Page 1       TOP OF DOC
44–149 CC








JULY 16, 1997

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
 Page 2       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
JAY KIM, California
TOM CAMPBELL, California
JON FOX, Pennsylvania
 Page 3       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
ROY BLUNT, Missouri
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
PAT DANNER, Missouri
WALTER CAPPS, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California
BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee
 Page 4       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
JIM DAVIS, Florida
RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff
MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Democratic Chief of Staff

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska, Chairman
JAY KIM, California
JON FOX, Pennsylvania
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
WALTER H. CAPPS, California
MIKE ENNIS, Subcommittee Staff Director
 Page 5       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
RICHARD KESSLER, Democratic Professional Staff Member
DAN MARTZ, Counsel
HEIDI L. HENNIG, Staff Associate


    The Honorable Aurelia Brazeal, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State

    Dr. Marvin Ott, Professor of National Security Policy, National Defense University

Prepared statements:
Hon. Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress from California
Hon. Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress from American Samoa
Hon. James Leach, a Representative in Congress from Iowa
Hon. Aurelia Brazeal
Mr. Ronald Abney
Dr. Marvin Ott
Mr. Sichan Siv
Additional material submitted for the record:
Statement from the Human Rights Watch
 Page 6       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC

House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.

    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Bereuter (chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
    Mr. BEREUTER. The Subcommittee will come to order. Those of you who are able to get into the room, please quietly take a seat as soon as possible. I regret that we do not have the opportunity for a larger hearing room today because I know the importance of this session.
    The Subcommittee has just completed a closed briefing with the Intelligence Committee on the subject of Cambodia and occurrences there. I appreciate the interest and attendance of Members of the Subcommittee at that briefing.
    The Subcommittee today meets in open session to assess the current crisis in Cambodia and to consider what steps the United States and other nations might take next to address this situation.
    Any person who has followed even the headlines understands Cambodia is once again in the midst of a violent political convulsion. The title of this hearing is ''Familiar Ground: The Breakdown of Democracy in Cambodia and Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy.'' It is, unfortunately, altogether too-familiar ground for the Cambodian people. The 4-year-old experiment with democracy is in dire straits, and a tyrant has seized power through the force of arms, intimidation, terror and summary executions. Hun Sen is apparently becoming very comfortable as a sole ruler of long-suffering Cambodia. I believe that it ought to be the intention of the Subcommittee and this House to exert pressure to make sure that Hun Sen is decidedly uncomfortable. I hope the Administration will also be aggressive in pursuing this objective.
 Page 7       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Few people have experienced as much pain, suffering and terror as the people of Cambodia over the last 30 years. A casualty of war in Indochina, Cambodia then was bled white under the nearly genocidal regime of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge, who put well over one million fellow Cambodians—perhaps one-quarter of the entire population—to death. That horror was replaced by a Communist repression controlled from Hanoi and fronted by the leader of the current coup d'etat, Hun Sen, a former member of the Khmer Rouge himself.
    After Vietnam withdrew its troops from Cambodia in 1989, protracted and difficult negotiations led to the Paris peace accords of 1991, a blueprint for disarming the warring parties in Cambodia and the establishment of what was hoped to be the country's first representative democracy. After 2 years and a more than $2 billion U.N. peacekeeping and pacification effort, Cambodia held its first democratic election in which nearly 90 percent of the populace exercise their right to choose their own leaders for the first time. The Cambodian people roundly rejected Hun Sen and the formerly Communist Cambodia People's Party, electing instead Prince Ranariddh and the United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia. That is the title of it. We call it FUNCINPEC.
    However, Hun Sen, unaccustomed to abiding by the true wishes of the people, threatened renewed civil war if he and his cronies were not given an unearned equal share in the new government. In the interest of peace, and under international pressure, Prince Ranariddh formed a coalition government wherein he became the first Prime Minister, and Hun Sen the second Prime Minister.
    Despite all this conflict, there were initial signs that Cambodia was beginning to climb out of the pit. Cambodia's economy had demonstrated signs of progress. Overall rates of growth had increased, agricultural production had grown, and there were even signs of foreign investment. The Khmer Rouge, which refused to participate in the elections but were unable to stop them, turned on itself and seemed a largely spent force by the beginning of this year. Recently, it even seemed for a time that Pol Pot himself, now apparently a prisoner by his own dwindling followers, might be brought to justice.
 Page 8       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    However, Cambodia has remained a polity rife with corruption, where the rule of law was, at best, inconsistently applied, and only when convenient to one or the other faction. There is clear evidence that both Prince Ranariddh and the former Communist Hun Sen engaged in political gamesmanship and intimidation of political dissent and free speech, toleration—if not encouragement—of continuing human rights abuses, corruption at all levels, and collusion with Khmer Rouge war criminals. As one anonymous U.S. official was quoted, referring to both leaders, ''There are no angels in Cambodia.'' Many who showed the promise in establishing effective, corruption-free government, particularly Sam Rainsy, were chased out of the government, intimidated, subjected to deadly attack, and in one case, forced into exile.
    In House Resolution 345 introduced by this Member and passed by the House on March 26, 1996, last year, the House of Representatives recorded its concern that, given these developments, and despite more than $3 billion in assistance in peacekeeping and national reconstruction, Cambodia was, ''sliding back in the pattern of violence and repression''. This was, unfortunately, an accurate prediction in our resolution, which the House passed.
    It was clear earlier this year that the situation in Cambodia had become explosive—in one case, literally so. On March 30th, an opposition rally was attacked with grenades, killing 19 and injuring over 100 people, including one of our witnesses here today, Ron Abney. This House and the Senate both condemned this attack in the strongest possible terms through legislative resolutions, including one drafted by this Member and staff and introduced by Representative Steve Horn. No responsibility has been claimed and no one brought to justice for this attack, but there is at least strong circumstantial evidence that it was carried out by forces loyal and answering to the CCP and Hun Sen.
    The too-brief experiment in democracy may have suffered a mortal blow when Hun Sen and the CCP launched what must be understood as a coup d'etat. First Prime Minister Ranariddh, who had already fled the country, was deposed; Interior Minister and several generals have been summarily executed while in custody; hundreds have been detained, and opposition and FUNCINPEC officials are being hunted down; and CCP forces have engaged in widespread looting and terror in the capitol city. Reports of fighting in the countryside continue to come in.
 Page 9       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Our interest here today is to call in the strongest possible terms for the restoration and expansion of the rule of law and democratic process. How best to move in that direction will be one of the many issues that we will be addressing here today.
    I note that Japan, Germany, and Australia have cut off aid to Cambodia, which depends on foreign assistance for fully 50 percent of its budget. The Clinton Administration has suspended its assistance for 30 days, while declining to label Hun Sen's actions thus far as a coup in order to avoid, I gather, triggering section 508 of the Foreign Affairs Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1997 that would cut off all U.S. assistance to Cambodia until, ''a democratically elected government has taken office''. This question of definition is one of the issues we will examine today.
    I also note that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, has suspended its consideration of admission of Cambodia as a full member to its organization. I personally welcome these actions and hope that other nations, as well as the Clinton Administration, will take determined steps to condemn and reject this coup against democracy by Hun Sen and his fellow thugs.
    I wish to welcome our witnesses today to what, nevertheless, will be a very sobering hearing. Our first witness today, representing the Administration, will be the Honorable Aurelia Brazeal, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs.
    Welcome, Ambassador.
    Ms. BRAZEAL. Thank you.
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Chairman I will have to be running in and out of this hearing because there is a markup in another subcommittee of our committee, of our Full Committee. And, in fact, the work that I am doing will relate directly to this issue. And I would ask permission of the Chairman if I could have a very short period of time for an opening statement just so I could make sure that is on the record if I have to run out.
 Page 10       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Mr. BEREUTER. I wasn't quite complete, but I will turn to the gentleman from California, Mr. Berman, first, then I will turn to the gentleman.
    Mr. BERMAN. You need to go first?
    Mr. BEREUTER. I think you are the only other Majority Member here, so hold on just a second.
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Our second panel will begin with Mr. Ronald Abney of the International Republican Institute. Mr. Abney was evacuated out of Cambodia last week and was injured in the grenade attack in March that I referred to earlier.
    Mr. Abney, the Subcommittee welcomes you, and we look forward to your firsthand observation of the situation in Cambodia.
    Our next witness is, on the second panel, Dr. Marvin Ott from the National Defense University. Dr. Ott is a professor of National Security Policy at the National War College, a former Deputy Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and chairperson for Southeast Asia for the Foreign Service Institute. He has lived and traveled widely in Asia and is the author of over 70 articles and op-eds on Asian and other topics. We look forward to his testimony.
    We will then hear from Mr. Sichan Siv, currently financial advisor for Prudential Securities and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs and Deputy Assistant to President Bush for Public Liaison. Mr. Siv was senior advisor to the U.S. delegation to the negotiations of the 1991 Paris Conference on Cambodia that produced the peace accords. Mr. Siv escaped to Thailand from Cambodia in February 1976 after having been in Khmer Rouge forced labor camps and twice marked for death by that regime. The Subcommittee welcomes him.
    Thank you all for coming today. I know we will all benefit greatly from your insights and advice. Your entire statements will be made a part of the record, but I would ask that you summarize your comments in approximately 10 minutes. This will likely be a well-attended hearing by Members; therefore, we need the time for asking questions.
 Page 11       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Mr. BEREUTER. Before we begin with the testimony, we will begin the opening statement by the gentleman from California, the Ranking Minority Member, Mr. Berman.
    Mr. BERMAN. Did you need to go first, or do you want me to?
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. No, you go right ahead. If I could follow up, that would be fine.
    Mr. BERMAN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. You have discussed the issue of section 508, and I don't know a better term for what has happened in Cambodia than it is a coup. And I think the Administration should give serious consideration to suspending all American assistance until that democratically elected government has taken office.
    I think it is important for us to consult with the front line ASEAN States, particularly Thailand, Vietnam, and Malaysia, about an appropriate approach to Hun Sen to convince him and other political leaders in the CPP of the necessity of restoring democratic practices as soon as possible. I think it is particularly important that Vietnam do what it can to convince Hun Sen to release political prisoners and restore the political coalition. The suspicion that Vietnam knew in advance and condoned Hun Sen's military action needs to be dispelled by Vietnam, or it will impede the improvement of our relations with Vietnam.
    At the same time I think we should encourage the U.N. Secretary General to visit Cambodia, and use his good office to negotiate a political reconciliation. In this regard, it is important that the United Nations strengthen its human rights office in Phnom Penh. There needs to be a full accounting of the murders and disappearances of those taken place, and those responsible need to be brought to justice. Given Cambodia's tragic history, the brutal murders open wide the chasm of fear that once engulfed that country. We must do everything we can to prevent a return to more violence.
    I think it is also very important that both CPP and FUNCINPEC halt their efforts to incorporate or form alliances with elements of the Khmer Rouge. It appears that secret deals being made between both parties with brutal factions and the Khmer Rouge helped to trigger this conflict. I think it is important to remind both parties that there remains in America a law, a prohibition against any American assistance being provided if it promotes, sustains or augments directly or indirectly a capacity of the Khmer Rouge or any of its members to conduct military or paramilitary operations in Cambodia or elsewhere in China.
 Page 12       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    I look forward to your testimony and to the witnesses on the schedule, Mr. Chairman, and yield back my time.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Berman, for your comments. I certainly do agree with you about what Vietnam needs to do to continue to improve Vietnamese-American relations.
    Mr. BEREUTER. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, for an opening statement.
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize for having to go back and forth, but this markup does fully relate to what we are talking about today.
    In regard to the July 5th coup and the ongoing violence in Cambodia, I believe that it is unconscionable for the Clinton Administration to take—or should I say—for lacking to have taken, or for not to have taken a strong stand and providing the leadership in condemning the violent overthrow of the elected government of Cambodia. In other words, I don't believe that our government, the Clinton Administration, has been strong enough, anywhere near strong enough, in its condemnation, this coup d'etat in Cambodia. Strong political economic and other type of action must be taken immediately to restore and to put pressure on the Hun Sen regime to restore democracy and restore the elected leaders in Cambodia to their rightful positions.
    The markup that I will be attending will be titled as the markup on the Subcommittee of International Economic Policy and Trade, and there I will introduce an amendment that would deny the Overseas Private Investment Corporation projects in countries that have nondemocratic governments, such as the Hun Sen regime in Cambodia.
    Let me make that clear. What has happened is Hun Sen and his group of gangsters have taken what is and should have been considered a democratically elected government, and it has now shifted Cambodia into the camp of despotism and oppression. And as far as the United States goes, this should make a major difference in the way we treat the Government of Cambodia. And if my amendment is successful, Cambodia will be relegated to the rogues of the world until democracy is restored in that country that has seen so much tragedy.
 Page 13       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Finally, let me say that there are numerous reports that we have been seeing since the grenade attack on March 30th, 1997 against peaceful demonstrators. And I do not believe that the reaction of our embassy in Phnom Penh actually met the challenge that we were facing by that action in the reports that we had in our hands. I believe that Ambassador Ken Quinn, although a fine man, has not done the job that his predecessor, Charles Twining, did in order to pressure those elements who would retrogress back into dictatorship were doing.
