SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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42–204 CC
1997
CONSIDERATION OF THE COMMITTEE'S VIEWS
AND ESTIMATES FOR THE FISCAL
YEAR 1998 BUDGET RESOLUTION
THE ADMINISTRATION'S SECURITY ASSISTANCE REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998
HEARING AND BUSINESS MEETING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
MARCH 20, 1997
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
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COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JAY KIM, California
STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio
MARSHALL ''MARK'' SANFORD, South Carolina
MATT SALMON, Arizona
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
TOM CAMPBELL, California
JON FOX, Pennsylvania
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JOHN McHUGH, New York
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
ROY BLUNT, Missouri
JERRY MORAN, Kansas
KEVIN BRADY, Texas
LEE HAMILTON, Indiana
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
HOWARD BERMAN, California
GARY ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PAT DANNER, Missouri
EARL HILLIARD, Alabama
WALTER CAPPS, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
STEVE ROTHMAN, New Jersey
BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee
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RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff
MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Democratic Chief of Staff
WALKER ROBERTS, Senior Professional Staff Member
HILLEL WEINBERG, Senior Professional Staff Member and Counsel
PARKER H. BRENT, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
WITNESSES
The Honorable William Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense
APPENDIX
Draft letter from Chairman Benjamin Gilman to Budget Chairman John Kasich
Prepared statement of Secretary of Defense William Cohen
Responses to questions submitted to the Department of Defense by Chairman Benjamin A. Gilman
Response to question submitted to the Department of Defense by Congressman Chris Smith
CONSIDERATION OF THE COMMITTEE'S VIEWS AND ESTIMATES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1998 BUDGET RESOLUTION
THURSDAY, MARCH 20, 1997
House of Representatives,
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Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order. The Committee on International Relations meets in open session, pursuant to notice, to consider its views and estimates on the President's budget for fiscal year 1998, and to receive the testimony of the Honorable William Cohen, Secretary of Defense.
As our first order of business, I direct the attention of members to the draft letter that is now before them. This letter would represent our position to the Budget Committee. It, in essence, splits the difference between the President's proposal and last year's spending, which was quite a bit higher in the end than the position we adopted in H.R. 1561. The budget proposed by the President calls for a $16 billion spending within our jurisdiction, as opposed to the President's proposal to spend $16.4 billion, but an increase to the comparable figure last year, which was $15.5 billion.
I would note that the figure of $16.4 billion for last year's spending on the international affairs matters within our jurisdiction represents a change due to a technical error from the figure in the letter that was distributed to the members yesterday.
We arrived at this figure by looking closely at the President's budget, and taking into account what we learned in the budget hearings and briefings we have had thus far.
In fact, I could have justified a lower figure, but we need to leave some room for additions should the Committee decide that that is the right way to go when we get into the authorization process in earnest.
I am mindful of the need both to move toward balancing the budget and to allow for spending on other matters, and I do not want to send a signal to our Budget Committee that they should allocate funds to this function that the Congress is unlikely to authorize and appropriate. We owe them our best judgment in this regard.
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We may well have our legislation on the way to the floor even before the budget resolution. That would be the strongest way to make our views known.
Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have reviewed your report, of course. As I understand the process here, you just send a letter to the Budget Committee. No voting is required. And I do want to say that I appreciate very much the recommendation with respect to the increase of $500 million over last year's level of $18.3 billion. The President's request is $19.3 billion and your request is going to be $18.8 billion, just to get the figures out in front of us.
So I thank you for the recommended $500 million increase, but I do not think it is enough. I think we ought to stay with the President's budget, particularly at this very early stage of the budget process. We are just beginning that process. Each step of the process almost certainly is going to require not increases, but cuts, and it seems to me we ought to come in with the President's figure. This 150 account has been much publicized, and there is quite a broad area of agreement. It seems to me that the President's request is reasonable since this account has been cut rather sharply in recent years.
So I thank you for the increase, but so far as I am concerned, I think certainly at this stage in the process—it ought to be the full request that the President has made. And I therefore request that when you send your letter to Chairman Kasich that you note the minority recommendation which I have just indicated; that is, we support the President's budget request for the 150 international affairs budget function.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton. We certainly can revisit all the matters you allude to during the next few weeks. During our recess our staffs will be working together on authorization legislation. I do appreciate that you and some of our other members may want to write separately to the Budget Committee, and we will certainly make note of your concern.
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Are there any other comments?
Mr. Lantos.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I want to associate myself in the strongest possible terms with Mr. Hamilton's observation. We have seen over the course of recent years a systematic downgrading of both the function and the budget of this committee. Last year, for instance, the Judiciary Committee, with much smaller staff, had a smaller budget than we do to operate. Now, they have a larger budget than we do.
It is extremely important at a time of such international turbulence that we are witnessing across the globe to assert the authority of this committee to be able to do its job and to assert the authority of all of our international agencies to do their jobs. I think it is a disgrace that we are closing consulate general after consulate general across the globe. We are cutting back on desperately needed funding of our embassies. We are reaching the point that only multimillionaires can afford to accept embassy posts because the posts are not adequately funded.
And I think Mr. Hamilton's proposal is a minimum proposal. I would like to go beyond the President's budget request, but the least this committee should do is to support the President's budget proposal on a bipartisan basis.
I hope that before you send the letter you will see fit to rethink your notion of cutting the difference and recognize the President's budget proposal itself represents the minimum amount necessary for this country to carry out its international responsibilities.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.
Any other members seeking recognition?
If not, I ask unanimous consent that the letter be transmitted as drafted, subject to technical conforming, grammatical changes, and adding reference to minority views.
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Is there any objection?
[No response.]
Chairman GILMAN. Hearing none, it is so ordered.
The Committee stands in adjournment pending the vote. We will be returning in about 5 or 10 minutes.
[Whereupon, at 10:30 a.m., the Committee was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]
THE ADMINISTRATION'S SECURITY ASSISTANCE REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998
THURSDAY, MARCH 20, 1997
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:43 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order. The next order of business is the testimony of our new Secretary of Defense, the Honorable William Cohen. Welcome, Secretary Cohen, to our International Relations Committee. We are particularly pleased that Secretary Cohen has agreed to come before the Committee at an early date to discuss the Administration's Security Assistance Request for Fiscal Year 1998.
His appearance today reinstates a longstanding practice of the Secretary of Defense testifying before our committee on the Administration's Security Assistance Request and its relationship to our national security interest. I believe your appearance today, Secretary Cohen, reinforces and gives credence to the Administration's efforts to secure additional resources to the International Affairs budget.
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In that regard, your statement is right on the mark. The American public understands, there is no more important military mission than protecting America's international interests, and that mission requires concrete resources. Our Security Assistance programs, in particular, are aimed at strengthening the ability of the nations with which we work to reform their economies, as well as to enhance their ability to ward off aggression.
In Europe, for example, as important to NATO as the U.S. military may be, at least equally important, if not more so, is the assistance we provide to new members to facilitate their integration into the NATO structure.
For our part, our committee expects to mark up State Department and foreign assistance legislation in April for floor action in May. I have shared draft language with the ranking minority member, Lee Hamilton, with the Administration, including the Pentagon, and hopefully, we will have the support of the Department of Defense.
Mr. Secretary, as you may be aware, most of the statutory authority requested by your department from this committee last year has been now enacted into law. However, if you have any new initiatives that are not already included in this year's draft legislation, please forward them to us at an early date, so that we can give them due consideration before we mark up.
I note for my colleagues that we only have the Secretary with us this morning for a very short period, therefore, it is my intention to recognize Mr. Hamilton for an opening statement and then proceed directly to the Secretary for his comments. Of course, if any member has an opening statement, we would be pleased to include them in the record.
