HOW THE QUALITY OF GRANT PERFORMANCE IS ASSESSED AT THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND

THE WORKFORCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

 

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, OCTOBER 14, 1999

 

Serial No. 106-77

 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Education

and the Workforce


TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PETE HOEKSTRA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE *

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TIM ROEMER, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE *

STATEMENT OF JAMES R. NAUGHTON, ESQ., FORMER COUNSEL FOR THE HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE *

STATEMENT OF RAYMOND J. UHALDE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR *

STATEMENT OF PATRICIA A. DALTON, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR *

APPENDIX A- THE WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PETE HOEKSTRA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE *

APPENDIX B-THE WRITTEN STATEMENT AND MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY JAMES NAUGHTON, ESQ., FORMER COUNSEL TO THE HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE *

APPENDIX C -THE WRITTEN STATEMENT OF RAYMOND J. UHALDE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR *

APPENDIX D -THE WRITTEN STATEMENT OF PATRICIA A. DALTON, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR *

APPENDIX E - QUESTIONS SUBMITTTED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE TO PATRICIA DALTON, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND RAYMOND UHALDE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR *

APPENDIX F-REPONSES TO SUBCOMMITTEE QUESTIONS SUBMITTTED BY PATRICIA DALTON, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR *

APPENDIX G- REPONSES TO SUBCOMMITTEE QUESTIONS SUBMITTTED BY RAYMOND UHALDE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR *

Table of Indexes *

 

 

 

HOW THE QUALITY OF GRANT PERFORMANCE IS

 

ASSESSED AT THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

 

Thursday, October 14, 1999

 

House of Representatives,

 

Subcommittee on Oversight

 

and Investigations,

 

Committee on Education

 

and the Workforce,

 

Washington, D.C.

 

 

 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:28 a.m., in Room 2175, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Peter Hoekstra [chairman of the subcommittee] Presiding.

Present: Representatives Hoekstra, Owens and Scott.

Staff Present: Dan Lara, Press Secretary; Patrick Lyden, Legislative Assistant; Michael Quickel, Staff Assistant; Michael Reynard, Media Assistant; Rob Sterner, Paralegal; Steve Settle, Professional Staff Member; Cheryl Johnson, Minority Counsel/Education and Oversight; Michele Varnhagen, Minority Labor Counsel/Coordinator; Peter Rutledge, Minority Senior Legislative Associate/Labor; Maria Cuprill, Minority Legislative Associate/Labor; Marjan Ghafourpour, Minority Staff Assistant/Labor; and Brian Compagnone, Minority Staff Assistant/Investigations.

Chairman Hoekstra. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Education and the Workforce will come to order.

The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony in exercise of its capacity to conduct oversight inquiries into the administration of programs and operations under the charge of the United States Department of Labor. Under rule 12(b) of our committee rules, any oral opening statement at this hearing is limited to the chairman and the ranking member. This allows us to keep the focus on the witnesses and not necessarily the members. If other members have statements, they will be included into the record.

The witnesses should also be advised that any additional information or testimony that they may wish to have entered into the official record of this hearing must be submitted, within the next 10 days. However, if there is not an objection, we would like to be able to forward some written questions to each of our panelists for insertion into the record.

We have received numerous documents from the Department of Labor, and there are questions that will be developed from those documents that we cannot get to today. Therefore, with unanimous consent, the hearing record will be held open for 30 days.

Without objection, so ordered.

SEE APPENDIX E FOR THE QUESTIONS SUBMITTTED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE TO PATRICIA DALTON, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND RAYMOND UHALDE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

SEE APPENDIX F FOR REPONSES TO SUBCOMMITTEE QUESTIONS SUBMITTTED BY PATRICIA DALTON, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

SEE APPENDIX G FOR REPONSES TO SUBCOMMITTEE QUESTIONS SUBMITTTED BY RAYMOND UHALDE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

 

 

THE OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PETE HOEKSTA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE

The subcommittee continues the inquiry into the successes and potential problems of the United States Department of Labor's administration of the various grant programs. What we are trying to do is to find out if, once grant money goes out the door at the Department of Labor, it is being used effectively and efficiently.

Let me give you a little bit of background as to why we are doing this.

Back in July of 1997, we began a project called the American Worker at a Crossroads Project. The purpose of the project was to study workplace policies that enhance or impede the work environment in this Nation and to report to Congress on possible actions to better prepare our workplace laws for the future. The motivation was to improve the environment of work in America so that our workers could be the most productive and maintain the highest standard of living of any workers in the world.

In August of this year, we released the report. Our purpose today, and in a series of hearings that will follow, is to build on what we have learned and to continue to strive for excellence in the workplace.

One important lesson that we learned from our work in preparing this report was the enormity of the task. There is really so much to learn about the strengths and weaknesses in today's workplace laws and the changes that are affecting us, for example, technology, demographic shifts, and others making it possible only to chip away at the very tip of the iceberg in a short period of time. The Congressional oversight process requires time and vigilance.

Our goal for the American Worker at a Crossroads Project was to grasp the intricacies of the financial management and accountability systems in place at the United States Department of Labor. At the outset, we found that the financial management accountability at the Department of Labor today hinges on multiple tracking systems, a very decentralized web of processes and procedures. The trick, we found, is not in understanding a single component within the whole, but in trying to put those components together into the whole. That is when one realizes that many of the pieces to the puzzle just do not seem to fit together. This leads to questions concerning accountability.

Government accountability must never become too complex for citizens to gauge. Therein lies the challenge to Congress, because guaranteeing government accountability to the public is one of our jobs.

It is not surprising, in that context, that Congress has sought a number of ways to better discharge this important task. For example, the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 seeks to establish and implement strategic planning and performance measurement practices. Traditionally, an agency's performance had been measured by the number of statutory functions or outputs that it performed. Under the Results Act, the focus of the measurement has shifted to an agency's ability to achieve goals or outcomes. This is a major step toward better evaluating the effectiveness of government.