    So let me just say I, as a Member of this committee, I am asking that the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency declassify a report that they have recently put together in Cambodia. I am asking the U.S. Department of Justice to release and declassify the FBI investigation into the March 30th grenade attack. I am asking that Ken Quinn, our ambassador in Phnom Penh, be immediately recalled from Cambodia to appear before this committee and to answer questions before this committee and to the American people about why there has been a less than forceful opposition to these horrible events that we have been witnessing in Cambodia. The American people and American policy demand and should demand nothing less than unequivocal support for the democratic forces inside Cambodia, and that means that we should support a democratic front of all of those, including former Prince Ranariddh and the others who are opposing Hun Sen and are now the targets of his violence.
    And one last point, and then I will move on, I am sorry for taking so much time, Mr. Chairman, and that is let us not forget that Hun Sen is not the equivalent of his democratic opposition. Hun Sen is unlike Ranariddh and the other democrats who were never part of Pol Pot's bloodthirsty gang that murdered millions of Cambodians. All this talk about FUNCINPEC and the Khmer Rouge has to be taken with a grain of salt. After all, Hun Sen was one of Pol Pot's murderers also. He was one of the triggermen who killed many of his fellow Cambodians. We should not tolerate this coup d'etat. We should have been against it, and in the strongest possible terms, from the beginning.
 Page 14       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    I look forward to hearing this testimony today. Thank you for indulging me with this time, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Rohrabacher, thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Rohrabacher appears in the appendix.]
    Mr. BEREUTER. And remind me that I should have mentioned that the ITT markup is proceeding on the OPIC bill. It may be necessary to recess this hearing, because yourself, myself, others perhaps, are also Members of that subcommittee. We will do that as necessary. We have a contact so that we will be informed of recorded votes in that subcommittee.
    Are there other Members who would like to be heard in opening statement?
    Mr. Faleomavaega, the gentleman from American Samoa.
    Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I certainly would like to offer my personal welcome to Deputy Assistant Secretary Aurelia Brazeal for joining us here this afternoon and also indicate my personal welcome to my very dear friend who has been a tremendous help to me in understanding a lot more about the crisis in Cambodia. This is my good friend Sichan Siv, who will testify later this afternoon.
    Mr. Chairman, I want to commend for you calling this important hearing to examine the crisis in Cambodia. Your 1996 resolution was well taken and somewhat prophetic of the events that have now transpired in Cambodia. Like many of our colleagues and the Congress and those watching around the world, I was shocked, appalled and saddened that this now has taken place in Cambodia. The nation is still wracked by the scars of the Khmer Rouge's genocidal killing of a million Cambodians and the civil war that has now raged for 2 decades.
    Co-Prime Minister Hun Sen's power grab has forced Prince Ranariddh to leave the country and destroyed, frankly, the democracy that was brokered in the 1991 Paris Accords. The Paris Peace Plan backed by the United States, China, the Soviet Union, Japan, Vietnam, France, India, the ASEAN nations, Australia, and other members of the United Nations was designed to bring to an end decades of conflict in that country. Since the Paris agreement and the U.N.-supervised elections in 1993, Cambodia has enjoyed relative tranquility and prosperity, with an economy expanding annually at a 7 percent rate.
 Page 15       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    During the last 6 years, the international community has invested more than $3 billion to bring about this peace and stability in Cambodia. The United States alone has contributed more than $300 million, increasing foreign assistance to Cambodia to $38.4 million in 1997, and with an additional Administration request for $38.6 million for fiscal year 1998.
    With the outbreak of violence in that country where scores of Cambodians have been killed and murdered, with custodial executions and torture widespread under Hun Sen's forces, it begs the question whether anything has changed in the country, and whether the international community has achieved anything by the massive investment of time and resources in Cambodia. I have to question, Mr. Chairman, whether the dollars of the American taxpayer have been wisely spent?
    Given the serious setbacks in Cambodia's democracy, I support the Administration's freeze of U.S. assistance to Cambodia and applaud the cutoffs of aid from Germany, Australia and, hopefully, Japan. Japan, to my understanding, has given the largest amounts of foreign assistance to Cambodia.
    Likewise, the decision of the Association of Southeast Asian nations to stop Cambodia's entry into their membership, I think was very appropriate. We will see how that develops, as well as the participation or lack of participation in these matters by King Sihanouk. The ASEAN ministers' delegation will be meeting with the King in Beijing later.
    I am hopeful, Mr. Chairman, that while the international community will help in bringing peace, ultimately, the matter will have to be decided by the Cambodian people themselves. I would hope that we learned from our tragic experience in Vietnam, which resulted from shortsighted U.S. foreign policy. Ultimately it will be the will of the people of Cambodia that will determine whether democracy will prevail in Cambodia.
    I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses also. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to provide an opening statement.
 Page 16       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Mr. BEREUTER. I thank you, Mr. Faleomavaega.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Faleomavaega appears in the appendix.]
    Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Hastings, the gentleman from Florida, is recognized for his opening statement.
    Mr. HASTINGS. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I will try to be brief and bring yet another dimension rather than a lot of specifics.
    First, let me join all of your colleagues in complimenting you for holding this hearing and for assembling the witnesses, who, I gather, as we ramble on interminably, won't get an opportunity to testify. So I will try to be brief.
    I especially am pleased to see the Deputy Assistance Secretary. When I first came to Congress, she was posted in Kenya. I would be very much interested, when this hearing is concluded and at some other point, in hearing her views on ongoing situations in Kenya today since it, too, is in the throes of difficulty at this time.
    Mr. Chairman, I am mindful, as are all of the Members, of the past in Cambodia and that region of the world. Additionally, I am relatively new to the Subcommittee on Asia, so I offer no real expertise. I just want to bring a human dimension to this matter.
    Two weeks ago, I signed on to a trip that is being led next month during the recess by the chairman of the International Relations Committee, Ben Gilman. I was more than happy and delighted that the itinerary included Cambodia. That was 2 weeks ago. I was excited for the reason that I had not been to that region of the world. In addition, we had hoped to, and likely will still, visit Vietnam and Thailand. And I was hopeful of being able to put the peace of Cambodia geographically in its proper setting for my mind and my work on this committee. I was going there, quite frankly, with open arms and an open heart, and certainly with an open mind.
    It is my belief that because of ongoing circumstances which we are all here assembled about, that that portion of the itinerary is now canceled, and Chairmen Gilman and the other Members along with myself who were going to visit Cambodia are, for a variety of reasons (not the least of which is that it would be inappropriate for us to go there under the circumstances and any attendant danger that might be ascribed thereto) advised that that part of the trip is off. Now, rather than an open-armed individual with an open heart and an open mind, I come to this hearing suspicious, concerned for the welfare of the multitude of Cambodians as well as people in that region, and, obviously, all of our personnel that might be there.
 Page 17       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    I come here basically supportive in such a short period of time of multilateral sanctions, and while I do not go that far in calling for them, I certainly am open-minded now to listen to those who are willing to join the Japanese, the Australians, the Germans and others in that regard. All I can say is there is a song that is offered in the jazz idiom that says, ''What a difference a day makes.'' Well what a difference 2 weeks makes in this global environment that we are in.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. BEREUTER. I think it is important that Members have an opportunity to express their concerns and their views on an important subject as this, and so I do not begrudge the amount of time we spend on these opening statements.
    Ambassador Brazeal, we welcome you and other witnesses—he has deferred.
    Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Will the Chairman yield?
    Mr. BEREUTER. I will be pleased.
    Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I want to note for the record, mainly because I know of two Quinns, and my good friend from California alluded earlier to either a Ken Quinn or Sam Quinn?
    Ms. BRAZEAL. Ken Quinn.
    Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you.
    Mr. BEREUTER. We want to welcome you and your testimony. The entire statement will be made part of the record, and you may proceed as you wish.

 Page 18       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC

    Ms. BRAZEAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and the Members of the Committee. I, too, endorse everyone's statement and applaud you for having this timely hearing.
    I would like to lay out our concerns about the current crisis in Cambodia, and describe what we have done so far, and share our thinking about next steps. I do not see this hearing as an adversarial process. I think in my mind the hearings are designed to bring out all of the options that might be possible in a collegial way. So that is how I am approaching this hearing.
    Mr. BEREUTER. That is the way we are approaching it.
    And I will announce the other hearing markup is concluded, so Members can rest easy. Thank you for letting me intervene.
    Ms. BRAZEAL. Thank you.
    The violence that took place in Phnom Penh July 5 and 6 was the culmination of tensions that had been building for months. The government that emerged after the 1993 U.N.-sponsored elections was an uneasy coalition of two parties, Prince Ranariddh's party, FUNCINPEC, and the Cambodian People's Party, or CPP, led by Hun Sen.
    Though the two leaders had managed to cooperate at first as co-Prime Ministers, by early 1997, they were no longer on speaking terms, and the government was effectively paralyzed. The National Assembly had not met since January, leaving key legislative bills in limbo, including the election law and political parties law necessary for next year's elections.
    Each co-Prime Minister has assembled a sizable bodyguard force, and the country's armed forces are split into two camps, one loyal to Ranariddh and one to Hun Sen. To further complicate matters, the insurgent Khmer Rouge began to disintegrate last year, and the two leaders competed intensely for the loyalty of breakaway former Khmer Rouge forces.
 Page 19       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    This extremely tense situation led to mounting violence. On March 30, Easter Sunday morning, there was a deadly grenade attack on a political demonstration in Phnom Penh led by Sam Rainsy, head of the Khmer Nation Party and a political ally of Ranariddh's. Nineteen people were killed in that attack. In May, Ranariddh said he would welcome support from the Khmer Rouge for his political coalition, leading to an angry reaction from Hun Sen.
    On the night of June 17, fighting broke out between the rival Prime Ministers' bodyguards. For several hours the battle raged in central Phnom Penh. Only three people were killed, but there was extensive damage. One rocket struck the backyard of the residence of our Ambassador Kenneth Quinn.
    But the most violent attacks occurred 10 days ago. Prince Ranariddh left the country on July 4, and the next day, Hun Sen's forces moved against a group of FUNCINPEC military, who may have been harboring illegal forces or moving troops and tanks into the capital. Fighting escalated quickly. Hun Sen has claimed he was trying to stop Khmer Rouge infiltrators who were alleged to be cooperating with FUNCINPEC troops.
    The CPP has also said it moved to seize a large shipment of illegal weapons brought recently into Cambodia. We cannot verify either of these claims, but even if we could, we would still condemn the large-scale fighting that ensued. Only after extensive casualties, including over 50 deaths, and the seizure of Ranariddh's compound on July 6 did the battle let up.
    In the days since then, Phnom Penh has been calm, but fighting has continued in outlying provinces. In the capital we have reports that the CPP has been rounding up FUNCINPEC officials. There are reliable reports from around the country that several FUNCINPEC officials, especially those who could command police and military forces, have been arrested. At least one official was killed while in CPP custody, and a military official appears to have been executed after his capture. We are aware of reports of other killings of FUNCINPEC military officials, but we cannot confirm them all at this time.
 Page 20       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Hun Sen declared last week that Ranariddh was no longer First Prime Minister and that the international community should stay out of Cambodia's affairs. These statements are completely unacceptable. Any attempt to depose the party that won the plurality of votes in the 1993 election would mean Hun Sen has forfeited the legitimacy the Royal Cambodian Government previously enjoyed. It would also destroy the basis for constructive relations with the United States and, we expect, with the rest of the international community.
    The U.S. Government reacted quickly and decisively to these events. Our first concern was the welfare of approximately 1,200 Americans in Cambodia. Ambassador Quinn established immediate contact with the American community through the warden system and set up a safe refuge for Americans in the Cambodiana Hotel, particularly tourists, who did not have a safe place to stay.
    Ambassador Quinn again was in contact with both Prime Ministers on the night of July 5, urging a cease-fire and restraint. On July 6, he met again with senior officials of the CPP party and spoke with FUNCINPEC ministers to forcefully advocate a halt to the violence.
    On Saturday, July 5, upon learning of the violence, we set up a task force in the State Department that has since operated around the clock, monitoring events and keeping a channel open to our embassy. With the departure of Americans, the task force may be standing down soon.
    On July 9, we ordered the embassy to draw down to only 20 officials, and we recommended that private Americans leave the country. Since then we have worked intensively to arrange for the departure of over 650 Americans by civilian aircraft.
    We have also dispatched a task force under the command of CINCPAC to the former U.S. base at Utapao, Thailand. Forces are standing by to undertake a military evacuation of Americans if our present arrangements using civilian aircraft breaks down. We do not presently anticipate this will be necessary, but we are continuing our prudent planning just in case.
 Page 21       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    On the diplomatic front we have been very active as well. On Monday, July 7, we formulated a set of core principles to guide our reactions to this crisis. These principles are, first, the violence that overturned the results of the 1993 elections is unacceptable. Fighting must stop immediately. Second, all political parties, including FUNCINPEC, must be allowed to operate freely in Cambodia. Third, there must be free and fair elections in 1998. Fourth, we remain opposed to any political role for the leaders of Khmer Rouge. Those responsible for crimes against humanity should be brought to justice. And fifth, the framework of the Paris Accords must be reinstated.
