SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
Page 1 TOP OF DOC
45–839 CC
1998
POLICY TOWARD HAITI FOLLOWING THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.N. FORCES
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
DECEMBER 9, 1997
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
Page 2 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
WILLIAM GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JAY KIM, California
STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio
MARSHALL ''MARK'' SANFORD, South Carolina
MATT SALMON, Arizona
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
TOM CAMPBELL, California
JON FOX, Pennsylvania
JOHN McHUGH, New York
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
ROY BLUNT, Missouri
KEVIN BRADY, Texas
Page 3 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
LEE HAMILTON, Indiana
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
HOWARD BERMAN, California
GARY ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PAT DANNER, Missouri
EARL HILLIARD, Alabama
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
STEVE ROTHMAN, New Jersey
BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee
BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
JIM DAVIS, Florida
RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff
MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Democratic Chief of Staff
CALEB MCCARRY, Professional Staff Member
JOHN MACKEY, Investigative Counsel
Page 4 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
KIMBERLY ROBERTS, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
WITNESSES
The Honorable David Greenlee, Special Haiti Coordinator, Department of State
Mr. James Milford, Deputy Administrator, Drug Enforcement Agency
APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman of the Committee on International Relations
The Honorable Gary Ackerman, a Representative in Congress from New York
The Honorable Joseph Kennedy II, a Representative in Congress from Massachusetts
The Honorable David Greenlee
Mr. James Milford
Additional material submitted for the record:
Letter to the Secretary of State from Congressmen Gallegly and Ackerman
GAO Report, ''Update on U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean,'' submitted by Chairman Gilman
Letter of November 14, 1997, to Mr. William Cohen, Secretary of Defense, from Chairman Gilman et al
POLICY TOWARD HAITI FOLLOWING THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.N. FORCES
Page 5 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1997
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman GILMAN. [presiding] The Committee will come to order.
We've called this hearing today to learn the Administration's plans for Haiti following the November 30 withdrawal of our U.N. forces. Haiti has been the Administration's most costly and time-consuming foreign policy engagement in this hemisphere. A month ago, Secretary of State Albright traveled to Port-au-Prince.
The Committee is disappointed and concerned that our State Department chose not to provide a more senior witness for today's hearing. While we look forward to hearing from Mr. Greenlee, I do note that we have invited Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, a key architect of the Administration's Haitian policy, to testify before us on two occasions. I believe the historical perspective that Mr. Talbott could provide, coupled with the testimony of Mr. Greenlee and others, would assist our Committee in conducting the kind of oversight that is required.
The Clinton Administration has so far invested some $2 billion in Haiti. In 1994, after abandoning a promising initiative to end the Haitian crisis through negotiations, our Administration committed 20,000 American troops to Haiti under the umbrella of the United Nations. Last week, President Clinton decided to make an open-ended commitment of U.S. troops in Haiti without any congressional approval. The troops have an implicit security mission and in extremis will constitute a tripwire for further military involvement.
A number of our Committee chairmen joined me in advising the Administration, at a minimum, to secure an explicit invitation for our troop presence from the Government of Haiti. President Preval declined to extend such an invitation citing a resolution passed by Haiti's Chamber of Deputies calling on foreign troops to leave. We continue to believe that time is past due for our troops to come home from Haiti.
Page 6 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Reversing the coup against former President Aristide and removing the Haitian army as the primary source of organized violence against ordinary Haitians were historic accomplishments. A massive international donor effort to rescue Haiti from the hemisphere's worst misery has been mobilized. A new civilian police force was created from the ground up and projects are underway to begin an overhaul of Haiti's corrupt and ineffective judiciary.
Now, after a little more than 3 years, the U.N. military mission has ended. On December 4, The New York Times reported that the departing U.N. troops, and I quote, ''will be leaving behind a country nearly as poor, prostrate, and paralyzed as when they stepped in to help.''
Specifically, we hope that today's testimony will shed some light on the following problems that were identified during a recent staff delegation visit to Haiti:
First, the political crisis continues unresolved. In fact, President Rene Preval and the Lavalas Political Organization have hardened their positions since former National Security Advisor Anthony Lake's November mission. There has been no movement toward confirming a new Prime Minister.
Second, the crisis is blocking substantial international aid while the Haitian economy languishes. The assembly firms that provided many ordinary Haitians with jobs have not recovered from the embargo. The Committee notes that while President Preval assures the international community of his support for privatization and foreign investment, domestically he has launched an economic program that embraces import substitution and land reform.
Despite progress on privatizing the flour mill and cement plant, privatizing the telephone company—which, incidentally, is being misused by the Government of Haiti for expenditures such as lobbying the U.S. Government—the electric company, and port facilities cannot succeed without consistent, strong, and public support from President Preval.
Third, the dispute over the April 1997 elections still remains deadlocked. Fraud, gross mismanagement, and a less than 6 percent voter turnout—6 percent voter turnout—characterized those elections. The international community and the Haitian Government's failure to include representatives of opposition parties in the elections risks the possible re-emergence of corrupt one-man, one-party rule. The international community has failed to foster and protect pluralism or even minimally acceptable electoral standards in Haiti.
Page 7 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Fourth, a major drug crisis has developed in Haiti. President Clinton has once again named Haiti as a major drug transit country. In its March certification report, the Administration stated, and I quote, ''Narcotics move relatively unimpeded through Haiti's seaports, with some shipments transiting Haiti overland to the Dominican Republic for onward transport to the United States.'' The State Department has additionally reported that, and I quote, ''Thousands of kilograms of cocaine have been smuggled over the border from Haiti into the Dominican Republic''. The Administration has noted that, and again I quote, ''Most of those accused of drug offenses are able to manipulate Haiti's weak and corrupt judicial system and are released.''
Now we've learned that the Haitian National Police—HNP—is under siege from drug trafficking and related corruption. A number of Haitian police officers have been found skimming drugs from seized narcotics shipments. And in a distressing development, senior U.N. and U.S. officials stated that they would ''not be surprised'' if former Haitian army officials, including key Aristide security aides associated with the Lavalas Family Party, are involved with drug trafficking.
Fifth, the politicization of the Haitian National Police continues unabated. Former Presidential candidate, Leon Jeune, was beaten and arrested by the Haitian National Police for alleged crimes against State security. HNP Director, General Pierre Denize, and Secretary for State Security, Robert Manuel, who reports directly to President Preval, participated in that arrest. Mr. Jeune is still being held despite a judge's order that he be released.
Sixth, the security situation in Haiti is tenuous at best. Gangs armed with automatic and other weapons continue to be seen in Cite Soleil. There are numerous, overlapping, heavily armed government and private security forces. Furthermore, key Aristide security aides are arming Lavalas Family partisans and rival Lavalas Political Organization partisans are also arming themselves.
Page 8 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Seventh, the Haitian National Police special investigative unit has received little support from the Government of Haiti. Eddie Arbrouet, who has been linked to politically motivated killings, is still at large in Haiti. It is clear that the Haitian National Police has the resources but lacks the political will to arrest Arbrouet.
And finally, on November 20, our U.S. Coast Guard intercepted a Haitian freighter with more than 416 refugees headed for Florida. The Administration notes that this was an isolated incident. However, it is a clear reminder of the consequences of failing to help our neighbors in Haiti build democratic stability and jobs.
Today's hearing, hopefully, will focus on whether the Administration has a clear long-term plan for Haiti that addresses these very hard questions facing our troubled neighbor. I welcome David Greenlee, Special Haitian Coordinator for the State Department, and James Milford, Deputy Administrator of our Drug Enforcement Administration.
You may proceed in reading or summarizing your prepared statements, whichever you may deem appropriate.
First, however, I would like to recognize our Ranking Minority Member, Mr. Hamilton, for any opening statement he may have.
Mr. HAMILTON. I thank the chairman. And, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and commend you for calling this hearing. I know a recess hearing is unusual in some respects, but I certainly share your view that the situation in Haiti merits special attention by this Committee.
I think Haiti has come a long way since we restored constitutional order in 1994, but I think all of us would agree that it has a very long way to go. And the question, I guess, is whether continued U.S. engagement is necessary in order to build the institutions that Haiti never had and certainly needs in order to establish a democracy.
The chairman mentioned I think seven, or perhaps more, very formidable problems. I found his statement to be unrelentingly negative with regard to Haiti, and there is much that is negative there. But I do think it is important to recognize some of the successes as well. I think the United States has created the context for reform in Haiti. It swept away the junta; it restored constitutional order; it focused attention on the need for international assistance to Haiti. Before we intervened in 1994, we were rescuing thousands of Haitians at sea on makeshift rafts. We were running three refugee centers. We were feeding 1.3 million Haitians every day. It was costing us millions of dollars—hundreds of millions of dollars—annually.
Page 9 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Today, the oppressive military junta is gone. The army has been abolished. Political violence, although certainly still a problem, is greatly reduced from 1991–1994 levels. The flow of refugees has certainly diminished sharply.
We are now spending significantly less money in Haiti than we were; and we're spending that money for the right things. We are trying to support the development of democratic institutions and move toward an open economic system instead of rescuing refugees. Haiti now has its first ever civilian police force. That force's inspector general has dismissed or arrested 175 police agents for human rights abuses, involvement in drug trafficking, and corruption; and that's a far cry from the impunity that was enjoyed by violent officials in Haiti's past.
Haiti has begun to modernize its inefficient industry. That process is painful. All of us would agree that it's been too slow, but at least part of the delay is the result of an institution that is very new to Haiti, and that is an independent multiparty Parliament.
I don't think we've succeeded in persuading Haiti's leaders to assume responsibility for the country's future. And that may be the biggest difficulty that we have at the moment.
The chairman is right to point to the political crisis that began with the national elections last April and has paralyzed the Haitian Government. There hasn't been any Prime Minister functioning since June. Haiti has failed to move forward on economic and political reform and that blocks hundreds of millions of dollars in international assistance for people who are as desperate as any people in this world probably, and certainly in this hemisphere.
All that has been achieved in Haiti is still at risk unless its leaders break very bad and very old political habits. Haiti's leaders must set aside patronage- and personality-driven politics and build a political culture that emphasizes institutions.
Page 10 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
We all know that so very much needs to be done. Unemployment is 70 to 80 percent—it's just an astounding figure. The economy only grew 2 percent last year, even though a lot of money—billions I think—was being put into the Haitian economy. The infrastructure is in ruins. Public officials are corrupt, still lining their pockets with money that should be invested in the Haitian people. There has been some improvement with the police, but the judicial system is corrupt and ineffective.
