it wasn't surprising that he'd want someone to make a call and try to determine the status.

Mr. Norwood. At the time of these discussions, were you aware that the White House and the Labor Department understood that the Diamond Walnut strike and the Pony Express deal were two of Mr. Carey's very large problems and major issues, two issues Mr. Carey really wanted to have solved? Did you understand that--

Mr. Kantor. No, sir, I didn't.

Mr. Norwood. --at the time?

Mr. Kantor. No, sir.

Mr. Norwood. Do you typically call CEO's around the country as U.S. Trade Representative?

Mr. Kantor. I called a number of CEO's on a daily basis to talk about a number of issues, yes, sir. I talked to union leaders, as well, and to NGO's and others to try to work with them as we were pursuing market opening initiatives.

Mr. Norwood. Could you give me some examples of who you might pick up the phone and call?

Mr. Kantor. Oh, gosh, there are so many. There is almost not a CEO of a major company I didn't call from one time to another, either to learn about a situation in a foreign country, what was inhibiting their ability to get into the market, or to talk about a treaty we were trying to negotiate and get their input as to whether we were going in the right direction.

I found that I learned more from CEO's and their staff, frankly, from labor and from NGO's, than I did from people in the government as to what an effective trade agreement should be and how it should work.

Mr. Norwood. So I guess when Bill Cuff got your call, he wouldn't have thought of that as anything other than very normal that the U.S. Trade Representative wants to talk to me.

Mr. Kantor. I had never talked to him before, that I recall. I haven't talked to him since. You'd have to ask him, sir. I really can't speak for Mr. Cuff, obviously.

Mr. Norwood. Oh, I understand, and I will.

Mr. Kantor. But I think any CEO would understand that. I think my reputation was I called a lot of people and tried to get a lot of input.

Mr. Norwood. When you knew--and this will be it--when you knew that you were attending this hearing, did you bone up on this, go back and try to look at the records?

Mr. Kantor. Except for the records that others showed me, I had no records. Maybe it wasn't very smart policy when I left the USTR and left Commerce, I didn't take a piece of paper with me.

Mr. Norwood. Well, it's available. It was available to us, and I presume it would have been to you.

Mr. Kantor. Yes, and I did. Finally, I was shown pieces of paper and I have tried to remember. But I think I am trying to distinguish between what I really remember and what I now see on the pieces of paper. I think it's only a fair way to help the committee, rather than trying to remember something in retrospect I really don't.

Mr. Norwood. Well, my point I make here is that too frequently in hearings, and in this one already, too, the answer is often ``I don't remember, I do not recall.'' And in your case so far, that's been said by you 16 times, and we haven't even been going 30 minutes. That just makes it pretty hard for us to have a hearing to get to the facts if nobody can remember anything.

Mr. Kantor. Well, Mr. Norwood, I've tried to do the best I can.

Mr. Norwood. I don't question that. I just wish that you had spent some time looking back over the records to refresh your memory. I can't remember what I was doing 43 months ago, either, but, you know, your memory gets triggered when you go back and sort of look at the situation, and sentences and letters and memos remind you of things and it'll come back up again. It's just too often in this town we are hearing these day, ``I do not recall.''

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kantor. Also, Mr. Norwood, you can assume in this town, no good deed goes unpunished.

Chairman Hoekstra. Mr. Parker.

Mr. Parker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I cannot remember what I did day before yesterday.

Mr. Kantor. Neither can I, Mr. Parker. I'm 59 years old. I can remember a lot from high school, though.

Mr. Parker. Great memories, aren't they?

[Laughter.]

Mr. Kantor. Oh, they are, yes, sir. Especially in Asheville.

Mr. Parker. Mr. Secretary, you are an honorable man. You and I have worked together on different trade issues like NAFTA and I have no question about that. I am going to just bring up one thing which I have a problem with. If you'll look at Exhibit 18, I think it may be in your book. It is a memorandum from Bill Hamilton to Ron Carey. I am going to ask you some questions about that memorandum.

Mr. Kantor. Sure.

Mr. Parker. If you will look on the third page of that memorandum, it says, ``The Department of Labor office in Atlanta has been trying to persuade the Federal Reserve to withhold funds to Pony Express for services which the company has performed for the Fed while violating the Service Contract Act, which requires the company to pay prevailing wages to its employees.''

On the next page, under Diamond Walnut, it lists several things. One of them says, number one, ``Reach out to Mickey Kantor to urge him to stop promoting U.S. walnuts overseas until Diamond Walnut reaches an understanding with its employees.''

Number two, it says, ``Help us identify other government agencies that can be helpful in resolving this situation.'' Number three, ``Urge the Department of Agriculture to exclude Diamond and the California walnut industry from its Market Promotion Program until the strike is resolved.''

My question is general in nature. You didn't write the memo. It came from people you have had very few dealings with. Are those actions illegal? If you have the United States government with its agencies to stop promoting a product, to get other agencies to be helpful in resolving the situation by using their influence, to exclude Diamond Walnut from market promotion programs. Are those legitimate actions on the part of the government?

Mr. Kantor. First of all, as you know, I have never, ever seen this memo, and it was written from Bill Hamilton to Ron Carey. Number two, there is no indication these actions ever took place.

Mr. Parker. I'm not asking that question.

Mr. Kantor. Yes, sir, I understand. I think rather than give you an off-the-cuff legal opinion, I think I will leave it up to the committee and the Congress and Justice Department to determine whether or not if something like that happened, it would be legal or illegal.

Mr. Parker. The question is--

Mr. Kantor. But let me just say that I think it's important for the record and I have said it, sir, and I appreciate your kind remarks. We took no action at USTR before, after, during the pendency of these memos floating around, which I was not aware of, to do anything but to frankly help Diamond Walnut. We continued to do so at USTR, based upon priorities set by USDA.

No one ever asked me to take any action with regard to Diamond Walnut. No one ever tried to persuade me to do anything negative towards Diamond Walnut, and we didn't.

Mr. Parker. Mr. Kantor, does it bother you that your name is listed in this memo and saying to urge him to stop promoting U.S. walnuts overseas? Does that bother you? Because that would, to me, give the indication that they were trying to manipulate you. I'm not saying that they did, not saying that they succeeded in getting you to do this.

What I am saying is does it bother you that your name is in this memo? Because I can tell you, from a personal standpoint, if my name was in this memo, I would be bothered.

Mr. Kantor. Well, Mr. Norwood might be surprised. I am very bothered. No one likes their name thrown around without knowing it, and in a way that certainly doesn't reflect what happened or even what I was asked to do. So of course, it bothers me. But does it rise to the level of any illegality or so on, I couldn't give you a comment on that. I don't believe so.

Mr. Parker. Let me just say in response to some of the things that have been said, in closing. I am not saying in any way, and not trying to cast aspersions on you, as far as what you did or did not do. What I am saying is that if any of these things happened on the part of the Federal Government getting involved in a labor dispute, to me, that is an unethical, irresponsible act on the part of our government and an abuse of power on the marketplace itself.

So that does bother me. And I think this is one of the most disturbing memos that we have in the exhibits, because it shows basically an abuse of power. And I, just like you, would be upset. I think that's probably one of the biggest reasons that this hearing is occurring, to find out exactly what went on, because we can't allow that to happen in our society.

I thank you, Mr. Kantor, for coming.

Chairman Hoekstra. Thank you. Any questions on this side? Mr. Schaffer.

Mr. Schaffer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Kantor, I want to go back to Exhibit 14 one more time and focus on under the heading of Outcomes, the bullet point number one. These are apparently the minutes from the meeting that took place. I suppose it took place on March 27, maybe prior to that, of 1995.

For some reason, Mr. Ickes apparently had the impression that you would use your discretionary authority to try to convince the CEO of Diamond Walnut that they would settle the dispute. And I take you on your word that you don't remember conveying that kind of impression to Mr. Ickes or anyone else.

Do you think it's possible that anyone else in your office may have been in contact with Diamond Walnut to use the office of the Trade Representative to convey that kind of sentiment, that kind of impression?

Mr. Kantor. No, sir, I don't think so. Number two, this memo was not written by Mr. Ickes. I've never seen this memo until I was shown it by your counsel, I guess a week or two ago, whenever we met. And it's someone else's impression of what Mr. Ickes said.

Number three, my contemporaneous notes, which you will see in Exhibit 6, I think, clearly indicate what the discussion was about. I took notes; they are very clear, and they have to do with assessing the situation and the prospects for settlements.

Mr. Schaffer. Then outside of this memo, do you think it's possible that--or are you aware of anyone else in the Trade Representative's office who might have contacted them.?

Mr. Kantor. No, I'm not. I have no knowledge of anyone at USTR who would have done anything that even approaches what you are referring to.

Mr. Schaffer. The second question I have is just with respect to the size of Diamond Walnut, the size of this dispute within the context of the American economy and so on. The Department of Labor, USTR getting involved with large disputes with large entities that seem to have a more identifiable connection to the economy or trade relations is understandable.

But this is a company, and this dispute that involves 500 seasonal workers, which is important on a regional level. But on a national level, it seems somewhat out of character of those other, larger conflicts that USTR might be involved in. Can you think of any other strikes, labor disputes, with that size, with 500 seasonal workers, or anything on that order that you might have been involved in over the course of your duties as U.S. Trade Representative?

Mr. Kantor. Not particularly labor disputes, but I got involved with companies smaller than Diamond Walnut in terms of trying to create market access with regard to textiles or apparel or agricultural goods or other goods or services around the world.

We were involved trying to get with some very small companies, pork into Korea. Or we were involved with Quaker Fabrics in Fall River, Massachusetts, not a major company in terms of their concerns, about getting market access into Mexico and other places for textiles or apparel, I think it was textiles in this case, although I can't remember.

So it wouldn't have been unusual. Sometimes some of these things that smaller and middle-sized companies have problems with are as important as major companies, and I think you ought to pay attention to both.

Mr. Schaffer. Sure, market access is one thing. I want to kind of zero in on labor disputes. Can you think of any other organizations of that size where there had been a labor dispute that prompted your interest and prompted perhaps a phone call or any kind of inquiry on your behalf?

Mr. Kantor. I don't remember one, no, sir.

Mr. Schaffer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Hoekstra. Thank you. Any questions on this side?

Mrs. Mink. No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Hoekstra. No further questions. Ambassador Kantor, thank you very much for being here this morning. I hope we've accommodated your schedule well and you can still catch your plane.

Mr. Kantor. Thank you very much. Thank you for being so gracious, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all.

Chairman Hoekstra. Without objection, all documents and deposition testimony referenced in this hearing shall be made a part of the public hearing record.

Mrs. Mink. Mr. Chairman, that is all materials, including those materials obtained in the depositions that are referenced today, are included in the record, correct?

Chairman Hoekstra. Correct.

Mrs. Mink. Yes. No objection.

Chairman Hoekstra. Thank you. So ordered.

Let me invite our next witness to the table, Mr. Ronald Carver. Good morning, Mr. Carver.

Mr. Carver. Good morning.

Chairman Hoekstra. Mr. Carver is the Coordinator of the Office of Strategic and Corporate Initiatives. Do you have an opening statement this morning?

Mr. Carver. Yes, I do.

Chairman Hoekstra. All right. Before we get to that, I think you know it is the practice of this subcommittee to swear in witnesses, therefore, you should be aware that it is illegal to make a false statement to Congress while under oath. Will you please rise and raise your right hand.

[Witness sworn.]

Chairman Hoekstra. We will recognize you for your opening statement. If you decide to summarize your statement, your full testimony will be included in the hearing record.

Mr. Carver. Thank you.

Chairman Hoekstra. Mr. Carver.

Mr. Carver. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Minority Member Mink, and members of the subcommittee, my name is Ron Carver. I am Coordinator at the Office of Strategic and Corporate Initiatives at the International Brotherhood of Teamsters.

Since 1992, my responsibilities at the IBT have included developing campaigns to assist workers in addressing injustices on the job and resolving a variety of labor disputes, including the strike at Diamond Walnut in California.

Diamond Walnut is the world's largest producer of walnuts. The IBT represents its cannery workers. For the past seven years, 500 workers, primarily Latino women who worked in the Diamond Walnut cannery, have been on strike. Prior to this strike, in response to a financial crisis caused by mismanagement, the workers had agreed to reductions in their salaries from $18,000 per year to $12,000 per year. Once the company returned to profitability, it refused to share that prosperity with the workers, and as a result, they went out on strike.

Over the past seven years, the IBT has spent a lot of time and energy trying to resolve the strike. We have organized boycotts and public information campaigns. We have also exercised our right to petition the government by contacting our representatives in government to tell them about the problem.

Unfortunately, this strike has still not been resolved, and we welcome anything that Congress or this subcommittee can do to bring about a just solution to the dispute at Diamond Walnut.

I am appearing before you today voluntarily, and am happy to answer any questions the subcommittee may have.

SEE APPENDIX C FOR WRITTEN STATEMENT OF RON CARVER

Chairman Hoekstra. Thank you very much. Mr. Bopp will be recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. Bopp. Good morning, Mr. Carver. When did you first come to work for the Teamsters?

Mr. Carver. In 1992.

Mr. Bopp. And what positions have you held with the Teamsters?

Mr. Carver. I originally came as a consultant, and then in September of 1992, I became the Director of the Office of Strategic Campaigns.

Mr. Bopp. And what were your job responsibilities as the Director of the Office of Strategic Campaigns?

Mr. Carver. I developed and oversaw a number of campaigns, as my statement indicated, addressing injustices on the job affecting our members around the country.

