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45–290 CC






OCTOBER 29, 1997

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
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HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
JAY KIM, California
TOM CAMPBELL, California
JON FOX, Pennsylvania
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
ROY BLUNT, Missouri
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
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TOM LANTOS, California
PAT DANNER, Missouri
BRAD SHERMAN, California
BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee
BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
JIM DAVIS, Florida
RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff
MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Democratic Chief of Staff
MARK GAGE, Professional Staff Member
JOHN HERZBERG, Professional Staff Member
Allison K. Kiernan, Staff Associate
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    Ambassador Marc Grossman, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs
    Opening statement of Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman, Committee on International Relations
    Prepared statement of Ambassador Marc Grossman
    Letters submitted by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
    Responses to questions submitted to the Department of State

House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.

    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (chairman of the Committee) presiding.
    Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order.
    As we begin our hearing this morning, I have an unfortunate duty to perform. I want to take a moment to pay tribute to our good friend and good Member of this Committee, the late Walter Capps, who passed away suddenly yesterday at the Dulles Airport in Washington.
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    Walter was a freshman on this Committee, but he distinguished himself in many ways in the brief period of time that he was with us. As we know he was a professor of religion for 33 years, he was a graduate of the Divinity School at Yale, he wrote 14 books, and he brought to us a wealth of experience and wisdom.
    Walter truly enjoyed his service on this Committee. His strong record of constructive participation in this room and on the floor demonstrated his deep commitment to the work of the Congress. In every way he was a gentle person, a man who deeply cared for others, and he will be sorely missed by this Committee. His moderate voice had a definite impact upon all of us.
    I would like to express on behalf of the Members and staff of the Committee our most sincere condolences to Walter Capps' family and his friends.
    I recognize the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Hamilton.
    Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for taking a few minutes this morning before we begin our hearing to recognize the extraordinary life and contributions made by Walter Capps. As you said, he had a remarkable career as a professor teaching religious studies for 33 years at the University of California in Santa Barbara before he came to Congress in 1996.
    Walter is a person I got to know, quite well really, in the few months that he was on the Committee and in the Congress. As you said, Mr. Chairman, he loved his work, he loved serving the people of the 22d District of California; and in a sense, I think he felt he spent his life preparing for this work.
    Some Members may remember that he handled a resolution on the floor just a few weeks ago at the time of the death of Princess Diana, and he spoke with great eloquence about her life, and one of the quotations he pulled forth at the time was from the poet, Thomas Campbell, who said, ''To live in the hearts we leave behind is not to die.'' What Walter said about Princess Diana, I think can be said about Walter Capps.
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    So we have heavy hearts today on this Committee and in this institution, but we are very, very grateful for his presence, we are diminished by his passing, and we extend, as you have done, Mr. Chairman, our deepest sympathy to his wife Lois and to their three children, Lisa, Todd and Laura, and of course to all of his friends and his staff.
    I hope that we will take more formal steps in this Committee and have an opportunity to pay further respects to the memory of Walter Capps.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton. We do intend to have a resolution before this Committee on Friday extending our condolences and our recognition of the work of Walter Capps.
    Mr. Lantos.
    Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to associate myself with your comments and those of Mr. Hamilton.
    Walter Capps was a friend of mine. He brought to the work of this Committee and to the work of the Congress a moral dimension. He was a man of extraordinary intellect and integrity. It rarely happens that a freshman makes as powerful a mark as he has in the short period he has served with us, and I merely want to extend to his family my heartfelt condolences and to express our deep appreciation for the work he has done for his district and for the country.
    I thank the Chair.
    Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My colleagues, I am glad I arrived as I did, because I wanted to say a couple of words about our late departed colleague, Walter Capps. I would intend to recognize his contributions and the kind of person he was as we begin to mark up the Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee where he served with us.
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    I took it upon myself to get to know him when he arrived, since he was a native of my State and a graduate of the same high school as my wife, and beyond that I found him shortly to be taking a very interested and interesting role in the Subcommittee work and the work of the Committee.
    Few people who have been here as short a time as Mr. Capps made more of a contribution in the kind of questions that he asked, the kind of intense interest he had in so many subjects. This was especially true in Vietnam where he had substantial expertise. The kind of humanity he brought, kinds of questions he asked that needed to be asked from a very different and important perspective will be a particularly big loss to this body.
    And so, with my colleagues, I lament his passing and wish that God may give a special measure of grace and understanding to his family and friends.
    Chairman GILMAN. I thank the gentleman from Nebraska. I thank my colleagues for their eloquent words.
    Without objection, I am going to ask that the record be kept open for any further comments that any of our Committee Members may wish to make with regard to the passing of Walter Capps, and I would like to ask that we observe a moment of silence in memory of Congressman Walter Capps.
    [Moment of silence observed.]
    The purpose of today's hearing is to provide Members with an opportunity to review recent developments in Europe. We are pleased to have as our witness Assistant Secretary Mark Grossman, who was appointed in August. He previously served in a number of high-level positions in the State Department, most recently serving as our U.S. ambassador to Ankara. We look forward to his overview of events, trends and policies that are of interest in the region in which our Nation enjoys the closest and friendliest of relationships.
    As has been the case during much of this decade, it is the Balkans which have consumed most of our attention. With over 8,000 of our troops in Bosnia, the recent turmoil in Albania, new and disturbing electoral trends in Serbia, unrest in Kosovo, an ethnic strike threatening in Macedonia, the Balkan region is living up to its reputation as the powder keg of Europe.
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    I would like to point out that, on Bosnia, we expect to reschedule for an appearance before the Committee as soon as possible, Ambassador Robert Gelbard, who is the President's and Secretary of State's representative for implementation of the Dayton peace accords. We would like Ambassador Grossman, however, to address the broader aspects of our Bosnia policy, such as whether the Administration intends to keep our troops in Bosnia after June 1998 and the termination date of the President's SFOR mission.
    The eastern Mediterranean region where relations between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus have commanded our constant attention and the attention of the State Department and Congress, will also be of interest during today's session. We look forward to hearing some of the Ambassador's expertise in this area garnered from his prior service as our ambassador to Turkey.
    There are also new governments of a different political cast in France and the United Kingdom. The new directions in foreign policy that we may expect from our traditional allies are certainly an area of concern, and there is a question of how those governments will approach the enlargement of NATO and the European Union (EU). Our Committee is also interested to hear about the progress of economic and political reforms across Eastern Europe.
    This region's relations with Russia in the wake of the Madrid Summit's decision of NATO enlargement is also of concern. We hope to be able to conduct future reviews and developments in this important region more often, and I hope the Ambassador will continue to make himself available to our Committee for that purpose.
    Finally, Mr. Secretary, I believe you are the first Assistant Secretary to testify before a committee since the Department of State released its first strategic plan under the Government Performance and Results Act. Our Committee has been consulting with the department as that plan has developed, and we also have several Members of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, including its chairman, Mr. Burton, and myself serving on this Committee.
    I understand, Mr. Secretary, you have been strongly involved in the planning process in the Department, which is appropriate given the great breadth of responsibilities of your bureau and the resources devoted to carrying out those responsibilities. We did not inform you in advance that we would be raising this matter, but I would like you, to the extent possible either in your opening remarks or in answer to questions, to discuss how the strategic planning process has affected your work in the Bureau for better or for worse as you allocate resources, plan for the future and work with other agencies in the executive branch.
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    Before giving you the floor, Mr. Ambassador, I would like to ask our Ranking Minority Member if he cares to make any opening statement.
    Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased indeed you are having the hearing on Europe. I think it is an important hearing, and I want to say a word of appreciation and congratulations to the Assistant Secretary for his appointment; and we look forward to working with him.
    Mr. Secretary, you have had an extraordinary record of service to the country in a variety of important posts, and we look forward to working with you on many, many European challenges. It is nice of you to be with us today.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.
    Are any other of our Members seeking recognition?
    Mr. Lantos.
    Mr. LANTOS. I just want to congratulate Secretary Grossman on his appointment. He has done a superb job as our ambassador to Turkey, and, as in all of his previous assignments he brings to this task an extraordinary intellect and grasp of issues, and we look forward to working with him.
    Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.
    Is any other Member seeking recognition?
    If not, Mr. Ambassador, you may proceed. You may put your full statement in the record or you may abbreviate it, however you deem appropriate.

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    Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I thank you for the opportunity of being here and for the kind words that all of you have given me. May I also join, if it would be appropriate, please, in extending the Administration's condolences on the death of Mr. Capps. As a graduate of the University of California at Santa Barbara and a long-time resident of Santa Barbara, I know how important he was there, and I very much appreciate your allowing me to express those sentiments as well. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Chairman, it is really an honor and a pleasure to appear before you and the Committee today to discuss the U.S. relationship with Europe. I think in your opening statement and the one that Mr. Hamilton made you have captured in many ways the key issues that are in front of us, whether it be the Balkans, the eastern Mediterranean, political and economic reform, and I hope you will find that my statement will cover these and many other issues; and I would, of course, be glad to answer any questions on any European subject that the Committee might have.
    I also wanted to say, since this is my first appearance here as Assistant Secretary, how much I have benefited from the advice and from the counsel that I have received from Members of this Committee, and from you in particular and the Ranking Member over the years. I believe in the closest possible consultation between the Congress and the Administration. I hope you will find me living up to that standard, and I accept, Mr. Chairman, yours and Mr. Hamilton's invitation to be available for more hearings of this kind, or as you and I have done in the past, sir, more private sessions on any subject that you would wish.
    Mr. Chairman, my philosophy is a simple one. I want to promote and protect the interests of the United States of America in Europe. America's relationship with Europe is a vital one to our country. NATO is the most successful alliance in history; and as Secretary Albright said in her Harvard commencement speech this summer, and I quote here, ''In Europe we are striving to fulfill the vision that Marshall proclaimed but the cold war prevented, the vision of a Europe whole, free and united, as President Clinton said, not by force of arms but by the possibilities of peace.''
