SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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49–595 CC
1998
U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
MAY 20, 1998
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
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COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JAY KIM, California
STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio
MARSHALL ''MARK'' SANFORD, South Carolina
MATT SALMON, Arizona
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
TOM CAMPBELL, California
JON FOX, Pennsylvania
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
JOHN McHUGH, New York
ROY BLUNT, Missouri
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KEVIN BRADY, Texas
LEE HAMILTON, Indiana
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
HOWARD BERMAN, California
GARY ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PAT DANNER, Missouri
EARL HILLIARD, Alabama
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
STEVE ROTHMAN, New Jersey
BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee
BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
JIM DAVIS, Florida
LOIS CAPPS, California
RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff
MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Democratic Chief of Staff
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Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska, Chairman
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JAY KIM, California
MATT SALMON, Arizona
JON FOX, Pennsylvania
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
WALTER H. CAPPS, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MIKE ENNIS, Subcommittee Staff Director
RICHARD KESSLER, Democratic Professional Staff Member
DAN MARTZ, Counsel
HEIDI L. HENNIG, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
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WITNESSES
Dr. Susan Shirk, U.S. Department of State
Dr. Kurt Campbell, U.S. Department of Defense
The Honorable James Lilley, American Enterprise Institute
Mr. Douglas Paal, Asia-Pacific Policy Center
Mr. Nat Bellocchi, Bellocchi and Company
APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
Dr. Susan Shirk
Dr. Kurt Campbell
Mr. Douglas Paal
Mr. Nat Bellocchi
Additional material submitted for the record:
Question for the record submitted by Hon. Sherrod Brown, a Representative in Congress from Ohio
U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS
WEDNESDAY, MAY 20, 1998
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice at 1:35 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Honorable Doug Bereuter (chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
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Mr. KING. [presiding] Good afternoon, the Subcommittee will come to order.
Congressman Bereuter is presently on the floor. He has an amendment up and has asked me to begin the hearing for him; and also, if I would read into the record his statement. I'm not as eloquent as Congressman Bereuter; I will do my best.
I welcome all of the witnesses here today and I'll begin with Congressman Bereuter's statement.
The Asia and Pacific Subcommittee meets today to examine U.S. relations with Taiwan as President Clinton prepares for the China Summit. With President Clinton's visit to China almost upon us, there's been a great deal of speculation that Taiwanese interest might fall victim to the U.S.-PRC dialog.
Some former government officials have suggested putting a ''hold'' on the sale of defensive weapons to Taiwan. In addition, a former high-ranking government official, Dr. Joseph Nye, has proposed a grain compromise to jumpstart negotiations between Taiwan and Beijing. Dr. Nye has suggested a three-way deal with Taipei with four square steps toward independence.
Beijing will not oppose ''international living space'' for Taiwan, and the United States would reiterate its one-China and their use-of-force policies, but also state clearly that we will not defend Taiwan if it were to declare independence. Not surprisingly, this proposal has caused considerable consternation in Taipei.
It seems that, absent a strong and unequivocal statement by the Administration, or by the Congress, that that sort of confusion is inevitable. I expect a clear statement to come from today's hearing. I believe that Congress has made it clear that it expects Taiwan and Beijing to resolve their differences peacefully and that the PRC should renounce the use of force.
Congressional support for the deployment of two aircraft carriers during the Taiwan Strait crisis was broad and unequivocal. I anticipate that the Subcommittee will mark up Representative Solomon's resolution on Taiwan, H. Con. Resolution 270, as early as tomorrow.
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I hope the Administration and our private witnesses will be able to address whether the Taiwan Relations Act continues to serve U.S. interest, or whether it requires amendment. Also, are there any anticipated changes in our longstanding one-China policy?
In addition, we certainly are interested in what efforts the United States has made to urge Beijing to renounce the use of force. I would also ask our witnesses about the impact of the emergence of the Democratic People's Party, which is a real force in Taiwanese politics, and whether the independence platform is incompatible with U.S. policy.
Last, I hope all witnesses will address the issue of arms sales to Taiwan. Are there any contemplated changes in our policy toward arms sales? What limitations have we placed on these sales? Given the modernization of the People's Liberation Army, there's a common point where our arms sales policy is inadequate to provide for Taiwan's security.
As a final note, the status of Taiwan's security interest is an extremely important issue, but it is by no means the only issue. Most importantly, we were successful in concluding bilateral negotiations with Taiwan on WTO accession. I cannot overstate the importance of this achievement, which resolves longstanding trade difficulties that have lingered for a decade or more. This is a win-win situation, for this agreement paves the way for Taiwan's WTO membership, and dramatically improves U.S. access to the lucrative Taiwan market.
That is Congressman's Bereuter's statement, and I will ask Congressman Berman, if you have an opening statement?
Mr. BERMAN. I think I'll give a statement by Congressman Bereuter as well. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Laughter.]
Obviously, with the President's visit to China, there is the almost inevitable stirring up concern in Taiwan that there will possibly be a new ''restatement'' of American policy toward Taiwan. This is an exercise we repeat frequently up here. Announcements of new policy approaches to China raise fears among the Taiwanese-American community that new steps forward with China will be more steps backward with Taiwan.
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One reason for the fear is that the Chinese make relations with Taiwan a constant, if not the first, subject of every conversation with American policymakers. Taiwan is clearly high on their agenda, and the Chinese seek to exploit any possible fissure in our relationship with Taiwan.
Today's hearing is one more opportunity to make evident to China that there is no shift in our policy toward Taiwan. I am pleased the Administration officials have made most clear that there will be no so-called fourth communiqué, should there be a Beijing Summit.
At the same time, I am concerned that the Administration has not aggressively implemented some of the comments that were made to Congress in its Taiwan policy review several years ago, a policy review which was headed by our Assistant Secretary, to assist Taiwan in gaining membership in appropriate international organizations.
We hear talk about APEC, the Asian Development Bank, possible WTO membership, but none of the other important organizations that at least I think Taiwan should be considered for membership in. I'm a co-sponsor of legislation urging Taiwan's membership in the World Health Organization, and I also think it would make sense—and that the world would gain—to find Taiwanese presence in the IMF and the World Bank as well. China and the developing world would benefit from Taiwan's active support for these international financial institutions.
Just as it made no sense for us to ignore China's existence for decades during the cold war, in a futile attempt to pretend to contain China or to make it go away, it is equally myopic to ignore Taiwan's existence and pretend that it is not a major democratic and economic power. I think we need a bit more progressive and forward-leaning approach, one that was outlined in the Taiwan Policy Review.
I look forward to hearing from the Administration today, from the excellent witnesses that have come before us, to speak about the U.S.-Taiwan relationships in the context of the upcoming meeting of the two Presidents.
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. KING. Thank you, Congressman Berman.
I realize that at least one of our witnesses, Dr. Shirk, does have a time constraint. I would ask in that context if Congressman Brown has any statement.
Mr. BROWN. I will be brief, Mr. Chair. Thank you for convening today's hearings on U.S. policy toward Taiwan, a country of increasing importance to American strategic and economic interest.
Taiwan's regional and global significance demands a more active and thoughtful U.S. policy. There is one body where the question of Taiwan's participation should produce little, if any, disagreement, and that is, as Mr. Berman said, the World Health Organization. Sick children feel the same pain and shed the same tears, whether they live in Taipei or Milan or Los Angeles or Nairobi. The stated noble aim of the WHO is to help achieve the highest possible level of health for all peoples, but the 21 million people of Taiwan are currently barred from access to the latest medical knowledge and techniques which the WHO could provide. Moreover, Taiwan cannot contribute its own substantial health resources in medical expertise to furthering the goals of the WHO.
Quite simply, as international trade increases and travel leads to a greater potential for the cross-border spread of infectious diseases, the case for Taiwan's participation in the WHO grows stronger every day. Taiwan and its children have much to gain from the WHO; the WHO has much to gain from Taiwan.
I've introduced legislation calling for Taiwan's representation in the WHO and urging the United States to support and lead such a bid. I'm pleased that over 40 of my colleagues, including Mr. King and Mr. Berman, from both sides of the aisle, have joined me in this important endeavor, and I hope the Subcommittee will soon take up this resolution, for the right to good health knows no boundaries, and it's an issue that should unite, rather than divide us.