In addition, I would request unanimous consent that the time for members to question the Secretary be reduced to 3 minutes, and if there is no objection, we will move in that order.
Mr. LANTOS. I object, Mr. Chairman. I think this is our first opportunity to have our most distinguished Secretary of Defense here. We have 2 hours allotted for this hearing and I see no reason whatsoever to rush through with our questions.
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Chairman GILMAN. Well, Mr. Lantos, I appreciate your concern, but the reason I have suggested a limited time, the Secretary has to leave by 12:15. I am certain we will be interrupted by several votes in the interim. So, if the members would bear with us and agree to a limitation of 3 minutes, we will try to go back for a second round, if there is sufficient time.
Is there any objection?
Mr. LANTOS. I object, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Then, we will stick with the 5-minute rule, and of course, that may limit some of the other members from testifying.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. Chairman, I might accommodate by limiting my comments to 1 minute each.
[Laughter.]
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. The chairman strongly urges members to pose their questions in a manner that the Secretary has adequate time to respond within an allotted time period, giving due consideration to other members who would like to question.
Now, I would like to recognize the ranking minority member, Lee Hamilton, for any comments he would like to make.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I just want to join in welcoming the Secretary of Defense before the Committee. He is familiar, of course, with the House and the Senate. He has served with great distinction in, I think, the Second Congressional District, as I recall, from Maine. He served three terms in the U.S. Senate as well as in the House, and earned the respect of all of us in this institution.
Mr. Secretary, you are here, you are a good friend, you are a colleague. I think you have one of the toughest jobs in Washington. We know you will handle that with great distinction and I just want to say to you that many of us on this committee, including myself, stand ready to be helpful to you in any way that we can as you carry out your very difficult assignments.
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We wish you the best. We think you are off to a good start. You follow, I think, a great Secretary of Defense, Mr. Perry, who served with great distinction, and I know you will, as well, and we wish you well.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Secretary, it would be most helpful if you could summarize your statement so my colleagues could have ample time to get into a dialog with you. We welcome you once again. We wish you well in your new endeavors. Please, Mr. Secretary, feel free to testify.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM COHEN, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. COHEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Hamilton and members of the Committee. I have submitted a formal statement for the record and I will try to even summarize the comments that I have to make right now. I would like to focus on just a couple of key issues.
I think in any discussion of the international affairs budget has to begin with the recognition that the world still remains a very dangerous and unstable place. There are hostile regimes, instability that threaten our interests in key areas of the world, particularly Southwest Asia, Northeast Asia, instability, nationalism, ethnic tension. They pose dangers certainly in Europe and elsewhere, and also, as you are well aware, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction endanger our interests, our forces and even our homeland.
Politically, economically, technologically, the world is changing at an unprecedented and indeed, sometimes an alarming pace. Technology, and I am sure Mr. Campos will agree, is miniaturizing the globe. It is shrinking it down to very small proportions, and it is binding our destiny ever more closely to that of our allies and our economic partners around the world.
Now, this works to our advantage as we seek to promote free markets and the principles of democracy. It also increases the degree to which we are affected by developments overseas, and so we cannot insulate ourselves from the forces that are sweeping the globe, and we would be foolhardy to attempt to do so, given our great and growing interest around the globe.
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To protect and promote those interests, we have to continue to pursue a national security strategy of engagement. This means that the United States must continue to exercise strong leadership in the international community, using all dimensions of our influence to shape the international environment. Military force is but a tool in our arsenal of influence, and to be used most effectively and wisely, it has to be integrated with effective and efficient diplomacy.
It has been observed that ideals without technique is a mess, but technique without ideals is a menace. Similarly, diplomacy without power can produce dialog without decision, while power without diplomacy can lead to arrogance, chauvinism and senseless conflict. So, in protecting our national security interest, we need both diplomacy and military power that act in concert.
Programs that are funded with the International Affairs budget, administered by the Department of State and by the Department of Defense, these are critical force multipliers to our armed forces in accomplishing their mission of preventing, deterring and, when necessary, to defeating the threats to our national interest.
The State Department diplomatic posts are essential platforms for DOD programs and personnel who pursue these defense relationships with host country officials, implement security assistance and cooperation programs and also collect information that is vital for our defense effort. So, strong international programs help ensure that when we fight, we can succeed quickly and with the lowest cost. While we will fight alone when we have to, it is usually better to do so with allies and partners who share our interest. We will often need access to foreign bases, facilities and support for those military operations, and the groundwork for successful coalition action is formed, I should emphasize, over the long term, in great part by programs that are funded through the International Affairs account.
One program I would like to focus on, Mr. Chairman, this morning, is the International Military Education Training Program, the so-called IMET program. It trains foreign military officers and U.S. military doctrine and values. The IMET program promotes military professionalism and important military-to-military relations. The enhanced IMET program addresses civil military affairs and relations, respect for human rights and management of defense resources.
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All of the things that I have talked to of the unified commands, to a person, they identify this as one of the most important programs that we can possibly support. It helps them in dealing with their military counterparts. It helps them to influence events in those countries. Moreover, given the support that IMET has contributed to the recent gains by democratic institutions and civilian control in many regions, I think we have to resist efforts to deny IMET participation to those who can most benefit from it. So, I would urge the Committee to support the fiscal 1998 request for the IMET programs.
When our forces are deployed in trouble spots, the programs that are funded by the International Affairs budget can help prevent mission creep and enable the military mission to come to a timely, successful conclusion.
By contrast, when they have a robust American military presence that is matched with a vacuum in civilian capability, there is pressure to draw the military into activities that should not be a part of their mission. Of course, I am pointing to a very good example of this dynamic, in the policing situation in Bosnia. SFOR is not a police force, and yet, in the absence of a local police who are willing and an international police force who are able to do the job, pressure will mount for SFOR to expand its mission. I think we have to resist that pressure, and the key to doing so is enhancing the size and the capability of the international police task force in Bosnia, especially in the Brcko area, which we are now in the process of trying to achieve.
On the topic of Bosnia, let me also emphasize the importance to the Department of Defense of prompt action on the supplemental request that is now pending before the House and the Senate. I know this is not of particular relevance to this committee, but it is of importance to all Members of Congress, because in the failure to act quickly on the supplemental will, in fact, start to degrade our readiness across the spectrum of our forces. So, I hope that you can support rapid action on the supplemental.
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Mr. Chairman, I will pass quickly over the programs that we need to fund. We are talking requesting $70 million in FMF grants for the Partnership for Peace countries. These are critically important, as we move forward, certainly, with NATO enlargement. The ability of these NATO countries to bear the primary responsibility to ensure they can fulfill these obligations will be aided by this request, so I have submitted that for the record. I would be happy to answer any questions pertaining to it.
There is just one other issue I would like to point to that is of importance to me, and that is to highlight the concerns that I have about our relationship with Turkey; a close ally and a geo-strategically critical location. I believe it is in our interest that we assist Turkey as we engage them on regional tensions, human rights and issues of concern.
Turkey endures substantial economic loss and political burdens to maintain the embargo on Iraq, and also the enforcement of this no-fly zone over Northern Iraq. I think most importantly, it is democratic, it is pro-Western, it is a pro-American bulwark in the juncture at several very unstable regions of the world. Yet, the EU's treatment of Turkey, and I would emphasize, our own deferral of several major arms transfers, fosters the perception in Turkey that the West no longer values Turkey's contribution to Western security and it is lending strength to those who would move Turkey in a different direction that is less favorable to our interests.
Security in the Aegean is not a zero sum game. Promoting stability there is a common interest. We need to work effectively with both Turkey and Greece, also another valuable ally in the NATO alliance. We have to work with both of them toward that end and our Security Assistance program supports that ability to do so.
