SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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46–880 CC
1998
THE AFRICA CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
OCTOBER 8, 1997
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
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BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JAY KIM, California
STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio
MARSHALL ''MARK'' SANFORD, South Carolina
MATT SALMON, Arizona
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
TOM CAMPBELL, California
JON FOX, Pennsylvania
JOHN McHUGH, New York
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
ROY BLUNT, Missouri
KEVIN BRADY, Texas
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LEE HAMILTON, Indiana
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
HOWARD BERMAN, California
GARY ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PAT DANNER, Missouri
EARL HILLIARD, Alabama
WALTER CAPPS, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
STEVE ROTHMAN, New Jersey
BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee
BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
JIM DAVIS, Florida
RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff
MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Democratic Chief of Staff
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Subcommittee on Africa
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio
MARSHALL ''MARK'' SANFORD, South Carolina
TOM CAMPBELL, California
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
JIM DAVIS, Florida
TOM SHEEHY, Staff Director
GREG SIMPKINS, Professional Staff Member
JODI CHRISTIANSEN, Democratic Professional Staff Member
SHANNON GAWRONSKI, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
WITNESSES
Ambassador Marshall McCallie, Special Coordinator/ACRI, Bureau for Africa, U.S. Department of State
Mr. Vincent D. Kern II, Deputy Assistant Secretary, African Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense
Dr. Steven Metz, Military Researcher
Professor David F. Davis, Program on Peacekeeping Policy, George Mason University
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APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
Ambassador Marshall McCallie
Mr. Vincent D. Kern II
Dr. Steven Metz
Professor David F. Davis
THE AFRICA CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1997
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:51 p.m., in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce (chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. ROYCE. Now this Committee will come to order for the purpose of a hearing on the African Crisis Response Force. Our hearing today will examine an evolving U.S. initiative to build the peacekeeping skills of African militaries in response to Africa's conflicts and humanitarian crises. Now known as the African Crisis Response Initiative or ACRI, the Administration plan apparently has recovered from a rough start. The concept of an ACRI force has been discussed for at least two decades as part of the pan-African philosophy of empowering African nations.
The roles played by the Economic Community of West African States and Liberia and now Sierra Leone are examples of how an all-African peacekeeping force can operate. The West African model now is being studied by the Southern African Development Community. But the ACRI has not been universally embraced.
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When former U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced this program last year in Africa, some African leaders saw it as a U.S. plan to disengage from Africa. Others saw it as a plan for the United States to use African militaries to promote American interests on the continent. However it is viewed, this is a significant U.S. initiative. The Administration has devoted approximately $11 million to ACRI in 1997, and it would like to spend $20 million in the Fiscal Year that begins today. This is a significant amount.
But of equal interest to this Subcommittee is the actual role of the U.S. military in Africa. U.S. trainers will conduct training in peacekeeping operations, communications, mine removal, and logistics. The United States also will contribute non-lethal equipment to ACRI participants. Some of this work already has begun. Battalions in Uganda and Senegal have completed a 60-day training course run by U.S. special forces. A Malawi battalion has just begun its training. In Ethiopia, two operational battalions and a headquarters battalion will begin training later this year.
The aim is to make these forces compatible so that they can better work together during peacekeeping operations. Despite these benefits, there are general concerns about the role of U.S. military in Africa. Members of Congress have expressed concern about the training by U.S. special forces of Rwandan troops who may have participated in military operations in former Zaire. This raised the question of proper consultation with Congress on training and deployment in troops.
Today's witnesses will examine the ideas and assumptions behind ACRI, the progress of this program, the diplomatic efforts to create an effective African force with multi-lateral support, and the likely effectiveness of ACRI battalions in dealing with conflict, among other issues. This hearing was postponed from last Wednesday due to the heavy press of congressional legislative business. I appreciate the cooperation of all four of our witnesses who returned here today.
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Before we proceed, I want to recognize the Members on the Subcommittee who are present. Our Ranking Minority Member is Mr. Robert Menendez from New Jersey. We also have with us Mr. Tom Campbell of California. Mr. Donald Payne of New Jersey is with us, and Mr. Jim Davis—is not with us yet. However, Mr. Alcee Hastings of Florida is with us. I would ask if any of the Members of this panel—and Mr. Steve Chabot has just joined us as well.
Does anyone on this panel have any remarks at this point? Mr. Menendez.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is an important hearing. I too want to thank the witnesses under the press of last week's extraordinary number of votes, for coming back and being so understanding.
American troops are increasingly involved overseas through our own initiatives and those of multi-lateral organizations. It's crucial that we consider alternatives to U.S. troop deployments. We can't send troops overseas every time there's a crisis or an incident. Yet as one of the world's great powers, we have a responsibility and a desire to resolve conflicts and alleviate human suffering where we can. While I expect that we will continue to be in circumstances under which the United States will deploy troops or contribute troops to for example, U.N. missions in Africa, it is preferable in my view to empower Africans by teaching and assisting them to conduct their own humanitarian peacekeeping and peace restoration missions.
Although the ACRI would take its mandate for deployment from the U.N. Security Council, it would allow Africans to actively solve African problems. The nature of the ACRI would allow the OAU and African countries to have a greater say in what actions the Security Council takes on their continent. Intra-African cooperation and increased debate within the OAU about what is happening on the African continent, can serve to promote the causes of peace and democracy on the continent. Perhaps the greatest benefit to be derived from the ACRI is the presence of forces on the ground and ready to respond to a crisis. Not only will this cut response time during humanitarian crises and save more lives, but hopefully the existence of the response team would be a deterrent to violence on the continent. Where it is not a deterrent to violence, I think it will provide an opportunity to restore peace before a situation escalates out of control which usually occurs long before we mobilize troops coming from abroad.
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The ACRI also presents an opportunity to share some of the economic burdens of missions. In just the last few years, we have had American troops in Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, Angola, the Central African Republic, and Zaire. The cost of the Somalia operation alone was well over $750 million for a humanitarian operation. By comparison, the cost of the ACRI, an estimated $25 to $40 million in startup costs is quite low considering the cost of full-scale U.S. involvement during a crisis.
I do think there are a number of questions to be asked about how the ACRI will work, the extent to which the Organization for African Unity will be included, the decisionmaking process for which countries will be trained under the ACRI, the scope and nature of operations they will undertake, and how U.S. funds will be spent. For example, I am concerned that we could end up training the military in a country like Nigeria, a country where we are extremely concerned about its commitment to democracy and human rights. We certainly want to be sure that U.S. training does not contribute to the ability of a military to repress its people or to assert undue influence over a democratic government.
Maybe that might be an extreme example. We might never foresee ourselves in such a situation, but I put it forth as a possibility that we need to be worried about.
Many issues remain to be resolved. But I think that it is safe to say from my personal view that we should support the concept of and funding for an African Crisis Response Initiative. I look forward to hearing the comments of the witnesses that have been convened to talk about this issue.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Menendez. Any other opening statements from the Members?
Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you for having this very important meeting and also let me thank the witnesses for coming back to this hearing on the Africa Crisis Response Initiative. I am very pleased to see that we are moving forward with this initiative to do something about the crisis on the continent of Africa. This comes at a most crucial time when we are scaling back on development assistance, and cutting money for peacekeeping missions. So this is very very important at this time.