    We immediately called in diplomats from the ASEAN embassies and the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and the other signatories of the Paris peace accords on Cambodia to describe these principles and discuss an international course of action to achieve results consistent with our principles. These interventions bore fruit later that first week. The foreign ministers of the ASEAN governments, this has been mentioned, meeting in an emergency session July 10, decided to postpone indefinitely Cambodia's entry into ASEAN, which had been planned later this month. And, with our strong support, the President of the U.N. Security Council made a statement July 11 deploring the violence and calling on both co-Prime Ministers to resolve their differences peacefully.
    One of the countries we were consulting with deserves particular attention. Vietnam has a long history in Cambodia, including over 10 years of military occupation. When Vietnam withdrew its forces from Cambodia and signed the Paris peace accords, a huge stumbling block to normal relations with the United States was removed. We now have a new relationship with Hanoi, with ambassadors in place in Hanoi and Washington, and a draft trade agreement on the table.
    Vietnam is now a full member of ASEAN. It joined in the ASEAN consensus to delay Cambodia's membership and send a ministerial delegation to Cambodian leaders. We have told Vietnam through diplomatic channels how important it is to our bilateral relationship that Hanoi continue to support the regional consensus and play a constructive role on Cambodia.
 Page 22       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    We called in the Cambodian ambassador to Washington, who represents Hun Sen's party, twice last week to underscore our disapproval of the events in Phnom Penh and urge that the party that won the 1993 elections, FUNCINPEC, be allowed to regain its leading position in the Cambodian Government. Ambassador Quinn made the same points and described in detail our core principles to Hun Sen on July 12.
    To underline our disapproval of Hun Sen's actions, we have announced the suspension of our assistance to Cambodia for 30 days. During that period, which coincides with the initial period of our embassy drawdown, we will review our aid programs, both USAID and military, and decide which should be suspended indefinitely. Decisions on specific aid projects have not been made yet, but we anticipate continuing some people-to-people programs that address basic human needs and democracy. Some humanitarian programs already underway continue, too. We do not believe it is appropriate to make the Cambodian people suffer further for the transgressions of their leaders.
    It goes without saying, of course, that we will not be prepared to resume any assistance that benefits the Cambodian Government directly. We expect to follow a similar approach when voting on loans from international financial institutions.
    Mr. Chairman, as we consider the future of U.S. policy and U.S. assistance to Cambodia, we need to consider what our efforts have and have not accomplished in that country over the last several years.
    As you know, the United States and the international community have made a considerable investment in the promotion of stability, democracy and economic development in Cambodia since the signing of the Paris peace accords. The purpose of the U.N. mission in Cambodia and of our engagement since its conclusion was to give the Cambodian people a respite from terror and war and an opportunity to rebuild their lives and their country. We were not under the illusion that these efforts could by themselves determine Cambodia's fate or solve all its problems. Ultimately only the Cambodian people and their leaders can do that.
 Page 23       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    But in many ways Cambodians have taken advantage of the opportunity we helped to create by participating in elections, returning home and beginning to rebuild their economy. Our assistance programs have also made a difference in supporting a free press, political party building, and helping Cambodians make progress against the challenges of poverty, disease and the danger of land mines.
    Cambodia now has a system of laws and institutions that can provide the foundation for democracy and stability to take hold. What we have in Cambodia today is a situation in which rules and standards have been violated, but that is better than having no rules and standards at all.
    At the same time, it is clear Cambodia has a long way to go before we can say it is securely on the road to being a stable democracy. But that is still a worthy goal, supported by the vast majority of Cambodians, and we believe that it is still within reach. We must and we will stay engaged.
    The long-term goal of our diplomacy is to restore the framework of the Paris Accords. These accords, signed in 1991 by 18 countries, provided for the introduction of a U.S. peacekeeping force to supervise the demilitarization, demobilization of factional forces, establish a neutral political environment, and hold free and fair elections. Though the U.N. transitional authority in Cambodia encountered serious changes while carrying out its mandate, it was successful in establishing a framework that has brought genuine pluralism and the beginnings of democracy to Cambodia. Restoring that framework is the only way to achieve stability and peace in this tortured country.
    We call on Hun Sen to restore to FUNCINPEC the leading role in government it won in the 1993 elections and make concrete preparations for free and fair elections in 1998. Unless he is willing to take these steps, the United States will not resume the cooperative relationship we have had with the Royal Cambodian Government, nor will we reinstate our sizable assistance program.
 Page 24       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Next year's elections, should they come to pass, will require considerable assistance from the international community. Even before this mounting crisis, it was clear that Cambodia lacked the capacity to organize free and fair elections on its own. For that reason roughly 25 percent of our aid program was focused on democracy and government programs aimed at training Cambodian jurists, lawyers and legislators and building the legal infrastructure a democracy requires.
    We would like to be in a position to resume that kind of aid. If the election takes place, we would also like to be there with monitors and observers as we were in 1993. It is our strong view that unless we and other countries are able to help, there is little or any chance that elections in Cambodia can be free and fair.
    In the weeks ahead, we will be looking for indications that Cambodia's leaders are ready to restore the framework of the Paris Accords. We are pressing Hun Sen to stop the unjustified arrests of FUNCINPEC and other officials and to cooperate once again with FUNCINPEC in the government. We will continue to consult closely with the signatories of the Paris Accords, particularly the Paris conference cochairmen, France and Indonesia, and with Cambodia's ASEAN neighbors. Decisions about our assistance programs will be made as we see the results of our diplomacy and Hun Sen's response.
    Secretary Albright will lead in our delegation to the ASEAN post-ministerial conference and the ASEAN regional forum in Kuala Lumpur next week. The Cambodian issue will be prominent on her agenda. She will be seeking further ways to promote results consistent with our core principles.
    In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, there is much to do in the days and weeks ahead. We intend to press vigorously for the fulfillment of our core principles on Cambodia, using all the tools, unilateral and multilateral, at our disposal. There is no question that intense international involvement will be necessary to restore stability to Cambodia. The United States is ready to play a leading role in that effort. Thank you.
 Page 25       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Ambassador Brazeal.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Brazeal appears in the appendix.]
    Mr. BEREUTER. Chairman Gilman, we welcome him. If he has an opening statement, his entire statement will be made part of the record, and he can proceed as he wishes.
    Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. I want to commend you, Mr. Chairman, the chair of our Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee, for taking up this issue in a very timely manner and for calling panelists together so that we can discuss foreign policy that has been posed by the recent developments in Cambodia.
    Indeed, it is regrettable that we find ourselves on familiar ground once again trying to restore peace and stability in Cambodia. It is a tragic turn off the path to democracy and prosperity that began with the signing of the Paris peace accords back in 1991. The military coup d'etat by Hun Sen, I wish our State Department would call it what it is, and the reports of politically motivated executions, arrests, and other human rights abuses have caused a great deal of concern and cast a long, dark shadow over what once appeared to be the bright future of Cambodia. These actions by Hun Sen and the CPP violate not only the Cambodian Constitution, but also all internationally accepted norms of behavior. More tragically, this brutality violates a mandate of the Cambodian people as expressed in the 1993 elections.
    These actions are clearly unacceptable. As a Nation we cannot afford to look the other way while violence and tyranny rule the countryside. Our government and the international community have made a significant investment in bringing peace to Cambodia and providing the Cambodian people with a chance to determine their own future through fair and free elections. We must remain committed to that ideal.
    Our Nation should condemn in the strongest terms this undemocratic and forcible change of government and renounce the use of violence to resolve political matters by all sides. And we should use our influence to make certain that democracy is going to be restored and the national elections will be held as planned in May 1998. We must also assist Cambodia in developing an independent judiciary, and depoliticizing the military.
 Page 26       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Last week the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Helms, and I sent a letter to the President urging him to take tough measures against the perpetrators of this egregious act to restore the hope of peace and democracy to the Cambodian people.
    In closing, let me say this will be a changing task. We look forward to working with the Administration to reverse this alarming assault on democracy in Southeast Asia. And, Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for calling this important hearing, and we look forward to hearing the balance of the testimony today. Thank you.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Gilman.
    Mr. BEREUTER. We have a series of votes, and so we are going to have to have a lengthy recess. Mr. Berman has passed on his initial round of questioning, and I will proceed with the Minority. The gentleman from American Samoa would like to address questions first.
    Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I didn't realize I was going to have the opportunity for questions that quickly.
    I want to thank Secretary Brazeal for her statement. I just make a general observation to the fact that the international community has been assisting Cambodia to develop democracy for 20 years. My question is, do you think that the people of Cambodia are really ready to accept democracy? Are they willing to die for democracy the way things are now with the leadership by the Prince, and now Hun Sen, who knows a lot about violence? I am a little tired of this. Do they expect that the United States will continue baby-sitting the situation, that we should continue pushing for democracy; perhaps the people are not ready for it?
    Ms. BRAZEAL. Thank you for that question. And if I may refer to your earlier statement where you had questioned whether we had accomplished anything with our assistance over the past few years, we think that you can detect at a grassroots level certainly people who are committed to democracy. You have nongovernmental organizations that have developed in Cambodia; Cambodia run by Cambodians that are dedicated to the building of democracy, to building of a judiciary, to preparation for the elections, to drafting the laws that are necessary to put the framework into place. So we feel that you can see at the grassroots a lot of movement compared to where Cambodia was prior to the Paris peace accords and all of the effort of the international community.
 Page 27       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I am very concerned with the statements made earlier by my friend from California. They seem to collaborate some of the things that I had heard also through the rumor mill about the activities of our ambassador there, whether he has been partisan to the process, rather than staying on neutral ground. Is he trying to do something that is not in conformance with our policies toward Cambodia?
    Ms. BRAZEAL. Thank you for that question as well. I feel strongly about my answer.
    Ambassadors, as well as all people at embassies, but particularly ambassadors, too, are supposed to keep in touch with all groups in a country and all people in a country. That is what our ambassador has been doing. He has also kept in touch with the American community. As I indicated in my testimony, he strongly contacted both sides when the fighting broke out and urged restraint, urged them to end the fighting.
    I do not feel that we should in any way criticize what he has done. He is—as others have pointed out, a very responsible person, and I feel very strongly that he has done what he is supposed to do in terms of being in touch with all groups.
    Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Because of the way the media has been reporting this, somehow I don't get the impression that the Administration had been very forceful—from the President, the Vice President or even the Secretary of State—in conveying that Cambodia is a very serious priority. The Administration should address it forthrightly, as indicated earlier by my friend from California. Can you comment on that?
    Ms. BRAZEAL. Well, I think that I tried to lay out today the steps that we have taken. This has been a very fast-moving situation. We were first mostly concerned about the welfare of Americans and then trying to get the fighting to stop and get Americans out. We are now turning to further consultation with our allies, with ASEAN and other countries, that have a stake in what happens within Cambodia.
 Page 28       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    So I don't feel that we have not stepped out strongly. We have suspended aid, as I pointed out. We have certainly laid out our principles around which we consider our future approaches, the five principles that are outlined. We have indicated strongly we are moving toward elections next year, and that is something we certainly support. So I think we have made it clear. Perhaps we have been competing with other news events, I am not sure. But within the State Department, all of us working in Cambodia have thought that we have made our position very, very clear.
    Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I have completed my first round, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Ambassador Brazeal, we often criticize the countries for failing to respect the rule of law. But Congress is the first branch of government under the Constitution, and the Congress has passed legislation which I mentioned earlier, specifically section 508 of the Foreign Affairs Appropriation Act in fiscal year 1997, which would cut off all U.S. assistance to Cambodia until a democratically elected government has taken office. We have specific legislation which addresses the possibility of a coup taking place.
    I think the Administration is playing word games with us. A coup has taken place, but they are avoiding calling it what it is, a coup, in order, it seems to me, to avoid cutting off aid. Reaching the judgment, I gather, is not appropriate at this point to trigger the cutoff of all aid, but it seems to me that is a prerogative you do not have if we respect the rule of law in this country.
    Ms. BRAZEAL. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that we have suspended all aid programs. We have a 30-day period that we want to consider what we do with our aid programs. I hear your message, but I will say that, first of all, the situation was fast-moving. We were concentrating on taking action, not trying to avoid calling something a coup or not.
 Page 29       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    I don't want to get into wordsmithing either as to what is a classical coup. This was, from our point of view, two civilian parts of government who had their own personal bodyguards and forces that they had solicited on their side or the other fighting. We were interested in stopping that. We were not interested in putting a label on there.
    Again, there is also a theory that if you call it a coup, you have foreclosed certain options, not on aid, but in terms of giving a signal to the international community that you think the situation has stabilized and that it has to be accepted. We are hopeful of keeping as much validity as possible in the situation, because we are still working out with all of the parties where we may go.
    Mr. BEREUTER. I understand your rationale, but it is inconsistent with law. And we have not granted a waiver on this determination. So it is an option that you do not have under the law. It has happened before, and I think the executive branch needs to respect the legislation which was enacted.
    We have a vote, followed by two more votes. I will say that we will recess at the call of Mr. Faleomavaega, because I am going to turn the chair over to him since he does not have, unfortunately, the privilege of voting as a delegate from the American Samoa.
    Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. That is what you call democracy, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Faleomavaega, my suggestion to you is when you complete your round of questioning, you should recess until approximately 3:20. At which time I would suggest that as many people as feel safe leaving their chairs exit the room, get some fresh air, and open the doors as widely as possible.
    Mr. Faleomavaega, please take the Chair.
    Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. [Presiding.] Madam Secretary, I feel like I am almost a beggar. Beggars can't be choosers these days with regards to privileges. I thank the Chairman for allowing me this opportunity to continue my line of questioning about some of the issues that I have discussed.