So, in this regard, I think resolving the arms transfer issues can contribute significantly to our ability to promote stability in the region. I know you have many questions you would like to address to me, Mr. Chairman, and I want to make just one point in closing. Let me reiterate my support for the 150 budget request, which supports programs of very important significance to DOD, to our commanders and especially to our troops in the field. Thank you.
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We will try to move along on the questions and I appreciate your willingness to be concise.
Many of us have noted your clear determination to make certain that all U.S. forces are going to be withdrawn from Bosnia by no later than June 1998. We commend you for your leadership and we do everything we can to make certain your commitment is not going to be frustrated as that date approaches.
Is there anything we in Congress can do to help you and the rest of the Administration ward off the inevitable diplomatic pressures to extend our presence in Bosnia beyond June 1998? For example, would it be helpful for us to add a right-of-withdrawal date into law?
Mr. COHEN. Mr. Chairman, first of all, it is not my plan to leave Bosnia in June 1998. It is a NATO decision. NATO has made the recommendation and issued the mandate, as such, that the mission will end at the end of June, 1998. President Clinton has agreed with that mandate as part of the United States being part of NATO, and I have supported the President's decision on that.
My concern right now is that the military mission has been, in fact, successful. I just returned from Bosnia and all of you should be extraordinarily proud of the young men and women we have serving over there. They are doing an absolutely outstanding job. Their morale is high, they are well trained, they are well led. They are committed to their job and obviously they are eager to leave and come home when their deployment schedule will dictate.
But, they have also indicated that they are concerned about the mission not being extended. Our leadership is certainly concerned about that, and what is faltering, from my perspective, at least, has been a lack of commitment on the civilian side of things. While the military side of things has been successful, the other side of Dayton has not been successful. There has not been the kind of energy and energized commitment to fulfilling the requirements of Dayton, namely, to start having a police force, an effective police force on the ground that can assume the burdens of police work, as opposed to shifting that to the SFOR forces. There has not been the commitment of funds for the rebuilding of the infrastructure.
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So, what I think we have to do is to accelerate the pressure to move in the next 16 months. I have talked to virtually all of our NATO allies in my recent trip to Europe. They want to focus on the remaining 16 months, what can we do in order to put pressure—not pressure, but at least focus our energy upon building up the civilian side of the equation as far as Dayton? That is the greatest guarantee that we have.
Chairman GILMAN. We recognize that weakness and we continually raise that issue. We will be pleased to join with you in refocusing attention to the need to build up the infrastructures on the civilian side.
Are you saying to us that as far as you know, there will be no attempt to extend the time? Of course, a date certain had been fixed before and then there was an extension. As far as you know, there will be no attempt to extend that time?
Mr. COHEN. Based on the conversations I had with the German Defense Minister, the Italian Defense Minister, the permanent reps at NATO in Brussels, there is no sentiment for extending it. The statement is that we are in together, we are out together, let us see if we cannot focus our energies in the next 16 months to really do our level best to put those civilian institutions in place that will allow the parties to decide at that point whether they wish to continue along the path of peace or return to the agonies of war.
Chairman GILMAN. We welcome your comments in that direction. Mr. Secretary, no one in the Congress has been a stronger proponent than I in urging early enlargement of the NATO alliance to include a number of emerging central and eastern European democracies, and of course, we favored doing this in a way that will not necessarily antagonize Russia or create new security problems for us in Europe. Along with many of my colleagues, we are becoming increasingly concerned that the Administration may be giving away too much in attempts to mollify Russia.
The new NATO cannot be treated as second class citizens and Russia cannot be given a veto over NATO decisions. What assurances can you give us, Mr. Secretary, in the CFE Adaptation negotiations and the negotiations with the NATO Russian charter that the Administration is not going to give away the store?
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Mr. COHEN. Well, Mr. Chairman, I can speak only as Secretary of Defense, but I can tell you that I have been intimately involved in discussions with the entire national security apparatus. I am satisfied that we will try to achieve exactly what you suggested. We are committed to proceeding along the path of NATO enlargement. We are going to do that irrespective of whether or not there is a Russian NATO charter. But, we are also determined to proceed on a two-track policy, and that is, we are going to actively engage the Russians in hoping to strike a charter with the Russians, as far as NATO is concerned, under the leadership and negotiating leadership of Secretary General Selano.
I am satisfied that we are committed to the proposition that Secretary Albright has testified to. We will try to provide the Russians with a voice but not a veto. We will take into account the sensitivities that they obviously have with respect to the enlargement of NATO, but in no way can we compromise the integrity of NATO itself, that we cannot adopt a two-tier approach to NATO membership, no second class citizens. I am satisfied that we will not make compromises that will endanger our security interests.
So, as of this moment, I have been kept up to date in terms of the President's plans as he heads off and is now in Helsinki, that we have a very strong unified position on this.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I have several other questions, but I will withhold them until either another round or I have to submit them in writing.
Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will just ask a single question. Mr. Secretary, we are coming to crunch time on the Chemical Weapons Convention. I know most of the action there is in the Senate, but I would like you to comment on that convention, particularly from the standpoint of the Pentagon, the military establishment. Why is that convention in the American national interest and why is it in the interest of ordinary soldiers that we ratify that convention?
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Mr. COHEN. Well, Congressman Hamilton, I think if it can be said that war is a window into hell, then the use of chemical weapons in the conducting of war takes us well past the vestibule into the deep regions of the inferno. I think most civilized nations have long ago come to the conclusion that the use of chemical weapons is something that is so abhorrent that it needs to be banned.
I start with a proposition that President Reagan made the determination that the United States was going to eliminate all chemical weapons by the year 2004. So, whether or not we have the ratification of this treaty, we are getting out of the business of using chemical weapons, period.
I make the second point that whether or not we ratify the treaty, the treaty is going to go into effect without us. I believe I represent effectively and accurately the voices within the Department of Defense, civilian and military, that it is in our national security interest to have an opportunity to be a part of the membership who will be designing the protocols for inspection of those who have chemical weapons, of those countries who maintain them, those who have signed up to this particular treaty.
If we do not ratify, we will simply be excluded from participating in the drafting of the protocols. If we do not ratify it, we will have no inspectors to carry out the inspections of those countries who, in fact, may have chemical weapons. So, it seems to me it is in our overall interest, No. 1, we will not have any. No. 2, there will be countries that will. We will not have any role in designing the kind of inspection regimes that would produce greater security for the United States and for our civilians as well as our troops and we are precluded from conducting any of the inspections ourselves.
So, for all of those reasons, it seems to me that it is in the overall national security interest of the United States to ratify a treaty that was negotiated by President Bush, strongly endorsed by President Bush and his national security team, and one which we should follow through on.
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Mr. HAMILTON. What can you do about States that seek to move ahead aggressively with a chemical weapons program?
Mr. COHEN. There are some States who will not be signatories to this treaty. There are some States who will be signatories, but who may decide that they also want to cheat, and that is a very realistic possibility.
But, the counter argument to that is, if you set in place a tough inspection regime, you cannot prevent small amounts of cheating, but you can detect large-scale types of cheating. So, it seems to me that we are far better off from our security point of view than if we isolate those countries that are not signatories, that, in fact, we have prohibitions on the sale and transfer of precursor chemicals to those countries, to make it more difficult for them to develop. When they undertake large-scale programs, that we can detect them and bring the international community down on them, in the form of sanction activity or perhaps other types of activity.
So, the answer is, we have no verification regime under any of our committees that are 100 percent perfect. We will have countries who will not sign and we will have countries who will sign and still attempt to cheat, but I think that we can minimize the cheating and confine it to low levels, which present a much lesser threat to our troops in the field.
Mr. HAMILTON. Just to conclude, is it accurate that the military leadership of the country, which you represent, of course, is firmly behind this convention as being very much in the national interest of the United States?