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Since the end of the cold war, to the Somali crisis in 1993, to the Rwandan crisis in 1994, when genocide first began, to the Liberian crisis of April, 1996, to Zaire in 1997, there has been a dire need for a standing force to restore order in countries where stability has been compromised. Given the capricious and political status in many African countries, there has been a need for a standing African peacekeeping force that will keep peace and restore order if the need arises.
There will be different situations of conflict which will require various responses in the area of command and control. They include pre-conflict, when we see a situation that has the potential of escalating from this pre-conflict stage. We could see during the conflict separating warring factions, protecting people disarming combatants. And post-conflict analysis, which would require that soldiers stay in a country long enough to build confidence in the country where there has been an absence of any kind of central authority.
I do believe that if trained properly, this initiative will work. However, this should not be seen as an alternative to the U.N. umbrella of peacekeeping. It should not be seen as a scapegoat for the USA. This does not mean that the United States can facilitate this initiative without committing itself further, whether it's under a chapter VII program or a chapter VI and a half, similar to the time our forces were going to land in the Goma region to alleviate the ex-FAR Interahamwe situation. But that was alleviated because of the alliance of moving forward in the eastern region of Congo.
Once again, I hope that we will see that this initiative is necessary and that there would be lasting peace that has to come to countries like Sierra Leone, Congo Brazzaville, Nigeria and Sudan. Until this time, the U.S. response is critical. We should do all we can to help in this volatile situation on the continent.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for calling this important hearing.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Payne.
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Any other opening statements? If not, we will move to our first panel. It's a pleasure to introduce Ambassador Marshall McCallie, special coordinator for the ACRI at the Department of State. Ambassador McCallie previously served as diplomat-in-residence at the Ralph Bunche International Affairs Center at Howard University. He has had a long association with Africa, including service as U.S. Ambassador to Namibia.
Mr. Vincent Kern is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. He is an acknowledged defense expert and a noted African scholar who is a member of the African Studies Association. Mr. Kern appeared before this Subcommittee last March to discuss the situation in Zaire.
Ambassador McCallie.
STATEMENT OF MARSHALL MCCALLIE, SPECIAL COORDINATOR/ACRI, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. MCCALLIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure to be here with you. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the African Crisis Response Initiative with the distinguished Members of this Committee. I will address the diplomatic and the conceptual aspects of the ACRI. My colleague Vince Kern will address in more detail the military aspects of the initiative.
I do have a longer written statement, which I would ask be placed in the record.
Mr. ROYCE. We will place that in the record. Of course we'll ask you to keep to 5 minutes, Mr. McCallie. Thank you.
Mr. MCCALLIE. Yes, sir. As you have indicated, the goal of the Africa Crisis Response Initiative is to enhance the capacity of African nations to respond to humanitarian crises and peacekeeping challenges in a timely and effective manner. Our objective is to generate rapidly deployable, inoperable units from stable democratic countries that can work together to maintain peace on a continent that's too often torn by civil strife. Our objective is not to create an African standing army.
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We are beginning our training with African units which already bring some peacekeeping experience to the table. Trained units will be able to operate under the auspices of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, African sub-regional organizations, or in the context of a multinational force arrangement. Such operations should in any case be conducted with the approval and endorsement of the Security Council of the United Nations. This is the expressed desire, incidentally, of all the African Heads of States with whom we have spoken.
Our approach to this task is two-fold. In the first instance, we are working on a bilateral basis with selected African countries to enhance their military capacity to do peacekeeping. Specifically, the U.S. Special Forces are training African battalions to a common standard based upon peacekeeping procedures used by the United States, the United Nations, NATO, Great Britain, and the Nordic countries. We have provided training in Senegal and Uganda, and are beginning training in Malawi. We plan further training, as you have noted, in Ethiopia, Mali, and Ghana. Several other African countries have quietly indicated an interest in participation.
On the diplomatic front, we are actively exploring with other countries a means to generate greater cooperation in peacekeeping training. Britain, France, and the United States have developed several principles to guide our initial peacekeeping efforts. There is a clear understanding that we are not trying to create a force, but we are working toward the development of a broad African peacekeeping capacity. We have committed ourselves to work cooperatively with the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, and to ensure that our joint initiative is fully open and transparent.
Recognizing that Britain, France and the United States even together do not have sufficient resources to do the complete job, we look forward to interested member States convening in New York at the United Nations to discuss how best to coordinate donor and African efforts. There we would expect the presence also of the Organization of African Unity. Such a meeting would be informal, and the discussions non-binding. The meeting could serve in essence as an informal clearinghouse, where States wishing to contribute troops, training, material or financial support could so indicate to one another.
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We believe Africans themselves in cooperation with the United States, with other donors, with sub-regional organizations, with the OAU and the United Nations, will also want to develop standby command structures which will enable them to field the requisite peacekeeping units more rapidly and effectively. Key to this command and control capability will be leadership and staff training. Here we should note that some African countries have some very fine command and staff colleges capable of addressing these issues. Britain, Ireland, Canada and the Nordic countries are also committed to staff training in an international context.
Finally, we do not expect that the ACRI or any combination of international training initiatives will solve all of Africa's problems. But peacekeeping is an important element in creating stability, and it's one that requires resources and expertise. While the United States will remain committed to supporting economic and democratic development in Africa, we must also lend our weight in support of African peacekeepers.
When one examines the human and financial costs of continued instability and violence on the African continent of which you spoke, Mr. Chairman, the costs both to Africa and to the international community, it becomes clear that the deployment of inter-operable, rapidly deployable African peacekeeping capacity is in everyone's interest.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador McCallie appears in the appendix.]
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador McCallie.
Mr. Kern.
STATEMENT OF VINCENT DAVID KERN II, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. KERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee. I too am happy to be able to come before you today and discuss this important initiative. I also have a statement which I will not read, but which I hope will be put into the record.
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What I would like to do in these next few minutes is to provide the Committee some details on the recently completed training in Senegal and Uganda that you, Mr. Chairman, talked about.
The training involves 60 Americans for a 60-day period. Approximately $1 million of non-lethal equipment was provided to each nation, an effort to promote interoperability, which as you know is the cornerstone of ACRI. The majority of this consisted of communications equipment, primarily hand-held radios and high-frequency long-range base stations. Both types are commonly used both by African militaries and by the NGO and PVO communities. Also included were water purification equipment sets, generators, mine detection sets, uniforms, boots, canteens and laptop computers.
The culmination of the 60-day training in both countries was what we call an FTX, a field training exercise, whose scenario had the battalions as part of a chapter VI operation being conducted in a fictitious country torn by political and ethnic tensions. The battalions' missions included monitoring a buffer zone between the factions and providing an environment for negotiations. In both cases, we involved the local populace as role players and as recipients of actual medical and civil affairs assistance. We sought and achieved transparency. Training was visited by congressional staff and was covered by various print, radio and television journalists from Africa and elsewhere. You may have seen the recent favorable articles in the Washington Post and U.S. News and World Report.
In Uganda, a BBC reporter summed it up by stating that ''This is something positive for Africa.'' When informed of the $15 million overall price tag, he appeared surprised and asked, ''And how much does Bosnia cost?'' Similarly , we encouraged observation and training by neighboring militaries and resident defense attaches. Although participation occurred in both countries, foreign observers were particularly visible in Senegal, where Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Cote d'Ivoire, Niger, and Cape Verde all sent observers. Resident defense attaches regularly visited the training. The Belgian MOD detailed a colonel from their J–3 for nearly 10 days to observe the training. Based on his observations, the colonel expressed interest in Belgian trainers formally participating in ACRI training in Mali.