 Page 30       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    One of the things that I am concerned about is that we are going to end up in another rift between the East and the West. Obviously Hun Sen has no intention of wanting to cooperate or work closely with Western democracies. My concern is whether the Administration foresees that Hun Sen will shop in some other countries that may be more receptive to his style of government; and has the Administration taken any consideration of this?
    Ms. BRAZEAL. Well, what we have tried to do is to contact all of the countries that have been involved in the Paris peace accord, and in particular also supporting the ASEAN initiative. ASEAN has three foreign ministers from the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand who will be going around talking to King Sihanouk, to Hun Sen and to Ranariddh. I think the first meeting begins tomorrow. As they make their consultations, we will be consulting with ASEAN to see where we go.
    We see this as an international effort. We want to use multilateral approaches if we can. We don't think that we have any evidence that Hun Sen has reached out to other countries as of yet. He seems to be focusing on domestic and internal situations in Cambodia.
    Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. There have been media reports that say one of the things that triggered Hun Sen's effort to take care of Prince Ranariddh was the fact that the Prince had made efforts to collaborate with the Khmer Rouge. And then other media reports indicated that even Hun Sen himself has made the same efforts. So can you indicate for the record if the Administration is aware of that, both sides have been working closely with the Khmer Rouge?
    Ms. BRAZEAL. Yes. As I think I stated that in the testimony and we have said before, that we have felt that it was a tactical mistake for Prince Ranariddh to seek a closer relationship with the Khmer Rouge or to engage in a flirtation with the Khmer Rouge. Both sides have been in touch with various parts of the Khmer Rouge. And we, as I said, as part of our principles for addressing this situation, we remain opposed to any political role for the leaders of the Khmer Rouge.
 Page 31       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. What is the situation now with Mr. Pol Pot? Is he still alive?
    Ms. BRAZEAL. No one has seen him. No outsider, I should say, has seen him in quite some time. And we don't have any reports—we don't verify reports, but we understand that he is, through some reports, still alive, although seemingly very ill, and he is in Cambodia somewhere.
    Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. If you could elaborate more closely. What was the final event that triggered Hun Sen to take action the way he did?
    Ms. BRAZEAL. The analysis of exactly what happened is incomplete, and both sides have put forward their own analysis of what made them act. But it seems clear that, as I said, that once Ranariddh left the country on July 4th, the next day Hun Sen's forces did move in to try to—according to their interpretation, to try to look for arms caches and also to somehow react to what they had seen was an infiltration of troops loyal to Ranariddh, and including from the Cambodia Khmer Rouge into Phnom Penh. It is still very unclear. And frankly, Congressman, I am not sure we will ever get all of the bits and pieces put together, but each side has put forward what they think happened.
    Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. There have also been media reports that even King Sihanouk has not been happy or satisfied with the way the Prince has been handling the country in his capacity as Prime Minister; is that correct?
    Ms. BRAZEAL. We have seen the reports of what he said. But as I said, we have instructed our ambassador in China to try to see the King in Beijing. And we know that the three ASEAN foreign ministers should be meeting with the King tomorrow in Beijing to try to ascertain his position. Those reports we are waiting for.
    Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Why do you suppose the King sought first the advice of Beijing in this effort rather than the countries who have been very helpful to the democracy that Cambodia had enjoyed previously? Why Beijing? Why not Japan? Why not the United States or other major players? Why not the members of the Security Council?
 Page 32       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Ms. BRAZEAL. Well, I didn't want to give the impression that the King went to Beijing to seek their advice. He was in Beijing for treatment of his medical condition, including some serious condition, a cancer condition. So he already was in Beijing when this happened and being treated medically. And that, I think, is why he found himself in Beijing. It was not that he traveled there in particular.
    Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Does the Administration believe that a position taken by the King will have an impact on this situation?
    Ms. BRAZEAL. Well, he is the constitutional monarch, and I think that he has been seen valued by the Cambodian people. He has been seen as a reconciliator. He has always urged unification and unity within the country. So he does have very much a role to play.
    Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. In retrospect, was it a mistake for the United States to encourage the democratically-elected government led by Prince Ranariddh to share power with Hun Sen? It is quite obvious sharing power in that democracy did not work. Go ahead.
    Ms. BRAZEAL. Yes. Well, I think hindsight is 20–20. But I think at the time, as the situation evolved, FUNCINPEC won the elections in 1993, and at the time, Hun Sen insisted on having a role. Those involved in the international community accepted that.
    It's difficult to go back and dissect what didn't work or not. Certainly I tried to describe a situation earlier this year when the co-Prime Ministers had stopped even speaking to each other, so there was paralysis in the government. But that does not mean that we do not support that system, because it seemed to be in accordance with the Paris peace accords, the co-Prime Ministership. That is what has been accepted.
    We have received Prince Ranariddh here in his capacity as First Prime Minister. He was met here in Washington by officials at the State Department, Under Secretary Pickering, in that capacity. So that we, as I've said, want to see FUNCINPEC have the leading role in the coalition, because they were the ones who won the election.
 Page 33       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. If Second Prime Minister Hun Sen decided to come and visit the United States, would we accord him the same protocols as Second Prime Minister?
    Ms. BRAZEAL. Well, I don't expect him to come. I would hope, though, in listening to the description of a possible coup d'etat, we would like to work with the Members of Congress on possibly where they might go, given the interest in this, in Cambodia, as they make their trip during the recess.
    Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Is there any reason to believe what Hun Sen said earlier, that there will be elections next year?
    Ms. BRAZEAL. He has said that there will be, and we welcome those words. But we will welcome even more actions that lead to concrete electoral outcomes that have the elections in a free and fair manner.
    Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Is there also belief that perhaps one reason why Hun Sen has taken action is that he is simply fed up with the incompetence of the Prince?
    Ms. BRAZEAL. Mr. Member, I don't want to be in the position of speaking for Mr. Hun Sen today or for the Prince. I think both of them seem to be fed up with each other in the sense that they had stopped communicating earlier this year and stopped talking to each other. That, I think, is a sign of frustration that did exist.
    Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Well, Madam Secretary, I think my time is up. I know that our friends here who want to listen will have just have to wait until the return of the Chair. So at this time I will call a recess of the Committee.
    Mr. ENNIS. Apparently there is some confusion on the floor of the House of Representatives that is going to take longer to resolve than originally anticipated.
    I thank Deputy Assistant Secretary Brazeal for her testimony. The Subcommittee is not going to call her back for additional questions. The Subcommittee shall convene a second panel as soon as the confusion on the floor is resolved.
 Page 34       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    [Brief recess.]
    Mr. BEREUTER. [Presiding.] The Subcommittee will come to order, for the hardy few that are remaining. Mr. Faleomavaega did not make off with the gavel, so there has been no coup.
    I would like to call the second panel of witnesses. It appears we have 2 hours, so we won't be interrupted. Will the second panel please come forward?
    We had a bit of a fiasco on the first vote on the House floor among the three votes, but long ago I introduced you gentlemen with your distinguished backgrounds and explained why we are so pleased to have you here today, so I won't go over that again. Certainly, I do want to welcome you and tell you that the Subcommittee appreciates your testimony. I think we will call on you in the order listed.
    First, Mr. Ronald Abney from the International Republican Institute. Welcome home. Good to see you in what appears to be good health. I appreciate your testimony. Please proceed as you wish. Your entire statements for all three of you will be made a part of the record.
    Mr. ABNEY. I certainly thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
    As you know and as you said earlier, I have just been evacuated from Phnom Penh, so I have only been back in the States for 3 or 4 days. As an eye witness to the violent events, not only of the past 2 weeks in Cambodia, but the past year and a half, I am really anxious to report to you and your committee what I have seen and what I have experienced.
    As Director of Operations in Cambodia for the International Republican Institute, I have been there since February 1996, and I have seen firsthand the bloody events which have led to the tragic overthrow of the duly elected Government of Cambodia. This took place last weekend militarily and continues to take place today politically through intimidation, harassment, and even political killings. I must say, this is heartbreaking to the people who have been working toward the establishment of a democratic process in Cambodia.
 Page 35       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Since Saturday, July the 5th, when the military coup began, Cambodia's Second Prime Minister Hun Sen has accomplished what he was afraid to risk in an open and free election, that is, the defeat of all opposition to his power. Today, he is the absolute one-man ruler of Cambodia as he has overthrown his ruling and constitutionally elected partner, First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh. After Hun Sen and his Cambodian People's Party took power in Phnom Penh, he instructed Prime Minister Ranariddh's political party FUNCINPEC to choose a new leader, one who would be acceptable to him. He even said the Prime Minister must be tried in court for his crimes, and he indicated that Ranariddh would be arrested if he returned to Cambodia. The sad part of the scenario is that Hun Sen is now the only law in Cambodia.
    Hun Sen has also told the FUNCINPEC Parliament members that they can continue to serve but only as long as their allegiance is not to First Prime Minister Ranariddh. If that allegiance still exists, they will be replaced by the new FUNCINPEC leader, which has the endorsement of Hun Sen. And I might add that the FUNCINPEC steering committee feels they are being asked to forge a government at gunpoint. They can't even leave their own country as they are being forced to set up this government. These are good and decent people and they are being threatened and harassed. I talked to Loy Sim Chhang, who is the General Secretary of FUNCINPEC, and he is truly frightened.
    Hun Sen, on the Monday after the coup, assured all opposition MPs that they would be safe. The following day, his guards started rounding up FUNCINPEC members and leaders. One of them was a senior advisor to Prime Minister Ranariddh who was shot to death while in custody that same day. On Wednesday, another top aide of First Prime Minister Ranariddh was found dead after being branded a ''terrorist'' by Hun Sen. Since then, dozens of democratic activists have been killed, according to the human rights people I talked to and the MPs I have talked to who are now in hiding.
    Many of the FUNCINPEC and other opposition party leaders are holed up with their families, including young children, in hotels and safe houses right now around Phnom Penh. They are in absolute panic. They are afraid to be seen in public for fear of being murdered.
 Page 36       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Fortunately, many of these leaders have escaped from the country in the past several days. I have been in these hotel rooms with these people, with their families, with these legislators; I have seen the terror on their faces.
    Last Tuesday, I was with the leading opposition voice for the FUNCINPEC party and his counterparts from the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party—BLDP-Son Sann—when the phone rang and aides told the MPs to leave immediately because Hun Sen's police from the Ministry of the Interior were checking all rooms in the hotel in search of the dissidents. I helped these Cambodian democrats flee the hotel and they were placed in secure homes by human rights organizations around Phnom Penh.
    I might also say that last night we started plans to evacuate all IRI Khmer staff and their families because of threats to their lives due to the work we have been doing there.
    I also talked to two MPs last night in Bangkok, Thailand, and they have told me of the killings of FUNCINPEC activists and members in the provinces of Svay Rieng, Prey Veng, Kompong Chhnang.
    Also, the headquarters of the main opponent to Hun Sen's government, Sam Rainsy's Khmer Nation Party, KNP, was overrun last weekend by CPP soldiers and a Hun Sen-backed splinter group was installed in the office. A huge bonfire was held outside to burn 2 years of Rainsy's planning work, which included files and the burgeoning membership data.
    The other opposition party in Cambodia, BLDP-Son Sann, was dismissed by Hun Sen, as he said he would only recognize the CPP-backed splinter group led by Ieng Mouly in any role in the government.
    This complete takeover of the entire Cambodian political system has resulted in the unchallenged authority of strongman Hun Sen. His troops remain in the streets of Phnom Penh today, many looting both the large stores and the small shops left closed during the military attacks, killing people in their wake.
 Page 37       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    During the violent overthrow of the government, hundreds of innocent Cambodian men, women, and children were killed, many unreported, but it is the Cambodian people who are always the ones who are killed and who suffer the most.
    IRI is no late comer to Cambodia. Our program started in December 1992, and we were there to train thousands of activists from all the political parties to prepare them for the 1993 elections.
    Funded by the National Endowment for Democracy, IRI remained established in Cambodia over the next 2 years, trained thousands of party members working in every single province in Cambodia, except for one.
    During this period, IRI also embarked on an unprecedented program to train women within the political parties to have the tools to participate in the democratic process in their own country for the first time. In 1996, with the democratic opposition under attack, IRI started its opposition party program, working mainly with Sam Rainsy's Khmer Nation Party and Son Sann's BLDP.
    During this period, membership grew in these two outspoken parties to the hundreds of thousands. Sam Rainsy's party today alone has close to 250,000 card-carrying members. Both of these parties have attracted huge followings, and in my opinion, Sam Rainsy is the most popular active political figure in Cambodia today.
    Cambodians are attracted to his vision for peace and change, and his image as a noncorrupt force in a government corrupt, almost to its core. In a country with 10 million people, an opposition movement that attracts hundreds of thousands of active members and many more who are committed to them is a major factor in the political dynamic.
    If you add to that the huge number of FUNCINPEC and BLDP members, the total represents what I believe to be an opposition majority in Cambodia today. I firmly believe, and this is my opinion, Hun Sen looked at these numbers and at the popularity of these leaders, and I believe his paranoia on this issue grew as last year these parties, FUNCINPEC, KNP, and BLDP-Son Sann, joined together in a coalition to oppose his party at the ballot box. I am convinced he came to believe he could no longer win an open election and, in my opinion, he began reacting in the only way he understands, and that is brutal force.