Mr. Bopp. These campaigns were generally on behalf of local unions, correct?

Mr. Carver. Sometimes on behalf of local unions, sometimes, in the instance of national contracts, it would be on behalf of the IBT.

Mr. Bopp. And among the disputes you became involved in, you became involved in strikes, correct?

Mr. Carver. This includes strikes.

Mr. Bopp. Generally, were those difficult strikes, strikes that were difficult to resolve?

Mr. Carver. Usually so.

Mr. Bopp. And whom did you report to during this period?

Mr. Carver. Ron Carey, the president of the union.

Mr. Bopp. Now, when coordinating these campaigns, did you also work with Bill Hamilton, the Director of Government Affairs for the Teamsters?

Mr. Carver. Yes.

Mr. Bopp. What kind of work did Mr. Hamilton do on these campaigns?

Mr. Carver. He was the Director of Government Affairs, and he would help set up meetings with members of Congress or government agencies.

Mr. Bopp. And did you personally have contact with government agencies during this period?

Mr. Carver. I did.

Mr. Bopp. Now, was part of your job at this time attempting to bring as much pressure to bear as possible on companies the Teamsters were striking?

Mr. Carver. Either that or to find any way to find a mutually satisfactory agreement.

Mr. Bopp. Who asked you to bring as much pressure to bear on a particular company during a strike?

Mr. Carver. I'm not sure that folks would use that particular phrase, but I could be asked to be involved in resolution of strikes by any number of folks at the union anyone from a local leader to a division director to the president of the union.

Mr. Bopp. So you did not get involved in all the strikes the Teamsters were involved in, is that correct?

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Mr. Bopp. And how is it that you determined how much pressure needed to be brought on a particular company that the Teamsters were striking?

Mr. Carver. Beats me.

Mr. Bopp. Did you try to evaluate strikes in terms of their significance to the union?

Mr. Carver. Yes.

Mr. Bopp. Was the Diamond Walnut strike an important issue to the Teamsters?

Mr. Carver. Yes.

Mr. Bopp. Who asked you to start working on the Diamond Walnut strike?

Mr. Carver. President Carey.

Mr. Bopp. Do you recall any specifics about what he asked you to do?

Mr. Carver. No. Basically, he just asked me to get involved and see if there was a way to end it. The strike had started prior to his getting into office. At that point, it had been some nine months and he said, see what you can do.

Mr. Bopp. Did Mr. Carey tell you that the Diamond Walnut strike was an important issue for the Teamsters?

Mr. Carver. I don't know if he said that, but his asking me to do it implied that.

Mr. Bopp. Okay. Your understanding, though, is that Mr. Carey thought the strike was an important issue for the Teamsters, is that correct?

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Mr. Bopp. And did you see your responsibilities as including trying to bring as much pressure as possible to bear on Diamond Walnut in order to get the strike settled?

Mr. Carver. Sure.

Mr. Bopp. Did you have any conversations with anyone at the White House about the Diamond Walnut strike?

Mr. Carver. Yes.

Mr. Bopp. Who at the White House did you speak to?

Mr. Carver. Harold Ickes.

Mr. Bopp. Did you speak to Mr. Ickes face-to-face?

Mr. Carver. Yes.

Mr. Bopp. Where was this meeting?

Mr. Carver. At the White House.

Mr. Bopp. When did it take place?

Mr. Carver. Sometime in the spring of 1995.

Mr. Bopp. Who else was present at the meeting?

Mr. Carver. Bill Hamilton; Judy Scott, also from the Teamsters; and I believe someone else from--I don't know, from the White House from Mr. Ickes' staff or someone else whose name I don't recall.

Mr. Bopp. What was Judy Scott's position at the time?

Mr. Carver. She was general counsel to the union.

Mr. Bopp. And what did you discuss at this meeting?

Mr. Carver. I believe there are a number of issues that Bill Hamilton and Judy were discussing with Harold Ickes, but I was there to give background on the Diamond Walnut dispute.

Mr. Bopp. Did you do so?

Mr. Carver. Yes.

Mr. Bopp. And was the meeting intended to seek help from Mr. Ickes?

Mr. Carver. Yes.

Mr. Bopp. Can you recall what you said to Mr. Ickes?

Mr. Carver. No, I can't.

Mr. Bopp. But you recall generally the intent was for you to give background on the Diamond Walnut strike?

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Mr. Bopp. Do you know if Harold Ickes did anything to help with the Diamond Walnut strike?

Mr. Carver. No, I don't know.

Mr. Bopp. If we could turn to Exhibit 14, please, in the book in front of you. Now, we've referred to this earlier. This is the March 27, 1995 memo from Bill Hamilton to List. The list on the bottom of page two of this exhibit shows your name. Do you recall if you received this document?

Mr. Carver. No, I don't recall.

Mr. Bopp. In the first paragraph, the document talks about a meeting with Ron Carey, Harold Ickes, and others. Did you attend that meeting?

Mr. Carver. No, I did not.

Mr. Bopp. Did you know about it when it happened?

Mr. Carver. I don't believe so.

Mr. Bopp. Again, the memo indicates that the U.S. Trade Representative agreed to, I quote, use his discretionary authority to try to convince Diamond Walnut to settle the strike. Did you suggest to Mr. Ickes that the U.S. Trade Representative might be able to help the Teamsters with the Diamond Walnut strike?

Mr. Carver. I don't remember saying that. I am sure--I don't remember saying that.

Mr. Bopp. Is that something you believed, though? That the USTR could, in fact, help the Teamsters settle the Diamond Walnut strike?

Mr. Carver. Well, I remember that at that meeting I was upset that the U.S. Trade Representative was aiding the company, whether I thought that the Trade Representative could aid the union, I don't recall then.

Mr. Bopp. Let me show you, please, Exhibit 1. Again, this document appears to be a memo from Harold Ickes to Ambassador Kantor. The subject of the memo is the Diamond Walnut strike. There were three attachments to this memo and we've only included one here.

The memo itself, have you ever seen it before, outside of any recent interviews or depositions?

Mr. Carver. No.

Mr. Bopp. If we could look at the attachment to the memo. It's entitled ``Background on the Diamond Walnut Strike.'' Have you seen the attachment before with the same qualifications?

Mr. Carver. Well, I've seen things like this. I've seen other background sheets. I'm not sure if I've seen this particular one.

Mr. Bopp. Do you think you might have had a hand in writing this attachment?

Mr. Carver. I might have supplied some information for it.

Mr. Bopp. Okay. Now, Bill Hamilton was the government affairs director for the Teamsters in 1995. Do you know whether Mr. Hamilton forwarded anything that you wrote on the Diamond Walnut strike to the White House?

Mr. Carver. I don't know for sure, though I routinely would prepare fact sheets or background information.

Mr. Bopp. For Mr. Hamilton?

Mr. Carver. For Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. Bopp. And did he ask you to write a memo on the Diamond Walnut strike?

Mr. Carver. He asked me to write many memos on the Diamond Walnut strike?

Mr. Bopp. Did he say why he was asking you to write the memos?

Mr. Carver. It would be for the work that we were doing.

Mr. Bopp. Including to be able to use the memos in your meetings with the administration?

Mr. Carver. It may have. I don't remember.

Mr. Bopp. Let me draw your attention to the last paragraph on the last page of Exhibit 1. It says, ``A company's labor practices should be considered before it is offered government assistance in expanding its foreign markets.'' Do you agree with that statement?

Mr. Carver. Yes, I do.

Mr. Bopp. The second sentence says, ``Diamond should receive no further assistance, financial or otherwise, from U.S. agencies until it negotiates an end to the strike.'' Are those your words?

Mr. Carver. I don't know that they are my words.

Mr. Bopp. Do you agree with the sentiments expressed in those words?

Mr. Carver. Do I agree? Yes, I do.

Mr. Bopp. Did you convey those thoughts to Harold Ickes when you met with him?

Mr. Carver. What I conveyed to Harold Ickes is that we noticed that in a number of instances, the administration, the U.S. government was assisting a company that had been found twice to be a violator of Federal labor laws, and I thought it was inappropriate that a repeat violator of U.S. labor laws should be given special assistance.

Mr. Bopp. So you conveyed to Mr. Ickes--and correct me if I am misstating you--that Diamond Walnut shouldn't receive assistance from the U.S. Trade Rep's office until it negotiated an end to the strike.

Mr. Carver. I don't know if those are the words I used, but I conveyed the sense that we were unhappy that the government would go out of its way to assist a repeat labor law violator.

Mr. Bopp. But that was the message? That the USTR should not assist Diamond Walnut because of the strike, correct?

Mr. Carver. That was my sentiment.

Mr. Bopp. Did you ever talk to Bill Hamilton about what the United States Trade Representative was doing to assist Diamond Walnut?

Mr. Carver. I believe I brought it to his attention.

Mr. Bopp. And when did you raise this issue with him?

Mr. Carver. Sometime that winter.

Mr. Bopp. Did anyone from the Teamsters actually contact Mickey Kantor or his office about the Diamond Walnut strike?

Mr. Carver. I don't know.

Mr. Bopp. Do you believe that someone did?

Mr. Carver. I believe there may have been discussions but I don't know for sure.

Mr. Bopp. Do you recall being deposed by subcommittee staff about a week ago?

Mr. Carver. Yes, I do.

Mr. Bopp. And do you recall telling us that you believed at the time, at least, that Judy Scott, the general counsel of the IBT, actually contacted Mickey Kantor or his office?

Mr. Carver. It may have been that. It may be that Judy had contacted the Trade Representative's office. I am just not sure.

Mr. Bopp. And why do you think she may have contacted the USTR's office?

Mr. Carver. I thought I remembered some discussions with her about that.

Mr. Bopp. Do you have reason to doubt that it happened?

Mr. Carver. No.

Mr. Bopp. Did Judy Scott tell you who she spoke to in the office?

Mr. Carver. No.

Mr. Bopp. If I could show you Exhibit 5, please. It is a single-page memo dated March 22, 1995 from Chris Marcich to Ambassador Kantor. Do you know Mr. Marcich?

Mr. Carver. No, I don't.

Mr. Bopp. The first paragraph, last sentence, says ``The Teamsters would like to see USDA terminate its Market Promotion Program and would like USTR to indicate we will not pursue our rights on walnuts in the soon-to-begin US-EU enlargement negotiations.''

Did you raise the general issue of USTR assistance to Harold Ickes during your meeting?

Mr. Carver. Yes.

Mr. Bopp. Now, your point in talking to Harold Ickes was you wanted him to ask Mickey Kantor to stop helping Diamond Walnut until they settled the strike, correct?

Mr. Carver. I believe what I said is that I didn't think it was appropriate for the administration to be proactively assisting companies that had been found to be repeat violators of Federal labor laws.

Mr. Bopp. Okay. But at a minimum, your assumption was that Ambassador Kantor had some leverage over Diamond Walnut and you wanted Harold Ickes to ask him to use it, correct?

Mr. Carver. I just wanted special aide to the company to end.

Mr. Bopp. Why did you think the aid was special?

Mr. Carver. Why did I think it was special? Because there were any number of companies out there looking for assistance, and they were specifically aiding Diamond Walnut.

Mr. Bopp. You were here for Ambassador Kantor's testimony, sir?

Mr. Carver. Right.

Mr. Bopp. Did you hear him say that the USTR's office did not give any special aid to Diamond Walnut?

Mr. Carver. No, I didn't hear him say that. What I heard him say, he said he helped open up the markets in South Korea and Israel.

Mr. Bopp. The walnut market, correct?

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Mr. Bopp. I take it, though, when you were talking to Harold Ickes, what you were generally referring to were the EU negotiations on walnuts, is that right?

Mr. Carver. No. No, I had read in the Sun Diamond quarterly magazine about Ambassador Kantor's assistance in opening up the South Korean market and I was a little bit startled that the administration was taking special efforts to help a repeat labor law violator.

Mr. Bopp. Okay. But to be clear then, the only reason you were talking to Harold Ickes about Diamond Walnut and Ambassador Kantor's trade negotiations was the strike, correct?

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Mr. Bopp. Did Mr. Ickes say he would talk to Ambassador Kantor and see if he would agree to pressure Diamond Walnut?

Mr. Carver. I don't recall that at all.

Mr. Bopp. Did he at least agree to contact Ambassador Kantor about Diamond Walnut?

Mr. Carver. I don't recall that.

Mr. Bopp. I have no further questions.

Chairman Hoekstra. Do any members have questions? Mr. Parker, Mr. Schaffer?

Mr. Parker. The question was asked in the last series of questions, in the meeting what did Mr. Ickes say to you?

Mr. Carver. You know, I don't remember.

Mr. Parker. Were you in the meeting?

Mr. Carver. I was at one meeting, yes.

Mr. Parker. Okay, but at that meeting, at the end of the meeting, you get through and he goes, good talking to you.

Mr. Carver. Right.

Mr. Parker. And you walk out and leave.

Mr. Carver. Right.

Mr. Parker. He made no statement from the standpoint--you had no feeling of what he would do at all?

Mr. Carver. No. Well, I may have then, but I don't--

Mr. Parker. Did you have any impression whatsoever?

Mr. Carver. I felt that we got a decent hearing.

Mr. Parker. Thank you, Mr. Carver.

Chairman Hoekstra. Yield to the minority for 30 minutes.

Mrs. Mink. Thank you very much. Welcome to the hearing, Mr. Carver. I had the opportunity last night to read through your depositions and much of it has been covered in direct testimony today.

Your position as the campaign strategist included not only concerns that IBT might have with respect to strikes of its unions all over the country, but also contract negotiations?