This CFO Act of 1990 was passed to improve the general and financial management of the Federal Government. Before that, the Single Audit Act of 1984 was passed to supplement our oversight resources with resources from the private sector to review the financial conditions of grantees. Before that, in the late 1970s, the Inspector General Acts were passed to establish independent oversight over government programs to strengthen accountability.

I think the testimony we will hear today will clearly point out many successes and some potential weaknesses resulting from each of these laws. But the Congress must always maintain its watch. To do this, we must continually assess the strengths and weaknesses in the financial management accountability systems found in individual agencies, like the U.S. Department of Labor. That is the purpose of our oversight today. We want to look specifically into the performance of the grant agreements that are administered by the DOL.

Before I begin, let me briefly frame this inquiry.

First, in fiscal year 1996, we know that the Department of Labor administered grant and cooperative agreements totaling more than $4.5 billion. Second, we are here to learn. We are here to learn, and the topic is whether the accountability systems in place at the DOL are working well or whether they need to be strengthened. What is being done to guarantee that taxpayer dollars are being spent by DOL grantees properly?

I hope by the end of this hearing we will be able to answer that question. Further, I hope we can agree on whether improvements are needed in the systems in place at DOL to ensure accountability and to discuss available options to address any problems that we may detect.

SEE APPENDIX A FOR THE WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PETE HOEKSTA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE

Mr. Roemer.

 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TIM ROEMER, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE

Mr. Roemer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you and thank you for holding this hearing today and look forward to the testimony from our very distinguished witnesses on the panel.

The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the manner in which the Department of Labor and the Departmentís Inspector General administer and oversee Federal program monies. Regardless of party, we all have a strong interest in ensuring that our tax dollars are properly spent and accounted for. Reviewing the policies by which the Department accounts for program funds is a necessary and important part of the oversight function of this subcommittee.

I look forward to hearing the concerns raised by the witnesses and by my colleagues. However, before concluding, I want to remind my colleagues that about 88 percent of the Department of Labor grants are directly administered by the States. Only 12 percent are administered by the Department of Labor. If we are to fulfill our responsibilities as caretakers, we must also be sure we comprehend the strengths and weaknesses of State-administered expenditures.

Finally, one purpose of this hearing is to examine the extent to which the Inspector General is able to make programmatic evaluations as well as financial audits. While some evaluations are clearly useful to the Congress, we must also recognize that it is not the Inspector General who is ultimately responsible for assessing the extent to which the programs that we have enacted are succeeding. That responsibility will always lie with us as elected Members of Congress and as members of this oversight committee.

Again, I thank the chairman and our witnesses today, and I look forward to a productive hearing, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman Hoekstra. Thank you, Mr. Roemer.

Mr. Roemer. You are welcome.

Chairman Hoekstra. Let me introduce our panelists.

Our first witness is Mr. James Naughton. Mr. Naughton is a member of the bar in the State of Iowa and the District of Columbia. He is also a CPA in the Commonwealth of Virginia. I would guess that would probably allow you to be a CPA just about anywhere; right?

Mr. Naughton. If I wanted to.

Chairman Hoekstra. If you wanted to, that's right.

Among his colleagues working in the Congress, however, he is known as one of the driving forces behind passage of the Inspector General Acts of 1976 and 1978. He achieved that status in his role as a counsel to the House Government Operations Subcommittee, where he worked under the leadership of Representative Fountain, one of the fathers of the Inspector General Acts of 1955 and 1983.

We must have a lot of Inspector General Acts around here. We ought to take a look at doing one of those. We could maybe do one of those on a bipartisan basis. Looks like it is about time to do one as well.

Welcome, Mr. Naughton.

We also have our second witness, Mr. Raymond Uhalde, who is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor. Mr. Uhalde is an outstanding career civil servant who has a number of responsibilities with the ETA. I can think of no one more qualified to educate this subcommittee on the procedures and mechanisms in place within the agency to guarantee accountability in the area of grant performance.

Mr. Uhalde, welcome.

Our third and final witness is Patricia Dalton, the Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Department of Labor. This subcommittee has been privileged to have Ms. Dalton before us in the past, so welcome back.

Ms. Dalton is also a certified public accountant and certified management accountant and has served the Federal Government for the past 15 years.

I think we have three very qualified and knowledgeable witnesses. I would ask you to try to limit your comments to 5 minutes. We will submit your entire written statements for the record.

Chairman Hoekstra. Mr. Naughton.

 

 

STATEMENT OF JAMES R. NAUGHTON, ESQ., FORMER COUNSEL FOR THE HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. Naughton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure to be here. I want to commend the excellent work done by the staff of the subcommittee on both sides of the aisle. They were most helpful to me in preparing for this hearing.

In my statement, I have called attention to a number of provisions of the Inspector General legislation, which make it very clear that Congress intended the IGs to play a pivotal role in program evaluation. In fact, Inspectors General are not just authorized to evaluate Federal programs and activities through performance audits and other methods; under the IG Act they are required to do so.

 

I might add that the IG Act provides for the Comptroller General

to establish standards for audits by Inspectors General. These standards, which are published in the GAO "Yellow Book" - emphasize that a major objective of performance audits is to provide information necessary for program evaluation.

 

Under the standards, program audits are a flexible tool, which can be used to accomplish a wide variety of objectives. For example, in addition to assessing the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of program operations, program audits can be designed to determine whether desired results or benefits are being achieved and/or the extent of compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

 

The availability of information needed to monitor Federal programs and activities has been significantly increased by financial management reform legislation enacted since 1978. The statutory requirement for audited financial statements is being particularly helpful in producing useful information, which was not previously available.

 

Perhaps the most important aspect of the financial management legislation is that the mandated reforms will continue unless changed by law; consequently, the statutory reforms are not subject to elimination at the whim of a particular administration or a change in program managers and are less vulnerable to pressure for change from special interests.