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. KING. Congressman Hastings.
Mr. HASTINGS. No, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Hastings.
Our first panel of witnesses today consists of Deputy Assistant Secretary Susan Shirk, who is the State Department's point person on U.S.-China and U.S.-Taiwan relations. In addition to a previous appearance before the House International Relations Committee, she's appeared before the Subcommittee in her previous capacity as a faculty member of the University of California at San Diego.
Our other witness in this panel will be Dr. Kirk Campbell, who is responsible for Asia policy within the Department of Defense. His major responsibilities are for the revision of the U.S.-Japan defense guidelines. Dr. Campbell has testified before the Subcommittee on several occasions, and we're pleased to have him back.
Dr. Shirk.
STATEMENT OF SUSAN L. SHIRK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC BUREAU, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Dr. SHIRK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about one of the U.S. most important and unique relationships in the Asia-Pacific region: our relationship with Taiwan.
I know that people in the Congress and elsewhere have questions about the state of U.S.-Taiwan relations during this period when the United States is developing its relations with the PRC through Presidential summits. I welcome this opportunity to clarify any misperceptions that may exist about the Administration's policy toward Taiwan.
I will not read my entire testimony; we have submitted it to you. But I do want to begin by highlighting the vibrancy of our economic relationship—Taiwan is the seventh largest market for U.S. exports—as well as the affinity that the United States and Taiwan have for each other as competitive democracies.
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I also want to highlight the strength of our unofficial relationship, particularly since the Taiwan policy review of 1994. I am particularly proud of our bilateral ''Open Skies'' Agreement to expand opportunities for U.S. airlines going to Taiwan and the rest of Asia, which was signed this past spring.
Another very significant achievement was helping Taiwan move toward membership in the World Trade Organization by concluding a bilateral market access agreement this past February.
Let me concentrate in my oral remarks, however, on the ways our policy contributes to Taiwan's security, and thereby to the broader peace and stability of the Asia Pacific region.
First, our policy insists that the resolution of the relations between the PRC and Taiwan must be peaceful, and urges direct dialog between the two sides as the best hope for peaceful resolution.
Second, we remain firmly committed to fulfilling the security and arms transfer responsibilities of the Taiwan Relations Act, which gives Taiwan the ability to defend itself.
And third, U.S. forward-deployed forces play a critically important role, as President Clinton's deployment of two carrier groups to the waters near Taiwan in March 1996 demonstrated.
We believe that by maintaining continuity and stability in these three policies, we have created a good environment for the PRC and Taiwan to take steps toward rapprochement. Over the past decade, the trade, investment, and travel flows between the two sides have increased dramatically, to the point at which the PRC is now Taiwan's third largest trading partner, and it has over $30 billion of Taiwan investment.
This is a very positive trend because Taiwan's security depends on more than military factors. Ultimately, stability in the Strait depends upon the ability of the two sides to come to terms with each other. For this reason, the Administration has encouraged Taipei and Beijing to reopen the dialog that Beijing broke off in 1995. We do not pressure either side, nor do we want to mediate. But we do tell both sides the same thing emphatically and repeatedly; namely, that we hope they will resume dialog because dialog is the best way to diffuse tensions and build confidence.
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We are encouraged by recent signs of a willingness of the two sides to resume their dialog. Last month, there was a meeting between the Straits Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, the two unofficial or quasi-official organizations which carry out direct contacts between Beijing and Taipei. We hope to see additional meetings in the near future.
I am struck by the fact that these moves toward cross-Strait rapprochement and dialog are occurring at the same time as we are having summits with the PRC. It illustrates the fact that U.S.-PRC-Taiwan relations are not a zero-sum game.
We are strengthening our engagement with the PRC because we are working toward the goal of a China that is stable and peaceful; that tolerates different views and adheres to international rules of conduct; and that cooperates with us to build a secure regional and international order. But our progress in working with the PRC has not come at Taiwan's expense. We remain resolutely committed to our unofficial relations with Taiwan, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act and the three joint communiqués. There will be no fourth communiqué; nor will our relationship with Taiwan be diluted or sacrificed in any way. Our efforts to improve relations with the PRC are intended to strengthen peace and stability in East Asia, and in that sense will benefit the region as a whole, including Taiwan.
I am proud of the way in which we have maintained frequent and frank communications with the Taiwan authorities through AIT and TECRO before and after the summits with the PRC; this communication plays an essential function in reassuring Taiwan that our policies toward Taiwan are unshakeable, and that our relations with the PRC and Taiwan are not zero-sum, but instead are mutually reinforcing.
As recent moves to resume cross-Strait dialog are demonstrating, strong U.S.-PRC relations are conducive to the improvement of Taipei-Beijing relations.
Let me conclude by addressing the question of whether the United States should assume a direct role in resolving Taiwan's future. This Administration, like the five Republican and Democratic Administrations before it, firmly believes that the future of Taiwan is a matter for the Chinese people on both sides of the Strait to resolve themselves. No Administration has taken the position on how or when they should do so; what we have said, and what I am repeating today, is that the United States has an abiding interest that any resolution be peaceful.
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In accordance with our commitments, we are continuing to pursue our traditional ''one-China'' policy. Consistent with this policy, we do not support ''two Chinas'' or ''one China'', ''one Taiwan'', Taiwan independence, or Taiwan's membership in the United Nations.
While only the Chinese on both sides of the Strait can determine their future, the United States must continue to play a role in ensuring the peace and stability of the region. Only within such a stable environment can the two sides return to a regular and fruitful cross-Strait dialog, and we believe that this dialog has the potential to address the larger issues.
Our engagement with the PRC adds to this regional stability and this kind of environment, and therefore, is of direct benefit to the people on Taiwan. Just as regional stability contributes to cross-Strait communication, so, too, does cross-Strait communication enhance regional stability. Such dialog is, thus, in all parties' interests, including those of the United States.
Our policy, Mr. Chairman, remains firm. It is up to the two sides to resolve their differences directly and peacefully. We should stay out of the middle. But this does not mean that we will be inactive. We will work hard to expand the strong web of unofficial relations which binds us to the people on Taiwan, and we will work equally hard to improve our relations with Beijing. We will at the same time encourage Taipei and Beijing to return to an active and direct dialog. All three sides of the triangle can and will reinforce each other, and the result will be beneficial to all of us, as well as to others in the Asia-Pacific region.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Shirk appears in the appendix.]
Mr. KING. Thank you, Dr. Shirk.
Dr. Campbell.
STATEMENT OF KURT CAMPBELL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
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Dr. KURT CAMPBELL. Thank you very much, Congressman King.
First of all, I'd like to associate myself with the comments of my colleague at the State Department, Dr. Shirk, and amplify on a few of the points that you've all asked in some of your questions.
First of all, for the purpose of time, I've submitted a very full testimony to the Committee today which goes into great detail about our commitments and how we see them, particularly under the Taiwan Relations Act. What I'd like to do, if I can, is just to amplify a couple of points and then hopefully respond to your questions with the time remaining. Is that appropriate, Congressman?
Mr. KING. Without objection, make it part of the record.
Dr. KURT CAMPBELL. Thanks very much.
First of all, I think it's very important to just state at the outset given the fact that this hearing is held in the steps preceding the important summit that is upcoming between President Clinton and Jiang Zemin in Beijing. The United States has stated again and again, and it is appropriate for us to continue to restate it, that improvement in U.S.-China relations and summitry between our two Presidents will not come at the expense of Taiwan.
As Congressman Berman very clearly stated, the improvement in Sino-American relations has caused concerns in Taiwan. It is very appropriate for them to ask—and for you to ask—us questions. We should stand on record very clearly that our improvement in relations will not come at the expense of Taiwan. This is important because I think we have to recognize that past diplomacy between the United States and China has come at the expense of Taiwan in the history of our relations. Our new period of relations between the United States and the PRC clearly has added truth that the improvement of our relationship will not harm Taiwan in any way.
Second, I'd like to just very quickly underscore what we see as our fundamental commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act, which is the law of the land, and at the Department of Defense, we take extremely seriously. In fact, I know of no other legislation that is treated with the same reverence as the Taiwan Relations Act in terms of our application—our studious application—to what was intended by the architects of this important piece of legislation.