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Mrs. Mink. So you were the principal strategist for the union, is that correct?

Mr. Carver. No, but I was one of them.

Mrs. Mink. One of them?

Mr. Carver. Sure.

Mrs. Mink. You shared that responsibility with who?

Mr. Carver. Any number of people. I mean, there were other folks in my department, there were other people who helped develop strategy for the union. We were not the--

Mrs. Mink. But when you met with the International President, Mr. Carey, and sat around the table, didn't they direct primarily their questions to you as to what should be done, what is being done to assist in this contract, that contract, or with a strike that was ongoing?

Mr. Carver. In a number of specific ones, but there may be others where he talked with other people. That's all that I meant.

Mrs. Mink. So what percentage of your time was spent on contract negotiations as against the strikes that were ongoing?

Mr. Carver. Probably a greater percentage on contract negotiations, and then strikes.

Mrs. Mink. Isn't it a generally accepted principle that whenever a local or any member organization of the union, the IBT, went on strike, that this was an important consideration of the International?

Mr. Carver. Yes.

Mrs. Mink. That none of them were considered trivial or unimportant.

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Mrs. Mink. If the International President, Mr. Carey, were heard saying, well, that's not important, he would probably be out of there pretty fast, wouldn't he?

Mr. Carver. Yes.

Mrs. Mink. So in that sense, every strike is important to the union and the settlement of that strike is also important, isn't that true?

Mr. Carver. Yes.

Mrs. Mink. So that the efforts of the International is to do whatever it could to be of assistance to that local that was on strike, isn't that the general policy of your union, as well as any other union?

Mr. Carver. Yes.

Mrs. Mink. So in that pursuit, the actions that you took with respect to Diamond Walnut, were they different, unusual, strategically extraordinary, or pretty common? Oh?

Mr. Carver. I would say that they were usual, but I would also have to say that we probably spent more time than on the average strike.

Mrs. Mink. Why was that? Why was this of particular concern to your office?

Mr. Carver. I think for a few reasons. One is because President Carey had personally met with the strikers and he was--

Mrs. Mink. When you say ``the strikers,`` you mean predominantly female minority members of his International?

Mr. Carver. Yes, and I think he was both personally moved by hearing of their plight, that they had been permanently replaced after some 20 and 30 years of service to the company. And I think also that he wanted to make a statement along the lines you just indicated, that immigrant women from the Central Valley in California are as important to his administration as truck drivers.

Mrs. Mink. So he felt very, very intimately concerned about these workers' personal situation, their loss of jobs, the effect on their families, and felt, as a national president, he should do his utmost to see if that strike could be settled. Isn't that the general drift of the Diamond Walnut situation?

Mr. Carver. Yes.

Mrs. Mink. And it became a national controversy to some extent. Wasn't part of the strategy to get out into the media and have a boycott and all those kinds of things?

Mr. Carver. Yes.

Mrs. Mink. And that was under your control?

Mr. Carver. Yes.

Mrs. Mink. Was it extraordinary, therefore, when it became such an issue within the union, that you would also feel, as part of your responsibility, to reach out to members of Congress, members of the House and the Senate, and the White House, to see if they would assist? Is that unusual, where you have given this particular strike that visibility?

Mr. Carver. No, not at all.

Mrs. Mink. Would you have been considered derelict if you did not reach out to the people in high places, in politics, in Congress, and the White House?

Mr. Carver. I think that's correct.

Mrs. Mink. There was no reason in any of the ethics standards observed by yourself as an individual or as a union officer or employee not to consider your right to express your grievances to the highest places in this country.

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Mrs. Mink. And so in that context, you established the meeting with Mr. Ickes to discuss with him the high profile, high urgency of the situation that you felt was ongoing, and particularly your distress that the administration seemed to be oblivious to this situation by extending, in fact, the export opportunities for the industry to Korea.

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Mrs. Mink. So in that context, you feel that you were performing in the highest levels of your service to your union and to the workers that were being affected.

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Mrs. Mink. Is there any time in your planning for the meeting with Mr. Ickes that you felt you were abridging your sense of professional ethics with respect to your job responsibilities at the Teamsters?

Mr. Carver. Not in the least.

Mrs. Mink. How do you explain, for all of these efforts, with all of your pleadings and whatever else occurred under your direction, that the administration seemed to ignore your plea?

Mr. Carver. I don't know. It's a big disappointment.

Mrs. Mink. Did they, in any way, provide any of the so-called assistance that you were seeking, such as not giving the market promotion funds or not allowing for new export opportunities. Was there anything that occurred that indicated the administration was paying any attention to what you were suggesting?

Mr. Carver. No. Only when they were required by law would they move.

Mrs. Mink. So, in effect, your pleas were really nothing more than pleas.

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Mrs. Mink. I will defer the rest of my time to counsel.

Ms. Lentchner. Thank you. Could you compare the assistance the Teamsters received with respect to the Diamond Walnut strike from the Clinton Administration with the assistance that Teamsters received from prior administrations with respect to other strikes.

Mr. Carver. Well, I didn't work for the Teamsters prior, other than for a few months under the Bush Administration. But I can say that, in general, we were displeased with the reception we got from the Clinton Administration and found that it in no way matched the concern and involvement, say, that the labor movement found from Labor Secretary Dole under the Bush Administration, which was more responsive and more effective.

Ms. Lentchner. And I take it from your testimony that you don't think the Teamsters got any special favors with respect to the Diamond Walnut strike from the Clinton Administration.

Mr. Carver. Well, quite the contrary. I think that the administration continuously favored the company and was unresponsive to the Teamsters.

Ms. Lentchner. And if we could just review for a second. In 1995, I think that here in your deposition--well, could you just list the contacts you had with the administration regarding Diamond Walnut in 1995. Would you like me to rephrase that?

Mr. Carver. I was just trying to--you mean, beyond the White House itself?

Ms. Lentchner. No, including the White House. Let's start with that. What is the sum total of contacts you had with the White House concerning the Diamond Walnut strike in 1995?

Mr. Carver. I attended one meeting with the White House in 1995.

Ms. Lentchner. And that's the meeting with Harold Ickes we spoke about earlier?

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Ms. Lentchner. Did any administration action to settle the strike result from that meeting, to your knowledge?

Mr. Carver. Not that I know of.

Ms. Lentchner. In 1995, did you have contacts with the Department of Agriculture concerning Diamond Walnut?

Mr. Carver. Yes, I did.

Ms. Lentchner. And what was the totality of the contacts you had with them?

Mr. Carver. I believe I had three meetings with them.

Ms. Lentchner. And with respect to any of those meetings--three meetings with them in 1995?

Mr. Carver. I believe so.

Ms. Lentchner. Okay. With respect to any of those meetings, did any administration action to settle the strike result, to your knowledge?

Mr. Carver. Not that I know of.

Ms. Lentchner. In 1996, there was an effort to negotiate a settlement to the Diamond Walnut strike, is that right?

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Ms. Lentchner. To your knowledge, did that negotiation arise from any intervention by Harold Ickes or anyone else in the White House?

Mr. Carver. Not the White House.

Ms. Lentchner. Are you aware of any actions taken by Harold Ickes to settle the Diamond Walnut strike?

Mr. Carver. No, I am not.

Ms. Lentchner. With respect to the one meeting that you had with Mr. Ickes regarding the Diamond Walnut strike, in your view, was there anything inappropriate about that meeting?

Mr. Carver. Not at all.

Ms. Lentchner. Earlier we saw--and I hope they are still on the table--three exhibits dated in 1997; a letter from Bill Hamilton, the Department of Labor, a letter from Ron Carey to the Department of Agriculture. Do you have those exhibits?

Mr. Carver. Yes.

Ms. Lentchner. Are you familiar with these documents?

Mr. Carver. No.

Ms. Lentchner. Are you familiar with the Teamsters' view in 1997 concerning the administration's activities with respect to the Diamond Walnut strike in 1997?

Mr. Carver. In 1997?

Ms. Lentchner. Yes.

Mr. Carver. I suspect so.

Ms. Lentchner. What is that view?

Mr. Carver. What is that view? Are the Teamsters still unhappy with the administration policies regarding the Diamond Walnut strike?

Mr. Carver. Well, to the extent that the administration still seems to be favoring the company, I would say yes.

Ms. Lentchner. So during the entire period, from 1994 through 1997, to your knowledge, was it the view of the Teamsters that the administration could have done more to assist with the Diamond Walnut strike?

Mr. Carver. Yes.

Ms. Lentchner. In any conversations you had with any administration officials, was it ever suggested to you that the administration would assist the Teamsters or be helpful to the Teamsters if the Teamsters made contributions to the Democratic Party?

Mr. Carver. No.

Ms. Lentchner. Do you believe that the administration granted the Teamsters special favors with respect to the Diamond Walnut strike in an effort to increase Teamsters' political contributions?

Mr. Carver. No.

Ms. Lentchner. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mrs. Mink. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. I am just trying to get a sense of where the labor movement was going in, say, the late 70's, 80's, early 90's. From what I have been able to ascertain, organized labor sort of had a decline in overall membership, kind of gradually, during those years, is that correct?

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Mr. Payne. And there were relatively few strikes because of the strength of the corporations' sort of slow growth, workers being concerned about a job with bad conditions is better than no job at all type of thing. So we sort of grin and bear it, we've got to go along because we don't want to take a chance of a strike and the company go out of business. That was sort of the thinking--isn't that correct?

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Mr. Payne. Now, this Mr. Carey gets elected and you have a group of workers who are, as has been mentioned, English is a second language perhaps, primarily women, maybe a few illegals. So these are people who are the most vulnerable, would you agree?

Mr. Carver. I would agree generally. I don't think there were undocumented workers among this group.

Mr. Payne. Right. No, I know you wouldn't have an undocumented worker work there. But just generally speaking, sometimes one might slip through. So I just use that, once again, as people who are most exploited, I would say, by corporations and businesses and so forth.

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Mr. Payne. And also, I don't think you would characterize President Clinton as being--I mean, I wouldn't, but I won't put any words in your mouth--I wouldn't characterize Clinton as being extremely pro-labor.

Mr. Carver. Neither would I.

Mr. Payne. As a matter of fact, he went to the AFL-CIO meeting where he announced he was going to support NAFTA back in 1992 when he was first running, is that correct?

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Mr. Payne. And he's been trying to get fast-track authority that Democrats oppose, true Democrats. But he has been pushing very, very hard, is that correct?

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Mr. Payne. And I am a Hubert Humphrey Democrat, you know--there are a few left alive, I guess--where you really had labor Presidents that stood there, knock down, drag out, sort of really for the worker. So I am once again baffled by this hearing.

You've got probably the most pro-business President, Democrat, has done the least for labor, and here you find some obscure situation where people are making it so unusual for someone to say to the administration, can you give us a hand someway to see if we could settle this.

Let me bring up another incident. I was on the Education and Labor Committee previously. I'm on this education, I can't keep up with it. It's the third change in the title, so I lose track. But on the Education and Labor Committee, we had the ADA legislation that was passed, remember that?

Mr. Carver. Yes.

Mr. Payne. Do you remember Greyhound Corporation was extremely opposed to any kind of law to assist disabled people? They felt it was going to mess up their busses, they were going to have to retrofit, it's going to be very expensive, ramps to be built up to the entrance to Greyhound bus terminals would be costly. We found out they cost about $200 apiece.

I bring that up because I was involved in the writing of that legislation. At that time, it was President Bush. And believe it or not, when we finally ended up with some legislation, it ended up with saying, you should make these changes in the workplace for these disabled people if it's readily achievable or if it doesn't create any undue hardship. And you know where all of that language came from? Somehow it got into our stuff from the Bush White House.

I just use that example as just one where it doesn't seem to me to be so unusual for an administration to get involved in something that is seen of significance to whatever the group of people, whether it's a labor group, whether it's a disabled group or any other.

So I just, once again, find this somewhat unusual. And second, finally, I would just conclude--I don't have many questions, as you can see--that you said this strike was a strike that Mr. Carey inherited, correct?

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Mr. Payne. Therefore, I guess everybody looks for reelections. One way to really kind of deliver to your workforce in general is probably to solve some problems that the previous administration was unable to solve, correct?

Mr. Carver. Sure.

Mr. Payne. Therefore, you then look as though you are a problem solver and the type of leader that people want. So, once again, like I said, I don't have many specific questions. I just wanted to get those points on the record. Thank you.

Mr. Carver. Thank you.

Mrs. Mink. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Hoekstra. Mr. Payne, we're glad you're here though, and participating this morning. And we look forward to sharing our report with you as we write the report so that you can get a larger context of what was going on within the Teamsters organization during roughly this same timeframe, whether it was their own election for the president, whether it was their money-laundering, whether it was their deterioration in their financials, or whether it was their potential involvement in some elections in Kentucky.

And perhaps when you get a broader context, you might understand why just asking some questions about what was going on and what was going on between the Teamsters and the executive branch back in 1995 might not be that unusual or that special of a circumstance.

So as we write the report, since you haven't had the benefit of being at all those other hearings, we will share the report with you and maybe you'll get a larger or better idea of what the context was of this organization with this administration during this timeframe.

Mr. Payne. Let me just, if I could--I have not been in those meetings, but I have, interestingly enough, been following a lot of this closely and carefully. But I would certainly welcome your report.

Chairman Hoekstra. Good. Thank you. Mr. Norwood.

Mr. Norwood. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. Carver, in 1995, how many different problem areas were you working on in terms of strikes?

Mr. Carver. Well, strikes or other serious problems, probably two dozen.

Mr. Norwood. Strikes that the Teamsters had going in 1995 would have numbered perhaps how many?