Mr. COHEN. Absolutely. As a matter of fact, I think General Schwartzkopf also testified very forcefully before a Senate committee on this subject matter, and I think he reflects, although he is no longer part of the active military establishment, he does reflect the active view of our military.
Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton. I will be calling members in the order in which they arrived.
Mr. Campbell.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, congratulations. I am very happy you are where you are, and I am happy our country did not lose the benefit of your service with the end of your Senate term. Really pleased to see you there.
My question deals with Bosnia and with the War Powers Resolution, so let me put to you my heart and hopefully get some guidance from you. I think my first and strongest argument is, it is strongly advisable, before we put U.S. troops in the potential of casualties, for the President, the sole leader of the United States in foreign policy, to get the support of the Congress.
I remember, I was in the Congress then when President Bush came to the Congress and asked for our support for the use of military force in the Persian Gulf. I think it was an excellent and highly advisable step whether he had to or not.
Second, it is hard for me to read the War Powers Resolution and not believe that it applies as a legal point. So, the first one is, it is advisable, even if you did not have to. The second is that it really applies and here is why I say that, and then I am done and would be anxious to hear your response. It is triggered where the condition of hostilities are imminent. If you take the position that, well, you have to wait for a soldier to be shot by a soldier of another power, you have a very perverse incentive, because then you create the incentive for somebody who wants a vote in Congress to kill or shoot at an American soldier.
I think the whole concept is correct that where you think it is imminent, it is possible that you seek the support of Congress. So, the other argument that seems to me is that it is unconstitutional. If that is the position of the Administration, good argument. I know the constitutional arguments, both sides, but I would then appreciate the Administration saying it and we can take it to the third branch and have the issue resolved. Right now, we are in limbo. It has not been the Administration's official position that it is unconstitutional, but in response, I cannot believe the argument, and I am going to use a strong word, the sophistry of saying that hostilities are not imminent in the context of Bosnia. What is your view on this, Mr. Secretary?
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Mr. COHEN. I am going to give you more than a 3-minute answer on this one. First of all, I was a very strong supporter of the War Powers Act. I also recognize after my years in service that no President has agreed with that position. Every President that I have served with has disagreed with the War Powers Act itself, putting Congress in the position of once forces are deployed, to have you cut off funds, which Congress is reluctant to do.
It led a number of us, Senator Nunn, myself and others to say, there has to be a better way. We believe that the War Powers Act is constitutional. We believe the President should follow it. The President has challenged that power.
If it went to Court, there is no guarantee the Court would even take it up. The Court might decline jurisdiction on the basis this is stepping into the political thicket, and therefore, we will not decide it. It is a political issue for Congress and the White House to work out, and you can use your power of the purse and the President can try to use his powers of persuasion, but it is not for the Courts to resolve. That is one alternative that might be followed.
I was also very actively involved in that decision on the Persian Gulf and I remember talking with President Bush both privately and in a semi-public fashion, urging him to come to Congress to get consent before undertaking Desert Storm. There was some sentiment at that time that the President did not need to come to Congress because he had the support of the United Nations. I felt that that was not going to do, that would not be good enough.
So, whether President Bush or any other President believed that the War Powers Act was constitutional, aside from that, politically, it is absolutely imperative that you get Members of Congress on record as either in support of or in opposition to a major type of deployment of that kind. Because when the crisis comes and when the bullets start flying and the bodies start falling and the blood is flowing, then public opinion can shift very quickly. A President who is standing out there without the support of Congress is really naked unto our enemies at that point.
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So, for practical reasons, pragmatic reasons, I have always urged Presidents to bring Congress in on an advisory capacity, but more importantly than that, I believe one of the reasons that President Clinton asked me to serve in this capacity is to help build a better relationship between the executive branch and the Congress. I am firmly committed to bringing Members of Congress in in the beginning stages, the formulation of policy.
There are some who feel that the President is the sole architect of foreign policy. I do not share that view. He is the prime architect. He is not the sole architect, and Congress has, if not a co-equal responsibility, it has a very large measure of responsibility in the formulation of that policy. That means you have to be brought in early, and that is something that Secretary Albright also agrees with. The President of the United States agrees with that and we are in the process, I think, of trying to build this bipartisan approach to not only defense, but also foreign policy consensus. That is what we need for the future, something that we used to have. It has broken down at times in recent years. We need to build that back up so we have a unified policy, both in security and also diplomacy.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, might I submit an additional question in writing?
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Might I submit an additional question?
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.(see footnote 1)
Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Lantos.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Secretary, I am particularly delighted to welcome you as one of the last practitioners of the art of bipartisanship in this body. You bring to this job a remarkable combination of independence, integrity and intelligence, and I want you to know that those of us on this side look forward to working with you.
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I have only one question, but it is a rather complex one and I would like to ask you to react to all of its ramifications. The previous administration and in its early years, this administration, failed miserably in dealing with Yugoslavia. Publicly and privately, many of us advocated in the previous administration that the deterrent capability of NATO be brought into action long before hostilities erupted in Yugoslavia. I applauded the President when he finally decided to move in with NATO. Unfortunately, 150,000 people were dead by then, we had 1.5 million refugees and it will take generations to begin to rebuild the fabric of civility that permeated Yugoslavia only 6 or 7 years ago. Sarajevo was a place of the Olympics, not a place of a bloodbath.
Now, I am profoundly disturbed by the Administration's repeated statements that we are determined to leave in mid-1998. I am also disturbed by the almost mantra-like repetition of the statement that this is a NATO decision. NATO has not made very good decisions initially on Yugoslavia, and the fact that this is now a NATO posture does not make me any more comfortable.
It is conceivable, Mr. Secretary, that everything will work out all right and the troops can be withdrawn, but I believe it is more likely, particularly in the light of the most recent unravelling in Albania, that as many of us publicly predicted, there will be a likelihood of hostilities erupting, the bloodbath resuming, the mass rapes resuming, and everything that we have built so far in the region disintegrated.
I find it incomprehensible that a commitment to an arbitrary deadline should appear to be more important than preserving the peace. Very few people are aware of the fact that we have 490 soldiers in Macedonia. That was one of the best decisions we ever made in this region. It has kept the peace in Macedonia.
Now, some of us were meeting with some of your European counterparts in recent weeks, and of course, they are all saying, together in, together out. We came in together, we go out together. But privately, they are hoping and privately they are telling us that our administration should have a bit more flexible policy on this issue. I make a plea to you, and through you, to the President, to allow publicly for the possibility that withdrawal in mid-1998 could result in the unraveling of whatever stability has been built. You, yourself, have indicated, Mr. Secretary, that the military side of the operation has gone well, but the civilian side has not gone well.
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Well, if you remove the side that has operated well and you are left with the side that has been so vocally inadequate in achievements, we almost guarantee that the stability and this minimum of peace we have will unravel. It would seem to me that it would serve Secretary Albright and you and the President well if you would put in a qualifying phrase in your responses to the more isolationist-minded colleagues when they ask the question, are you sure you are going to withdraw in mid-1998? I would prefer to have you say yes, that is our intention. But, if circumstances change, we are subject to changing policy.
Secretary Christopher, Secretary Perry and General Shalik-ashvili sat where you sit now and I told them that I am ready to bet $1,000 that their 1-year time limit will not stand. I am prepared to make a similar bet with you. Mid-1998 will not find the stability in Bosnia that will allow NATO safely to withdraw. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Congressman Lantos. I enjoyed the first part of your comments more than the second part, but let me respond to the second part. I thank you very much for your generosity.
My concern is that whenever the United States expresses flexibility, that is translated into longevity. The fact of the matter is, there has been very little impetus on the civilian side of things, and that is because SFOR is doing quite a good job, and the longer we can keep SFOR there, the less incentive there is to have an international police force there, to have a local police force there.