 

Identification of program problems and deficiencies through audited financial statements is only one step toward reduction of fraud, waste and abuse. Inspectors General are making significant progress in this battle by coordinating the work of their own auditors and investigators with the efforts of other Federal, state and local entities. In some instances, joint task forces have been established to which each member brings a particular expertise.

 

Federal grant programs are often difficult to monitor effectively because Federal funds are expended and audited by nonfederal agencies and entities, with no single unit having the responsibility, authority and information necessary to combat fraud, waste and abuse.

 

Years ago, as counsel for an investigative subcommittee, I looked at literally hundreds of reports by public accounting firms on their audits of HEW grant programs. As expected, the reports discussed receipts and disbursements. However, to the best of my recollection, only two of the reports contained any useful information concerning the extent to which the audited program was achieving its intended goals.

 

While monitoring of grant programs has improved to some degree under the Single Audit Act, it is still far from satisfactory. Moreover, since the GAO and most Inspectors General have been assigned additional mandatory duties while their personnel and other resources were being sharply reduced, there is little likelihood the IGs will be able to give adequate attention to grant programs.

 

Over the years, there have been many one-time studies of government programs and activities, involving both governmental employees and non-governmental individuals and organizations.

 

Some of these temporary study groups have made valuable contributions to the improvement of government operations. Others have done more harm than good and have faded into well-deserved obscurity after issuance of self congratulatory reports on their accomplishments.

 

The best known temporary study group currently in existence is, of course, Vice President Gore's National Partnership for Reinventing Government (formerly known as the National Performance Review).

 

In a 1999 "Summary of Accomplishments, 1993-1998", the National Partnership stated that:

 

"The Reinventing Government initiative is the longest-running and most successful government reform effort in U. S. history."

 

In my opinion, even if you look at only the 20th century, there have been many reform efforts, which have accomplished more than the National Partnership. For example, while I'm obviously prejudiced, I am confident that the Inspectors General have been far more successful in protecting the public purse and improving the integrity, efficiency and effectiveness of government programs than the National Partnership.

 

And if you look back a century or two in U. S. history, you will find such monumental reforms as the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights -- events which apparently escaped the notice of the writer(s) of the National Partnership press release.

 

I should confess that I have not paid much attention to findings and recommendations of the National Performance Review since it issued its first report - "The Gore Report on Reinventing Government" - in September 1993. Among other things, the report contained an unsupported allegation that much of the money being spent on the staffs of the General Accounting Office and the Inspectors General was being wasted; moreover, it strongly suggested that there were twice as many auditors as there should be.

 

The report also declared that the "reforms" proposed by the Partnership would result in the net elimination of approximately 252,000 positions; however, it did not explain what positions were involved and what government activities would be affected by the reduction in positions.

 

The report did not explain how the 252,000 number was selected.

I made an unsuccessful attempt to find out, but even the GAO couldn't tell me. I finally concluded it had been picked out of thin air.

 

I resent the implication that cutting the number of government employees results in a net saving of the amount being paid them because they were not doing anything worthwhile. There undoubtedly are government employees who would not be missed, but there are many more who do indispensable work and do it well.

 

Media reports about fraud, waste and abuse in government programs

are far more common than they were before enactment of the IG legislation. However, this is an indication of success, not failure. Before the Inspectors General came into existence, it was less likely that irregularities would be detected. When problems were detected, there was no assurance that they would be publicly disclosed. Because of the Inspectors General, it is likely that less fraud, waste and abuse is occurring but much more of it is being detected and disclosed.

 

The chief sponsor of the Inspector General Acts of 1976 and 1978, then Representative L. H. Fountain, often stressed the importance of a cooperative working relationship between agency heads and IGs.

 

There is an outstanding example of such cooperation at the Department of Health and Human Services. The reverse is true at HUD. The HUD Inspector General, in my opinion, is a very competent, experienced and dedicated person who has been working diligently to improve the HUD program operations. She has had to do so over the active and unprincipled opposition of agency officials. At one point, in an attempt to prevent public disclosure of serious problems, the HUD Deputy Secretary tried unsuccessfully to prevent the IG from responding to media inquiries without permission of the HUD Office of Public Affairs.

 

Chairman Hoekstra. Are you just about wrapped up?

 

Mr. Naughton. Yes. I can stop at this point and will be pleased to respond to your questions.

 

Chairman Hoekstra. Good. Thank you.

 

SEE APPENDIX B FOR THE WRITTEN STATEMENT AND MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY JAMES NAUGHTON, ESQ., FORMER COUNSEL TO THE HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Chairman Hoekstra. Mr. Uhalde.

 

STATEMENT OF RAYMOND J. UHALDE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Mr. Uhalde. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having me appear on behalf of the Department of Labor's Employment and Training Administration to address how we are ensuring the financial program integrity of the grants that are awarded under the Job Training Partnership Act.

In recent weeks, my staff has met with the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee staff, including Mr. Settle, to provide an overview and documentation of our grant management procedures. Today, I will just summarize my formal testimony.

ETA takes our responsibility for stewardship of Federal funds and programs we administer very seriously. We place a high priority on measuring and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of our employment training programs in several ways. We do this by collecting detailed data on our program participants through our management information system, by monitoring program results through a performance measurement management system, and by evaluating our programs through rigorous studies of their costs and net impacts. We routinely provide feedback to our State and local partners and the national grantees on their performance.

We focus not only on local performers to raise performance of the system as a whole, but also on high performers to set benchmarks for the system and to showcase exemplary programs.

To ensure that services provided by our delivery system will continue to improve, the Department has launched monitoring activities working with our State and local and national grantees. One prominent example of our efforts is the Enterprise, which promotes quality practices and a system for certifying high-quality dislocated worker programs at the State and local level.

Another, the Promising and Effective Practices Network, PEPNet, recognizes and supports a nationwide network of youth employment initiatives that meet best practices criteria.

