SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
Page 1 TOP OF DOC
49–158 CC
1998
U.S. COUNTER-NARCOTICS POLICY TOWARDS COLOMBIA
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
MARCH 31, 1998
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
Page 2 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JAY KIM, California
STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio
MARSHALL ''MARK'' SANFORD, South Carolina
MATT SALMON, Arizona
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
TOM CAMPBELL, California
JON FOX, Pennsylvania
JOHN McHUGH, New York
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
ROY BLUNT, Missouri
KEVIN BRADY, Texas
LEE HAMILTON, Indiana
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
HOWARD BERMAN, California
Page 3 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
GARY ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PAT DANNER, Missouri
EARL HILLIARD, Alabama
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
STEVE ROTHMAN, New Jersey
BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee
BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
JIM DAVIS, Florida
LOIS CAPPS, California
RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff
MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Democratic Chief of Staff
JOHN P. MACKEY, Investigative Counsel
ALLISON K. KIERNAN, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
Page 4 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
WITNESSES
The Honorable Rand Beers, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State
General Charles E. Wilhelm, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command
General Jose Serrano, Director General, Colombian National Police
Dr. Thomas Hargrove
Ms. Tania Rich
Mr. Dan Germann
APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress from New York, and Chairman, Committee on International Relations
The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from Indiana
The Honorable Robert Menendez, a Representative in Congress from New Jersey
The Honorable Rand Beers
General Jose Serrano
Dr. Thomas Hargrove
Ms. Tania Rich
Ms. Nancy Mankins
Ms. Patti Tenenoff
Additional material submitted for the record:
October 10, 1996 letter from Assistant Secretary Barbara Larkin
March 12, 1998 letter from Assistant Secretary Barbara Larkin
March 1998 letter from Col. Jose Gallego
Page 5 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
February 12, 1998 article from The Washington Times by Ben Barber
March 26, 1998 article from Word & Way by Stacey Hamby
March 30, 1998 article from The Washington Times
May 12, 1998 article from The Washington Times by Rachel Ehrenfeld
National Defense Council Foundation Issue Alert
Information paper by the U.S. Army on the grounding of the UH-1 helicopter fleet
Colombian National Police Antinarcotics Direction
Chart on status of Colombian helicopters
Chart by U.S. Customs Service on Heroin Seizures
Chart on South American heroin threat
Photo of Black Hawk and Huey helicopters
Payload Capacity Chart notes on Black Hawk vs. Huey II helicopters from the Colombian National Police
Operational weaknesses of Huey II vs. Black Hawk helicopters
Chart on aircraft comparison
U.S. COUNTER-NARCOTICS POLICY TOWARDS COLOMBIA
TUESDAY, MARCH 31, 1998
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:08 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin Gilman (chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order.
I'd like to, along with my colleague, Mr. Hamilton, extend a warm welcome to our newest Member, the gentlelady from California, Mrs. Capps.
Page 6 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mrs. CAPPS. THANK YOU.
Chairman GILMAN. Lois Capps brings to our Committee a devotion to public service that's dedicated to helping people improve their everyday lives, which includes more than 20 years of service in education and in health care. Trained as a nurse at Pacific Lutheran University of Tacoma Washington, Mrs. Capps earned a Master's degree in religion at Yale University while serving as head nurse at Yale New Haven hospital. She later earned a Master's degree in education at the University of California at Santa Barbara. Her training and experience in child development and health care will provide a special perspective to our Committee. We look forward to working with her on these and other issues as well. We're pleased that she's elected to join our Committee and to fulfill the good experience of history and activity of her former husband, who was an outstanding Member of our Committee who we sorely miss. Welcome, Mrs. Capps.
Mrs. CAPPS. Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I just want to join you in welcoming to the Committee Lois Capps. We're delighted to have her here, as we were delighted to have her husband here, Walter. I think you've pretty well run down her biography so that we're reasonably well acquainted with her, but I think it is important to note that, for many years, she served as an educator and as a nurse and a teacher; dedicated herself to public service; was an enormous help to her husband, Walter Capps; and worked very hard to improve the lives of the people on the central coast, their families and their children. She and her family have been very much in our thoughts and our prayers in recent months. She and they have made and are making a remarkable contribution in this town and in the country. She is a very remarkable lady and we're delighted to have her on the Committee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hamilton, I join you in the sentiment of welcoming our colleague from California. I've gone up personally to say how pleased I am that she has joined us here in the Committee and how much I know she'll continue to do the good work her husband was doing with us. Welcome.
Page 7 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mrs. CAPPS. Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. Any other Members seeking recognition? If not, Mrs. Capps.
Mrs. CAPPS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, those of who have spoken, Mr. Bereuter, Mr. Hamilton. I'm very touched by your welcome and I will briefly say that it is such a pleasure and a real honor to be sitting here today. I can't tell you how much it means for me to be able to fulfill Walter's term of office, particularly to be sitting on this esteemed Committee, which he held in such high regard. I want to thank especially the chairman, Mr. Gilman, Ranking Member Mr. Hamilton, as well as the chairman and Ranking Members of Walter's subcommittees, Mr. Bereuter, Mr. Berman, Mr. Gallegly, Mr. Ackerman.
This Committee addresses issues of great importance to our country. Today's hearing on narcotics policy reflects the urgency of the tasks before us and my experience for 20 years bears witness to that urgency. I eagerly anticipate the challenges that lie ahead in our work here. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mrs. Capps. And, again, we hope you'll enjoy the work of our Committee and I'm certain that you'll be an asset to us.
We begin today the second in a series of hearings on U.S. policy toward Colombia, in particular, the war against illicit drugs. And today we hear from the Administration, as well as our good friend, General Jose Serrano, Director General of the Colombia National Police (CNP). General Serrano is world-renowned as a fearless drug fighter. DEA Administrator Tom Constantine recently said in congressional testimony, and I quote Tom, ''General Serrano and his men and women are heroes in our war on drugs.'' I fully agree, and I'm sure our Committee agrees, the general is a cop's cop, and we're proud to have him with us today.
A raging war that is based upon and financed by illicit narcotics is placing the future of Colombia, and the stability of the entire region at risk. Our own vital national interest and that of the good Colombian people who are engaged in a difficult struggle, hang in the balance. The frightening possibilities of a narco state just 3 hours by plane from Miami, can no longer be dismissed.
Page 8 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
President Clinton's February 26th certification of Colombia with a national interest waiver was in large measure due to the efforts of General Serrano, Colonel Gallejo, and the other brave men and women of the CNP's elite anti-narcotics unit, the DANTI. We must help them do better and even more in the common struggle against illicit drugs. And, though long overdue, the President's certification of Colombia was welcome. There are no longer any excuses nor any reasons to delay vital counter-narcotics assistance to the CNP. We must help all those good, dedicated men and women in the fight against the corrosive and deadly narcotics trade, which originates in Colombia.
Following the certification decision, Secretary of State Albright summed up what the future of our bilateral relationship should be, and I quote Secretary Albright, ''The waiver decision is intended to lay the groundwork for increased future cooperation and to support those in Colombia who are striving to strengthen the rule of law and to buttress their embattled democracy.'' Those were certainly welcome words from the Secretary of State. And now we look forward to some concrete action. For example, when will we see delivery of the long-overdue Black Hawk utility helicopters, at least 12 Huey II upgraded choppers, DC3 supply planes, and other vital anti-narcotics assistance that's urgently needed by the CNP.
As of today, only 7 of the entire fleet of 36 CNP Hueys are operational for counter-drug missions. The rest are shot up or are being repaired, or have been grounded. And I know our military has grounded our own used Hueys that were used in Vietnam as being unsatisfactory for operational activities at the present time. I hope we're not sending more of the same to Colombia. They need better equipment than that.
They need good assistance now if they are to wage a serious and credible war against drugs in the major drug source nation in our own hemisphere. We find now that a recent communique issued by the narco-guerrillas just this week declared war on any U.S. operatives in Colombia. If that's a declaration of war, then it certainly spells out the need for our being engaged in a warlike response. Helicopters are not an insignificant part of that struggle against drugs in Colombia. And, as General Serrano has said, these choppers are involved in 90 percent of the CNP's anti-drug missions. Colombia's a nation with high-altitude mountains and vast low plains, and is larger than Texas and Kansas combined. Mobility is the key to victory in any real war on drugs in Colombia, as General Wilhelm recently stated himself, and we're pleased the general is here with us today.
Page 9 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
However the enthusiasm with which the certification of waiver was received both here and in Bogota has been tempered by recent events. Earlier this month, the FARC narco-guerrillas killed or captured more than a hundred members of the Colombian army in the cocaine-producing regions of southwest Colombia. It was the worst defeat of the Colombian army in what some still mistakenly believe is a war driven by ideology, rather than by narcotics. The subsequent announcement by the triumphant FARC commander that they will now also target Americans working in Colombia is a measure of how strong and arrogant these guerrillas have come to feel. They're also targeting American-provided helicopters and, last week, they downed two CNP choppers that were on a mission to destroy a cocaine laboratory.
In reality, the guerrillas of the FARC and ELN are nothing but common criminals and terrorists. Our own State Department last fall officially designated these Colombian guerrillas as foreign terrorist organizations. In light of these determinations and their targeting of Americans, there should no longer be any romanticism about these former Leftist guerrillas. These groups have kidnapped and held Americans for ransom and, just last week, grabbed four more Americans, including a 63-year-old retired school teacher. Along with these individuals, the narco-guerrillas are holding hostage the future of our own youth. We will hear later in our hearing from the families of some of the hostages and an American who was held for nearly a year by one of the criminal guerrilla groups.
What happens in Colombia directly affects our own nation and especially our young people. Colombia is a source of more than 80 percent of the world's cocaine, and most recently, 60 percent of the heroin that's seized on our streets. We look forward to today's testimony, which I hope will serve as a wake-up call for all of us, the Administration, the Congress alike, as to what's unfolding in Colombia. We'll also learn what more must be done to turn things around before it's too late.
Before turning to our first panel, I would welcome any comments that our Ranking Member, Mr. Hamilton, may have.
Page 10 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think you should be commended for the hearing that we're having this afternoon. I think this is the second hearing and I understand there are other hearings scheduled with respect to Colombia. I do want to remind you that you made a commitment to me on a hearing on the drug certification-decertification question and said that you would set a hearing on this subject. I understand you and your staff are working on a date now. I wonder if the chairman can confirm that?
Chairman GILMAN. Yes, we'll be holding a hearing, hopefully, near the end of April.
Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I appreciate that very much. Returning to the Colombian situation, it's a very bad situation. It seems to me to get worse every day. They have a wide range of problems: drugs, corruption, armed insurgency, human rights violations, very weak civilian leadership in the government. Instability there affects regional stability; it affects drug production; and, as the kidnapping of the four U.S. citizens last week demonstrates, it affects the national security of our citizens. I think it's time for us to look at our counter-narcotics policy and to ask ourselves what our assistance to Colombia is accomplishing.
I have a number of questions. Among them are these: First is the question of effectiveness. Is our assistance leveraging tangible cooperation from Colombia to curb drug production? Is the U.S. certification policy, after four straight years of decertification, producing positive results?
Second is the question of end-use. Are we getting the kind of cooperation on end-use monitoring and respect for human rights that U.S. law requires?
Third is the question of sustainability. Is the Government of Colombia taking steps to curb corruption and provide sufficient resources to sustain an effective counter-narcotics program? Does the Government of Colombia have the personnel to use the assistance we have provided and are intending to provide?
Page 11 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
And, finally, is the question of who's dealing with whom. What are the connections between the guerrillas and the drug trade? What are the connections between paramilitary organizations and the drug trade? What are the connections between the government and the drug trade?
So I welcome our distinguished guests this afternoon. I look forward to their testimony and I want to explore with them some of these questions. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton. Any other Members seeking recognition?
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Yes, Ms. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. I wanted to welcome General Wilhelm to our Committee hearing. We are so fortunate and blessed in Miami to be the new home of South Com. It's a wonderful center. Along with my colleague, Congressman Lincoln Diaz-Balart, I had an opportunity to tour South Com just last week. Wonderful men and women who make up that center, of course, strategically located in Miami because that's the place where you can get the updated information about what is going on, especially in the Caribbean. We had a heated exchange, Lincoln and I, with the general about the new report that we expect to be coming out soon about whether Castro is or is not a threat to the United States. And, although we did not agree, I know that we do agree on the fact that drugs are a never-ending threat to our national security and we believe Castro's complicity is ever-present. We know that it's been a problem for Colombia as well, but no group of people have valiantly fought against drug traffickers as the Colombian people have. And we're very pleased to have South Com in our community. We're very honored to have General Wilhelm here. And there will be other times when we will agree more than we have these past few days and I welcome the free exchange of ideas. Welcome so much to our Committee, General.
Page 12 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen.
Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Burton.
Mr. BURTON. Yes, Mr. Chairman, in the other room we just met with the three wives of the New Tribe Missionaries who've been held captive down there for 5 years. And this past week four more Americans—I believe they were all Americans—were down there watching birds and were captured. And the guerrillas have sent out a memorandum which we're having translated right now, which indicates that any American that's down there, military or otherwise, is in jeopardy. And it sounds like the guerrillas have declared war on any American that's in that vicinity.
I hope the Administration and South Com will give some direction as to how we're going to deal with that. It may necessitate some direct involvement, if American lives are at risk, and whatever pressure needs to be exerted on the narco-guerrillas down there needs to be exerted. It's been going on for a long time and I've been told by my sources that the entire country is in jeopardy of being lost, the entire northern tier of South America could be lost to narco-guerrillas and traffickers and that would be horrible for the United States, not only the United States, but the entire hemisphere.
And so I just want to express my concern about the safety of Americans down there and I'd like for General Wilhelm, when he has the opportunity, to address what he thinks, and what the Administration thinks needs to be done to protect Americans down there and to stop the guerrillas from being able to impose this kind of penalty on anybody who's down in that area. Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Burton.
Before proceeding with Mr. Beers as our first witness, I'd like to recognize in the audience Gustavo Gallon, president of the Colombian Commission on Jurists. Welcome. Welcome, Mr. Gallon.
Page 13 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Our first witness is Mr. Rand Beers, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. Prior to his position at the Department of State, Mr. Beers served in the Marine Corps, the Foreign Service, and on the National Security Council. His experience working in the fields of international security, counterterrorism, and political military affairs make him a valuable witness for today's hearing. Mr. Beers, we look forward to your testimony. You may read the entire testimony or you may insert it in the record and summarize it, whichever you deem appropriate.
STATEMENT OF RAND BEERS, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS
Mr. BEERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Hamilton, other Members of Congress. I would ask that my statement be submitted to the record and I'd like to make some brief, oral presentation.
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, your statement will be made part of the record.
Mr. BEERS. Thank you, sir, and thank you, again, for the opportunity to appear before this body and talk about a subject of such importance—Colombia. And thank you and the Committee for your support over the years for the counter-narcotics program.
As you mentioned, I recently came to this job in December 1997. I was asked to take on this position after 10 years at the National Security Council, serving in three Administrations. As I took the job, several of my colleagues asked me what I thought was the greatest challenge and the greatest opportunity in this job. And, without a doubt, my answer was and remains Colombia as both the greatest challenge and the greatest opportunity.
Let me briefly explain. As you all know, over the course of the last year, we learned of the great success of our and the national efforts of both Bolivia and, especially, Peru in limiting the amount of cultivation in both of those countries, a change that was so dramatic that, over the entire Andean ridge, there was a reduction of 100 metric tons of cocaine being potentially produced in the course of the last year or a 15 percent reduction overall. That said, it is clear that the traffickers have made a strategic decision—thwarted in Peru—to move their production to Colombia. They have moved and expanded their production in Colombia so that, even despite a massive effort on the part of the Colombian National Police Air Wing to limit that cultivation, it still expanded by approximately 18 percent in the southern area of Colombia. This situation is compounded further, as you are well aware, by the growing nexus of cooperation between the insurgents and the narco-traffickers in protecting and transporting that cocaine throughout the country. With this situation, we are, if we do not do something about it, going to find ourselves in a much worse strategic situation in the years ahead.