Now, I think where we are at this point: First, the United Nations made the right call to keep a 300-man international civilian police force in Haiti. That force will help Haiti's police carry out their mission to provide security. That move has fairly broad support in the Congress, although some opposition, too.
Second, I think President Clinton made the right call to keep the U.S. Support Group in Haiti. We'll learn more about that in a few minutes. As I understand it, our soldiers there are not assigned to any security mission but their continued presence there sends a message that the United States remains dedicated to helping free institutions take root in Haiti, and that's a very important symbolic presence, it seems to me. They're also getting some unique training. They're making some differences in the lives of ordinary Haitians by building roads, and wells, and schools, and providing tons of clothing, food, and supplies to these very desperate poor people.
Finally, let me just observe that I don't think we can save Haiti from itself. Haitian leaders simply have to understand that the international and the U.S. presence in Haiti can not long continue. They are going to have to get their act together. They don't have a lot of time to do it. They have to begin to assume responsibility for governing the country. If they don't, Haiti is going to return to the violence and the chaos that has marked much of its recent history.
Our economic assistance for Haiti must be conditioned on the achievement of that reform. We do no service to the people of Haiti unless its leaders work to establish free markets and democratic institutions. And the most important condition of our involvement must be—an insistence, really—that they have fair and free elections. Our engagement in Haiti, together with a demonstrated commitment by Haiti's own leaders to reform, is the only possible way, I think, to sustain and build upon Haiti's genuine but so far very fragile progress since 1994.
Page 11 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
I thank the chairman again for the hearing. I look forward to it. I welcome the witnesses as you did, Mr. Chairman. I thank them for coming.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.
We'll now proceed with the testimony of Ambassador Greenlee. Ambassador Greenlee is now the Special Haiti Coordinator for the Department of State. He has been a former representative to the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group earlier this year, and political advisor to the Army Chief of Staff at the Pentagon. He has served in Chile and Bolivia, and in many other important posts.
Mr. Greenlee, you may put in your entire statement, or you may summarize it as you see fit. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF DAVID N. GREENLEE, SPECIAL HAITI COORDINATOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. GREENLEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before this Committee to discuss our efforts to promote stability, democracy, and economic growth in Haiti. I welcome this Committee's interest in Haiti. It is an important matter which requires our concerted efforts. I have submitted a more comprehensive version of my comments for the record.
It is no exaggeration to state that Haiti must deal with challenges more numerous, complex, and deep-rooted than any other nation in the Western Hemisphere. Within the hemisphere, Haiti has the lowest annual per capita income and the highest child mortality rate; the highest illiteracy rate and the lowest life expectancy age. Haiti's fledgling democracy is a brave attempt to overcome decades of despotism and dictatorship. Haiti's democratically elected leaders are struggling to reform, develop, and strengthen inherited institutions which were abused and neglected for many years. We must recognize that these challenges will persist for many years to come.
Page 12 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
We can all agree that the United States has clear, long-standing interests in helping Haiti overcome these challenges. As a close neighbor, we have a major stake in improving the social and economic well being of Haiti to avoid mass migration that would be destructive to Haitian society and costly to the United States. Haiti's geographic location and poverty make it vulnerable to becoming a major transit point for narcotics trafficking. Instability in Haiti could become an example for those seeking non-democratic answers in other countries.
I am convinced Members of Congress and the Administration share common goals with respect to Haiti. Let me state what I believe those goals to be. We are seeking a stable, democratic government which maintains public order while tolerating dissent and disagreement. We are seeking a pluralistic political system that uses public debate to strengthen government. We seek a country where public security forces function with integrity, efficiency, and respect for human rights, and can control the spread of international crime and narcotics trafficking. We seek an economy growing in a sustainable manner to help Haitians of all social strata achieve higher income levels and a better future for their children. We seek a Haiti that gives private initiative the space to make the economy grow and provide employment for all who wish to work. Finally, we wish to help Haiti recover its environment through wise population policies and restoration projects. These are practical goals that advance our interest, but they will not be achieved in a fortnight, or even in the 4 years of this Administration.
These goals and interests justify active, unyielding support for Haitian democracy, stability, and economic development. More progress toward these ends is needed, but much has been achieved. Haitian democratic institutions are in place. The old tools of repression have been dismantled. Haitians are working to resolve a political crisis through negotiation rather than violence. Structural economic reform legislation has been enacted and the first of several planned privatizations of State-owned enterprises has occurred.
Page 13 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Haiti's first civilian police force has been trained and fielded. The Haitians have demonstrated a will to join us in efforts to combat narco-trafficking. The Haitian National Police seized 6,000 pounds of cocaine over the past 2 years and is rooting out corruption within its ranks. Haiti has entered into a bilateral maritime counternarcotics agreement with us. And while 67,140 Haitian migrants were interdicted at sea during the 3 years of de facto rule, about 4,200 migrants have been interdicted since the restoration of democracy, and only 704 migrants have been interdicted in 1997. This marked reduction in illegal migration represents a significant savings to the American taxpayer.
Much hard work remains. it is very much in America's interest to help the Haitian people realize their dream of a just, democratic and prospering society; the type of society which attracts job-creating private investment and reduces migration pressures.
We should also work together with the international community whenever possible. For example, about 41 Creole-speaking Haitian-American law enforcement officers will participate in the 300-person U.N. Civilian Police Mission in Haiti—MIPONUH. MIPONUH will continue the important work of previous U.N. peacekeeping missions in mentoring and professionalizing the Haitian National Police as it continues to make progress toward the goal of self-sufficiency. MIPONUH is strictly a civilian police mission and demonstrates a further reduction in the size and scope of the U.N. presence in Haiti.
Since April 1995, DOD's U.S. Support Group in Haiti has deployed engineering, medical, and other units for training purposes on a bilateral basis, providing humanitarian, civic assistance to the citizens and institutions of Haiti. The Support Group's presence symbolizes our commitment to Haitian democracy and undertakes projects which directly benefit Haitians of all ages and walks of life. For example, engineering units have completed renovation of 16 schools and have drilled 20 public wells. The group's medical units have provided basic health care to over 100,000 Haitian citizens. These activities provide valuable field experience and training to DOD personnel and are of lasting benefit to the people of Haiti.
Page 14 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
As an example of the kind of engineering activities that are planned, the Support Group will help the Haitian Government construct a maritime facility for the Haitian Coast Guard in Jacmel on Haiti's southern coast. Consisting of a pier and a barracks-office building, this would be the Haitian Coast Guard's first major facility outside of Port-au-Prince and would greatly enhance its narcotics interdiction capacity. It is within the context of such engagement that the President determined that the current U.S. military posture in Haiti is appropriate and should continue for the time being.
President Preval and Haitian political leaders are working toward a resolution of the political impasse which has beset Haiti since June. We have urged all parties to act in the national interest and to resolve their differences promptly so Haiti can continue to move forward. We do not yet know if their efforts will yield success. The impasse has its roots in the April 6 elections for nine Senate seats in which international observers noted irregularities. President Preval has put forth a formula which takes into account key areas of concern, but which has not yet achieved the degree of broad spectrum backing that may be necessary.
As frustrating as the length of the political stalemate might seem, we must not lose sight of our goal: a democratic, stable, and prospering Haiti. Given their history, the process of political negotiation is novel for Haitians. They're learning how to engage on contentious issues in a peaceful, non-violent manner. They are using words, not guns or knives. This is a marked departure from the Haiti of old in which the edicts of despots like Duvalier or Cedras were swiftly carried out with brutality and violence.
Haiti will continue to need the help of the United States and the international community. Without such help, Haiti's fragile democratic institutions could fall prey to predatory, anti-democratic forces that will have adverse consequences for American interests. The result could be instability, brutality, a flotilla of rickety vessels packed with freedom-seeking migrants, and a flood of narcotics transshipments bound for our country.
Page 15 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
The Administration is pleased to broaden opportunities to consult with Congress on how best to advance our shared goals of a stable, democratic, and prospering Haiti. I look forward to responding to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Milford appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.
Now, we'll proceed with the testimony of Mr. Milford from the DEA. Mr. Milford is Special Agent in charge of the Miami Field Division, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Acting Deputy Administrator, Washington DEA. He has served in many capacities in the DEA since June 1971.
Mr. Milford, we're pleased to have you with us. I might also note that Mr. Milford is the recipient of the Presidential 1996 award for meritorious executive performance in the Senior Executive Service.
We welcome you to our Committee, Mr. Milford. You may submit your full testimony, or you may summarize, whichever you see appropriate.
STATEMENT OF JAMES S. MILFORD, ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. MILFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it's a pleasure to appear before you and the Committee today. I have my full written text that I'd like to submit for the record.
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.
Mr. MILFORD. And I have some comments that I would like to make before any questions you have.
Chairman GILMAN. Please. Feel free.
Mr. MILFORD. First of all, I'd like to thank you and the other Members for your continuing support of DEA operations both domestically and internationally. It has been a true pleasure to work with you and I think that we have made a significant difference as a result of the support from all the Members on this Committee.
Page 16 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
I believe it's important to look at the Caribbean itself and what has happened. As you know, Mr. Chairman, in the early 1980's the Bahamas and some of the areas around the Bahamas became an important transshipment point for cocaine coming into the United States. Over the last several years, we have seen Mexico become the preeminent location of cocaine moving into the United States with south Florida and the Caribbean taking a secondary role.
With the fall of the hierarchy of the former Cali cartel, the Cali traffickers have really bifurcated their operations and moved to more individual sort of trafficking activities. That has lead many of the Cali traffickers and the traffickers from the North Valle del Cauca in Colombia to look for new avenues to really move their cocaine from Colombia through sometimes the Central American area and into the United States via the Caribbean. Much of that is happening, as we all know, through Haiti and the island of Hispaniola which also accommodates the Dominican Republic.
What we have tried to do, and what we have done with a coordinated law enforcement effort, is develop a coordinated Caribbean initiative between DEA, the Coast Guard, U.S. Customs Service, and the FBI to look at many different areas throughout the Caribbean which are important to us, and that includes Haiti.
Haiti itself over the past several years has seen a tremendous increase in the amount of cocaine coming into that island. The island really experiences cocaine coming in by air drops via small planes. We see it by commercial cargo coming in through primarily in transiting Venezuela and Panama, and we also see it through coastal freighters that come up from the source countries, primarily of Colombia, stopping off in Panama and Venezuela, and then moving into Haiti.