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    Now, some people may ask, and I certainly am asked this on many occasions, why in this time of relative peace and security we are so focused on the U.S.-European relationship and projects such as the enlargement of NATO. The answer is that we want this peace to last. We want freedom to endure, we want to prevent the dangers of Europe's past returning, and we want to manage the dangers that still exist in Europe's present. It is important that we not forget, and it was a point you made in your opening, Mr. Chairman, that Europe has already buried more victims of war since the Berlin Wall fell than in all the years of the cold war. We must consider Europe's future and how the United States plays in it.
    Again, I think it is worth quoting Secretary Albright in her testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee last week that ''We don't have a crystal ball, we don't know about new challenges and dangers that might arise in and around Europe. But what we do know is that whatever the future may hold, it will be in the interests of the United States to have a vigorous alliance with those European democracies which share our values and, very importantly, the determination to defend them.''
    U.S. engagement is based on America's interests. U.S. exports to Europe support several million American jobs. More than 4,000 European-owned firms in the United States employ 3 million Americans, while U.S. firms employ about the same number of Europeans. Together with Europe, we are involved in a global struggle against crime, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, pollution and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and on these and on other issues our conclusion is that you cannot make progress alone. We need Europe as a partner.
    In the conduct of foreign policy, we spend time dealing with crises or managing disagreements with nations that don't see the world essentially as we do. But we sometimes take for granted those upon whom we really can rely. The first commandment of foreign policy is probably very much like the first commandment of politics, which is to secure your base, whether it is the life of a family, the life in a neighborhood, politics of a nation or an international stage. When we want to get something done, we start by banding together with those who are closest to us in our values and in our outlook. That's why Europe and NATO remain a core to the policy of the United States.
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    Mr. Chairman, I also wanted to take a moment to say that this is not just obviously a matter for an administration, that relationships with Europe are now a very important part of your work as well; and I wanted to tell you how much we appreciated the Committee's work with European parliamentarians and the delegation that you had here last month.
    Members of the Committee also went on to the North Atlantic Assembly meeting in Bucharest, and we greatly appreciated that. I am very grateful for attention that this Committee has paid to the new transatlantic agenda, and we look forward to continuing to work with you, as we don't just speak as an administration on U.S.-European relations, but as a country and as a government and as a collective between Congress and the Administration.
    Mr. Chairman, I was sworn in in August, and as you might imagine, since then Secretary Albright and I have had a series of conversations about our policies and our priorities in Europe. She has charged me with carrying out a policy to Europe and in Europe which has five core points. In recent weeks I have been traveling and I have explained these points to our European allies, and with your permission, I would like to present as quickly as I can these five core priorities, because you might be interested in them, and I think it would form the basis for our discussion.
    My first priority as Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs is to get NATO enlargement right. We believe that a larger NATO will make America safer, NATO stronger and Europe more peaceful and united. A larger NATO will make us safer by expanding the area in Europe where wars won't happen.
    Today, no part of Europe faces any immediate threat of mass armed attack for perhaps the first time in all of European history, and NATO enlargement will help keep it that way. Enlargement will also help make NATO stronger and more cohesive. The three countries we have invited to join the alliance are committed to NATO and share its principles of shared risk and shared responsibility. And the enlargement of NATO also encourages prospective members to resolve their differences peacefully. The three States we have invited, for example, have resolved every potential problem of this type. And finally, enlarging NATO will erase the artificial line in Europe drawn by Stalin at the end of World War II.
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    NATO enlargement is the culmination of years of hard work by the United States, by other members of the NATO alliance and by the new democracies that wish to join us. All 16 NATO leaders have endorsed it, many Members of Congress have urged it, and in recent weeks, the process of advise and consent of the Senate has begun.
    Now, of course, the Constitution grants the Senate a unique role in ratifying treaty obligations, but one of the reasons I am so pleased to be here this morning is that in this national debate this Committee and the House of Representatives will obviously have an important role to play. The commitment to enlarge NATO will only be meaningful if the American people and their representatives will accept it.
    What does NATO enlargement mean in practice? I give you four points. First, we must get NATO enlargement right for the United States and for our current allies. We have spent time, and I think properly so, talking about those people that we have invited or those people we did not invite, but it is very important that this alliance must continue to work for the United States and for the current allies. That means that we have to speak clearly about the costs of enlargement, and the Madrid Summit declaration lays out our position very well.
    Every NATO leader there signed onto the statement that there would be costs of enlargement, that they would be manageable and that they would be met. NATO is currently in an intensive effort to assess the force requirements and costs of enlargement.
    In the testimony that Secretary Albright and Secretary Cohen gave last week, they emphasized that the first and the most important principle guiding this process should be, and is, that the amount our allies pay in be a function of concrete military requirements. We need to focus on the level of military capability that we and our new allies should have in this changed security environment.
    Secretary Albright and Secretary Cohen also said that it now appears, based on assessments being conducted by NATO, that the portion of enlargement costs borne by NATO's own common funded budgets will likely be less than the Administration's estimate that we provided to Congress in February.
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    In addition to getting the cost issue right, we will also need to continue the work the alliance has started to adapt to the future. This means deciding new command structures and choosing the right direction for the alliance in the 21st century.
    Second, we must also get NATO enlargement right for those countries whom we have invited to join the alliance; Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. NATO is not a charity, and we expect these countries will make a first-class contribution. At the same time, we are not seeking to recreate the defense structures of the 1960's–1970's, and working with our NATO partners and with the invitees, we are already trying to come up with the right plan for those three invitees so that they can make a real contribution to the alliance.
    Third, we must also get NATO enlargement right for those countries we did not ask to join the alliance at this time. I think one of the accomplishments of the Madrid declaration was the clear statement that the door to NATO remains open. We cannot let countries we did not invite fall into a gray zone where they worry about their security or their connections to a whole free and democratic Europe; and one of the things that I have done since I have been Assistant Secretary is spend a considerable amount of time consulting with our allies and visiting the region to make clear to countries like the Baltic States; Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia, that their security is tied to the West and we want to keep them coming toward Western and transatlantic institutions.
    We have been clear with everyone that the United States has not decided when there should be a second round of NATO enlargement and is not in the business of predesignating candidates, because we wish to be misunderstood by no one. But since the door to NATO membership remains open, we want to make sure that countries of importance to us stay connected to us.
    Fourth, getting NATO enlargement right also means getting right NATO's relationship with Russia and Ukraine. Pursuing NATO enlargement and a new NATO Russian relationship are both parts of our overall European strategy. We recognize that many European leaders still oppose enlargement. The alliance is nonetheless committed to working with Russia in spite of this disagreement, and I must say that Russia also appears committed to work with us. And I say that because of the evidence with NATO—with Russia, NATO has created, through the founding act, a permanent joint council which met for the first time in administerial session during the U.N. General Assembly in New York, and this session approved a work plan through the end of the year that was an important step forward in setting the course for a new level of NATO-Russia cooperation.
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    We should also stop for a moment to applaud the strong contribution Partnership for Peace has made to the alliance. Before the Madrid Summit, NATO decided to build on this success by establishing the U.S.-proposed Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, giving partners a greater voice in political consultation and in planning.
    The Secretary has also charged me as my second priority with doing all I can to support the President, the Secretary and the President's Special Representative, Ambassador Gelbard, in getting Dayton implemented. As you say, Mr. Chairman, this is a very important part of our priorities, and I hope that the Committee will be able to reschedule its session with Ambassador Gelbard soon.
    When in Europe, my message is clear that Dayton implementation is key to how Americans will view their involvement in Europe. I always take our allies through the Secretary's requirements for Dayton implementation which she laid out in her speech on the Intrepid in New York early in May; and I think since that time, we have done a much better job and are very clear about our commitment to Dayton implementation.
    Now, as part of our efforts to celebrate the implementation of the agreement, we have increased pressure on the regional guarantors of Dayton—Croatia and Serbia—to improve their cooperation on peace implementation, and we think that last month's Bosnian municipal elections had a high turnout and no significant incidents of violence; thanks, in part, to lessons that OSCE learned in running national elections the year before. This step toward democracy is encouraging, and will help as we turn to the challenges of implementing the results and of preparing to hold assembly elections in Bosnia's Serb Republic.
    We have also paid considerable attention to supporting mass media that are unbiased and professional because that's a key component of Dayton implementation. What I am trying to do to support Ambassador Gelbard, as well, is to reinforce the Dayton implementation effort by our broader efforts to promote regional cooperation, security and development throughout southeastern Europe. In our efforts to place greater focus on the region, we will work on the basis of three principles. First, we want to support broad integration into the key institutions of Europe—NATO, the EU, OSCE, the Council of Europe; second, to secure the peace in Bosnia; and third, by encouraging real regional cooperation.
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    I had a chance earlier this month at a meeting of the Atlantic Treaty Association in Sofia, Bulgaria, to reiterate our desire to serve as a willing and active partner to countries in the region working together to further stability, to intensify cooperation and to solidify reforms. The U.S. peacekeeping mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been a major stabilizing force in the region and the wonderful initiative that Ambassador Shifter has pursued, the Southeast Europe Cooperation Initiative, which we call SECI, is gaining steam and now includes 11 participating States.
    We had an administerial meeting for the first time of these 11 at the U.N. General Assembly in New York last month, and I thought what the Secretary said there was very clear about what we were after in southeastern Europe. She said, ''Our goal is clear, we want to work with you, the nations of southeastern Europe, in making this a region where democracy can flourish, human rights are respected, prosperity is growing and good neighborly relations are so common that they are routine.''
    The third priority the Secretary has asked me to focus on is the point you made, Mr. Chairman, relations in eastern Mediterranean between Greece and Turkey and the situation in Cyprus. I look forward to continuing to be part of the effort that we are making to get progress in relations between Greece and Turkey and push toward a settlement on Cyprus; and I am delighted that Ambassador Richard Holbrooke has agreed to be the President's Special Envoy and Tom Miller is serving as our Special Coordinator for Cyprus. We think we have put together a formidable team with our about-to-be, we hope, ambassadors in Athens and Ankara and our ambassador in Nicosia. The situation in the Aegean and in Cyprus is too dangerous to allow it to go unattended.