Page 14 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Fortunately, there are several important advantages for the United States in Colombia. First, we have, as you have mentioned, a police agency within Colombia and leadership of that agency that is forcefully committed to taking the war on drugs to the narco-traffickers with a strong interdiction program. In addition, we have a Government of Colombia which is prepared to allow aerial eradication as a tool for extending this war against the traffickers. We have a military which is prepared to participate in this effort and we have an intelligence community which has now established itself into a useful and contributing member of the fight in the war on drugs.
Based on these considerations, I traveled to Colombia in February to discuss future cooperation and I talked with the CNP, with General Serrano, the Minister of Defense, the representatives of the military, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and with the Minister of Justice about what cooperation we could look to in the year ahead. And then I toured several of the field activities that the police and military are undertaking there. As a result of this effort, we, that is the United States and the Government of Colombia, we, Washington and the Country Team in Bogota, have developed a broad concept of operations for moving across the board against narco-trafficking.
This will involve an expanded intelligence collection effort, in cooperation between the United States and the Government of Colombia. It will involve an expanded interdiction campaign, both busting cocaine laboratories on the ground and going after narco-trafficking aircraft in the air in Southern Colombia. It will involve an expanded eradication program, both against opium poppy and coca, and it will involve expanded efforts to improve the justice situation in Colombia with respect to issues such as extradition, as well as money laundering and corruption.
We, the United States and the Government of Colombia, cannot cede Colombian territory, either air or ground to the traffickers and the insurgents. We must contest them in a broad-based effort, using our flexibility, our mobility, our technology, and sound management practices. We must be more effective than the traffickers are. I believe we're committed to this process. I believe we have a plan for this process, which I'm prepared to discuss in more detail.
Page 15 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
We need, essentially, to increase the operational tempo of our activities in Colombia. We have budgeted for Fiscal Year 1998 and notified to Congress a $30-million budget for Colombia. I am here today to tell you frankly that that is an inadequate budget for Colombia. We need a larger budget for Colombia. We need, at minimum, another $21 million to maintain the momentum to deal with the traffickers there; to maintain the level of eradication at 50,000 hectares, which is what we sprayed last year; to be able to go after both opium and coca in the field; and to expand our interdiction efforts.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Beers, let me interrupt you a moment. Have you made a request for those additional funds?
Mr. BEERS. I would like to come and see you and explain to you how we intend to do that. But let me start by saying, sir, that this expanded effort is constrained by the earmark for the Black Hawk helicopters, which you have placed into the record. As the Secretary explained to you earlier, there are other alternatives which we would like to discuss with you as well as how we can deal with this problem and accomplish both of our objectives—because we do share the objectives behind which you stood when you put forward this Black Hawk earmark. And, we do need your assistance in this process. The Administration cannot do it without the cooperation of the Congress. Let me end there and leave the floor to my colleague, or however you wish to proceed, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Beers appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Beers and we'll get to questions after both panels are finished.
Well, we will now hear testimony from General Charles Wilhelm, Commander-in-Chief of our U.S. Southern Command. Prior to his appointment, in September 1997, General Wilhelm served our nation as commander of the various forces in the U.S. Marine Corps and has received many decorations for his distinguished service. Having recently returned from Colombia, I'm certain that General Wilhelm will be able to offer us some keen insights. General Wilhelm, welcome to our Committee. You may proceed. You may put your full statement in the record or summarize, whichever you may deem appropriate.
Page 16 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
GENERAL CHARLES WILHELM, U.S. MARINE CORPS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
General WILHELM. I have a brief opening statement that I would like to make, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.
General WILHELM. Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you to discuss U.S. narcotics policy for Colombia and the current security situation in what I consider to be the most threatened country in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility.
The timing of this hearing could not be more appropriate. The events of the past month have brought into clear focus the growing strength of insurgent forces in Colombia and the inability of Colombian security forces to answer their challenges. The unfavorable outcome of the major engagement between the Colombian army and elements of the FARC southern front near LBR in the Caqueta department and the recent spate of kidnappings involving Americans are alarming indicators of just how badly the situation has deteriorated.
While the current tactical picture is bleak, I am encouraged by the recent policy decision to grant a national interest waiver to Colombia. This decision can open the doors for better, more comprehensive, and more effective security support to the security forces of Colombia as they attempt to regain the initiative. I have just returned from a visit to Colombia during which I discussed the current situation at length with our new Ambassador, Kirk Kamen, and spent considerable time with the commander of the armed forces, General Bonet, touring recent areas of conflict; surveying coca production in the southern departments; discussing planned operations and the intelligence, training, and equipment support needs of the armed forces.
As a prelude to your questions, I would like to provide the Committee my personal assessment of the current situation in Colombia and some of my thoughts about the approaches we should take to assist the Government of Colombia and its security forces in reasserting control and governance over the countryside. The problems confronting the Government of Colombia are numerous, complex, and, in many cases, they're intertwined. They are simultaneously confronted with an active, growing, and increasingly violent insurgency; an expanding narcotics industry; and brutal paramilitary organizations which are wrecking havoc on the civilian population.
Page 17 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
In combination, these elements have abridged governance in about 40 percent of the rural countryside, distorted and damaged the national economy, displaced significant portions of the population, and created security emergencies for each of the five countries with which Colombia shares a common border. Colombia is ill-prepared to effectively counter these threats, due in part to weak national leadership and an overloaded, often corrupt, judicial system and, in part, due to the ineffectiveness of its security forces.
Although senior officials of the Government of Colombia have sought to establish a peace process, few believe they're in a strong enough position to reach any acceptable accords. Thus far, the insurgents have rejected offers to begin a dialog and, at this point, I see little hope for a negotiated settlement. As the impasse continues, the Government of Colombia has little, if any, presence in large rural sections of the country; has been unable to bring economic and infrastructure development to these regions; and has not provided alternatives to coca and poppy cultivation. This lack of control has opened the door for the cultivation of illicit narcotics on a huge scale. In fact, recent surveys indicate that the vigorous eradication efforts in the Guayabero Department have been more than offset by new growth in the Putumayo and Caqueta regions. The performance of the Colombian military to date provides little cause for optimism that they will be able to reverse the erosion of government control over the outlying departments. To the contrary, the weak performance of the military gives the government little leverage in their attempts to reach a negotiated settlement with the insurgents. Absent incentives to negotiate, FARC and ELN spokesmen are becoming increasingly strident in their demands for the government to cede control of large areas where their fronts now hold the upper hand.
Having briefly defined the problem, I would now like to discuss some possible solutions. My focus will be on the military side of the equation. Our analysis of Colombian security forces is based on a review of their doctrine, their organization, training and equipment, and its adequacy to successfully counter the alliance of convenience between the narco-traffickers and insurgents. As we see it, the primary vulnerability of the Colombian armed forces is their inability to see threats, followed closely by their lack of competence in assessing and engaging them.
Page 18 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
In the near-term, intensified assistance and intelligence collection and analysis, commander control, operational-level planning, small unit training, and aviation maintenance can bring about a significant and positive change in the capabilities and performance of the Colombian security forces. For the mid-term, we will need to look at the physical capabilities of the forces themselves. During my recent visit, I received a needs assessment from our military group in Bogota and then I discussed this in some length with General Bonet. Based on their analysis, the combat deficiencies of the Colombian armed forces was primarily in southern areas. Mobility, direct attack capabilities, night operations, communications systems, intelligence systems, the ability to operate in rivers and coastal regions, and the ability to sustain their forces once committed. I am reviewing the assessment and, though I am not in full agreement with the priorities that have been assigned, I think they have correctly identified the deficiencies themselves.
For the long-term, we at U.S. South Com are working with Colombian military leaders to build a stronger base of professionalism within their armed forces and an enduring code of military ethics. We will achieve this through military-to-military contacts, the international military education and training program, small unit exchanges, battle staff training, and through Colombia's participation in joint and multilateral exercises.
In conclusion, as I look at the Andean Ridge, I see a study in contrast. On one hand, we have Peru, which has made steady and measurable progress against the dual threats of insurgencies and narco-trafficking. On the other, we have Colombia, which has not. My staff is completing a side-by-side analysis of the situations, past and present, in these two countries. We believe that the results will be useful and may provide a set of benchmarks which we and Colombia can use as we attempt to reverse the current stream of events. For now, we believe it imperative that whatever we do to assist Colombia not be at the expense of Peru and Bolivia, where things are going reasonably well for us.
Page 19 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Again, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the Committee and I look forward to your questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Beers. We have a few questions. I'm sure my colleagues have a few also.
Apparently, both of our witnesses believe that our own vital national interests are at stake in Colombia, especially from the illicit drugs down there, which are destroying a number of our young people in our communities here at home. If Colombian stability and our common effort in fighting drugs there is in our vital national interest and, as the Vice President has said, illicit drugs cost our nation over $67 billion in societal costs each year, what should spending be annually in Colombia to help the courageous people like General Serrano and others fight our fight? Mr. Beers.
Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir. That is a question which can be answered in two ways. First, while it is possible to postulate a very large budget in order to pursue activities within Colombia, we all are within the constraints of an overall U.S. budget that makes it particularly important that we manage and husband our resources adequately. We have, as I indicated to you at the beginning of this testimony, recalculated our current budget level for Colombia with the narcotics section in Colombia, and we believe that we can perform the mission of both maintaining and expanding the current program in Colombia with approximately $51 million for that section. Second, we have approximately $20 to $25 million which comes out of our Air Wing, which produces additional support for that Colombian program, and we have other programs in terms of training which amount to about $5 million.
So, what I'm telling you at this particular point, sir, is that, for what we believe is approximately $75 to $80 million, we can offer you a prudent, managed, but forceful, program in Colombia.
Chairman GILMAN. Well, Mr. Beers, how much are we spending, then, today in Colombia?
Page 20 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. BEERS. In Fiscal Year 1998 or 1997, sir?
Chairman GILMAN. The most current year, how much have we spent for the entire year?
Mr. BEERS. In the year to date, sir?
Chairman GILMAN. Yes. In the last year, which is a full year.
Mr. BEERS. I can give you a full fiscal year total for Fiscal Year 1997, which is the last complete fiscal year.
Chairman GILMAN. How much was that?
Mr. BEERS. We spent approximately $90 million during that fiscal year, sir.
Chairman GILMAN. For all of the FY 1997?
Mr. BEERS. And that included——
Chairman GILMAN. Is that for all of the counter-narcotics programs?
Mr. BEERS. That is for all of the counter-narcotics programs and that included $14 million in a 506 drawdown and that included about $20 million in pipeline FMF programs from prior years. So, while I tell you that that amount of money was about $90 million, I'm telling you that, out of those monies, approximately $35 million were extraordinary expenditures which came above and beyond the INL budget.
Chairman GILMAN. Do you know how much the FARC and ELN take in in 1 month from their support of the trafficking in drugs?
Mr. BEERS. The FARC, sir?
Chairman GILMAN. Yes.
Mr. BEERS. No, sir, we estimate that they receive approximately a third of their subvention from the narco-trafficking trade, and we estimate that in the tens of millions of dollars, sir, but I can't tell you a precise figure.
Page 21 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Chairman GILMAN. It's been estimated, I think by some of our intelligence people, that that's about $100 million in 1 month that the FARC and ELN receive from the drug trade and we're spending $90 million for the entire year in trying to combat this drug trade. It seems to me we're a little bit out of whack and I'm very concerned. When we were trying to find out why the State Department was withholding support for giving the CNP Black Hawk helicopters and some of the other equipment, we couldn't fathom what the resistance was. And now, in the Washington Post this past Saturday, March 28th—I'm reading from that article by Dana Priest, who said, ''Officials in the State Department, which had been cautious about increasing U.S. involvement in one of the world's most violent countries, are skeptical and recently opposed the transfer of three Black Hawk helicopters to the Colombia National Police,'' and the quote says, ''We are really not interested in getting sucked into this,'' said a State Department official.
Can you comment on that kind of a response?
Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir, I can. It's a total misquote. It couldn't possibly be correct because they have mixed counter-narcotics assistance with the question of assistance to the insurgency and there is no lack of support within the Administration or within the Department of State for assistance with respect to counter-narcotics for the Government of Colombia. We, the Administration, and you, the Congress, may have some differences or questions about what particular programs or what particular pieces of equipment might be the appropriate amount, but, with respect to the commitment to support the counter-narcotics effort in Colombia, there is no difference between the Administration and the Congress, sir.
Chairman GILMAN. Well, this comment was made in response to our request for the Black Hawk utility helicopters for the Colombian National Police. And I would hope that you would straighten out anyone in the State Department that feels that we shouldn't become involved in trying to do something about the narcotics trafficking from that country. We've long advocated getting the CNP some good Black Hawk utility helicopters to help do a better job on fighting drugs in Colombia. I've faced inexplicable State Department resistance to that effort and that's why we were concerned about that kind of a response.
Page 22 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
The newest American hostages, four taken by the narco-guerrillas last week, we understand are possibly being held in the San Juanito mountain area above 10,000 feet in the high Andes. Colombian police have no helicopters that can safely even attempt to rescue with enough armed troops in that high altitude. Can you tell us what plans, Mr. Beers, we have to help get our Americans out of there? We have some of the families today who are very much concerned. It's been 5 years that some of them have not had any information about their missing. I'd address that to both you and General Wilhelm if you can provide us with any information on what could be done.
Mr. BEERS. Let me begin and General Wilhelm can add, if he wishes to. Sir, with respect to the various hostages which have been taken, as you are aware, there are three hostages which are held who were members of the New Tribes Missionary program. With respect to those, while we have asked repeatedly of the Colombian Government for any information which they have, we still do not have any information with respect to their presence. We continue to ask for that information, and we are working with the Government of Colombia. With respect to the other hostage who has been held, while we, that is the U.S. Government, do not engage in negotiations for hostages, we are assisting the family in their own efforts to get back their loved one.
With respect to the new hostages who were taken over the course of the last 2 weeks, we do not, we do not, I repeat, have any information about where they are located, although we do have information that there have been discussions with them by various nongovernmental organizations who are seeking to gain their release. At this particular point in time, were there to be a location of those hostages and were we and the Government of Colombia to choose to proceed, it is my understanding that the Government of Colombia would probably use the military and would probably use the capabilities that the military have to deal with that problem, sir.
Page 23 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Chairman GILMAN. General Wilhelm, do you have some comments about the hostage situation?
General WILHELM. Yes, sir, I think your most direct reference was to the four hostages who've been loosely referred to as bird-watchers and the one U.S. property owner who was formerly an employee of one of the petrochemical companies in Colombia. I believe those were the ones to which you were making reference, sir.
I've been in contact throughout the weekend with Ambassador Kamen, and we've been following closely the discussions that have been taking place within the embassy with representatives from the Government of Colombia. We are prepared to provide advice and assistance as may be requested through the State Department and some other support, sir, that I cannot discuss in this hearing, but could talk with you afterwards.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, General. Let me ask both of you: What do you think now would be our best strategy to try to attack the drug production in Colombia and to try to assist those police and military who are trying their best to reduce the supply? What could be our best strategy in that area?
Mr. BEERS. Sir, I have spent the entire time since I have come to INL working on that very question and we have, I think, a strategy which we are in the process of trying to pursue. It involves, basically, four major elements which I alluded to earlier. First, it involves, as General Wilhelm would say, preparation of the battlefield through the use of expanded intelligence to locate targets of opportunity, both fixed and mobile that we can go after using the various elements of both the Colombian National Police and the military, if that's appropriate.
In addition to that, we foresee, in conjunction with DEA and the Colombian military and police, an expanded interdiction campaign which would go both after laboratories which our intelligence agencies working together can locate and after trafficking aircraft in southern Colombia which are flying from Peru and within Colombia, moving both cocaine base and cocaine hydrochloride in Colombia.