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The transparency with which operations were conducted was particularly important for those NGO's and PVO's who participated. In both nations, civil military operation centers, CMOCs, were set up and functioning. The World Food Program representative in Uganda admitted that she and her colleagues had had some reservations regarding their participation. She related that she was pleasantly surprised at the openness with which they met from the detachment commander and his eagerness to include them in every facet of the FTX.
This partnership resulted in a serendipitous juncture of missions, where the World Food Program took the opportunity to add realism to the FTX scenario by actually conducting a food relief convoy from the training area at Kabumba for the FTX area in Mubende Town. Twelve metric tons of food aid was transported with security provided by the Ugandans in training. At one point, the convoy was ''denied'' passage by approximately 300 villagers, arranged by local leaders as part of the exercise script, who wanted the food for themselves. After 3 hours of ''negotiations'' with local elders, the convoy commander took the elders' demands to his final destination for presentation to the district authorities there. Interestingly, BBC crews filming this convoy from the air declared that it looked exactly like actual operations they have filmed elsewhere.
In Senegal, there was also successful NGO and PVO participation. The local Red Cross offered 25 of their volunteers as role players, in their real world capacity of managing a displaced persons camp established for the exercise.
I also have some details here on some of the medical programs that we did and engineering programs which I will not go into, unless you have questions, for purposes of time. Let me end by saying that as could be expected, both nations' military expressed appreciation for the opportunity to receive both the training and the equipment.
In discussion with a member of my staff, a Ugandan lieutenant put much of this in perspective. He stated that Africans need the capabilities to solve their own problems. ''We shouldn't have to rely on the Europeans or Americans to come in.'' He pointed out that he understands his fellow Africans better than we can. He further said that the most valuable lesson he has learned was regarding proportional application of force. He characterized the Ugandan soldiers always having to be tough and violent when confronted. ''This training is something new,'' he said. He now realized that one must adjust a reaction to the level of confrontation, another key lesson to be learned in any peacekeeping operation.
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In sum, the training in the field is achieving the goal of the Africa Crisis Response Initiative. That is, to enhance the peacekeeping capabilities of African nations so they can participate in further international operations in Africa and elsewhere. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kern appears in the appendix.]
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Kern. Let me ask you a question about the fact that many States in Africa have been afflicted by military coups. Do you think it's possible that in training basically the military and upgrading the military in terms of their efficiency here, that we're building the capability of African armed forces that might contribute to a future coup in one of the countries in which you are engaged there?
Mr. KERN. Well, I would be less than truthful if I said that there was absolutely no possibility of that. We have been very careful in picking the countries that participate in ACRI to make sure that they are countries where there is a firmly rooted sense of civilian control of the military.
We also in our training both in this training and as you know in our overall IMET training stress the importance, in fact the paramountcy of civilian control of the military. Beyond that, the sort of training that we are providing I don't think would be particularly useful in making a coups.
Mr. ROYCE. I see.
Mr. KERN. And the sorts of equipment that we're providing, all non-lethal, would not be useful.
Mr. ROYCE. Then let's go from the question of training, and you have discussed training in both Uganda and Senegal, to the question of deployment. Since there is no agreed-upon control mechanism, how would decisions be made on deployment now that the troops are trained?
Mr. KERN. Shall we pass it back to Mr. McCallie?
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Mr. ROYCE. Ambassador.
Mr. MCCALLIE. This was a real subject as we developed the Africa Crisis Response Initiative. As you will recall, when it was first proposed as a force, it was proposed in fact with a command structure or superstructure. But as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, many of our partners in Africa, and also in Europe, were very much concerned that what we were doing was creating a force that might be manipulated by the United States. It became very clear that they were much more comfortable and they so stated, with the creation of capacity but relying upon institutions that already existed, to call that capacity forward to serve in peacekeeping, which would be the United Nations or the OAU or perhaps a sub-regional organization such as SADC or ECOWAS, or perhaps a multinational force arrangement as we saw in the Great Lakes area under Canadian leadership, with Security Council blessing.
Now having said that, I think that somewhat begs the question of long-term command and control. In our conversations with African military leaders, they have asked the same question, how do we put these battalions together with other battalions that perhaps are training with the British or the French or the Nordics or others, how do we put it together into a force for a particular operation?
My own view is that through a series of joint exercises the African battalions will work together and develop some of that command and control capacity. In fact, we visited a training exercise conducted by Zimbabwe with nine other southern African States last April in Zimbabwe, where they set up a command structure, and in fact ran about a 7-to-10-day exercise in peacekeeping. I think that is one way that Africans themselves will evolve command and control structures.
Mr. KERN. Can I just add one comment?
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Kern.
Mr. KERN. I agree entirely with Ambassador McCallie. I think it's very important that there be African ownership of this. As you noted, Mr. Chairman, at the onset of this initiative, there was some sense in Africa that this was something that was being pushed upon them by the United States or by others. We don't want that to happen.
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Beyond that, there is within Africa in certain militaries, particularly among the militaries that we have begun to do this training with, capacity for command and control. It's that it's not widespread. It's not very deep. When last September we first briefed Africans on this and we talked to Ian Khama, who is the chief of staff of the Botswana military, about this, he said Botswana could provide the command and control, but I would have no officers left in my country. So what we need to do is to be able to find ways to help Botswana and Malawi, Ghana, other countries to work together so that they have that capability at the time of an operation beginning, so that we won't have that painful buildup startup time during a crisis.
Mr. ROYCE. There's one last question I have to ask. Is there a significant risk that ACRI will in any way set the stage for U.S. intervention into African conflicts in which we might otherwise choose to avoid?
Mr. MCCALLIE. Vince, let me take a first shot at that.
It's one of the reasons, Mr. Chairman, that we felt it was important to divorce the training initiative from operations. If it's all one, then the problem, the danger that you identify is certainly there. For that reason, we wanted to have a training initiative that did not have the capacity to commit a force.
For a force to be committed, one has to go through the same processes that we have had to go through before, including a Security Council resolution. The other reason, quite frankly, is that even if you train multiple units, some of those units will not be available to do peacekeeping in a particular operation. It may be inappropriate, in fact, for a neighboring country to do peacekeeping in a particular operation.
Therefore, it is better to have that capacity out there, have them exercise together, but let the political institution which decides whether it will be deployed, be separate and apart from this particular initiative.
Mr. ROYCE. All right. I am going to turn to Mr. Payne at this time. I thank you, Ambassador. Thank you, Mr. Kern.
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Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. When this was originally introduced, what was the general reaction from the African countries that initially were approached?
Mr. KERN. May I take that one? I was on that initial trip accompanying then Assistant Secretary George Moose and Susan Rice of the NSC.
In all of the countries that we visited, all the countries were positive about this. Many of them had questions, some of the very questions that we're discussing today. But they were positive. Even in Kenya, which we visited, and had a meeting with President Moi, he was positive about the idea but he spent most of his time lecturing us on other subjects. But in other countries, the focus was clearly on ACRI.
In the SADC countries that we visited, principally in this case Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, all three of those countries told us we like this idea, we think it's a good idea, it needs to be formed a bit more, shaped a bit more, but we don't want to get involved in this on a bilateral basis, the United States and Botswana, the United States and Zimbabwe or South Africa. We need to work this through the SADC mechanism, which is something which is ongoing, although much slower than we would have liked. But there was no country that we visited that said absolutely not, we think this is a bad idea. They all said it was a good idea, needs some work, needs some shaping.