 Page 38       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Since that time, members of FUNCINPEC, KNP, BLDP-Son Sann have been unable to safely organize in the provinces, getting ready for the election, due to open harassment, intimidation, and even killing by Hun Sen's CPP. And on March 30 of this year a peaceful, legal demonstration by the KNP against the corruption in the judiciary was disrupted violently by a series of hand grenades and over 20 innocent men, women, and children were killed, and scores of others injured. I was watching that event from across the street at the National Assembly and was hit by a grenade fragment. And I might add that this event took place in one of the most public places in Cambodia, directly adjacent to the King's palace and right across the street from the National Assembly.
    Five minutes before the explosion, there were scores of American tourists on tour buses and motor bikes riding by the palace directly in front of the demonstration. Had those grenades gone off just minutes earlier, 20 or 30 more Americans would have been killed.
    I might add, there have not been any public demonstrations or open meetings by opposition groups since that day and now even the parties themselves have been dismantled by Hun Sen's violent force. There are hundreds of thousands of Cambodian people who no longer have a voice or a part to play in the political system. We were all hoping that the election in 1998 would give them a place at the table. That hope today is dead. Make no mistake about it!
    And one of the sad parts of that is that within these opposition parties, there are some of the best and the brightest young men and women in all of Cambodia ready to lead that country into the next century. People like Rainsy; Rainsy's wife and partner, Toulong Samura, Kem Sokha, Keat Sukun, Khieu Rada, Son Soubert, and Ahmad Yahya, people in their thirties and forties who are honest, able and dedicated people. These people will not have the opportunity now to be in the government because they will not have the opportunity to participate in the election that Hun Sen is now calling for.
 Page 39       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    I would like to say that this is not necessarily the policy of IRI, as I am speaking from my own experience in Cambodia. In addition to being there the last year and a half as a witness, I was head of the IRI group that worked on the elections in 1993.
    I would like to talk for a minute about the role of the U.S. State Department in terms of what has happened in the Cambodian political process over the last 3 years.
    When I was evacuated, after 2 days of heavy shelling, street fighting and looting in the country, and by the way, the evacuation process itself was horrendous—I finally got to Tokyo, and this was 5 days after the bombing, and I picked up a newspaper and the headline was ''U.S. Adopts Wait and See Attitude.'' My question is, what are they waiting for, and what other horrors do they want to see next?
    The U.S. State Department has always discouraged the democrats in Cambodia, even after impassioned pleas by the leaders of these parties. The leaders have appealed to the U.S. Government as the leading democracy in the free world and yet they have been rejected. Over the years, the United States has continuously refused to criticize Hun Sen and, in fact, has a relationship with him today which frightens the outspoken critics of his strong arm government.
    I happen to know firsthand, often talking to human rights people, and also Members of Parliament and members of the opposition parties, BLDP and FUNCINPEC, that they sent an emissary to the U.S. Embassy to ask for protection and asylum and they were turned down and now their lives are definitely in danger. I was with them, and they are now looking for a government that will believe in them and that will protect them.
    I believe the United States should immediately call last week's action exactly what it is, a military coup. They should denounce Hun Sen for his violent takeover of the government; they should call for the reinstatement of the legally elected First Prime Minister, Prince Ranariddh, they should suspend all non-humanitarian financial support, refuse funds for any election that does not include legitimate opposition parties, and call on Cambodia to pass election laws which legalize and protect all political parties that wish to form and participate in the political process.
 Page 40       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    I can report to you today that the atmosphere in Cambodia is one of fear, absolute abject fear. The democratic parties are afraid, the press is afraid, and I will tell you firsthand, the men, women, and children are afraid. What they fear most is that a brutal, one-man, military type provisional government is being set up right now and it will be endorsed very soon by the United States and other members of the international community under the name of stability.
    I am afraid ''stability'' is a term really used only by diplomats and hardly ever by people in countries like Cambodia. What is stable for the U.S. State Department in Cambodia over the last several years has translated into the loss of freedom for that country's people.
    I just want to close with one statement. Hun Sen is giving the world a Khmer Rouge story as to why his military coup took place. Let me tell you what he said in Khmer on a Cambodian radio station Monday night following the coup. He used a Khmer analogy. He said Prince Ranariddh has long been ''a bone in my throat. I have now gotten rid of that bone and I will never let it back in''.
    Thank you very much.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Abney, for your sobering testimony.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Abney appears in the appendix.]
    Mr. BEREUTER. I want to commend you and other people working for IRI and for anyone else working under the auspices or funded by the National Endowment for Democracy for your work and, you personally, for your personal courage. You have seen the face of fear; you have seen fear on the faces of so many people. We hear about so much violence that in some ways, unfortunately, it becomes somewhat abstract. For you, I am sure it isn't. You help us to understand how many people are terrorized and victimized and living in terror and fear for their lives. We are so accustomed to having political change take place by nonviolent means that sometimes we forget about what it really means to real people. So you have helped convey that concern as well as your recommendations and your ideas today. Thank you.
 Page 41       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Next, we would like to hear from Doctor Marvin Ott, Professor of National Security Policy at the National War College, the National Defense University.
    Doctor Ott, your entire statement will be made a part of the record. You may proceed as you wish.

    Mr. OTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will try to adhere to the staff demands for brevity.
    My role, I am afraid, is going to be a little bit of the dog in the manger or the skunk at the garden party, I am not sure what the proper metaphor is, but I was asked to talk about the historical backdrop to current events and then to comment more specifically on the relationship between the FUNCINPEC leadership, Prince Ranariddh, in particular, and the Khmer Rouge, so I will try to do that fairly briefly.
    Let me begin by the obvious disclaimer that I speak only for myself and not for the Department of Defense.
    The historical backdrop is worth exploring. We Americans tend to be, as a British friend of mine said, ahistorical. We have a tendency to parachute into complex events with no knowledge or little interest in the historical antecedents to the current situation that we confront, and it is sometimes useful then to try to go back and understand how current events, in fact, have emerged the way they have.
    Cambodia has a uniquely tragic history that Members of this committee are certainly aware of. It is a history that I allude to briefly in my statement. Let me just pick up the thread, fairly recently, in 1970. Prince Sihanouk as Head of State, had succeeded in keeping his small country out of the growing flames of the Vietnam War going on next door. But in 1970, a coup d'etat, by his own generals, led by General Lon Nol overthrew him. The net effect of that was to draw Cambodia into the Indochina conflict on the side of South Vietnam and the United States. That was one fateful decision.
 Page 42       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    The second fateful decision was made by Sihanouk, now in exile, who chose not to come back to Cambodia and contest for power, many people thinking he in fact could have recovered his position rather easily if he had chosen to do so. Instead, he chose to throw his support behind a relatively small and obscure Communist guerilla force to which he gave the name Khmer Rouge, a group that had no more than 5,000 followers at the time. But with Sihanouk's imprimatur and with the Khmer Rouge's leadership remaining secretive and behind the scenes and its role disguised, the Khmer Rouge grew rapidly in strength, and in April 1975, a few days before the North Vietnamese took Saigon, the Khmer Rouge took Phnom Penh.
    The subsequent 3 years and 8 months are well-known to anyone who has followed events in Asia. This is the period of the killing fields. I would summarize this period by simply saying that the Kmer Rouge instituted the most brutal, most radical regime that modern history has ever known. There are a number of candidates for that dubious honor, but I think this one earns that label.
    Current estimates are still in flux, but, as you alluded to in your opening statement, perhaps a quarter of the entire population was exterminated. The process was still ongoing with no end in sight and was halted only because the Vietnamese army invaded on Christmas Day, 1978, and in 2 weeks, occupied Phnom Penh and the rest of the country.
    From a humanitarian standpoint, the Vietnamese invasion was certainly a blessing. It brought the killings to a close. But as a professor of geopolitics, in effect, let me play the geopolitician for a bit, if I may—from a geopolitical standpoint, the picture was rather different. Bangkok, the Thai Government saw the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia as a fruition of its worst nightmare. Having the Vietnamese army on the Thai border was the worst conceivable situation that the Thai could imagine. For China, the invasion of Vietnam had the effect of removing an ally and protege—the Khmer Rouge that they had supported and aided—and replacing it with, in effect, an enemy regime under the Vietnamese. Hanoi was seen as a cat's paw, an instrument of what was now an adversary regime in Moscow, and what the Chinese saw was a Soviet hostile encirclement of China, and this being part of that process.
 Page 43       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    For the United States, of course, still with open wounds from the Vietnam War, the invasion of Cambodia seemed to provide some validation for the domino theorists of a few years earlier. For the non-Communist Khmer, the occupation of their country by the Vietnamese was the occupation of their land by their ancient historic cultural enemy and the people to whom they had lost the historic Khmer lands to the east. For the Khmer Rouge, of course, the Vietnamese invasion had just displaced them from power. The upshot of all of this was a surprising marriage of convenience, a coalition between the Southeast Asian countries that were worried about Vietnam's imperial reach, the United States, China, the non-Communist Khmer, the Khmer Rouge, all of them in a loose coalition against Hun Sen, who had been installed by the Vietnamese and the Vietnamese army. I would be happy to go into some of the details.
    The coalition adopted a remarkably comprehensive strategy that had diplomatic, economic, and military dimensions to it. Nonetheless, I think that among all the participants in that effort, very few, if any, actually expected it to succeed in its objective, which was to expel the Vietnamese army from Cambodia. To the surprise of almost everyone in September 1989, it worked, and the Vietnamese army withdrew. As far as Washington was concerned, this left the United States without a policy. We were unprepared for success. The result was a remarkable policy debate about trying to figure out what to do next. It basically pit the Hill against the Bush White House, and if I can summarize it in a word, the White House saw the need to continue the effort to expel Vietnamese influence and Communist influence from Cambodia by continuing the effort against what was now a puppet Vietnamese Government left behind in Vietnam under Hun Sen.
    The prevailing view in the Congress, on the other hand, was that such a course of action would benefit primarily the Khmer Rouge, who were the strongest element in the coalition who would be the most likely to acquire power if Hun Sen were overthrown and that in itself was an unacceptable outcome.
 Page 44       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    All of this was resolved ultimately by the Paris Accords. You are familiar with those, I need not review them here, but I would be happy to do so in a question period.
    Suffice it to say, in my own view, the achievements in Paris were really quite substantial, and that remains true to this day. At the same time, the Paris Accords could not guarantee a positive outcome in Cambodia. To do that would have required a continuing international involvement of a degree and intensity that few were willing to contemplate and probably would have amounted to some kind of international trusteeship in Cambodia.
    Let me, if I can, in the last few minutes read from the last couple pages of my statement, focusing on some policy implications of all of this.
    Americans like to view foreign policy in terms of moral categories. Moralists, not strategists, tend to dominate our public discourse about foreign affairs. We are a parochial people. We have little patience or knowledge concerning the complexities and ambiguities of the real world of international affairs, so we impose simplifying categories of right and wrong.
    This tendency has been on full display in media commentary on events in Cambodia; Hun Sen is evil, Ranariddh is good; Hun Sen is a dictator, Ranariddh is a democrat. Unfortunately, there, in fact, are no saints on the current Cambodian political stage, at least none that stand out. Prince Ranariddh and FUNCINPEC are a case in point. Between 1979 and 1991, the non-Communist forces led by Ranariddh were allies of the Khmer Rouge. It was an alliance born of necessity, a pact with the devil, but a reality nonetheless. Royalists and other non-Communist guerilla units often collaborated closely with Khmer Rouge troops in the field. During the 1993 election campaign, Ranariddh faced a fateful choice. Despite signing the Paris Accords, the Khmer Rouge decided to boycott the elections and called upon FUNCINPEC to join them. Had it done so, the entire UNTAC effort would surely have collapsed. U.N. officials went to great lengths to persuade Ranariddh not to follow the Khmer Rouge lead and in the end he did not, and largely on the strength of his father's popularity, FUNCINPEC won a plurality.
 Page 45       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Then came a difficult challenge of actually governing in a coalition with his old adversary, Hun Sen. At the moment of its triumph, FUNCINPEC was utterly incapable of running the country by itself. The national bureaucracy, such as it was, was staffed by Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party. FUNCINPEC did not have the trained functionaries to replace them. This fact, as much as Hun Sen's demands, made a coalition a requirement. But knowing that his coalition partner was ruthless and ambitious, it was incumbent upon Ranariddh to build an organization that could credibly demand and assume an equal share of government power and responsibility as time passed.
    For 2 1/2 years, Ranariddh achieved an apparently constructive working relationship with Hun Sen, but he failed to build his party into a real national grass-roots political organization. Partly as a consequence, FUNCINPEC was unable to make credible demands on the CPP for a real share of government power. Disaffection with this state of affairs produced increasing dissent and division within FUNCINPEC and growing criticism of Ranariddh's leadership. At the same time, the FUNCINPEC leadership began to exhibit some of the same taste for corruption that had badly tainted the CPP.
    Faced with growing pressure from within his own party's ranks for a greater share of the spoils of political power and with elections looming, Ranariddh apparently adopted a high-risk strategy that included at least three elements. First, high decibel public demands for greater power sharing by the CPP, along with threats to disband the coalition and thereby the government; second, an attempt, partly successful, to strengthen the size and capabilities of military units loyal to FUNCINPEC; and, third, a fateful decision to pursue contacts with the remaining hard core Khmer Rouge with the intent of enlisting military support against the CPP and Hun Sen, his nominal coalition partner.