We are now implementing the Workforce Investment Act of 1998. This act is landmark bipartisan job training reform legislation that will become effective on July 1, 2000, when JTPA will be repealed. This act calls for a customer-focused, high-performance system. To help States and local communities implement the act, we are establishing a common framework for continuous improvement and performance excellence based on the Malcolm Baldrige performance criteria.

Under JTPA, the Employment Training Administration awards both formula funded grants to States and discretionary awarded grants that are nationally administered.

Nearly 90 percent of our JTPA grants, about 3.6 billion, are awarded to the States based on statutory allocation formulas. States then allocate most of the funds to local areas using formulas. Under these grants, States have the primary responsibility for oversight of the local activities.

The ETA regional office staff has the responsibility for Federal on-site monitoring and providing technical assistance to States. They also help States carry out the monitoring technical assistance responsibilities with local areas. ETA national office staff are responsible for the overall management of the grants.

A second type of grant is administered directly by our national office. Many of these grants are competitive awards, and they account for about 12 percent of our budget. They include grants to Indian and Native American grantees and migrant seasonal farm worker grantees under Title IV-A of JTPA.

My formal testimony lists the other types of grants.

ETA national program staff have the responsibility for Federal on-site monitoring and for providing technical assistance to these grantees. Since I understand the subcommittee is particularly interested in these title IV-A national program grants, my formal testimony focuses on these.

In managing our national program grants, ETA deals directly with grantee organizations on all aspects of grant management. We use a three-part performance management strategy. First, we review program results to identify areas of weakness and develop capacity-building efforts for continuous improvement; second, we ensure fiscal integrity and performance accountability; and, third, we strengthen partnership efforts with grantees through vehicles such as the Enterprise and PEPNet, but also the Native American Advisory Council, Migrant Seasonal Farm Worker Advisory Committee and grantee associations. I will elaborate briefly.

Program review and capacity building are linked. Our approach is a problem-solving one, using program data to identify the grantees with emerging problems of a serious nature. Second, grantees are identified that have the capacity to provide peer-to-peer training and technical assistance. We provide training and technical assistance to strengthen grantee capacity to collect and accurately report program data. Depending on the requirements of the program, we collect and analyze program and fiscal performance data on a quarterly, semiannual and annual basis.

Our approach to overseeing grants to States and for national programs are similar. Those who perform ETA's monitoring and oversight are grant officer technical representatives, GOTRs. We require all program staff who perform the direct oversight of grants to take a week-long training course to become certified to serve as a GOTR. In the last 2 years, nearly 150 ETA staff have completed the course.

The GOTR conducts regular periodic reviews of each grant, monitoring the performance, product delivery schedules, and reporting requirements. A key GOTR role is to arrange for or provide this technical assistance.

Grantees submit quarterly or semiannual and annual financial reports by fiscal year of appropriation. These reports are used to reconcile appropriations with grant award amounts and reported expenditures.

Also, and we will hear more of this from other witnesses, under the OMB circulars, all ETA grantees that spend over $300,000 per fiscal year are required to have an independent single audit annually. The audit includes reports from the independent auditor on the grantee's internal control system, as well as on compliance with Federal program regulations.

Approved audits of the Department of Labor grantees are sent to the Department's Office of the Inspector General. The OIG determines whether there are findings that ETA needs to revolve, and a copy of the report is sent to ETA for action. And when ETA has concerns about a specific program or a specific grantee, we can request, and do, an IG audit of these programs.

When audit reports are issued by the IG to ETA, our Division of Resolution and Appeals issues a resolution. Grantees have the option to appeal the final determination to the Office of the Administrative Law Judges. Further appeal for cause may be made to the Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the U.S. District Court. ETA's accounting office is responsible for collection of debts established by the grant officer's final determination.

The third point is that effective performance management requires ETA to work in partnership with our grantees. We have developed a mutual respect and trust among, for example, our tribal leaders on the Native American programs and our program office directors. We try to solve problems and support the focus of program investment and capacity building. The effectiveness of this approach is evidenced by a significant decrease, for example, in delinquent reports and timely submission of required plans under the Native American program. The Native American Advisory Council engages in various activities to improve the service. We have a similar relationship with migrant seasonal farm worker grantees and their advisory committee.

In conclusion, we believe that ETA grants management activities, from preaward through grant administration to post-grant activities, continues to ensure the integrity of grant programs that we administer. We also believe that under the Workforce Investment Act and with the application of the uniform administrative requirements, fiscal integrity and performance accountability will be further enhanced.

 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared testimony. I will be available for questions.

Chairman Hoekstra. Great. Thank you.

SEE APPENDIX C FOR THE WRITTEN STATEMENT OF RAYMOND J. UHALDE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

 

Chairman Hoekstra. Ms. Dalton.

 

 

STATEMENT OF PATRICIA A. DALTON, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

 

Ms. Dalton. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure for me to be here this morning in my capacity as Deputy Inspector General for the Department of Labor to discuss the financial and performance integrity issues involving DOL grants. From the outset, I would like to emphasize that the views that I express today are those of the Office of Inspector General, consistent with its independent role to provide oversight to the Department.

At DOL, audit oversight is provided through entity-wide audits required by the Single Audit Act and also by audits performed by my office. We also provide various technical assistance to the Department on a number of issues.

There are two important issues that impact on our grant oversight capabilities: The Single Audit Act audits provide limited audit coverage for DOL programs; and, secondly, the scope of single audits does not include performance data.

In the early 1990s, studies made specific recommendations on how the single audit could be strengthened. These recommendations served as a foundation for the Single Audit Act amendments of 1996, which extended single audits to nonprofit organizations that administer Federal programs, exempted thousands of entities from federally mandated audits by raising the dollar threshold for requiring audits from $25,000 to $300,000, and authorized a risk-based approach to selecting programs for testing.