Most of the drugs, and primarily what we are talking about is cocaine, is coming into Haiti, coming into some of their ports, their outlying ports—Cape Haitian, Jacmel, St. Mark and some of the outlying areas. It is warehoused in those areas and then moved across through primarily border posts or the border between the Dominican Republic and Haiti. They are moved into the Dominican Republic by a combination of Haitian traffickers and by the Dominican Republic traffickers themselves.
Page 17 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
As we well know, and as you know, many of these border operations and these border crossings are unmanned, or poorly manned at best. And for those other traffickers that want to move drugs from, let's say one side of the island over into the Dominican Republic, the use of the small canoes or the motorized canoes called yolas and also more coastal-type freighters are also used to move in the drugs. At that point, because of the large commercial shipping operations that really are located in the Dominican Republic, a lot of the cocaine is moved out into the United States via commercial cargo.
We have also seen a tremendous increase with the use of Haitian and Dominican traffickers with Puerto Rico. As we know, Puerto Rico has become an important entrance point for traffic of cocaine.
Moving a little bit to what our problem is: and what we have and what we see in Haiti has been for many years just a total lack of infrastructure and organization in the law enforcement arena in Haiti, much as we have seen in all other areas of the Haitian Government itself. There has been, you know, a total free-fall as far as any type of organizational structure. In recent times, and as a result of initiatives by the U.S. Government, the State Department, and many other organizations, there has been established and continues to be established, a police force and the structure of a police force within the Haitian National Police and the Judicial Police. And more importantly, as far as narcotics is concerned, most recently, in February 1997, the counter-narcotics unit was developed. Now, I must say that this is just a fledgling organization. It has 22 members at the present time, plus its director. This is an organization that brought people in who were for the most part, totally inexperienced not only in drug law enforcement, but law enforcement in general. Since October and over a period of time, we in law enforcement—we in the U.S. Government, we in DEA as a part of this—have worked in a training operation that we are trying. And we are hopefully developing an infrastructure that can be sort of the basis—the foundation—for working into a structured sort of police drug enforcement organization that we all know and we all rely on. That training, as far as DEA is concerned, started in October. We hope to complete that in January 1998. And then, hopefully, we can move from that point.
Page 18 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
This is going to be a long process. It's not going to happen overnight. But, I think it's important to point out that we have this and that we are hopeful that it will move along.
The DEA office in Port-au-Prince which is in the U.S. embassy, as we all know, has a complement of three people at the present time. We have two people at that location, and hopefully, we can get a third in the country in the near future.
With all that in mind, and assuming that we can develop a structure and an infrastructure of drug law enforcement, we also have to look at the prosecutions in the prosecutors' offices which have been less than credible. It is a process that needs to be reformed. It is a reform that is absolutely critical to the overall structure of making a difference in Haiti. And also, as you have mentioned, we have to look at the judicial system. And the judicial system has to be supported and enhanced to have any thought of any effectiveness there.
That is basically the comments that I have. I would be more than happy to answer any questions that you or any of the Committee Members have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Milford appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Milford.
Ambassador Swing stated he wouldn't be surprised if key Aristide aides were engaged in drug trafficking. There are other reports to that effect which should be investigated and I'm going to ask Ambassador Greenlee, why wouldn't Ambassador Swing be surprised. Is the Administration concerned about Mr. Aristide's close association with people who may well be narcotics traffickers? And what steps are we taking to look into all of that?
Mr. GREENLEE. I think what we have to do is follow trails of evidence wherever they might lead. And what Ambassador Swing was saying in effect was that he wouldn't be surprised if they led in one direction or another. I think Mr. Milford has described very effectively the security environment in Haiti and the still nascent abilities of the Judicial Police and the Haitian National Police to develop evidence. I think we should not leap to the conclusion because there are allegations or rumors to the effect that people close to Mr. Aristide or close to some other political figure might be involved in narcotics that those allegations are in fact true.
Page 19 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Chairman GILMAN. So are we pursuing then that review to see how many are involved or to what extent that involvement goes up the ladder?
Mr. GREENLEE. We certainly work closely with the Haitian National Police to press them to pursue every lead consistent with effective law enforcement practice. The DEA office is just being set up. I hope that when it's fully staffed that contingent, working together with the new antidrug contingent in the Haitian National Police, will begin to make some effective inroads.
Chairman GILMAN. Ambassador Greenlee, for the past 2 years Haiti has been listed as a major drug trafficking transit country, and how do we explain Haiti's transformation into a major platform for drug transshipments to our country and Europe during a period in which both the United Nations and United States had major military administrations in that country?
Mr. GREENLEE. Mr. Gilman, Mr. Chairman, we are talking about a country where everything needs to be done at once; a country the size of Maryland whose armed forces were dismantled after October 1994 and had no security apparatus at all. A new security force had to be trained from scratch. Many things are being addressed at one time.
There are vast expanses of the Haitian coastline that are still not adequately patrolled. I think it's understandable that such an environment would be an attractive place for drug traffickers, particularly as more effective law enforcement techniques are brought to bear on other traditional routes.
So, I'm not surprised if there is an increase in trafficking through Haiti. I don't really know the statistics on that, some of it I think is pretty anecdotal. But, it does not surprise me at all that Haiti would be seen by traffickers as an attractive place to try to initiate trafficking.
Chairman GILMAN. Ambassador Greenlee, since we've made known our intent to maintain U.S. troop presence, what's going to be the specific mission now of our U.S. troops there?
Page 20 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. GREENLEE. The specific mission now is the same mission as has been the mission since March 1996. The mission is to conduct training exercises specifically in the areas of medical and engineering projects, and to conduct such exercises in a manner beneficial to the United States and the Haitian people.
Chairman GILMAN. Can you tell us under what circumstances rules of engagement would be changed or permitted to evolve? What scenarios have been in discussion in the Administration?
Mr. GREENLEE. I think any discussion of changes of rules of engagement is highly hypothetical. The discussions that I've been involved in, and I think I have been involved in all of them, relate to the mission that I have described and only that mission. The U.S. Armed Forces and the Support Group in Haiti do not have a security mission. The security mission is the responsibility of the Haitian National Police.
Chairman GILMAN. And, Mr. Milford, how critical are the Dominican Republic drug dealers to the success of drug trafficking in the New York City area? I understand they are one of the largest trafficking groups today.
Mr. MILFORD. Absolutely. Mr. Chairman, as you well know, the Dominicans have had a foothold beginning in the early 1980's with low-level drug trafficking in the Washington Heights area of New York City. Over time they developed a very close relationship with the Colombians and subsequently developed their own coordinated effort through the Dominican Republic and moved not only cocaine but also heroin.
Chairman GILMAN. So by getting the drug supplies into Haiti and going across the land into the Dominican Republic we're really fostering that kind of distribution ring, are we not?
Mr. MILFORD. Well, Mr. Chairman, as I've said in my testimony, what we have is the Haitian traffickers and the Colombians bringing drugs across the Haiti-Dominican Republic border into the Dominican Republic. We have air drops around the Dominican Republic and Haiti and the drugs are then moved into Puerto Rico and the continental United States by the Dominican traffickers and the primary destination of those drugs, at least for the Dominicans, is New York City.
Page 21 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Chairman GILMAN. Is it true that a number of the former Haitian military officials that were heavily involved with narcotics trafficking in the past left their posts and are now heavily engaged in taking up their old trade moving drugs from Colombia through Haiti? Is there some evidence to that extent?
Mr. MILFORD. Mr. Gilman, I'd like to explore that in maybe a closed session with you.
Chairman GILMAN. Alright.
I've extended my time. Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much.
Mr. Greenlee, you said the U.S. Support Group has no security mission.
Mr. GREENLEE. That's correct.
Mr. HAMILTON. So if the——
Mr. GREENLEE. I'm sorry, may I qualify that? I would qualify it to the extent that it has the mission of securing itself. It is responsible for its own protection.
Mr. HAMILTON. Alright, so if the U.N. Civilian Police Mission or the Haitian police got into trouble and were being attacked, the U.S. Support Group would not lift a finger to help them.
Mr. GREENLEE. That's correct. In fact, we worked very hard to ensure that the civilian police mission had its own organic security. Three hundred CIVPOL members will be deployed to Haiti, 140 of that number will be dedicated to the protection of the operational mentors.
Mr. HAMILTON. I understand that. But the U.S. Support Group would not take any action to secure the nation——
Mr. GREENLEE. That's correct.
Page 22 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. HAMILTON. —or of a police nature.
Mr. GREENLEE. That's correct.
Mr. HAMILTON. Now you heard the chairman a moment ago call for the troops to come home—the U.S. troops. What would happen under that circumstance; if we said, OK, come on home?
Mr. GREENLEE. Well, I think the point has been made that the U.S. Support Group symbolizes our support for Haitian democracy and economic development. The point was also made in a letter that I've just seen that was sent by Mr. Gallegly and Mr. Ackerman to the Secretary of State, that in effect says that the U.S. military forces in Haiti constitute an important factor of stability.
Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I'm interested in what you think, and what the Administration thinks. We pull them out, what happens?
Mr. GREENLEE. I think if we pull them out at a time when the international military is leaving, and I think if we do that, we send a very bad signal. We send a signal that we are going out with the rest of the international community.
Mr. HAMILTON. OK. We send a bad signal; what happens?
Mr. GREENLEE. It may be that nothing will happen. It may be that the situation in Haiti will not change in any way. On the other hand, it may be that when elements that have not been identified at this point see that the United States is pulling out of Haiti and no longer maintaining the visible commitment that it had in the past, that they will begin to probe and test the Haitian National Police in ways that will be difficult for the Haitian National Police to handle.
Mr. HAMILTON. You seem to be saying the situation is only marginally or a little better if they stay there; if they pull out, no big deal. I mean, I don't get any sense that you think this is a highly important mission of the U.S. Support Group.
Page 23 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. GREENLEE. I think it is highly important because it symbolizes our commitment. I think it is highly important because it provides good training for the United States and great benefits to Haiti. It's part of a bigger picture of the commitment of the World Bank, the IDB, and the United Nations.
Mr. HAMILTON. And if they are in fact pulled out, what happens? I'm still not clear as to what you think happens.
Mr. GREENLEE. I think it's not in the U.S. interest to pull them out. If we were to pull them out, I don't think we would be furthering our interests in supporting Haitian national democracy.
Mr. HAMILTON. Now let me ask you a little bit about the political leaders. I have supported what the Administration has tried to do in Haiti, and I recognize the problems involved, and I understand that many of the criticisms the Chairman has made have a lot of validity to them. I must say to you, I have been enormously disappointed in the Haitian political leadership. And I want your frank appraisal here: President Preval and Mr. Aristide, is Mr. Aristide at this point helpful or unhelpful?