We did take all of those African as well as European concerns on board. That is why the initiative has evolved the way it has.
Mr. MCCALLIE. Congressman Payne, let me add to that if I may. There was also a concern that we have heard that we coordinate closely with the OAU and the United Nations. That was one of their concerns.
Mr. PAYNE. Having been in many of the areas in Africa where there has been conflict, I have seen some of the weaknesses of the United Nations. For example, in Somalia when I went on one of the trips there, the French troops would call Paris first to find out whether or not they should take a mission on. The Italians would call Rome. We kept in touch with our mission control. I was there during the height of the situation and any time they wanted to execute an issue it seemed like they had to call back maybe to see how the politics were back home. The same situation that we found here when we lost the men in Somalia, was the same situation that the French had when they lost an officer, the Turks lost some people.
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How will this work? Will we be able to avoid troops calling back home to see whether they should be able to execute their jobs? Will there be a better command and control than the Somalia situation?
Mr. MCCALLIE. I think one has to say that this is a training initiative. So, in fact, we are not going to field the forces. We have intentionally split it away from the operational question. That remains an operational question and a very legitimate question that you raise. That is one of the reasons we split it up too. There were too many things, frankly, to take, too many issues to take on if you tried to create a force in the field. So we are dealing in the ACRI with training the capacity.
That question will yet remain for the deploying organization. How will you have the unity of command. That is one of the reasons I feel that what we would like to see develop out of this initiative is an African decision to work on the command and control question for us and many of our friends in Africa and elsewhere, to develop command and control capacity. But some of that will require a political decision that we hope will begin to move within the OAU. The OAU is wrestling with some of these issues. But frankly, it's not there yet.
Mr. KERN. If I could just add one comment. One concern, one reason why often times the national force commander will call back home is because he's not sure about the ability of the other forces in the operation to hold up their end of it. He's never worked with them. These are legitimate military concerns.
The fact that there will be this cadre of African soldiers who has worked together, rather trained together, might alleviate some of that.
Mr. PAYNE. Finally, on the decisionmaking process, and I know that these things are still being worked out. But once again using the Zairian situation. As you know, a million-plus refugees were in Goma and I think it was the Canadians that decided there should be—who didn't know where the people were. They were having problems with nutrition. The Canadians decided that there should be a force, which the French then said they would assist. Then finally the United States said we will be a part of this force to go in to see if we can assist the refugees from Rwanda that were there.
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Then there was discussion and debate about it. Before that could be implemented, the alliance started its offensive in the Goma region, which caused the lock-jam that kept people there. I always contended that the ex-FAR and the Interahamwe, Hutu militia and ex-army of Rwanda prevented refugees from going back. They were armed. They were protected with the number of a million-plus. Therefore, they could mix in the crowd and would not be exposed. But once the alliance opened up and the Banyamulenge people fought back from the Mobutu army, 800,000 or 900,000 people came back over the border, therefore not needing the use of this U.N. group.
It wasn't the United Nations that initiated action. It was sort of inspired by the Canadians. The United States and the French finally said we will kind of go along with it. I guess the question is in the whole command and control, the decisionmaking about where we go or who leads it. Should there be a country that would lead, for example, the way Italy did in Albania, and say this is something that we need to go in and we need to create stability? Have you thought through those kinds of problems yet?
Mr. MCCALLIE. The flexibility that you get from training individual units and then doing some joint training where you would have units from a sub-region of Africa train together without creating a force per se, is that you retain the flexibility to determine given a particular situation whether you want a U.N. operation or whether you want an OAU operation or whether in fact an ECOWAS or if it's in southern Africa, SADC, would respond to a particular situation.
Depending on which political authority responds to the situation, then you will set up a different command and control structure. I think that's the answer. It does give you more flexibility. What it doesn't give you is quite as rapid a response time that you would have if you had one composite force. What we ran into very clearly though was political resistance in Africa and in Europe to having one composite force.
Mr. KERN. But if I could just add, a possible scenario would be a coalition of the willing that could move more rapidly than the United Nations can move under U.N. aegis, under U.N. sanction and approval, which could at some point transition from a multinational coalition of the willing into a blue-helmeted operation, but without the long period of time, as you know, Congressman, that it took to set up UNAVEM II and the hundreds of thousands of deaths that occurred. That's one of the things that we are trying to work on, is also to help Africans be able to deploy more rapidly.
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Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. I think I have used up my time. But I strongly support this initiative. I look forward to seeing it move forward. I commend you who have conceived of it—and I hope it will be successful.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Payne.
Mr. Campbell of California.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Is the United States the predominant force providing the training?
Mr. MCCALLIE. Providing the training?
Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. MCCALLIE. Currently it is. We are following a two-track approach, which is to go forward with the training that we're able to provide bilaterally to countries that have indicated they want that training. At the same time, we have engaged in a lot of diplomatic work to see if we could urge other countries to also provide training or assistance. As you know, the French have longstanding training relationships with many West African countries. The British have longstanding training relationships in both West Africa and southern Africa and also in East Africa.
What we are trying to do is at least coordinate our various training activities. The British worked with the 10 States of southern Africa in April that I mentioned. I believe that the French have plans, which they will have to announce, to do similar work in West Africa. So I think we are going to see more of a burden sharing.
Mr. CAMPBELL. And on a geographic basis?
Mr. MCCALLIE. So far, the French impact has been primarily West Africa, but I think we may see a broader interest as well. But there are other countries that have indicated an interest in providing peacekeeping training, the Nordic States have, the Canadians have, the Netherlands, the Portuguese, the Spanish.
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Mr. CAMPBELL. Now who is doing it is the United States?
Mr. MCCALLIE. We are providing an awful lot of on-the-ground training right now.
Mr. CAMPBELL. And the United Kingdom?
Mr. MCCALLIE. They tend to start at command structures. So they have been working with the command and staff colleges in Accra and in Harare.
Mr. CAMPBELL. And France?
Mr. MCCALLIE. France is working with several African units. They are sponsoring five African peacekeeping countries right now that are in the Central African Republic working with them. They will also be sponsoring some very effective exercises in West Africa.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Kern, you wanted to speak on this? I just am trying to get a lay of the land on it.
Mr. KERN. I just wanted to say that in some ways, we form a bridge in that the French deal almost exclusively with Francophone countries, the British through their centers of excellence that the Ambassador talked about, training Anglophone students, Anglophone military. We do both.
Mr. CAMPBELL. And do we try to bring them together or is it a geographic unspoken perhaps, but a geographic division? France will handle Francophone Africa?
Mr. KERN. No.
Mr. MCCALLIE. We are going to work all over the continent. I think the fact that we are doing the same training all over the continent with units from every area of the continent, the fact that we are providing the same type of communication equipment makes our contribution absolutely key here.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I wanted to ask about the Rwanda case which might some day, I hope not, but might be replicated or somewhat replicated in Burundi. As I understand the terms of engagement, if there's not a cease-fire, the application of the crisis response team, the crisis response force is not called for. What concerns me is a civil war, a genocide. This force would not have been able, would not have been designed to be able to stop what happened in Rwanda. Is that correct?
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Mr. KERN. There are very few militaries in the world, quite frankly, that can pull off a chapter VII operation. We are using the sort of basic military notion that first you learn to crawl, and then you learn to walk, and then you learn to run. So we're working on providing training for chapter VI operations, which as you say, would have to have some sort of a cease-fire in place.