    I know that Members of the Committee will have questions about this, and I look forward to discussing them in detail.
    Fourth, relations with the EU are obviously of increasing complexity and importance. As you say, Mr. Chairman, it is often our disagreements that get highlighted, whether it is the Libertad Act or our disagreement over the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, but the EU is playing a growing role in world affairs, and we share a very great deal in common with EU members. The EU can serve as a powerful force for democratic and market reforms.
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    The EU is currently the largest contributor to Central European development and has proposed spending $50 billion in Central Europe over the next 10 years. The EU is a major supporter of the Middle East peace process, $433 million in 1995, Russian reform, $1.5 billion in 1995, and Third World development. A partnership with the EU in these and other areas advances our policy goals, and that is why, in 1995, President Clinton and EU leaders adopted the New Transatlantic Agenda, which is aimed at developing cooperative efforts to promote peace and democracy throughout the world and, very importantly, to address the new global challenges, drug trafficking, the environment, transatlantic and global trade and more people-to-people contacts. I can assure you also that advancing our trade goals and resolving those problems which arise will receive high priority in the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs under my management.
    Fifth, and a very important priority—and I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, your mentioning it, and that is the management of the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs. This will be a major priority for me, and I told the Secretary that when I talked about my priorities, I would talk about this one as well. I want to do everything I can to let the tremendous people who work in the Bureau, civil service and foreign service, at home and abroad, do the job that they are capable of doing; and I look forward to making this an explicit part of my conversation with the Committee. My objective is to have a bureau of which the taxpayers can be proud.
    To your specific question, Mr. Chairman, I have been involved in the strategic planning process because I believe in it. I believe that the United States of America, and the State Department in particular, ought to be able to speak clearly about what our goals are. We ought to be able to have people understand why we are spending money; people ought to be able to judge how we are doing on results. And so I have been a very big part of this. I believe in what Craig Johnston is doing, and I believe the Secretary does as well.
    You asked me whether it has helped me. It has helped me tremendously, and I can tell you, sir, that just yesterday I had a town meeting with all of the people in the Bureau of European Affairs, and the first slide I put up to them, before I began discussing our budget and what we were doing, was our national security priorities so that they felt that they were part of something important, something larger and something that supported the President and the Secretary and our country.
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    So I am in favor of it, I am a big supporter of it, and I look forward to continuing any conversation the Committee would like to have on it.
    Mr. Chairman, obviously this short review doesn't convey our views on all of the important issues that we try to manage in the Bureau. But our work, with your support, will succeed. What I wanted to do today is to give you as clear a statement as possible of my priorities and our plans for pursuing this. I hope this will be a useful introduction to our conversation.
    So again, Mr. Chairman, may I thank you for this opportunity to address the Committee and say that I am obviously prepared to answer any questions that you might have.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Grossman appears in the appendix.]
    Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for your very astute statement and a broad overview. It is very helpful to us. We do have some questions, and I will be turning to my colleagues in a few moments for their observations.
    Mr. Ambassador, while I understand that you want to avoid sending the wrong signal to those in Bosnia who believe they can wait us out, I want to ask if the Administration is reviewing with our allies what happens under the worst scenario in June 1998 if it is apparent, as I believe it already is, that withdrawal of all international troops from Bosnia is going to lead to any resumption of conflict if Dayton has not been implemented fully.
    I would like to remind you that Secretary of State Albright was to come and present a candid picture of our Bosnia policy. She was not able to meet our request. And Ambassador Gelbard had agreed to appear before the Committee; regrettably, he fell ill last week. But I would like to emphasize, the Administration needs to be candid with us about our future policy in Bosnia, and I hope that you can address our concern.
    Mr. GROSSMAN. First, Mr. Chairman, let me say that I will take your message and I will report it.
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    Second, let me say that I have made exactly the point that I will now make to you, to our European allies about the future, and that is to say that we have invested a tremendous amount obviously in Bosnia. But as President Clinton has said, SFOR's mandate will end in June 1998, and I think the President has been absolutely right to say that the focus of our attention has to be today, tomorrow, the next day, because as I said in my statement, Dayton implementation here is key to our ability to achieve any kind of success in the area. So the SFOR mandate will end.
    I think, as Sandy Berger said in a speech late last month, the international community has invested a lot and there will likely be continuing international presence in the political area, in the economic area. But I can tell you without fear of contradiction that the decision on how we will participate, certainly in a military area, has not been made. I can also tell you without fear of contradiction that that is an issue on which we will consult very, very closely with the Congress.
    Chairman GILMAN. What has been your recommendation with regard to continued deployment of our troops in Bosnia?
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think again, although some people say, oh, it is too simplistic to say, I actually think the President's policy here and the way he has focused is exactly right. I don't see how we can accomplish anything unless Dayton continues to be implemented, and that is why we are in such close support of Ambassador Gelbard.
    And I believe—and I say this really in praise of him—if you take the period from late April, early May when the Secretary made her speech on the Intrepid and you see where we are on Dayton implementation, certainly in the civilian area, I think it is a good record and we need to keep going in that direction.
    So we are focused on today and tomorrow, and obviously, Mr. Chairman, this is a matter that is under consideration in the Administration. I saw today in the New York Times a report all about it, but I can assure you and without fear of contradiction that no decisions have been made, No. 1, and No. 2, we will consult closely with the Congress.
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    Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Secretary, how do you assess the recent talks between Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash on Cyprus?
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Chairman, first, we thought that it was a good thing that those security talks took place; second, we want more of those security talks to take place. And our assessment was, good start, but we need to do more.
    As you and I had a chance to converse the other evening, we want to pay very close attention to Cyprus, to Greece and Turkey and relations in the eastern Mediterranean; and one of the most important ways to do that is to have both Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash speak to each other directly.
    I know that Members will see him today, and I hope you will help us convey that message.
    Chairman GILMAN. Was there any progress made in the recent talks?
    Mr. GROSSMAN. I think two things. One, I believe the fact that they had the conversation without anybody else there was progress, and that is why we asked the Secretary to announce it when she happened to be in Cyprus that day; and two, the fact that they have begun a conversation on security is, I believe, progress.
    Mr. Clerides was here, Mr. Denktash is now here. Our message to them is, go back into these talks, make these face-to-face, work on issues of security and get this job accomplished.
    Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Secretary, for a number of months now there has been talk by high-level Administration officials with regard to a ''Baltic Charter'' that would provide additional security commitments of some nature for all three Baltic States by our nation. Regrettably, this Committee has yet to learn anything about this so-called ''Baltic Charter''. Can you give us some information about it?
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    Mr. GROSSMAN. I would be glad to, Mr. Chairman.
    I think it is worth stepping back for just a moment to say that the Baltic Charters are part and parcel of our plan to implement the Madrid Summit document, which is to say that we need to be interested in the security of those countries, especially those countries that did not get invited to join NATO, and the Baltic States, I think, are very much part of that.
    I said in my statement that we wanted to make sure that they did not fall into a gray zone. We have been negotiating for some months with the Baltic States on the Baltic Charter, and our intention is to consult with the Congress when we have concluded these negotiations.
    Let me first of all tell you what these Baltic Charters are and then tell you what they are not. First, they are an attempt to be clear about what U.S. policy is toward the Baltic States. They are an attempt to have a conversation with the Baltic States about political commitment. They are a way for us to show that we are interested in the future of their security, and they are an attempt by us, as I said in my statement, to keep them coming in the direction of European institutions and transatlantic institutions.
    What they are not, Mr. Chairman, is they are not a security guarantee, they are not legally binding, and they are certainly not a substitute for NATO. And we hope that when we are completed with this negotiation—and I am told we are about 99 percent of the way there—that we will have the chance to consult with you, present them to you; and I hope that you will see that they meet these requirements and do really keep us in close contact in the right way with the Baltic States.
    Chairman GILMAN. I would like to request that you provide some information in writing to our Committee so that we can be better informed.
    Mr. GROSSMAN. We would be glad to.
    Chairman GILMAN. Thank you. And one last question. My time has run.
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    Mr. Ambassador, it appears to some observers that western Macedonia may well be the site of renewed ethnic violence in the Balkans given the recent clashes between the Macedonian authorities and the members of the ethnic Albanian minority there as well as the crossing of the nearby border with Albania by Albanians, bearing arms, as a result of the recent chaos in that country. What are we doing to help calm down that situation?
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Chairman, we do pay considerable attention to that situation as we do others in the neighborhood, and I should say, first of all, that the human rights report that we did last year and, I would assume, the one we do this year will detail this concern, precisely this concern of the minorities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
    I can also tell you that in New York I raised this issue myself with the Foreign Minister and told him that democracy, human rights, the ability to get along in these countries are very important parts of how we judge our future relationship. We think that the government of Mr. Gligorov is committed to doing the right thing here, and our objective in answering your question is to keep them focused on exactly that.
    Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
    Mr. Hamilton.
    Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary, your comments about an American presence in Bosnia seem to me to be quite counter to that New York Times article this morning. You said no decisions have been made. The New York Times reports that there is a consensus among the top foreign policymakers on the need to keep American troops there. That sounds to me like a decision.
    Are you denying the New York Times story?
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am going to be as clear as I can. I read the New York Times article, obviously, this morning, and I think in the beginning of it and also in the middle it says that no decisions have been made. And so what I am telling you is that, I have checked this morning, I checked with Secretary—I checked with Mr.——
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    Mr. HAMILTON. So there is no consensus among the President's top advisers——
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Well, what I would say and what I know——
    Mr. HAMILTON. Is there a consensus among the President's top advisers?
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Hamilton, this will seem like a bureaucratic answer to you, but I am going to give you the most honest answer I can. I was not in any of those meetings; I cannot answer your question yes or no. But if you allow me, I can answer your question to say that there has been no decision made, obviously.