While these amendments have improved the single audits, we still have concerns regarding the oversight capabilities it provides to DOL grants. The extent of single audit coverage concerning DOL programs has been a concern of my office for some time. We have recently completed quality control reviews of five State single audits. These quality control reviews are reviews of the work papers of the CPA firms or State and local auditors that conducted the audits. We have found in these limited reviews that either inadequate audit testing of DOL program clusters occurred, or that DOL programs were simply excluded from being audited.

Since we have completed these quality control reviews for only a handful of States, we cannot make broad conclusions about the extent of audit coverage of DOL programs under the Single Audit Act at this time. However, the work we have done is an indicator that improvements in the quality of the audit work may still be needed.

My second area of concern is the lack of performance data in the scope of single audits. In order to determine program effectiveness, the Department needs to have accurate, reliable program statistics so that program performance can be evaluated. Audits conducted by my office have identified a number of instances in which performance by grantees was lacking.

In my full statement, for example, I cite problems discovered in our audit work in the Puerto Rico Seasonal and Migrant Farmworker Program and the Employment and Training Program. I have also cited Florida's Performance Based Incenting Funding Program established to help funds schools with adult education programs. If there was audited program data and it was reported within the single audit, such problems could be discovered sooner rather than later, saving the taxpayers millions of dollars.

In response to the concerns I have expressed regarding the single audits, my office has undertaken a number of proactive efforts to provide more accountability over DOL grant funds. For example, recently the OIG conducted audits of 59 Welfare-to-Work grantees during the past year in order to assess their status, identify vulnerabilities, and recommend corrective actions before funds were misspent. We have also been providing our technical expertise to the Employment and Training Administration as it works to implement the Workforce Investment Act, which will soon replace the Job Training and Partnership Act.

In conclusion, improved grant accountability will only be ensured through effective Federal Government monitoring supported by an effective audit program. Therefore, the IG will continue to monitor the single audits and will conduct grant and contract audits to supplement these single audits.

In addition, we recommend that the single audit require more testing to ensure greater audit coverage and that the single audit incorporate a performance audit component.

 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement.

SEE APPENDIX D FOR THE WRITTEN STATEMENT OF PATRICIA A. DALTON, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

 

Chairman Hoekstra. Thank you very much.

 

Chairman Hoekstra. Ms. Dalton, what are your authorized full-time equivalent positions? What were they in 1992 and what they are today?

Ms. Dalton. In 1992, we had 529 full-time equivalents; currently, it is 417.

Chairman Hoekstra. I'm sorry, you were at?

Ms. Dalton. We were at 529. We are currently at 417, which is about a 20 percent reduction.

Chairman Hoekstra. Has the scope of the IG's office, or the work that you do under the Single Audit Act and other acts, your workload has significantly increased?

Ms. Dalton. Basically, our workload covers the entire Department, so the work does not change. However, in the past 10 years or so, we have had additional mandatory requirements placed on us. For example, I think Mr. Naughton mentioned the Chief Financial Officers Act, which requires us to audit the financial statements of the Department each year. That consumes a considerable amount of resources. We also have mandatory requests within our appropriation laws each year, which also consume resources.

Chairman Hoekstra. Are the Department of Laborís books fully auditable now? Does an independent auditor come in and help you with that or not?

Ms. Dalton. It is a combination of our staff and independent auditors. We have been auditing the Department's books since the late 1980s. We actually started doing that work before the CFO Act was implemented. So it is a combination of our staff and independent public accountants.

Chairman Hoekstra. By law, what specific activities or audit work are you required to do for DOL, since the new laws between 1992 and 1998?

Ms. Dalton. The biggest change has been in the Chief Financial Officers Act and subsequent amendments and the requirements under that law. We also have a standing requirement to audit the contracts of the Job Corps program.

In addition, as I said, we regularly have audit requirements come through the appropriation process. For example, most recently we were required to perform an audit in conjunction with the Social Security Administration of the transfer of the Black Lung Part B program, portions of that, over to the Department of Labor and how effectively the Department was performing.

Chairman Hoekstra. How many grants are covered under this Single Audit Act that come out of the DOL?

Ms. Dalton. It is difficult for us to determine exactly how many grants, because the Department issues numerous grants. From our preliminary work, for example in the Employment and Training Administration, as part of our financial work this year they are issuing over 2,000 grants a year. But that only is the tip of the iceberg, because those are the direct grants from the Department. Those are then subgranted down to lower entities.

For example, in JTPA, a grant would be given to a State. The State would then give a grant to a local, to a city or a metropolitan area. All of those would be covered under the Single Audit Act.

Chairman Hoekstra. Then the Single Audit Act is primarily a process that reviews the accounting within the organization as to how the money flows and how the money works and whether it all flowed properly?

Ms. Dalton. Right. The single audits give you a broad picture of how the money is being administered. It focuses on the systems, it focuses on the financial aspects of an operation. It does not look at performance. It will give you the broad picture. It does not give you an in-depth picture.

For example, when we go out and look at some of the quality control work that we have done on single audits, probably examples would be a good way to illustrate it. The State of New York's single audit, there were a little over $15 million in JTPA expenditures that were looked at in the audit. Five transactions were tested as part of that audit.

Chairman Hoekstra. What do you mean by tested?

Ms. Dalton. It meant that the auditors took a look at those transactions to see if they were appropriately recorded. Was it an appropriate expense under that program?

Chairman Hoekstra. So I would surmise that that is not a whole lot that you have an opportunity to go back and take a look at?

Ms. Dalton. Correct. That is why I say it is sort of a superficial look. They do a lot of work on the systems in terms of how the system is operating.

Chairman Hoekstra. And that does not even get to perhaps what Mr. Roemer and I might be most concerned about, which is does the money go where it is intended to. But it does not necessarily answer the question as to whether we are achieving the results that we are intended to achieve.

Ms. Dalton. Yes, that is correct. It does not look at what the performance was. For example, in a training grant, a grantee will report to the Employment and Training Administration--one of their performance measures would be how many participants have been placed in employment. It would not look at the integrity of those statistics.