We are, however, cognizant of the fact that despite the best intentions at the time a peacekeeping force is deployed, they need to have robust enough rules of engagement and enough equipment that they can defend themselves toward a chapter VI peacekeeping operation breakdown as was exactly the case in Rwanda.
So we are providing that, but we haven't gotten to the point of providing the sorts of equipment and training that would be required for a peace enforcement operation.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I'm interested in your recommendation, and I do recognize and I grant that you are not speaking for the Administration necessarily on this, but what would you do if another genocide, what would you recommend the United States do in connection with a rapid response force if another genocide were to break out, let's say this time in Burundi or a resurgence in Rwanda?
To make the question a bit more leading, this troop is not able to do the job it seems to me as of the present moment.
Mr. KERN. I think that it's hard to speak hypothetically.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I know, and I am absolving you from any, of all sins present or future that I can. But I am interested in knowing what we should do, because this is for the rare case. What I am worried about is the rare case, but nevertheless it's the most serious when it happens.
Mr. KERN. I think given the capability of forces now, that there would have to be a decision made in the United States at the highest level as to whether or not we wanted to involve U.S. forces in such an operation.
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Mr. CAMPBELL. That's what I thought.
Mr. KERN. As you may know, the President I believe as long ago now as 2 years ago, said that in a Burundi operation, we would be willing to provide airlift and a small unit on the ground to control the airlift, but we wouldn't be willing to provide combat forces.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you.
Mr. MCCALLIE. Let me just add one thing there. I think you put your hand on a serious problem. That right now we're training for chapter VI. I think as we develop chapter VI capability and confidence among African States and also frankly among non-African States that are working together for the first time in providing peacekeeping training, that as we develop that confidence, perhaps the international community will be prepared then to address the next questions down the line. I don't think we're there yet.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I follow you. Thanks.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Alcee Hastings of Florida.
Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for holding the hearing. I join and echo my colleagues' statements regarding the witnesses coming back and I appreciate your gentlemen as well as the next panel.
In the development of the Africa Crisis Response Initiative, were all African countries consulted?
Mr. MCCALLIE. Initially all African countries were not consulted. Let me say that they were briefed on the initiative. We have gone back since again. I think Vince was here at the creation, I was not. I came on board in December. I think they were all consulted, briefed initially on what the Africa Crisis Response Initiative wanted to do.
Mr. HASTINGS. And then you met some resistance and some criticism from some of the countries. After having that criticism come forward, was there any discussion with those countries who were balking in so far as going forward with the development?
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Mr. MCCALLIE. Yes, sir. There has been a lot of discussion. We also went back with a recommendation of many countries to end any appearance of competition between France, Britain and the United States. We sat down and worked together with them to come up with a common approach. Then together, Britain, France, and the United States sat down with the Secretary General of the OAU and discussed this initiative. Upon his recommendation, we went back to the Foreign Ministers of all the African States and presented the joint initiative to them, and again took African responses.
A great deal of the evolution that you have seen in this initiative comes from discussions both with African Governments and European Governments.
Mr. KERN. But we did early on brief all of the African ambassadors and their attaches in Washington, and then subsequently briefed at the United Nations all of the perm reps and any of their military who they wished to bring.
Mr. HASTINGS. Noticeably South Africa is not a participant. Yet South Africa is considered to have more capable forces than some of the countries. Also for a variety of reasons I would imagine, Nigeria is not a participant. Two of the largest countries in Africa, who in some respects could arguably be said to be among the more influential in Africa, are not included. How do we respond to that? What are we doing to either include or make certain that we're never going to include certain of them?
Mr. KERN. I'll leave Nigeria for you. South Africa was on the list of countries that we originally visited when I went with George Moose and with Susan Rice. As I said earlier, in South Africa there was enthusiasm for this, but a desire to do this through SADC rather than bilaterally.
The South Africans are in a peculiar position in that they are the big kid on the block, as you say. They don't want to be the bully and they don't want to be perceived as being the bully. So I think they are very judiciously trying to work on this initiative as are Zimbabwe and Botswana and others, through SADC, to come to some sort of a consensus either that SADC would endorse the initiative or that SADC would say that countries, members are allowed to—you know, we pose no objection to people participating.
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Mr. HASTINGS. But our policy has been to support SADC and ECOWAS. Is this going to be a drain on SADC and ECOWAS development? Do you understand what I'm saying?
Mr. KERN. No. I would argue that just the opposite would be obtained. That this will make it easier for SADC or for ECOWAS or for any subregional group to be able to effectively do peacekeeping through this training, as well as the training that the French and the British and others are providing.
Mr. MCCALLIE. Congressman Hastings, I was sometimes asked in fact by southern Africans whether we were getting ahead of the game by training Malawi without a SADC agreement. Our answer has been that we are not trying to pre-judge what SADC may do, that there certainly is no harm in providing training to individual units. We would be delighted, and we said so to members of SADC, if SADC itself came up with its own peacekeeping structure or plans and then approached the international community, be it Britain, France, the Nordic countries, ourselves, and showed us their plans and asked for assistance in putting their plans into action. We would be delighted to approach it that way as well.
Now your question on Nigeria. I was asked that question by the press a few months ago. I indicated I would be delighted to work with Nigeria when Nigeria becomes democratic, when that is politically possible. Clearly we're not prepared to provide security assistance or military training to militaries of countries that are run by a military and who don't accept civilian authority.
Mr. HASTINGS. Yet we wind up praising them in Liberia. There are some inconsistencies that just clearly have to be put to rest. The Nigerians are all over that area of Africa in a variety of ways, Liberia being especially one, and other areas as well. I am not arguing for it, I just am pointing it out.
I would like to ask one final question, Mr. Chairman, and ask the gentlemen what conflicts they foresee that the Africa Crisis Response Initiative would be involved in, and specifically address if you would, the Sudan and Sierra Leone.
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Mr. KERN. Well, I would say that there are several types of crises that the ACRI could play a role in. One would be as we talked earlier a chapter VI operation, where there would be a truce or cease-fire and movement toward a political solution. I would say it's also possible that the ACRI trained forces could be helpful in a humanitarian crisis. Also potentially in some form of natural disaster, particularly within a region. Maybe SADC forces doing something in flooding, as has happened previously in southern Africa, or in central Africa the Lake Nyasa disaster in Cameroon.
I don't think that in Sierra Leone, we don't have a situation yet that's right for this sort of a force. In Sudan, I think that the likelihood of that in the near term is much lower.
Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Menendez. Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Just a question. As you mentioned in Rwanda there was a breakdown when the United Nations was there. Some people feel that if rather than to have left, hightailed out, if just the opposite, if reinforcements would have gone there, perhaps the genocide could have been prevented. Of course all this is hindsight. But the fact that the much smaller band of Tutsi soldiers out of Uganda under Mr. Mugambi's leadership was able to route the Hutu army, which was maybe three, four, five times its size, you know sort of leads to the question that sometimes not to become engaged in combat, but the way that Operation Turquoise with the French that came in and sort of encircled two and a half million people. One, the French lost no soldiers. Two, no more genocide was continued from that group of people.
So I just raise that as sometimes I think that we perhaps could have prevented the genocide of 500,000 to close to a million people that is estimated to have been killed in Rwanda, and actually with very little attention from the United Nations or the world, and the tremendous amount of attention given to this investigation that they want to go on in eastern Congo, which I think should happen. But there seems to have been an absence of concern for the Rwanda situation and with the new situation in Congo.