    Not surprisingly, Hun Sen saw these moves as a serious threat. The threat was more than just political. The Khmer Rouge that Ranariddh was dealing with were determined to kill Hun Sen at the first opportunity.
 Page 46       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Hun Sen and his colleagues were no angels and their actions have been well characterized by others in this room. Suffice it to say, it all added up to a witches brew of hatred and paranoia that produced the events of recent days.
    Where does all this leave U.S. policy? Over the last three decades, American foreign policy has viewed Cambodia—in sequence—as a military theatre, a humanitarian catastrophe, a geopolitical arena, and a testing ground for a new era of U.N. peacekeeping.
    In determining the next step, it will be useful to ask a question one does not often hear these days: What are U.S. national interests and what realities constrain the pursuit of those interests?
    I submit that the United States has no vital strategic interest at stake in Cambodia. However, the stability and viability of the Southeast Asian region is such an interest, and an unstable, crime-ridden, drug-ridden, vulnerable Cambodia would be a problem for the region. Second, the United States has a moral, humanitarian responsibility to prevent a return to power by the Khmer Rouge. Third, to the extent it can be done, at reasonable cost and without jeopardizing national strategic interests, the United States has a legitimate concern to foster democracy and the rule of law in Cambodia.
    The realities are that Hun Sen is now in effective control in Cambodia and there is little or no possibility that Ranariddh can be returned to his former position at any acceptable cost. Hun Sen is an autocrat by background, training, and instinct, and let it be said that he is ruthless and a killer. But he is also highly capable and he has publicly pledged to honor the current constitution, including its requirement for elections next year. The international community and the ASEAN States share an American interest in seeing that Hun Sen make good on the public pledges he has made. The international community also has a legitimate right to demand a full, judicial accounting for all the killings of recent days. Investigations should be demanded, trials held. Results may be a white wash, but it is important to force Hun Sen and his colleagues to go through the exercise. There is powerful leverage available due to the extreme dependence of the Cambodian economy on international assistance. It is in no one's interest to actually implement sanctions against a weak and poor country whose populace has already suffered far too much, but the threat can be made credible.
 Page 47       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    In conclusion, the best of a series of bad options is for the United States to join with other signatories of the Paris Accords, including ASEAN, and especially ASEAN, and seek a common understanding of what is expected of Hun Sen and his colleagues in the months ahead. If a consensus can be reached and there is a determination to follow through, up to and including the use of sanctions, if absolutely necessary, a satisfactory outcome for the international community and the people of Cambodia may yet be achieved.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Doctor Ott.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Ott appears in the appendix.]
    Mr. BEREUTER. Finally, we would like to hear from Mr. Sichan Siv, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, now Financial Advisor for Prudential Securities.
    Mr. Siv, welcome. You may proceed as you wish.


    Mr. SIV. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Chairman, since coming to America in 1976 as a refugee from Cambodia, I have celebrated with family and friends the blessings of this great Nation on our Independence Day. But the news on Cambodia received throughout this July 4th holiday was disturbing. Fighting between rival forces of the two co-premiers put in jeopardy the democratic principles in which we have tremendously invested.
    Mr. Chairman, in August 1989, while serving as the Deputy Assistant to President Bush for Public Liaison, I had the opportunity to accompany Secretary of State James Baker to the Paris Conference on Cambodia. Although a comprehensive settlement could not be reached at the time, the United States kept its leadership in the international efforts to bring peace and stability to Cambodia. In October 1991, we reached that agreement, and the United Nations spent $2 billion to organize the May 1993 elections.
 Page 48       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    An ancient Khmer prophecy foretells that Cambodia would go through a period of turmoil, so violent that the bloodbath would reach the elephant's belly before peace would return. In May 1993, the tide of blood seemed to have crested. Ninety percent of registered voters went to the polls. FUNCINPEC won the U.N.-supervised election, but the Communist Cambodian People's Party, led by Hun Sen, still maintained a larger force and threatened a civil war. It bullied its way into the government.
    Mr. Chairman, in many parts of the world, Cambodia included, arranged marriages are commonplace, and usually last until the end. However, the Ranariddh-Hun Sen union was a shotgun marriage. The world winked at this unholy matrimony. Both parties had been ''sleeping with the enemy'' until this month's violent divorce.
    The Royal Government of Cambodia under Prince Ranariddh and Mr. Hun Sen showed some signs of promise at the beginning. There seemed to be efforts to support economic growth and political stability. Newspapers sprang up and progress was made in human rights areas. Both the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute have done an excellent job in promoting democratic change.
    Unfortunately, the unnatural Ranariddh-Hun Sen coalition between the Prince and the Communists created a clear division of authority. Every public institution, civilian and military, was politicized and officials kept their allegiance to their political parties. There is no independent judiciary and the National Assembly is turning itself into a rubber stamp parliament.
    With very ineffective leadership, corruption mushroomed and other problems followed: Illegal logging, narcotics, prostitution, AIDS, in addition to the ever-present land mines on the ground. The donor countries continue to provide assistance, hoping to maintain and improve the little progress that has been made.
    Mr. Chairman, neither French nor English is my mother tongue, but I know both languages quite well, and according to Webster's, a coup d'etat is described as a sudden and forcible overthrow of a government. What happened during the July 4th holiday in Cambodia was, without any doubt, a coup. There is no other way to describe it. Force was used to topple a democratically elected government. Not only should this action not be condoned, but it must be condemned in the strongest terms.
 Page 49       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    In his opening remarks at the Paris conference, Secretary Baker said, among other things, that ''the strength of our support for any Cambodian Government will directly and inversely depend on the extent of the Khmer Rouge participation, if any, in that government.'' This should have been a warning to both Prince Ranariddh and Mr. Hun Sen that the United States would strongly oppose the inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in the Government of Cambodia.
    Mr. Hun Sen's action is in clear violation of the Paris Accords. It is an insult to the majority of the Cambodian people who did not vote for him. It is an affront to the international community. This must not be allowed to go unchecked. Otherwise, all the dictators who want to use force to grab power will be tempted.
    There are heroes in Cambodia. I count the many freedom fighters who gave their lives during the war against the Vietnamese occupation, the 70 U.N. personnel who died organizing the May 1993 elections, the NGO workers and human rights advocates, the journalists killed for trying to tell the truth, and the victims of the Easter Sunday grenade attacks, which include my fellow panelist, Ron Abney, and of course the 90 percent of Cambodia's electorate who overcame intimidation to express their rights for the first time as free citizens.
    Mr. Chairman, the 1991 Paris Accords was a good agreement. It was the implementation that was flawed. First, there was no complete disarming of the warring factions; second, the result of the elections was not respected; third, no effort was made to put democracy back on track when the breakdown began; fourth, both parties were not given strong warnings when they were flirting with the Khmer Rouge.
    The Wall Street Journal of July 11 asked the question, ''Who Lost Cambodia?'' I believe we all did. But the big losers are the people of Cambodia who gave us their faith and fate.
    We knew from the beginning that we were betting on miracles to make the Ranariddh-Hun Sen marriage work. We knew that monarchy and communism do not mix, like oil and water. We knew the road to recovery for such a live-and-make-it-die arrangement was fraught with ''land mines''. We knew that strong medicine was needed to stop the political hemorrhage. So who knew it when? And what was done to prevent the death of democracy in Cambodia? Were we too eager to make Cambodia a U.N. success story that we tolerated too many incorrect actions by the Royal Government? Yes, we were. Did we sacrifice long-term stability by overlooking short-term deficiencies? Yes, we did.
 Page 50       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    The concept of ''no taxation without representation'' should apply to Cambodia. Almost 60 percent of Cambodia's budget depends on foreign aid. If America and the rest were bankrolling Cambodia's reconstruction and development, we ought to be able to warn Cambodia's ruling parties of dangerous land mines if they got off the road to democracy. To borrow a phrase, I would say that ''it takes the international community to raise Cambodia from the ashes,'' and ''it takes the international community to keep it alive''.
    Mr. Chairman, the United States emerged from the cold war as the sole superpower. There is a burden of our leadership, which we must carry with diligence. This is where our leadership is needed. We should mobilize the international community to bring diplomatic, economic, and political pressure to bear upon the Phnom Penh regime to restore democratic institutions and principles. Until this has been done, and the 1991 Paris Accords fully subscribed to, all bilateral and multilateral assistance should be discontinued. To achieve this objective, we should pursue all avenues available, including the United Nations, P–5, G–7, ASEAN, and international financial institutions. We should urge France and Indonesia to reconvene the Paris Conference on Cambodia.
    All political reprisals, including arrests, intimidation, and killings, must be stopped immediately and perpetrators punished. AFP and others reported this morning that at least 35 supporters in custody have been killed. These Khmer Rouge-style executions ought to stop.
    We should continue to support political plurality. This includes existing democratic forces, the BLDP, FUNCINPEC, KNP, and any future democratic movements. King Sihanouk, who has always played a pivotal role, should also be consulted.
    We are 3 short years away from the new millennium. In order for us to maintain global leadership into the next century, we should take our responsibility seriously, stand by our principles, and lead with resolve. The overly traumatized people of Cambodia are crying for help. We must heed their call.
 Page 51       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Mr. Chairman, at the National Gallery of Art is on display, until the end of September, a stunning exhibit called ''Sculpture of Angkor and Ancient Cambodia—Millennium of Glory.'' It is a selection of some 99 splendid pieces of stone and bronze figures from the 6th through the 16th centuries. There are not many civilizations in the world that have produced such art work for such a sustained period. If you have not done so, I urge you, Members of the Committee, and everyone here, to view this once-in-a-lifetime show. You will see that the Khmer people are master builders, who perfected the construction of stone structures and waterworks over a thousand years ago.
    More than twice the size of Manhattan, the city of Angkor contains about 600 magnificent monuments, including the world's largest religious temple of Angkor Wat. The exhibit will show you that Cambodia is NOT the killing fields. It is a civilization that gave birth to some of the world's architectural and engineering wonders. That is the Cambodia I want people to remember.
    I appreciate the opportunity to share with you my thoughts, and I commend you for holding this timely hearing. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Siv, thank you very much for your testimony.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Siv appears in the appendix.]
    Mr. BEREUTER. Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony. It was very strong.
    Of course the purpose of the hearings are, in part, to educate the Members of Congress, this subcommittee, and for us to help our colleagues reach decisions about potential actions that we as a government should take. It also helps as a matter for public examination on this important issue.
    Of course, we have heard from all of you, directly or indirectly, some criticism of our government, the executive branch at this point, and the actions it has taken and some that it has not taken. I would like to ask all of you the very important and timely question, since we will have an opportunity to express ourselves on this issue, and perhaps to shape policy, what do you think Congress should do in light of the situation we find today in Cambodia and in light of the actions or inactions of our own government?
 Page 52       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Mr. ABNEY. First of all, I know it would be extremely symbolic and helpful to the freedom fighters in that country if the U.S. Government called this exactly what it is and condemned Hun Sen for what he has done. They are waiting for that message. That is a signal they have not received, so that is symbolic and something that can be done.
    Second, I think that in no way should our government, the U.S. Government, endorse a provisional military regime that is being set up right now because it excludes the duly elected First Prime Minister of the country. It would be constitutionally illegal, and, more importantly, it would endorse Hun Sen's actions which have completely demolished all the opposition parties. I also think that in no way should the U.S. Government fund an election that excludes the Khmer Nation Party, the BLDP party, or any other party that wants to participate. Because the way it is being set up now, a government, in my opinion, will be announced soon in Phnom Penh and the international community will say this is a government we can work with, Hun Sen will then call for elections, and there will literally be no opposition to his authority. So in my opinion, I would strongly urge—at the beginning and not the middle or the end—the U.S. Government not to endorse or participate in any elections that exclude the opposition.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Abney.
    Doctor Ott or Mr. Siv. Mr. Siv next.
    Mr. SIV. Mr. Chairman, I agree with Ron Abney, but I want to stress it is very important for the United States to send a very strong message, loud and clear, to Hun Sen and his people that this will not stand.
    We support democratic change. We have invested a lot of time, effort, and money in bringing the Paris Peace Accords into effect with other counterparts around the world, and we will have to make this truly subscribed to before we can restore what we call normal business activities with the Phnom Penh regime or anybody there.
 Page 53       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. Doctor Ott.
    Mr. OTT. I would basically subscribe to that, but let me come back to a slightly different point. There are no good solutions in this situation. The crockery has been well and truly broken and whatever gets put back together again is going to be pretty ugly. So I think we have to start, by disabusing ourselves that there is going to be anything very pretty come out of this.
    Having said that, that doesn't mean something can't come out of it, and I would argue, again, that a solution is going to have to be found in concert with our other international partners, the countries involved in Paris, but particularly the ASEAN countries. We cannot afford to get in a situation, like we have managed to get ourselves in with regard to Burma, where we and the ASEAN country are on the opposite sides of policy. If we do get in that situation, we will simply be ineffective and we will end up driving a further wedge between ourselves and our natural allies in the region.