So, the mission now, the pressure is on, what about war criminals. Why are we not apprehending war criminals? Well, that is not the mission of SFOR. There will be increased pressure to place that responsibility upon those troops, which will put them into greater danger. They are not policemen.
So, for me, when we say let us be a bit more flexible, that is a signal for the other countries, especially international organizations, to have less enthusiasm for what needs to be done. So, I think we do have to keep the pressure on. I think we do have to have a deadline. I, frankly, am dealing with a situation in which other members, other than yourself, would like to get out now, who would like to mandate an exit now, who would like to write it into law right now. I have not supported that.
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I have talked to Minister Portillo of the United Kingdom and other foreign Defense Ministers and they feel that if we concentrate our efforts in the next 16 months, we can put in place those institutions and organizations that will allow the peace process to be self-sustaining.
Absent a commitment to do that, the same dynamic will unfold that ''let us just leave the status quo'' and we will be there not a year from now, we will be there, as some predicted a year ago, 10 and 20 years from now, and that is not acceptable.
Mr. BEREUTER [Presiding]. Thank you, Secretary Cohen. The chair will recognize himself at this point, not exercising prerogative of the chair, but because I was here and had to leave.
Secretary Cohen, welcome. We are pleased to see you in your current role as Secretary of Defense and I have three items I would like to quickly cover and see if you would respond. First, the North Atlantic Assembly Delegation will shortly visit Slovenia and Macedonia. Your attitudes about the readiness of Slovenia, to be considered among the first countries to be taken into NATO in light of adding them to the Visa Grad 3, are the kind of questions we should be asking of Slovenia.
The second item concerns your attitudes on the importance of our forces located in Macedonia.
The third item is how much I appreciate your strong statement of support for IMET, and I think it is important to our national interest to authorize the full amount that the President is requesting for IMET, which I helped authorize last year to get to the full amount.
But, I would raise your attention to one thing that troubles me, and that is, a bill has just been introduced by Congressman Kennedy of Rhode Island, which would place very severe conditions on IMET regarding Indonesia that their government certainly cannot meet, and would not meet.
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But IMET is the only real source of stability and unity in Indonesia. But, we also have our concerns over East Timor, which undoubtedly prompts Congressman Kennedy's attitudes toward IMET. But, I would like to have your view about the importance of IMET and specifically, the continuation of IMET for Indonesia.
Mr. COHEN. Well, let me take the first issue on Slovenia. Obviously, the NATO enlargement process in the first round, it has been clear on the part of the Administration that this is just the beginning of a process. We are going to pursue NATO enlargement, that those who come in the first round will not be the last to gain entry.
I believe Slovenia should be among the candidates to be given serious consideration. I think they have made a number of reforms. I think we have seen the civilian domination of the military. I think they will be in a position to certainly measure up to the NATO requirements as far as being full-fledged members, but that is a decision that obviously other members of the NATO organization might disagree with in terms of their readiness.
My personal judgment is, I think that they should be among the candidates for early admission.
Macedonia, I think things are going quite well there. Congressman Lantos mentioned the roughly 500 troops that we have there. I think that they have performed a very valuable service and they have been an important deterrent presence in that region.
On IMET in Indonesia, I think that we have to realize that Indonesia has a population of roughly 200 million people. They are almost as large as the United States. Indonesia sits at a very strategic location, as far as the sea lines of communication between Japan and the Persian Gulf. This is a country that is growing rapidly. It is a country that will have enormous influence throughout ASEAN. It is a country we should be deeply engaged with, and we should proceed with IMET, with Indonesia. The best way that we have of having influence with countries is having contact with them.
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I just finished a meeting this morning with the Defense Minister of Malaysia. It is a particular concern of mine, it was a very narrow parochial interest of mine, because Malaysia happened to be Maine's second overseas trading partner. So, 4 or 5 years ago, I started traveling to Malaysia, and I found a dynamic country, a small country of about 18 million people. They have a growth rate of about 8.5 percent a year. The same is taking place throughout all of that region.
If we are going to have influence in a very critical region of the world that has enormous growth potential and enormous consequences for us in terms of maintaining stability, sharing in their prosperity and the regional security of that entire area, we have to be engaged. IMET is one of the most important ways that we can maintain those types of contacts. So, I would urge the members to support IMET for Indonesia.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Next, Mr. Hastings, the gentleman from Florida, is recognized.
Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Secretary, I will join in welcoming you, as did my colleagues. I would also like to associate myself with the remarks of my colleague, Mr. Lantos. Generally, I am in full agreement with him. I find myself in that same position again.
Also, Mr. Secretary, it is the only opportunity I get to talk to Administration hierarchy sometimes when we are in these hearings, and I make calls to them as I am going to make to you with reference to their travel. When you travel, please ask your staff to consider visiting the countries of India and Pakistan. I do consider them crucial and critical in terms of both strategy and particularly with nuclear proliferation being of paramount interest. Sometimes I feel that as large as that problem looms in the world, it does not seem to get enough policy attention. I beg you to give consideration to that.
Time will not permit me to ask you about the troop level in East Asia and whether or not the Administration has any plans for forced reduction or how much that costs. If you would be so good as to ask a staffer to assist me in better understanding that, I would appreciate it.
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I also will not get to ask you about Liberia and Sierra Leone and all the imminent problems ongoing in Zaire. I do not hesitate to say this, Mr. Secretary. I have followed African policy and the attitude of the French with reference thereto, and I do not find myself aligned with them very often at all. I just want you to know when you are looking for members at some point and you are talking French policy in Africa, do not count on me.
You know, other people are more diplomatic. I am not a diplomat, I am a politician. So, the question that I will put to you has to do with Albania and the fact that all of us know, that it is an anarchistic State, certainly verging on anarchy. I would like to know, Mr. Secretary, what effect you think a destabilized Albania will have in the Balkans and what, if any, kind of weapon systems they have and where did they get them? I see this as yet another of the potential flashpoints. I will stop there, and that will be my only question, Mr. Chairman, specifically oriented toward Albania. If you would have staff help me with my other matters, I would appreciate it.
Mr. COHEN. Thank you very much, Congressman. I am glad you asked all those other questions because they are very important, especially on the India-Pakistan issue, and we do have a bilateral working group that works with both India and Pakistan with frequent exchanges.
With respect to Albania, I think that the potential for the instability to spread is of great concern to those surrounding countries. That is the reason why Italy, for example, has become very engaged in trying to help negotiate some kind of a peaceful resolution to the conflict in that country, which is basically a rebellion taking place in that country by the citizens who are greatly disenchanted with their government. It is the reason why the EU now is also actively engaged diplomatically to try to bring a peaceful resolution about. The principal concern, of course, would be the outflow of immigrants at this point or refugees, trying to escape from the country and overrunning the immigration control that the surrounding countries might have. So, that is of great concern to the neighboring countries.
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Right now, there appears to be some level of calm in the country itself. We have conducted what we call a NEO, a non-combatant evacuation operation very successfully, as far as the American citizens are concerned. About 800 people have been pulled out. About half of them have been Americans, just about 400. So, that has gone very well.
But the diplomatic side of things is underway as far as the European community and also Italy is very much involved at this point. So, things appear to be somewhat more calm than they were just a few days ago, and people are going to have to come to that point of resolution, because food shortages will become a critical problem within a very short period of time. So, efforts will have to be undertaken to get food to the people to make sure that this does not spiral completely out of control and that is underway right now.
Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. The gentleman from New York, Mr. King, is recognized.
Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Mr. Secretary. Secretary, I would just like to follow up on the Bosnia questions. If you could give us your best estimate as to what the extent of the Iranian presence is today and to what extent that poses a threat to the American forces?