Chairman Hoekstra. Mr. Uhalde, would you test the validity of those statistics the GOTRs, or whatever they were?

Mr. Uhalde. The GOTRs.

Chairman Hoekstra. The GOTRs.

Mr. Uhalde. Well, Mr. Chairman, our principal responsibility is analyzing the information that is provided. We do, on our national grants, work very closely with the grantees with on-site reviews, desk reviews, and look at their data. But the validation of the information that is put into a report is really beyond our logistical capability to analyze on an ongoing basis.

That is, we can look at the data, even at the grantee level on a site review, but whether those data have been recorded accurately or not on the ground is something that we just cannot validate on a regular, ongoing basis. We do not have the resources to do that.

Chairman Hoekstra. And the resources at the IG's office have been reduced.

Ms. Dalton. Yes. We have very limited resources. When we do go out and do a grant, to look at a grant from the Department, the OIG will look at the performance side of the grant, and we have found problems.

Chairman Hoekstra. All right.

Mr. Roemer.

Mr. Roemer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I now know why I never became a CPA and I hire somebody to do my own taxes after this testimony this morning. I appreciate all your time.

One of the things that I like to have happen in these hearings, and I know Mr. Hoekstra shares this concern, we like to have some dialogue between the witnesses, given what they have said in their testimony.

Mr. Uhalde, would you like to respond at all to some of the IG's criticisms of ETA's auditing and oversight of its grantees? Do you have any response to what was testified to here?

Mr. Uhalde. Well, I think, in general, we work very closely with the Inspector General. To some extent, we have some of the same obstacles that they face. The IG has experienced a 20 percent reduction in staff. In 1982, we had 3,000 staff. In 1992, we had about 1,700 staff. I currently have 1,385 staff. And the last I checked, no one had taken any work away from our agency.

Mr. Roemer. So you went from 3,000 to 1,700 in how many years?

Mr. Uhalde. From 1982 to 1992.

Mr. Roemer. From 1982 to 1992. What did that do to the case workload for each person handling some of these things?

Mr. Uhalde. What happened in this time is that much more reliance is placed on States to oversee grants with their localities. And with our national grants, we have simply had to about double the amount of national grants that are overseen by each GOTR, each technical representative.

Now, we have gotten smarter. We do things better. We have much more reliance on electronic reporting. For example, E-mails and computers help us to do our job better. But to get at some issues, like performance issues, to be able to judge and assess the quality of training and services, there is no substitute for being on the ground, talking to participants, talking to staff.

Mr. Roemer. The Inspector General has had about a 20 percent staff reduction, you have had about a 40 percent staff reduction.

Mr. Uhalde. Depending on the time period, yes.

Mr. Roemer. Okay. You described what you are trying to do with devolving some of this stuff to the States. Eighty-eight percent of your programs are State administered. How do you work with the States in administering these grants and then how do you evaluate the States' performances?

Mr. Uhalde. Well, we work with the States through our regional offices, principally.

Mr. Roemer. How many regional offices?

Mr. Uhalde. We have 10 offices with six regions. We are located in 10 cities around the country, and we have close to 60 percent of our staff in our field offices. We have about 700 people in our field offices. That is to oversee not only JTPA but the unemployment insurance system, apprenticeship system, all our national grants, employment services and the like.

We work with the States, and we essentially will oversee the States' records. We have a system of performance standards with the States and with localities on performance and outcome measures, and on an annual basis we report back to the States. We write to the governor and give him a detailed report of the performance of each of the localities within the State, identify those areas, those communities that are below performance and those that are exemplary.

And then, with the principal designated person in the State, we will develop a corrective action plan for those local areas that are falling below performance and work during the course of the year to get them that kind of training or help they need to pull performance up.

Mr. Roemer. Do you have any idea what number are put into corrective action and what number are terminated based on their failure to perform on a financially performance basis?

Mr. Uhalde. In any one year the actual numbers that fail to perform and, therefore, are essentially reorganized would be relatively few--two, three, four, five. But over the year, in those that have failed performance in one or more measures, maybe anywhere from 10 to 20 percent. And those are ones where, for those particular areas, like they may fail the average wage for people, maybe getting people too low a wage, we would work with them or help the State to help them to improve the kinds of jobs they are getting people.

Mr. Roemer. Do you have particular States that are stellar performers in administering these and that you do not usually have problems with, like Indiana?

Mr. Uhalde. Probably an outstanding example, but I cannot remember the list.

Mr. Roemer. A good answer. Very good answer.

Ms. Dalton, let me come back to you. Does the Department of Labor generally abide by your office's findings and recommendations?

Ms. Dalton. I think on the whole they do. I think, as Ray had said, we do have a fairly good relationship on most issues. There are, obviously, some disagreements at times.

Most recently, I think a good example of how we have been working together has been in the Welfare-to-Work Program and the implementation there. We have gone through kind of a history on the audit side of it.

What we are trying to do at this point, because we do have limited resources and we cannot be out doing grant by grant auditing as we used to do in the early 1980s, is looking at the front side of it before the money is spent. And we have been out looking at, as I said, 59 of the Welfare-to-Work grantees as they were getting money, as the grants were being issued, to see if they were ready to perform.

That work identified a number of problems which we brought to the attention of ETA very early in the process, and we have been very pleased with their reaction to that information and getting out technical assistance, guidance to improve, so that the grantees are in a position to perform.

In some cases we found some situations where money was going to be directed to activities that were not allowable under the program. We were able to stop those expenses from even being incurred, as opposed to when we find it after the fact. Oftentimes, that money is never returned to the Federal Government for a variety of reasons.

Mr. Roemer. Thank you.

Last question, Mr. Naughton. You seem to be very proud in your testimony of the Inspector General Act. Any recommendations on how to further improve that Act?