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My question quickly is this. I think that ECOWAS, Mr. Hastings, they went in before. They went in when Nigeria was working on elections and there was the election. They were in there with the Ghanaians and so forth. I think the Abacha regime came sort of after the fact, after Nigeria went in initially. I'll put that on the record.
Mr. ROYCE. Thanks. Mr. Menendez.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I want you to know I had another hearing where the Assistant Secretary of State had the advantage of reading your testimony before hand. So I have some questions based on that.
Ambassador, given that we anticipate the Security Council overseeing the ACRI, what role do you envision the Organization of African Unity having? Is it an advisory one? Do you have an interplay that you envision? Could you share that?
Mr. MCCALLIE. I think there are several points there. Before the Security Council would call for troops to participate in a peacekeeping operation in Africa, I think the Secretary General of the United Nations would consult with the Secretary General of the OAU before deploying, and in fact before inviting various countries to send troops for peacekeeping operation. I think that process is already there whether or not we have an ACRI.
My concern on the ACRI even in the training phase is that we try to bring the OAU into this process. First of all, I want to tell you that we have been consulting with the OAU. We did meet with Secretary General Salim Salim last fall. I met with him around Christmas, have since met in April with his staff, and again in July with the director of the Conflict Management Center.
Mr. KERN. Also, when we went to Africa last year, before we talked to any of the national military leaders or Heads of State, we started in Addis Ababa and went to the OAU before we broached this with specific African countries.
Mr. MCCALLIE. But I think when we have a general meeting, hopefully at the beginning of November—we would like to have a general meeting of any country interested in peacekeeping in Africa—it's very important that the OAU be there and express itself—that it give us an idea of the types of initiatives that it would like to see.
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The OAU has a problem, however. It has 53 members who have very diverse interests. They would have to go through their security organ to get a judgment on any particular initiative that's proposed. That so far hasn't been possible for them.
Mr. MENENDEZ. So you see them being basically it sounds like expressing their opinions where they may, but not having any formal role nor advisory role, no direct interrelation in this process?
Mr. MCCALLIE. To this point, yes. We would like to see them become a very important part of a coordination group of countries that have committed themselves to build this capacity in Africa. What we have been doing diplomatically is trying to build up to the point where we could have a group of countries come together in an absolutely open meeting. The meeting would be non-binding, informal, and there are reasons for that. That is that the principle of universality is important in both the United Nations and the OAU. But it would allow everyone to come in and express their view, and there we would hope that the OAU would express its view as well.
For the Secretary General of the OAU to express an OAU official opinion, however, he will have to consult the security organ in the OAU or at least Heads of State Summit in the OAU. He's not done that so far. We did brief him on the P–3 initiative before the Heads of State Meeting in Harare last June. He briefed the Council of Ministers that met prior to the Heads of State, but they did not have a full discussion or debate on the subject.
Mr. MENENDEZ. I would urge you to continue to find ways to engage them in the process in which you are deciding in terms of this particular endeavor. I think that they are a very important component to help us in forging acceptance on the continent.
I just have one other question to Mr. Kern. That is, in your testimony, you said that the ''ACRI training is open to any and all nations who are interested in participating as either trainers or observers.'' My concern, having read that statement, is what is the process, and this may have been pursued, for making the decision about what countries are trained under the ACRI.
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For example, we have had troops that have trained Rwandan troops, not necessarily in the ACRI, but who have trained Rwandan troops, U.S. Special Force trainers. Show some of the difficulties that you face in the process of deciding, that the process as to who is decided upon is very important. As well as do we have an easily available option to withhold training and/or funding to countries for which we feel military training, having made the statement that it's open to any and all nations who are interested in participating as either trainers or observers, when it's not appropriate, does the mechanism exist clearly for them not to be included?
Mr. KERN. There are three levels. There is as Ambassador McCallie was saying, we are trying to establish a group that would be open to anyone who evinces an interest in peacekeeping in Africa. Beneath that would be a group that would be both interested in peacekeeping, but willing to commit resources either as a troop contributor or training or provision of hardware or money. Then finally, at the bilateral level, is our ACRI program, the French training program, the British program. Under our program, we are only providing assistance to countries that are democracies and have clearly established civilian control of the military.
So that for example, at this large level, perhaps the Libyans or the Sudanese could be involved and come and listen. At the middle level, only countries that were willing to participate and be involved in making contributions. And down at the specific level of the United States, we would only provide training to those countries, to those democratic countries. So that a country such as Nigeria, for example, could not at this time while it's under military rule, receive ACRI training. The same would be the case for Niger and Gambia and other such countries in Africa.
Mr. MCCALLIE. That's one reason that a meeting that includes any member or any country that wants to walk into the meeting has to remain informal and the discussions non-binding. Clearly we're not prepared to be directed to provide assistance to a country that we do not feel that we can provide assistance to. We are going to retain that. We have to retain that, the right of sovereign decision there.
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Incidentally, our other partners would like to retain their right of sovereign decision also. I think, frankly, African countries would like to retain their right of sovereign decision. They may not want to accept training from certain countries and they shouldn't have to.
Mr. ROYCE. Ambassador McCallie and Mr. Kern, we thank you very much for your testimony here today. We have a second panel. We will now go to the second panel. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your participation in this hearing.
In our second panel, we have two distinguished, private witnesses on the ACRI. Dr. Steven Metz is a military scholar doing research currently in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Dr. Metz previously taught at the Air War College, the U.S. Army Command and the General Staff College, as well as several private universities. He has written extensively on African military forces.
Accompanying Dr. Metz is his colleague Colonel Dan Henk, who is Director of the Department of African Studies at the War College. Colonel Henk will not present formal, verbal testimony today, but he will be available to Members for any questions specifically concerning African military forces.
Professor David Davis is a senior fellow and assistant research professor at George Mason University's Institute of Public Policy Program on Peacekeeping Policy. Professor Davis has worked on peacekeeping operations research since 1992, following his retirement from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. He chairs the Cornwallis Group, and international working group of military, humanitarian, and diplomats working on strategies to resolve conflict.
Dr. Metz.
STATEMENT OF STEVEN METZ, MILITARY RESEARCHER; ACCOMPANIED BY COLONEL DAN HENK, DIRECTOR OF AFRICAN STUDIES, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE Mr. METZ. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, it's an honor to be here today to have the opportunity to talk to you about a topic of growing importance in American national security policy. I intend to take a strategic approach to talk about ACRI in a broader policy framework and from a long-time perspective. I'll focus more on its potential, what it might develop into rather than what it is today, as the previous panel dealt with.
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We all know that the security environment that has emerged in Africa over the past few decades is one where conflict is common, if not endemic. More and more armed violence generates refugee problems and humanitarian disasters. These are often beyond the capability of African States to deal with and thus result in intervention by the United States, the United Nations and other outsiders. But the opportunity exists today to transform the African security environment into one where most conflict is prevented, and that which is not is handled by Africans themselves. The question is, how can the United States best use its influence in Africa, which may be at an all-time high to support and encourage such a transformation?
In my opinion, the Africa Crisis Response Initiative is a useful first step in this direction. It is a fairly inexpensive program that will have tangible benefits. The American military forces that participate in the training would gain valuable insights and skills. The African units which undergo the training are likely to be more effective in any future peacekeeping operations in which they participate.