    Mr. HAMILTON. So you reject the New York Times article. You are right in the middle of the decisionmaking process; you are not aware of any consensus by the top officials in the Administration on the need to keep American troops in Bosnia. Is that your testimony?
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Obviously, Mr. Chairman, this is a matter that is under discussion in the Administration.
    Mr. HAMILTON. I understand it is under discussion. The question is, is there a consensus among the President's top advisers on the need to keep American troops in Bosnia? That is the story; is it right or is it wrong?
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Chairman, you are kind to say that I am in the middle of this decision. I have to respond to you that in this particular case, with due respect, sir, I am not.
    Mr. HAMILTON. You are not in the decision?
    Mr. GROSSMAN. You were kind enough to say I was.
    Mr. HAMILTON. How is it possible for the United States to retain operational command of a NATO-led force in Bosnia if we don't have troops on the ground there?
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    Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Chairman, I recognize this is not satisfactory to you; it is not satisfactory to me either. I would like to be able to answer your question. All I can tell you, sir, is that I believe it to be true; I know it is true, that no decision has been made.
    Mr. HAMILTON. When you say no decision has been made, you are saying no decision has been made by the President?
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir.
    Mr. HAMILTON. Right?
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir.
    Mr. HAMILTON. I understand you are in a tough spot here. I just want to convey to you that I think we have delayed, the President has delayed on this decision much too long; and that the whole world is anticipating a decision, and it should have been made a long time ago, and I just cannot understand the delay. It is going to make the task much more difficult.
    Now second, I read in the paper this morning about the SFOR blocking the delivery of 126 U.S. heavy artillery to the army of the Muslim-Croat Federation, and I just don't understand what is going on here. That is the second time this month that the NATO-led SFOR operation has halted the U.S. train-and-equip program.
    Now we have been assured over and over again that the Muslim-Croat army is well under all the Dayton-mandated limits. What is going on here? Is there some conflict between the United States and SFOR and NATO?
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I think that the—I know that you have had concerns in the past and have discussed them on the train-and-equip program. Actually, the train-and-equip program has been successful, and it has been successful because we have been committed to it and we have been sensible and it has brought a reduction in forces there; and just last week actually the Bosnians and the Croats have together started to create some institutions there.
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    My report this morning, and again we are both reacting to a newspaper report here—I would be glad to get you more information in a more structured way, but my report this morning is that that article is not right. But as I say, I would be very glad to follow up in a more structured way and give you a full response.
    Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I would appreciate it if you would, and do it promptly. You are quite right, I have real reservations about that train-and-equip program, and I am beginning to think that NATO agrees with me.
    Mr. GROSSMAN. As I say, I am told the report this morning is not factually correct, and I want to respond to you as quickly as I can.
    [The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
    Then finally, Mr. Chairman, let me just ask. You have had a distinguished record in Turkey as our ambassador there, as Mr. Lantos mentioned earlier on, and I must say that Turkey is a big puzzle to me, and perhaps you can help me understand it better.
    We have over a period of years a long list of problems with Turkey: Cyprus, human rights treatment of the Kurds in southeast Turkey, Greek-Turkish differences in the Aegean, the Armenian problems and a lot of tough issues associated with the EU; and as I look back over a few years here, what impresses me is, we don't seem to make much progress on any.
    We have had a whole lot of changes in the Governments of Turkey, but not much progress is made on these problems, and I am beginning to wonder what difference it makes, so far as these problems are concerned, who is Prime Minister and who is calling the shots in Turkey.
    Why don't we make some progress on these issues?
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Chairman it is a good question, and let me say that my philosophy in going to Turkey was one actually I got from you and from Senator Sarbanes, which is, it is probably time we start taking some items off the agenda rather than putting them on the agenda.
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    Our objective in Turkey, and certainly my objective as the ambassador there, was to speak clearly and to speak directly and to speak positively about all of the issues that you mentioned. One of our major objectives was to talk more with the Turks about human rights and to talk to Turkey about the fact that more of its problems would be solved with enhanced democracy rather than in any other way. We spent a considerable amount of time, as you might imagine, on the Aegean, on Cyprus, with the EU.
    I would answer your two specific questions, why don't we make more progress, we would like to make more progress. To say that I think that we haven't made any progress, I think is probably a little bit too hard. Let me give you, if I might, sir, one important example.
    In March 1995, when the EU offered the capacity of Turkey to join the Turkish customs union, we worked very hard with the Europeans to set out a very specific series of goals in the human rights area, in the economic area and in a couple of other areas, as well, that we needed Turkey to do more if they expected a positive vote in the European Parliament; and come the end of that year, there were some changes in the Turkish constitution, there were some changes in the law, about 140 people got out of jail.
    Does that mean we solved all of those problems? No, sir. But I think we showed that by real engagement and where there were real incentives, and as you say, where we were very straight in our conversation with them, we could make progress.
    On your second question, obviously, who is the Prime Minister of Turkey is up to them. But when you say, does it matter who is the Prime Minister, yes, it does, and I think in the last few weeks you have seen, from Mr. Gilman anyway—and obviously he would have to speak for himself—some comments on human rights which we certainly endorse and hope that he will follow up. We see that he will meet with Mr. Simitis on Crete early next week, and we want those to be positive conversations.
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    So I do think it matters, and I think our engagement matters.
    Mr. HAMILTON. On these key areas, like Cyprus, for, example and the war in southeast Turkey, is the Turkish general staff really the power that calls the shots in Turkey?
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Hamilton, I came to conclude after my time there that they obviously play a very important role in the decisionmaking progress in that country. But do they call the shots? In other words, can they do everything exactly as they want it? I came to conclude actually the answer to that question is no.
    Do they play an important role? Yes. Do we need to keep involved with them? Yes. But are there other parts of that society that need to be influenced? I think the answer to that is yes, as well, sir.
    Mr. HAMILTON. Are they the prime actors in those areas? Are they the most important voice?
    Mr. GROSSMAN. I think certainly in the southeast they are very, very important.
    Mr. HAMILTON. In Cyprus?
    Mr. GROSSMAN. As well, absolutely. But I say, so there is no misunderstanding, I don't disagree with you; but I just don't want you or I to think that they are the only voice.
    Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.
    Mr. Bereuter.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary, congratulations on your appointment and confirmation. I haven't had a chance to work with you in the past, but I look forward to it now in this capacity.
    Let me just stipulate that my first interest and concern in Europe would be on Bosnia, but I am going to proceed to other country issues.
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    First of all, with respect to Slovakia, I have been told that the United States has asked Slovakia to destroy SS–23 missiles on its territory and made a similar request to Bulgaria. What is their intention? In fact, we don't see action in that respect, what do we intend to do?
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Sir, I will be absolutely honest with you; I don't know the answer to your question, but I hope you will allow me to supply it to you this afternoon.
    [The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
    Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much.
    I have just had a chance to lead a delegation to this North Atlantic Assembly in Bucharest. I think I might compliment the President and Administration on his handling of that issue after the Madrid Summit. I think going to Bucharest was exactly the right thing to do, and I sense that, if anything, they have redoubled their effort and commitment to qualifying for NATO membership.
    I am more concerned about Slovenia, not because of anything that has happened there, but because I felt objectively they met all the criteria better than most or all of the other three for membership. Having been denied membership in the Madrid Summit, there is the possibility that there may be some disillusionment and dissatisfaction.
    I would hope that we could redouble our efforts there. I would hope that we might have a larger degree of military engagement with this very young nation. I think that their mountain troops, for example, have a lot that we can learn from them because of their particular expertise.
    What can and should we do to try to move Croatia along toward settling a few remaining difficulties between Slovenia and Croatia? I don't see a particular incentive for Croatia to be forthcoming. What can we do about that?
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    Mr. GROSSMAN. Thank you for those questions, sir. Let me try to answer them in turn.
    First, on Romania, I very much appreciate your comments. I had the good fortune, as I think you know, to have been in Romania the week or so before the North Atlantic Assembly meeting, and my purpose there was precisely as you described it, which was to review with them where they stood in this effort of ours to keep them coming toward Western institutions, be they transatlantic institutions or European institutions. And I had the chance there, I know, as you did, to see their senior leadership, and I agree with you; they, I think, are very focused on the job at hand.
    And what we tried to do is follow up the President's commitment to have a partnership with Romania. We defined it as best we could, and I hope that we will go forward.
    And I would say, just parenthetically, that a very important part of this will be getting more direct American investment in Romania. I met a lot of American business people there who want to do business there, and we want to support that as strongly as we can.
    Second, sir, on Slovenia. I think the Slovenians have received our message that our answer in Madrid was not no, but not yet. The second thing, as I said in my testimony, we want to make sure that all of these countries know that they can keep coming in our direction, and one of the reasons that I tried to put our southeast Europe efforts in a larger context is precisely that, so that we are not talking just to one country, just to another country, just to a third country, but that we can work together with groups in that area so they don't fall into a gray zone, so that they can keep coming in terms of our institutions.
    We will be doing a lot of work with the Slovenians. I think that their troops make a good contribution, and we would encourage them to continue with their Partnership for Peace efforts.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. I am hoping for another round, but let me slip in another question before this red light.
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    What are the prospects for an independent path for Montenegro, given what has happened in the last month?
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Obviously, we welcome that there were elections in Montenegro. We want very much for the current President, the President now in Montenegro, to take his view as a supporter of Dayton implementation—that is, how we are judging these things; are you for Dayton, or are you against Dayton—and we want to be for Dayton implementation.
    But I think our position is, sir, that we don't need any more border changes out there, and we think that that is an area that is part of a State and they ought to figure out ways to work together.
    Mr. BEREUTER. I am sorry to hear that. I don't think we have an activist role, but I wouldn't like to have them think that is our message either.
    Mr. GROSSMAN. I appreciate that.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield.
    Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter.
    Mr. Lantos—if I might, I just want to note for our Members who arrived after our opening that at the opening of this Committee session we had some memorial remarks on behalf of our colleague, Walter Capps. If any of our Members want to insert into the record some statement on behalf of Walter Capps, I urge you to do it today. The record is kept open for that purpose. Thank you.