Mr. Carver. Without looking back, I cannot say, actually.

Mr. Norwood. If we wouldn't hold you to it, would you just ballpark me?

Mr. Carver. Maybe a half dozen.

Mr. Norwood. Okay. Now, in your job, which, I am sure, is very busy, did you in any way prioritize what was most important for you to spend your time on?

Mr. Carver. I'm not sure. I mean, I was handed certain assignments and I did my best to do them.

Mr. Norwood. Was this strike particularly--in other words, was this strike put at the top of the list? Was this a must-do situation, we've got to get this problem resolved, it's more important to us--though all are important--it's more important to us than any of them?

Mr. Carver. I wouldn't say it was more important than any, but it was up there among the significant issues, more significant issues.

Mr. Norwood. This was the situation--and you help me--you were at the meeting on March 1 because of your knowledge of the Sun Diamond strike.

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Mr. Norwood. And help me if I get any of this wrong. But this strike occurred prior to Mr. Carey being elected.

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Mr. Norwood. And at the time the workers walked off the job, you, the union, the Teamsters begin paying benefits.

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Mr. Norwood. As I presume you do. And then the employer replaced those workers.

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Mr. Norwood. And that has been going on a long time now, and even in 1995 had been going on a pretty good while.

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Mr. Norwood. Though it would have been politically--and I don't mean politically anything other than politically from the Teamsters' point of view, this would be one of those strikes that President Carey would very much want to get resolved, because, number one, these people are out of work; number two, they are receiving benefits, which certainly, I presume, is less than their pay, though I understand Mr. Carey raised those benefits.

But this would be a very important issue in 1995 if, for no other reason, the politics of it, from the Teamsters now. I'm not talking about Democrat and Republican; I'm talking about the politics within the Teamsters Union. It would have been a pretty important situation to resolve, wouldn't it?

Mr. Carver. I think it was an important situation to resolve, but I don't think I'd want to agree that it had anything to do with politics internal or external. I think on its own merits, it was important.

Mr. Norwood. Just out of curiosity, would it be better for them to go out of business?

Mr. Carver. For whom?

Mr. Norwood. Would it be better for the union for them to go out of business?

Mr. Carver. I think it would be better for the union if we could resolve the strike in a way that was mutually agreeable and beneficial.

Mr. Norwood. But nobody seems to be able to agree on how to resolve it, and if you can cut off their exports, certainly it would hurt the company. Would it just be better if the company went out of business? Is that a consideration in trying to resolve these strikes?

Mr. Carver. I don't know. I wouldn't--

Mr. Norwood. I mean, you can say, I won. You know, if they go out of business, you know, the workers didn't get their jobs back, but we won, by gosh, we forced them out of business. We got this Federal Government to not help them with their exports.

Mr. Carver. I would not say that.

Mr. Norwood. I wouldn't either. I just wondered if you would. In conclusion, I find it a little amusing, the discussions about his pro-business President. You know, the Teamsters didn't give but $2.4 million in 1992. Now, you've got to get on it if we want to turn this President into pro-labor, although you upped it in 1996. The Teamsters, I believe, gave Clinton and Gore $3.5 million. How much do you got to give before we can get him to be pro-labor?

That's all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Hoekstra. Any questions? Mr. Scott.

Mr. Scott. Mr. Carver, what is the status of the Teamsters being the bargaining unit for the company?

Mr. Carver. The Teamsters remain the bargaining unit, the representative of the bargaining unit at Diamond Walnut.

Mr. Scott. And was there a decertification election?

Mr. Carver. There have been two since the strike began.

Mr. Scott. And what is the status of those elections?

Mr. Carver. Both elections were voided and thrown out because of repeat illegal behavior by the company that tainted the elections.

Mr. Scott. And is an election pending?

Mr. Carver. Not that I know of. There ought to be one sometime. It's not clear when it will be.

Mr. Scott. Unless there is another election, the Teamsters are the bargaining agent for the company?

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Mr. Scott. I don't have any further questions.

Chairman Hoekstra. Mr. Schaffer.

Mr. Schaffer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me start where Mr. Scott just left off. There were two decertification elections, both were voided?

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Mr. Schaffer. And you said because of repeat illegal behavior on behalf of the company?

Mr. Carver. By the company.

Mr. Schaffer. When you say illegal, I am not familiar with these kinds of determinations. NLRB voids these elections, is that right?

Mr. Carver. The NLRB voided them and the Federal courts upheld the NLRB's decision.

Mr. Schaffer. So is it accurate to say that voiding the elections is the same as finding some kind of illegal activity?

Mr. Carver. The elections were voided because of the finding of illegal activity.

Mr. Schaffer. But the court actually determines that some illegal activity took place. Or the NLRB or the Federal court makes that determination?

Mr. Carver. No, the NLRB made the determination and the courts upheld the NLRB's position.

Mr. Schaffer. Made the determination that--

Mr. Carver. The NLRB investigated the company's conduct in the election. It was determined to be illegal, voided the election. The company appealed the Board's action and the Court upheld the decisions by the Board.

Mr. Schaffer. I understand that. I am kind of focused on that term ``illegal,'' that some law was broken.

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Mr. Schaffer. Is it accurate to say that when the NLRB voids an election, that some illegal activity--do they certify or do they make a statement or is there some solid founding or finding that an illegal activity took place?

Mr. Carver.e, if you'll look at these two separate issues, particularly number two. Why would the Department go out of its way to bring Diamond Walnut, with its sordid history of mistreating Hispanic women workers, back into the family of honorable companies eligible for government contracts in light of the new administration policy or procurement.

Are these the kind of questions you raised at, what was it, the March 1 meeting with Mr. Ickes?

Mr. Carver. Correct.

Mr. Schaffer. Did he suggest that the administration could do anything?

Mr. Carver. I don't recall that he did.

Mr. Schaffer. Did the issue of the U.S. Trade Representative come up at all as a possible option, applying any pressure using the office of the USTR in some way?

Mr. Carver. As I mentioned, it was one of the concerns that I know I probably cited, because that was at that time, a major concern to us.

Mr. Schaffer. That was what? I'm sorry?

Mr. Carver. That was one of the concerns to us. In other words, the government was opening up new markets, just had given them a $1 million contract for the school lunch program, was giving them millions of dollars in aid for promoting their product in TV advertisements overseas. It seemed like the administration was going out of its way to assist a company that was mistreating its workers, violating Federal labor laws, and had recently been convicted of bribing the Secretary of Agriculture.

Mr. Schaffer. Was there ever at any time any reason given as to why the U.S. Trade Representative would not be able to use its authority in resolving this dispute?

Mr. Carver. I don't remember asking that they use their authority to resolve the dispute.

Mr. Schaffer. But when Mr. Ickes was laying out a menu of possible options or just engage in this discussion, did at any time he say that using the authority of the U.S. Trade Representative was inappropriate or not an option?

Mr. Carver. I don't recall.

Mr. Schaffer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Hoekstra. Any other questions?

Mrs. Mink. No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Hoekstra. No further questions, Mr. Carver. Thank you very much for being here.

Mr. Carver. Thank you.

Chairman Hoekstra. Let me invite our next witness. Our next witness is Mr. William Cuff. Good morning.

Mr. Cuff. Good morning.

Chairman Hoekstra. Mr. Cuff is the former president and CEO of Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. Mr. Cuff, as I think you are aware, it is the practice of this subcommittee to swear in witnesses. Therefore, you should be aware that it is illegal to make a false statement to Congress while under oath. Will you please rise and raise your right hand.

[Witness sworn.]

Chairman Hoekstra. Mr. Cuff, do you have an opening statement today.

Mr. Cuff. I do not.

Chairman Hoekstra. Well, then we'll summarize it and we're all set and we'll begin with questioning. The majority will be yielded 30 minutes.

Mr. Cuff, it's correct you were the president and chief executive officer of Diamond Walnut Growers?

Mr. Cuff. Yes, I was.

Chairman Hoekstra. What time period?

Mr. Cuff. From 1990 till March of 1997.

Chairman Hoekstra. And what is the sales volume of Diamond Walnut?

Mr. Cuff. When I joined Diamond, it was around $150 million, $160 million. When I left, it was around $220 million, $230 million.

Chairman Hoekstra. Medium-sized company.

Mr. Cuff. Yes.

Chairman Hoekstra. You were there when the strike began and through all of its duration, since it's still going on, correct?

Mr. Cuff. Correct.

Chairman Hoekstra. We heard testimony from Mr. Carver, who was responsible for developing and coordinating campaigns on behalf of local unions involved in disputes with employers. Mr. Carver testified that the Teamsters used every possible legal tactic to pressure Diamond Walnut to settle the strike.

Is his testimony consistent with what you experienced on the receiving end? Did he do his job well?

Mr. Cuff. Yes. He's very capable, and the Teamsters, as I think you are probably aware, are also very powerful and very resourceful.

Chairman Hoekstra. Do you know Mr. Carver?

Mr. Cuff. I do.

Chairman Hoekstra. And what did you understand his job to be at the IBT?

Mr. Cuff. To basically get the strike resolved and to bring as much pressure as possible upon Diamond.

Chairman Hoekstra. And you were aware at the time that the Teamsters had a formidable lobbying team in Washington, is that correct?

Mr. Cuff. Yes.

Chairman Hoekstra. Were you also aware, or did you know that the Diamond Walnut strike was a major issue for the Teamsters leadership?

Mr. Cuff. I was.

Chairman Hoekstra. Was it your impression that the Teamsters were embarrassed by their inability to settle the strike?

Mr. Cuff. Yes.

Chairman Hoekstra. Do you have an idea as to how much money the Teamsters may have spent on the strike at Diamond Walnut?

Mr. Cuff. I would be genuinely guessing, but before I left, we had made estimates of well over $20 million.

Chairman Hoekstra. Are you also aware that the Teamsters had strong ties to the Clinton Administration?

Mr. Cuff. That, I am not aware of. I mean, I have heard some of the testimony this morning and had a chance to read some of the documents as the hearing has proceeded. But I was not aware of how close or the extent of the relationship that they had.

Chairman Hoekstra. Did you see more administration interest in the strike after President Clinton's election?

Mr. Cuff. That would be hard to really quantify, because I can't really remember how much the Bush Administration was interested in it. But I don't remember very much at all. I would say that there was interest from many parties, many sources related to the strike as the strike continued. And certainly, that being after the 1992 elections.

Chairman Hoekstra. Could you briefly describe some of the pressure that the executive branch applied to get Diamond Walnut to end the strike, or what you may perceive to be pressure?

Mr. Cuff. Again, I can tell you about things that happened. Now, what I cannot talk about is how they were orchestrated. But I can certainly tell you that from my experience from what I knew of the kinds of things that Diamond was subjected to prior to my time as president, that all of a sudden we started to go through many kinds of visits and investigations, whether from representatives from the Labor Department, whether it was from OSHA, whether it was from EEOC, whether it was calls from members of Congress.

I think there were a lot of people that were very interested in the strike.

Chairman Hoekstra. Did you see significant more activity from the Labor Department, OSHA, EEOC, EPA, than perhaps what you had before?

Mr. Cuff. Well, again, I had only been there since 1990. The strike began in 1991. And I can't tell you specifically what went on before my time there, but my sense, from everything I knew, was that there was more involvement by the groups that I mentioned.

Chairman Hoekstra. Do you have a general impression as to where the root of these various types of executive pressure, what the root of that pressure was?

Mr. Cuff. I have no specific knowledge of where the root was, but my belief or speculation has always been it was from the Teamsters.

Chairman Hoekstra. If you'd take a look in that binder that's to your left, and look at Exhibit 21. It's a copy of a report on the strike written by Karen Nussbaum when she was head of the Labor Department's Women's Bureau.

Mr. Cuff. Yes.

Chairman Hoekstra. You seem familiar with the name.

Mr. Cuff. I am familiar with the name.

Chairman Hoekstra. Are you familiar with the report?

Mr. Cuff. Yes, I am.

Chairman Hoekstra. Is it fair to say that the report contains sharp criticism of Diamond Walnut and its handling of the strike?

Mr. Cuff. I believe it does.

Chairman Hoekstra. Did you think that much of this criticism was unfair?

Mr. Cuff. I did.

Chairman Hoekstra. It appears that you responded to the Nussbaum report. Exhibit 22 is a letter from you to Labor Secretary Reich dated November 12, 1993. The second paragraph of the letter reads, ``We are very disturbed about the role your Department appears to have taken in supporting the Teamsters campaign against the cooperative and its growers. This campaign is designed to apply pressure on our company outside the traditional collective bargaining process, and your agency appears to have willingly participated in it through such actions as Nussbaum's highly publicized visit to Stockton,'' that's end of quote.

It sounds like, at the time, you interpreted the Nussbaum report and some actions by Karen Nussbaum as pressure on your company to settle the strike, is that correct?

Mr. Cuff. Yes.

Chairman Hoekstra. What led you to believe that the Department of Labor was acting in concert with the Teamsters to pressure Diamond Walnut into settling the strike?

Mr. Cuff. Again, as I said before, I don't know of any actions between the union or the Teamsters specifically and the Department of Labor. I just guessed that there probably was.

Chairman Hoekstra. In his deposition, Mr. Carver testified that he talked to Karen Nussbaum before her trip to Stockton and that he met with her at the Department of Labor before the report was written.

Did you know that this was occurring at the time?

Mr. Cuff. No.

Chairman Hoekstra. What happened with Ms. Nussbaum's trip to Stockton?