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I should also say that we do not undertake the commitments in the TRA as some onerous burden. In fact, we believe that fulfilling these commitments is part and parcel of what makes U.S. commitments in the Asian-Pacific region sound. It's in the interest of regional security.
As we see it, there are four key commitments in the Taiwan Relations Act. No. 1, perhaps the most important is to keep Congress closely apprised of the security situation and about developments in the Asian-Pacific region. That's why we are grateful to have this opportunity to appear before you today.
No. 2 is that it requires us to monitor very closely changes in the security environment in the Asian-Pacific region, which, as you can imagine, we follow extremely closely and do make those assessments available to our Taiwan interlocutors.
No. 3, as Dr. Shirk indicated, we provide Taiwan with the appropriate defensive technology that allows Taiwan to feel secure, both in its international space and also in terms of any diplomacy across the Taiwan Straits with the PRC.
And No. 4, and in my view perhaps the most important, is the commitment that the United States maintain the capability in the Asian-Pacific region, should there be a challenge to this peace and stability. And again, as Secretary Shirk indicated, our primary interest is a process point that whatever happens across the Taiwan Straits be a peaceful process; if that process is undermined in any way, that we have the capability for an appropriate response.
Welcome, Mr. Chairman.
The third point I'd like to underscore very quickly is the nature of the arms sales talks that the Department of Defense, with our colleagues, conducts every year. That process has just completed. We don't talk very much about the process in public, but I can assure you that our goals are to provide the kind of hardware necessary for Taiwan to meet these defensive purposes.
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However, in addition to that, we have also in recent years and months taken steps to improve the dialog to include not just hardware, but also important contacts—people-to-people contacts or organic links, what we call the software of the relationship—to ensure that Taiwan's capabilities and understanding of important developments in the revolution of military affairs, in logistics, in personnel, are well understood.
Let me also underscore to you that we agree wholeheartedly that the resumption of cross-Strait communications is in the interest of all parties concerned. We also believe that it is not in U.S. interest to interfere in this process; that, indeed, this is a process for the Chinese people to undertake independently, and our goal is to create an environment in which both sides can contemplate discussions and interaction without pressure.
As we review the security situation across the Taiwan Straits, however, and as we looked at the situation in the period since the crisis of 1995 and 1996, I will tell you a personal and a Department view is the only area that we are particularly concerned about; that in a crisis there are not the means for rapid communication to avoid accidents or misinterpretation between the PRC and Taiwan. And that, in fact, if we looked to Europe for opportunities to apply some regional or new ways of thinking in terms of diplomacy, we believe something that both sides might want to consider are avenues in which to communicate quickly in a crisis, to hopefully avert unattended developments or a crisis across the Taiwan Strait. This is not for the United States to decide or to introduce, but it's something that I think both sides should have some interest in pursuing.
Let me also say, as Congressman Berman indicated, there is a tremendous amount—a cottage industry on the outside of government—that is looking at other ways to consider the situation across the Taiwan Straits and whether this should be a U.S. role.
The only point I would make is that, with many of these suggestions as others have, I think, very eloquently stated, there are many unintended consequences, things that are difficult to imagine if implemented. I think that the U.S. policy that has given us the tremendous peace and stability and growth over the last 25 years has served our interest, has served the PRC's interest, and Taiwan's interest very well. I believe that it is the appropriate way forward from this point on.
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Let me also just conclude with two last remarks. I think every Administration official has now stated very clearly, and we will continue to do so, that there will be no fourth communiqué and there will be no document that harms Taiwan's interest. I think that's important for us to keep in mind as we go forward.
Let me just underscore that I think with the improvement of U.S.-Sino relations comes responsibilities on the part of the United States. Two years ago I think, when all of us traveled throughout the region, and when the doors were closed, many people had serious questions about U.S. policy toward the PRC. They were worried that the stability—the framework—was showing signs of wear and tear. I think largely due to the leadership of the Department of State and the White House, and hopefully with the DOD playing a supporting role, and our other agencies, that we've improved the framework of our engagement with the PRC, and hopefully, have bought a degree of stability to the Asian-Pacific region.
Now, the interesting thing is that when the doors are closed in Asia, and questions are asked, people say, wait a second, we wanted you to improve relations, but, you know, keep us informed. It's extremely important that, as the United States engages in a determined process to improve our relationship with China, that we make very clear the good China policy for the United States is fully imbedded in the region—the surrounding Asia-Pacific region—and that reassurance and close consultation are extremely important elements of a successful China policy.
I pledge to you today, the Members of the Committee, that we will work closely not only to continue close relationship, working to make a better relationship with China, but also to underscore the health and stability of our other relationship and alliances in the Asian-Pacific region.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kurt Campbell appears in the appendix.]
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Mr. BEREUTER. [presiding] Secretary Campbell, thank you very much for your statement, and for yours, Secretary Shirk. On behalf of the Administration, we appreciate your statements and the responses that you'll be able to give us in the question period that follows.
I want to thank the vice chairman, Congressman Peter King, for starting the hearing in my absence while I was handling an amendment on the DOD authorization bill.
I will call upon Mr. King first for his questions under the 5-minute rule.
Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Campbell, you wrote recently that the PRC should publicly renounce the use of force against Taiwan. It seems to cause some consternation. Can you give us your thoughts on the basis for the consternation, and where you see the policy going?
Dr. KURT CAMPBELL. Well, in fact, I did not write that. My view and the Department's view and the view of the U.S. Government is that the process across the Taiwan Straits should be conducted peacefully, and that the PRC should take whatever possible steps to ensure that Taiwan is not threatened in terms of its diplomacy with the PRC. I think that's entirely appropriate and consistent with the policy of the United States. Threats of use of force are not conducive to dialog, and I think we've seen an improving relationship, as Dr. Shirk has discussed, in the last several months based on communication as opposed to threats. I think that's very healthy.
Mr. KING. Secretary Campbell, you and Secretary Shirk, can you envision any conditions under which the United States will not come to Taiwan's defense?
Dr. KURT CAMPBELL. Congressman, I'm not going to sit here and answer those kinds of hypothetical questions. I want to just be very clear that the framework of our policy has stood us in very good stead over the last many years. I think it's provided the basis of peace and stability. We always refrain from answering those kinds of hypothetical questions.
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Dr. SHIRK. Yes, I don't think it's useful to speculate, but no one should underestimate the U.S. commitment to maintain peace and stability in the region.
Dr. KURT CAMPBELL. I think the language of the Taiwan Relations Act, Congressman, speaks for itself; grave consequences for steps that are counterproductive in terms of maintenance of peace and stability.
Mr. KING. Are there any assurances that you can give other than what you said in your testimony already to Taiwan and the upcoming summit as part of any tradeoff as far as nuclear sales to Pakistan from China—Taiwan will not be in any way sacrificed and there will be no cutting back on our support from Taiwan?
Dr. SHIRK. No, we have said it here; we have said to our colleagues from Taiwan; and we have said it in Beijing, and we will continue to say it: that our position toward our policies toward Taiwan are unshakeable, and we're not about to trade them away for any benefits in our relations with Beijing.
Dr. KURT CAMPBELL. Just to underscore that, Congressman, as I indicated, we have just concluded our annual exercise of the arms sales talks between the United States and Taiwan, which is the fundamental basis of our relationship between the United States and Taiwan. All the other important cultural, economic, people-to-people contacts are based on that fundamental. I don't think you need to hear it from me. I'd encourage you to ask both Taiwan interlocutors and others in the U.S. Government and on the outside. I think we had our most successful talks in many, many years, and I think that is proof positive that the United States will stand very firmly by Taiwan, and our commitments—our legal binding commitments—that we believe not only are in Taiwan's interest, but actually fundamentally in the U.S. interest, and I think perhaps even in PRC interest, as we go forward.
I also want to just thank you, actually, because I think the opportunity to make this statement as often as possible cannot be underestimated at this time.
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Mr. KING. Thank you for your testimony and for your reassurances. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. King.
Now I'd like to call on the distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Berman of California, for his question period.
Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First, either of you, is there anything wrong with China publicly renouncing the use of force in its efforts to resolve whatever disputes it might have with Taiwan?