    Mr. Lantos.
    Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary, I am truly delighted to be working with you for, I hope, a long time to come; and my comments, as you will note, don't relate to your tenure, but precede your tenure, but I think they have relevance for your tenure.
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    As you know, I am a very strong supporter of this Administration, and I think very highly of Secretary Albright. When the Administration came to us some years ago after both the Bush Administration and during the early years this Administration so appallingly handled Yugoslavia, we had before us Secretary Christopher, Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili; and in an open session, in response to my very specific questioning, they basically swore on a stack of Bibles that our presence in Bosnia will last 1 year.
    I offered each of them a major bet that it will be more than 1 year. They declined my major bet, which showed good judgment because they would have lost.
    Subsequently, we had before us Secretary Cohen, and I had an almost identical dialog with him. He made it crystal clear that the mission will end on June 30, 1998. I told him I am convinced that it won't end on June 30, 1998. I offered my bet, which again was not taken up; and of course we all know now, as some of us, of course, knew all along—and I believe everyone of the players in this game knew all along—that all of the gains in Bosnia will be lost should the United States, because of domestic political pressures, many of them within this body, ill-advised colleagues who are anxious to turn isolationist, a situation we now clearly have.
    And I was listening carefully to your dialog with Mr. Hamilton on the New York Times story, and we know what that New York Times story means. It means that there is a consensus among the policymakers that they will make a recommendation to the President, who will accept that recommendation.
    I am mentioning all of this because I passionately want to have an excellent working relationship between you and this Committee, and the key to that will be candor. Some of us have been on this Committee for a long time; we have had a tremendous range of relationships with Assistant Secretaries of State for the various geographic areas. Some of these relationships were excellent. They were excellent not because of any other reason except a degree of candor that went both ways. And I would have to say that Secretary Eagleburger was probably the most outstanding example, in my experience, in the degree of candor that characterized our relationship. It was a delight to look forward to each of his appearances.
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    And then we had colleagues of yours, former colleagues—and they shall remain anonymous—where the relationship was predicated really not on candor, but on an intent to play a very clumsy diplomatic game of not leveling with this Committee.
    Now, I fully realize that there are times when you are not yet in a position to state certain things, and in all due respect, I would suggest that you then propose to the chairman of this Committee that we meet in closed session, because I think it is infinitely more important for us to meet in closed session with a total degree of candor than to have open session meetings where you are constrained from expressing things that you know, and we know that you cannot express things that you know because it will make for a degree of awkwardness.
    I would like you to comment on this issue of candor, and I would like you to comment on two other items, if I may.
    With the recent announcement of the $500 million gift from another penniless Hungarian immigrant, George Soros, to Russia, and with a billion dollar gift by Mr. Turner to the United Nations, we are beginning to see the privatization of foreign policy. I would be grateful if you could comment on this phenomenon, because I find it appalling that the one remaining superpower is incapable of acting with the same degree of boldness and decisiveness that individual financiers are capable of acting. And since the one remaining superpower clearly is not acting with the same degree of decisiveness and boldness, I would like to ask you to speculate on what steps can be taken to bring about that degree of boldness and decisiveness.
    Mr. BEREUTER. [Presiding.] Mr. Lantos, could we end with that question? We will come back for a second round.
    Mr. LANTOS. Sounds fair to me.
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lantos, first of all, thank you for the kind words.
    I hope, as I said in my statement, to have the best possible relationship with this Committee. Larry Eagleburger would be a hero of mine. I wouldn't ever put myself in the same category as Larry Eagleburger.
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    When I think of myself—and I hope that you will find me sort of basically modest, direct, truthful, and we try our best; and I can give you that commitment on my behalf that that will be the way that I will present myself to you, as a modest person, as an honest person, as a direct person.
    I actually think, Congressman, that to the extent that you wish it, or your colleagues wish it, or that it is proper by the rules, I would be glad to do closed sessions, briefings, anything that would make this relationship closer and more candid.
    For example, sir, when I had the good fortune to be invited by the Chairman and by Mr. Gilman to talk a little bit before the European parliamentarians came; that was a very good session. You were good enough to invite me to talk a little bit before your trip to the North Atlantic Assembly, in my view, a very good session.
    So I think some combination of these things where, obviously, we are making a record and you are making a record, and they serve a purpose in our system and in our democracy—but I would always welcome, always be interested in any other kind of structure, because, as I say, candor and honesty seem to me the only way we can possibly go forward.
    Mr. BEREUTER. I am just going to say now, the struggling Hungarians——
    Mr. GROSSMAN. The struggling Hungarians, that is right; and struggling TV magnates.
    I would say three things. You asked me to speculate, and I will break my rule to do that slightly. I think actually one of the things that is happening in our foreign policy—and I would say that you must see it as well; and I would put this in as a good thing, not as a bad thing—is that foreign policy actually is becoming a lot less foreign and that your constituents, NGO's, groups in foreign countries are now much more involved in foreign policy.
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    I mean, I used to find people in Turkey when I was the ambassador there, you know, from Rotary or from business or from States and towns in the United States; and I actually think all of that is to the good. And one of the things that we have to figure out as practitioners of this and as overseers of it is how, actually, do we feel about the fact that foreign policy is becoming a little less foreign, one; and two, that there are many more actors in our foreign policy today?
    And I personally believe it is the future, just like I think that these new global issues—crime, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction—that is the future of what we are going to do. And if you take that future, and the future is going to be a more private one, then we have to start thinking ahead about what we are going to do about it because you won't stop, I would imagine, Mr. Soros or Mr. Turner from doing what they will be doing, what they feel is the right thing to do.
    So they challenge us. We have a job to do.
    Second, on the question of boldness. It wouldn't surprise you, I think, in this forum to say, Mr. Lantos, that some of the things that I think we are doing now—NATO enlargement, for example—are actually the bold moves of a country that has the rights of the United States. I think the fact—as we talked about before, the fact that we remain committed to things like human rights, when a lot of times other people don't, are bold moves and are proper for the United States.
    So I certainly don't want to get involved in a definitional question of what is bold, but I think if we have a clear view of U.S. interests and we are practical about them, and we recognize that the world is changing and that some of our interests are changing, as well, we can sort of meet this connection that you have very rightly pointed out.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Lantos will have a chance to further enlarge on that or rebut if he wishes on the next round.
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    The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith, is recognized.
    Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Ambassador Grossman, welcome to the Committee. I would like to join Mr. Bereuter, congratulating you on your job.
    Let me just say, as you know very well as former ambassador to Turkey—that nearly a year after Turkey first proposed to hold the summit of the OSCE, nothing really has changed with regard to their human rights situation; perhaps it has even gotten worse in some areas.
    Back in 1996, in November, Mr. D'Amato and I sent a letter to then-Secretary Christopher asking that the summit not go there unless there were some significant changes in their human rights situation; and again, Mr. D'Amato and I wrote to Secretary Albright on July 15 of this year expressing that sentiment. I would ask that those letters and the response of the Department of State be made part of the record.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Without objection.
    [The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
    Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Without reciting the lengthy list of Turkish human rights violations, including the use of torture, it is fair to say that Turkey's record of implementation of OSCE human dimension commitments is very poor. For example, the Committee, to protect journalists, has documented the fact that at least 47 Turkish journalists, the largest number of any country in the world, remain imprisoned.
    I would just like to ask you if you can give the current thinking of the Administration on the issue and whether or not there will be an insistence that, if it is to occur, the summit in Turkey sometime next year, that there first needs to be progress in the area of human rights.
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    And second, we all know that the Romanians had originally talked about making a bid for that, but it was during the election, although that is over now, and we all know that, probably more than anyone else, the Romanians are moving very aggressively in a whole host of fronts to make that democracy work.
    Would Bucharest then be an alternative venue, and is that something you might pursue?
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Smith, thank you very much for those questions. Let me try to respond as candidly as I possibly can.
    First, sir, I hope that you know my record as the ambassador to Turkey, which was that we spoke about, was committed to and kept after this question of human rights. And I want to say, and I have no fear of saying it out loud and in public, as I have done on many times in the past, that precisely the issues that you raised, banning of torture in Turkey and the fact that there are too many journalists in jail in Turkey—zero is too many—too many journalists in jail in Turkey is very much of concern to me personally—was when I was the ambassador to Turkey, remain now.
    I believe, as I said to Mr. Gilman earlier, and to Mr. Hamilton, that an answer to most of Turkey's problems—I don't say all Turkey's problems, but most of Turkey's problems—is more democracy and not less democracy. And I hope, Mr. Smith, you will hear me continue to speak out that way, because that is what I believe and I believe that is what the Administration is committed to. Human rights is a very important part of our agenda with Turkey.
    Second, sir, on the question of the OSCE summit, or the summit in Istanbul—and here I would take Mr. Lantos' invitation to be candid—we have made a decision about what to do about Istanbul, and we have to do that, I think, sometime before December; and we look forward to continuing in consultation with you about that.
    But let me say two things. It is my instinct here—and I just speak personally. It is my instinct here that we want to continue to try to engage the Turks in this conversation about their commitments and about the OSCE and about the kinds of things that they need to do to become more democratic, and I have a very practical piece of evidence here which might lead me to recommendation. I won't say what it is right now, but it might lead me to a recommendation, and that is I happened to be the ambassador to Turkey when Habitat II took place in Istanbul; and I must say, sir, that having this huge international conference in Turkey was a wonderful thing, it was a wonderful thing for Turkish NGO's, it was a wonderful thing for those parts of civil society in Turkey that didn't have a chance to sort of break out and be part of an international community before. It gave confidence to people in civil society in Turkey that lots of things were happening in the world, and it was a very exciting time.
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    And would I have missed it? No, I think it would be too bad. Did I think it added to Turkish civil society? Yes, I think it did.
    So my instinct about this is always going to be one of engagement, and I recognize that that may be a debatable point, but my instinct would be for engagement. My model would be Habitat, and I would need to think about that.