Page 24 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
In addition to that, we would like to take the eradication campaign, which we have been conducting—at a relatively stable rate—against opium poppy and expand it. We agree with you entirely that it is not sufficient to simply keep the opium poppy crops stable. We need to put a bigger dent in that because you're right, we can argue about the numbers of the amount of heroin on the street that's Colombian, but there's no question there's too much of it if there's any of it on the street in the United States. And, we want to eliminate that crop over the course of the next several years and by several, I mean three.
In addition to that, based on the fourfold expansion of our coca eradication effort in the course of the past year, we think we can do more; we think we can do better; and we think we can expand to areas that we haven't even gone after in the past year. If you look at the effort in the course of the last year when we sprayed 43,000 hectares of cocaine, that was a fourfold increase in our pilot effort. It was an eightfold increase in the number of hectares which were sprayed during the course of the last year. We know we can do better than that. We cut coca cultivation in the area which we sprayed by 25 percent last year. The traffickers planted new cocaine in areas that we did not spray, and we and the Colombian National Police want to go after those coca areas in the year ahead. We're in the process of making plans in order to do that.
In addition, but by no means last, we have a strategy to work with the current government and the next government in order to resolve our differences over extradition, over money laundering, and corruption. We believe that this is a program for the future of Colombia and the future of the United States, and we welcome your help and assistance in moving forward with it, sir.
Chairman GILMAN. Well, the Congress is prepared to help, Mr. Beers. We've been awaiting some significant request by the Administration. Your program sounds ambitious. I hope that you'll back it up with the kind of resources that are needed to implement that program.
Page 25 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
General Wilhelm, on March 12th you appeared before a committee hearing on oversight of U.S. regional counter-drug efforts by the Subcommittee on National Security. And, at that time, a question was asked of you, General: Could you give us an assessment of what the disruption in Colombia would mean to Panama, Ecuador, and Venezuela and the whole region? And you responded, as you may recall, about the five nations that share borders with Colombia. Would you like to repeat your assessment that you stated to the National Security Committee for us here today?
General WILHELM. Yes, sir, I'd be glad to. As I mentioned, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, in my opening statement, each of the five nations which shares a border with Colombia is being stained in one size, manner, shape or form by the situation that exists in that country right now. I would say in terms of direct involvement, Venezuela is probably feeling the pressure more than any other. No less than 12,000 of their troops are now arrayed along the border to prevent incursions by both narco-traffickers and paramilitaries across the border into Venezuela.
I would say the second-most hard pressed right now is probably Panama in the Southern Darien province. There has actually been a loss of life. While the narco-traffickers and insurgents have sought sanctuary in southern Panama, they've been pursued by paramilitaries who have then actually killed Panamanian citizens who they construed to be sympathizers with those that have crossed the border.
Ecuador has a relatively small commitment of forces along the border, but that's not because they do not place a lot of importance on the threat which the situation poses to them. Until their current dispute with Peru is ironed out, however, in the Amazon, that will command their first attention. And having talked to their military leaders, I'm very confident that that is, in fact, a very sincere appraisal from them.
Brazil, on the other hand, has really declared itself over the last year. There was a long period of denial in Brazil about having a narcotics problem. Now I think there's full and free acknowledgement that the pressure that we've put on the air bridge between Peru and Colombia and the effects of our ground-based radars have forced some of the trafficking over into Brazil, again, much of it leaking over from Colombia. There is concern about the effects of chemicals being dumped into the watershed of the Amazon. There are now indications that some cultivation has spread from Colombia into Brazil. So this is most definitely very much in the minds of the Brazilians.
Page 26 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Peru, on the other hand, has had a good run for the last year. I think we all appreciate that. A 27 percent net reduction in coca cultivation within Peru; last year alone, 45 percent over the last years. They are pretty much riding a favorable crest right now and I've probably less in terms of overall national anxiety from them.
Sir, a quick five-country rundown. That's the way I see and that's the way I've heard it.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, General Wilhelm. I've exceeded my time. Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Wilhelm, you're the commander-in-chief of the U.S. forces in this hemisphere. You've recently prepared a report to the Congress on the assessment of the Cuban threat to the United States. That's been in the press. I know this is a hearing on Colombia. I have some questions on Colombia.
[Laughter.]
But I wanted to get your judgment on that. Do you consider the Cuban military in its current form a threat to the national security of the United States?
General WILHELM. Sir, as I've stated previously, I do not consider the current Cuban armed forces to be a threat to the United States. I believe in the years since their client status with the Soviet Union has lapsed, that we've seen a very significant change in the quality and character of those armed forces. In terms of size, their active forces are about half of what they were in the decade of the 1980's. It's a force that can no longer project itself beyond the boundaries of Cuba. I have no indications that Cuba is fomenting instability elsewhere in the Western hemisphere. And, in fact, we have convincing evidence that as much as 70 percent of the effort of the existing forces is being expended on agricultural and other self-sustainment kinds of activities.
Mr. HAMILTON. So the trendline on the Cuban military is diminished in number, diminished in capability, not a threat to anybody beyond the Cuban borders; they can't project force.
Page 27 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
General WILHELM. That is my assessment, sir. It is a force that maintains internal order; it's no longer an offensive force.
Mr. HAMILTON. Turning to Colombia, I'm interested in the whole process of decertification and I'd just like to get your assessment of it. Is it working, I guess is my fundamental question. We've taken a peculiar sort of a way here. We've decertified Colombia for—what?—3 or 4 years now, whatever the time period is, but increased aid despite decertification. Now, of course, this year, I understand the President used the national interest waiver. But are we producing what we had hoped to produce by the decertification process or has it now become a hindrance to effective U.S. policy?
Mr. BEERS. Sir, you're correct in indicating that we have decertified Colombia over the last 4 years, but the first and the last year in that process was with a national interest waiver. We only decertified Colombia for two of those years fully.
Mr. HAMILTON. But aid goes up?
Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir. As you well know, the actual terms of the legislation are that aid, except for counter-narcotics assistance and some other humanitarian forms of assistance, are limited or voted against in the development banks. The aid profile which we have been talking about over the course of this timeframe is aid which we have indicated is for counter-narcotics purposes. In the irony of this situation——
Mr. HAMILTON. But what I'm really after here is does this process, now, help us or hurt us in the objectives that all of us share, here?
Mr. BEERS. Sir, I would argue that the basis which led us to the national interest waiver this year with respect to Colombia is a testament that the process has worked for the following reasons. Over the course of the last several years, we have stated unequivocally that we do not and have not had a problem with the performance of the Colombian National Police or those entities within the Colombian Government who were pursuing the traffickers directly as law enforcement officials. We have indicated that we have had some problems—some serious problems—with the senior levels of that government, and you're certainly aware of what those problems are.
Page 28 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. HAMILTON. You would like to see us continue this annual exercise of either certifying or decertifying Colombia and then waiving or not waiving on a year-by-year basis?
Mr. BEERS. Sir, it is my intention that, at this time next year, we will be talking about a fully certified Government of Colombia, that the United States and the Government of Colombia will have overcome their differences, that the new Presidency in Colombia——
Mr. HAMILTON. OK, you've got a lot of optimism there and I hope you're right about it.
[Laughter.]
Mr. BEERS. Sir, this is the reason that I took the job.
Mr. HAMILTON. I've got the picture, sir. I admire your dedication and your commitment and we want to be helpful in your achieving those objectives. Now, let's talk a little bit about that Colombian Government and whether or not they have the political will to deal with narco-trafficking.
You've used some very curious language in your statement. You talk about coordination with the Colombian National Police. You never talked about cooperation and coordination with the Colombian Government. It's a very curious way of stating things. Here we are dealing with the Colombian National Police. Now we know their record is good and I applaud that, but what's not clear to me is that the Colombian National Government has the political will to deal with the problem of narcotics trafficking. And I don't care how good our program is and how good you are, if you don't have the cooperation of the Colombian Government, you're not going to get the job done over a period of time.
I'm impressed by the fact that the Colombian military budget has been decreased by 30 percent. That doesn't impress me as a government that is serious about dealing with the problems of the guerrillas and the insurgents or the narco-traffickers.
Page 29 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. BEERS. Sir, with respect to the Government of Colombia, I spoke, as I indicated in my opening statement, not solely with the Colombian National Police nor with the Colombian military. I spoke to ministers of four departments while I was down there.
Mr. HAMILTON. I caught your statement, but I also caught your answers and your answers were in connection with the Colombian National Police.
Mr. BEERS. That is correct, sir, and that's why I'm returning to my original statement, lest I leave a misimpression with you. The certification this year was based on the clear, tangible effort of the Colombian National Police last year and the commitment of the current government to me during my meetings in Colombia in February for the rest of the administration of this government. We are talking and we will continue to talk with the next government. We're talking now with the candidates about continuing that program with the next government. So please don't misunderstand in the way that I answered the questions that we are not talking with the Colombian Government, that they haven't indicated that they're prepared to cooperate.
Mr. HAMILTON. And so I ask you the question: Do you think the Colombian Government has the political will today to fight an all-out effort against the narcotic traffickers?
Mr. BEERS. I think at this particular point in time they've indicated to me that they're prepared to do it. We have a change of government. We have to reaffirm that with the next government. But that is our process——
Mr. HAMILTON. You have no doubt in your mind about their political will to carry this fight?
Mr. BEERS. I have talked with members of the government with respect to the expanded program which I have described to you, and they have indicated to me their commitment to pursue that program.
Page 30 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. HAMILTON. Vigorously. Why are they cutting their defense budget 30 percent?
Mr. BEERS. Sir, I'm sorry, I can't speak to the issue of their defense budget. I was talking to them about their narcotics budget.
Mr. HAMILTON. Well, what does that tell you about—look, you heard the General a moment ago. He said they don't control a large part of the country. The insurgents, the guerrillas, are stronger today than they've been for a long time. This country's falling apart. It's coming apart. And they cut their budget 30 percent for defense. That doesn't make any sense to me at all; absolutely no sense. And I don't understand it.
Mr. BEERS. Sir, I can't disagree with you on that. I don't understand it either. If General Wilhelm has a comment on this?
General WILHELM. Sir, I think we see fractional commitment in Colombia. General Jose Serrano is sitting right over here. He's committed. General Jose Bonet is committed. I would tell you that I don't think the national leadership is. General Bonet took pen in hand and wrote a military strategy which is tied to nothing. There is no national strategy that states that it is an objective of the Government of Colombia to defeat the insurgency or narco-trafficking. He took the bull by the horns. Of course, when you write a military strategy that doesn't support a national strategy, you've got no resource hooks to hang anything on. So it's a nice philosophical document which contains some good ideas and I think it contains some good guidelines for the conduct of military forces and operations and I think it provides some good and solid rudder for how to establish and maintain good relationships with the civilian populace. I think the military and I think General Serrano and the CNP deserve better and I hope they'll have it after the elections this summer.
Mr. HAMILTON. I hope the State Department could learn something about the directness of an answer that you just gave me, General.
Page 31 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
[Laughter.]
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. HAMILTON. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I've got a lot more to say, but my time has expired.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Burton.
General WILHELM. Mr. Beers has a future and I don't.
[Laughter.]
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Burton.
[Laughter.]
Mr. BURTON. What are we doing to help get those hostages out of there?
Mr. BEERS. Sir, as I indicated earlier, we are in regular contact with the Government of Colombia to develop any information with respect to the location——
Mr. BURTON. Mr. Beers, Mr. Beers, we just heard very clearly that the Government of Colombia is not really all that sympathetic to taking on the FARC guerrillas down there and if that's who we're negotiating with, we're probably not going to get much accomplished. What are we doing outside of negotiating with this government that's as corrupt as you can get to try to get those people out of there if they're still alive and the ones that were just captured?
Mr. BEERS. Sir, in addition to talking to the Government of Colombia about this, we are also talking with intermediaries who may have some access to hostages in order to learn whether or not there is a way to locate and rescue those individuals, and we are using our intelligence assets to supplement that effort. Beyond that, sir, I can't go into any more detail. But that's the breadth of our effort.
Page 32 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. BURTON. Well, I'd just like to express my concern that it doesn't appear as though this government is really doing much. It just doesn't appear to be doing anything but talking.
Mr. BEERS. Sir, I've served in the counterterrorism area for many of the 10 years that I've spent on the National Security Council and I agree with you that trying to get hostages out of any situation is a tough and demanding task. But I have to assure you, sir, that it is not from a lack of effort of our Central Intelligence Agency or our State Department or our Defense Department to protect American citizens around the world.
Mr. BURTON. OK, well, General Serrano, as has been stated by General Wilhelm, is one of those people down there that's expending a lot of personnel; a lot of lives are being caught in firefights down there with the narco-guerrillas, with FARC guerrillas. In fact, we had one case where over 100 died, a helicopter was shot down. Just recently four FARC—four of General Serrano's men were butchered by the guerrillas. The ones that were butchered were butchered because the helicopter in which they were riding, the minigun, one of the few miniguns they had, misfired because it didn't have ammunition from the United States. It had ammunition from Portugal and possibly South Africa that was inferior. What are we doing to try to get adequate, good-quality ammunition down there so that they can have the kind of firepower that's necessary to protect their troops when they're in a firefight?
Mr. BEERS. Sir, we have an open FMF case that will run until it runs out in order to supply minigun ammunition to the Colombian National Police. There may have been an instance of procurement by the Colombian National Police of some other ammunition, but the case is there; it's open; and anytime there's any need for any ammunition, it simply needs to be ordered against that open case and we will move it down there as quickly as we can move it down there.
Mr. BURTON. So it wasn't because we wouldn't supply it, it was simply——
Page 33 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. BEERS. No, sir. It was not because we wouldn't supply it.
Mr. BURTON. All right, what about the miniguns? We have been trying to get additional miniguns down there. The chairman of the Committee and myself were—what, a year and a half now? And every time we talk——
Chairman GILMAN. It's been 2 years.
Mr. BURTON. And every time we talk to the State Department about the Black Hawk helicopters or the miniguns they always say, Yeah, well, we're getting them down there. They're going to go. And they never get there. And regarding the Black Hawk helicopters, you indicated a while ago that you had some concern about the funding. There was $16 million. We upped the budget request by $16 million and then we took $25 million out of the Bosnia authorization for those Black Hawks. So the money should be there for those three Black Hawks. It doesn't need any additional funding. And the miniguns should get down there. I mean the weapons that they're using on the side of those—you were shot at, I understand, just recently when you were down there in a Huey and the weapons that they have on the side of those Hueys—and I've been in them myself—are not nearly as accurate as the miniguns. Why in the world wouldn't we want the miniguns down there to work so that we can be effective in those firefights with the guerrillas? And, also, why aren't we going to get the Black Hawks down there?
Mr. BEERS. Sir, I was not shot at in a helicopter. There were helicopters that were shot at, but please don't, don't——
Mr. BURTON. Well, I'm happy for you.
Mr. BEERS. I served in Vietnam. I'm not trying to take credit for having been in a firefight, sir.
Mr. BURTON. OK.
Mr. BEERS. That's all. With respect to the miniguns, let me tell you I have been wringing the neck of my staff since I determined that this problem existed, and I am no happier with this situation than you are. But let me tell you what we're doing and what we intend to do in order to solve that problem. First of all, we have opened an FMF case to repair the 15 miniguns that were in the Colombian National Police fleet. We have repaired, unfortunately, only six of them. We have located in the last month the parts which are being ordered now, to repair the remaining nine.
Page 34 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
In addition to that, because we were not satisfied with the fact that procuring these parts for obsolete miniguns was becoming such a problem, INL transferred some money to the Defense Department and ordered ten new miniguns in November, approximately, of 1997. To date, four of those miniguns—excuse me, to date, four of those miniguns have been delivered and mounted on Air Wing aircraft. We expect to receive another six.
I was told on Monday that it would be Monday or Tuesday. I come down here having called just before I got here, and I can't report to you that they are yet delivered. But let me tell you, sir, we will take those six miniguns that belong to the INL Air Wing and we will make a decision, consulting our lawyers to make sure that we are complying with the law, and we will put those miniguns on the CNP helicopters if that is the highest priority. I won't ask pilots for INL to fly, without adequate protection. And I am committed to that, and I am not satisfied with where we are. And I intend to be able to report to you in the next 30 days exactly what the disposition of those weapons is.