Dr. SHIRK. No, of course there is nothing wrong with that, Congressman Berman. But we think that there is no magic formula for resolving the relations between the two sides, and it's not helpful for the U.S. Government to propose what Beijing should say, what Taipei should say, and how they should resolve their differences other than that it be done in a peaceful manner.
Mr. BERMAN. Well, that's an interesting question. It's not a policy that's being followed in the Middle East right now, but that's another story.
[Laughter.]
Dr. KURT CAMPBELL. Can I just say, Congressman, of course, it's not unhelpful. In fact, it could be quite productive, but it's also not likely.
Mr. BERMAN. All right. I mean, it certainly would provide some reassurance to Taiwan. First thing—before we get into that—I just want to follow up on the question Mr. King asked, the one thing the United States did do on this whole issue of what we'll do in terms of the defense of Taiwan. We have the Taiwan Relations Act, and we have our previous statements. Perhaps more importantly, in 1996, when there were missile attacks in the area around Taiwan, the United States moved carriers and other craft to the area in a demonstration which I think was effective in helping to bring a potential crisis back down. So I think—this is more than just simply words or repeating nostrums that have developed over the years—the Administration has acted.
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This question of not getting involved, if the Taiwanese would like to hear a public renunciation of the use of force, and they would, and if the Taiwanese would like the President to seek that, and if the Chinese leadership would like Taiwan to renounce any declaration of full independence as opposed to greater levels of participation in international forum, and the Chinese would like the United States to help to secure that, why would the United States want to settle? We want the parties to deal with this with each other; we don't want to get in the middle of this; we don't want to play a role when the external circumstances might be such that both parties would like you to play a facilitating role. I'll just throw that out.
Mr. BEREUTER. Would the gentlemen yield? We have a dilemma here in that we have a 15-minute vote and then three 5-minute votes. I anticipate this is going to take us 35 minutes, and I know that our Assistant Secretary will have to go. My suggestion—and I would ask unanimous consent to proceed under this order—is that this gentleman's question be answered shortly, but each of the other Members here be able to ask a question which we will accumulate for the two of you to respond to before we take a significant recess and permit you to go back to the rest of your businesses. I would ask unanimous consent for us to proceed in that order. Is there any objection?
Mr. BERMAN. I have no objection to it, and I will not say another word at this point in terms of the question, but is Dr. Campbell also leaving or is just Dr.——
Dr. KURT CAMPBELL. Yes, we both are.
Mr. BEREUTER. So, if you could keep his question in mind, I now call upon Mr. Rohrabacher and then Mr. Brown for the statement of a quick question to either or both of the witnesses.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let us not forget that it is on Taiwan we have democracy, and on the mainland you have a dictatorship. When we are trying to determine what American policy should be, we should always keep in mind that America should be on the side of people who believe in democracy and freedom, and not on the side of those who would maintain a vicious Communist dictatorship.
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With that in mind, is the United States, is it our position of our government, that we are willing to provide Taiwan—meaning the people who are living under the democratic government—missile defense and submarine tracking systems that are purely defensive technologies in order to deter any type of military aggression through the Taiwan Straits?
That's my question. Thank you very much.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Brown.
Mr. BROWN. Just a brief comment: I hear over and over—and I heard Dr. Shirk do it and then I heard the President say it—that it's up to the Chinese on each side of the Strait to decide. Does that mean the Taiwanese, who are 80 percent of the people on the island, should have no role in that? I don't think you mean that.
I'll just ask this question: I wonder why the Administration over and over talks about the Chinese on each side of the Strait, ignoring that 80 percent of the islanders are of Taiwanese extraction, not Chinese extraction.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Brown.
We will ask your cooperation—the two of you in your Departments—to respond to written questions from any of the Members. Now if you would respond to Mr. Berman, Mr. Rohrabacher, and Mr. Brown's questions.
Dr. SHIRK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
In response first, taking them in the order they were asked, Congressman Berman's question about a U.S. mediating role in cross-Strait relations, I think the key here is the desires of the two sides. You said in your question, if the two sides would like us to get involved, why don't we get involved? The important point, I believe, is that the two sides at the present time do not want us to be involved. In fact, we have given some assurances that we will not play a mediating role, and that is the desire of the two sides.
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Mr. BERMAN. Well, one side, very clearly, wants us to ask you to ask the Chinese to make a public renunciation of the use of force. That I can testify to.
[Laughter.]
Dr. SHIRK. Well, again, that's one side's request of the other side. As you point out, there are different requests that each side has of the other side. At the present time, there's an overall preference of the two sides that we not play a mediating role, and we think that makes sense.
Dr. KURT CAMPBELL. Just on that point, Congressman Berman, the other issue that I'm sure you're well aware of is that, as you go farther into some of this sort of speculative thinking about refining a policy in one direction or the other, you quickly run into very dicey and difficult definitional questions. What does force mean; what does independence mean; what does pressure mean? And I think those are some of the very hidden, but extremely important unintended consequences of some of these things.
Our current policy I think has many pluses. And, of course, the critics will point to the down sides, as there are with any complex sophisticated policy. I would argue that after 25 years, however, we understand most of the unintended consequences. And my own personal belief is that the framework of the three communiqués, the Taiwan Relations Act, provides us with all we need for sophisticated diplomacy. When you start calling for other things, basically, what that is is an admission that you can't work the machinery. So I think that what we've got is a framework that can be viable and extremely useful for the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits.
Congressman Rohrabacher, I think your question is very important. Let me talk about two things in particular in terms of military capabilities. First of all, the anti-submarine mission where Taiwan—we gauge to be among the most important—and we provide, I think, as you know, comprehensive detailed classified briefings to all of your staff. In fact, we just had I think three 2 weeks ago or last week. I'd be happy, and I'll just put you on notice right now, I'll be happy to brief you tomorrow, your staff, about the various capabilities that we are working with Taiwan: hardware, including in addition to that, some software, some people-to-people contacts that we think go directly at this particular challenge, which we agree is significant.
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Second, I think as you know, and again I'll be prepared to talk about this at any time at perhaps a more private setting, but we provide Taiwan with state-of-the-art advanced air defense systems. These are primarily for aircraft, but they do have some limited TMD capability for not very sophisticated scud-type weapons. There are some other associated architecture issues, in terms of radars and other issues, that Taiwan does not have, but I can assure you that on all aspects of defense requirements for Taiwan, we are in close consultation and we talk to them in very great detail in all of these matters.
Dr. SHIRK. And in response to Congressman Brown's question, are we talking about the Taiwanese majority who live on Taiwan when we talk about the Chinese on both sides of the Strait? Yes, indeed, we are.
Mr. BROWN. I would advise the President, if that's not presumptuous, to say it more precisely. I think it really is a message to the Taiwanese that we may side with the 20 percent Chinese more than the Taiwanese; and the Chinese are not Taiwanese; and the Taiwanese are not Chinese; and I think that should be made more clear.
Dr. SHIRK. Sir, this is a shorthand that we used in our communiqués——
Mr. BROWN. George Orwell used shorthand, too. I understand that. But shorthand, when imprecise and inaccurate and misleading, is simply not accurate.
Dr. SHIRK. I take your point, sir.
Mr. BROWN. Thank you.
Mr. BEREUTER. The Chairman has not had a question, and so my question would be related to the Taiwan Relations Act, where the President and the Congress show the term of the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services provided solely on their judgment for the needs of Taiwan. You had discussions at the annual arms sales talk in April 1998, and I would ask you, is there any policy change regarding arms sales to Taiwan?
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Dr. KURT CAMPBELL. Absolutely none.
Dr. SHIRK. I second that.
Mr. BEREUTER. I thank you very much for being here and for your testimony. We would appreciate as rapid as possible responses to our questions, since this is an issue of some immediate importance.
And I would say to the audience and to our distinguished second panel upcoming, that we will recess until 2:50.
[Recess.]
Mr. BEREUTER. The Subcommittee will be in order.