Mr. Naughton. Well, I am sure that some things could be done to improve it. One concern I have is that if they open it up for amendments, you may get some things put in that you do not want, which leaves you worse off than you were before you started.

Mr. Roemer. That occasionally happens around here.

Mr. Naughton. But I think more law enforcement authority might be helpful. Perhaps some subpoena authority for testimony of individuals in appropriate circumstances. Inspector Generals can issue their own subpoenas for documents, but sometimes a company that has been subpoenaed for documents will deliberately assign their newest employee, who has the least knowledge about the documents, to respond the subpoena. So that it is not very helpful if you have a roomful of documents and you are looking for something in particular.

I do think, as you indicated, Congressional oversight is absolutely necessary. And if Congress keeps a close eye on what the IGs are doing and what they are not doing, that undoubtedly some improvements in the laws could be made.

Mr. Roemer. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Hoekstra. Mr. Owens.

Mr. Owens. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this opportunity.

I would like to start with Ms. Dalton and ask if you have full weight in deciding which programs you are going to audit or is that guided by some other board or force or executive decision?

Ms. Dalton. We have independent authority to decide what work we are going to do. Obviously, we are under general oversight of the Secretary as well as Congress, but we make the selections in terms of what we will be working on. However, we also, with the exception of the requirements that are in statute, we also do receive requests for work from the Congress, from the Secretary, from the program agencies.

Mr. Owens. Absent any requests from Congress or the Secretary, do you have a formula by which you choose to conduct audits at random, or do you avoid big cities, like New York and Chicago and places that are more complicated?

I notice your examples are relatively small programs. Migrant programs in Puerto Rico, an adult education program in Florida. But there are some multibillion dollar outfits in New York.

Ms. Dalton. Generally, for example, for the State, for the large States we look at program-wide issues. When we are doing that, the large States generally are reviewed through that process. For example, if we are looking at the unemployment insurance program, for a number of the large States we will use a statistical sampling approach, and it is usually stratified by dollar. So that the bigger States are usually selected through that process.

The examples that we used were really highlighting some of the grantee performance issues.

Mr. Owens. Do you examine the question of corruption in the process of awarding contracts? We have a Republican governor and a Republican mayor. The Republican mayor of New York City refused to let the controller, who happens to be a Democrat, come in and audit the books. Now, the law says he should audit the books of any programs at any time, but we had to go through a 2-year fight in court before the court ordered the mayor finally, recently, to open up the city's programs so that he could audit them.

Now, a lot of those programs are Federal programs, and there is a huge training center in Manhattan which is one of the smaller boroughs, well, not small, but compared to Brooklyn, which has 2-1/2 million people, a lot of unemployed people, that is where the people are and the workers are, the biggest training program is concentrated in Manhattan, and we wonder how they got the contracts.

There was a scandal 2 or 3 years ago about awarding contracts from city hall, and it blew over, and we never got any results. And I was just wondering, does that attract your attention at all when you decide which targets are audited?

Ms. Dalton. Yes, it will. If we have allegations that there is fraud in our program, it may be handled through an audit.

Mr. Owens. Any big cities that you have audited programs at recently, like New York?

Ms. Dalton. Atlanta. We performed an audit in Atlanta. We do not have any recent audits in the City of New York.

Mr. Owens. No recent meaning what, in the last 10 years, the last 5 years, the last year?

Ms. Dalton. I would say probably about 10 years.

Mr. Owens. Does the lack of staff make you stay away from the complicated big grantors?

Ms. Dalton. Yes, it does.

Mr. Owens. Isn't that kind of a contradiction in terms of the intent of the law? Where the most money is being spent, the most people are being impacted.

Ms. Dalton. Well, what we have to do, because of the resources, is we try to look at the programs at the State level, which is where the grants are being received. And then we have to depend on the States to do the work at the lower levels.

Where we do have an indication of a problem, if it comes to our attention, then we will go in and do the work ourselves. In some cases, we just do not have the resources. However, if we do have an indication that there is fraud, we will either do it through an audit or we may open a criminal investigation.

Mr. Owens. Mr. Naughton, I think you said the effectiveness of the Inspector General law depends somewhat on what happens after the audit is conducted, and the media and the Congress need to pay attention, otherwise it is a lost venture and time wasted.

During the 12 years of the Reagan-Bush administration, were there any outstanding audits that you found that were ignored by Congress or ignored by the media? Any particular ones that come to mind?

Mr. Naughton. It is harder to think of audits or investigations which received appropriate attention from the Congress.

Mr. Owens. In general they do not?

Mr. Naughton. Pardon me?

Mr. Owens. In general, they do not receive appropriate attention?

Mr. Naughton. I doubt that very many people read the semiannual reports that the IGs send up. I think that there are probably not very many Members of Congress who have ever read the Inspector General Act and are really familiar with what is in there.

But I think the big problem is not in finding out what is wrong, it is in successfully doing something about it. That is the tough part.

Mr. Owens. Mr. Uhalde, do you think we are sufficiently geared up and with all these staff cutbacks are going to be able to deal with the Welfare-to-Work programs that you administer? Up front, what can we do to make certain we are properly staffed and can guarantee that those programs deliver what they are supposed to?

Mr. Uhalde. Well, I think that the example on Welfare-to-Work is a good example, where we have had a good alliance with the Inspector General to be able to try and look before actual operations on these competitive grants to make sure that the recipients were ready and test their readiness and make corrections before they actually expend them.

I think more largely, for our operations, there is a tension between how much resources we put at the front end, that is in the oversight program operations, versus how much we put in the audit side. And I think what we are saying here is we would like to shift resources earlier, earlier in the audit side, to do kind of these readiness audits, if you will, in conjunction with the program managers. And then also figure out ways for these GOTRs, these day-to-day program overseers, to make sure that they are detecting issues of performance or expenditure of funds early so that we can catch these things.

Mr. Owens. Those are the people who have an extraordinary high workload at this point?