Mr. GREENLEE. Mr. Aristide is pursuing his political interests and——
Mr. HAMILTON. That's not what I'm asking. Is he helpful or unhelpful? Is he causing problems for us at this point?
Mr. GREENLEE. I think it is unrealistic to talk about the political context in Haiti in terms of whether someone pursuing his political interest is causing problems or not causing problems.
Mr. HAMILTON. I'm talking about not the Haitian national interest, I'm talking about the American national interest. From an American national interest standpoint, is Mr. Aristide at this point being helpful or unhelpful?
Page 24 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. GREENLEE. I think we'll know more about that when the——
Mr. HAMILTON. You don't know at this point?
Mr. GREENLEE. No; I think the political situation is ripening and I don't think it has reached the point where the parties are ready to compromise in a significant way.
Mr. HAMILTON. Are you pleased with Mr. Aristide's political leadership in Haiti today? He's the most popular politician there.
Mr. GREENLEE. Mr. Aristide is not the President of Haiti, he's a political——
Mr. HAMILTON. I understand what he is not. Are you pleased with his leadership?
Mr. GREENLEE. I am neither pleased nor displeased.
Mr. HAMILTON. You're not displeased with it. You think he is doing OK?
Mr. GREENLEE. I don't think it is a matter for me to be pleased or displeased about; or the Administration.
Mr. HAMILTON. You mean when the American national interest is strong, when we're putting hundreds of millions of dollars into that country—billions, perhaps, as the Chairman said—we can just stand back and not make an evaluation of political leaders. I'm not asking you to make an evaluation from Haiti's standpoint; I'm asking you to make an evaluation of Mr. Aristide's conduct from the American national interest. Is he helping us or is he not?
Mr. GREENLEE. Mr. Hamilton, I would be able to answer this better if I were sure I knew what aspect of Mr. Aristide's conduct you are referring to.
Page 25 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. HAMILTON. In general, I'm asking you.
Mr. GREENLEE. In a general way, we would like to see the Haitian leadership in all areas be more flexible and more constructive in reaching a solution to the political impasse and in moving forward on economic development in ways that are consistent with the undertakings that Haiti made in 1994.
Mr. HAMILTON. Well, you are unwilling to make any judgment about him; I guess there are reasons for that. How about President Preval. He started out pretty well, but it seems to me in the last few months we've not had any real leadership from him either.
You see my frustration here? You're coming up here asking us to appropriate a lot of money for Haiti; you're asking us to do a lot of things to be supportive. I want to try to support that. I think it is a worthy objective. But my goodness, we can't do it unless the Haitian leadership steps forward. I am enormously disappointed with the Haitian leadership. I don't think anybody is stepping forward and moving that country in the direction that you say we want to go—stable government, pluralistic system, market economy, and all the rest. I just don't see any leadership moving forward there. I don't know the reasons for that. I don't know enough about Haitian politics to know. But I am frustrated by that leadership. And you can't expect the Congress of the United States to continue to pour money into Haiti and do a lot of other things if the indigenous leadership doesn't step forward.
And what worries me about your testimony this afternoon is you don't show any frustration with that leadership. I'm frustrated by it. I don't think they're performing very well. And I think we have a right to see on their part more effective political leadership. You don't convey that to me.
Mr. GREENLEE. Mr. Hamilton, I share your frustration with the situation, and let me say that any number of high-level Administration officials, congressional delegations, Ambassador Swing almost daily convey exactly the frustration you've expressed.
Page 26 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
We want to see the Haitian leaders find ways to compromise; we want to see them make the democratic process work.
What I was trying to do in my comments to you earlier was frame the political problem in the context of a Haitian history of no experience with democratic processes, no experience with compromise and understanding how compromise is achieved. But in a general way, yes, we are enormously frustrated. That's why we've been trying to on many, many occasions urge compromise. That's why your comments are going to be useful for us to send right back to the Haitian leadership, because we agree with them.
Mr. HAMILTON. Well, despite my comments, I appreciate the efforts being made to try and get this thing on the right course. But, I want to say to you and to the Haitian leadership that they have a window of opportunity that is quite extraordinary for that country. They have got a lot of international support out here; a lot of people wanting to help, including the United States; a lot of good people working on the problem. And they simply have to get their act together and begin to assume responsibility to govern Haiti. And if those leaders—and I've mentioned two or three of them—are not prepared to do that, then Haiti is going to slip back into violence and chaos like they have had in most of their history. I just hope those leaders can understand the extraordinary opportunity they have right now. And if they blow it, there is going to be untold misery for the people of Haiti for a long, long time to come. If they seize the opportunity that is now available to them, they can begin to turn around that country that has had a long tragic history.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. Leach.
Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to turn a little bit more to the U.S. leadership. Pursuing further some of the comments of the distinguished Ranking Member. But, as I understand it at this time we have no formal request for the Government of Haiti to have troops there. Is that correct?
Page 27 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. GREENLEE. Well, we've been in a dialog with President Preval and the Government of Haiti. We go over the projects we've been doing with them. There is a status of forces agreement which is in place and that is a formal agreement.
Mr. LEACH. But we have no formal written request from the government? Is that true?
Mr. GREENLEE. We have no formal written request but we've discussed——
Mr. LEACH. Let me go on about this for a second. I mean, in one sense, people in Congress that have appraised Haiti have in a sense had an ambivalent attitude. That is, everyone who looks at Haiti, their heart goes out and wants to give the benefit of the doubt to anything that will help Haiti, including things that are a little expensive for the United States; i.e., intervention. On the other hand, there is a great deal of doubt that any other country can cause another country to pull itself up. And the historical American terms are that you have to do things for yourself. And there has not been an immense demonstration of that in Haiti.
And so from an intellectual and philosophical point of view, the U.S. Department of State has just testified to the U.S. Congress that we have a multi-billion dollar operation in a foreign State for the purpose of training. It has testified to the U.S. Congress that it is necessary to maintain a training exercise because of support for democracy and economic development in another country.
Now the obvious intellectual question one has: that rationalization can apply to many, many countries in the world for which we have no troops present, nor should we. I mean, what we are now looking at from a rationalization point of view is a government that has made no request formally for troop presence; we're maintaining that presence for training, with no security purpose; and then we're saying it would be a bad signal to depart. And if we get ourselves trapped in that kind of rationalization which is either intellectually uncompelling or fraudulently misleading that there are other reasons we are there, we get in a pickle in terms of foreign policy in general.
Page 28 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
I am really increasingly on the side as one who's never been a great particular critic of our policy and almost wanting, in balance, to give support to the Administration, increasingly doubtful that this kind of rationalization is sufficient. And I would just ask you, can you frame your reason for committing American troops in a larger parameter? We've dealt abstractly many times with missions—why we send troops around the world in difficult situations—and training is not necessarily a very compelling one when the situation is difficult.
Mr. GREENLEE. I appreciate your comments and your question. In the first place I'd like to say that although we have continuous deployment in Haiti, in fact such training missions are not unique to Haiti as a country in the Western Hemisphere. There are other such deployments for periods—discrete periods, for example of 4 months—basically the same size in countries like Ecuador, El Salvador, Saint Lucia, Jamaica, for example. And there have been such deployments in other countries in Latin America. So the fact that we are conducting medical training and engineering training is not particular to Haiti. It's just sort of the way we do it that's particular to Haiti.
Mr. LEACH. And the length of time we do it.
Mr. GREENLEE. And the length of time, right. But 4 months is not a short time to deploy in other areas and other contexts where we haven't had the same experience that we've had with Haiti. And we have to remember where we were in October 1994; the geographical proximity to Haiti; the particular conditions of Haiti as by far the poorest country in the hemisphere and where we have a particular commitment in other areas to try to help that country develop so that it can become self-sustaining. So it seems to me that what we are doing on the military side is consistent with what we are doing in other areas and is complimentary to those other efforts.
I've said that our commitment, our presence, in Haiti symbolizes our commitment to Haitian democracy. I did not put out there on my own that it was a factor of stability, but I noted that it was said in another place. I think that that is also the case, though, that there are intangible benefits to a U.S. presence that are not strictly related to its mission but simply as an example of our commitment to ensure that our interests are recognized as well as Haitian interests.
Page 29 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. LEACH. Well, I appreciate that, but not very much. The intangible American national interest is hard to find a very compelling precept.
Mr. GREENLEE. I'm sorry, I don't understand that because I think the interests are very tangible.
Mr. LEACH. What I'm trying to say is: you represent the U.S. Department of State as the articulator of American foreign policy, and as such you have expressed that we have an intangible American national interest. Well, if you are going to suggest that, I would like to suggest that you have to bring tangibility to the intangible. What do you mean?
Mr. GREENLEE. I'm sorry.
Mr. LEACH. You've expressed nothing about meaning. You've not said we're going to have peace in the world because of it; you've not said that you're defending American jobs; you've not said you're defending anything. But maybe you can list 40 things, I don't know; it's quite possible. But, for someone to stand up and say, I defend the commitment of American troops to another country because of the intangible American national interest, I say to you that that is not a very compelling concept. You've got to tell me what that national interest that you are defending is and how vital it is.
Mr. GREENLEE. I'm sorry, sir. We're going down the wrong path. I don't think I said intangible interests, I think I said tangible interests. I think we have tangible interests in Haiti.
Mr. LEACH. Well, then list them.
Mr. GREENLEE. In 1994, we had approximately 30,000 seaborne Haitians coming toward our shores. The interdiction of those seaborne Haitians cost us about $400 million. We put some of them in Guantanamo, that cost about $1 million a day. Our foreign policy for months was tied up with trying to relocate these Haitians in other countries. Our Atlantic fleet was tied up with trying to find the Haitians on the sea, rescue them, put them aboard, put them in to Guantanamo. That cost us millions of dollars and was very, very disruptive to the United States. I think that preventing that kind of thing from happening again is a tangible interest.
Page 30 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. LEACH. Thank you. You've said something.
Mr. GREENLEE. Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Leach.
Mr. Faleomavaega.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts for deferring.
Mr. LEACH. Excuse me, would the gentleman yield for a few seconds?
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I gladly yield.
Mr. LEACH. I have a unanimous consent request I was requested to make and didn't, to put a letter in the record from the distinguished chairman and Ranking Member of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee. Would the Chair allow that?