    But to answer your question very directly, I can't imagine that we would go forward in discussions with Istanbul without also talking about the requirements and needs and interests of not just the United States, obviously, but other countries as well, and I would say, of many people in Turkey for more democracy in Turkey.
    Mr. SMITH. Just very briefly to follow up, I think the opportune time to press for those human rights issues would be before any decision is made, and I think you would agree with that. Second, did Habitat really produce any long-lasting changes in the area of human rights even though that was not the focus of it?
    Mr. GROSSMAN. No, sir, and I don't mean to be—I am sorry, can I ask a question?
    Mr. BEREUTER. Briefly.
    Mr. GROSSMAN [continuing]. Don't mean to be misunderstood.
    What I was trying to say was that Habitat, for the purpose it served, which opened up to Turkish people and to NGO's and to civil society there a window on the world, which was more than beneficial.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Smith. I hope you can stay around for a second round.
    The gentleman from California, Mr. Campbell, is recognized.
    Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Welcome, Mr. Ambassador. I have three questions, and they deal with Bosnia, France and Canada.
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    Bosnia, are there hostilities in Bosnia?
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Are there hostilities in Bosnia?
    Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes.
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Well, I mean, compared to pre-Dayton, no, sir.
    Are all problems in Bosnia solved? No, sir.
    Is that the main reason that we are continuing to pursue our very careful and very aggressive and, I hope Mr. Lantos would think, bold implementation of Dayton? Yes, sir.
    Mr. CAMPBELL. Are there hostilities in Bosnia?
    Mr. GROSSMAN. There is no one in fighting in Bosnia, there is no one dying in Bosnia, there is no war in Bosnia the way there was before Dayton.
    Mr. CAMPBELL. Are there hostilities in Bosnia?
    Mr. GROSSMAN. I don't mean to be naive, Mr. Campbell. If you could help me, I would be glad to try to answer your question. I am just not getting it.
    Mr. CAMPBELL. I was anxious to have an answer, if you might, as to whether you believe there are hostilities in Bosnia; and if you feel free to tell me that, I would be grateful to have an answer.
    My judgment is, there are. But I wish to hear your answer, and there is no more amplification I can give.
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Sir, I would say that there are hostilities in the sense that there are still jobs to be done. I mean, not enough refugees have gone home. Not all the war criminals that we would like to see in The Hague are in The Hague. There are clearly disagreements—as Mr. Hamilton said, we have more work to do in train-and-equip. There are disagreements and unhappiness between various factions in Serbia, Pale and—so I am not trying to avoid your question. I am trying to answer it in the best way that I can.
    Mr. CAMPBELL. I don't wish to put words in your mouth. I will move to the next subject, but if you did have an answer that was direct, I would be happy to take it, and the answer could even be a yes or a no.
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    I will give you one last chance. Are there hostilities in Bosnia?
    Mr. GROSSMAN. If you would take it, as I have just defined it, you would know we are not done with that job.
    Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, what can I say? Perhaps in a different language. Does Hungarian permit a subtlety that English does not? I thought perhaps the answer would be yes, perhaps the answer would be no.
    But I will move along unless you have anything further to tell me on it.
    France, go ahead, sir.
    Mr. GROSSMAN. I am just waiting for your question on France. I was just trying to be polite.
    Mr. CAMPBELL. OK. I am on the Africa Subcommittee. I am very privileged to be on that Subcommittee, and it has taken most of my attention in Congress actually; and the role France is playing in Africa right now is of great interest and of some concern to me.
    When I was in France last in May I spoke with your equivalent, actually George Moose's equivalent at the time on the Quai D'Orsay. Recently France participated in—I believe it is correct to say, in the installation of Nguesso to replace Lissouba in the Congo, Brazzaville.
    My question is simply this, whether you have or whether you intend to make the French role in Africa a part of your brief in dealing with European nations; and if so, maybe you could just take a moment now and give me your take on that role vis-a-vis the United States.
    I will simply add that the French press is convinced that the United States is intending to replace hegemony in France and Africa. I do not believe that is our goal at all.
    And the last question I had, and then take as much time as the Chairman will permit us in Canada. I am not asking you to depart from the—the phrase is actually called the mantra, so I think—not using it, denigrating, but the mantra is to say, it is a Canadian affair, we will abide by the outcome.
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    But there is a case pending in the Supreme Court of Canada right now on whether Quebec can decide to separate from Canada on its own or whether it must be permitted by the rest of Canada. All I ask you in this category is whether your office is preparing a contingency plan for the outcome of that Supreme Court case, because we will be asked, as Canada's, I think, best friend—they are our best friend, our neighbor. We will be asked whether we will abide by the outcome of that Supreme Court opinion or not, and all I want to know is whether you are engaged in the contingency plan.
    Those are my questions.
    Mr. BEREUTER. If I may intervene briefly? I need to meet with a constituent. After the Secretary completes his answer, would you mind taking the Chair?
    Mr. CAMPBELL. Sure.
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Campbell, first, on the question of France, let me answer your first question—your first question in a way that I perhaps failed at first, which is, are we going to make French relations with Africa part of my responsibility and part of our conversation with France?
    Yes, sir, and I have had a conversation with the Africa Bureau about this and, in fact, Strobe Talbott and I went—day before yesterday, I think it was, we visited with the French ambassador for a while. We had obviously some other business with him, but we spent considerable time on this; and what we agreed there was that we needed to have a structured and serious conversation with the French on a continuing basis about Africa, and I think that George Moose's successor, Susan Rice, will continue that.
    I actually think in terms of the French press that all of that really very much overplays what is going on. I think you have got it exactly right. Our purpose here is not to push anybody out of anywhere; our purpose here is to try to pursue the right policies in Africa. In many cases, we have pursued them with France and, you know, I think we shouldn't forget that during the summertime it was French troops who helped evacuate American troops out of certain parts of Africa, so we want to work closely with France. Perhaps in a couple of months you would maybe allow Susan Rice and me to come up and visit you and tell you how we are doing.
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    On your last question, I am just going to have to get back to you on that. I was not aware of the Supreme Court case, that is my failure, and I would be delighted to come back to you on it with a real answer to that question.
    Mr. CAMPBELL. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, and I will have follow ups in my round—second round.
    My good friend and colleague from California, Mr. Lantos.
    Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary, I want to commend you on a very fine prepared statement, and I particularly want to discuss with you a comment you make on page 14 where you say we are pleased to say our U.S. Information Agency center in Pristina has been doing great outreach in the region.
    Long before you assumed this job, I had been unsuccessfully advocating a U.S. presence in Pristina for years, and I am delighted that at long last we moved in that direction. And, as you probably know, years ago I advocated the establishment of a U.S. presence in Cluj in Romania.
    I would like to ask a generic question, because I think at a time when, unwisely in my view, Congress restricts the resources, the Department has—because I feel that the Department should be given far greater resources than what we give you—I would like to ask your view in Central and Eastern Europe of establishing a number of such miniposts in various regions of the different countries, because we are dealing with an entirely different milieu than we are in Western Europe.
    Clearly, in Western Europe, the American presence is noticeable in countless different ways—commercial, tourist, otherwise. Is it not true in Eastern and Central Europe?
    For instance, in the Slovak Republic, Bratislava and Kosice, functionally, are light-years apart, and the fact that we have an embassy in Bratislava, which is next door to Vienna, really does nothing for eastern Slovakia. And I am wondering if you would care to comment, or maybe you want to give it some thought and comment at our next meeting about the possibility of establishing throughout this entire region several miniposts which would keep the flag flying high in areas where we now have no representation whatsoever.
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    Clearly, in a large country like Romania, to have one single post is unrealistic, and while I realize that our staffs are limited at the various embassies, perhaps the establishment of a minipost in Constantsa might do more good than having one more person in Bucharest.
    There is a general question here, it seems to me, that not having had any significant presence in Central and Eastern Europe for so long, we have come to assume that once we establish an embassy, we are covering that country; and in point of fact, given the lack of mobility, the far lesser degree of movement in Eastern Europe than you have in Western Europe, a reallocation of resources might not be inappropriate.
    The second question I would like to ask of you is a very broad one. When Russia became an independent country, our prestige there was very high and the expectation of the Russian leadership concerning us was very high. When Mr. Gephardt and Mr. Gingrich led a group of us there in 1993, we got a tremendous reception. In 1994, when we repeated the trip, the reception was much less effusive. In 1995, they barely noticed that we were there, and I suspect the fact that we are unable to deal with Mr. Primakov on their technology transfer to Iran is merely an indication of the diminishing U.S. influence and leverage over Russia.
    I wonder if you would care to comment on how, in your view, we could attempt to recapture some of the influence which we so clearly lost by the tremendous disappointment the Russian regime has experienced by the failure of the West to lubricate the process of transition from a Soviet system to a Western-style democratic market economy.
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Thank you very much, Congressman, for both questions. I will take your invitation to reflect on your first point, because I think it is a very important one and I want to answer it in a systematic fashion.
    May I just say, though, here that I think that your first question in this round is absolutely related to the point you and I were discussing in your last round, which is to say that in many ways all of us are going to have to change the way that we do business; and if you are interested now in promoting American commerce, which I am; getting America's story out, which I am; doing the things to have real impact in local areas, which I am; because of foreign policy not being so foreign anymore, I think you do have to think of new ways to be represented and to represent yourself.
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    We experimented some years ago, as you know, sir, with a small embassy model in a small post, and I think in many places those have worked extremely well; and so I am grateful for your advice, and let me take that. But I can assure you that many of us are trying to consider new ways of doing business to get our story out and pursue our interests, especially in new areas.
    The other thing I would say is that we also ought to be flexible about this. We ought to make sure that we don't define one cookie cutter and say all has to be this way, because in some places you might have a post that is more commercially focused, in another place you might have a post that was more focused on getting America's story out, another job. So I think the flexibility is an important one.