But ACRI is not a complete solution to Africa's problems. It will not transform the region's security environment. Alone, it will not end Africa's reliance on outsiders, whether the United States, our European allies or the United Nations. For this to happen, ACRI must be simply the first step in a broader program for the transformation of the African security environment.
The goal of such a program would be an Africa free from dependence on outside assistance in all but the most complex or dire emergencies. For it to succeed, such a program must synchronize the activities of many elements of the American Government. Congress for instance would have a vital role in providing consistent support for the program and in helping to explain it to the American public. The American public must understand that the reform of the African security environment is in the American national interest, but will take time.
The Department of State would also have a vital role. It would need to work to expand involvement in the program, both among other developed nations and in Africa itself. Linkages to the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and sub-regional organizations would have to be further strengthened. The State Department would also have to support the development of African political structures to prevent violence in managed peace operations when they do occur. The Department of State must encourage initiatives by Africans in this direction, but not impose them.
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The U.S. Department of Defense would have to help African militaries augment their ability to plan, lead and support peacekeeping operations through exercises, conferences, consultations and simulations. It would be particularly valuable to improve the ability of African militaries to provide support to civilian authorities during natural disasters. Any DOD program must however avoid placing an inordinate burden on the U.S. military resources and existing commitments.
The most important role in such a transformation of the African security environment however, would of course fall on the Africans themselves. Africans must sustain movement toward democracy and the ongoing free market reforms. They must begin to craft their own programs for the transformation of their regional security system. In the end, the United States can support the transformation of the African security environment, but not direct it.
In my opinion, if some sort of deep change does not take place, Africa will remain dependent on outside assistance for the foreseeable future. The American people will demand intervention in the periodic crises that occur there. Given this, I believe that it is in the American national interest to both support ACRI as it is currently configured and more importantly, to build on it. This is an instance where a relatively small expenditure of money and effort could bring substantial returns.
Given this, I applaud your current support for ACRI and urge that this be continued for any programs that grow from it. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Metz appears in the appendix.]
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Dr. Metz.
Professor Davis.
STATEMENT OF DAVID F. DAVIS, PROGRAM ON PEACEKEEPING POLICY, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY
Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, I want to start by thanking the Committee for asking me here today. I believe the future of international peace operations, of which the African Crisis Response Initiative is a part, is of long-term importance. I will do my best to contribute to your understanding of those implications, and I will also attempt to extend those implications to peace operations in general.
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I will say at the outset that I support the ACRI as an attempt to provide Africa with the long-term capacity that is needed for the furtherance of peace on that continent. I support these goals of ACRI because they are consistent with the theory of peace operations that is emerging in our work at George Mason University. To explain this support and some reservations, I must spend a minute talking about that emerging theory.
We define a peace operation as a third-party intervention for the purpose of maintaining or restoring peace. Peace further being defined as order with justice. Given this definition, and I have used it with NATO, DOD, and others, a peace operation is a more holistic approach than a simple military peacekeeping approach.
In terms of peace operations, there are three primary processes which must occur simultaneously for success. These are the diplomatic and political processes of conflict resolution, treaty negotiations, cease-fire negotiations, and other activities which will result in the long-term stability and peace that is sought. We label this first process as peacemaking.
Peacemaking is necessary but very rarely sufficient in and of itself. Peace does not exist because of a signed piece of paper. Just as a house must start from a firm foundation, peace making also requires that humanitarian needs are met, human rights are upheld, economies, jobs, infrastructure, and governance are supported. This second aspect of peace operations is referred to as peace building. Of the over 700 tasks and functions in our model, over half of them represent those of peace building.
Finally, the long-term stability that will be created by the peace maker or the peace builder must at times be supported by security presence, logistics, command and control and potentially by force. This final and subordinate process is called peace support. Under our model, peacekeeping and peace enforcement are simply different types of peace support.
A peace operation then consists of these three pillars: peace making, peace building, and peace support. Successful operations have aspects of all three processes. Unsuccessful operations are those that are working at less than potential, can be analyzed as incomplete.
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Understanding this theory is important to the ACRI as it addresses two questions. How does the ACRI support the concept of an overall peace operation, and what other aspects of a peace operation need to be considered? Given the stated goals of ACRI, it is clear that the tasks of peace support are to be central to the training given to the various battalions. In order to judge ACRI, we compared the tasks contained in our models with the tasks to be trained under their program of instruction or POI. There is a clear consistency.
If we had developed the program of instruction at GMU, they would have gotten an A. They did it well. I believe that ACRI is teaching the correct tasks to the militaries involved. This is important since the military involvement in peace operations, the peace support activity can be pivotal to the overall operation. Although many African nations have participated in peace operations, this participation has not always been such as to support the goals of peace. The ACRI POI addresses these issues either directly through fire discipline, marksmanship, and human rights training, or indirectly through the professional example of the U.S. trainers in democratic ideals.
Furthermore, the concentration on independent capacity building and not force building is appropriate. Some of the nations would be very wary as was mentioned earlier of a trained force in the country next door. However, with all that ACRI is doing correctly, it begs a second question. What other aspects of a peace operation need to be considered? More directly, how can a peace operation be stood up in order to respond to an internal humanitarian emergency or regional requirement?
I am concerned that we will create a capacity to respond with soldiers, but not have had the opportunity to create the capacity to control that response. Considering the other aspects of a peace operation, the diplomat, the international organizations, and the NGO's requires a higher level of exercise and training than has been currently demonstrated by ACRI.
A final effectiveness of ACRI is dependent upon the integration of this approach. My understanding is that one of the activities that ACRI has on the table for future exercises are combined in joint exercises with multiple countries and other non-military agencies. For ACRI to have produced trained soldiers that can be used as building blocks in support of a peace operation, the higher level exercises in capacity building at the operational level is a must. No matter how well ACRI has prepared individual soldiers in small units to the battalion level for peace support, if the operational level of the entire peace operations has not been equally prepared, then failure is likely and the money spent is wasted.
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ACRI has the tools, the capability, and I believe the interest in minimizing any future ad hoc arrangements. Additionally, this higher level of exercise is an excellent opportunity for sharing the load with our allies. ACRI is important and the United States must lead, but it need not be strictly a U.S.-only initiative.
To summarize, I support the Africa Crisis Response Initiative as a fully credible and capable effort to build African capacity for peace support. Peace support is, however, insufficient in and of itself. More needs to be done to prepare for actual responses which include the peace making and the peace building aspects. This preparation must include combined and joint training, and predetermination of a controlling authority. Otherwise, the response with Africans can be no more successful than some of the international responses have been in the past.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Davis appears in the appendix.]
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Professor Davis.
Dr. Metz, Nigeria has used its participation in peacekeeping to improve its image as a defender of democracy. Are you concerned that ACRI participation might offer cover for a multitude of sins by member States as the Nigeria situation?
Mr. METZ. I think ACRI as it's configured today would not do that. But the Nigerian case does lead to what may be the largest conundrum for the United States if this would grow into something else.
Our goal with ACRI is eventually for it to lead to something where Africans take responsibility for their own peacekeeping situations. What we need to realize though is what that implies is a diminishing influence over the decisions they make, the political decisions they make for the United States.
What I mean by that is it's conceivable that in 5 years from now ACRI might have worked wonderfully and the United States has a limited role. At that point, African organizations might decide, for example, that being a democracy is no longer a prime criterion for participation. They might decide that the Nigerias of the world or whoever else can participate in this force, in this training regardless of their political system. That would be difficult for the United States because what we would see would be something that we had hand in creating, was then doing something that was antithetical to our policy.