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Mr. LEACH. And I apologize to the gentleman.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, may I make a similar request?
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. I ask unanimous consent to have a statement by Representative Joseph P. Kennedy made a part of the record.
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection. And at the same time I'd like to introduce a portion of a report for the record entitled, ''Update on U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean, Eastern Pacific,'' page 6, which reads, ''In addition, the Department of State has reported that thousands of kilograms of cocaine have been smuggled over the border from Haiti into the Dominican Republic whose army has had little success in stopping the flow of drugs.'' And I offer that for the record without objection.
Page 31 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Faleomavaega.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Greenlee, I'm sure I, more than anyone in this hearing, can appreciate the circumstances and the reason for the Committee's hearing this afternoon concerning Haiti. I am also sure of your recollection 3 years ago when there was such a tremendous groundswell in support, not only by many of the leaders from the Congress but as well as from the Administration, and for the reason why eventually we sent a very highly decorated delegation to Haiti hopefully to bring some sense of decency and honor to this country and the Caribbean.
And of course, you know, former President Carter, Colin Powell, and several others in a very dramatic fashion were able to work out some sense of solution to the crisis that was at hand in the Caribbean. And I think this probably is one of the reasons why our distinguished Members of the Committee are trying to raise the question: what exactly is our national policy toward Haiti? Is it because of near presence that might have some real security problems with our own national security, or is it because it will cause some political crisis into our own Nation? It seems to me that this is what we are trying to raise at issue with the Administration and with yourself.
And I just wanted to ask you too, you mention in your statement that sometime in July the President will then reevaluate the situation in Haiti and he will then make a decision. And I want to ask: if he does make a decision, what conditions will it be based upon. Has the Administration formulated any set of conditions or priorities that say by July if this doesn't happen in Haiti, I, as President of the United States, this is what I'm going to do? Has the Administration formulated that sense of policy?
Mr. GREENLEE. Let me say first of all that our clear national interests with respect to Haiti certainly are driven in significant part by the geography of Haiti, its proximity to the southern coast of the United States; and the experience of what happened when there was a brutal, repressive regime and Haitians fled Haiti in huge numbers and we were not, on humanitarian grounds, able to put them back into Haiti. So that very clearly drives our national interest.
Page 32 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
We have also an interest in seeing the poorest country in our hemisphere develop and get on its feet and become self-sustaining. After all, we don't want to live in a world where there are countries that are not viable, and not able to trade with us, and that are inherently unstable. And that's particularly the case in our own hemisphere. So we have an interest there.
As regards the U.S. Support Group presence, there will be an evaluation of that presence, you said, in July. I think that that's about the time that that will happen. The criteria, I'm not sure that I can answer that precisely because we are talking about a mission that is a training mission.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Ambassador, I'm sorry, my time is running out on me. This is the problem: it has been 3 years now—and I'm a little surprised myself to say that after 3 years we have not formulated a more definite set of criteria which, come July, says this is what we are going to do. And I think this is the frustration that we are going through now here as a Committee.
Mr. GREENLEE. I'm sorry, I didn't want to leave the impression that there are no criteria.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. OK. Alright, please.
Mr. GREENLEE. What I was trying to say was that we are talking about a training mission with projects that are mutually beneficial and if it's determined that those projects are no longer mutually beneficial, then we should leave.
As regards the reason that the U.S. Support Group is in Haiti and the reason that the U.S. military has been in Haiti, well, there has been a change in the reason. Because the first mission was quite different from the mission we have now. Also there has been a dramatic decrease in numbers over time. We started out with over 20,000 troops in Haiti, and we have drawn down to now between 400 and 500. That's the size of a training mission; that is not a security mission. And as I pointed out earlier, there are such training missions in other parts of the hemisphere. That's the kind of thing that we can sustain if we find it to be in our interest and in the interest of Haiti.
Page 33 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Well, Mr. Ambassador, I'm sorry to say that you say that you have classified this policy as a training mission. I don't look at it as a training mission. I look at it as a more broad and a very powerful sense of presence. And I wanted to ask you by the same token, the contradiction to our whole policy in the Caribbean is that 90 miles away you have a Marxist Government that is not very democratic, and I make reference to Cuba. And why haven't we done the same in the Cuban situation? I want to leave that for further discussion.
But here is another problem I have. A couple of months ago we had the Prime Minister of Cambodia duly elected. He came to Washington and met with the Congress pleading with America that democracy is at a crisis now in Cambodia. Should we apply the same standard that we're doing with Haiti to the crisis that we're now confronted with in Cambodia? Even though we may not be in the Caribbean, there is the same set of problems underlying the fact that here is a country that has the same similar situations that we find in Haiti, and they are asking us to help because democracy is at a risk right now. Should we apply the same principles to Cambodia?
Mr. GREENLEE. You're going to take me quickly away from my portfolio, and I don't want to go there. I think principles are principles, and principles remain constant. But, Haiti is Haiti; Cambodia is Cambodia. Haiti is an hour and half plane ride from Miami; Cambodia is farther away. I don't want to speak about Cambodia. I'd like to keep the focus on Haiti.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Five hours away from Guam, I know.
Mr. GREENLEE. I'm sorry. I want to keep the focus on Haiti, and I cannot speak to the other issue.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I understand. Mr. Chairman——
Mr. GREENLEE. Did you have another question though about our—you said that it wasn't simply a training mission, the U.S. troops in Haiti provide a presence. And I very much agree with that and I think that presence is understood in the framework of our commitments in broad terms to Haiti.
Page 34 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I would say that you would agree then, that symbolism sometimes is our best foreign policy sometimes.
Mr. GREENLEE. Symbolism backed by commitment, I would say.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Yes; and we have the commitment.
Mr. Milford, what is the approximate cash value of the drug traffic coming out of the Caribbean to the United States? Do you have any sense?
Mr. MILFORD. The sense is billions, sir.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Billions?
Mr. MILFORD. Billions.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And you mentioned Puerto Rico as a major trafficking market. We have U.S. Customs presence there. Any estimates of the amount of drugs coming out of Puerto Rico directly to the United States?
Mr. MILFORD. Again, the situation with Puerto Rico, I think as you well know, once drugs get into Puerto Rico, there is no customs check coming back out, or a customs check in the United States. So, that is where the traffickers have utilized Puerto Rico really as a very lucrative transshipment point. They've also used a lot of the ports, including the airport, in co-opting a lot of the airport employees and so on. We have a very vigorous ongoing operation with U.S. Customs and with the other law enforcement organizations—U.S. law enforcement organizations—in Puerto Rico in an initiative that looks at Puerto Rico and the entire Caribbean, including, of course, the island of Hispaniola.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. May I ask Mr. Greenlee, Mr. Chairman, one more question if I may?
What exactly is Mr. Aristide's position toward the United States at this point in time?
Mr. GREENLEE. I don't know exactly.
Page 35 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Is he pro-American?
Mr. GREENLEE. I don't know exactly what his position is. I have always had trouble with describing foreign leaders as being pro-American or pro-something else. I image he's pro-Haitian and pro the interests he sees in his political agenda. I know that he feels very warmly toward the United States and appreciative for our efforts in October 1994. I think it is fair to say though that he is a Haitian with Haitian interests.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, thank you; and I want to say that I associate myself entirely with the statements made by the Ranking Democratic Member of this Committee. Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Faleomavaega.
Mr. Goss.
But before Mr. Goss proceeds, I would like to make part of the record a letter in which Mr. Goss and I joined together with our colleagues, Gerald Solomon, Bill McCollum, Dennis Hastert, Henry Hyde, Chris Cox, and Bill Young where we asked the Secretary of Defense to spell out the specifics of our further mission in Haiti. This was dated November 14, 1997, and I don't believe we've received any response yet. And we noted in there that our troops and navy should not be used as a tripwire, and under no circumstances should they stay without an unequivocal invitation to remain from the Government of Haiti. And I hope that our good ambassador will help us get a response to all of that.
Mr. Goss.
And I ask that this be made part of the record, without objection.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Goss.
Mr. GOSS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to return to my home Committee today.
Page 36 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
I have a number of questions. Going on the basis of some that have started, however, to try and wrap up some loose ends. I have a DOD report which I think several of us have seen that said Operation Fairwinds staffing in Haiti, as of November 1997, broke down as follows: 20 percent headquarters staff, 64 percent security personnel, 14 percent engineering, and 2 percent other functions. I'm curious, if that is accurate information, and we have double-checked with DOD, how you could characterize the mission as an engineer and medical training mission? And if indeed you are going to stick to the fact that it is an engineer and training mission, how is it that the tangible results response that you gave to Mr. Leach would still be effective today? Will these people who are there, these medical trainers and engineer trainees who are military, in fact be able to stop any flow of refugees coming out of Haiti? And if the answer is yes, how do you explain the recent ship of 417 people? And if the answer is there was no ship of 417 people, my next question is, are we watching the refugee situation carefully? And if we are watching it carefully, how do you explain that a shipload of 417 Haitians almost got all the way to the United States without being detected?
Mr. GREENLEE. You've asked a lot of questions.
Mr. GOSS. I have.
Mr. GREENLEE. Let me start with the first one. I remember that at the discussion, I believe it was about a month ago or so, maybe more, with Sandy Berger and others, you put the piece of paper on the table——
Mr. GOSS. Indeed.
Mr. GREENLEE. —that had the relationship of the number of security personnel in Fairwinds to engineers and so forth. I was always sort of surprised by your doing that because I understood that that piece of paper was a snapshot and that at any given time there could be a relatively large number of troops in one area or a relatively small number. And I did ask about that and I understood that at that particular time that the snapshot was taken, there were two security companies at one time—one was coming in and the other was leaving. So, that skewed the numbers.
Page 37 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Also, I'm not certain, I think that you drew a comparison in that other meeting between the number of engineering elements in I think July, as opposed to the relatively fewer engineering elements in November.
Mr. GOSS. It was no snapshot. It was actually a spectrum, and it was a pattern that was shifting away from engineering into security. That is why I put the piece of paper on the table; because over an extended period of time it showed a change in pattern and policy which I suspected might have something to do with the fact that the U.N. mission was coming to an end and we were beefing up the security forces to try and cover it.
Mr. GREENLEE. My understanding is, and I stand to be corrected by DOD if the information I got from DOD isn't correct, but my understanding is that there were two rifle companies at one time, and one was coming in and the other was leaving in the November statistic.