Mr. COHEN. I would say the threat, the presence of the Iranians has been greatly diminished. We made it very clear to the parties there that any continuation of Iranian activity, either militarily in supplying weapons or from a participation in their intelligence activities, would preclude aid for them from the U.S.A, as a result of that mandate to them. Most or all of the revolutionary guards have departed. There is no intelligence apparatus that has been established between the Iranians and the parties, and we think that the flow of Iranian weaponry into the region has been discontinued.
So, from our perspective, we have a very small, if any, threat to our troops from the Iranians. It is not to say that there is not Iranian potential for terrorist acts, but as far as participation in the organized activities of the parties, the Iranians no longer have that presence. But, as always, there is a potential for acts of terrorism. We do not anticipate that, but we are always taking precautionary measures against it.
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Mr. KING. One further question on Taiwan, Mr. Secretary. What is the current status and timeframe for the sale of the F–16 to Taiwan?
Mr. COHEN. That sale is proceeding and the initial delivery should take place within a couple of weeks.
Mr. KING. Thank you.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much. Mrs. Danner is not here, so Mr. Sherman, the gentleman from California, is recognized.
Mr. SHERMAN. I would like to defer to Mr. Rothman and then take his turn.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Rothman.
Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, it is a pleasure to meet you and to be able to ask you some important questions. I very much look forward to working with you. I am one of the freshmen here.
I am very concerned about recent reports in Defense News and other media regarding Russia's transfer of some very, very serious military technology to Iran. The introduction of this kind of technology to Iran concerns me deeply, and it is clearly a national security priority for me. I want to know, No. 1, what the Pentagon is doing to halt this transfer, and No. 2, will President Clinton be raising this matter with Mr. Yeltsin.
Mr. COHEN. This issue is of great concern to the Department of Defense. We have raised the question of sale of weaponry to Iran on a continuous basis. When Mr. Chernomyrdin was here meeting with Vice President Gore during the course of 2 days, this issue was raised at level by the Vice President. So, on each and every occasion, we have brought this to the attention, that this type of activity, selling any caliber of sophisticated weaponry to Iran, poses a grave threat to the security interests of the United States and the Gulf region.
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We have raised this. We will continue to raise it, and we have had some receptivity to these questions that we have raised. Whether or not it is an organized activity on the part of the government or whether there are elements outside of the government who have access to this technology who are transferring it, we follow it on a very close basis. I can assure you that it is raised on a perpetual basis.
Mr. ROTHMAN. If I may just follow up, this is of such deep concern to our national security that I would certainly recommend and support whatever unilateral measures we would need to take as a nation militarily and otherwise, to make sure that this transfer is not completed.
Mr. COHEN. Thank you.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Fox.
Mr. FOX. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, congratulations on your appointment. We are very proud to work with you in this Congress, looking forward to your bipartisan leadership.
I wanted to ask you a question with regard to NATO and its enlargement, if I could. Specifically, which countries do you believe will be the first to join NATO? Should the Baltic countries be eligible and what role will Russia have in determining new NATO membership?
Mr. COHEN. Well, as I indicated earlier, the decision as to who gets in the first round will be decided at the summit in Madrid in July. Obviously, there are countries that have been named in terms of the potential candidates. I think everyone is aware of the names that have surfaced as the prime candidates. There may be others. The Europeans might have additional candidates, some of the smaller countries. Others may object, saying let us just keep it to three, not four or five. So, that has to be worked out at the Madrid Summit, as such. But, by July, we will know who the candidate is going to be.
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Obviously, those countries who can carry out the requirements of NATO membership, and what I indicated before is that we cannot have any second-class citizens, as such. No second tier. Each country who is admitted will have to be able to carry out their Article 5 commitment. So that is underway right now with each country who is seeking admission to NATO, undertaking that kind of preparation.
With respect to Russia, Russia will have no veto. This is going to be an evolutionary process. It will not end with the first entry of those countries in July, those who are recommended for admission. It obviously has to come before the Congress for ratification, but Russia will have no veto over the membership.
Mr. FOX. Switching, if we could, to Israel, to what extent would the proposed F–16 sale to Saudi Arabia impact Israel's ability to maintain a qualitative military edge in the region?
Mr. COHEN. Well, first of all, the Saudis have not indicated they are going to pursue an acquisition of F–16's. I met with Prince Sultan on his recent visit here. It was not raised to me. There was no indication that was going forward. They have, in fact, requested technical data from the manufacturers of the F–16, but there has been no formal request, so I think any consideration would be premature.
But, second, I would indicate to you, I also met with Prime Minister Netanyahu recently and assured him, and I will be meeting with the Defense Minister Mordecai in a couple of weeks, that we intend to make sure that Israel's qualitative superiority or edge is not eroded.
Mr. FOX. The United States has traditionally viewed its bilateral strategic alliance with Israel as another avenue for supporting Jerusalem's defense needs, as well as bolstering their own regional security requirements. How do you see the U.S.-Israel strategic relationship growing during the next 4 years?
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Mr. COHEN. Well, I think we have a very strong and unshakable relationship with Israel, and that is the reason why the Prime Minister was here. He had a very good meeting. He walked away, I think, from his meetings with the President, with myself and others very enthusiastic and optimistic that that bond that has been established over the years remains solid.
Mr. FOX. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Chairman GILMAN [Presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Sherman.
Mr. SHERMAN. I would like to associate myself with my colleagues that have praised your service in the Congress and welcomed your role as Secretary of Defense.
Israel has survived because of its qualitative advantage, but recently, U.S. technologies have begun to enter Arab arsenals, often before Israel can obtain or develop countermeasures. I am specifically interested in the recent decision to transfer 100 new F–16 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia. What steps can we take to make sure that this does not damage Israel's qualitative edge and can we utilize such non-FMF mechanisms such as drawdown and prepo-sitioning that have been effective in the past in ensuring Israel's security?
Mr. COHEN. Well, first, there has been no sale of 100 F–16's so that is something that has been speculated about, but it is not a formal request. So, to my knowledge, no steps have been taken that would formalize that at this point.
Should it occur in the future, then obviously, we will want to examine that as to whether or not it would put Israel at a disadvantage. That is something that we are very much concerned about, and as I indicated just a moment ago, Defense Minister Mordecai is going to be coming to Washington to meet with me, and we are going to discuss those kinds of systems that would enable Israel to maintain its qualitative superiority or edge well into the future.
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So we have ongoing negotiations with the Israelis. We are very concerned about that. We want to promote regional stability. The Saudis have been very important in terms of their contribution to maintaining that stability in the region as far as Iraq is concerned and the threat that it might pose to Kuwait, as well as the threat that is posed by Iran well into the future. So, we want to make sure that we have a reasonably secure region as such, reasonably stable security apparatus in that region. The Saudis contribute to it, the Kuwaitis are contributing to it, Jordan is contributing to it, Egypt is contributing to it, and, of course, Israel is also contributing to it. So, we are trying to maintain the balance, but we assured Israel that that qualitative edge will remain.
Mr. SHERMAN. You bring up Egypt, and Egypt recently had military exercises called BADAR 96 that included a rehearsal for crossing the Suez Canal and proceeding with operations against Israel. I wonder if this brings into question the types of military aid that we provide to Egypt and whether the Defense Department or State Department has voiced concerns to Cairo about rehearsing for crossing the Sinai, rather than rehearsing to deploy forces in the Persian Gulf?
Mr. COHEN. I think any time there is a kind of rehearsal that would give any indication that planning was made to provide an attack upon Israel, would be of concern to us. I would reiterate that I think that the Egyptians have been very important in the peace process. I entertained President Mubarak when he was here. We discussed the nature of the relationship between Egypt and Israel. Egypt is going to be critical to the peace process, to its continuation, and we think that that is still a very solid relationship.
Mr. SHERMAN. Are your comments here today, though, or have we in the past voiced concern to Egypt about the nature of the exercises they conducted?