    On your second question, Mr. Lantos, I certainly wouldn't want to presume on my colleague, Steve Stavonivich, who has just been confirmed as the Special Ambassador for Russia and the Newly Independent States, but I think we need to, as you say, stay focused on our relationship with Russia. And we want to make sure that we are walking this line between making sure that they understand that what we are doing in Europe, especially in areas like NATO expansion, is not a zero-sum game.
    So I have the good fortune to talk to you in your office; that is our whole purpose in southeastern Europe and in northwestern Europe is to say, not a zero-sum game, keep coming in our direction, we really do mean Europe whole, free and at peace.
    And I must say, I think if we can change this conversation, keep pursuing our policies, but change this conversation, we can have the Russian Federation recognize that being part of a Europe whole, free and at peace is in their interest as well. And I must say that it was very exciting and interesting for me—I had the good fortune to participate in that first meeting of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council and to see the Russian Foreign Minister, the NATO Secretary-General and, in this case, the Foreign Minister of Belgium together organizing this meeting and trying to consider how to go next. To have to take next steps forward was a very exciting prospect.
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    So my own view is, if we stay true to our principles, we keep focused on goals, if we recognize that they have problems, these are things that we can continue to discuss with them.
    Mr. LANTOS. Let me just say how much I look forward to working with you in the years to come.
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. BEREUTER. [Presiding.] The Chair will recognize himself at this point for a second round, and I just wanted to make three statements and then move to a couple of questions. You can respond, if you wish to respond, to any of the first. I think we need to give more emphasis to trying to cause our European allies to understand the gravity of the export by their firms of technology that contributes to the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Iran. They should understand that, since they are in missile range. But, they don't seem to understand the gravity of the situation, indeed, for multilateral enforcement of sanctions.
    Second, some American commentators that follow European issues closely believe there are signs—I hope they are right—that it might be appropriate and, now, productive for the United States to try to solve some long-term irritations and difficulties with France. If that is possible, it is time to restore a better working relationship with our first ally.
    Third, it seems to me there are signs that Bulgaria welcomes a larger role in working with us and with NATO on the Partnership for Peace toward NATO expansion. I am hoping that we will respond to it if you in fact see that kind of encouragement.
    Now two questions. The first relates to Slovakia. It is indicated that the Prime Minister, Meciar, has proposed a volunteer corps of helpers for the Slovak police force totaling up to 6,000 such volunteers in 1998. I am wondering, in light of that, would it be accurate to say it is one more step toward a police state being constructed in Slovakia? In any event, what is the United States going to do to coordinate with European democracies to bring pressure to bear on Meciar to allow true democratization in Slovakia?
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    Second—this is really going to stretch you a little bit, I suspect—would you see if there is interest in investigating the possibility of establishing an American-English language university in Macedonia, in Skopje, for the Balkan region as a source of educational expertise to meet the needs in the area and to establish some sort of stability not only in the former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia, but in the region?
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take the opportunity to just make a comment on your three observations and then answer your two questions.
    First, I couldn't agree with you more. I think that all of our European allies—actually, I think everyone around the world has to understand the gravity of the export of those items that help people get weapons of mass destruction; and it was certainly the primary goal of my first trip abroad in every place, every European capital I went to. With everybody I talked to, I said, first of all, that we have got the law of the land, the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, and we intend to enforce the law of the land; and second, it is very important that you all start to focus on weapons of mass destruction.
    So I couldn't agree with you more, and if you would allow me, I would be glad to have your voice added to that when we talk to them. This is not just the Administration talking, but this is the Congress, obviously, as well.
    Mr. BEREUTER. I think it is reflective of a large number of Members of the House.
    Mr. GROSSMAN. I agree with you.
    Second, on France, absolutely I agree with you, we need a better working relationship with France; and as I said actually to Mr. Campbell, while you were out, sir, the Deputy Secretary and I went and visited the French ambassador the other day, and our purpose was to say, you know, let's make sure we are all on the same page here; let's make sure that we recognize, first of all, the vast majority of places in which France and the United States are working closely together.
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    Africa was the one that you and I were talking about, but we need the right working relationship there with the French, and I must say, I think the President's appointment of Ambassador Rohatyn to be the ambassador to France is going to help us tremendously in this. He has been a big hit since he arrived there around Labor Day. He knows the French, he speaks French; I think he is going to be very good.
    And we will continue to pursue that because I agree with you, they are a very important country, a very important ally; and we want to have the best possible relationship with them.
    Third, on Bulgaria, I had the chance just before—as I explained earlier, before I was in Bucharest, to spend a couple of days in Bulgaria. In fact, I made a speech at the Atlantic Treaty Association meeting there, which I thought was quite amazing for the ATA, to be meeting in Sofia. I found in every place, both in the executive there—and I had the good fortune actually to do a session like this with some members of the Bulgarian Parliament, their commitment to keep them coming in our direction, and I said exactly what you just said, be members of PFP, be useful in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, do all this work together that you can with us precisely because we have the commitment, and keep coming. And I think that was a message that was very well received.
    On your two points, Mr. Chairman, on Slovakia. I would just stop for a minute here and say that I personally, and I hope Members of this Committee, really admire what our ambassador in Slovakia has done, Ralph Johnson. He has stood up on every occasion publicly and privately there for democracy, and I think that is what our ambassadors ought to do. And I can tell you—I have been an ambassador in a hard place—it is not easy sometimes; and he deserves a lot of credit.
    And the answer to your question is that we want to stay focused on questions of democracy there, we want to speak out in that way; and in fact, just this week—earlier this week, I think, or late last week, I apologize—there was a group of Slovaks, not from the ruling party, from some dissidents, and they were received at the State Department because we very much wanted to hear their views and send the message that we are interested in all of the people there.
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    So Ralph, I think, has got the right philosophy. We want to go forward in this area, and if you allow me, I would be back to you on the specific report of volunteers, which actually I don't know very much about.
    And finally, on the University of Macedonia, I would be pleased to check and see what our view might be about that. I know that universities are obviously good things. The Swedes came in the other day, and they are establishing business schools and law schools in the Balts and in the former Soviet Union, in the Russian Federation, so I would be glad to take that idea from you, sir.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much. It is good to hear those appropriate and kind remarks about Ralph Johnson, who was and is my neighbor in Arlington.
    I would tell Mr. Sherman that Chairman Gilman began the session with taking tributes and expressions of condolence for Walter Capps, our late colleague, and he left the record open for any kind of a written statement that you might want to make. Beyond that, I believe that there will be a special order on the floor. But I would recognize the gentleman for 5 minutes for his questions.
    Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I was on the House floor, where there was more than an hour dedicated to remembering Walter Capps; and not everyone who wanted to speak had the opportunity to speak there. With due respect to the witness, I would like to use much of the 5 minutes.
    Mr. BEREUTER. You may do that.
    Mr. SHERMAN. Walter Capps was my neighbor, literally, the chair to my left. I know they will have another Member sit there some day, but this Committee will never really fill that seat. Walter Capps was also my neighbor in California, his Santa Barbara County just next to the Ventura County area that I represent, and Elton Gallegly, also a Member of this Committee, was between the two districts.
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    You know, I am here as a freshman, and freshmen need a lot of advice; and every time I wanted to know what was the smart political move either on the floor or in this Committee I never turned to my left and I never asked Walter. But whenever I wanted some wisdom and some thoughtfulness and a way of looking at things that is different than today's headlines and yesterday's poll questions, that is when I turned to Walter. I think he was one of our best, both on this Committee and in the House, and I was proud to serve with him in both locations.
    Turning to the Ambassador, I have been asking the same question continuously since July. I have asked it in writing, I have asked it face-to-face to the Secretary of State, I have been promised by Madeleine Albright twice an answer. I have been promised by witnesses sitting there, an answer. Last meeting of this Committee, I had a chance to address your other representative from the State Department. And so I will ask the same question again until I get an answer.
    We have tried to put the economic squeeze on Iran in every possible way, and I want to know whether the three prospective NATO members are doing the same thing. My fear is that we are asking to extend our security umbrella to the edges of the former Soviet Union at greater cost and expense than we will realize at this time, and that trade, at least in nonmilitary goods, will flourish with Poland and Hungary and the Czech Republic and Iran, Iraq and other rogue nations.
    And I don't ever want to go back to my district and say, we made Hungary secure, we made Poland secure, we made the Czech Republic secure, and that nuclear bomb exploded by Iran—whether it was in the Middle East or Central Asia or carried by terrorists to somewhere in the United States—was built with money generated from an economy supported by the countries that we made secure.
    When I spoke to the Secretary of State, I asked whether those three countries had a ''not one pistachio'' policy, speaking of Iran's leading nonpetroleum export. I have asked the question over and over again, and I fear, Mr. Grossman, you have not brought an answer.
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    Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Sherman, first let me say that I had the opportunity after the very gracious words about Mr. Capps, also to say that as a graduate of the University of California at Santa Barbara and a longtime resident of Santa Barbara—my grandparents for many years lived in Oxnard—that I wanted to join in this tribute, as well, both personally and on behalf of the Administration. So you will allow me to do it again.
    Let me give you the straightest answer I possibly can. You are right, I didn't come with an answer; but it is a fair question, and if you would allow me not to fall into what is clearly a bad habit from your perspective, try to get you an answer. You have my word, I will try to get you an answer.
    And let me give you a second word. If for some reason I can't get you an answer, I would like to come up and tell you why. So if you allow us just to continue——
    Mr. SHERMAN. With leave of the Chair, just—do you know of any circumstance in which a Member of the Committee has addressed to the Department of State the question—as you say, a fair question—week in and week out, at every occasion from July to the end of October, and not even been told that he is not going to get an answer, or that he is going to get an answer, or when he is going to get an answer or never get an answer.
    Do you know of any circumstance that fits that?
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Oh, you know, I regret——
    Mr. SHERMAN. That is a rhetorical question.
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Let me give you my commitment on either side. Either we will get you an answer, or you have my commitment, I will come up and visit you and explain to you why I can't answer the question.