That said, it would not be surprising that if with the drawdown of international military, the responsible military commanders were to decide to increase security personnel relative to their other personnel, but that would be their decision. I don't know that that's the case now. I understand there is a total of 408 as of today at Fairwinds. I don't know the relative mix, but it's possible that the security components could go up, it's possible that later they could go down. But, I don't think that particular piece of paper that I saw the other day established a clear trend.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Ambassador, this is in no way an ad hominem remark: I honestly have trouble knowing which piece of paper to believe from the Administration on the subject of Haiti. It is very difficult to grasp the policy here.
I think you got a very straightforward question on the subject of President Aristide: is he helpful or not? I believe that Mr. Hamilton had a fair question. We have a lot of money invested in Mr. Aristide and his representation of democracy. I have had some people characterize his role to me as sabotaging the elections of April 6. It has been said that the only nation who observed those elections that said those elections passed as free, fair, democratic, or even close to it, was the United States of America. Everybody else—everybody else—said those elections were a fraud, a sham, or worse. It is very hard for me to understand, since it was Mr. Aristide who caused the problem with those elections, and his family party, that we could not draw the conclusion that Mr. Aristide has not been helpful to our efforts and our tax payer support which we have extended to provide democracy to Haiti. I think it is a clear cut answer. I don't understand why you are afraid to say it. Tell me why my conclusion is wrong.
Page 38 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. GREENLEE. The April 6 elections were flawed. They were clearly flawed.
Mr. GOSS. Is that official policy now?
Mr. GREENLEE. The April 6 elections were flawed.
Mr. GOSS. Is that the U.S. position?
Mr. GREENLEE. The U.S. position is that the elections were flawed but they should be reviewed in a Haitian context. There is a process that provides for review of the April 6 elections in place. We will have to see with what degree of integrity it goes forward.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, my time is expired; can I finish this line?
You know as well as I do that the key in the elections was not who won the elections as much as it was to get the elections satisfactorily completed so we could get on with the appointment of the electoral council which has been the critical—the pivot stone, the key stone—of free, fair, democratic election possibility in the future in Haiti. You know that that was forestalled by what happened in the political scenery before, during, and after those April elections as well as I do. That's a fact. It's done; it's over.
It seems to me that by frustrating the installation of the CEP—that democratic observers could agree was fairly there—and could therefore monitor future elections, that former-President Aristide has systematically and deliberately forestalled the opportunity for fair, free elections in Haiti in the future. Now that to me is a huge setback for our democratic efforts. I am sorry to say that because nobody wants to see democracy come to Haiti more than I. I've been watching for 35 years, and I guess the question remains: can we save the Haitians from themselves? So far the answer does not seem to be encouraging. But I'd like your response on the Aristide piece.
Page 39 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. GREENLEE. Well, let me back up though. You were talking about the CEP, the provisional electoral council. There is a process in play now where significant numbers of the CEP will be replaced. That process has not been fully accepted by the OPL. We'll have to see how it goes. There is still room for negotiation and perhaps an outcome that will be broadly acceptable and that we can support. That's one thing.
Mr. GOSS. It's not just the CEP, as you are well aware. It's all the way out into the grassroots, into the mayoralties, to use a juxtaposition that doesn't exactly fit—the local elections, as it were.
Mr. GREENLEE. The local elections produce assemblies that would in turn produce a permanent electoral council. I think that's what you are talking about. Again, that hasn't happened yet, and certainly a large part of the political crisis right now revolves around the shape of that Committee.
Mr. GOSS. And that was Mr. Aristide's primary engineering, to the best of my knowledge; was that that was upset by the actions he took. Is that incorrect?
Mr. GREENLEE. Mr. Aristide certainly has his interests. The OPL has its interests. The OPL was concerned about the conduct of the CEP that it accepted in the previous elections.
Mr. GOSS. Are his interests, in your view, the interests of his party, himself, Haiti, democracy, or something else that I haven't listed?
Mr. GREENLEE. Certainly his party; certainly himself; possibly Haiti. Democracy is a much bigger issue because democracy is a field on which players contend, and he's contending on that field.
Mr. GOSS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your generosity.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Goss, the distinguished chairman of our Intelligence Committee.
Page 40 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. William Delahunt, who recently was part of a task force to Haiti. Congressman Delahunt.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate the invitation, the opportunity to participate. As you indicated, I've been to Haiti several times with Members of the Judiciary Committee and have formed some of my own opinions.
I intended to explore with Mr. Greenlee some of the political questions in terms of what's the best approach toward this government, including for Members of Congress, to assist in terms of breaking that political impasse. But, I'm going to devote my time, I think, to Mr. Milford because this is my first introduction to the issue of the flow of drugs, particularly as it relates to Haiti. You talked about Puerto Rico. I take it the problem has increased in terms of the flow of drugs in and out of Puerto Rico. Is that a fair statement?
Mr. MILFORD. It's not only Puerto Rico, but the entire Caribbean, and particularly the eastern Caribbean.
Mr. DELAHUNT. OK. And I think the point I want to get to, is that while we single out and talk about Haiti in terms of an increased level of the flow of drugs, this is true of the entire eastern Caribbean. It's not peculiar to Haiti. Is that, again, a fair statement?
Mr. MILFORD. Well, I think, just to try to answer your question, I think Haiti, with the lack of a structure—an organizational structure—with the police force and political structure for a period of time has invited more corruption, and frankly more traffickers, to penetrate their borders.
Mr. DELAHUNT. How would you compare it to the increase in the Dominican Republic, for example?
Mr. MILFORD. The Dominican Republic has also had an increase, but I think you——
Page 41 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. DELAHUNT. In the same proportion as——
Mr. MILFORD. I think you'd have to put them together since they really share the same island. A lot of the trafficking which the Dominican Republic sees—or a lot of the cocaine coming in—actually does come from the Haiti side and enters the island on the Haiti side and then is moved over via land.
Mr. DELAHUNT. And exits via the Dominican Republic.
Mr. MILFORD. Absolutely.
Mr. DELAHUNT. But in comparing those two island nations, there is not a great disparity in terms of the increase that the DEA has encountered.
Mr. MILFORD. Well, again, you have to look at it, as far as the Dominican traffic, it is really permeating all the Caribbean in the Dominican Republic, Dominican Republic waters, Haiti to some extent, and just as important, Puerto Rico and into the United States. It's a little different situation as far as the structure, for example, with the police force in the Dominican Republic——
Mr. DELAHUNT. Let me interrupt and just ask you this question: when the Cedras regime was in place, what kind of relationship did the DEA have with the coup leaders at that point in time?
Mr. MILFORD. We had less than any type of——
Mr. DELAHUNT. So you had no formal relations.
Mr. MILFORD. We had an office there. And, at times, because of the total political and social unrest, it was a difficult place to work in. And with the political structure.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, let me again ask you to make the comparison between now and then in terms of the response, of the Preval Government and the response of the Haitian National Police. Have you seen an improvement?
Page 42 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. MILFORD. Yes. What we've seen in where we are today; we've seen a will by many of the Haitian officials to try, at least at the police level, to try and change and develop an organizational structure.
Mr. DELAHUNT. So you would say that with the advent of democracy at least there has been an awakening in the willingness of the government to respond to the flow of drugs in and out of Haiti.
Mr. MILFORD. Well, I would look at it in terms of the police itself, rather than get involved in the political structure.
Mr. DELAHUNT. And there has been an improvement?
Mr. MILFORD. There seems to be a will for improvement. We are hopeful that that will——
Mr. DELAHUNT. And has there been cooperation from the Haitian coast guard that didn't exist heretofore?
Mr. MILFORD. Well, I think the coast guard which Haiti has is, as you well know, very limited.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Right.
Mr. MILFORD. But they are cooperating with our coast guard, and moving forward.
Mr. DELAHUNT. And they are cooperating.
Mr. MILFORD. Yes.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you.
And back to Ambassador Greenlee, because I see myself running out of time here. I share the frustration that everyone else does and that I know that you do also about the political impasse. But you made reference to the fact, I think, in response to Mr. Hamilton, that the political situation is ripening. Can you amplify that and clarify that?
Page 43 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. GREENLEE. Yes. Several weeks ago, President Preval launched a political process which has a number of elements. But the primary element is that he appointed a Presidential commission to review the results of the April 6 elections and to determine what should be done about those elections in recommendations that will be made public. That commission—a three person commission—has begun work.
President Preval also determined that six of nine members of the provisional electoral council that presided over those elections could be replaced and that those positions could be filled with persons drawn from a list of people submitted by what's called civil society—by non-political groups—and that two of those persons would be selected by the Presidency, two by the Parliament, and two by the judiciary. And that part of his proposal, his initiative, has not been completed but it's in play.
Now, originally there were indications that the OPL—the other major Lavalas party which is in dispute with the Aristide-based party and which is the party that has objected most vocally to the April 6 elections—originally that party appeared to go along with elements of the Preval plan, but since then, it has objected to the way the plan is being implemented. President Preval, at the same time as launching his plan, selected a candidate for Prime Minister. That person, Herve Denis, is now being considered by the Parliament. For him to become Prime Minister would require the ratification of both houses. Now the Chamber of Deputies will take up his candidacy and vote on it within the coming days. It's unclear whether the Chamber will ratify his candidacy; perhaps it won't. If it were to ratify his candidacy, the candidacy would then go to the Senate where the OPL has enough strength to block even a quorum to consider it.
The OPL is in a position to urge a further refinement of President Preval's initiative. President Preval is in a position to insist that his initiative go forward according to the agreement he thought he had. As the Prime Ministerial process goes forward, it intersects with the concerns over the April 6 elections. It's possible that there could be room for flexibility on both sides. It's also possible that the Denis nomination will collapse entirely. It's possible that President Preval will go forward with his commission and his initiative without reference to the concerns of the OPL.
Page 44 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
So, there are a lot of things that are possible, but there are some X factors and we simply have to wait and see how they bear on the process.
Mr. DELAHUNT. May I just have one more question?
Chairman GILMAN. If you would. Time is running on us, please, go ahead.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Just one; and this is a question for Mr. Milford. Earlier there was a statement ascribed to Ambassador Swing, that he wouldn't be surprised if key aides to President Aristide were involved in drug trafficking. Do you as the deputy in charge of that particular area of the world, do you have any evidence whatsoever—or solid intelligence as opposed to rumors—that any close associates of Mr. Aristide are involved in drug trafficking?
Mr. MILFORD. Congressman, I would prefer to get back to you at the appropriate time and discuss it at that moment.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you Congressman Delahunt.
Mr. Hamilton, do you have any further questions?
Mr. HAMILTON. One comment: is there some question now as to whether the central bank president will be renominated, Mr. Delatour?