Mr. Cuff. She came. To the best of my recollection, she visited with us, with me, although I say that and I think I remember meeting with her, but I can't be sure that I did. She met with the union, met with other people in the community, and then, to the best of my knowledge, went back and wrote her report.

Chairman Hoekstra. You are aware that in the summer of 1995, the Department of Labor proposed that Diamond Walnut be debarred from contracting with the Federal Government, correct?

Mr. Cuff. Yes.

Chairman Hoekstra. I'd like to show you a timeline of the debarment proceedings against Diamond Walnut. As you can see, it took approximately three months after a complaint was filed for the Department of Labor to propose debarment.

Are you aware that the debarment complaint was filed by the Teamsters?

Mr. Cuff. I don't remember exactly how the filing took place.

Chairman Hoekstra. A copy of the complaint is actually in the notebook. It's Exhibit 11. Are you, or were you also aware that the Teamsters cited the Nussbaum report in support of its debarment complaint? It's Exhibit 11, page 3, and it's in the first paragraph.

Mr. Cuff. You know, I don't remember, Mr. Chairman, seeing this document, but obviously, I can read it now. The Nussbaum report is referred to.

Chairman Hoekstra. Let's talk a little bit about your call and your discussions with Ambassador Kantor. In 1995, when there was a lot of pressure being brought to bear on Diamond Walnut, was a key strategy for the company to move into foreign markets?

Mr. Cuff. Yes.

Chairman Hoekstra. This was also around the time that the European Union was formed. Were there ongoing negotiations between the U.S. and the E.U. over entry of American products, including walnuts, into European markets?

Mr. Cuff. I believe there were.

Chairman Hoekstra. Would the outcome of those talks affect Diamond Walnut's access to overseas markets?

Mr. Cuff. They could.

Chairman Hoekstra. Could you briefly describe the importance of those negotiations to Diamond Walnut.

Mr. Cuff. Well, if you're focused on the E.U., a major portion of our exports, which when I left the company were representing high 30 percent of our business. When I got there, I think they were representing maybe 25, 28 percent of the business.

So exports were very important to us, and exports particularly to some countries in Europe were very important.

For example, for our in shell business, Germany is the biggest market in the world by far.

Chairman Hoekstra. Would you take a look at Exhibit 5, which is the March 22, 1995 memorandum from an official in the U.S. Trade Representative's office to Ambassador Kantor. Towards the end of the first paragraph, the memo reads, ``The Teamsters would like USTR to indicate we will not pursue our rights on walnuts in the soon-to-begin US-EU enlargement negotiations.''

Were you aware at that time that the IBT was trying to stop the U.S. Trade Representative from helping Diamond Walnut in international negotiations?

Mr. Cuff. I was not.

Chairman Hoekstra. This memorandum was written about the same time as you received a call from Ambassador Kantor, wasn't it?

Mr. Cuff. I don't remember exactly when I received the call from Mr. Kantor, but I do believe it was sometime in the early part of 1995.

Chairman Hoekstra. And from your impression, what was the subject of the call?

Mr. Cuff. The ongoing labor dispute with the Teamsters.

Chairman Hoekstra. And if you would turn to Exhibit 17. Could you tell us what Exhibit 17 is?

Mr. Cuff. It starts out by saying ``Meeting of the Board of Directors of Diamond Walnut Growers, April 25, 1995.''

Chairman Hoekstra. And it goes on to describe what?

Mr. Cuff. There is a paragraph which appears to be taken from the minutes, and during board meetings, I would typically give a report of what had gone on that I thought was important during the last month. And this looks like it was something that I reported to the board.

Chairman Hoekstra. And what is your description of the call from Mr. Kantor?

Mr. Cuff. Would you like me to read it, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Hoekstra. Sure.

Mr. Cuff. ``President Cuff received a call from Michael (Mickey) Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative urging Diamond to resolve its labor dispute because it was interfering with international trade issues. President Cuff reiterated that Diamond remains willing to negotiate. He also told Mr. Kantor that he is willing to discuss the matter with any foreign government concerned about this issue.''

Chairman Hoekstra. How often do you get a call from somebody who is a member of the President's Cabinet?

Mr. Cuff. That's the only one that I can remember.

Chairman Hoekstra. That's a pretty big deal, I would guess.

Mr. Cuff. Yes.

Chairman Hoekstra. So you must have taken a fairly close note of that call, since it was somebody from the Cabinet and you also took the time and the interest to highlight that you had received this call from Mr. Kantor, highlighting this fact to your board of directors.

Mr. Cuff. Yes.

Chairman Hoekstra. Can you expand at all on what you thought Mr. Kantor was talking about in the phone call beyond what was in the minutes?

Mr. Cuff. Yes, what I recall is that it was a very pleasant conversation. He opened up by--again, this is a number of years go, so my recollection can be somewhat faulty--but I remember him saying that he was calling related to the strike, that he wanted to see if there was anything that he could do to help resolve it.

He wanted to try to understand what were the unresolved or major issues. And we talked for a relatively short period of time. He had said three to five minutes this morning. I may have said seven to 10, but it was not a lengthy conversation.

Chairman Hoekstra. What about how this was interfering with international trade issues? You mentioned that in your description here.

Mr. Cuff. Yes. I remember during the conversation that Mr. Kantor mentioned that in trade negotiations around the world, that the United States was always concerned about human rights, that that came up often related to trade negotiations.

And I thought I recall his saying something to the effect that either it had come up from foreign leaders that he had met with and that therefore, it could be potentially one of those embarrassing or difficult kinds of situations that could interfere with trade negotiations.

Chairman Hoekstra. That the strike at Diamond Walnut could be an embarrassing situation in international trade negotiations.

Mr. Cuff. Right. And that's why I believe I said to Mr. Kantor, as well as to my board, that if there was any help that I could provide in talking to any foreign leader about the reasons for the strike, that I would be more than glad to do so.

Chairman Hoekstra. Did you agree with his assessment?

Mr. Cuff. That being?

Chairman Hoekstra. That this was interfering with international trade issues.

Mr. Cuff. I find it hard to believe that the Diamond strike was interfering with international trade negotiations of the kind that were significant to the Trade Rep's office.

Chairman Hoekstra. When you got the call from the Trade Representative, what role did you see or what role did you understand that the Trade Representative had in settling labor disputes?

Mr. Cuff. I did not know of any role that he did have.

Chairman Hoekstra. This call did come at a time when walnuts were on the bargaining table with the European Union, is that correct?

Mr. Cuff. Yes, I believe they were, but I am a little unclear of exactly what was going on during that time specifically. I just can't remember, Uruguay Round or what discussions were going on at that time.

Chairman Hoekstra. But obviously, the USTR is an important person to your business. Did you feel an implied or implicit threat in what Mr. Kantor had to say to you?

Mr. Cuff. There was absolutely no explicit threat. He handled the conversation very professionally, very informally. The only thing I would say is that when you get a call from, as you said, a senior official of the administration, you always have to be concerned.

Chairman Hoekstra. You had never received a call from the Trade Rep, from Mr. Kantor, prior to that?

Mr. Cuff. I had not.

Chairman Hoekstra. You indicated that you had expressed a willingness to talk to foreign leaders.

Mr. Cuff. Yes.

Chairman Hoekstra. Has there ever been any followup on that side?

Mr. Cuff. No.

Chairman Hoekstra. Do you have a theory as to why he maybe called you?

Mr. Cuff. You know, I would truly be speculating, or I would have been speculating at that time. I mean, today I've seen some documents that would reduce the speculation. But I figured it was part of the ongoing significant effort by the union to try to bring us to our knees.

Chairman Hoekstra. Did Mr. Kantor do anything else to try to get Diamond Walnut to settle the strike?

Mr. Cuff. Not to my knowledge.

Chairman Hoekstra. So he didn't speak to you or anyone else affiliated with Diamond Walnut about the strike?

Mr. Cuff. There was one incident that Richard Douglas mentioned to me, which was earlier than 1995. I cannot tell you whether it was 1994 or 1993.

And by the way, to clear it up for some members of the committee, because there seems to be some confusion between Sun Diamond and Diamond, Diamond is a part owner in Sun Diamond. Sun Diamond, basically, for Diamond is a sales and distribution agent. Richard Douglas worked for Sun Diamond.

He mentioned to me that the Trade Rep, Mickey Kantor, had mentioned something to him at some occasion at the White House. For some reason I have in the back of my mind, it was in the Rose Garden, but I can't be sure about that, and that Mickey Kantor said something to him about Richard, you've got to help get this strike resolved.

Chairman Hoekstra. Was that an unpleasant or a pleasant conversation?

Mr. Cuff. Which one?

Chairman Hoekstra. The one that you were describing just here at the end.

Mr. Cuff. The one with Richard Douglas?

Chairman Hoekstra. Yes.

Mr. Cuff. I would characterize it as neither. It was just Richard advising me that that conversation with the Trade Rep had taken place.

Chairman Hoekstra. There have been a couple of different exhibits that have been referenced today. Exhibit 18, which is the memo from Bill Hamilton to Mr. Carey. I am looking for the exhibit for Mr. Ickes.

What's your reaction as a president and CEO of a private company in seeing these kinds of documents talking about your livelihood and your business, floating through the Teamsters and floating into the executive branch, especially if you're a medium-sized company?

Mr. Cuff. I guess I have a couple of reactions. In one way, I am not surprised, because I think, as Mr. Carver explained quite well, I think the union has every right to use its resources to try to accomplish what it believes its goals are. That's our system, and I believe in and support it very strongly.

I guess the second point is that it confirms what I thought probably was going on but didn't know. If you deal with the bigger issue I think that you might be referring to about do I--and I am probably reading something into your question I probably shouldn't be--but does it seem unfair that a small company like Diamond Walnut is coming under this kind of pressure?

I didn't feel that particularly in any personal way. I think we knew that there would be many pressures put upon us during the strike, and that we were going to do the best we could according to what we thought was important to our growers, as well as to our workers.

Chairman Hoekstra. But you recognized that there is a tremendous power within the Federal Government to do good, but also if it falls outside the rules, to do significant harm to your business with the power of a Labor Department or a U.S. Trade Rep or Department of Agriculture or any one of these could have a significant impact on your business.

Mr. Cuff. They certainly can.

Chairman Hoekstra. Do any other members have questions? Mr. Schaffer.

Mr. Schaffer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Did you receive any contacts, either verbally over the phone perhaps or written contacts from anyone other than Mr. Kantor in the U.S. Trade Representative's office?

Mr. Cuff. No.

Mr. Schaffer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Hoekstra. Mr. Norwood.

Mr. Norwood. Mr. Cuff, your business has been characterized today as a ``repeat labor law violator.'' Do you agree with that?

Mr. Cuff. I do not.

Mr. Norwood. Why would you have been characterized as that?

Mr. Cuff. I think we were characterized because it is part of the PR effort against Diamond.

Mr. Norwood. Being a labor law violator, are there consequences or penalties involved in that?

Mr. Cuff. Yes, I believe there are.

Mr. Norwood. Have you received any of those consequences?

Mr. Cuff. Not to my knowledge, except for what Mr. Carver mentioned himself, that there was the need for repeat of an election, decertification election, and my understanding is that there is the possibility of another election.

Mr. Norwood. Which is costly to your company?

Mr. Cuff. I believe it would be costly.

Mr. Norwood. My understanding is that the NLRB has those elections go over and over again until you get it right.

Mr. Cuff. Well, let me mention one thing just as an aside, because it's one of those kinds of things you do get frustrated by. The kind of violations during the last election--and I can't remember when it was, but it was 1993, 1994--got down to, I believe, three points. One of the points had to do with what was called a mail, m-a-i-l ballot. Again, I left the company March 31, 1997 when I turned 55. But to my understanding, as one of the reasons there may be another election, is because the NLRB has concluded that there should have been a mail ballot, m-a-i-l ballot. What's so frustrating about that is the reason there was not a mail ballot is because the local NLRB offices that have control over these elections had determined that there should not be a mail ballot.

Mr. Norwood. Wait a minute. Do that one more time, now. The NLRB locally said don't do it, and the NLRB nationally says, uh oh, we are going to have a new election because you didn't do it.

Mr. Cuff. Now, again, I have left the company. But one of the objections that was critical related to the second decertification vote. One of the issues that got--what will happen, as you are probably aware, during one of these elections, there will be all kinds of things done to try to create objections to the election by both parties, depending on what they want to have accomplished.

The union does all kinds of things in terms of trying to find objections to the election, and you go through lengthy administrative processes, you go through lengthy processes within the judicial part of the NLRB to resolve them. It gets up the national board, they go through votes and all that kind of thing. Depending on what happens there, it can be put into the court system.

What I am saying is that as I recall it, there were three major objections to the last election. One of the objections had to do with the mail ballot, where the local arm of the NLRB which runs the elections, says where they should be held and what time, had concluded there should not be a mail ballot.

One of the objections, as I understand it--and I can be wrong, so therefore I'd like not to be held to it--was that one of the reasons there may have to be another election is because in the NLRB's wisdom, it was found that there should have been a mail ballot.

Mr. Norwood. Well, I stick by my original comment. You didn't get the election right, so you've got to do it again.

Chairman Hoekstra. Mr. Bopp, I believe, has a question.

Mr. Bopp. Mr. Cuff, you testified earlier about a conversation that Richard Douglas related to you, correct?

Mr. Cuff. Yes.

Mr. Bopp. I would note that we asked Mr. Douglas to testify today and he pled his privilege, or asserted his privilege against self-incrimination instead of testifying. And so we only have secondhand information about that conversation.