Mr. BURTON. One last question, Mr. Chairman, I see my time has run out and I guess you have addressed the Black Hawk helicopter question earlier. I hope you'll keep that in mind because there are a number of us that are still concerned about getting those three additional helicopters down, as you know, because of the legislative action we've taken.
We've heard that there are Russian advisers in Colombia—and this is a question for General Wilhelm—and they're assisting the FARC in training. Is it possible there are former KGB or Russian military now there in Colombia disguised as businessmen or maintenance personnel with the MI 17 helicopters sold to the Colombians and acting in the capacity as advisers to the FARC guerrillas?
General WILHELM. Sir, there are certainly technicians from Russia who are there to assist with the maintenance of the MI–17's that the Colombians bought. The only thing that I've heard about advisers or anyone who has direct involvement with any of the insurgents or the narco-traffickers has only been rumor and hearsay. I've seen no responsible intelligence reporting that would lead me to believe that's correct.
Page 35 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. BURTON. Well, since that is a concern, I hope that the DEA and the CIA will use their resources to find out if that's true because we're assisting Russia a great deal with economic support and every other kind of support right now and we certainly don't want Russian military people down there helping the Communists—or the narco-guerrillas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Burton. Mr. Menendez.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I have a statement for the record I'd like to include.
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Menendez appears in the appendix.]
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, I came here to talk about Colombia, but since my dear colleague and friend Mr. Hamilton raised some questions about the Cuba DOD report, let me very briefly ask the General three quick questions. No. 1, General, is it fair to say that the reduction of the Cuban military, which you now described as defensive and not offensive, is primarily based upon the lack of monies from what was the Soviet Union and economic need?
General WILHELM. I think that's a fair statement, sir.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Is it fair to say, beyond the report, because I haven't seen the report yet—it seems the Miami Herald has the only confidential report that the Secretary of Defense is supposed to have, before Members of Congress have it. Is it fair to say that that statement of the Miami Herald said that Cuba does not have the opportunity or the ability to have forward projection of biological and chemical weapons, but it does not say that it does not have the capability of producing biological and chemical weapons?
General WILHELM. See if I can—I hope I got the question right.
Page 36 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. MENENDEZ. The report says that they don't have the capability of projecting——
General WILHELM. OK, I think I know what they're trying to get at.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Now the question is: Is the report also saying they do not have biological and chemical weapons ability?
General WILHELM. I think the indications that we've received is they do have the capability to produce those kinds of substances, but they have not weaponized them.
Mr. MENENDEZ. They have not weaponized them. So if I produce a defector to the United States that says to the contrary, the DOD will consider that in their report as an amendment?
General WILHELM. I'm sorry, sir, would you please repeat that?
Mr. MENENDEZ. If I produce someone who worked at the biological and chemical weapons stations in Cuba and that person is proven to be credible and tells you that they have, in fact, created biological and chemical weapons—not with missile projection ability—the DOD will consider that individual testimony?
General WILHELM. Sir, I don't know who they would report that kind of information to. You know, I would just offer an observation. Any nation with a pharmaceutical industry—and Cuba certainly has that—can engage in the production of biological agents or chemical agents.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Well, the suggestion, however, is that, I think is that there's a difference between missile projection ability and not having the ability to perform biological and chemical weapons. And that's what I wanted to clarify with you. Last, is it fair to say that the shoot down of U.S. citizens in international air space would be considered an offensive act?
Page 37 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
General WILHELM. I would say that it was.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, General. Now, Mr. Beers, let me ask you a question. While this testimony of the hearing has been focused on our counter-narcotics policy, I'd like to ask you to speak, if you can, to what I think is a very important element of the counter-narcotics policy which is the forthcoming Presidential elections in Colombia, the impact of corruption, the extent to which threats will affect voter turnout, and, ultimately, whether it's possible to hold a fair and free election in Colombia. And the reason I ask you that is based upon your testimony here where you say, and I quote, ''We are nearing completion of a new ambitious strategy to attack narcotics trafficking in Colombia on all fronts. To implement it, we will need the active cooperation of the Colombian Government, both for the remainder of the Samper Administration and after the inauguration of a new President in August.''
And I heard Mr. Hamilton's comments, which I am equally concerned about. In the municipal elections last year and the legislative elections earlier this month, the FARC and the ELN narco-guerrillas successfully, in my view, asserted themselves, intimidating and murdering candidates who were not affiliated with their movements; 1,200 candidates dropped out of the municipal elections for fear of their lives. In the March legislative elections, 15 people were killed on election day and the campaign has had allegations of drug contributions as well as allegations of massive voter fraud in the context of registrations.
What I want to know from you: Is it possible, under this present set of circumstances, to hold an election upon which we are going to base our relationship with the Government of Colombia, I'm not taking about General Serrano who I've met and who I've visited and who I have—flew on helicopters on. I have the greatest respect for him. But for the Government of Colombia, can we have a Presidential election that in fact can be free and fair and for which we can put our policy considerations and decisionmaking with. Do you believe that this election provides that opportunity?
Page 38 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. BEERS. Sir, with respect to the municipal elections last fall and the elections this spring, I believe that the turnout figures were relatively normal for a Colombian election, which is not to say that the traffickers didn't seek to thwart that election; didn't seek to intimidate candidates; didn't bring violence to the election place and on election day. But I think, with respect to the elections themselves, we judged those that are past to have been free and relatively fair. That is not to say that there wasn't corruption from the traffickers as well as that. And we're not entirely happy with every individual result or in the individually elected candidate.
With respect to the elections that still are to come this year, with respect to the first round of the Presidential elections and the second round, if that is necessary, the Colombian Government, as I understand it, as I have talked to them, and General Wilhelm can add his own comments to this, are committed to protecting the Colombian people with respect to that election. And until that actually occurs, we can make, I think, a reasonable assumption based on elections to date in the course of the last year that they stand a reasonable chance of being able to protect those elections.
Now are they going to be perfect? No. They're not going to be perfect elections. There probably isn't an election anywhere in the world that's entirely perfect. But I think that we have here a reasonable expectation that it will be, and we have a reasonable expectation that the government that comes to power in August will be a fair and freely elected government, and we intend to do everything in our power to make sure that it's a government that we can work with.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Well, just as a final follow-up, in 1,200 municipal candidates—you know, an election is also about what you get to vote for. It's not only something to vote for, but someone to vote. When 1,500 candidates get out of an election because of what is happening; when people die on election day, when thousands of Colombian citizens are prevented from registering to vote—we can have an election. Fidel Castro just had an election. Now, I hope you're not going to tell me that that is an appropriate election as well. So there are elections and there are elections.
Page 39 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
And the question is that, for the United States and its national security interests and its national interests, in the context of dealing with resources and intelligence which puts the lives of Americans at risk, along with the lives of Colombians at risk who have done it with great courage, I am concerned that we are having an election process which we are not paying attention to in the context of having a fair and free election. And at the end of the day, that we can say we had an election in Colombia, but what we really have is not an election based upon the fundamental principles that not we, the United States, but the international community would accept.
I am concerned about what is happening with the narco-guerrillas in the context of the intimidation that they are generating in this election, with the lack of Colombian citizens able to register to vote, and with other questions of drug money in the context of this election and, to me, that will undermine all of our efforts. It will undermine machine guns; it will undermine Black Hawk helicopters, because, as Mr. Hamilton says, what you need is the national will, through its leadership, to help General Serrano and others who are beyond that type of reproach, to make a difference.
And I hope that we are serving observers. I hope that we are doing it before election day and looking at the registration process so that we can make a decision as to whether the next government that is elected in Colombia is one that we are truly worthy of making the type of very important and sensitive decisions on behalf of the United States with.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Menendez. Mr. Ballenger.
Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Beers, I'm reading your poop sheet here and it says that you've been in this job since January?
Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir.
Mr. BALLENGER. And I heard you say, I think, you volunteered for the job?
Page 40 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. BEERS. I was asked, but I took it willingly, sir.
Mr. BALLENGER. You didn't turn it down, in other words.
[Laughter.]
Considering the past record of what seems to have been occurring as far as our own government is concerned, I'm just curious—in other words, I hope you're not sticking your neck out with nobody behind you. I mean, you've got the general there and the South Com, but the support that you might be able to get from here in Washington, DC—I'll be frank with you, this Committee's with you. We'll do anything you would like. But I'm afraid that past history has shown our Administration doesn't really push very hard as far as getting something done. I mean, we decertify very easily—it showed that we didn't like their politics, but it didn't do anything great as far as accomplishing a great deal as far as this drug war's concerned. But somebody somewhere made a commitment to you, I hope.
Mr. BEERS. Sir, I took the job, came to office, within 2 weeks, we held a senior-level meeting at which I put my first proposal on the table. I was approved to go to Colombia in order to talk about that proposal with the Colombian Government. I came back from Colombia. I debriefed that same senior committee. I have circulated my draft strategy within the Administration. No one in the Administration is opposed to my proposal. I believe that I have the backing of the Administration for this expanded effort against Colombia. If I don't have the backing of this government, then I'm not going to be able to do what I said I'm trying to do and that's my basic purpose for being in this job, sir.
Mr. BALLENGER. Well, I understand that and I recognize—somebody made the statement that sending our people into dangerous areas, we didn't seem to worry a great deal about Bosnia and I would have considered, as far as the safety and health of the American people, this is much worse than Bosnia. Do you have any idea how many American citizens there are in Colombia now?
Page 41 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. BEERS. No, sir, I can't answer that question. I can only tell you about official presence at this point in time, which is roughly 400-plus people.
Mr. BALLENGER. But there's an oil—Occidental Petroleum——
Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir.
Mr. BALLENGER. —and all those boys are there and they——
Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir, there is a larger presence. I just don't have that figure, sir.
Mr. BALLENGER. So there are substantial numbers of American citizens there and our government made a wild commitment to Bosnia and we just passed a bill—I don't know how much of it's for Bosnia, maybe $1 billion for a peace effort there. So I hope that somebody somewhere up there is particularly desirous of somehow doing the proper thing.
Am I mistaken? I understand—I know everybody talks Black Hawks, Black Hawks, Black Hawks, but did you all not sign a contract on Super Hueys?
Mr. BEERS. We did, sir. What we actually did, sir, was we appended our buy to an existing DOD contract in order to get the best price for the Super Hueys. We did that in the middle of this month. I am fully committed to that program. I know there have been some problems with that program before, but I intend to see it through. I've talked to General Serrano about this, and we will get those helicopters refurbished as quickly as it is possible to do so.
Mr. BALLENGER. When you were there, did you have the opportunity to see—the repair-maintenance crew for the Air Force, I guess it was, had done, had built a Super Huey down there. It was the first or second one.
Page 42 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir. I did not see that repair facility, but I am aware and we are working with the Colombian Government to see if some of that work can be produced in Colombia with the Colombian National Police, since we are aware of that capability. But our first commitment is to delivery of those helicopters and the best possible product, so we will work multiple strands in order to do that as effectively and quickly as possible.
Mr. BALLENGER. I'd like to ask the General, in a situation where we have American citizens kidnapped in a very dangerous area, what has been our past reaction when things like that occur? It would seem to me we shot up a little island in the Caribbean under Bush because some students that weren't even hurt; they were threatened to be in danger and we blew that little island apart, and I'm not sure whether we did that in Panama or not, but we seem to have reacted, maybe I should say—excuse me, if I may be political—under Republican effort rather than the peaceful effort of the Democrats, but what is the normal reaction that you have in a situation like that?
General WILHELM. Sir, in a situation like the one that we have in Colombia right now, our point of contact, the place where we go for request for assistance is to the Ambassador and the country team. That immediately becomes a policy issue, because the criminal act of kidnapping in Colombia is still something that the Colombian authorities exercise jurisdiction over and responsibility for. Now there are support measures that are available from the armed forces. To provide them requires a policy decision. Are we prepared to do it? Yes, we are.
Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Beers, one more thing. I was down there back at Christmas time, a little before Christmas, and there was a big to-do—and I think this is all of Central America and you've probably been in long enough to know that most Central American countries don't want to have the Big Daddy up north tell them what to do. But we were pretty well strongly talking about extradition of criminals into this country, people that would commit crimes in this country and had gone back to Colombia and, at that time, we were told that there would be a likelihood that an extradition would be done. I just remember hearing over and over again, Well, it's going to happen; it's going to happen. Has it ever occurred yet?
Page 43 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. BEERS. An extradition from Colombia, sir? I'm not aware of one actually having happened. The current terms of the constitutional amendment are such that a case has to have occurred after that amendment was passed in December, under the current terms. Now, there is a challenge in the court to the way in which the nonretroactivity clause of that amendment was put into the constitutional amendment and it may well be that the court removes the nonretroactivity clause and then we could request extradition of a Colombian who had committed a crime prior to that time in December when the law was passed. But the current way the law is written, we cannot do that. We expect to hear from the Colombian courts during the course of April, I believe, is when the Ambassador told me that process would normally have run its course.
Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry I ran over and I thank you kindly.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ballenger. Mr. Blunt.
Mr. BLUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know we're all anxious to get onto another panel, but I have a couple of questions. General Wilhelm, it seems to me that clearly the key to this is helping Colombia not doing anything at the expense, as I think you said in your testimony, of the other countries, of Bolivia and Peru. How do we ensure, first of all, that we don't actually take money from them and see it go to Colombia?
And, second, is there some potential that if we do solve part of this problem in Colombia, with more money to Colombia, that that in fact puts more stress on Bolivia and Peru and we need to also be spending more money to help them because we're creating a problem for them as we push the drug business out of Colombia into the places of less resistance?
General WILHELM. Yes, sir. Really you just articulated the case that I try to make and that is that, right now, we're talking about this problem in a regional context. In truth, it's a hemispheric problem, as we all know, and it extends all the way from North America, from Canada, to Tierra del Fuego, if you look at who's making it and who's using it. Right now we're focused on the Andean Ridge, which we call the source zone, and, again, to deduct assets from the successful programs in Peru and Bolivia to really bail out our activities in Colombia might leave us with three problems instead of one. Recognizing that none of us can print money, what I'm saying is that if more money is required for Colombia, then the effort in all three countries needs to be plussed-up. We simply need to raise the bar.
Page 44 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Again, there's a lot of pessimism that I find, particularly in Washington and I guess I understand why. But, you know, Peru has had an aggressive strategy: strong national leadership, really a three-point program based on interdiction, eradication, and alternative development. The Vice-President of Bolivia was in town about a month ago and he articulated a four-point strategy designed to really eliminate coca production in Bolivia over the next 5 years. It had the same three components as the Peruvian strategy, but it added one of education to reduce the use factor in Bolivia. So my concern is that, again, we mortgage two successes to bail out one country that is not going in the direction that we all want it to go, including, obviously, our Colombian friends.
Now if we solve Colombia, do I think that the problem is then going to immediately worsen in Peru and Bolivia? The answer is no, sir, I don't think it will. I think both of those countries have strong strategies that are succeeding on their own rights and I don't see a displacement of the insurgents nor the narco-traffickers into either of those countries. If we can stay the course and sustain good, sound, robust programs in all three countries, we are going to be making headway.
Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Beers, in that regard, what kind of assistance are we providing in Bolivia and Peru right now?
Mr. BEERS. With respect to both Bolivia and Peru, sir, based on the requirement to notify Congress with respect to what we were doing with this fiscal year's budget, both of those programs are underfunded. The Bolivian program is underfunded dramatically below the request level which we had. We had requested originally $45 million. We have it funded currently, until we resolve the Black Hawk issue, at $14 million. With respect to the Peruvian program, we have it funded at $31, we had requested $40. We would like to work on a proposal to restore those programs to their request levels, and we expect to have a proposal to this Committee and other Members of Congress for that in the very near future.