For our second panel today, we are extraordinarily fortunate to have three distinguished Americans. The Honorable James Lilley has served as both Ambassador to the People's Republic of China and the Director of the American Institute on Taiwan. He has a depth of understanding that few can match and has had a leading hand in the formulation of America's China policy for over two decades. He now serves as resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
Mr. Doug Paal, President of the Asia-Pacific Policy Center, had major responsibilities for Asia policy at the National Security Council during the Bush Administration. The ensuing years, Mr. Paal has maintained close contact with policymakers in both Taipei and Beijing.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Nat Bellocchi is a distinguished career Foreign Service officer who served as director of the American Institute on Taiwan. He now serves as chairman of Bellocchi and Company, a company which advises corporations doing business in Taiwan and the People's Republic of China.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for coming today. We'd like to ask you to limit your introductory comments to about 10 minutes each, and that will allow some time for questions and discussion. I expect the Ranking Member will be back with us here shortly, among others.
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We'll first call upon Ambassador James Lilley for his remarks. Ambassador Lilley, you may proceed as you wish. Entire statements that the three of you have will be made a part of the record.
STATEMENT OF JAMES LILLEY, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND FORMER DIRECTOR, AMERICAN INSTITUTE ON TAIWAN, RESIDENT FELLOW, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Mr. LILLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
There are many positive developments in U.S.-China relations which I can support. Madame Albright was just there; Charlene Barshevsky, David Aaron, and they made progress, I hope, on the trade front; and I've always supported MFN extension for China.
Madame Albright mentioned again ''strategic partnership,'' and I think that there is merit to that, but, as the Chinese say, there's another side of the coin. So I'm going to look at the other side of the coin.
Chinese attempts to procure missile technology are longstanding. In late 1989 the Bush Administration waived ASIA SAT, which was fired successfully in April 1990, with 24 transponders, to bring news into South and Southwest China. They had access to information which they did not before, which I thought was a positive move. This was also before the detection of M–11 sales to Pakistan, and we subsequently sanctioned China and took this away.
The Chinese priority now, I believe, is to block arms sales to Taiwan. They have stressed theater missile defense must be blocked—also a very high priority. They want a fourth communiqué they want the French Formula accepted on arms sales to Taiwan, and they're putting considerable pressure on us to do these. On theater missile defense, the Chinese say it's the same as first strike capability, and in the same breath they say, ''Our own first strike, however, does not apply to Taiwan as it is part of China.''
Let me go back a little bit on the use of PRC missile diplomacy, because I think this figures into Taiwan; it also figures into a current debate here. The PRC use of missile diplomacy is unprecedented. They are probably the only nation in the world that has ever fired nuclear-capable missiles near their target area which is political. The North Koreans haven't done this; the Russians didn't do it, in the way the Chinese have. The Chinese had a live-fire exercise in 1995. They fired their DongFen–15 missile on 21 July 1995. And one crashed; its guidance system failed. I think the guidance system is rather important to remember.
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Late in March 1996, M–9 nuclear-capable missiles were fired off Taiwan, and, as you know, and as the Administration proudly said today, we sent aircraft carriers off the east coast of Taiwan. The single greatest fear of the commanding officer of that particular battle group was Chinese missiles landing on his carriers.
Eric McVaden, Admiral, says that the missile live-fire exercises were the most successful part of the March 1996 exercise. It was at this precise time in March 1996—the same month that they fired live missiles at Taiwan—that the President overrode the recommendations of the Department of State and the Department of Defense, and approved relaxed export controls for China by moving the missile technology from the Munitions Board at State over to the Department of Commerce.
I ask you one question: As American sailors went into the east coast of Taiwan and missiles were their most dangerous threat, and the President was approving relaxed controls to Taiwan, I merely ask the question, was this in America's national interest?
Let me go on, and let me give you a quote of what the Chinese themselves have recently said about tracking stations and missiles. They have set up, as you know, a satellite ground station in Kiribi, also known as Tarawa, where thousands of Marines were lost in World War II. The Chinese have a tracking station in the Mid-Pacific for reconnaissance satellites and missiles, and this is what this magazine ''Wide-Angle'' said, and this belongs partially to Chinese Defense Industry Association:
''In a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, Chinese reconnaissance satellites will know the exact location of U.S. aircraft carriers, as well as Taiwanese destroyers and frigates,'' the magazine said. ''If the satellites are used to coordinate a saturated strike by long-range anti-ship missiles and submarines, neither the United States nor Taiwan naval force could defend themselves.''
Now it seems to me this is a clear-cut statement of what the Chinese figure their missiles can do in terms of the U.S. presence in that area. It's also a statement that they've learned their lessons of March 1996, and they're moving ahead with what we call asymmetrical warfare to develop systems to deal with the American missile threat.
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The missile diplomacy goes back a long way. Missiles were transferred to the coast of Taiwan in January 1995, which, according to my colleague, Rick Fisher, was at the time that President Jiang Zemin was making his forward-looking eight-point proposal to Taiwan. They were moved in their base from Jiangxi down to the borders of Fujian, and that's where they are kept.
So all I'm saying is that, if you're in Taiwan and you're looking at what the United States is doing with the Chinese Missile program, there's a very murky picture; and at a time when Taiwan is under threat, the President is releasing technology on an easier basis to China.
The second thing I think is important, that Congress address this whole business of arms sales to Taiwan. I know you've had a very hard time getting the various departments to talk to you. My good friend, Kurt Campbell, mentioned he briefed you on this, but this isn't what I'm hearing.
The Taiwan Relations Act clearly spells out that Congress and the Executive have a joint role, and that Congress must be completely apprised of the Executive programs on arms for Taiwan. If you feel satisfied, I withdraw my point. But I also have read in Defense News, and I think we should get a comment on that, by an article in the 26 April edition, saying that, ''U.S. and Taiwan sources said that failure to approve new items on Taiwan's list of weaponry will be interpreted as evidence of a de facto, yet unacknowledged, moratorium on new arms to Taiwan in an attempt to curry favor with China on the runup to the President's visit to China in June.''
It seems to me a full accounting is in order for that because Congress has a say on what kind of weapon systems are approved for Taiwan. It was the intent of the Taiwan Relations Act to do this, and my friend, former New York Congressman, Lester Wolf, is here and can assure you that's the case; that he wrote the book on this; he wrote the act; he wrote the intentions. And the intent is always the key part of this—that Congress needs to play a very important role, not only in watchdogging with the Administration, but according to the act actually participating in the systems—deciding on the systems.
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Let's move on just to one or two subjects as I close out. I think there's another aspect that's important. I'd like to see somebody ask people like Susan Shirk, and perhaps others, about this question. When Lee Teng Hui, the President of Taiwan, came here in 1995, June, he went to Cornell University's alma mater; he didn't see a single Federal official; and the Chinese pulled out their ambassador and they went into a paroxysm of rage and accusations. We're a superpower, true, and they have reason to be upset perhaps because of the way it was bungled.
But I want to raise with you something that always puzzles me about our reaction to what the Chinese do. If the Vice President of Taiwan goes to Malaysia, he gets a motorcade; he goes right to the Premiere's office; he meets him in his office, and he discusses a whole series of matters with him. His cabinet from Taiwan, including the Foreign Minister, and everybody else is with him. If he goes to Singapore, he gets much the same treatment. If he comes to the United States, he's put in a hotel room and he's not allowed to see anybody. Is there some sort of an imbalance here? It seems to me I've never thought of America as a fourth rate Banana Republic, but I do think that we've got to watch this and see how we're being treated as opposed to other nations such as Malaysia which also recognize China as the sole legal government.
Finally, I would just mention that the Chinese have vehemently denied any involvement in campaign funding or any link between campaign funding and the issuance of licenses. I want to bring you up to date on another vehement denial they just made. As you may recall in the papers today, the Canadians got a photograph film of Chinese beating up people in the Shanghai police station, and they put it out. The Chinese said this is all an utter fabrication, and it is designed to slander China. The same words are used about the campaign funding. So when you look at the vehement denials, I think you've got to take into consideration who's denying what in the face of what evidence.
Thank you very much.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Lilley, for those questions and comments.
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Now, we'll hear from Mr. Douglas Paal, president of the Asia-Pacific Policy Center. Mr. Paal.
STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS PAAL, PRESIDENT, ASIA-PACIFIC POLICY CENTER
Mr. PAAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to put my statement on record today. I'd like to just touch on five points that I deal with in greater detail in the statement.