We have heard from other people that the conversation between Mr. Douglas and Ambassador Kantor was not pleasant. Did you hear that as well?

Mr. Cuff. I did not.

Mr. Bopp. So all you can remember about that conversation is what Mr. Douglas told you, correct?

Mr. Cuff. Correct.

Mr. Bopp. And he told you that Ambassador Kantor, just to be clear, had said to him words to the effect that we have to get this strike settled.

Mr. Cuff. Yes.

Mr. Bopp. Thank you.

Chairman Hoekstra. Ms. Mink.

Mrs. Mink. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to review the interview that you had yesterday with staff, since it was scheduled just last night, as I understand it. So I don't have the benefit of the discussions that you had previous to this hearing today.

But I wanted to know, you mentioned in the decertification response to one of the questions that there were three reasons, and one had to do with the use of a mail ballot. What were the other two?

Mr. Cuff. I don't remember the other two clearly. I think one of the others had to do with the belief that a striker who came back to work was placed in a position that was not considered appropriate compared to the previous position that he held while he was working at Diamond.

Mrs. Mink. How would that have affected the outcome of an election?

Mr. Cuff. My understanding is it was believed that because he was not treated properly, other workers could be of the belief that that could affect how they would vote in the election.

Mrs. Mink. Prior testimony indicated that there were two decertification elections that were set aside. Do you have any information about the other?

Mr. Cuff. I don't recall the reasons for the first one.

Mrs. Mink. When was the first one?

Mr. Cuff. I don't even remember when it was. The first one was either in 1992 or 1993 and the second one followed a year or two after that.

Mrs. Mink. I will defer at this time to the counsel on the minority side while I look over some of these notes. Thank you.

Ms. Lentchner. Thank you, Mr. Cuff. We have discussed this morning in questions with the Chairman the union's efforts to lobby, and I think you said you believed that they do, in fact, have a right to lobby the administration and others, is that right?

Mr. Cuff. I do.

Ms. Lentchner. And in fact, as we discussed last night in an interview with majority counsel, during the same period, Diamond Walnut undertook efforts to lobby the White House and the administration with respect to issues of importance to Diamond Walnut, is that right?

Mr. Cuff. We did, through the Walnut Commission, for example.

Ms. Lentchner. Amongst the issues that Diamond Walnut and the walnut industry were lobbying on in this time period were efforts to open foreign markets, is that right?

Mr. Cuff. Yes.

Ms. Lentchner. And, in fact, during the pendency of the Diamond Walnut strike, the Clinton administration negotiated for the opening of at least the Korean market, correct?

Mr. Cuff. Correct.

Ms. Lentchner. Diamond Walnut also lobbied the administration with respect to GATT and NAFTA during the pendency of the Diamond Walnut strike, is that correct?

Mr. Cuff. Correct.

Ms. Lentchner. Was the administration with respect to these issues consistent with the policy advocated by Diamond Walnut?

Mr. Cuff. Given that our position was that they should go forward to, for example, NAFTA, and given that that's eventually what happened, I would say yes, they were consistent.

Ms. Lentchner. During the pendency of the Diamond Walnut strike, did Diamond Walnut lobby the administration with respect to the Market Promotion program?

Mr. Cuff. Yes.

Ms. Lentchner. Could you explain to this committee what the Market Promotion program is.

Mr. Cuff. The Market Promotion program was initiated back in the mid-80's. It was under another name at that time. I was not there at Diamond, but to the best of my understanding, it was enacted by Congress because there was believed to be in certain countries unfair competition, and that one of the ways, and maybe a good way to help overcome some of the unfairness involved with that would be to use funds to support agricultural products to create demands in different markets throughout the world.

Ms. Lentchner. And I understand that Diamond Walnut lobbying with respect to the Market Promotion program would have been advocating that funds be continued to be spent.

Mr. Cuff. Yes. I want to make clear one thing, though, because there was also a little confusion on that this morning. Those funds go to the Walnut Commission that spend them on generic advertising. It's not branded advertising for Diamond. It's generic advertising for the whole industry.

Ms. Lentchner. And as of the time you left Diamond Walnut in 1997, the walnut industry was still getting Federal funding under the Market Promotion program, is that right?

Mr. Cuff. Yes.

Ms. Lentchner. And to your knowledge, Teamsters' efforts to cut such funding were unsuccessful.

Mr. Cuff. Given the fact that they continued, I would make the conclusion they had not been successful. The one thing you have to remember is that Congress did make decisions that that program should be reduced in terms of the amount of funds appropriated for it. So the funding had continued to go down through the 90's.

Ms. Lentchner. During the pendency of the Diamond Walnut strike, the administration also benefitted the walnut industry by reducing the tariff on walnuts in the Uruguay Rounds, is that right?

Mr. Cuff. Yes. And that is where, again, as we talked last night, there was a little confusion when I read that memo. Because to the best of my understanding, there were some reductions in duties or rates during that period, and again, I can't tell you exactly when that period was, but I assume it was around 1995. It could have been 1994. But as I recall it, there was a minor reduction in rates.

Ms. Lentchner. And a reduction in tariff rates benefits the walnut industry?

Mr. Cuff. Yes, because these are rates related to exports going into the E.U.

Ms. Lentchner. So overall, is it fair to say that during the pendency of the Diamond Walnut strike, the administration did take actions that benefitted Diamond Walnut and the walnut industry?

Mr. Cuff. Yes.

Ms. Lentchner. Did any administration official ever threaten you that continuation of these or other actions that were beneficial to the walnut industry would be threatened if Diamond Walnut did not settle the strike?

Mr. Cuff. No.

Ms. Lentchner. Did anyone ever tell you that administration policy would change in any way if you settled the strike?

Mr. Cuff. No.

Ms. Lentchner. You have described Ambassador Kantor's phone call generally. Could you just give a few more specifics. Tell me the approximate length of that call.

Mr. Cuff. Well, I really do not remember. My belief is that it was certainly less than 10 minutes. He had said three to five minutes, I thought it might have been a little longer than that. But certainly, no longer than 10 minutes.

Ms. Lentchner. It wasn't a lengthy call.

Mr. Cuff. No, it was not.

Ms. Lentchner. There wasn't a lot discussed during that call.

Mr. Cuff. No.

Ms. Lentchner. Now, you said this was the only call you received from a Cabinet level official, but you did receive calls from a lot of other Washington bigwigs with respect to the strike, is that right?

Mr. Cuff. I have been called by others in Washington.

Ms. Lentchner. Is it fair to say that this is a strike that received attention from a fairly large number of relatively senior political people?

Mr. Cuff. It appears to have.

Ms. Lentchner. Did Ambassador Kantor threaten you in any way in his phone call?

Mr. Cuff. He did not.

Ms. Lentchner. Did he tell you that Diamond Walnut's business relations with the government would be adversely affected if the strike wasn't settled?

Mr. Cuff. He did not.

Ms. Lentchner. Following this call, were Diamond Walnut's business relations with the United States government adversely affected?

Mr. Cuff. Not that I saw.

Ms. Lentchner. Are you aware of any action taken with respect to the Diamond Walnut strike by Ambassador Kantor other than placing the one phone call to you?

Mr. Cuff. I am not.

Ms. Lentchner. Are you aware of the administration changing its policies in any way following this phone call?

Mr. Cuff. I am not.

Ms. Lentchner. Did the administration or any elected officials ever make you any promises in connection with your positions with the strike?

Mr. Cuff. No.

Ms. Lentchner. Following Ambassador Kantor's phone call, did Diamond Walnut continue to have dealings with the United States Trade Representative's office?

Mr. Cuff. Yes, in a general sense.

Ms. Lentchner. Now, you said that you had an overall impression of Teamsters efforts to put pressure on Diamond Walnut. But if I correctly understand, you have no specifics of any particular conversation or action taken towards Diamond Walnut that resulted from Teamsters involvement, is that right?

Mr. Cuff. Could you repeat that, please.

Ms. Lentchner. Do you have any firsthand knowledge of any administration action relating to Diamond Walnut that directly resulted from Teamsters involvement or prompting?

Mr. Cuff. I do not know of any.

Ms. Lentchner. After Ambassador Kantor's phone call, did you or Diamond Walnut change your position with respect to the strike?

Mr. Cuff. No.

Ms. Lentchner. Did this call result in you entering into negotiations with the Teamsters?

Mr. Cuff. No.

Ms. Lentchner. Did this call result in you making any effort or taking any additional steps to settle the strike?

Mr. Cuff. No additional ones. We always wanted to resolve it. The issues were very significant on both parties part. We did not change our position; the union didn't change its position.

Ms. Lentchner. So is it fair to say that nothing happened as a result of this call?

Mr. Cuff. Not that I am aware of.

Ms. Lentchner. There was no change in Diamond Walnut's position and no change in the administration position.

Mr. Cuff. That I could see.

Ms. Lentchner. Nothing happened.

Mr. Cuff. Right.

Ms. Lentchner. Is the strike still happening?

Mr. Cuff. Yes.

Ms. Lentchner. Today, sitting here?

Mr. Cuff. To the best of my knowledge.

Ms. Lentchner. So any pressure in a generalized sense that you may have felt didn't result in any change of policy or the strike being settled, is that right?

Mr. Cuff. Correct.

Ms. Lentchner. As of the time you left Diamond Walnut, did it continue to do business with the government?

Mr. Cuff. Yes.

Ms. Lentchner. It sells walnuts to the military?

Mr. Cuff. I believe so.

Ms. Lentchner. And is eligible for the school lunch program?

Mr. Cuff. I believe so.

Ms. Lentchner. I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you, Mr. Cuff.

Mrs. Mink. Mr. Scott.

Mr. Scott. Thank you. Mr. Cuff, what portion of the walnut business in the United States does your company have?

Mr. Cuff. Slightly under 50 percent.

Mr. Scott. Fifty?

Mr. Cuff. Slightly under 50 percent.

Mr. Scott. Did I understand you to say that the reduction in the Market Promotion program was done in Congress and not in the White House?

Mr. Cuff. Well, my understanding is Congress voted on it. I don't remember exactly what the administration's budget was that they proposed to Congress. I don't remember the details of that.

Mr. Scott. If there's a strike going on anywhere in the country and the administration thinks it can be helpful to solve the strike, should it not make a phone call to people to see if there's anything it can do?

Mr. Cuff. I think it would be always wise to try to resolve any labor dispute.

Mr. Scott. And as a result of the call, you didn't do anything different than you would have done had you not received the call.

Mr. Cuff. Correct.

Mrs. Mink. No further questions.

Chairman Hoekstra. Mr. Schaffer.

Mr. Schaffer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Cuff, could you flip to Exhibit 6 in the book there. This is the memo that Ambassador Kantor--in fact, these notes are in his handwriting and were made, according to his testimony, when he was on the phone. Do you have it in front of you there?

Mr. Cuff. I do.

Mr. Schaffer. Have you seen this memo before?

Mr. Cuff. I have not until today.

Mr. Schaffer. You were here when Mr. Kantor--

Mr. Cuff. I was.

Mr. Schaffer. Is there anything on this memo or in any of the descriptions in his handwriting on the bottom that seems inconsistent with the phone call that you had with him?

Mr. Cuff. Nothing seems in consistent, but frankly, I can't read anything at the bottom.

Mr. Schaffer. But you were here when he went through the four points that are the A, B, C, and D paragraphs there that were notes made while he was on the telephone.

Mr. Cuff. Yes.

Mr. Schaffer. Look at the top part there, the note from Jeff--how do you pronounce that name? Nuechterlein? The note that was made, that Mr. Kantor would have had right in front of him when he was making the phone call. Does the phone call seem consistent to you, as you recall it, consistent with what the expectations seem to state in that paragraph?

Mr. Cuff. If you are referring to the statement, ``Mickey told Ickes that he would call the Diamond Walnut folks and put some pressure on them vis-a-vis the strike,'' I would respond that there was nothing in the conversation that was threatening or I would consider to be pressure, except for the fact that it's not usual to be called by the Trade Rep.

Mr. Schaffer. Well, that's a pretty significant point to bring up, I think, because there is a context to be considered. Let me just ask, how many Federal agencies would you imagine you had received contact from at about the time you received this call?

Mr. Cuff. Oh, maybe a couple.

Mr. Schaffer. What are some of the agencies that you had heard from that you would attribute to the strike? You mentioned OSHA, for example. Was that one of the agencies that you had heard from around this time?

Mr. Cuff. No, I don't remember exactly when OSHA came knocking, so to speak.

Mr. Schaffer. After the strike--

Mr. Cuff. Began.

Mr. Schaffer. Began?

Mr. Cuff. Yes.

Mr. Schaffer. How about other agencies? Can you think of any other Federal agencies that you happened to hear from more than seems normal?

Mr. Cuff. EEOC.

Mr. Schaffer. EEOC, all right.

Mr. Cuff. I believe EPA. Those would be the key ones that I would remember.

Mr. Schaffer. IRS?

Mr. Cuff. Nothing from the IRS.

Mr. Schaffer. Three Federal agencies that you've mentioned, and then this would be the fourth. Then there is the Department of Labor, I suppose. You've been in regular contact with them.

Mr. Cuff. Well, again, the Department of Labor we had regular contact with. You mentioned the Labor Department. Frankly, I don't know what the reporting relationship is for EEOC.

Mr. Schaffer. In your position, how would you characterize the intent of all of these contacts and conversations taken in total, the total context? Was there some objective that you felt the Federal Government was trying to achieve with respect to your company?

Mr. Cuff. Yes, I think all the ones that I have referred to were probably trying to find something wrong that could be used in PR to make us look like we are some kind of bad company.