Mr. GREENLEE. I understand that Mr. Delatour's term was to have expired December 5. I don't think he's been renamed and I don't know the status of this and I can check and get back to you.
Mr. HAMILTON. The Haitian Government has demonstrated admirable fiscal restraint, austerity. He, I think, deserves some credit for that, and we would favor his renomination, would we not?
Mr. GREENLEE. He has been a fiscally conservative, responsible central bank president from everything I have heard. And I don't know whether it's my position here to say that we favor this or favor that, but I think we appreciate what he's done and would be very comfortable with him continuing to do it.
Page 45 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. Mica, thank you for joining us. Mr. Mica.
Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I'm not a Member of this Committee, but I'm a Member of the Oversight Committee and the Subcommittee on National Security and International Affairs overseeing DOD and the Department of State. I have the privilege of working with the Chairman who does a fantastic job, and the Ranking Member, on a number of international issues.
I take particular interest in Haiti, having in the private sector represented a Florida group that was trying to help them start their economy. And I was involved in that effort before the government fell.
I took the position when I got elected to Congress, very strongly opposed to the embargo which dealt an incredible blow to that fragile economy. I have visited there on a number of occasions over time and followed up with the visit of congressional committees to see the status of the situation there. It truly is one of the absolute scandals and shames of this entire hemisphere what we have allowed to happen in Haiti.
I have some questions about economic development because you can do all you want to do and put in all the institutional programs and train all the police and security and institution-building programs, but where are we on assisting business and investment? One of the problems we have, of course, is when you did the embargo, we had 60 to 80 thousand jobs that were supporting a million Haitians, and it completely disrupted those job opportunities. Very few folks returned that I know of, the last count I had. We had some young AID official who had no clue as to how to get business restarted there. What has happened to those who had investments there? Are they there? What are we doing to build business? Maybe you can tell me. Because that's the only thing that's going to get these folks back on their feet.
Page 46 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. GREENLEE. Mr. Mica, I very much appreciate your question. I think it's the key question in this session.
Haiti must one day become self-sustaining. It can't become self-sustaining without economic development. Generally speaking, economic development can only occur if there is both public and private investment. There are problems in both areas. A significant amount of public investment is being hung up because the Parliament has not been able to pass needed legislation that would permit the disbursement of——
Mr. MICA. So with all we've done, they haven't proceeded. What about private?
Mr. GREENLEE. Well, they are——
Mr. MICA. The privates won't come into Haiti until this is in place.
Mr. GREENLEE. If I could keep going with this thought: there is needed tariff reform and needed legislation so that they can accept concessional loans that would permit the disbursement of money into the economy which would really provide a stimulus for further kinds of investment. That's one problem and it's wrapped up with the political impasse. That's only one problem.
Private sector investment: there is a little bit of good news in that there has been one privatization so far and another one is in the works. The transaction for the flour mill has been completed. We would expect that that flour mill could be operational within 9 or 10 months and that would provide some jobs and demonstrate it's possible to invest in Haiti and ultimately, we hope, turn a profit.
There is a cement plant that will be privatized shortly. The bids are in. Unfortunately, without a functioning government—without a Prime Minister in office—there is no one to sign the award. So that's a problem and a great concern.
Page 47 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Let me mention another thing that is a concern to us. There is a cellular license pending. The elements in the agreement are in place. For reasons that are not altogether clear, the government has not completed that transaction. We think the completion of that cellular license agreement would send a very important signal to future foreign investors and we think that that's a very important test case.
On the light industrial complex, the assembly sector: there used to be perhaps as many as 100,000 jobs before the period of de facto government—before, in fact, the first period of democracy when conditions were a little bit different in the hemisphere. During the period of the embargo and the de facto government, a lot of those people pulled up stakes and left and few of them have returned. A sector that once had 100,000, and then during the de facto period I think went down considerably more, has now built up to only 16 or 17 thousand.
There are things that we can do to make investment in that sector more attractive. They really are mostly in the area of helping Haiti with its infrastructure of roads and so forth. We are, frankly, constrained by existing legislation from directly lobbying U.S. firms to set up business overseas. That's something that the business sector can do for itself, by itself; the Haitians can do it; but there is an impediment as to what we can do directly.
There is another factor, and again, here's perhaps a role for the Congress. NAFTA has greatly, I think, helped the United States and helped the countries in NAFTA, and it certainly has helped Mexico. It has not been so kind to Haiti. It would be good if there were some kind of NAFTA parity or legislative initiative for Haiti that would enable Haiti to compete more equally with some of the bigger industrial platforms, like Mexico.
Mr. MICA. Well, you know, you've confirmed my worst suspicions. The last time I was there we had 100,000 jobs—previously I said 80,000, but 100,000—that did really support over a million people with viable income from legitimate sources. The last I saw, we had 2,500 feeding stations and the biggest program was picking up trash or public employment. It sounded like just a total wrong direction.
Page 48 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
And what concerns me is I'm hearing again that we haven't done anything. I mean, if you put me out of business, I would be concerned about it. And we put, through the embargo, a lot of American firms and other firms out of business and that denied these people jobs. That's why I was against the embargo. It hurt the poorest of the poor and it put these folks out. As a business person, I won't take my money and go to a country where I get put out of business and I don't get compensated. So we shafted our people; we ruined their economy. It's still not put back in place. There was no plan when I got there with AID or anyone. We had absolutely novices to business—not a clue. And I sat with the Ambassador and discussed this and they still haven't done a damn thing about it, and this burns me more.
The other thing, too, is putting in the infrastructure. You don't have to be a genius to look at the place to put a road from the airport to the port. Is there a road from the airport to the port?
Mr. GREENLEE. There is a road that goes right through a densely populated slum.
Mr. MICA. Well, the last time I was there they were building a road in front of Aristide's house and not that.
The Corps of Engineers, when I was down there, said it would take just a few million dollars to redo their port and open their port. Has that been done?
Mr. GREENLEE. The port is undergoing a study for privatization.
Mr. MICA. A study. OK, well, I just get so frustrated by this.
Energy? You cannot operate any economy unless you have energy. I was taking down, as the government fell, people from Florida who are retired from Florida Power and other power generation folks to try to get their energy started. When you have power 4 hours on and 4 hours off, it's not going to attract a whole lot of business or create a stable economy. Where are we with power?
Page 49 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. GREENLEE. Power is a problem. One of the problems is that there are an awful lot of people who are tapping into the public utilities and getting power for free.
Mr. MICA. Do we have them up and running? No? Are we helping them? The last time I was there I asked the question and I never got an answer. And I think our money was going to have Canadians put in Canadian equipment rather than U.S. equipment. And when you put in Canadian generating equipment, then you put in Canadian switching equipment, and you put in Canadian power lines and transformers. And then you put in Canadian boxes—what do you call them—on everybody's, because they don't know how to bill people or even a billing system to have an electric meter on these houses. So, we use our money—and I think we're into this about $3 billion, Mr. Chairman——
Chairman GILMAN. Over $2 billion to date.
Mr. MICA. OK. Well you could take those folks, divide that by $5 million and probably divide by the number of families—that's a million families, something like that. We could put them on a boat—a cruise boat—and probably sail them around the world for 5 years and still have money left over to buy them a condo in south Florida for what we've spent in this place.
And this is what I'm hearing. I'm so glad I came because it confirms again my worst suspicions. But we need some folks with some business sense to get down there. And if we can't put pressure after what we've done for that country, there is absolutely something wrong.
And then most disturbing is, I go down to south Florida and I find out here we're training police—we've spent money on training police and forces, and setting up judicial systems, and everything—and I go to south Florida and do a report for my Subcommittee and find out one of the major transit zones now is Haiti. Here we put all this money in building their judicial and law enforcement infrastructure and it is contributing now to transshipment through Jamaica, through the Colombian connection, through the South American connections, one of the great stop-over points for the Jamaican canoes that are filled either with cocaine, heroin, marijuana, whatever the drug of the day is, and that Haiti is the major launching point.
Page 50 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
So, Mr. Chairman, I have had it.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Mica, for the cogent points that you have raised today.
Mr. MICA. And I hope your Committee, too, will pursue this. You know, we get slapped in the face. We did everything for Aristide, and one of the first things he did was turn around and recognize Cuba as a favor to us. And we know that some of those folks are even involved in this trafficking and illegal activity.
But, I'm really concerned about this, Mr. Chairman. This is a human tragedy of the greatest proportions. These are wonderful people. If you have ever been with the Haitians, these are fine human beings and they are willing to work.
I could get into micro-enterprise, what we're doing in that regard. They're industrious; they will work; and they have been dealt a terrible deck of cards by the United States, and I just think this is a tragedy. I thank you for allowing me——
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Mica. And we will continue our oversight on Haiti, and see what we can do to improve things.
Just one or two questions and we will then conclude. Ambassador Greenlee, does the Administration accept the Haitian Electoral Council's announcement that the Lavalas family Senate candidates, Celistin and Medard Joseph were elected in the first round of the election? The Electoral Council fraudulently said Celistin and Joseph were elected to the Senate and then they——
Mr. GREENLEE. Celistin and Feuille, I think.
Chairman GILMAN. Yes.
Mr. GREENLEE. Not Medard.
Chairman GILMAN. The United Nations cut off additional aid in protest to the way that election was held and Ambassador Swing said this was water under the bridge. Does the Administration support the Electoral Council's declaration?
Page 51 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. GREENLEE. Mr. Chairman, the President has launched an initiative that provides for a review of the April 6 elections by a three-person commission. We want to see how that commission operates and whether integrity can be restored and transparency can be restored.
Chairman GILMAN. Is the commission doing something substantial?
Mr. GREENLEE. It's begun work. The returns are not in, and I think what Ambassador Swing was saying was that the April 6 elections have occurred. We need to find out if there is a way to make some necessary corrections. We have not stated what those corrections should be.
Chairman GILMAN. The OAS proposed an initiative to bring a broad spectrum of parties back into the election process. Has the Administration done anything to support that?
Mr. GREENLEE. We certainly want to see a broadly inclusive process. The six non-Lavalas parties elected not to compete in the April 6 elections. There are elections scheduled again for November 1998. We hope they will compete in those. And let me just say also that I think it's very important that we try to have some kind of bipartisan initiative maybe through NDI or IRI to try to create as large an electoral space as possible so that all who want to compete can compete and feel that they're able to do so fairly.
Chairman GILMAN. Well, election reform will be very significant in the future of Haiti and we hope that you'll keep pressure on and move in that direction.