First is considerable anticipation about what the President may or may not do when he visits China with respect to Taiwan this coming June. We heard today some statements from the two Administration witnesses. I found no comfort from the statement I heard from Deputy Assistant Secretary Shirk on the issue of whether or not the President of the United States will make remarks in China with respect to the so-called ''three no's'' which she spelled out as no independence for Taiwan, no U.N. membership for Taiwan, and no one-China/one-Taiwan formula. This can sound benign to our ears.
I'm told the President has in various forms conveyed this message to the Chinese previously officially. But think about the context. The statements are consistent with our policy, but they are also consistent with objectives that China has as pressure tactics on the people of Taiwan. These three no's are intended really to foreclose the outcome of whatever talks may someday take place between Taiwan and the mainland.
To me intellectually, hypothetically, it's entirely possible that, after 25 years, Taiwan and the PRC may want to go separate ways. Why should the United States put itself on record as being opposed to Taiwan reaching that outcome through a dialog with the mainland? This is an inconsistency in policy, and it tends to put us on the side of the PRC with respect to Taiwan unnecessarily.
The second point I have is to suggest that the Congress call upon the Administration to undertake a comprehensive review of the military balance of the Taiwan Straits. I've been out of office for 5 or 6 years now, and I'm not privy to all the intelligence that's been taking place, but my understanding is that no comprehensive review of the changing military balance has been done. There have been some snapshots taken, but the kind of thorough-going review that our agencies can do on an interagency basis would look at what China has done to transfer capabilities that are no longer needed to be dedicated against the northern border with the former Soviet Union, as successive agreements have been reached between Moscow and Beijing. And what has perhaps been done with respect to Taiwan, and how that should affect our overall consideration of Taiwan's defense requirements.
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I suspect the Administration can put up a pretty good case that they've been thinking about this. I don't think there's a substitute, however, for a comprehensive review that really engages the top-quality intelligence and other analysis we have in the U.S. Government.
The third point is that congressional oversight of Taiwan policy has been lying fallow in the last few years. Arms sales to Taiwan have been taking place. But notifications to Congress, you may notice, have not been forthcoming since about the time of Jiang Zemin's visit to the United States last October, as I understand it.
These tend to pile up, these notifications. People say we don't want to issue them now because we're going there, or they're coming here, and it could ruffle feathers. After a while, you've got so many notifications that you never want to release them because it may look like we're suddenly unloading the entire arsenal at one time.
I think the function that this Committee, and other committees, can serve in supervising an oversight of the arms sales policy is enormous, and this is one area in particular where I think Congress has a right to speak and a duty to speak.
Fourth, on the issue of Taiwan's defense needs, a lot has been said, and some things have been attributed to me that have not been quite accurate, but I appreciate the opportunity to say here that we're now at a phase in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan—defense articles and services sales to Taiwan—when we have less of an emphasis on new hardware—planes, ships, tanks—and more of an emphasis on improving their interoperability. Here again, I think your Committee and others can serve a useful purpose in making sure Taiwan extracts maximum value from the kinds of equipment that have been transferred, and we make sure that we give the know-how to go with the equipment. We just don't want to turn these into emblematic transfers that don't do the job of providing the security that the American people expect us to provide for Taiwan.
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A final point that's on the question of improving dialog between Washington and Taipei: Over the last years, everybody knows the United States have done a great deal to strengthen conversations, and so-called strategic dialog, between the United States and Beijing. To a small degree, there have been improvements in our dialog with Taiwan. Personnel changes at the AIT office in Washington have been a significant improvement. But the degree to which Taiwan's political situation has exploded into a new and more democratic phenomenon, the degree to which there are many voices—a polyphony of voices—in Taiwan today on the issue of independence of Taiwan, reunification with the mainland, and other issues that are before the Taiwan public and political leads, means the United States has to do a better job of making clear what its views are to them.
Here I would recommend that Congress urge the Administration to appoint people to more clearly represent the Administration on a more frequent basis, to get friends and counselors and other unofficial envoys over to Taiwan to talk to the full range of political figures there and explain what our views are.
This recommendation is intended to be in contrast to a kind of slipshod approach where people volunteer to go over to China, to Taiwan, and they make their own remarks, and they're misunderstood as Administration views. We've had quite a spate of that in recent times.
Finally, I'll just point out that I think on a trip the Chairman took with Speaker Gingrich a year and a half ago to China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, the proper note was struck in how to deal with the issue of Taiwan's security. The message that was given to Beijing loud and clear, that the United States stands behind Taiwan, was the correct one. The private message to Taiwan about caution was also the correct message and the correct method of delivering it. I would encourage that to be continued.
Thank you, sir.
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Paal appears in the appendix.]
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Paal.
Next we'll hear from Mr. Nat Bellocchi, chairman of Bellocchi and Company.
STATEMENT OF NAT BELLOCCHI, FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER, AND DIRECTOR, AMERICAN INSTITUTE ON TAIWAN, CHAIRMAN, BELLOCCHI AND COMPANY
Mr. BELLOCCHI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to express my view here before the Committee. I'll try to abbreviate the oral presentation. I have submitted a full statement to the Committee.
I've just come back from a trip to Taiwan and the main topic of conversation, as usual, is domestic politics, with the legislature going through its budget exercise and getting ready for their elections toward the end of this year. But the main conversation in domestic politics is still the Presidential election coming in the year 2000, at which time Taiwan will have a new President, though it's absolutely unclear at this time who that will be.
The other subject of most interest that I found was the resumption of cross-straits talks and the forthcoming summit meeting between President Clinton and President Jiang in Beijing. The people there, it seems to me, are generally ambivalent about what that summit will mean for Taiwan. There remains a pretty strong residue of trust that the United States will not harm their interests, but at the same time there's great concern that the pressures generated by a summit meeting between these two powers will bring some gains to the PRC at Taiwan's expense.
One of the things I noticed in talking with people out there is that so often when our own people go to Taiwan, as well as academics there and people here in Washington, often intermingle the two words ''dialog'' and ''negotiations'' in trying to urge Taiwan to resume talks with the PRC. For people in Taiwan, they have two entirely different meanings, as they should have everywhere. Dialog—the government has always been in favor of it—in fact, it's been putting forth proposals for some time to resume a dialog. But negotiations to them are translated as political talks that would raise tensions rather than lower them.
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Our government just recently has categorically said there will be no fourth communiqué at the forthcoming summit, nor any change in arms sales policies. I think that's going to be reassuring in Taiwan. I would suggest we could do a little more, and that is, you recall in the 1982 communiqué, following that, we gave six assurances to Taiwan with regard to arms sales. I think the fact is that these are something less than a communiqué. In fact, they have no standing at all. A public statement of this commitment would do much to raise the status of these six assurances, and reassure the people on Taiwan.
The possibility that the United States might be pressed to refine our own one-China policy is another factor that clearly makes Taiwan very uneasy. Time is needed to develop a consensus in Taiwan on the Taiwan-PRC relationship, before that island can be prepared to address a formal relationship with Beijing. The excitement that is brought on by democracy of openly debating the issue of Taiwan's political status is already moderated, to a surprising degree, in only a few short years.
A greater degree of consensus has been reached, but it is a slow, laborious process. One must remember that some political leaders who now hold the responsibilities of elected office there spent time in jail for their political views not too long ago. The leadership in the opposition party, which has as its objective independence for Taiwan, has moved closer to the middle ground on cross-Straits issues. It is unlikely that that party would renounce its objective. But, increasingly, that becomes a long-term ultimate objective, much like unification is to the ruling party.
In the meantime, other policies of the two main parties are not that far apart. There are some differences in economic policies, but in policies dealing with security and foreign policy they are very much the same. Time, it seems to me, could help to bring even greater consensus among the people on that island.
There's also in Taiwan a situation that resembles Washington somewhat. The executive branch is in the hands of the ruling party. The legislature is so closely divided that in electing their own speaker—the speaker got in by one vote—so it is almost a split government, as it is here in Washington. That means that even in cross-Straits relations, movements to strengthen economic relations with the PRC, for example, to satisfy one constituency, usually means that they must balance these movements by gaining more international support as a separate entity to satisfy another constituency. There is always this balancing that must be done.