Mr. Schaffer. Was there any reason to believe that a phone call from the U.S. Trade Representative would be inconsistent with those other objectives from the Federal Government?

Mr. Cuff. Not inconsistent.

Mr. Schaffer. Would you say the phone call could have been interpreted as being consistent with those other contacts?

Mr. Cuff. I guess one could say that.

Mr. Schaffer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Hoekstra. Mr. Cuff, thank you very much.

Mr. Cuff. Thank you.

Chairman Hoekstra. Our final witness is Ms. Jennifer O'Connor, a former White House Special Assistant.

Good morning, welcome.

Ms. O'Connor. Thank you.

Chairman Hoekstra. It is the practice of this subcommittee to swear in witnesses. Therefore, you should be aware that it is illegal to make a false statement to Congress while under oath. Will you please rise and raise your right hand.

[Witness sworn.]

Chairman Hoekstra. Do you have an opening statement.

Ms. O'Connor. I do not.

Chairman Hoekstra. All right. We will yield 30 minutes to the majority. Mr. Bopp.

Mr. Bopp. Thank you. Good morning, Ms. O'Connor.

Ms. O'Connor. Good morning.

Mr. Bopp. We've been talking today mostly about events that took place in early 1995. Where were you working at that time?

Ms. O'Connor. I was on Mr. Ickes' staff.

Mr. Bopp. And what was your title?

Ms. O'Connor. Special Assistant to the President.

Mr. Bopp. Were you responsible for labor issues on Mr. Ickes' staff?

Ms. O'Connor. Not at that time. I assumed responsibility for labor issues around October of 1995. At the time at which you have been discussing this morning, I didn't have any general labor responsibilities.

Mr. Bopp. Okay. If you would, can you pull the microphone just a little bit closer, please.

Ms. O'Connor. Sure.

Mr. Bopp. Thank you. When did you first become aware of the Diamond Walnut strike?

Ms. O'Connor. I don't know when I first became aware of it. I recall that it was a pretty significant issue and had gotten press attention and I had heard about the boycott I think much earlier than the months that you've been discussing, but in a general sense.

Mr. Bopp. And was the Diamond Walnut strike raised with you while you were at the White House?

Ms. O'Connor. By the Teamsters, do you mean?

Mr. Bopp. Just generally. Was the issue raised around the White House when you were there?

Ms. O'Connor. No, I wouldn't say the issue was raised. Not that I know of, not that I was involved in.

Mr. Bopp. Were you ever asked to do anything concerning the strike?

Ms. O'Connor. The only thing I was ever asked to do concerning the strike was Mr. Ickes at one point asked me to find out whether Mr. Kantor had made a phone call to the head of Diamond Walnut.

Mr. Bopp. Okay. Now, approximately when did he ask you this?

Ms. O'Connor. I really don't remember specifically, but it was sometime in March. I guess it must have been in March of 1995, maybe late February, I don't remember exactly.

Mr. Bopp. Okay. And what was your understanding why Mr. Ickes asked you to call the U.S. Trade Representative's office?

Ms. O'Connor. As I sit here today, it's very difficult to separate what I knew then from what I know now, because I have had to talk about this issue and been shown so many documents. But I am not sure I had any understanding of it at the time, because it was a pretty minor task and I didn't give it much thought.

If I had thought about it, I probably would have thought it was associated with the strike, but I'm not sure that I did.

Mr. Bopp. But was it your impression that Mr. Ickes was asking you to call the USTR's office in order to help the Teamsters with their strike against Diamond Walnut?

Ms. O'Connor. I would just repeat that it's very difficult for me to separate what I know now from what I knew then. I don't know that I would have assumed that it was to assist them. I probably would have guessed that, because if the issue was the strike and if I knew the issue was the strike, I would have thought a call to the company would be an assistance to the Teamsters.

But again, as I sit here, I have read so many documents that say that, that I don't know if I knew it at the time or not.

Mr. Bopp. When you say you would have guessed that, why would you have guessed it?

Ms. O'Connor. Because it was in the interests of the Teamsters to settle the strike. I think one of the big issues was the permanent replacement of the Teamsters employees.

So it just would have seemed logical to me that a call to the company would be something that would be helpful to the Teamsters or at least would further the end of settling the strike.

Mr. Bopp. And was it your impression that Ambassador Kantor was asked to call Diamond Walnut at the Teamsters' request?

Ms. O'Connor. Again, that's my understanding now, but I don't know if I knew it then. I have read Mr. Hamilton's memorandum saying that, and I heard Mr. Carver's testimony, but I don't know what I knew then.

Mr. Bopp. Okay. Now I take it Mr. Ickes never said to you that the reason he wanted to help the Teamsters with the Diamond Walnut strike was to encourage Teamster political contributions, correct?

Ms. O'Connor. No, he never said anything like that.

Mr. Bopp. I'd like, if we could, to take a look at Exhibit 15, please. Exhibit 15 just says ``Teamster Notes'' on the top. It was produced by the White House. Have you seen this document outside of any interviews or depositions you have been involved in?

Ms. O'Connor. No, I have never seen it before the various proceedings in the past months.

Mr. Bopp. Now the second paragraph of this document states, and I quote, ``The Teamsters played an enormous role in the 1992 campaign. They spent upwards of $2.4 million in contributions to our State coordinated campaigns, the DNC, the Clinton campaign, DCCC,/DSCC and congressional candidates.''

Were you aware of the Teamsters political contributions to Democratic causes while you were working at the White House?

Ms. O'Connor. I don't think I was generally aware. I certainly didn't have an awareness of the amounts, but it's likely that at some point, somebody from the DNC might have mentioned to me that they were contributing. I think around the time of the convention I saw a list of contributors and they were on it.

Mr. Bopp. The 1996 convention?

Ms. O'Connor. Yes. But I didn't pay very much attention to contributions, because it wasn't part of my responsibilities.

Mr. Bopp. Okay. Now did labor leaders like to talk to you about their political contributions?

Ms. O'Connor. The labor leaders didn't so much, but political directors or legislative directors often liked to report on whatever it was they were doing on behalf of the administration. Sometimes it was contributions, sometimes it was what they had done with respect to a piece of legislation the administration was in favor of.

I mean, in general, they kind of bragged about whatever it was that they were doing that was consistent with the administration's goals.

Mr. Bopp. Now, did Bill Hamilton brag about political contributions made by the Teamsters?

Ms. O'Connor. Not that I know of. If he did, he didn't do it to me, as far as I know.

Mr. Bopp. Now the recommendation section of Exhibit 15 states in part, and I quote, ``Carey is not a schmoozer, he wants results on issues he cares about.'' Do you agree with that statement?

Ms. O'Connor. I would agree with it from the period that I was a liaison to the labor community, but I don't know when this document was written, so I don't know if it was true at that time.

Mr. Bopp. We are not sure either. Our best guess is sometime probably in 1995, and certainly before the 1996 elections.

Whose handwriting is on the document?

Ms. O'Connor. I don't know for sure, but it looks like Mr. Ickes.

Mr. Bopp. Do you know who gave this document to Mr. Ickes?

Ms. O'Connor. No, I have no idea. I had never seen this document before I was first interviewed about this, or deposed about it by one of the committees of the House, or the Senate, perhaps.

Mr. Bopp. Do you know who Steve Rosenthal is?

Ms. O'Connor. Yes.

Mr. Bopp. Did you know him when he worked as Associate Deputy Secretary of Labor?

Ms. O'Connor. I did know him generally when he had that role, although when I assumed sort of general responsibilities for being a labor liaison, he was only at the Department for another few months, I believe, and then he went to the AFL.

Mr. Bopp. Okay. Did you have contact with him after he left the Labor Department and became the political director of the AFL-CIO?

Ms. O'Connor. Yes, I did.

Mr. Bopp. Now, Mr. Rosenthal testified in a deposition before this committee that, and I quote, ``It's fair to say that I could have either written this memo or that this memo was kind of pieced together from memos that I had written like this and perhaps some information added, and other information left out.''

And he also said, and I quote, ``I think it's unlikely that this memo was written without contributions from me.'' Were you aware before today that Mr. Rosenthal had a hand in writing this memo while he was at the Department of Labor?

Ms. O'Connor. No, I had no idea who wrote this memo.

Mr. Bopp. Now, Mr. Rosenthal also testified that Mr. Ickes may have asked him to write this memo. Do you know why Mr. Ickes would have asked Steve Rosenthal to write this memo?

Ms. O'Connor. I have absolutely no idea.

Mr. Bopp. Did Mr. Rosenthal write other memos for Mr. Ickes that you know about?

Ms. O'Connor. Not that I am aware of. But again, at the point at which I was focusing on labor issues, Mr. Rosenthal was only at the Labor Department for a few more months.

Mr. Bopp. Now, Mr. Rosenthal testified that the target audience of this memo was the White House. Yet you have just testified you never saw it, whereas Mr. Ickes obviously did from his handwritten notes.

Do you know why Mr. Ickes did not forward a copy of this memo to you?

Ms. O'Connor. My guess is that it was written sometime before I assumed responsibilities for labor issues, and therefore, there would have been no reason for him to forward it to me.

Mr. Bopp. Now, according to Mr. Rosenthal--and I am paraphrasing his testimony, this was intended as an advocacy piece of sorts designed to show the White House the importance of the Teamsters and issues important to the union.

Was it your impression that Mr. Ickes thought the Teamsters were an important constituent group?

Ms. O'Connor. He thought that unions in general were an important constituency group, and I'm sure he would have considered the Teamsters among the important parts of the constituency group.

Mr. Bopp. You testified earlier that Mr. Ickes asked you to contact Mr. Kantor's office to see if Ambassador Kantor had called Diamond Walnut, correct?

Ms. O'Connor. Yes.

Mr. Bopp. If you would, could you take a look at Exhibit 16, please. Exhibit 16 appears to be an e-mail from you to Janice Enright. The date is April 19, 1995. Do you recall writing this e-mail?

Ms. O'Connor. No. I wasn't shown this until some point in my recent interviews about this matter, but I have no reason to doubt that I wrote it.

Mr. Bopp. In it, you say, towards the end that you had been ``bugging'' the USTR staff. How many times did you call Kantor's office?

Ms. O'Connor. I only remember two.

Mr. Bopp. And who did you talk to when you called Mr. Kantor's office?

Ms. O'Connor. I talked to Peter Scher.

Mr. Bopp. And he was Mr. Kantor's chief of staff, correct?

Ms. O'Connor. Correct.

Mr. Bopp. Now, what did Peter Scher tell you when you asked him if Kantor had called Diamond Walnut?

Ms. O'Connor. The first time I spoke with him, he said something to the effect that they had checked with counsel or somebody to make sure Mr. Kantor could make the call and that that was affirmative, he could make the call, although he couldn't say very much. And that he would make it, but he hadn't made it yet.

Mr. Bopp. Did you ask who had actually checked with the counsel's office?

Ms. O'Connor. No, I don't think I asked anything regarding that.

Mr. Bopp. You didn't ask why they had checked with the counsel's office.

Ms. O'Connor. No.

Mr. Bopp. When you called again and spoke with Mr. Scher, had Ambassador Kantor called Diamond Walnut?

Ms. O'Connor. The second time I spoke with him, yes, the Ambassador had called Diamond Walnut.

Mr. Bopp. And did Peter Scher tell you how the call went?

Ms. O'Connor. My recollections of this are very hazy, but what I remember is he said that Mr. Kantor had made the call; that as he had told me previously, Mr. Kantor hadn't said very much, and that nothing much came of the call.

Mr. Bopp. Did Mr. Scher say to you words to the effect that I told you it wasn't going to help?

Ms. O'Connor. I don't remember his exact words, so I can't really say.

Mr. Bopp. Do you have a general impression that he said words to that effect to you?

Ms. O'Connor. I think he said something along the lines of as I told you, he didn't say much and not much came of it.

Mr. Bopp. Now, was it your impression that the USTR's office was already involved in the Diamond Walnut issue before you began calling the office?

Ms. O'Connor. No, I didn't have that impression, but again, this task of calling Mr. Kantor's office was the only thing I ever did related to Diamond Walnut as far as I know. It wasn't an issue I was working on in general or paying any attention to at the time of these events.

Mr. Bopp. If we could look at Exhibit 1 for a minute, please. Exhibit 1 is a memorandum from Mr. Ickes to Mr. Kantor. The subject is the Diamond Walnut Growers Cooperative, talking about the strike. Did you write this memo?

Ms. O'Connor. No, I didn't.

Mr. Bopp. Do you know who did?

Ms. O'Connor. Well, I don't know who did. It says that it's from Mr. Ickes, but I don't know if that means he wrote it or somebody wrote it on his behalf.

Mr. Bopp. Is it likely that Mr. Ickes wrote this memo himself?

Ms. O'Connor. I don't know. As I said, other than the phone call, I wasn't involved in this and I didn't see any of these documents and I didn't really pay any attention to the substance. I just had a simple task of finding out whether or not Mr. Kantor had made the call, and that's really all I did.

Mr. Bopp. Well, back in March of 1995, who was handling labor issues on a regular basis for Mr. Ickes?

Ms. O'Connor. To the best of my recollection, there was nobody on his immediate staff who was handling labor issues in the way that I did starting in October of 1995. So I imagine it was somebody somewhere else in the White House, but I don't know for sure.

Mr. Bopp. Now, with respect to Exhibit 3, which is another memo from Mr. Ickes to Ambassador Kantor, I am going to ask the same question. Did you write this memo?

Ms. O'Connor. I didn't write this one either.