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So I think that any time you create an organization, an institution or something that you want to become more autonomous and independent, you have to realize it's going to make some decisions that you might not like. Just as when your kids grow up, they are going to make some decisions that you don't like. In fact, that could potentially happen with any kind of African peacekeeping force.
Mr. ROYCE. Do you think it could contribute at all to militarization in Africa? I mean, there's really been an emphasis on a call for peaceful solutions to political and social problems faced by African nations. Now we're discussing capacity building in terms of military forces.
Mr. METZ. I really don't see that risk at all. I think that's true at a couple different levels. One, in terms of the question of coups, having a more proficient or effective military force doesn't necessarily make a military more likely to intervene in politics.
Mr. ROYCE. It might make it more professional and just the opposite.
Mr. METZ. Exactly. In fact, I think we need to think of ACRI as a complementary effort to a whole bevy of programs that we have underway today to help Africans develop models of civil military relations that are more compatible with democracy. So this is really just one piece of a larger puzzle. We're doing lots of other things, DOD and other organizations as well, to work that piece of the puzzle. We need to continue to give that as much effort as ACRI itself.
I also don't think that having more effective battalions would necessarily make African political leaders more likely to seek a military solution to a problem that might otherwise be solved through diplomacy. My own reading of Africa is that African leaders of today, nearly every one, have some kind of experience or at least understanding of the cost of military activity and the cost of war. My feeling is that in most cases, they are going to see military activity as a last resort. I believe that having more effective militaries isn't going to make them more likely to use them.
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Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask Professor Davis on your point there. Could ACRI and similar programs actually encourage the democratic principles necessary to keep African military officers in their appropriate roles? Do you think that's——
Mr. DAVIS. I think that is quite possible.
Mr. ROYCE. And how do you ensure that then?
Mr. DAVIS. I don't know how you would ensure it. I do know the only way that you can ensure any of these things is continually train, watch, monitor. If you see a blip, go do something about it. But especially, some of the armies in Africa actually exist in a foraging mode and they are not professional. Things that you can do to make them professional, to lessen the humanitarian or human rights abuses that are occurring will do nothing more than go toward stability.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you.
Mr. Menendez.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I want to thank both of you for your testimony.
Professor Davis, let me ask you, you said in your statement that you see peacekeeping operations consisting of the three pillars, the peace making, peace building, and peace support, and that a successful operation will have all three pillars involved. My question is, and I think I heard part of your answer, your comments, but let me if I can focus on it. Do you think the ACRI has enough capacity to carry out those three pillars? If ACRI involvement is in let's say the peace making pillar, is it possible for it to carry out the other two successfully?
Mr. DAVIS. All three of the aspects need to be addressed. The ACRI addresses in my mind the peace support question. Are the militaries prepared to provide the security and the presence and the activities of the military and do that well?
The peace making part usually needs to be done by an activity that has been built to do that. The OAU crisis management, conflict management center, the U.N. high representatives, the controlling civilian authority that is responsible for the overall intervention is where the peace making will be primarily.
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Peace building is mostly going to come in U.N. activities, human rights, humanitarian relief, NGO's, that sort of thing.
Mr. MENENDEZ. So isn't that what you were referring to before, to integration?
Mr. DAVIS. All three of those things need to be integrated. ACRI is doing a very good job of preparing and building the capacity for the peace support side. An intervention, the peace operation in toto needs someone to bring all three parts together.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Outside of ACRI?
Mr. DAVIS. Outside of ACRI, but maybe starting with the OAU or starting at the United Nations, that then uses ACRI for the capacity that has been put there in place.
Mr. MENENDEZ. One other quick question. You also say in your testimony that no matter how well ACRI has prepared soldiers in small units to the battalion level for peace support, if the operational level of the entire peace operation is not equally prepared, then failure is likely and the money spent is wasted. Now do you believe that that issue is being addressed?
Mr. DAVIS. I believe that they have plans to do it, talking with the British in their staff training, talking about future plans for joint and combined exercises that will train that. As long as that aspect is supported by you all, I think they have the ability to do that as well.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Campbell.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Thanks. Just one question. What is the state of ECOWAS and SADC's approach to a military intervention force? Can you tell me where they are? Are they still in planning or is there actually something that exists?
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Mr. DAVIS. I don't know about SADC. I know ECOWAS has the ECOWAS monitoring and observer group or ECOMOG that's currently extant in Liberia.
Mr. CAMPBELL. But SADC, you have no knowledge of yet?
Mr. METZ. Sir, if I could call on Colonel Henk.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I would be grateful if the colonel could come forward, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ROYCE. Yes, sir. If you don't mind.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I think the colonel should come to the microphone so that the court reporter can take his words. Thanks.
Colonel HENK. Thank you. SADC has in fact made considerable preparation for that kind of a role. It goes back actually a few years. You recall back in 1994, there was a coup in Lesotho. On very short notice, the Botswanans, South Africans, Zimbabweans and Namibians got together. Although it was a very ad hoc arrangement, it attempted to convey very clearly to the coup perpetrators in Lesotho that either the solution would be acceptable to all or these nations would intervene.
Since that time, the SADC organization has hardened its organizational capacity to do conflict resolution, and in fact, even military operations. The problem is the resources for putting together, sustaining, deploying military forces just aren't there. Zimbabwe was tasked for instance to do the training for peace operations of any kind. The exercise to which the Ambassador alluded, Blue Hungwe in April of this year, was probably the first in an annual series of exercises to test this capacity. They're thinking about it with British help particularly, their organizing to be able to command and control it. But what they really lack at this point is the resources to pull a major operation off.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I'll yield back to give Don Payne a chance before we break.
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Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Just very briefly. I really have to be brief this time because time is out. I think the chairman figured that out.
One way perhaps that countries could be selected could be the same way that countries are selected for the Africa trade and development bill, for investment. Nigeria would not be on the list. There's just no question about it. Countries I think that should qualify would demonstrate democracy, transparency, governance and so forth. Now all of those countries may not have a military presence, but I think if you go through those countries that would—Ghana would for example qualify, even Uganda is on the list of market economy moving in the right direction. I think if we had a criteria like that, sort of leave the rogue countries out, the Sudan and Nigeria, they should not be a part of anything in my opinion, like this. That may be one way to go.
I also think that there are already militaries in Africa that have good reputations. Botswana has excellent representation, Ghana, for example, there have been many places, Senegal, through the years have had peacekeeping folks. So I think that that would be another source.
Finally, there are countries that are trying, in Malawi, they really behave well even with the transition of the life President. When they had an election and he lost, he thought he was really popular, but he never had an election in 30 years. He lost, but the military did not react.
Finally though, there are a number of countries that are trying to demobilize. The problem is they just have no money or training or tools to give to the soldiers. Ethiopia is trying to figure out what to do with all their military. Eritrea is doing the same thing. Uganda has all these soldiers that they are trying to reintegrate but they have no money to do it. Mozambique, the same problem. Liberia is finding itself in this tremendous situation. In Angola with the UNITA and the Dos Santos forces, with them integrating into one army.
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So I think that if you use some of those kinds of criteria, we may be able to come up with the better guys over the worse guys.
Mr. ROYCE. All right. Dr. Metz and Professor Davis apparently are in agreement. I want to thank you for coming all the way down here again for your testimony. Indeed, we want to thank all of the witnesses today, and Colonel, thank you as well. We very much appreciate it. At this point, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]
A P P E N D I X
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