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The PRC, of course, does not accept this political reality on Taiwan, and seems to have increased its efforts to isolate Taiwan in the international community. To some, efforts by Taiwan to expand its international participation seems provocative, given the PRC opposition. It is, however, a matter of survival. Without international support, Taiwan will be at the mercy of the PRC in negotiating and even discussing the future relationship.
One of the reasons the Congress and the TRA assured that arms sales of defensive weapons would continue to be sold to Taiwan, even after the break in relations, was to provide Taiwan with confidence it would need in future dealings with the PRC. The same could be said of supporting participation by Taiwan in international organizations. It would be strongly opposed by the PRC, but it would be in our interest to have Taiwan contributing its resources and knowledge to the international community, and subjecting itself to the same rules it observes. Even in the Taiwan Policy Review, which Secretary Shirk referred to, it was recognized that Taiwan has a legitimate role to play in a number of international issues, and that it was in general international interest, as well as our own, for Taiwan's voice to be heard by appropriate international organizations. Unfortunately, the net result is we went in the opposite direction and said we would not support Taiwan in any international organizations that require statehood, which of course includes the most important of the international organizations.
Some form of membership in these organizations could also provide a useful platform for meetings between the two sides, thereby contributing to stability. In answering those who would like the United States to take a more active role in resolving the cross-Straits issue, something that Secretary Shirk also brought up, we usually reaffirm our policy that the United States does not want to broker that difficult issue itself, but to help create the atmosphere for two sides to do so themselves. Of course, I agree. But one of the best platforms would be an international organization in which the two sides could meet informally and in a neutral setting.
The present Asian financial crisis is demonstrating once again, as it did during the Persian Gulf War, that it serves no one's interest to keep Taiwan with its resources and capabilities from contributing to the international community's needs. As for Taiwan, where will it turn for help, should it need to do so, if it has a financial crisis of its own? Can it turn to the IMF? Can it turn to the World Bank, as others have done?
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The Taiwan Policy Review recognizes that profound changes have taken place in China and Taiwan, and the study was meant to accommodate changing circumstances there. Despite the profound nature of the changes, the study admitted that the adjustments made were only refinements of existing policy.
The restrictive system for conducting their relations with Taiwan, established in 1979, may have been appropriate at a time when it was generally believed that Taiwan would soon be absorbed by the PRC. But today's Taiwan is clearly a de facto country, and in its present form or in some other, is likely to be around for some time.
The system for conducting this unofficial relationship was entirely devised by us. There is nothing in the communiqués or any other agreement with the PRC that spells out how we are to conduct this relationship other than it is to be unofficial. We then proceeded to devise one that is based almost entirely on what we thought the PRC would think about any particular activity. At times, frankly, this makes us appear silly, like prescribing what buildings these supposedly private persons from Taiwan can enter. But it also can be dangerous, as Secretary Campbell pointed out—there are no military contacts whatever, even when our ships or planes of the 7th Fleet even routinely operate in the Taiwan Straits.
If we wish to provide greater encouragement to Taiwan in addressing its relationships with PRC, I suggest three actions we could take in this regard: One, we could make our six assurances to Taiwan a matter of public record through a statement from the Administration or through legislation; two, we could establish a policy that we will support Taiwan's participation in some form in international organizations to which it can make a contribution; and, three, we could revise our own rules on conducting this unofficial relationship to allow more realistic opportunities for dialog between us, including at senior levels.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bellocchi appears in the appendix.]
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Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much.
I'll start just where you finished, Mr. Bellocchi, and that is your third point. How would you anticipate that could be done?
Mr. BELLOCCHI. Well, I think we could make it by simply doing it without much fanfare. But the fact is that we have people transiting through here at senior levels and they are supposedly private citizens. I think senior-level meetings have an important function. If they're going to take place, things are done by each bureaucracy to assure that some things can be agreed on at the senior level.
Mr. BEREUTER. And these meetings could address issues before international bodies?
Mr. BELLOCCHI. These would be bilateral.
Mr. BEREUTER. But they could address issues that are coming before international bodies which the Taiwanese are not able to join. Is that your point, or is that one of your points?
Mr. BELLOCCHI. Well, it was one of the points, but it was primarily for bilateral purposes they could get together and talk about some of these issues.
Mr. BEREUTER. The line regarding which international organizations Taiwan can participate in as a full member; is it based strictly on the interpretation of what is a sovereign state?
Mr. BELLOCCHI. It depends on whether the international organization requires statehood as a requirement for membership. That has been defined as things like IMF and the World Bank, which are in the U.N. system. Therefore, they're not qualified—even though I was told this morning that Taiwan was actually a member of the IMF and the World Bank for 9 years after they left the United Nations. So there are ways that could be found for Taiwan to participate.
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Mr. BEREUTER. Taiwan, for example, is eligible to join the WTO?
Mr. BELLOCCHI. The WTO—because the WTO is not made up of sovereign states.
Mr. BEREUTER. Right. And we're waiting for agreements with the various existing members that they are meeting the necessary requirements and commitments and the phase-in periods of time. The United States has just concluded its arrangements, but the European community, for example, has not. But the WHO requires that they be a sovereign state, is that correct?
Mr. BELLOCCHI. That I'm not clear.
Mr. PAAL. They must be U.N. members to be in the WHO.
Mr. BEREUTER. Is that same rationale said to apply now to the World Bank?
Mr. PAAL. The World Bank is also——
Mr. BEREUTER. Another one of the threatened institutions?
Mr. BELLOCCHI. Yes. However, that does not include observers which Taiwan has asked for.
Mr. BEREUTER. Ambassador Lilley, you raised a question. Your comments were about the interesting imbalance that seems to exist between the way we treat a Vice President or a President of Taiwan versus the way that person would be received in some other countries. It came to a great deal of attention to this country when I believe the Administration misread the attitude of the American people, and certainly the Congress, with respect to President Lee's visit to his alma mater, then reversed the course and permitted him to make that kind of visit.
What can you or the panel members tell me about the history of how our treatment of the elected leadership, or the leadership of Taiwan has evolved? Was there ever a period of time when they were accorded a different kind of status, since 1979, for example? How have we come to have our policy regarding how these elected persons are received in our country?
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Mr. LILLEY. Well, it started way back in 1980 that the Taiwan officials were not permitted to go either to the White House or the State Department. That was the decision made at the time.
Mr. BEREUTER. Ambassador Lilley, was that directly as a result of the Taiwan Relations Act? Was it cited as such?
Mr. LILLEY. It was done informally.
Mr. PAAL. It was done by interpretation.
Mr. LILLEY. Informally. Then when President Reagan came in 1981, there was a full court press from Taiwan to elevate this because they felt he was a friend. And at that time, the team in the State Department blocked it and said we wanted continuity in the relationship, and we should not allow Taiwan officials to come into the White House or the State Department. Now, then you get into the real world of how you make things work, because after there was a cleaning of house in the State Department, 1982, then you got a new team in and we started seeing Taiwan officials all the time. With all due respect to Dr. Shirk, that the Taiwan policy review started to elevate all of these things is not true. That was going on all the time. Vice President Lee came here; Premiere Yu Kuo-hun came here; the Foreign Minister came here; they all came here. It was handled discreetly. But they came and they were treated with dignity and respect.
That continued all through the 1980's, and my sense is the Taiwan Policy Review was probably a mistake. As I said at that time, you took this review and you stuck it right in the Chinese face. They had to react; whereas before, we always handled this quietly. And the Taiwan leaders did get access—not to the White House and State, that still holds—but you could see these people at restaurants; you could see them in hotel rooms; you could see them at many places around the world. And official, high-ranking Americans visited Taiwan regularly. So we had a regular pattern going. We set the precedent and then lived with it.
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Our friends, meanwhile, had their own interpretation of how to deal with Taiwan officially and were moving ahead in their own way, often ahead of us. The Chinese always focused a great deal more on us and what we did, unfortunately.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you.
Mr. Paal, your comments regarding congressional oversight of our relationship with Taiwan certainly caught my attention. I want to do as good a job as we possibly can in the House and the Congress. You mentioned how oftentimes a report to Congress on arms sales the notifications are delayed, pile up, and then there is even more concern or embarrassment about revealing those. What would you think about a monthly request to the Administration by this Subcommittee of anything that has happened in the way of arms sales, transfers, and decisions related to arms in the last month? Just do it routinely?