Mr. COHEN. I am not aware that we specifically voiced concern on this issue. We continued to express our interest and seeing to it that Egypt does, in fact, cooperate with Israel, that we have seen, for example, the Defense Minister Mordecai pay a visit to Cairo. We want to continue those types of military-to-military contacts.
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I think that President Mubarak understands fully the nature of the relationship that Israel enjoys with the United States, and our interest has seen to it that no untoward action is taken toward Israel that they would find provocative or, in any way, aggressive.
Mr. SHERMAN. There has been virtually no discussion of the economic costs and budgetary costs of NATO expansion to the United States. I wonder whether it is important for us to identify those costs as the first step in making sure that well-to-do European countries bear 100 percent of those costs?
Mr. COHEN. Well, there has been the beginning of discussion of that. I filed a report just a week or 10 days ago where the Congress outlined the nature of the costs that are required.
With respect to the United States, the costs, I think, are quite affordable and will range between $150 to $200 million per year over a 13-year period of time, and that each year, our total cost will be somewhere between $1.5 and $2 billion over a 13-year period. We think that that is quite affordable, given the fact that we are going to see an expansion or enlargement of NATO. Much of the expense will be borne by the individual countries who have to make the infrastructure improvements in order to qualify for membership, and also, we have our European allies who also have to make major contributions to that. So, we think that the total cost will range between $25 and $37 billion for the entire cost of the enlargement, and our costs are in the range as I indicated before of about $150 to $200 million per year.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Houghton.
Mr. HOUGHTON. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, good to see you. The country is very fortunate to have you in your position now.
I have two questions, one specific, one sort of generic. The specific one has to do with the U.S. Army School for the Americas in Georgia. You know all the criticism about the human rights abuse and the confusion with the Kennedy bill. Maybe you would like to make a comment on that.
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Second, and this is sort of a soft ball, aside from funding, what do you think is the biggest worry you have in working with Congress this year?
Mr. COHEN. How much time do I have?
[Laughter.]
Mr. HOUGHTON. I can see the red light is already on.
Mr. COHEN. With respect to the School of the Americas, I think everyone is aware of the problem that occurred back in the 1960's with the development of the handbook that obviously contained information that was offensive by our standards today, certainly, and that that information was translated into Spanish and was used in the School of the Americas.
When it was discovered that that kind of information was present, Secretary Cheney called for its total elimination. Apparently, there was one handbook or manual that was not eliminated, but Deputy Secretary White called for the Inspector General and DOD to conduct a thorough investigation into this matter. We think that there will be no further such instructions going out to the School of the Americas.
That school is important. It is important for us to deal with our Latin American friends. We have seen a remarkable transformation in Latin America going from authoritarian regimes to now very pro-democratic countries. So, to the extent that we can, we would like to continue this School for the Americas and expose Latin American students as such in the military to our doctrine and to our training, to our values, that can only benefit the United States.
With respect to what is my biggest problem in working with Congress, I frankly do not see major problems in dealing with Congress. The big problem is going to come with something called QDR, the Quadrennial Defense Review. That is going to present, I think, the most controversy for certainly me, the Defense Department, or the country. We have to examine exactly who we expect to be in the future. I mean, do we want to remain a superpower? What are the costs of remaining a superpower? What does it mean, what are the benefits? How do we achieve that?
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As we look at a constrained budget environment, my expectation is that we are likely to see constant funding. If we can count on that, roughly where we are today, not much more, hopefully not less, but in the absence of a major conflict, I do not expect to see large increases in the Defense budget.
Well, if that is a reality, what does it mean as we look into the future? What is the nature of the threats we are likely to face? How do we develop a strategy to combat those threats? What are the requirements for force structure, equipment, end strength, and modernization, etc.? What do we need for weaponry to contend with that?
I just returned; I was out at Ft. Irwin in California, looking at the National Training Center, and it is exciting what we are doing out there in terms of examining the ways in which we will manage warfare in the future, should we have to, as far as the digitized battlefield. We are going to have to depend upon more and more sophisticated weaponry. We will probably have smaller forces with greater lethality. We are going to have to have more capability in the future, because technology is spreading. We are not the only ones who have a monopoly on technology, so we are going to have to stay ahead of those who would try to pose a threat to us in very, what I would call, asymmetrical ways. Very few are going to want to take us head on. They will develop asymmetrical strategies to defeat our superiority. They will look for our Achilles heel.
So, the biggest job that I have is to try to articulate a strategy that will be the right strategy for the future, matching the resources up with the strategy, and that is going to involve a lot of pain. That means that people are going to have to give things up, and it is across the board. Everything is on the table. So, once I present that, I guess I will then don a flak jacket and body armor and then be prepared for the criticism.
But, that is what has to be done, and I am sure that if we have an intelligent and open-ended, two-way dialog on what needs to be done, we will come up with the right conclusion, ultimately. This report will just be the beginning of a process. I will submit a report by May 15. It will not be an end product. It will be the beginning of the product, saying, OK, this is what we think the right strategy is. Here is the right force structure, here is the right equipment, here is how we think the force structure should be sized, and this is the ''infrastructure recommendations,'' i.e. Brack proceedings again. If we have too much infrastructure compared to our force structure, it means inefficiencies, it means costly maintenance of facilities we no longer need. I know how painful that is.
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So, all of that will be on the table for examination, deliberation and hopefully, resolution, and that will be the biggest problem. I think ultimately, it is not a problem with the Congress. Ultimately, it is, how do we maintain a strong, bipartisan consensus for the need for a strong national defense, when there is no identifiable enemy? That is going to be the biggest job that all of us have.
Mr. HOUGHTON. Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Houghton.
Mr. Capps.
Mr. CAPPS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I noted that in your testimony today, you used a phrase, war is a window into hell, chemical weapons take us into the inferno. I am just very, very pleased that your literary abilities have transferred.
Mr. COHEN. I was extemporizing. I am sorry, I got carried away.
Mr. CAPPS. Oh, no, I like that, I like that. I am also gratified, actually, thrilled, that that talent is compatible with your new responsibilities.
I am a freshman here and I sort of come at the end of the line and I get to ask a question that I think might allow you to provide some summary. We are in a very new situation here in the world today. It is arguable that the cold war is over. There is not an iron curtain. We do not have major wars between major countries. We do have a variety of civil wars around the world.
In your testimony, you made, I thought, a distinction between the capacity the United States has to provide foreign aid first, security assistance second, and then third, military power. But, it is also clear that we cannot assist everyone, we cannot ensure everybody's security. There are times, but not every time, when military power is called for.
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Now, the question. Is the differentiation there determined on the case-by-case basis, or are there principles that guide our policy? I would be very grateful if you could state what one of the primary principles is. I ask this in light of the question that I asked the Secretary of State when she was here. I just asked her, what period are we in right now? People are talking about the post-cold war world, but when we define something in terms of what is post, you still have not defined quite where we are presently, and I am looking for the kind of language to use, even to talk to my own constituents about why our foreign dimension here in our overall policy is a very critical one to the United States. Thank you.
Mr. COHEN. Thank you very much for your question. Let me indicate to you that 25 years ago, I sat almost precisely in that chair, in a different room, but that was my position, so it brings back some memories of a young freshman coming in and asking those kinds of questions.
But, you asked me a question which is going to require me a little bit of time to answer, because it is not an easy one. If you were to ask me about what age in which we are living, my tendency would be to fall back on Alvin Toffler, who wrote a book more than 25 years ago called ''Future Shock.'' I think that we are seeing that Toffler's vision of what the future would look like as it unfolded, that we are seeing time speeded up by events. We are seeing customs and traditions and alliances shaken in the sort of hurricane winds of change.