Page 45 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. BLUNT. You know, we're talking today about helicopters and relative helicopter cost and those are, obviously, serious things, but you know that your agency—I think it was September the 11th, 1996—in this room, before this Committee said they were going to get a dozen Huey IIs to Colombia, and none have been delivered. This is the last day of March 1998—so it's 18 months later. You know, if the agency had done what they told the Committee they were going to do 18 months ago, the Committee, in all likelihood would have had a different view of the helicopter issue and the Black Hawk issue. Why has it taken that long to get that, to get nothing done?
Mr. BEERS. Sir, I appreciate your comment. I understand your frustration. I am certainly committed to the Super Huey program. The circumstances which led to the inability to produce the contract for the Super Hueys had to do with a number of budgetary problems that the bureau experienced during that time. I'm afraid I can't tell you in great detail what those were. I wasn't here. But I can tell you that I'm committed at this point to making that Super Huey program work, and not just this Fiscal Year, but in several years ahead. The original, or this year's, buy that we have programmed is only the first of several years of this program. I've spoken with a company. They are aware of my intentions and I'm committed to making this program work.
Mr. BLUNT. Well, I think there's been a long gap of leadership in the agency and maybe that's, then, part of why there's been no followup on these commitments. But certainly the commitments made before the Committee, hopefully, would be made with some correlation with whether it was possible to get that done or not and I hope your commitments today are made in that regard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Blunt. Just one or two quick questions. Mr. Beers, how can we expand operations when the Hueys are dead, grounded, and can't be flown—just this week we learned that they were taken out of operation—it may be 6 months to a year before they can be put back in operation. Only 7 of the 36 Hueys delivered to the CNP are operating today. It certainly stretches credibility and, as Mr. Blunt noted, I have a letter dated October 10, 1996, from Barbara Larkin, the Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, saying, ''As you noted, the 12 UH–1H helicopters for the CNP have been included in the Fiscal Year 1996 drawdown, notified by the President as of September 14th and, as you know, it's our intention to convert a number of UH–1H helicopters to the so-called Super Huey configuration for the CNP.'' This is October 1996 and not one of those upgraded Hueys has been delivered yet.
Page 46 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Chairman, could I put this letter into the record?
Chairman GILMAN. Yes, by all means, the letter of October 10th, 1996 directed to the Chairman of this Committee by Barbara Larkin will be made part of the record.
[The letter appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Beers, you've indicated you're going to give attention to this, but from October 1996 and here we are in 1998, not one of these Hueys has actually been worked on yet. I would hope that there's going to be some better attention to a war that's going on down there. And we're sitting back saying, Well, we'll get it and try to provide them with something up the road.
Mr. BEERS. Sir, that Fiscal Year 1997 letter——
Chairman GILMAN. 1996 letter.
Mr. BEERS. Sir, Fiscal Year 1997 was when the letter was written.
Chairman GILMAN. October 10th, 1996.
Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir. I'm simply making a point that we were talking about Fiscal Year 1997 money. That's all, sir. I don't mean to contradict you.
Chairman GILMAN. But the money was there. There was no problem——
Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir, I'm not disagreeing with you. I'm simply——
Chairman GILMAN. It was a 1996 drawdown——
Mr. BEERS. It was a 1997 line item that was not spent. That's what——
Chairman GILMAN. If I might interrupt you, as you noted—and this is the letter, 12 UH–1H helicopters for the CNP have been included in the Fiscal Year 1996, Section 506, aid to drawdown, notified by the President on September 14th. And we're talking about 1996.
Page 47 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir. Yes sir. That's correct and the program for the refurbishment was a Fiscal Year 1997 program. That's the only point I'm trying to make, sir. I'm not disagreeing with you about the time. I'm simply making the point that the money that was in the budget that was not spent—I'm not disagreeing with you, it was not spent—it was Fiscal Year 1997 that was in the program budget.
Chairman GILMAN. Why wasn't it?
Mr. BEERS. And it was not spent because other program priorities, as determined by the leadership at that time, made the determination to spend the money in the area of operations in Colombia to expand the eradication effort in Colombia in order to be able, at the end of the year, to produce basically the results that we're talking about here, which were 50,000 hectares of coca and opium poppy that were sprayed in Fiscal Year 1997.
Now I understand your concern about the Hueys and, as I've indicated to you, in this fiscal year, with the money that I am Acting Secretary and in charge of, we have produced that contract, and we are committed to completing that program and we will do it again the following year, if I am in charge of the bureau or if I am still the principal deputy at that time, and I have no reason to believe that I won't be one or the other of those positions at this time.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Beers, has that contract been let now?
Mr. BEERS. Yes, yes, sir, that's what I'm telling you.
Chairman GILMAN. Who is the contractor?
Mr. BEERS. We have two pieces of that contract, sir. We have a piece of that contract with U.S. Helicopter for the refurbishment of five and we have a contract for an additional five kits with Bell Helicopter, who provide the input for that. The reason that I am not at this point in time able to tell you who the final contractor for assembly is, one, we have some time in order to make that decision and, two, we're investigating with the Government of Colombia as to whether or not some of that work will, in fact, be done by the Colombian Government.
Page 48 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Chairman GILMAN. You talked about two contracts for five units——
Mr. BEERS. That's correct. That is what the contract was let for, yes, sir.
Chairman GILMAN. What happened to the 12 we were talking about upgrading?
Mr. BEERS. At this point in time, sir, the contract is for 10; that's what $14 million buys.
Chairman GILMAN. The letter I received from your department, from the Department of State, said 12 UH–1H helicopters for the CNP have been included in the Fiscal Year drawdown, notified by the President as of September. What happened to the other two?
Mr. BEERS. Those helicopters are either in the Air Wing in Florida or they're already in Colombia. Those were the helicopters that were to be refurbished, sir. We have some of those retained at the Air Wing in Florida and the rest of them have gone down to Colombia.
Chairman GILMAN. Are those the used Vietnam-type helicopters?
Mr. BEERS. Those are UH–1H Vietnam era aircraft. Yes, sir.
Chairman GILMAN. Are these the ones that have been grounded this past week?
Mr. BEERS. Yes, they are, sir, and the terms of the grounding, as we understand it, are that the engines have raised a concern with respect to the vibration of the engine leading to some form of metal fatigue. There is a test, which the army has and for which we also have the diagnostic equipment, which we are undertaking with respect to our own and with respect to the Colombian helicopters, to determine whether or not they are encompassed by the grounding or whether or not they are believed to be safe. We will, as vigorously as we can, as quickly as we can, as we learn fully what the Army grounding order intends, determine whether or not the helicopters in our and the Colombian fleet should be grounded. We don't know the answer to that yet, sir.
Page 49 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Chairman GILMAN. I'm reading a Washington Times article, March 30th this year, that the National Guard and the Army have grounded their fleets of UH–1 Huey helicopters, which have an unexplained history of potentially catastrophic mechanical problems. And this is the kind of equipment that we delivered to the Colombian police who are trying to do a job and we can't get them the Black Hawk utility helicopters that they need and now we—you're telling us that the 12 Super Hueys that they wanted will probably not be available for quite a period of time. Is that correct?
Mr. BEERS. We do not expect the Super Huey helicopters to be available before the end of this calendar year.
Chairman GILMAN. When do you expect them to be available?
Mr. BEERS. The first kits out of Bell are available in October at a rate of two per month. They will be refurbished in 60 to 90 days from the delivery of the kit, roughly. And so if the first two kits come in October, we expect to have the first two refurbished Hueys in the beginning of calendar year 1999, with two per month following until that original contract is extended. By that time, we will also have the next contract online. So we will continue that effort.
Chairman GILMAN. So it could be a year from now before they finally get the kind of helicopters they need?
Mr. BEERS. That's correct, sir.
Chairman GILMAN. We promised them in 1996.
Mr. BEERS. That's correct, sir.
Chairman GILMAN. I think that's a pretty sad situation when we recognize how critical the problem is in that there's a war going on. I sure would hope that in any time of emergency we're going to do better for our own troops than we're doing for the Colombian people who are left out there hanging without the kind of equipment they need. I guess my time is up and I'm going to ask Mr. Ballenger if he'd take over for a few minutes. I have a meeting in the side room. Mr. Ballenger.
Page 50 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Chairman BALLENGER. [presiding] Yes.
Mr. MICA. Now?
Chairman BALLENGER. Yes. Fire away.
Mr. MICA. Thank you for recognizing me. I'm not a member of this Committee, but I am a member of the National Security International Affairs Subcommittee and the General has testified before us. I haven't had the opportunity to deal much with you, Mr. Beers, but we have been investigating this since our side took over the Congress in 1995. We've held 40 hearings. We have begged, pleaded, asked, demanded, done everything we can to get the equipment to Colombia to General Serrano and others. Not just helicopters, but all the other array of equipment. We've had every excuse; we've had every delay; we've had every blocking of this.
It is the intention of this panel, I believe, our Subcommittee, the leadership of the House of Representatives to get this equipment there. If we have to do it piece by piece, in resolutions before the House; if we have to haul people in and charge them with whatever we can charge them for not obeying a direct law and request of Congress, we will do whatever measure we need to do. This stuff is coming into the country in incredible quantities. We saw charts behind closed doors and open doors of what's taking place. And Colombia is a disaster; we've helped them get in that situation. That's not a question, it's a statement of fact and it's a statement of action. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to join your Committee. Thank you.
Chairman BALLENGER. All right. Let me thank you gentlemen for coming here. I think we want to start the next panel. It's sad we have a vote coming up, but, Mr. Beers, you seem maybe too tough to be able to stick on your job, but I hope like the dickens you do stay there and that, if you need some help with your appointment on the Senate side, we'd be glad to put somebody in your position that really kicks some tail. And, General, we greatly appreciate your service and anything we can do to help you, let us know. And with that, we thank you and we call the next panel.
Page 51 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. BEERS. Thank you, sir, for the opportunity to appear before this body.
General WILHELM. Thank you sir.
Chairman BALLENGER. You know, if possible, we'd like to be able to call the next panel in and start the question—considering those ladies have waited a long time. The longer we spend here the longer they'll be sitting there.
If we may break up the conversations. We're honored today to have as our second panel, General Jose Serrano, Director General of the Colombian National Police. General Serrano has served in the Colombian National Police for 39 years. He has commanded respect throughout the world as the man who dismantled some of the most notorious drug cartels. Currently, General Serrano is battling the FARC and the ELN narco-guerrilla organizations throughout Colombia. And we are pleased you have come all this way to be with us today, General Serrano. We look forward to your testimony.
If we may, General Serrano, could we postpone the beginning of your testimony for—it'll take us about 5 or 7 minutes to go over and vote and we'll be right back. So you can relax.
[Recess.]
Chairman BALLENGER. General—if you can just tell him we're sorry we had two votes instead of one and that took an extra 10 minutes. So, if we may, you can go ahead with your testimony, please, General.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOSE SERRANO, DIRECTOR GENERAL, COLOMBIAN NATIONAL POLICE; ACCOMPANIED BY CAPTAIN BUITRAGO, COLOMBIAN NATIONAL POLICE
General SERRANO. [Speaking through an interpreter] Thank you very much. I want to give my gratitude sincerely to the President of this commission. And, first of all, I'd like to tell you about the fine fly down of the support and, second, to understand what is the problem in Colombia because it's very complex and very difficult right now. I come to you today, as we continue with the compromise to the fight against the narco-traffickers. Of course, the problem of this phenomena is very complex, but we continue it. And we are very concerned right now with the alliance with the guerrilla and narco-traffickers.
Page 52 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Today, the guerrillas in Colombia receive much support through narco-traffickers. For example, they attacked last week the members of DANTI when those agents tried to destroy their clandestine roadway. The guerrillas destroyed one helicopter, killed one policeman, and this moment we have five policemen missing. And this is the best proof to confirm that the guerrillas have a nexus with the narco-traffickers. And now, for this reason, this is a through war. And one war on the Colombian National Police lost more than 4,000 policeman. We find also in the war against marijuana and, after today, a coca war and now the heroin war. And this establishes concern that we continue to fight; we try to break this criminal network.
We are very glad to receive support today from this Committee and the U.S. Government through the N.A.S. Office from the State Department. And the helicopters we try to obtain are very necessary for our duty. We need two helicopters to take more capacity for our reach. The reason is the altitude of the poppy crops and also the increase of the coca cultivation in the far-away regions and this moment we turn operator.
For this reason, we propose of the Colombian Government to consider it to approve a new herbicide. This herbicide is not liquid—it is granular, and its name is tibuteron. If we use tibuteron, we can fumigate more hectares of coca. And also we put a very strong effort to give the new orientation of the police. And this moment we have more than 100,000 men. And also in one process, against the corruption, we fight at 7,000 men, policemen since I took the direction of CNP in December 1994. And this means clear action, clear operation, for my policemen. With this operation we intend to stop the narco-traffickers trends. Also the Colombian fiscal year put a big effort to give application of the new laws recently approved like a forfeiture seize, increase the punishment, and also the extradition.
The extradition is an element; the narco-traffickers are very afraid with this element. Recently the extradition was approved. We tried to improve the deliverance of troops after they approved the newest legislation and extradition against the narco-traffickers, the new ''low messouras.'' We continue to fight shoulder to shoulder with DEA; with CIA; with FBI; and, of course, with the State Department. This union is very important for continuous and very good results. Also we have the support from the international branch to try to stand in to break the network of the international network criminals.
Page 53 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Today we have new concerns. For example, the presence of the Russian mafia in our region. They suspect our union with American counterparts will avoid this new element of the mafia Russia put in the drug fight, the drug wars.
In Colombia today, we don't have big cartels or big organizations. We have small groups, but it's very difficult to detect these new groups. This new trend to appear in our panorama because the former big cartel to get back experience. The Medellin cartel has big strength. His boss has died and also the Medellin cartel today is dying. The Cali cartel is more sophisticated; they tried to employ corruption like a big strategy, but now all campaigns of the Cali cartel are behind the barons. Now the CNP, we prepare to try to attack the narco-trafficker with the new trains. And also we require the compensation and the support of the international community. Also we need the support of the countries to produce the chemical precursors to try to control the delivery of these chemicals because for the narco-traffickers it is impossible to obtain cocaine or heroin if they don't have the chemical precursors.
Also, we'd like to receive more effective control of the money laundering. Also control of these murder weapons that come to Colombia and exchange for drugs. And also let me say it's necessary to increase the miseries to try to control the consumption. If we are not willing to stop this cycle, we cannot see to the finish the problem or eradicate the problems of the narco-traffickers.
Another concern for us is the synthetic drugs. At this moment, there are synthetic drugs. If the countries don't put a strict control, many will be produced more dangerous that produce a combination of natural drugs. And this problem is for the next century and this problem we put in our focus and also we'd like to put today for the concern of the American society for the reason is try to analyze the very close future.
To end, let me express my gratitude for the interest of this Committee and try to obtain support for CNP. This attitude is our compromise solidly to continue to work for Colombia and for the rest of the world—to try in the future to eradicate this problem; the drugs make many problems for our country and also the rest of the world. Thank you very much.
Page 54 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
[The prepared statement of General Serrano appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. [presiding] Well, thank you, General Serrano. I'm sorry we had the interruption with the votes on the floor. General, how well financed and armed are the narco-guerrillas that your men face each and every day in Colombia? Are they well-armed; are they heavily financed?
General SERRANO. This is one of the best-financed and sophisticated guerrilla movements in the world. They have modern arms. We have information that they are working to obtain missiles clandestinely. They have M–60's, 50 caliber; AK–47's; they have rockets. This is a guerrilla force that is extremely well-armed—financed with money from narcotics trafficking.
Chairman GILMAN. What's the source and who is the major supplier of their arms? I note the photos here showed some Russian arms. Who is the major supplier of the arms for the narco-traffickers and guerillas?
General SERRANO. There are important stockpiles of weapons that were left over from the conflicts in Central America. We also believe that there are new arms coming in from the former Soviet Union. Last year the police alone seized 400 AK–47's.
Chairman GILMAN. Are there any Russian military trainers there training the narco-guerrillas?