Mr. Bopp. Is it likely that Mr. Kantor--I'm sorry, Mr. Ickes, wrote this himself?

Ms. O'Connor. I have no idea. I don't know the context in which this was written.

Mr. Bopp. Okay. No further questions.

Chairman Hoekstra. Mr. Schaffer.

Mr. Schaffer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

With respect to the Diamond Walnut strike, Did Mr. Ickes initiate any kinds of inquiries, actions, visits, contacts, any of those kinds of things with other Federal agencies that you know of? OSHA, EEO, EPA, any other organizations or agencies within the Federal government?

Ms. O'Connor. No, I am not aware of him every doing anything other than this phone call with Mr. Kantor.

Mr. Schaffer. With respect to employing the assistance of other Federal agencies to resolve labor disputes, any labor dispute that captures the attention of the White House, were those kinds of contacts common, uncommon?

Ms. O'Connor. They were common.

Mr. Schaffer. Would you say it was likely that those other kinds of phone calls or contacts or requests for assistance were made with respect to the Diamond Walnut strike?

Ms. O'Connor. The only thing I know is related to Mr. Ickes, and it's this call and that's the only thing I had anything to do with.

Mr. Schaffer. Would it have been out of character for him to make those kinds of calls or contacts to other Federal agencies asking for assistance?

Ms. O'Connor. I don't remember him ever being the person who would call an agency to see if they could play a role in moving a strike towards settlement.

Mr. Schaffer. When I asked you before about making those contacts, you suggested that that is not uncommon, that it is common, in fact.

Ms. O'Connor. It's common for the administration to try to move a strike towards settlement if the parties want it to have any role at all. I don't know the extent to which Mr. Ickes directed any agencies to do it.

Mr. Schaffer. Do you know if the administration made any efforts with respect to Diamond Walnut to employ the assistance of some of these other Federal agencies to move the strike toward resolution?

Ms. O'Connor. I believe that the Federal Mediation Service had tried to get the parties to sit down. I think they actually did get the parties to sit down at some point.

Mr. Schaffer. How about some of these other agencies, OSHA, EEO, EPA, some of those groups? Do you know if the administration made any attempts to ask for the involvement or the assistance of those agencies in moving the strike toward a resolution?

Ms. O'Connor. There is absolutely nothing that I am aware of to suggest that that happened.

Mr. Schaffer. If it did happen, would you say that was consistent or inconsistent with other responses that the White House may have initiated with respect to strikes?

Ms. O'Connor. Well, which agencies are you talking about?

Mr. Schaffer. I suppose it depends on the company involved, under whose regulatory jurisdiction they might come under. But with respect to Diamond Walnut, they had testified that they had seen an increased level of interest and activity from OSHA, from the Equal Employment Office, from the EPA perhaps, and certainly from the Department of Labor. Those would be the ones I am referring to in this case, or inquiring.

Ms. O'Connor. I'm sorry, but could you tell me what your question is just one more time.

Mr. Schaffer. I'm just trying to find out whether it would be consistent for the White House to request the assistance of these agencies in moving a strike to resolution.

Ms. O'Connor. Yes, it would be very inconsistent and I don't think that the White House ever did.

Mr. Schaffer. When I asked you the first time whether it was common or uncommon, your answer was that it is common.

Ms. O'Connor. Well, you didn't mention which agencies you were talking about. It was certainly common to call the Labor Secretary. I don't know if the White House ever called OSHA or EPA. The EEOC, certainly, is an independent agency. I don't think we ever talked to them.

Mr. Schaffer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Hoekstra. Ms. O'Connor, if you go back to Exhibit 15, I am wondering how a document like that would have been dealt with in Mr. Ickes' office, because I think it's a fairly interesting document.

It talks about the role--this is potentially a document that came from the Labor Department. It talks about the Teamsters' role in the 1992 campaign. The first paragraph talks about the fact that Mr. Carey is also up for reelection.

And then at the end in the conclusions, it says we should assist in any possible way. I think that is the third to the last sentence. And just the sentence prior to that, ``The Diamond Walnut strike and the organizing effort at Pony Express are two of Carey's biggest problems. We should assist in any way.''

How does a recommendation like that--how, within the White House in something that was of importance to Mr. Ickes, did you get focused on a recommendation like that? Or how would you measure whether a recommendation like this was ever followed up on or whether it was implemented or whether it would become part of your strategy within the White House?

Ms. O'Connor. As I said, I don't know who wrote it, and whoever the author is would affect how it would be treated. But, in general, recommendations that we, for some reason, paid any attention to would be analyzed by a policy analyst or somebody else to see if they were consistent with the administration policy and any action was warranted.

Chairman Hoekstra. So should there be some additional documents in the White House if this is a recommendation that came out of the Labor Department as to what the response to this recommendation would be?

Ms. O'Connor. Not necessarily. We didn't have that many staff in general, and I'm not sure that things were followed up on that comprehensively as to send a memo back.

Chairman Hoekstra. Because I mean, the recommendation is--I would guess, in your position in the labor area, was a fairly significant recommendation, because it recognizes the fact that Carey is up for reelection. ``If he doesn't succeed in his efforts, the union is likely to fall back into the hands of the old Teamsters.'' That's a quote. ``We should assist in any possible way.''

That is a fairly significant recommendation. It not only impacts a 1996 potential Presidential election, but it appears to say that the administration is picking sides in a union election.

Were you ever a part or did you ever hear that discussed in any of the meetings that you were in, that somebody was acting on this recommendation coming out of the Labor Department that Mr. Ickes saw which says we want Mr. Carey to win? Were you part of any of those discussions? Did you hear any of those discussions?

Ms. O'Connor. I don't recall any discussions. I had never seen this memo, so I certainly do not recall any discussions about this memo or about assisting in any way. With regard to taking sides in a strike, the administration generally thought strikes ought to be resolved as quickly as possible.

And if the parties thought it would be helpful, they got in, but the administration was very supportive of the collective bargaining arrangements, you know, that are embodied in the National Labor Relations Act and didn't try to get in the middle of negotiations unless somebody thought that it would be helpful.

Chairman Hoekstra. I'm not talking about getting in the middle of the strike. I am talking about getting in the middle of an election within the Teamsters, which it sounds like. ``Carey is up for reelection'' is the first sentence in this Teamster Notes, and then the last paragraph in the recommendation, they make some value judgments about Mr. Carey and the work that he has done.

But the first sentence starts out, ``It is in our best interest to develop a better relationship with Carey.'' It goes on to say some of the bad things that will happen if he's not successful, and then it goes on to say we ought to focus on Diamond Walnut and Pony Express, ``We should assist in any possible way.''

So you don't have any more information as to whether and how this recommendation may have influenced policy or strategy in the White House?

Ms. O'Connor. As far as I know, it didn't influence it at all. I am not aware of anything that came of that recommendation or the memo.

Chairman Hoekstra. Thank you. Ms. Mink.

Mrs. Mink. I defer my 30 minutes to minority counsel.

Ms. Lentchner. Thank you.

Ms. O'Connor, I'd like to go back to the telephone conversation between Ambassador Kantor and Mr. Cuff that was discussed earlier in their testimony. If I correctly understand, you personally have no knowledge of Mr. Ickes' conversation, if there was any, with Mr. Kantor on the subject, is that right?

Ms. O'Connor. That's correct.

Ms. Lentchner. Your involvement was limited to calling Ambassador Kantor's office and checking to see whether or not the call was made.

Ms. O'Connor. That's correct.

Ms. Lentchner. Do you have any reason to dispute Ambassador Kantor's characterization of the call as a status inquiry?

Ms. O'Connor. No. His recollection of what it was is roughly consistent with what I think Mr. Scher told me.

Ms. Lentchner. When he told you the results of the call after that?

Ms. O'Connor. When he told me the results of the call, yes.

Ms. Lentchner. And to your knowledge, did anything happen as a result of this call?

Ms. O'Connor. No. My understanding from Mr. Scher was that nothing would come of or did come of the call.

Ms. Lentchner. Do you recall telling Mr. Ickes what Mr. Scher reported to you as the result of the call?

Ms. O'Connor. I vaguely remember telling him, yes.

Ms. Lentchner. Was Mr. Ickes upset, disappointed, or did he otherwise indicate that he expected something more?

Ms. O'Connor. No. He didn't indicate that he expected anything more and he didn't seem to be particularly focused on the issue or concerned about the result.

Ms. Lentchner. And when it turned out that nothing happened as a result of the call, are you aware of Mr. Ickes' trying to take other actions or do something else to settle or intervene in the Diamond Walnut strike?

Ms. O'Connor. No. As far as I know, he never did anything other than asking Mr. Kantor to make this call, and of course, I don't even have direct knowledge of that.

Ms. Lentchner. So other than indirect knowledge in his arranging for Ambassador Kantor to make a telephone call that he's characterized as a status call, you don't know of any action taken by Harold Ickes with respect to the Diamond Walnut strike, is that right?

Ms. O'Connor. No actions whatsoever.

Ms. Lentchner. And you are not aware of Harold Ickes causing the administration to take any action with respect to the Diamond Walnut strike?

Ms. O'Connor. There is nothing that I am aware of that he did other than this call.

Ms. Lentchner. And you are not aware of Harold Ickes arranging for anyone to put pressure on Diamond Walnut?

Ms. O'Connor. No, I'm not.

Ms. Lentchner. Are you aware of any administration policy being designed to increase Teamsters contributions to the Democratic Party?

Ms. O'Connor. I never heard of an administration strategy of that sort.

Ms. Lentchner. Thank you very much for your testimony. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mrs. Mink. I yield back the time, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Hoekstra. Do you have a closing statement?

Mrs. Mink. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have spent a number of hours looking through the papers and documents and reading the depositions, and sat through the entire hearing this morning. And I must say that I agree with some of the words in your opening statement, that there is really not much there.

We are talking about one phone call. And from all points of view, the maker of the call and the recipient, there was not much of a discussion except to make an inquiry about the status of the strike and what potential successes there might be to negotiate. I think that those inquiries are always appropriate.

We had a devastating strike in my State with respect to Northwest. With the economic downturn in my State, it was very appropriate for us to make phone calls whenever we could to get to an early settlement of that conflict, which I think is appropriate for all parties in the legislative and executive branch.

So I am somewhat troubled by the extent to which we have gone to try to find some iniquity in a phone call by a member of the executive branch. Nothing I have heard here today or read indicates that there is any sort of a connection.

In fact, what has come out of this hearing is that in most instances, with respect to the functioning of Diamond Walnut, they benefitted from positive actions taken by the administration with respect to such things as the Market Promotion program, which enabled them to explore--with taxpayer assistance, by the way--markets that they had not enjoyed previously.

And despite concerns and expressions of dismay, new markets were opened in Korea and elsewhere. So it seems to me that we are talking rather idly about one phone call by an administration official and not much more. So I am somewhat, well, amazed that we would take this much time over that one incident.

I am sure the chairman and the majority staff had hoped to find the smoking gun, but I don't think there's any smoke at all, not even the gun.

Thank you very much.

Chairman Hoekstra. Thanks. There is plenty of smoke, when we talk about the Teamsters. The question is when are we going to get to the fire on it. It's kind of interesting as we have gone through this process.

That's why I say we put it in context, we put it in context of where the Teamsters have been, the partnerships that they involve themselves with. We will begin taking a look at what people have pleaded guilty to in New York, investigating the allegations with the money-laundering, with the DNC, and those types of things. And when you put it all together, it is something we ought to take a look at.

We have heard from the Teamsters today, we have heard from the Administration, the White House; we've heard from Diamond Walnut. We might have heard more from the company, but Richard Douglas, Diamond Walnut's former lobbyist, asserted his privilege against self-incrimination rather than testifying today.

Why did the White House put a full-court press on Diamond Walnut? People from the administration believe maybe it didn't happen. When you take a look at where Diamond Walnut is coming from, they seem to have felt it. We found a plausible answer in what is called the Teamster Notes memo, which is Exhibit 15.

Here we see generous Teamster political contributions, perhaps all but offered in exchange for help with the Diamond Walnut strike and other issues. We see also that not only was it for political contributions, but we also see that the administration is--or at least, somebody within the Labor Department is proposing that in election of a private union, that the administration maybe ought to favor one candidate over another.

We know that this document came out of the Labor Department with close ties to organized labor and the Teamsters. As a matter of fact, he is now the political director at the AFL-CIO. We know from his handwritten notes all over the memo that Deputy White House Chief of Staff Harold Ickes read the document. The question is how much did he act on it. He may even have requested the memo.

Yet, after all of that, we do know what Mr. Ickes has said previously, that he knows of nothing the administration did to assist the Teamsters in its dispute with Diamond Walnut. But I think we are still left with questions that we are going to take a look at.

Why was the White House so concerned about a walkout involving 600 workers? Why did the White House pressure Diamond Walnut to settle? Why were the U.S. Trade Representative and Agriculture Department involved in a labor dispute? And why did the Teamsters step up their political contributions after the White House pressure started?

So we've gone about as far as we can today. We've perhaps raised as many questions as what we've gotten answers. Obviously, we haven't answered all of Mrs. Mink's questions. But we will--

Mrs. Mink. Mr. Chairman, I had none.

Chairman Hoekstra. You had none. Well, that's good. We'll see if we can get some more answers for you as we move forward.

Ms. O'Connor, thank you very much for testifying today.

Ms. O'Connor. Thank you.

Chairman Hoekstra. This is also an issue that Ms. Reno has found significant enough to open a 90-day probe of Mr. Ickes on. And this committee will also continue working on the issue. Thank you very much.

The subcommittee will be adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:29 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]