Mr. Uhalde. Yes.

Mr. Owens. Thank you.

Mr. Roemer. If the gentleman will yield.

Mr. Owens. I don't have time left, but I will be happy to.

Mr. Roemer. I just wanted to comment that Ms. Dalton has probably never had the red carpet unrolled for her to come and visit a particular town like Mr. Owens has just--.

Chairman Hoekstra. I always look forward when Mr. Owens is a visitor to the subcommittee. And, actually, you come here quite often for this subcommittee, and I always look forward with eager anticipation to what has attracted Mr. Owens to the hearing.

Mr. Owens. I appreciate your hospitality.

Chairman Hoekstra. But, actually, I think what Mr. Owens is talking about are things that Mr. Roemer and I and the subcommittee are very concerned about, and it is there is one issue of tracking the results of the money flowing through the system, there is the other in talking about the performance, and I think Congress has passed different laws putting requirements for the departments to get a feeling for all of those issues. And the question is whether the current structure and the current resourcing actually enables the Department to do that and to meet its mandated requirements.

There is about, I think, $27.8 billion of DOL's $31.2 billion costs are pass-through funds, of which $8 billion is given for the Job Training Partnership Act. That is about right?

Ms. Dalton. Close.

Chairman Hoekstra. Plus or minus a few, okay.

Given that the IG doesn't have adequate resources to obtain sufficient coverage of grantee performance and single audits do not cover an assessments of grantee performance, then how will DOL determine if it is meeting the requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act, which I think focuses on the results, not the pass-through?

It is kind of like, if the Single Audit Act doesn't cover it and you don't have the resources to do performance audits, how can the Department be assured that it is meeting its objectives?

Ms. Dalton. I don't think the Department can have total assurance on that. Certainly we all have a role in ensuring the integrity of the data that the Department produces. However, as you point out, so much of our performance is controlled by or is through other organizations. They are reporting information in. There are some mechanisms, through the analysis, the employment and training that other agencies do on the quality of that data, but that still does not get at the true integrity of that data that is coming in.

An example would be the Job Corps program, when we went out and looked at that and we looked at their placement numbers. The first time we looked at that, there was a 25 percent error rate in the placement data that the Department itself was producing. It was just that there was not discipline in the systems.

I am happy to report that I think that error rate has gone down substantially since then. But that gives you an example of the experiences that you might have with the grantees of, yes, they are reporting information, and generally they believe it is truly accurate information, but you have so many parties feeding information in.

Chairman Hoekstra. Right.

Mr. Naughton, do you have concerns about the system that is currently in place, either because of a perceived lack of resources or a real lack of resources that we are not maybe getting the accurate information either on performance or on the flow-through of the costs?

Mr. Naughton. I think there is a real lack of resources, perhaps due at least partially to efforts by the Gore Commission to reduce the number of government auditors.

One method that might help alleviate the drastic shortage of resources seems to be working well at HHS.

Under the Health Insurance portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), an innovative arrangement arrangement is being used to recover money lost through Medicare fraud. Under the program, a percentage of the amounts collected becomes available to the HHS Inspector General to hire additional auditors and otherwise carry on the work of her office.

I have seen one newspaper article that says that they have been recovering $8 for every dollar spent, and the total is in the hundreds of millions.

A key feature of the program is that it relates the value of the results to the cost of doing the work.

 

I think there is a lot of inflation in some of these claims of savings, less by the IGs than by the Gore Commission, but even if you discount these claims of the IGs by half, it is still a very good bargain.

Chairman Hoekstra. Mr Uhalde, a constant debate we have here is flexibility versus accountability. How much flexibility do you give to the States versus how much accountability do you request. We just had that debate yesterday on education. I am sure the Education Department will have the same kind of problems perhaps in tracking performance. Do you feel comfortable reporting under the performance act the results that you are getting with the programs that you administer?

Mr. Uhalde. Well, yes, I do. Let me just step back a moment and just say I would not be as pessimistic as maybe this sounds like it is coming off.

First of all, I don't think the government is ever going to audit its way to high-quality performance, good customer satisfaction, and service. We will never get the amount of resources to be in a real-time basis sort of audit. So we have to figure out how a system of incentives and standards and performance are going to drive people to good performance. And I think the JTPA before and the Workforce Investment Act tried very hard to sort of use the system of performance standards and incentives and sanctions to try to systematically, on a day-to-day basis, have the system point toward good customer service, satisfaction, and those kind of performance outcomes you are talking about, not relying on audit process and oversight to get us there. Because we will never have enough people to be able to do that.

We have spent 18 years trying to do that under JTPA. We have gotten a lot of criticism that we have not measured it right, that we cannot validate all the data that is going in.

On the other hand, I daresay now we are going to be following up the earnings and outcomes for every person in the program. Six months after they leave the program, we are going to check their earnings, and a year after it is going to be reported for everyone, and Job Corps is going to go up to 2 years. The education system does not do that. They do not track graduates from universities systematically to find out.

So I think our system has built in something that is going to make for a much better ability to achieve the GPRA goals, and we will get better at it over time.

Chairman Hoekstra. Mr. Roemer?

Mr. Roemer. No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Hoekstra. I would like to thank the panel for being here, and I would like to reiterate again that you will probably be getting some additional written requests for information. We will leave the record open for 30 days.

Again, we are interested both in making sure that the dollars that are spent appropriately and that we also get the performance for the dollars. I think we are interested in working with both the Department of Labor and the Department of Education to put in place a system that Congress has confidence in and that we can help move us towards the goals that we have.

Mr. Roemer.

Mr. Roemer. Mr. Chairman, I would just ask unanimous consent that you share those submissions with us before officially submitting them for the record.

Chairman Hoekstra. So ordered.

Mr. Roemer. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Hoekstra. All right. Any comments?

Mr. Roemer. No, sir. Thank you again.

Chairman Hoekstra. Good. Thank you. The committee will be adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]