General SERRANO. No. The Colombian guerrillas have been around for 40 years. It is a self-sufficient guerrilla force in terms of its training. In fact, they are actually looking outside to develop a network and reactivate the network of guerrilla organizations to try to destabilize other countries.
Chairman GILMAN. General, how many do you estimate there are of the narco-guerrillas?
General SERRANO. From an operational perspective, 17,000 to 20,000. The great problem is in those who lend assistance to the guerrillas—we're talking about narcotics traffickers, those who plant illicit crops, and large numbers of people who provide assistance and informants.
Page 55 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Chairman GILMAN. General, how many in personnel do you have in your anti-narcotics units?
General SERRANO. Anti-narcotics intelligence: We've got 1,000 and they work exclusively on gathering information. They work with the DEA, the CIA, and other international organizations. And for operations in the field, we have 3,000 men in the anti-narcotics police. On a permanent basis, we have 30 helicopters that are operating and we have 9 turbo-thrush airplanes used for fumigation.
Chairman GILMAN. You use your helicopters in about 90 percent of your work, is that correct?
General SERRANO. Every aircraft which the National Police has is used exclusively for counter-narcotics operations.
Chairman GILMAN. For many years, General, you've been recommending and advocating Black Hawk utility helicopters for the CNP to help you fighting drugs. Can you tell us why you need the Black Hawks?
General SERRANO. For several reasons: First, the poppy is located at more than 3,000 meters above sea level. The UH–1H helicopters do not have the capability to carry necessary elements to the altitude to provide the support for the fumigation. And the Huey, at those altitudes, we can only send two men up. In a Black Hawk we could put 15 or 18. Where coca's concerned the narcotics traffickers are planting the coca at greater distances than the range of the Huey. They know what the range of the Huey helicopter is so they calculate that range and plant the coca farther than that. We can also put more armed men onto a Black Hawk to take down, destroy laboratories and also clandestine air strips. And instrument flight is also possible, allowing foul weather flying. The Huey helicopters are flown by sight only, which makes it more complicated to fly them in jungle areas.
Chairman GILMAN. General, we've been talking about removing our troops from Panama. If the United States were to leave Panama, you've expressed some concern. Would you state those concerns to us, if U.S. troops were to leave Panama completely?
Page 56 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
General SERRANO. Basically, from what we've observed, it's an operation zone close to the Andean zone. There's a proposal to create a counter-narcotics school in a part of the facilities there. Even though it's a decision that may have been taken, we would certainly like to see the continuation of schools there to prepare people for the counter-narcotics fight. Because, without that, we would be left only with the School of the Americas at Fort Benning.
Chairman GILMAN. General, there was some testimony when we were talking about the Black Hawks and some of the critics said that you don't have enough qualified pilots to handle the Black Hawks in Colombia nor are you capable of maintaining it. Can you tell us how you would respond to that?
General SERRANO. We have had trainers arrive at our facility in Mariquita. We also have 800 technicians who are trained with the police. Also I'd like to point out that we have loaned pilots to the army to fly their helicopters and these pilots have over 4,000 hours of flight time under their belts. They have an extraordinary amount of experience at their disposal. I'd like to point out that they also train the pilots for the army, not the air force, and for the navy as well. And they also provide a training internationally to pilots from the region, from the Dominican Republic, Panama, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia with great results. Actually it's the first pilot training school in Latin America for police. The U.S. Government invested $9 million in that school.
Chairman GILMAN. What's the name of the school, General?
General SERRANO. The Mariquita School.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, General. Mr. Ballenger.
Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I'd like to introduce for the record information that is answering those questions that they have given us.
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection. What is it entitled—what's the paper entitled?
Page 57 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. BALLENGER. It's the Colombian National Police Anti-Narcotics Direction, Helicopter Pilot Population, Repair Population and Fleet.
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.
[The report appears in the appendix.]
Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Burton.
Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Serrano, have you gotten any intelligence information from our spy satellites or any of our other intelligence-gathering paraphernalia to assist you in fighting the narco-guerrillas?
General SERRANO. We do have support from CIA satellites to be able to map the illicit cultivation of drug crops. The satellite images tell us how many hectares are under cultivation. Also it follows up and takes a look at the results after fumigation.
Mr. BURTON. Well, what I want to find out is: You have lost a lot of men in firefights with the guerrillas and one of the things that our intelligence satellites and others could provide would be some information on troop movements, where there's a heavy concentration of guerrillas, and whether or not they're prepared for your attack. And what I want to find out is have our intelligence people—DEA or CIA—given you anything like that?
General SERRANO. We have two OV–10 airplanes, no, but we have two OV–10 airplanes with flares and we have to detect the presence of groups and also laboratories and we do have some support from platform, but in a very limited way.
Mr. BURTON. Do you think they could be more helpful than they have been, our intelligence agencies, in giving you satellite information on the enemy?
General SERRANO. I believe so. They've given good support with equipment that we ourselves have installed. Colonel Naranjo is the chief of our intelligence program. We have invested $20 million in our own efforts. This is money from the Colombian Government for the development of an integral intelligence capacity. And this is extremely helpful to us.
Page 58 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. BURTON. But, I guess, maybe I'm not making myself clear. Are you getting from our government and our intelligence sources as much help as you think you should get or do you think you should get more?
General SERRANO. I think we could use more. We already receive some intelligence support, but knowing of the U.S. intelligence-gathering capacity, we could receive much more.
Mr. BURTON. One second. Are you getting real-time intelligence that you could use when you get it?
General SERRANO. In some cases, yes, we have gotten that support.
Mr. BURTON. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Burton. Mr. Ballenger.
Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You mentioned in your statement that you had 4,000 police members killed, I think. Over what period of time?
General SERRANO. Since the beginning of our fight against the narcotic traffickers, in 1990 and Medellin, 500 police were murdered by Pablo Escobar. He paid between $2,000 and $3,000 for each policeman who was killed. That's not taking into account the soldiers.
Mr. BALLENGER. Do they have a price on the helicopters that they shot down?
General SERRANO. The guerrillas will pay for shooting down of a helicopter. We've lost five helicopters and three planes.
Mr. BALLENGER. I was there in Colombia, Bogota, when they were rebuilding the Huey I and the Huey II, the Super Huey, and I've seen pictures of it flying. Does that belong to your police force or to the air force?
Page 59 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
General SERRANO. The air force.
Mr. BALLENGER. Well, has the air force tried it at the altitudes that you need for, say, your Black Hawk?
General SERRANO. The army does have Black Hawks and they use them in the highest parts of the country.
Mr. BALLENGER. But I'm asking about the Huey, the Super Huey.
General SERRANO. I don't know. We don't have them and I'm not sure what tests the air force may have conducted.
Mr. BALLENGER. From prisoners that you may have captured among the narco-traffickers, is there some way of knowing what they want to do? Do they want to overthrow the government? Do they want to take control?
General SERRANO. They don't know what they want.
[Laughter.]
Terrorism. They blow up pipelines; they attack police stations. The truth is they don't have an ideology from the time that they joined with the narcotics traffickers.
Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Chairman, I thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ballenger. Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. By way of brief background, Mr. Brian Sheridan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense at the Pentagon, was quoted in the Columbus Georgia Ledger Inquirer of 1998, as follows: ''The young Latin American soldiers and police officers who train at Fort Benning School of the Americas, are vital in keeping drugs off America's streets. There's no greater threat to our hemisphere right now than drug trafficking and the young people that we just saw go out and risk their lives trying to keep cocaine, heroin, and marijuana off the streets of the United States.'' General Serrano, I think you're familiar with the School of the Americas. Could you comment on what types of counter-drug operations graduates from the School of the Americas are performing to aid the United States in prosecuting the drug war in Colombia?
Page 60 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
General SERRANO. We have two very important resources. The first is the School of the Americas which trains our reaction forces for use in fighting narcotics trafficking with excellent results. We also receive support from Fort Rockert to train our pilots. It seems to me that the School of the Americas has been a very valuable instrument to train the anti-narcotics police. We also have officials who are instructors there who also support other countries. I know of its organization. I've been to visit several times. And I'm a witness to the fact that it's a very valuable instrument for training our men to carry out the anti-narcotics fight.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, General Serrano, I have just one more question. Last year at Meta, Colombia, 19 young Colombian National Police officers were executed by guerrillas on the battlefield after being wounded and attacked, and they were shot in the back of the head. Did any of the human rights organizations that you're aware of condemn those killings and the violation of fundamental human rights which these brutal killings represented?
General SERRANO. I have always generally complained, even though I respect them and we have very good relationships with nongovernmental organizations, we wish that the NGO's would also speak out when murders and established norms of human rights for the policemen are also violated.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter. And, General, we thank you. We thank the captain and your associates for being here. We can't tell you how much pride we have in the wonderful work you're doing. And may you continue your good work, and via con dios.
General SERRANO. Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. The Committee stands in recess during the vote. We'll return very quickly.
Page 61 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
[Recess.]
Mr. BLUNT. [presiding] I think we're ready to go ahead and start with this panel. We want to thank the panel who has been here with us all afternoon. Certainly our schedule is pretty unpredictable. It's just as unpredictable for us as it is for you.
This panel, of course, is going to be able to focus on the cruel phenomenon of kidnapping in Colombia. There are currently nine Americans who have been kidnapped and held hostage in Colombia. On March 23, only 8 days ago, four American birdwatchers, as they have been described, traveling a road outside Bogota became the latest kidnapping victims. Three men and a 63-year-old former nun from Peoria were seized at a road block by the so-called Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, known as the FARC. The FARC recently announced it would seek to kill American counter-narcotics officials. The FARC clearly has no compunctions about also targeting American civilians. Since 1980, 83 innocent Americans have been held hostage in Colombia. Twelve of these Americans are known to have been murdered. On February 1997, an American geologist was brutally killed by the narco-guerilla group that called itself ELN, National Liberation Army. In 1995, Steve Welch and Timothy Van Dyke of the Florida-based New Tribes Mission, were executed by their abductors as well. These kidnappings and suffering of the victims and their families go largely unnoticed and are under-reported in the media.
In Colombia, kidnappers act with substantial impunity. Ninety-seven percent of the crimes in Colombia are never brought to justice. Colombian judicial authorities do not prosecute cases involving narco-guerrillas to any appreciable extent. The U.S. Government does not negotiate with terrorists. In Colombia, however, kidnapping victims are commonly ransomed. Such negotiations are legal under Colombian law, but must be coordinated with the government's anti-kidnapping czar.
Today we will hear testimony from three Americans whose lives were callously and inextricably altered by kidnapping at the hands of the narco-guerrillas. Before I introduce the panel, I would like to yield to Mr. Mica for an opening statement.
Page 62 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank your Committee on International Relations for the opportunity to be with you today and to introduce to your Committee three individuals from my district who have had their loved ones taken away from them in this hostage situation in Colombia. I appreciate this Committee also recognizing that there is a serious plight for these American hostages held by Colombian narco-terrorist groups as you focus today on the issue of U.S. narcotics policy, and how intertwined their captivity is in this issue relating to this country.
I am pleased to introduce to you first—there is one individual who is going to speak for the three. One wife who is going to speak for the three. Her name is Tania Rich. She is the wife of hostage Mark Rich. Maybe you could hold up Mark's photo. She is accompanied by two other wives who are not testifying. They are Nancy Mankins. She is the wife of Dave Mankins. If you would hold up Dave's picture, please. And Patty Tenenoff, the wife of Rick Tenenoff.
All three of these individuals were taken hostage on January 31, 1993, and have been held. We have done everything we can to raise their plight to a national and international level. We appreciate this Committee's hearing from one of their representatives today.
Also representing the New Tribes Mission, and that missionary group is located in Sanford, Florida in my district, is Mr. Dan Germann. He is representing the management committee and the executive committee of that New Tribes Mission. So again, I appreciate your attention to this important matter and the lives of my constituents. We appreciate the focus and attention of this hearing today. Thank you.
Mr. BLUNT. Thank you, Mr. Mica.
Let me say to the people that have been introduced, particularly the wives, I have heard comments here today about how this is an unnoticed topic. I am sure it seems unnoticed, but I represent southwest Missouri in the Congress. I don't think there's any international issue that I have received more input on from constituents than this issue. In fact, beyond that in the Southern Baptist paper, which we get at our house, this week in Missouri there was a two-page article on your appearance here today, on the problem that we're facing, and on the frustration of a solution for that. So many people all over the country are very focused and clearly can identify as you'll be able to help us identify today, with what this is like for you. But certainly this is not an overlooked topic. Many people are praying and hoping that we can seek the right kind of resolution to this.
Page 63 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Also on this panel today we have Dr. Thomas Hargrove, who is an agricultural scientist. He served in the U.S. armed forces in Vietnam, and worked professionally to propagate improved crops to feed people in developing countries. In September 1994, while working on an agricultural project in Colombia, he was seized at a roadblock by the FARC. Dr. Hargrove's family of course suffered. They were forced to pay ransom twice to secure his release. Today Dr. Hargrove will tell us about his experience as well.
Dr. Hargrove, I think we'll start with you. Then we'll move down the table in that order.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS HARGROVE, FORMER FARC HOSTAGE
Mr. HARGROVE. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. Unlike most kidnap victims in Colombia, in the past at least, I was not targeted in advance. My situation was very much like the four Americans kidnapped last week. We lived in Cali and I worked at a research center near Palmira. I was late for work on the morning of September 23, 1994. If I had been following the normal pattern, I would have missed what happened. In a way I blame Robert Fulghum, the author, for what happened. I had just read one of his books. He gave 10 commandments for a better life. One of them was ''always take the scenic route''. Even though I was late for work that morning, I could either drive through Cali, Colombia, heavy traffic and nerve wracking, or I could take a little longer and drive through the Colombian countryside. I thought: always take the scenic route. Life is too short otherwise. So I turned right off the Pan-American Highway to drive through the countryside. That was the last decision I made on my own for about a year.
I was driving fast. Up ahead, I saw a roadblock. That didn't bother me at first because roadblocks are a common part of life in Colombia. Manned by the police or the army, they search cars, looking for drugs, guerrillas, arms, et cetera. I pulled up and saw all of these soldiers. Then something looked a little strange. A couple of them held pistols—instead of having the pistols in their holsters. Then two men came from behind a truck wearing ski masks. That's when I knew I had trouble. One waved a .45 at me and told me to get out of the car.
Page 64 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Well, I said that I worked for the International Center for Tropical Agriculture, in Spanish, and I'm on my way to work. I heard them talking. I heard one word: ''gringo.'' The next thing I knew, they were motioning me to get in the back of a pickup. It was a stolen pickup. The FARC had come down from the mountains to steal cars, pass out propaganda, rob people, and I drove into that.
They started passing out propaganda with a portrait of Che Guevara on it. I said, ''Who are you?'' He said ''FARC.'' Well I knew who FARC was, but I know a lot better now. Two kids about 13 and 14 were put in the back of the pickup, one was wearing bandoliers of M–60 machine gun ammunition and carrying a Galil. The other held an AK–47. The next thing I knew, we were bouncing away. I was in the back of the truck.
We pulled out of Cuaca Valley and went up to a village in the Andes Mountains. The guerrillas were all over this village, like they owned the place. That night, we went further in the mountains. They took over an Indian's hut up there. We stayed there that night. The guerrillas asked if I would like marijuana or ''basuco''. Basuco means bazooka in Spanish. It's what is left over from the cocaine-processing process. It is bad cocaine that's sold to the poor all across South America. That is the drug of choice, by the way, of the guerrillas. I said I didn't. I was never offered drugs again, by the way. These guys didn't know, they weren't expecting me, so they didn't know that they weren't supposed to offer me drugs.
The next morning, I kept thinking: I'll be out of this as soon as I meet somebody who is in charge and who understands what I do. I thought: Marxist guerrillas, they're supposed to be out to help the poor and, well, that's what I am doing. The next day I was able to look around. Behind the Indian's hut, he was growing an unusual agricultural crop, onions intercropped with opium poppies. Even though I had lived and worked in Asia for a long time, I saw my first Asian opium poppies in the Andes while I was up there.