    And so whatever form it would take, I would like to see Congress basically emphasizing two points: first, that there has to be a coordinated international response, that Hun Sen, looking out at the world, has to see a convincing united front; and, second, that we start to lay down clear markers as to what the international community will require. And, for example, it would require that any election that takes place has to include Mr. Sam Rainsy, that he has to be able to go back in the country and be safe, that he has to be able to organize his party and to campaign. That would be simply one of the kinds of measures that a solution is going to have to involve.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you.
    Mr. Siv, you mentioned in your testimony that, in fact, perhaps we in the international community overlook things in order to try to find a success for the United Nations, for the international community, and what happened in Cambodia, and I agree with you, you reached that conclusion.
 Page 54       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Did we sacrifice long-term security and stability overlooking short-term deficiencies, and you said, yes we did, and that is certainly the case. Is Cambodia now a failed State that, because of the political turmoil that has ensued, in light of the coup, does it call for an international involvement, a physical presence there beyond what we have done in the past? I would ask that to you, Mr. Siv, first, but ask any of you.
    Mr. SIV. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I think it is a failed State in a sense that the rule of law has broken down and there is no justice and no judicial system. People that have been in custody have been tortured and killed, and I want to take issue with my friend Marvin, who said that we can trust Hun Sen's public pledge that he will respect the constitution.
    I was in Phnom Penh when the Khmer Rouge came in 1975. I missed the U.S. Embassy evacuation by a half hour, so I got stuck there. The Khmer Rouge said they would only punish seven people of the government, seven people, and we realized that there were almost 2 1/2 million people who died under the Khmer Rouge regime.
    Hun Sen, after the coup, he said there were only four people they considered as traitors, but so far, as of this morning, there were 35 killed while in custody, so, yes, it is a sad state and if we do not mobilize an international effort to call or reconvene the press conference again, I think we are not fulfilling our responsibility as the oldest democracy and also the leader of the free world.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Doctor Ott.
    Mr. OTT. If I could respond, I don't want to be misunderstood. I do not trust Hun Sen and I am not suggesting that we should. What I was trying to suggest is that he, Hun Sen, has made a series of public statements in which he has, in effect, pledged a set of steps that he is willing to take. What I would like to see is the international community to say, in effect, OK, we are going to etch those in stone and we are going to hold you to them and we are going to do it in a very fundamentalist sort of fashion. We are going to be absolutely rigid in demanding that you adhere exactly to what you have pledged to do publicly and we will, in fact, hold the threat of sanctions against you to enforce that. So, no, I don't trust him at all, but I would like to test him and, in effect, compel him to live up to what he has, in fact, stated publicly.
 Page 55       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    On the failed State issue, maybe a slightly different perspective on it.
    My first recent visit to Cambodia was in early 1990. One official in the U.S. Embassy commented when I was out there in May of this year, how you view Cambodia depends on what your starting point is. If you arrive in Cambodia today and look around and say this is a mess, it sure looks like a failed State. But if your starting point was 1990, it looks like a miracle. There has been a remarkable transformation. I mean, Cambodia actually looks like a functioning society now. In 1990, it did not. In 1990, you could sit on the main street of Phnom Penh and look down it and see virtually no activity. Today, you stand in the same spot and you will get run over by the traffic in about 5 seconds.
    There has been a remarkable change and I think it is important to remember just how far down this society was driven. I mean, it was driven into the dust. All the literate people were killed; the schools were closed and razed; the monks were killed. This was absolute and total social destruction. The metaphor, or the anecdote that sticks in my mind was a comment of one Khmer who was talking about this time. (Sichan of course was there for part of it.) Toward the end of the killing fields period, this person said people were reduced to mining the mass graves, and what they were doing was digging down to the bottom layers of these mass graves because the people that were killed at the beginning, some of them had gold in their teeth and they were literally mining the mass graves for gold to try to find something that they could use to obtain food. So it is important to remember just how far Cambodia was driven down and not be too unreasonable in expecting what it can become in a fairly short length of time.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Doctor Ott, what would you have the United Nations do there now? How should their mission change?
    Mr. OTT. Well, the U.N. mission, and Ron can probably speak to this better than I can, the U.N. mission, once UNTAC was completed, largely ended, not entirely, but largely ended. What you have now is an active U.N., demining program, which has been really quite remarkable.
 Page 56       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    I agree, I forget who said it, that there are heroes in Cambodia. There are a lot of heroes, people in the human rights community, people working on demining, people doing remarkable things. So I guess the United Nations has basically assumed a kind of monitoring role and humanitarian assistance role and that strikes me as appropriate at this point.
    Mr. OTT. The sort of intervention I am talking about, I don't think is a U.N. function. It is really an outgrowth of the Paris Accords.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Let me conclude my questions with a question of Mr. Abney. He may care to comment on this last one as well.
    You mentioned that Cambodians in this recent tragedy were denied political asylum and requested it from the American Embassy.
    Mr. ABNEY. Right.
    Mr. BEREUTER. What do you think should have been done on the spot?
    Mr. ABNEY. I think the U.S. ambassador should have taken them in until they felt safe instead of turning them away, which is apparently what happened.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Why didn't that happen?
    Mr. ABNEY. I believe that it didn't happen because it would have alienated the Hun Sen Government and that is something the U.S. Government—State Department—does not want to do.
    Can I also just speak to that?
    Mr. BEREUTER. Yes, please.
    Mr. ABNEY. I am convinced that there is no internal force that can influence Hun Sen. King Sihanouk can no longer do this. He is no longer a major player in terms of mediation. It is going to take immediate, strong action. The only possibility of getting Hun Sen's attention is by drastic international, the U.S. sanctions.
 Page 57       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    To make statements like those we have heard in the last 3 or 4 days by State Department spokespersons that once this new provisional government is set up, we are going to call on Hun Sen to have free and fair elections and observe human rights is ludicrous. So the only potential here, and it is not, in my opinion, for the United Nations to come in, it is for the people who provide money, 60 percent of this government's budget, to say, ''no more'' until there is a democracy forming in that country, which includes opposition parties. And it is the only way to get Hun Sen's attention.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Abney.
    We will turn now to Mr. Capps for his questions and then to Mr. Rohrabacher.
    Mr. CAPPS. Thank you.
    Well, I want to thank all of you, the three of you, for providing what I think all of us in the room recognize to be very sobering testimony. And there is no way that I can listen to that and go out of here with any sense of cheer or with an idea about what the solution might be in terms of one thing we can do.
    So I want to back it up a ways. And I think this is in keeping with your observation at the beginning, Dr. Ott, about knowing the history and knowing some of the background on this.
    What I have trouble with—what perplexes me the most about what happened there is getting the overall story line. And I hope this isn't too abstract. But I know that you know Paul Fussell wrote a great book called ''The Great War in Modern Memory,'' in which one of the thesis is that they didn't know how to fight World War I until they understood what the war was about. And it seems, and in situations like this, it is very difficult for us to understand what this really is and what the plot line is, why the tension is there.
    And I have been concentrating on this one all day. I sure don't have it. But I don't apologize for that very much, because I don't think we know the story of Cambodia in those terms. I don't think we knew the story of Vietnam when we got in there. I think it took a long time for us to really understand that this was a lot about nationalism. It was a civil war. There were things going on there that were not very well understood in the beginning. And if, Mr. Chairman, if it is fair to ask this question—could I ask you to help us with the plot line, with the story line?
 Page 58       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    This is not simply about ideological conflict, although there is a lot of it. I think there is more ideological conflict here than has been brought to light. But I don't know. Something is going on here, it has to do with the transfer from what was a civilization to the destruction of that civilization to what is left afterwards. And yet the forces are not fair from the outside. This is not a country that is responding to destructive forces outside Cambodia. This is—well, there is some of that as well. But this is primarily internalized.
    I found it really interesting that the contrast between the killing fields and the civilization—I mean, that was, Mr. Siv, a very interesting point that you made. But, you know, if I were teaching a class on this, which is what I used to do, and I wanted to describe what this story illustrates, I have to say I really don't get it yet. I mean, I don't quite know what is at stake here. And I think until we understand what is really at stake here, it is very difficult for us to know what U.S. policy should be and you have warned us not to do this unless we simply take it in sort of present-tense terms; I think we have to take it in the longer perspective.
    Now if I have asked a question that anybody can respond, I would love to hear your answer. If not, I will give up my time and transfer it to my colleague down the way.
    Mr. OTT. If I can?
    Mr. BEREUTER. Dr. Ott.
    Mr. OTT. I will take an initial shot at it. As sort of one professor to another, I guess.
    Mr. BEREUTER. But just so we can all understand it.
    Mr. OTT. I would say there are two, maybe three story lines. One (you alluded to it actually), is the breakdown and transition of a traditional society into the modern era.
    The Khmer Empire in the 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th centuries was the greatest empire in Southeast Asia. For 500 years, it has been in decline. For 500 years, the Khmer, in a sense have been on a downward slope in terms of their position, their strength, and so on. They have steadily lost territory. As I mentioned in my statement, were it not for the intervention of the French, there would be no Cambodia and the Khmer would be a minority people divided up between the Thai and the Vietnamese.
 Page 59       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    So part of it—one story—is a traditional society with a once great tradition, very conscious of that tradition but with a social order, a culture, a political order that is entirely inappropriate to a modern era. And trying to find how to make the transition—you know, the god-kings of Angkor have no place in the modern world, but if that is the only political system your society has ever known, then you have got a real problem adjusting to this strange thing that people keep talking about called democracy. What the heck is that?
    Hun Sen has made the comment, rulers rule and the people obey. That is the way it is supposed to work. This is not a man who understands what democracy is. But he is a man who understands the Khmer tradition. That is one story line.
    The second story line I would identify is that what is going on right now is a competition for power. I don't think it has very much to do with ideology. I don't think Hun Sen is a Communist. I think Hun Sen is out for power. I mean, he is perfectly willing to work within a free market. Free markets make money. Free markets provide opportunities for big-time corruption. He has no problem with free markets. This has nothing to do with communism. This is about power. So that would be my second story line.
    And the third one, if it is, is outside of Cambodia. It is the one I tried to allude to earlier. There are other interested parties in what happens to Cambodia and they have their own story line. And what they are basically concerned with is what happens in Cambodia that affects the broader region of Southeast Asia. That has to do with instability. It has to do with drugs. It has to do with economics. It has to do with deforestation. It has to do with a lot of things. That is the other story.
    Those would be my three story lines.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Siv, do you want to try and take a crack at that?
 Page 60       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Mr. SIV. Yes, let me take another shot. I am interested in the concept of god-king that Marvin mentioned. And Angkor Wat, you know, Mr. Chairman, from the 9th to the 15th centuries, those are the periods that the Khmer Empire was very powerful, a center of a very powerful civilization. But the god-king concept seems to still remain with Hun Sen and Pol Pot and all these people. I mean, these are the people who think that they are the ones who can have absolute power and do whatever they can do over the people of Cambodia. That is exactly what Pol Pot did, because he was the sole supreme leader of the country.
    In terms of whether Hun Sen is a Communist or not, I have lived under communism for a year before I was able to escape to Thailand and the United States in freedom. I said this is exactly what the Communists do. Having no opposition, to destroy their enemies, abolish all kinds of freedom, from freedom of expression to freedom of speech and so on and so forth. So I will just leave it like that, at that point.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Abney.
    Mr. ABNEY. I agree with Dr. Ott.
    As to his second point, since IRI has been involved, it has been totally about power. And it started in 1991, in my opinion. Hun Sen, assuming he would win the election and the admiration and love of the entire world, called for free democratic elections. It had nothing to do with freedom or democracy. But it was totally a power move since he assumed he was going to win. And then when he didn't win, and I was there the day the United Nations announced the election results, he claimed the elections were rigged. And so it was all about power from the start.
    He did the same in late 1993. He recreated the exact same situation that we are seeing now. He called for elections in 1994, 1995 because FUNCINPEC was completely disorganized. He thought that the opposition parties would divide up and split the anti-CPP vote, and he would win the election. When it became apparent that he couldn't win the elections, that is when the violence started. So as far as our involvement, it has never been about philosophy; it has always been about power and greed.
 Page 61       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Capps has one more brief question and we will turn to you.
    Mr. CAPPS. One more quick one.
    Mr. Abney, you allude to the climate of fear in Cambodia today as you just came back from there. Do I also understand from your allusions that the U.S. Embassy, in your judgment, has not fulfilled an appropriate role? I mean that, turning back people who have come there for assistance.
    I think what I am asking this time is that in that climate of fear, people obviously traumatized, where trauma has appeared here at least twice in a coup, the United States, could it have done more 2 weeks ago? Could we be doing more in the city today than we are doing?
    Mr. ABNEY. It is not just what we did or didn't do in the last 2 weeks. It is what led up to the last 2 weeks. We have never—that is, the U.S. Government has never encouraged the opposition parties. By the way, this is also true of the entire international community. The international community has, in many cases, been led by the U.S. Government in this regard.
    Stability and fair and free elections in Cambodia has never included the opposition parties. By the way, UNTAC felt that the opposition parties should not be involved because they felt it was unsafe. They thought it created an unstable situation and they wouldn't control it.
    So I think that the time for the U.S. State Department to start helping this process by speaking out for allowing Rainsy's party to be legal, and for the passing of a political party law which allows opposition parties to organize is now. It should have started 3 years ago, but it didn't. And the U.S. State Department has never supported the opposition movement. So it is not surprising to me that these people were turned away. It is disappointing but not surprising.