So, we are in a period now of greater instability. When the Berlin Wall came down and the cold war ended, we had a number of academics start to analyze exactly where we were going. You had Francis Fukiyama, for example, who wrote a thesis called ''The End of History,'' which produced quite a reaction in terms of others who looked at that. They thought that Fukiyama oversimplified it, but with the fall of the Berlin Wall, we begin to see the sweep of economic capitalism just across the globe. Critics said, now wait a minute. You have not taken into account Islam, which might pose a problem there. You have not taken into account what the reaction might be in China, or, indeed, other countries.
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So, that was taken on or followed, I should say, almost immediately by Samuel Huntington's ''Clash of Civilizations,'' a piece that he wrote for Foreign Affairs Magazine, which has now been expanded into a book called ''Clash of Cultures,'' and it is something worth reading. That, too, is a matter of dispute.
If you turn to some of the Muslim countries in Southeast Asia, they would say you failed to distinguish between radical extreme fundamentalism and fundamental Muslims, and there is a distinction.
So, we have to be careful when we are talking about what kind of an age in which we are defining. I look at it as a period of great opportunity, but also one that is fraught with great danger, because we no longer have this cold war mentality and the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. You nonetheless have seen the breakup of many countries with ethnic tensions, and these human agonies that we have seen surface present great potential for turmoil, for disintegration of States and for the spread of that conflict well beyond national boundaries.
So, it is a period of great opportunity, as we are seeing more and more countries eager to embrace our ideals. We are seeing countries rush to come into NATO, can we come in? We are seeing Latin America change dramatically as far as their economic, social, and political systems are concerned. So, it is a great opportunity, because you are seeing countries, rogue nations who are acquiring weapons of mass destruction, chemicals, biologicals, some seeking to get nuclear weaponry. We are seeing the kind of disintegration, in some respects, of the control over nuclear weapons in certain parts of the former Soviet Union, as far as rogue elements, getting their hands on some of the nuclear materials.
So, I think that what we have to have is a very strong military capability that has the capability of fighting wars across the full spectrum, but more importantly, deterring them; what we call shaping the environment, what Secretary Albright has also testified to.
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Our military power as such is the muscle behind our will power. We need to have the diplomats out front, helping to shape the environment. Our military presence helps to shape that environment, and for those people who want to return to the Continental United States, I think they make a mistake. A presence that we maintain back here is not as effective as when we are out, forward deployed, and helping to shape the environments so the crisis never really arises to the level that requires a military response.
So, it is a long way of answering your very important question, but I would say it is a period of great instability, and one in which we are seeking to stabilize. What President Bush was talking about, a new world order, some would say is a new world of disorder. We are trying to introduce order through these regional security arrangements and that is why when we talk about Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, why we are trying to build these kinds of relationships. When we talk about Asean, we want to build a relationship with Asean. Why Imid is important, etc. I do not want to give you this editorial answer, since I am no longer in the business of giving filibuster-type answers, but it requires a very long and I would hope, thoughtful response to an important question.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. I might note we are on a roll call. The Secretary is going to have to leave shortly. I am going to ask our members to restrict themselves to one question each.
Mr. Andrews.
Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would also like to congratulate you, Mr. Secretary, and welcome you to the Committee. I am going to submit to you in writing a question pertaining to continuing problems with dispute resolution between some employers in our country and Saudi Arabia, which I would like you to answer.(see footnote 2)
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I want to ask you another question this morning. One of my most optimistic hopes is that our relationship with the People's Republic of China will unfold in a mutually beneficial way, that China will become a valuable trading partner, that China will evolve toward human rights and democracy, that we will have a rich, diverse and mutually beneficial relationship with that huge country.
In the interests of preparation, however, we have to assume the other set of possibilities, as well. I wonder what you might suggest a successor of yours 15 or 20 years might be looking at, if the other eventuality occurred? If China evolved in a bellicose, hostile fashion, if China began to define its international interest very differently from ours, and we found ourselves 15 or 20 years from now once again in a superpower confrontation, though this time with a different superpower?
Would that pessimistic assumption, and again, let me say for the record, it is my profound wish it does not occur, but with that pessimistic assumption in mind, what steps should the Department of Defense be taking in the near term to prepare for that, and what specific planning mechanisms exist today to think about the answer to that question?
Mr. COHEN. Well, Congressman, first of all, I guess I would fall back on the expression, whom the gods would destroy, they first make prophetic and it requires some of us to be prophetic in terms of looking into the future. But, your question is a good one, and what can we do to prepare for the worst unfolding scenario?
First of all, what we do is, we build regional alliances. One way in which you make it less likely that China would emerge as a bellicose, hostile type of power is such as to build relationships with other countries that share our ideals, our interests and our military capabilities, so that we are not alone, face to face with the United States versus China in another cold war.
Second, you try and engage China, as we are doing now, on a military-to-military basis and a diplomatic basis, as well, so that we encourage China to emerge as a regional power into the community, the international community of nations in a more satisfactory, salutary fashion. That it will have, obviously, interests that are different from ours. We will have both good times and bad times with the Chinese, but that we resolve those differences in a peaceful way.
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So, the things that we are doing now by establishing military-to-military contacts, having their military Defense Ministers visit me and my visits there, having Secretary Albright go to China, having President Clinton visit with Chinese leaders, building the diplomatic relations along with maintaining an adequate, a very strong, robust, military capability and promoting alliances in that region as well as other regions. All of that would help mitigate any possibility or potential for the Chinese to emerge as a bellicose, hostile power that would be directing its enmity against the United States.
Mr. ANDREWS. Is there——
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, just so the others could question.
Mr. ANDREWS. I understand.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Hilliard, if you would be brief, so Mr. Clement would have an opportunity to question.
Mr. HILLIARD. Thank you very much. I will be brief. Let me just make a statement first. Out of your budget, it is so difficult for me to understand, and I realize that all you guys are smart and you have all kinds of capital leaders, it is so difficult for me to understand how you do not have any money left over at the end of the year to return back to the Treasury, and you do not have a shortfall. Let me ask, tell me do you appropriate money for things to be done in the future that is not done in the fiscal year, that is not spent in the fiscal year?
Mr. COHEN. Yes, there are funds that are appropriated for programs which may not be spent out during the course of a year which are carried over into future years, and those funds are then used in combination with future year appropriations to carry forth the programs.
Mr. HILLIARD. So, there is never a savings? Nothing is ever left over?
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Mr. COHEN. If you are talking about the International Assistance budget, I would tell you, you need more money, not less. You want to spend more money in this field and not see how you can save money. You should be encouraged to try to find more funds to try to carry out diplomacy, rather than fewer ones.
I think if we make savings in diplomacy, it will cost us in other programs, as far as Department of Defense programs and others.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Clement.
Mr. CLEMENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, congratulations on your new position. We are pleased that you are there.
I was just going to ask you, with all the regional and ethnic conflicts in the world and when we are putting that much more emphasis on technological warfare, what technological capabilities are we going to have for the future?
Mr. COHEN. Let me respond very quickly to that. It is a point that was raised earlier in terms of Secretary Perry, whom I believe is one of the finest public servants that we have ever had in our country.
Secretary Perry put at the top of his list of priorities people as being No. 1, that we have to continue to recruit and then retain the best possible young men and women that we can in our military. We can develop all of this exotic weaponry that I am looking at, and it will not matter if we do not have the competence and the capability of the young people and not even those so young; people who have served 20, 30 years in the military, to be able to operate that equipment effectively. So, we put the top priority on the people, their recruitment and retention and also quality of life. Then we look at the weapon systems, in that order.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, we want to thank you for your appearance today. We will be submitting some questions for the record and we ask for your consideration to return them promptly, and we thank you again for being here.(see footnote 3)
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Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. The Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
(Footnote 1 return)
The answer was provided to the Committee in classified form.
(Footnote 2 return)
The answer was provided to the Committee in classified form.
(Footnote 3 return)
The answers were provided to the Committee in classified form.