I kept thinking we'd be released soon. After 3 days they said, ''Thomas, can you ride a horse?'' I said ''Yes, of course I can ride a horse. I am from Texas.'' They said, ''We are going to be making a trip. Would you rather ride a horse or a mule?'' I said ''a horse''. That night they brought me a mule and we started riding higher and higher into the mountains. The mule's name was Batella or Battle.
Page 65 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
We rode through incredible territory with hundreds of feet below us, straight drop-offs, the river rushing through the rocks. I kept thinking, boy I am glad I have this mule instead of a horse after a while. We rode for 2 solid days. We wound up at a mountain camp that was typical of most of the FARC camps I was in. We came to a high river valley. Then you went straight up the mountain from that high valley. The peaks were 3,000 meters. Just below the mountain peaks were other valleys that you can't see from below. Up there in that case, there was a one-room mud hut. That became our headquarters.
The guerrillas didn't worry much about helicopters or anything like that. There's a lot of wind up there. Also the mountain peaks trap the clouds. It was almost always raining or misting and covered over in clouds. We stayed in that camp for 2 months. There were seven guerrillas guarding me at first.
Let me say something about the guerrillas as I know them. A lot of people have an idea of South American guerillas as intellectual revolutionaries that have left the university to fight for the poor. The people who had me had about a second grade education. That was about the most that anybody had. They were all either illiterate or semi-literate. I never met anyone that I really considered of average intelligence, and I am not confusing intelligence with education. They used drugs. They liked to talk about drugs. People who use drugs like to talk about drugs. A third of the guerrillas are female, about a third of all of them I saw were female.
If I had to categorize them from the least cruel to the most cruel, I would put the women in both extremes. I thought a lot of the women had been abused by men. It's pretty easy to take revenge on a hostage. I almost died. About every 3 weeks, supplies would come up by mule train. We were very, very remote. During the whole year, I never saw a wheel. I don't mean a wheel on a vehicle, I mean any kind of wheel. I never saw a window with glass in it or a door knob or anything like that. I never spoke English or used the English language.
At one point, a load of supplies came up and with the supplies came a load of liquor, brandy. That night all of the FARC guerrillas got drunk on brandy and stoned on this bad cocaine. They started playing with their weapons. They liked to play with their weapons when they were stoned. They were shooting over one another's head. The next morning, they were still stoned and drunk. One of the guerrillas accidentally shot a cow while spraying the mountainside with his Galil. The commandante, the commander, when he came back and he saw the dead cow, went insane. He actually went insane. He saw that his troops, under his command, while stoned, had killed this cow. He started wandering around shooting randomly at different things.
Page 66 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Later on that day, he decided that I was the real reason that this had happened. If the unit had not been detailed to guard me, this all wouldn't have happened. He put the muzzle of his assault rifle behind my head. Then at the last minute, he raised the muzzle and fired over my head through the roof. I didn't even jump. I knew that I was very, very close to death. I turned around and he was lying against the bunk with the muzzle of his rifle like that, his eyes wide open. I left.
Two hours later, without going into it, he put the selector switch of his Galil on full automatic, stuck the muzzle under his chin, pressed down with his thumb and blew three rounds through the top of his head.
At that time, we left that camp. I called, as we left I'll never forget, I looked back and there was dead Juaco lying by the dead cow. I said in Spanish, farewell to this valley of death. From then on, that camp was called the Valley of Death. They asked me to name the other camps.
I wound up in December——
Mr. BLUNT. Doctor, could you summarize here so we can get everybody in here. Then we'll have some questions and come back.
Mr. HARGROVE. OK. Later I was accused of being a full colonel in the U.S. Army in a letter from the commander of the Sixth FARC. I was put in chains. I was kept in chains for 2 1/2 months. Later on, a 15-foot chain. I could take 22 steps exactly. Christmas came. Later on, well, let's go on to 8, 9, 10 months passed. In July, the camp I was in was attacked by the Colombian army. From then on, we were on the run or hiding from the Colombian army until the time I was released. Meanwhile, they took a ''proof of life'' video of me, which was sent to both my company and my family. The organization that I worked for decided it would not negotiate with terrorists. So my family was sort of left out there alone.
My family hired professional negotiators. They took money that would eventually be my inheritance, my father was a very good cotton farmer, and hired professional negotiators. My family broke with the company and initiated negotiations with FARC.
Page 67 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
After 9 months, an initial ransom was paid but I was not delivered. Later on, FARC contacted the family again and said that we used that money to give him better treatment. Now this is the real ransom. If you want him back, you are going to have to pay again. Then my family had to decide whether or not I'm still alive and whether to raise the money to pay again.
We wound up hiding in an extinct volcano crater at the end. One morning on August 21, someone came to me and said, ''It's your time to leave.'' We walked through a free-fire zone. They said that the army would shoot anything on the ground. A spotter plane saw us and called a helicopter. By the time the helicopter got there, we were running and we had escaped from it.
After 2 days, on the evening, my family thought I was dead, I walked into our living room at 8:15 on the night of August 23, 1995. I had lost 50 pounds, 50 to 60 pounds. My hair was not the color it is now when I was taken. My hair and beard had turned orange from malnutrition and vitamin deficiency.
I think you would rather I cut it off right now and leave time for other statements.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hargrove appears in the appendix.]
Mr. BLUNT. Certainly we're interested in your story and it's helpful, but we do need to do that, I think.
So Mr. Germann, let's go onto you. I'm going to set this for 5 minutes.
Mr. GERMANN. Could I defer to Mrs. Rich.
Mr. BLUNT. You certainly could. Mrs. Rich.
STATEMENT OF TANIA RICH
Mrs. RICH. I just wanted to introduce the three of us missionary families who were living in Pucuro, Panama on the evening of January 31, 1993. We are the Mankins. Dave and Nancy Mankins had been living in the village for the longest amount of time, 7 years. Rick and Patty Tenenoff had been living in Pucuro for about 5 years. Mark and I had been living in Pucuro for about 6 months when the night of January 31st came around. We were each in our own homes that night. It was starting to get dark. Each in a little bit different way, but all similar in the way that it happened. Armed men burst into our homes and tied up our husbands. They had us pack bags for our husbands. They ransacked the homes, took the things that they wanted, food mainly, medicine, and whatever else, electronic equipment they could find. They led our husbands off into the night. We believe they were led across the river and down a trail toward Colombia, South America.
Page 68 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
We were living in Pucuro to help the Kuna people. We were there upon their invitation. We had asked their permission to be living there. They encouraged that and were thankful that we were there. We were helping them. Our goal there was to teach them the word of God and to help them be able to live a better life. We just had a team meeting and were planning on how we could best teach them how to read and also we were very interested in their medical supplies and just the medical work that needed to be done there in the village also.
January 31st was the most terrifying night of any of our lives. There were four children under the age of three there in our houses with us. I am thankful that Tamara and Jessica, my daughters that were 2 1/2 years and 11 months old at the time were asleep in their beds. In Rick and Patty's house, the children were still awake. So they saw these guerrillas in their house. That night is a night we'll never forget. The girls ask us, the children ask us all the time about their dad. None of the younger ones remember their dad at all. So we have to talk to them about things that have happened before and try to remind them the best we can of their dad. The Tenenoffs had an 8-year-old daughter at the time. She was in boarding school in Chame, Panama. Dave and Nancy Mankins had two grown children. Their daughter, Sarah, was living in Chame working as a secretary for New Tribes Mission, and their son was going to college at the time.
You know, life hasn't stopped in these 5 years since our husbands were taken. I have mentioned just the age difference in our children. Kids that were learning to walk and talk are now playing baseball and riding bikes and rollerblading, and their dads have never been able to share in some of these first events in their lives. The older children, Chad and Sarah, Dave and Nancy's children, have both met their spouses and gotten married in these 5 years. Nancy has found out that she is going to be a grandma in October. Dave doesn't even know that his daughter is married. Also family members, grandparents have died and our husbands have no idea that they are gone.
The children seem to take their cues from us. When we are doing OK, they seem to be doing OK. The girls have recently asked me, ''Mommy, do you think that people know that it's not just hard for us to have daddy gone, but that it actually hurts inside because we can't have daddy here with us?'' It is very hard to look your children in the eye and tell them I have to go on another meeting. I have to go to another meeting. They say, ''Well, will daddy come back?'' I say I don't know. We are asking people to help. We'll do the best we can and it will just be a wonderful day when we can tell them, because we went on this meeting and talked to these people, your daddy is going to come back.
Page 69 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Nancy, Patty and I are getting through each day because of God's strength. People have looked at us and said, ''You are strong women.'' But I am here today to say we serve an awesome strong God. That is the reason why we are still here. It has not been easy, but we have learned to trust him more and know that he loves us no matter what happens. But we are ready for this horrible ordeal to be over. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mrs. Rich appears in the appendix.]
Mr. BLUNT. Thank you.
Mr. Germann, do you have a statement? You can put it in the record and summarize it or you can present it, whichever you want to do.
STATEMENT OF DAN GERMANN
Mr. GERMANN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There are a lot of things that I would like to say. I was going to relate a bit more of the history, but want to get to some specific points, if I may, briefly.
In late December 1997, the leadership of this organization, FARC, issued a public statement from one of its international offices in Mexico City. The FARC denied complicity in the kidnapping, but did state that it had been able to obtain information about who FARC believed was responsible. FARC also extended condolences to the families of the hostages. We see this statement as a very important development, as it acknowledges for the first time FARC's knowledge of this case and its ability to gain information about the hostages.
This brings me to an important point. We have no proof of the identity of the persons who came into Pucuro and kidnapped these men. We don't know what the reasons were at that time or whether those responsible perhaps thought there was some justification. But the evidence is overwhelming that these men were transported to and held in a part of Colombia that the FARC controls. We are convinced that the FARC has the influence and resources to gain the safe release of these men, and that FARC has a humanitarian obligation to do just that. Private communications that have been received in recent months support that conclusion.
Page 70 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
There are some things that we would also like to ask the U.S. Government, things that we believe they can be doing. We ask that the Congress do what it can to make these things happen. We want the Administration to petition countries with any means of contact or influence with FARC to take all possible steps to advocate for the immediate return of the men. These countries include Costa Rica, Mexico, Venezuela, Panama, Guatemala, Nicaragua, France, Switzerland, Spain and Norway. The Administration should also reject disingenuous and self-serving claims of non-responsibility, lack of knowledge of the case, et cetera, that are relayed through these countries or through any other party.
We also want the Administration to request the Colombian Government make the return of the three missionaries a primary point of inquiry in any discussions with FARC. We are asking the Administration to request in the strongest possible terms that the United Nations take an active role in seeking the return of these hostages. Our repeated requests to the United Nations have been rebuffed, with the explanation that this case is not within its mandate. We want to ensure that all appropriate government resources are used in efforts to determine the location and condition of the hostages. Finally, we want the Administration and its agencies to forward in a timely manner information it obtains, learns, and develops about the location and condition of the hostages and the identity and circumstances of their captors to the Crisis Management Committee that actively works to gain the release of these hostages. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We're open, welcome questions.
Mr. BLUNT. Thank you, Mr. Germann.
Mr. Germann, what was the last contact that you had with anybody who had seen the three hostages?
Mr. GERMANN. We had a ''proof of life'' in early 1994 that the captors sent via the radio. That's the last time we heard the voices of the men. They pre-recorded a message from them. That was the last actual proof of life. They have been seen and we have gotten reports of having seen them as well as statements from FARC representatives in countries such as Costa Rica, where they acknowledge that the men continue to be alive and well.
Page 71 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Our most recent comment from a FARC representative stating that the men are alive was December 1997.
Mr. BLUNT. Have you had any contact from the guerrillas or emissaries of the guerrilla groups, you or the families with a ransom request? What is the status of that?
Mr. GERMANN. Yes. I am sorry that I didn't go into just the process that we face. But during the first year of captivity via radio communication, they demanded $5 million for the release of these three men.
Mr. BLUNT. What kind of response was there? Did you have any dialog following up on that?
Mr. GERMANN. Yes. We certainly did. During that entire year we endeavored to explain to them that we were indeed missionaries, that the payment of this ransom was very difficult for them. We sought other avenues. We insisted that there must be some other way to resolve this particular situation. They unexpectedly cut off those radio communications early in 1994. They didn't return to communicate with us again.
Mr. BLUNT. Mrs. Rich, this is not to be critical of you in any way, but did you have any notification from our government that the part of Panama you were in was dangerous? Had these guerrillas been in this area prior to the time they came in and took the husbands of the three of you? What led up to that in terms of the security you felt that obviously wasn't there?
Mrs. RICH. Right. We felt totally secure living in this basically idyllic little village on a river in Panama. Panama was not known to have any problems with guerrillas or there were no threats that we were aware of or that we had been advised of at all as far as any danger. There are always hikers going through because Pucuro is located in the Darien gap, the gap in the Pan-American highway. So I mean chances are that people, guerrillas were passing through there. But we had no warning from anybody that anything like this would happen.
Page 72 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. BLUNT. Do you feel the Panamanian Government was at fault in not guarding their borders adequately or do you think they also had no reason to anticipate something like this could happen?
Mrs. RICH. I am not sure. I mean looking back you always wish somebody would have been paying attention, you know, to let us know, to be more careful or to get out of the area or even that the guerrillas themselves would have given us some warning that they didn't want us there. But I believe that everybody thought that it was safe for us to be there. Otherwise, there would be no way that New Tribes Mission would have even allowed us to be in that area.
Mr. BLUNT. Another question, Mr. Germann. Do you have missionaries in areas that you know have travel warnings and things like that, and how do you alert them? Would there have been any reason to have done that here?
Mr. GERMANN. No. We had no prior information that this was an area of risk. Currently any New Tribes missionaries have been taken into areas that are safe. No one is out in those remote areas any more. Missionary work in Colombia has changed drastically over the last few years.
Mr. BLUNT. What about in other parts of the world? Do you send missionaries where there are State Department warnings against travel?
Mr. GERMANN. No, we don't, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BLUNT. You don't do that?
Mr. GERMANN. No, we don't.
Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Hargrove, did you have any knowledge of other hostages while you were a hostage?
Mr. HARGROVE. No. I did not.
Mr. BLUNT. The guerrillas you were with never mentioned that there were other hostages in other places? You were just—their world was them and you. Is that right?
Page 73 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. HARGROVE. No, no. But I had no contact with other hostages. Although I was in one camp, there were two fellows down below. They told me not to even look at them because they were high FARC officials and that I would go back into chains if I even looked. This was in the volcano crater that we were in. I never doubted the story. But after I came out, a negotiator who worked with them told me that this was a father and son, Colombian sugar mill owners. They were, in fact, hostages themselves. Had I known that they were other hostages, I would have tried to communicate in some way, but I did not know. I never had personal contact with anyone other than FARC.
Mr. BLUNT. In your situation, did your family have any assistance from the government or did they hire negotiators on their own or how did that work out?
Mr. HARGROVE. Yes. They did have assistance from the government. The FBI gave my family all the assistance that they could. In fact, during the course of my captivity, my family became very, very close friends with the FBI agent who was looking on my case. But they hired professional negotiators to handle the negotiations.
Mr. BLUNT. OK. I am going to turn this back to the Chairman. I am also going to tell you that I am going to be looking into what we can do to draft a sense of the Congress resolution. I can only speak for myself, not for the Committee here, that goes into the specific areas that you ask about and see if we can get some more attention to this case. I know I have written about half of the countries, their ambassadors, that you have mentioned today, but I don't think I have written all of them. Maybe it's time for the Congress to step up and draw the kind of attention to this case that it needs to have and to the whole problem that Americans face in Colombia today.
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. [presiding] Thank you, Mr. Blunt, for chairing during our absence. I regret that we were called to a couple of other meetings while you were testifying but I have been briefed about it.
Page 74 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Let me ask our good wives how long had your husbands been in the missionary work in Colombia?