    Mr. SHERMAN. My fear will be that the answer will be that the supporters of NATO expansion don't want to answer the question, and accordingly, if you just want to say we should provide security to other countries and not worry what effect they have on ours, you can communicate that by letter.
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    Mr. GROSSMAN. Well, I think also that, before you came in, Congressman Bereuter and I were talking. It is very important, sir; and I would repeat, if I could, the answer I gave to him. People need to understand the gravity of the export of these technologies for weapons of mass destruction—not only the nuclear weapons, as you say, but biological and chemical, as well.
    Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Ambassador, I will ask you not to shift the nature of the question I have been asking. It is not about weapons trade, it is not about technology trade; it is about any economic relationship at all.
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Understood.
    Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Sherman, and thank you for speaking for us once again on your attitude, which we share, about our late colleague.
    The Secretary has been with us quite a while. He has time constraints, so I am going to ask that he understands that I will give each of my two remaining colleagues here their second-round 5-minute questions, and then we will adjourn.
    So Mr. Smith first and then Mr. Campbell.
    Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, I appreciate that. First of all, I want to acknowledge that our former Member, good friend, and colleague, Tom Evans, from Delaware, is in the room. Welcome to the Committee.
    Mr. Ambassador, just let me ask you again. In reflecting on your statement with regard to the OSCE summit, I wonder about the lesson learned from the U.N. Habitat conference held in Turkey several months ago.
    The lesson learned may be the wrong one, and I say this with all due respect. When we are talking about shelter and something around which there is a clear consensus—more housing, better housing, cleaner housing, and things of that kind—it does not provoke a government to crack down on opposition. Last night Mr. Hoyer, Mr. Cardin, Mr. Solomon, Mr. Markey, and I introduced a resolution, H. Con. Res. 179, which would express the sense of Congress that until there is progress in the area of human rights the venue ought to be changed. I asked you about Romania, whether or not that might be suitable, and perhaps you might want to respond to that because, again, they are breaking their backs to try to move toward democracy, human rights, civil society and the whole list of items that all of us enjoy. There is disappointment in Bucharest that they were not invited to be part of NATO during this first round. This might be one way of at least recognizing their progress.
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    The sense of the Congress, the operative line just says, ''until there is progress''. It is a concern. I just want to raise that in the context of the Habitat Conference. We know that the NGO's that are getting raided are the human rights foundation of Turkey, and their chapter offices throughout Turkey are the ones whose doors are being crashed and whose people are being dragged away. And as you know so well, as former ambassador, journalists when they write ill of the ruling party sometimes find themselves being arrested. In a way, that is a major part of civil society.
    As much as all of us in politics sometimes loathe the reports we get from newspapers, I, like many of my colleagues, would defend freedom of the press to the hilt because it is one of the greatest protections of our democracy. Yet they have targeted the journalists in a very special way. So I would hope, as the thinking progresses on this, that the Habitat experience might be taken into consideration.
    I argued the same thing unsuccessfully, when the women's conference was held in Beijing. I was in Beijing for a week. I co-led the delegation for Congress to that. And I was amazed—I don't read Chinese, but I got the Chinese newspapers every day and had somebody who could understand Chinese read major headlines to me and some of the articles. I would then juxtapose that with what was going out to the rest of the world, which was critical of Beijing, as it ought to be, versus what was being used for internal consumption. The Chinese regime saw it as a major public relations coup, that somehow we were honoring the human rights of women in China, when you and I know that that regime treats women as second-class citizens and commits crimes like forced abortions and other heinous acts. I am certain, especially given the control over the press, that this kind of summit will lead to that same kind of internal press. There might be some negative articles, but those journalists might find themselves in jail as a result.
    So I would just ask that the Habitat conference be seen as significantly different from this kind of conference, which is seen as a reward of sorts. I would ask if that would be part of your consideration. Ours is a bipartisan resolution, and we do think that there is a venue that might be better. Unless there is progress, we would be tripping over ourselves to say, ''Turkey, that is just fine and dandy''.
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    So it is a conditional sense that we have that we really want to see some progress. I just commend that to your thinking.
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Smith, thank you very much. I certainly take your point.
    I obviously take lessons from where I can find them, and I certainly am not trying to argue with you. The only point I was trying to make on Habitat was exactly the point you made, which is, how do you expand civil society; and Habitat helped us do that and, more importantly, helped Turks do it for themselves.
    You properly said, and I said, I haven't made a decision. I was trying to inform myself and I am grateful for your views.
    Mr. SMITH. Again, it is how they treat their opposition. The threat doesn't come from shelter building, but it does come from somebody who says, wait, I don't like this policy. The next thing you know, they get the knock in the middle of the night from the police.
    Thank you very much.
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir.
    Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Campbell.
    Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Ambassador I just thought I should say for my colleague's sake, I understand that the hearing was supposed to be on Europe, but you are Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs, so I completely understand why you may not have been absolutely briefed on the level regarding Canadian affairs. Nevertheless, I thought I would take just a moment longer, since we are about to end to say why I was asking that about Canada, and here is what I would like to share with you.
    In October 1995, there was a referendum in Quebec. The side that wanted to separate—they would call it a new ''sovereignty''; they would resist the word ''separate''—but a new sovereignty was defeated by less than 1 percent—less than 1 percent, very narrow—and very much part of that debate was a perception shared by the side in favor of the new sovereignty that the United States didn't object.
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    Maybe you wouldn't be, but most Americans would be surprised how much America's attitudes toward this issue matters in the debate in Quebec. Quebec views itself as trading with America far more than with the rest of Canada; it is a north-south relationship economically far more than it is an east-west relationship, and they look at the United States as having split off from England, something metaphorically they would like to do.
    In this context, if truly we don't care, that is the policy of our government, then they are operating correctly. But I don't think that is correct. I think we do care. With respect for their sovereignty, we still do care about the outcome. I think we should care regarding NAFTA, regarding international peacekeeping obligations, regarding the St. Lawrence Seaway, regarding immigration and concerns in our own New England States that border not only Quebec, but the Maritime Provinces.
    The case that is pending now was brought by an individual. Standing was granted to the individual to bring the case in the Supreme Court of Canada, and then the Canadian Government, the Federal Government, intervened and took over his case. The Government of Quebec has failed to respond. They don't recognize the sovereignty of the Supreme Court of Canada to adjudicate the question of whether Quebec can separate or not.
    So the court has appointed an amicus curiae for Quebec, a gentleman named Jolie Coeur, and I spoke with him at some length when I was in Quebec a couple of months ago. If the Supreme Court of Canada says Quebec may not separate pursuant to Canadian constitutional law without the permission of the federation—in other words, a constitutional amendment would be required; a position, I might suggest, that was taken by Abraham Lincoln in our country's history—we will be asked, as sure as the sun rises tomorrow, whether that is our view as well. And we could, it seems to me, respond yes or no, and the mantra won't work anymore. That this is a Canadian issue begs the question, because the Supreme Court of Canada has just said, this may not happen, what is your attitude?
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    So it is wise not to speculate on contingencies. I am not asking you to. It is also wise to prepare for contingencies, and a year and a half ago, I was privileged when the then-Chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee permitted me to conduct hearings on just this issue; and I asked the State Department to send a representative, and they declined. And it was not an inadvertent declining, it was an intentional declining, and that was then taken by both sides as events that, well, the United States didn't particularly care.
    I conclude by saying, I think we should care, I believe we do care; and all I am asking for you to do is sometime, when you're finished with Bosnia and finished with Turkey and finished with France and all your other obligations—maybe I shouldn't say when you are done with all those, but on a level of priority equal to those—consider the potential breakup of our biggest trading partner, our best friend, and if you begin the contingency planning, I think you do our country a service.
    It is my belief that, at least as of the time of the hearings, there was no contingency planning in the State Department; and then if you care to let me know what the contingency plans are, I would even be discreet and keep them confidential if you would wish.
    So I invite that as part of your offer to be candid and forthcoming.
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Thank you, Mr. Campbell. First of all, let me, just for the record, make sure that the mantra, as you rightly put it, gets out on the record, because I think it is good now and it is very important, as you say, to let people know that we do care about Canada. As the President has said, we care a lot about our relationship with Canada and that relationship is with a united Canada. As you say, it is up to the Canadians.
    I am very grateful to you today for raising this issue to me, for highlighting it to me. As I told you the first round, I was not aware of it, and I intend to make myself aware of it.
    Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you.
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    Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Campbell.
    Mr. Ambassador, just one more question; then we will let you go on.
    Mr. Ambassador, under the Dayton peace accords in Bosnia, Serbia is obligated to cooperate in bringing to justice those indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague. However, the Serbian Government has stated it is not going to extradite Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, who has been indicted by the tribunal for war crimes.
    Can you tell us what we are doing to gain Serbian compliance with its obligations in such matters?
    Mr. GROSSMAN. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman.
    As you know from the Secretary's statement, and I am glad to make it today as well, we are focused very hard on this question of war criminals. We believe there will be no peace without justice, and I think—again to give praise where praise is due to the people, who have worked over the past few months to increase the number of these indicted war criminals who go to The Hague—the 10 Croatians that went a few weeks ago, I think very much to the credit of the international community and the United States, who focused on Croatia, focused on our need to get those war criminals to The Hague and succeeded.
    I can tell you, Mr. Chairman, without fail, that in every conversation with Mr. Milosevic, the Secretary, or Ambassador Gelbard, war criminals are a very important part of it. And second, you won't see us talking about any diminution of sanctions and our desire to have a policy of conditionality and linkage and leverage with the Serbs until this is one of the things that gets taken care of.
    Chairman GILMAN. Again, Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for being here today, for your very comprehensive review of the European situation. We look forward to further meetings with you in the near future.
    Without objection, the Chairman will submit to the State Department questions for answers in writing, from the Chairman on behalf of the Majority and the Ranking Minority Member on behalf of the Minority, and we ask for an expeditious response to the questions we may submit.
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    The Committee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]


    Insert "The Official Committee record contains additional material here."