 Page 62       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Capps, I think you would agree that is a devastatingly serious assessment.
    Mr. CAPPS. Yes.
    Mr. BEREUTER. The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher.
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. And you think this is a very serious thing. You say that in the middle of a crisis when people's lives are at stake that we turn democratic leaders out into the street so that a person who we know is murdering this democratic opposition, can get at them. This is a very serious thing.
    Mr. ABNEY. Most serious.
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. Maybe the other panelists would like to comment on that. Is there any other thing, before the other panelists comment on that, anything else the Embassy has done that you think warrants the concern of people who think the United States should stand for more than just, you know—
    Mr. ABNEY. Well, as I said, the main thing is not encouraging—by not speaking out on behalf of the opposition, which, by the way, as I said earlier, probably consists of 750,000 to a million supporters in a country of 10 million, which means that there are at least that many more supporters of the parties. We are talking about major membership, major supporters.
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. And Hun Sen didn't win the last election.
    Mr. ABNEY. Right.
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. So everybody is in opposition to him, except his clique, right?
    Mr. ABNEY. Right. But now there is a real articulate opposition led by some of the brightest people I have ever worked with in any country. Some of the names I mentioned while you were not in the room—from BLDP, Son Sann, Rainsy's party, and people like Ahmad Yahya and others from the FUNCINPEC party. People who are the best and brightest in that country—are not able to participate in this election.
 Page 63       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    The U.S. State Department has never spoken out encouraging Hun Sen's government to legalize the BLDP and KNP. And as a result, Rainsy cannot organize in the provinces. It is dangerous personally for his people to organize. It is illegal.
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. Was there a change in the effectiveness of the Embassy when Charlie Twining left and Ken Quinn came in?
    Mr. ABNEY. I think that the State Department's stand never changed. It was always pro government. The difference was Charlie Twining opened up, allowed and encouraged opposition party leaders. He went to opposition party events. We used to see him all over the provinces having dinner with opposition party leaders. He was still pro government and that was the State Department's policy, but he was encouraging other Cambodian voices to speak out. This embassy does not do that. They don't meet with them publicly. They don't encourage them. And I think it has resulted in the intimidation and harassment of these people.
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let's understand what, hear what you mean by ''government'' when you are referring to what relationship we had with the government. In reality, Hun Sen did not win the election but we, as some sort of compromise in order to maintain order, permitted him to hold a position of power; is that correct?
    Mr. ABNEY. Absolutely.
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. That was a compromise?
    Mr. ABNEY. Absolutely.
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. And the billions of dollars we spent, all of our diplomatic activity has been aimed, has it not, in the last few years of trying to ease out this one individual, either into the democratic process, or ease him out of power? Isn't that what this has all been about? Everything else has been a facade to hide the fact that we have a gangster in power that we are trying to civilize or get him out of power?
    Mr. ABNEY. In my opinion, yes.
 Page 64       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. So it has been a failure; hasn't it?
    Mr. ABNEY. Well, I believe that the Embassy and the State Department felt that the strongest person in the government was Hun Sen, and they did everything they could possibly do over a 3-year period to encourage that leadership. And as a result it sent a message to the growing opposition parties that the U.S. Government was endorsing a person who was violating their rights and keeping them from participating in the process.
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. Sometimes governments or shall we say sometimes representatives of government mistake very strong and forceful people as being legitimate people to hold power because they can make decisions and they seem very forceful. And the personality seems more like a leader. In fact, I visited Cambodia many times.
    Mr. ABNEY. Sure.
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is what I found, is that Hun Sen is very forceful—have you ever met Hun Sen? Have you folks ever met him? He is a very forceful guy and seems like a real determined fellow. And he is just the kind of guy I don't want to control all the guns in the country.
    I am afraid of people who are too easy to make decisions about other people's lives. And this fellow is a forceful man and knows how to make decisions. And if you don't have your values screwed on straight, you will end up trying to establish a relationship with him instead of the people who work hard and are trying to get along and believe in compromise and have trouble making forceful decisions. But it has been—this is pretty much to the panel, wouldn't you say that this is a basically American policy and this consensus policy, as you have been describing with our allies and such, has been a failure now with Hun Sen taking over? Isn't that correct? Aren't we here today celebrating a total failure of our policy and our goals?
    Well, I will answer the question. The answer is yes. And where do we go from here? What about the idea of making some forceful decisions on our own, like we are supposed to do? For example, recognizing that Hun Sen is a dictator, should we now, instead of with a namby-pamby policy that we have had, at least we have seen coming out of our embassy for the last month, shouldn't we now be backing a government in exile or recognizing some kind of a united democratic front which would include all these other parties rather than trying to deal or in some way recognize and then deal with Hun Sen and again try to reform him? Is that the best approach? Or do you think the best approach is to try to, well, you have already stated that.
 Page 65       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Mr. BEREUTER. I think Dr. Ott was about to be tempted at your previous question.
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. Go ahead. I am rambling as well. I am not a professor but I ramble as well.
    Mr. BEREUTER. I saw movement toward the mike there.
    Mr. OTT. I thought better of it then. Well, I guess two quick comments.
    Certainly, in a narrow, political sense, the arrangements that were put in place after the 1993 elections have now failed. I do want to put the word ''political'' in front of it because there has been a lot that has happened in Cambodia and in a sense there has been a true transformation of that country socially and economically. This is not the same place it was in 1993. Remarkable things have happened. And so I don't want to put the word ''failure'' with all of that. I don't think that has been a failure. But if you want to put the label ''failure'' on the political formula we put in place in 1993, that is now broken down. So, yes, that is a failure.
    Backing a government in exile, I mean keep in mind, going back to history, we did that for 10 years. We backed a government in exile. We supported one side in a civil war. We had a 10-year conflict in the jungles of Cambodia. We were a participant in it. Arm's length, but we were there. And I'm not criticizing that policy. I think that was, in fact, the right thing to do. But I don't think we want to go down that road again in the current context.
    One thing, I recently reread when I was in Phnom Penh, David Chandler's very good biography, ''Brother Number One'', the biography of Pol Pot. And it struck me that, you know, he is talking about Pol Pot sitting up there in the jungle with his visions of agrarian Communist perfection and the blood on his hands and all the rest of it. And in the meantime, just a half an hour's plane flight away you have got Singapore, you know, chrome and glass, Internet, CNN, international financial center. In short, there are two entirely different worlds out there. So the world of supporting exiles and civil wars and guerilla movements and so on, that world is over, I think, in Southeast Asia. So my answer is, no, you don't try to go back to that.
 Page 66       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    What you do is, as I have already said, you have a bad situation. There is no good answer. The best one I can come up with is see if you can put together a truly forceful international coalition that will come to Hun Sen and basically read the riot act to him.
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, reading the riot act to somebody like Hun Sen, and not be willing to use force is not effective—let me put it this way. I mean, I don't know of any examples in history where you go to a gangster and you act like a schoolteacher and they pay attention to you.
    Mr. OTT. But if the gangsters—
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. Gangsters usually pull out their pistols and shoot the schoolteacher, and that is the end of their conversation.
    Mr. OTT. If they are gangsters on an iron lung, and you can pull the plug on them, then you don't have to shoot them.
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. So in other words, now that is what I wanted to get to.
    Mr. OTT. I think this gangster is on an iron lung.
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, I think the country is in an iron lung, and I don't think he cares.
    See, the trouble with these bad guys like Hun Sen, he doesn't care how many of his own people are hurt. Am I wrong, Mr. Siv? He doesn't care how many of his fellow countrymen die. He doesn't care if the economy goes to hell. He doesn't care how many kids don't get any education. He doesn't care because he has all the power. That is all he cares about.
    Now, let me ask you about the other strategy. One strategy is you go support a government in exile, try to have some sort of movement where there is force behind it. What about the other strategy? What about the total isolation, economic and political isolation? And with that in mind as I just said, as a dictator he doesn't care one bit.
 Page 67       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Now of course there are people around him who might care and say we have got enough of him and let's off him some night or something, or let's put something in his breakfast food or something, but will that be effective at all only having an economic and political isolation of the Hun Sen regime? I am just opening it to up to the panel. What would be the most effective course? Because right now just talking to him with all our buddies I don't think is going to get us anywhere.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Anybody want to try that?
    Mr. SIV. I agree with you, Congressman Rohrabacher, that people like Hun Sen listen only to a big stick, because the issue of power here is something that we have to consider—he is very hungry for power. And The Economist last week mentioned that he is only 45 or 46 years old and he might be able to stay on for another 30 years. So that is very scary.
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is right.
    Mr. SIV. I think the issue that is facing us is an issue of leadership for the United States to coordinate international efforts. We really have to take the heed—we cannot just wait for ASEAN to take a position, and follow ASEAN leadership. That is not a position we should take. Vietnam is now in ASEAN and Hun Sen went to Vietnam before the coup took place. Nobody would go on vacation before a major coup was going to take place. So I am not saying that the Vietnamese are having their hands in this whole thing, but we have to keep that angle into perspective.
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. One last point.
    Mr. ABNEY. It is a very depressing question, because it—
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. It sure is.
    Mr. ABNEY. It depends on Hun Sen's attitude. He is 46 years old. And, you know, if you look at 1993, he lost the election. Now he is still running the country. So, you know, you can pull up stakes and nobody can be there.
 Page 68       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    There has developed over the last 3 years an incredible grass-roots opposition to Hun Sen. And if any kind of drastic sanctions or any movement of the international committee of the U.S. Government that can affect people like Rainsy being able to go back into the country and continue to organize, that is worth something. That might not be worth something now, but it will be worth something in the future.
    In my time in Cambodia, from 1993 to 1997, the opposition has grown unbelievably. The activity—IRI's involvement in supporting women in the political process has been important. You know, over 60 percent of the population in Cambodia are women. They are active. They are beginning to organize. There is also a large number of young people who couldn't vote in 1993 that will be able to vote in 1998.
    I think by being there and talking about the opposition and organizing, if you can just get that, that is something. But you are only going to get that through pressure. You are not going to get that by waiting until Hun Sen's government is formed and then go in there and try to talk him into becoming democratic.
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right.
    Mr. ABNEY. That is ludicrous.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Will the gentleman yield for a question for Mr. Abney?
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, absolutely.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Abney, there is some evidence that members of the CPP, Hun Sen's own party, were not on board for the changes that he made as he seized absolute power.
    Do you think it is possible that enough distension could be found or generated so that he could be deposed within his own party?
    Mr. ABNEY. There is absolutely no doubt that there is a moderate wing of the CPP. There is—and it is led by the Minister of Interior, Sar Kheng. And there are people within CPP for the first time who oppose Hun Sen. When they had their congress, some of Hun Sen's candidates did not get elected. There is a group of people within CPP who has voiced private opposition to his military brutal type government.
 Page 69       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    The problem is when the war starts and the fighting starts, Communists, as you know, stick together. They don't speak with two voices. They all form one voice. But there are people within that party who are more moderate. And whether or not that could eventually have an effect on the policy of CPP, I don't know. But there is a split.
    Mr. BEREUTER. OK. I understand you have one brief question.
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. By the way, just for the sake of people who are here, I am introducing an amendment tomorrow to the Foreign Operations' appropriations bill that would cut off all aid to Cambodia, except for democracy building and humanitarian aid. So that is just one note.
    Mr. BEREUTER. There will be two amendments there, then.
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. And this is basically the question. And again, and some other note just for the record, someday the United States really will be a powerful force for democracy in the world but it is only when we actually decide that we have the courage and we have the commitment to do so.
    In situations like this, in the post-cold war world, we are paying billions of dollars for the CIA. And before we were fighting communism. Well, now we should fight dictatorship. And one hope for people in these situations is if the United States of America would live up to our ideals, buy off one of the generals, one of Hun Sen's generals and just say, ''Hey, you want to be a hero for all of your people, here are the resources you need, the United States will back you up. Get rid of this bum.'' There is the solution. And make sure he is going to go for free elections, et cetera; make sure he is the right guy.
    My last question to you is, is it not true, and again Hun Sen was a triggerman for Pol Pot. Let's make sure everybody remembers that. Is that not the case? We are talking about a man who pulled the trigger for Pol Pot. That is all I am asking, yes or no. Or if you want to—people keep talking about this guy as if he is shocked that somebody is trying to make a deal with the Khmer Rouge and here is a guy that was a triggerman for the Khmer Rouge. I needed to say that. Thank you very much.
 Page 70       PREV PAGE       TOP OF DOC
    Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you.
    Mr. OTT. Hun Sen was a regional commander in the Khmer Rouge forces who at age 25 was slated to be purged, and then defected to Vietnam.
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right.
    Mr. OTT. Or slated before he was 25 but defected to Vietnam and then came back with the Vietnamese Army.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your testimony. It is very important, informative, sobering.
    I would say to my colleagues, in addition to apparently at least two amendments on this subject to the Foreign Ops bill, that I would hope to draft and introduce and move appropriate legislation through the Committee in relatively short order, but we will do it to the best of our ability.
    And I would say to the colleagues here and to any personal staff or Members of the Subcommittee who might be here, that your ideas would be welcome on this subject and we will try to work out something that will have the best ideas from everyone.
    Mr. ROHRABACHER. Great.
    Mr. BEREUTER. You have helped contribute to that today. So thank you very much for your attendance. And I thank my colleagues for their thoughtful questions. This subcommittee is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 5:08 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]