Mrs. RICH. Mark and I had been living in Panama for a year——
Chairman GILMAN. Could you put that mike a little close to you?
Mrs. RICH. Yes. Mark and I had been living in Panama for only about a year and a half. But the Mankins, Dave and Nancy, had been living there for, I believe, 7 years, and the Tenenoffs for 5. That's the time that we had been involved with New Tribes Mission, basically.
Chairman GILMAN. What sort of missionary work was he doing?
Mrs. RICH. All of us were there just trying to help the people translating. Actually the first job that Mark and I were still involved in was learning their language to be able to communicate to them in their heart language. Then involved in teaching them the scriptures that had been translating and translating other scripture portions into their language, and there to help the people is why we were really there.
Chairman GILMAN. And I address this to all three of the wives. Have you received any information at all since they were taken away?
Mrs. RICH. In the first year after they were taken, we heard, not us personally, but the Crisis Committee heard off and on. They came up over the two-way radio and made demands, the ransom demand. We heard our husbands' voices in Spanish saying that they were alive and that they were OK. But that was within the first year. Since then——
Chairman GILMAN. Where were you when you had that information?
Mrs. RICH. The information came in Panama and was recorded off the two-way radio. So we heard it on a cassette tape and we were living here in the United States. As soon as the ransom demand was made, the ninth day after our husbands were taken, a ransom demand for $5 million was made over this two-way radio. As soon as that demand was made, as is New Tribes Mission policy, all of us family members were evacuated here to our home country to the United States. That is where we have been since. We have made a couple of trips to Panama and Colombia since, but we have stayed here.
Page 75 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Chairman GILMAN. Did anyone try to follow up on the ransom demand?
Mrs. RICH. It wasn't like we just said flat out we can not do this. There were negotiations off and on, but we tried——
Chairman GILMAN. Who negotiated?
Mrs. RICH. That was the representatives from New Tribes Mission.
Chairman GILMAN. Negotiated with whom?
Mrs. RICH. With these people, the captors that came up on our two-way radio that they took from the village of Pucuro the night that they took our husbands.
Chairman GILMAN. And who was it from your organization that negotiated with them?
Mrs. RICH. Mr. Germann was part of the Crisis Management Committee that was formed shortly after our husbands were taken and he was involved in some of what went on.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Germann, did you have direct negotiations with them?
Mr. GERMANN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. And where did that take place?
Mr. GERMANN. At the time of the capture, they took a radio which also had the frequency that the missionaries communicated regularly on. So it was easy for them to appear a few days later to say that they were responsible for having the three men. They wanted to speak with someone who had the authority to address the issue of their demands.
Chairman GILMAN. And did they identify themselves?
Mr. GERMANN. They never did. Neither during the taking of the missionaries, nor during this entire process which lasted for about a year.
Page 76 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Chairman GILMAN. Did you recall what their demand was?
Mr. GERMANN. They demanded $5 million.
Chairman GILMAN. How and when was that supposed to be paid?
Mr. GERMANN. They never stated exactly where or how that was to be paid. They never varied either from the demand of that amount of money. So we spoke to them in terms of some other alternative, knowing that $5 million was an impossible demand.
Chairman GILMAN. Did you make any counter offer?
Mr. GERMANN. We did talk to them about other possibilities, but they never accepted anything that we suggested.
Chairman GILMAN. What possibilities did you talk about?
Mr. GERMANN. There were private discussions of some other kind of help, some other kind of assistance, but none of it was ever accepted.
Chairman GILMAN. Can you tell us what you offered them?
Mr. GERMANN. Those were held in private conversations. It would be difficult to discuss them publicly.
Chairman GILMAN. During those discussions, did any of the captors identify themselves in any manner?
Mr. GERMANN. Never, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Did they identify where they were located at all?
Mr. GERMANN. No, they didn't. Though it was possible to ascertain that they were communicating to us from the northern part of Colombia.
Chairman GILMAN. Did you ask for any police help in the negotiation?
Mr. GERMANN. To my knowledge, every single conversation that I had with the captors I was accompanied by a professional FBI negotiator. I don't think that I had any conversations without an FBI negotiator present.
Page 77 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Chairman GILMAN. Were those discussions taped?
Mr. GERMANN. That would be information that you could probably obtain from the FBI, yes.
Chairman GILMAN. Was there any attempt to triangulate where the messages were coming from?
Mr. GERMANN. Those types of efforts were taken by other agents. We weren't responsible for that type of endeavor.
Chairman GILMAN. Was our Federal Bureau of Investigation involved you said?
Mr. GERMANN. Yes. They were.
Chairman GILMAN. Who was the agent working on this?
Mr. GERMANN. We had several over the course of that year. They were sent from the Miami bureau.
Chairman GILMAN. When was the last of the conversations?
Mr. GERMANN. The 16th of January, 1994.
Chairman GILMAN. 1994?
Mr. GERMANN. Yes, sir.
Chairman GILMAN. How did they happen to break off?
Mr. GERMANN. It made no sense to us because at that conversation they left the impression that they would be right back. So we waited by that radio until April 1994, expecting them to return. The last communication was not really one of the more hostile engaging conversations. So there is a possibility that there was some interference by some people that made a contact with the captors, entered into a negotiation, and we had no knowledge of it. But they came to us some months later and said that they were indeed negotiating.
Chairman GILMAN. Negotiating about?
Page 78 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. GERMANN. For the release of the men.
Chairman GILMAN. Who was doing that?
Mr. GERMANN. It was an individual from Europe who had a contract with the United Nations to do mine sweeping. A disturbing development for us, because we realized that we were now in a delicate situation to try to explain to them that the people that you have been talking to were indeed not in contact with the family and in no way were authorized, they came to us and asked us for $2.5 million in order to reach this settlement that they had been discussing with FARC.
Chairman GILMAN. What date was that?
Mr. GERMANN. That was in 1994.
Chairman GILMAN. Was there any further discussion after that?
Mr. GERMANN. Not directly with them. No, sir.
Chairman GILMAN. Well, was there any discussion with anyone after 1994?
Mr. GERMANN. We knocked on hundreds and thousands of doors seeking support and help in the release of these three men. Considerable effort was spent in Colombia, making trips up into the area of Udaba where we believe the men were being held, contacting officials in that area, trying to gain some link to the people that held our men.
We have more recently in 1997 sought support on international levels to see if other countries couldn't aid us in this effort to gain their release.
Chairman GILMAN. You heard the message. We've concluded legislative business for the day.
Dr. Hargrove, when you were in captivity, did you see any narcotics trafficking taking place with any of your captors?
Mr. HARGROVE. I didn't see actual trafficking, but I was in two camps that I am almost certain were actually drug laboratories.
Page 79 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Chairman GILMAN. How did you know that?
Mr. HARGROVE. Well, for one thing the first 6 months the guerrillas, there were seven guerrillas, later ten. They would just hang around the camp all day. They didn't do any training or anything. Then we moved to another camp and something changed. They would go off every day and leave just two or three to guard me and come back. Then we went back to the camp that we had left and things changed completely. By then, I was out of chains and I could walk around in an area about like a football field. One area off to this side they said I wasn't to even look there. They built two buildings that I could barely see through the forest that were covered with black plastic. It was by a stream leading into a river down below. I was almost sure that these were drug laboratories.
One day, they were playing a game. One of the guerrillas, he disappeared and came back carrying a barrel, an orange colored 25-gallon barrel that he set up to play this game on. Well later, the other guerrillas came in. They said where did that come from? I said that Moño brought it. They were very upset. That barrel disappeared right away. Now to find this barrel up in an area where I had never even seen a wheel for a year just didn't fit in. The barrel was from over by the river where the new buildings were being built.
I went to another camp after the Colombian army mounted an offensive against us, against them. This was my second time in that camp. I noticed another new building, covered again with black plastic. I am reasonably sure that it was a drug camp as well. Later when I was debriefed, the FBI said that this was during the time that FARC had taken over running the drug laboratories themselves.
Also a civilian came in, always wearing civilian clothes. They were paranoid to make sure that I never saw this guy's face. One time I just by accident, I came face to face with him. Everybody stood in front like that. I caught on pretty quick that it might not be healthy for me to try to get a good look at this guy. I always thought that he was running the drug laboratories.
Page 80 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Chairman GILMAN. So you never saw any direct evidence except seeing this barrel and maybe a building in an area. Besides that, you never saw any direct evidence of narco trafficking?
Mr. HARGROVE. No I didn't. I never saw direct evidence of narco-trafficking. In my opinion, it was obvious they were doing it.
Chairman GILMAN. Was there any discussion around you about any narcotics?
Mr. HARGROVE. Oh yes, especially at first. They liked to talk about narcotics and about drugs and so forth. But after I was in these camps that I figured out were actually drug laboratories, if the subject of drugs ever came up, I changed the subject. I didn't want them to know that I knew.
Chairman GILMAN. What were they saying about narcotics?
Mr. HARGROVE. Oh, they were talking about what drugs that they liked to take. Incidentally, the guerrillas have absolute contempt for anyone who uses marijuana. They have a thing that marijuana makes you crazy, ''busuco'', this bad cocaine, is power. They told me that they kept a neutral stance on the peasants who were growing coca and opium poppies because the people needed the money and so that they were neutral on it.
Chairman GILMAN. In other words, they weren't harming the peasants who were growing?
Mr. HARGROVE. They didn't say, ''We're in the narco traffick business.''
Chairman GILMAN. While you were in captivity, were you aware of any other people being held as hostages?
Mr. HARGROVE. I knew that other hostages were being held.
Chairman GILMAN. How did you know that?
Page 81 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. HARGROVE. Well I heard once about a Colombian Congresswoman who had been kidnapped and released. I heard about the two New Tribes missionaries who were killed. I was told that the Colombian army had killed them so it could be blamed on FARC. They always told me, by the way, that they were protecting me. That if the Colombian army found me, then the Colombian army would kill me so that they could blame it on FARC. I personally would have preferred to take my chances with the Colombian army.
Chairman GILMAN. What year were you held?
Mr. HARGROVE. From September 1994 through August 1995.
Chairman GILMAN. And you heard about the missionaries being held, you say?
Mr. HARGROVE. Yes. Being killed.
Chairman GILMAN. When did you hear that?
Mr. HARGROVE. I think it was June or July. It was while I was still being held.
Mr. GERMANN. Mr. Chairman, we had two New Tribes missionaries that were killed in Colombia almost 3 years ago.
Mr. HARGROVE. That's the ones that I am referring to.
Chairman GILMAN. Mrs. Rich, did you want to add any more information?
Mrs. RICH. I guess I would just like to thank you all for the opportunity for being here and ask for continued interest and support in the things that we feel are really important right now. I believe that there are many people here on this Committee who are very interested. We are very thankful for that. I am looking forward to going back and telling my girls that I had an opportunity to tell a lot of people about their dad and that they will work hard to——
Page 82 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Chairman GILMAN. How many children do you have, Mrs. Rich?
Mrs. RICH. I have two girls. They are 6 and 7 years old now. They were 2 1/2 and 11 months old.
Chairman GILMAN. Do our other missionary wives have children too?
Mrs. RICH. Nancy and Dave have two grown children who are married now. Rich and Patty Tenenoff have three. Their oldest is now 13 and their youngest 6.
Chairman GILMAN. Since 1994, have you had any further contact by any of the captors with regard to your husbands?
Mrs. RICH. We have not had any direct contact with the captors but we have heard via other people, private contacts between the guerrilla group and different countries and NGO's, nongovernmental organizations, that have been told by FARC that our husbands are alive and that they are OK, as recently as December.
Chairman GILMAN. December, of this past year?
Mrs. RICH. Yes.
Chairman GILMAN. And which group told you that?
Mrs. RICH. I honestly don't know which one. I am sorry. I just know that there have been several claims made that our husbands are still alive. There have been a few made that they have been killed, but none that have been able to be followed up on or substantiated at all.
Chairman GILMAN. Has the International Committee of the Red Cross helped you in any manner?
Mrs. RICH. They have had letters and pictures from us since the beginning of this that they have never been able to deliver for us. So they have really not been able to help us at all in getting any messages to or from our husbands. We have not been able to send them any letters or get any letters back from them. We feel like that is something that in almost every other hostage case that we have heard about, they have been able to at least get letters out or receive some kind of information.
Page 83 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Chairman GILMAN. Has Amnesty International been able to help you?
Mrs. RICH. In the first years, they were not very helpful. But recently when we went to Venezuela for the Iberian-American Human Rights Summit, they did sign onto a statement declaring this as an unhumanitarian thing to do, as holding our husbands.
Chairman GILMAN. Dr. Hargrove, were you released upon payment of a ransom?
Mr. HARGROVE. Was I released after payment of ransom?
Chairman GILMAN. Yes.
Mr. HARGROVE. Yes.
Chairman GILMAN. How much was the ransom?
Mr. HARGROVE. Twice. What?
Chairman GILMAN. How much was the ransom that was paid?
Mr. HARGROVE. I would rather not say that here in public, but the common rule of negotiation that professionals use is they wind up usually paying about 10 percent of the initial demand. My ransom was considerably less than 10 percent. The initial demand was $6 million.
Chairman GILMAN. What work were you doing at the time you were seized?
Mr. HARGROVE. I was the head of communication and publications at the International Center for Tropical Agriculture. I was in charge of the scientific publication, the public awareness to try to make people aware of the need for international agricultural research, and the visitors services. I am an agricultural editor and an agricultural journalist by profession. I ran that operation for this——
Chairman GILMAN. Were you able to communicate with your family at all while you were held hostage?
Page 84 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr. HARGROVE. Oh no, except for the ''proof of life'' video that was made to give. Twice when they made me write letters, you know, to my family, that were all part of the ransom demand. But that's all. I never got any word, any communication from my family at all. They got two letters and one video from me over the year. Each time, it was a big thing. They came up and said——
Chairman GILMAN. And who negotiated, who negotiated on your behalf?
Mr. HARGROVE. My family essentially. My wife, my two sons, our next door neighbors who were Germans with their two children. They, along with two professional negotiators that were hired from England.
Chairman GILMAN. What year were you released?
Mr. HARGROVE. I was released in 1995.
Chairman GILMAN. How long were you held?
Mr. HARGROVE. Eleven months.
Chairman GILMAN. Did they inflict any torture on you in any manner or any pressure on you?
Mr. HARGROVE. Well, I was never physically tortured, but I would consider being locked in a box 3 feet wide and 6 feet high, with no windows, for as long as 48 hours at a time pretty bad treatment. Later, they would let me out for 3 hours a day, from 3 p.m. to 6 p.m., on a 15-foot chain. I suppose that's not torture.
Chairman GILMAN. Torture enough, I guess.
Well, Mr. Mica, do you have any further questions?
Mr. MICA. No, Mr. Chairman, I don't have any questions. We have had a long day with our three guests from Central Florida from the New Tribes Mission; these heroic wives that you had an opportunity to meet and have testify. I want to thank you for bringing national attention to their plight. Thank you for your past efforts to bring national and international attention to their situation. I guess no one could really experience what they have been through.
Page 85 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
I have heard some recommendations, Mr. Chairman, of further actions that we can take. We do pledge to work with the wives and representatives of the New Tribes Mission. These are probably some of the longest held American hostages in the history of our Nation. They should not be ignored because they are not wealthy, they are not well-positioned, they are not government officials. But we should care about them. We should do everything we can to secure their release and bring their situation to the attention of every international organization and country.
So I want to thank you again, Mr. Chairman. Unless our witnesses have any comments, again, I would just say thank you from the bottom of my heart.
Chairman GILMAN. Well thank you, Mr. Mica, for assisting us in arranging for the witnesses to be with us. I want to thank Dr. Hargrove, Dan Germann, and Tania Rich and Mrs. Mankins, Mrs. Tenenoff, for making yourselves available to us so that we could explore this issue. We will keep this issue before us in the Congress. We will try to do our best to help you seek the release of your loved ones.
Thank you very much. The hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:24 p.m., the Committee was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]
A P P E N D I X
Insert "The Official Committee record contains additional material here."