Mr. Milford, thank you very much for your insight with regard to the narcotics problems. Does DEA have anyone in the Haitian security services today that you can rely on and trust in working on the narcotics problems?
Mr. MILFORD. I think from time to time and all through this process we've had several people we've worked with, much like in most countries that we work in. What we need to see is a move toward an organizational structure, as I mentioned before. But, to answer your question today, yes, there are people. We have faith in them; we're moving forward with the training program; and we hope to make a difference in the near future.
Page 52 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Chairman GILMAN. We wish you a lot of success. Tell us, how are the Colombians moving all that heroin into New York? Are they using any mules through Haiti, or any process through Haiti?
Mr. MILFORD. There have been from time to time, Haiti has been used as a transshipment point through the airport.
Chairman GILMAN. For heroin?
Mr. MILFORD. For heroin, much as cocaine, the same thing. The Colombians are using Puerto Rico, Haiti, anywhere they can get. Final destination, as you well know, is normally New York City where the heroin is then distributed throughout the Northeast.
Chairman GILMAN. Is the Preval Administration helping you at all in your efforts with regard to drugs?
Mr. MILFORD. At this point, I believe yes, sir. We just need to see continued successes and develop that structure and organization that we can actually make a difference.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Goss, do you have any further questions?
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I had one area I wanted to ask about very briefly.
Chairman GILMAN. Please, go ahead.
Mr. GOSS. We all have a great investment in stability there and by my count, discussing today, we are going to have 500 troops there indefinitely. We're going have 300 CIVPOL there for a time to be determined, I guess months—4 months—something like that.
Mr. GREENLEE. It's a 1-year mandate.
Mr. GOSS. One year; for 1 year. And then we're going to have this Argentine mercenary backup team that has been negotiated, or whatever it is.
Page 53 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. GREENLEE. No, that's not correct.
Mr. GOSS. Well, explain to me what it is. I have read a report——
Mr. GREENLEE. It's not a mercenary team, it's a contingent of Argentine national police which is an assessed part of the CIVPOL operation. They are CIVPOL. But they're organic——
Mr. GOSS. I have them as a military-based swat team to back up CIVPOL. But it's military and I understand it was because——
Mr. GREENLEE. I'm sorry, military?
Mr. GOSS. It's a military-based swat team. I don't know that means to——
Mr. GREENLEE. If I had prepared your talking point, it wouldn't have read that way.
Mr. GOSS. That's the question. Anyway, there is going to be an Argentine swat team, or something like that there.
Mr. GREENLEE. Right.
Mr. GOSS. And this is for stability.
Mr. GREENLEE. No, sir; this is not for stability. This is to protect CIVPOL if CIVPOL needs to be protected.
Mr. GOSS. Force protection then?
Mr. GREENLEE. It's in effect, force protection for CIVPOL. It is CIVPOL, and it's for CIVPOL. It's not for intervening in Haitian national security matters.
Mr. GOSS. Got ya. I understand the point. The question, then, would be: are we correct in the information we have that, in fact, the U.S. Government is going to be paying the freight for these folks?
Page 54 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. GREENLEE. No, that's not correct.
Mr. GOSS. We have some kind of an arrangement that induces them to come here to do this?
Mr. GREENLEE. No, that's not correct. They're part of an assessed——
Mr. GOSS. The Argentines, out of their own—they just decided they needed to come to protect CIVPOL?
Mr. GREENLEE. No, sir, it's part of an assessed U.N. mission.
Mr. GOSS. The Argentines, as a member of the United Nations——
Mr. GREENLEE. The Argentines are a member of the United Nations.
Mr. GOSS. And therefore, they are contributing through the United Nations of their own volition?
Mr. GREENLEE. The Argentines are receiving compensation from the United Nations for their role in CIVPOL as the security component, yes.
Mr. GOSS. OK. So, the United Nations is footing the cost?
Mr. GREENLEE. Correct.
Mr. GOSS. OK. That's very helpful. And the Argentines were asked to do this by the United Nations?
Mr. GREENLEE. We asked the Argentines bilaterally. The United Nations asked both the Argentines, and I believe the Pakistanis, and ultimately decided on the Argentines.
Mr. GOSS. That's curious. The Pakistanis have been there until the 30th.
Page 55 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. GREENLEE. Well, it's complicated. The Pakistanis that they were asking would have been Pakistani National Police.
Mr. GOSS. I see. Different Pakistanis.
Mr. GREENLEE. But there are Pakistani military in place, in fact now, because we need some kind of bridge for the security of the CIVPOL between the departing military and the in-coming police security team which isn't in place yet.
Mr. GOSS. OK. Thank you, that's helpful. The final point of this: I understood that this is costing us about $2 million a month at a time when Southcom is facing a $5 million shortfall for similar training missions in Latin America. Is that not accurate, or is that accurate?
Mr. GREENLEE. I understand the incremental costs to the Support Group are about $2 million a month.
Mr. GOSS. I know the shortfall exists, I'm familiar with that. So, what we basically are doing is we are focusing on then, as a priority matter, these training dollars on Haiti. Is that a fair statement?
Mr. GREENLEE. I think it is a fair statement that we have a priority for supporting Haiti.
Mr. GOSS. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Goss.
Ambassador Greenlee, how much have we spent in Haiti since we tried to restore the Aristide Government?
Mr. GREENLEE. I've looked at different figures trying to break it down.
Chairman GILMAN. Just an approximation.
Mr. GREENLEE. I think a global figure of $2 billion is probably accurate.
Page 56 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Chairman GILMAN. What is it?
Mr. GREENLEE. A global figure of about $2 billion is probably about accurate.
Chairman GILMAN. Two billion?
Mr. GREENLEE. A little bit less, but about $2 billion.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, may I? Will you yield to me?
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Goss. Yes.
Mr. GOSS. Thank you. Let me ask, because I'm still a little bit puzzled. In that cost, we've had some debate about what's in that $2 billion and what isn't in that $2 billion. I understand, for instance, that we've got Presidential security units down there; and we have personnel; and we have an advisory unit; and they have a Presidential security unit. And I have been told that some monies are paying for the elected President, who would be Preval, and yet there is some kind of a security force that is protecting Aristide. And I have never really been able to figure out whether we're paying for that or somebody else is paying for that. And that's in the $2 billion, or that's something extra? Can you help us?
Mr. GREENLEE. We are providing assistance to Haiti in many forms and some of that assistance is fungible. Some of it was provided in the form of balance-of-payments support, for example. And I'm not sure which pot money has been pulled out of, or it might have been revenues from the Government of Haiti for certain security contingents. It is correct that there is a Presidential security unit and that unit provides protection both to President Preval and to former-President Aristide.
Mr. GOSS. I am told that part of that is that there are some employees—this is a privately based firm, in part—and that there are some hires as well. And my real concern about that is, not so much the cost—although I am concerned that we're using taxpayers' money, whether it's fungible or not to do that—but what I'm really concerned about is these people, I understand, are authorized to use deadly force for security for these people. And my concern is if we have passive people of our own down there—granted we do have force protection—that we might be looking at the extraordinary situation where we have people who are authorized to use deadly force on behalf of the people they are protecting in some type of a conflict or standoff with our own security protection people—our own security force protection.
Page 57 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. GREENLEE. Mr. Goss, it's a very complicated picture. I thought when you were talking about Presidential security you were talking about the Haitian PSU. We're talking about the U.S. contract, about the MVM contract—U.S. personnel who are training, but also working with, Presidential security unit.
Mr. GOSS. Right.
Mr. GREENLEE. That's right. We initially paid for that contract. It has since been picked up by the Haitian Government. And I think it's correct that they have rules of engagement that permit them to use lethal force.
Mr. GOSS. That's my understanding. Again, I'm quoting the Ambassador, and reading his answers. And, candidly, I wasn't satisfied with about 58 percent of his answers, and I'm going to pursue that. But there were many puzzles, and that was one of them about exactly who was doing what now in terms of protecting whom. Is it fair to say, money may be fungible, that some of the support we're giving for Presidential protection or VIP protection may in fact be being used to protect not only Preval but other VIPs including Aristide?
Mr. GREENLEE. I'm not exactly sure of the role of those six advisors with respect to President Aristide, but there is a provision for the Presidential Security Unit, the Haitian National Police, to provide such protection. In the past, at one point, the United Nations was providing protection, but they withdrew that.
Mr. GOSS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Goss.
Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. DELAHUNT. I'll be very brief. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
On the $2 billion that we're talking about, that global $2 billion also includes the cost of picking up refugees, housing those refugees, feeding those refugees. So, I think it's very important to understand that I would presume a significant percentage of that $2 billion went to the tragedy that befell that island nation as a result of the coup, not subsequently in terms of our efforts to nurture democracy. Is that accurate?
Page 58 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. GREENLEE. Yes, sir; thank you for that.
Mr. GOSS. Will the gentleman yield on that?
Mr. DELAHUNT. I'll be happy to yield.
Mr. GREENLEE. Thank you for that perspective.
I understand that during 1994, approximately $400 million was spent on picking up Haitian boat people, housing them on Guantanamo, and so forth.
Mr. GOSS. Will the gentleman yield?
The gentleman may not be aware that much of the reason that those people left Haiti is that they were economic refugees. And the reason they left is because the situation was so miserable, as my friend Mr. Mica from Florida has pointed out, because of the embargo. What we did was we created a policy that had a hook in it that made these people come out of the country. And so the responsibility of all of this is part of the result of the Administration's policy. And, yes, whether it's the $2 billion that went to relocate those, the reason those folks came—and I think the numbers were better than 95 percent—they were economic refugees. We had testimony today that some were returned to Guantanamo for ''humanitarian reasons''. I would agree, humanitarian in its broadest sense. But you cannot ignore the fact that most of these people were not being politically persecuted in the traditional political persecution sense. Obviously a bad dictatorship is persecution by definition.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Mica, for the last question.
Mr. MICA. Just a point, Mr. Chairman. What concerns me, I think within the last month we've had another boat with 400 or 500 that was turned back.
Chairman GILMAN. Yes, we mentioned that earlier.
Mr. MICA. Yes. I mean, we have the potential for this starting all over again because of the economic situation, because of the failure of our programs to get these people back on their feet. It's a serious situation, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Page 59 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Mica.
And I want to thank our witnesses. And I want to leave the record open for 1 week for Members to submit questions to our witnesses.
Thank you, and the Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the Committee adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]
A P P E N D I X
Insert "The Official Committee record contains additional material here."