Mr. PAAL. Routine is good; whether it's a month or 2 months, it doesn't matter. Routine request dislodges its bone from the throat of the Administration and becomes the normal practice of the U.S. Government, so that even the initial presumed reaction of the PRC would recede over time into just a routine reaction. This would be a beneficial process.
Mr. BEREUTER. If we cited the Taiwan Relations Act and the requirement that Ambassador Lilley mentioned, and I mentioned earlier in a question to the panel, would that be the proper predicate for that type of question which would make it difficult for an Administration to fail to respond?
Mr. PAAL. I'm not a lawyer on this issue. My reading and understanding of the Taiwan Relations Act would send me in that direction initially, but I'd seek counsel as well because the various privileges claimed and possessed by the Presidency are controversial.
Mr. BEREUTER. Now I would ask a question to any or all of the three of you related to a fairly interesting and controversial op-ed piece written last March by Dean Joseph Nye of the John F. Kennedy School of Government, the former Assistant Secretary of Defense under the Clinton Administration.
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He referred to his proposal as ''dynamic status quo,'' and it had three parts; it fell on all three entities. The United States should reiterate its one-China policy and its no-use-for-force policy. It should add that, if Taiwan were to declare independence, we would not recognize nor defend it. Two, Beijing is called on to assure greater living space for Taiwan, if Taiwan decisively rejects the idea of declaring independence. Three, Taiwan would explicitly undertake to foreswear any steps toward independence, intensify cross-Strait talks, and increase cross-Strait exchanges and investment.
I lay this out for the record. I know you're all three familiar with it because it has become quite controversial in Taiwan. What are your views about this proposal, and how do you think it should affect American policymakers here in Congress or in the Administration? And perhaps you can spell out why you think it's so controversial, if you have that view?
Mr. LILLEY. I think on the surface, it makes logic in an academic sense. Again, I would recommend that Dr. Nye read the minutes of the Marshall Mission to China in 1945–1946 and see the limitations and the value of American intervention in Chinese Internal affairs.
I think the perception in Taiwan was that he was largely carrying China's water and that the way he handled it was mainly in Beijing's interest. In Taiwan he lectured. In China, he listened—so the Taiwanese leaders said. As Doug Paal says, you're foreclosing options for Taiwan in this, and you really aren't doing very much for Beijing. You're not asking them to renounce force; you're merely saying to Beijing, there's no need to use force because we won't recognize Taiwan's independence and we'll discourage other people from doing so. So there's no need for Beijing to use force. But Beijing will not renounce the use of force; they simply won't do it. It's a good tactic to put China on the defensive, but you have to be conscious of the fact that they probably won't change.
Mr. BEREUTER. If you want results, you don't expect it from that kind of request?
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Mr. LILLEY. You're simply not going to get them to do it. This is their sacred, sovereign right, and they can be quite impossible on this.
Mr. BEREUTER. Even if it is coupled with the assertion by the Taiwanese that they are not seeking independence?
Mr. LILLEY. I can't read their mind, but this gets into the very touchy business of internal Chinese sovereign affairs. You can get into that, as we have through the Taiwan Relations Act, and through other ways. But this is a direct intervention without much subtlety into their internal affairs, saying that we are going to dictate to you how this works out. China and Taiwan have, in fact, been more or less working on their own Chinese version of that formula for some time. Simply put, Taiwan doesn't declare independence; Beijing doesn't use force.
That broke down in 1995–1996. The perception in Taiwan was, as I mentioned earlier in my chronology of the missile games that China played, that the United States was looking the other way until the last possible minute when they had to send aircraft carriers in. And even then, the idea that the President had approved licenses during that month—or approved the shifting of the policy—the sense was that you talked a good game, but you did not mean it. Joe Nye's position looked to them as though it was just so much more talk. It's not a framework in which we can make arrangements with China.
Mr. BEREUTER. Do you think, gentlemen, that there is a substantial or even growing sentiment on Taiwan that the United States would be supportive of Taiwan, even if it declared independence?
Mr. PAAL. Sir, I think the evidence is pretty clear that there is substantial opinion that believes that or asserts it, for purposes of trying to make it a fact, even if they don't believe it's a fact. This was behind the point I was making earlier in my remarks about the need for the Administration to be much more clear and repetitive and high level and authoritative in its conversations with a broad range of politicians in Taiwan. The number of private citizens who've gone and expressed their own views in Taiwan one way or the other on this issue has really helped to keep the issue alive and confusing for many people. This is an area where the Administration has started to do the right thing, but hasn't done enough of it.
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Mr. BELLOCCHI. One of the things I see from his statement is very common. Mr. Perry, the former Secretary of Defense, also used the term ''don't declare independence.'' There is no one of the political leadership of at least the main parties in Taiwan that will. They have all said they would not declare independence. So we're batting at one thing that is not likely to happen.
The other element of his essay seems to me is the way he ignored the democratic character in Taiwan as body politic; that he would do away with the idea of self-determination. Even though we may be opposed to some kind of self-determination that would lead to independence because of the problem it would bring, I don't think we should be in a position to say we deny some people certain elements of a democracy that all of us have.
Mr. LILLEY. I think that the polls that we've seen lately in Taiwan indicate that perhaps 70–80 percent of the voters prefer the status quo. They don't want to move in the direction of independence or of unification with China.
The second issue that bugs the Chinese is that ''independence'' is in the party charter of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party of Taiwan. But when the leader of that party came over here, he said, ''I can't take it out of our party constitution, but it's hinged on a plebescite, and the plebescite can be put off indefinitely, so it doesn't kick in even if we are elected.'' Now if you go to them and say, ''Get it out of your party constitution,'' he says, ''I can't do that.''
Mr. BEREUTER. There are two elements in the Taiwan Relations Act that interest me. One is that the United States will not play any mediation role between Taipei and Peking; and the other is that the United States will not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the Chinese Communists. Do you think, for example, that the Nye proposal violates that? Do you think that these provisions are generally considered to be provisions we could ignore these days? Or are they still important and relevant to our relationship with Taiwan and the PRC?
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Mr. PAAL. Sir, you've quoted from something known as six assurances, which were issued in testimony in various forms in 1982 at the time of the arms sales Communiqué regarding Taiwan. I believe these are bedrock; they provide the stability for our relationship with Taiwan. They maintain what faith Taiwan can have in our willingness and ability to stand behind them, should they be victims of pressure or military attack.
I don't know a single person familiar with the history of U.S.-China relations, whether they're on the left, the right, or in the center, who thinks that the Nye proposal is not in conflict with those principles, or that the Nye proposal really stands on solid, realist ground. It's an effort to involve ourselves in an area precisely we had abjured in 1982.
Mr. BEREUTER. Any other comments from you gentlemen on that?
Let me go more directly to the upcoming summit meeting between President Jiang Zemin and President Clinton. Their press report suggests that the PRC will seek concessions from the Administration regarding U.S. arms sales to Taiwan at the upcoming summit. This, of course, worries the Taiwanese and is, in part, the reason we're having this hearing. What would you have to say about that subject in general? As part of the Administration, none of you are privy to those discussions, but what should we think here in the Congress about those allegations?
Mr. PAAL. Well, I think it's important for the Congress to raise the question and to keep feet to the fire on this issue. My own sense is that the President understands, or his key people understand, that he's on shaky enough ground going to Tiananmen Square 9 years almost to the date after the massacre there. But to throw in concessions with respect to Taiwan will only further erode the basis for a sound China policy. I think this is well understood by key people in the Administration, but at other levels it's not well understood and the chatter has been maintained in this town that something can be conceded to the PRC with respect to Taiwan. And the PRC, hearing this and having its own interest, has been repeating its desires for that kind of action. It's vital that Congress keep the Administration's feet to the fire on this issue.
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Mr. LILLEY. I've learned, Mr. Chairman, that the Chinese are turning a full court press on the Administration, on various supporters of the Administration who have been to China recently on Taiwan arms sales. And, again, as I said earlier, the No. 1 pressure point is theater missile defense. And you might wonder how, after having fired nuclear-capable missiles at Taiwan, that these people could walk out and say boldly, no missile defense. We haven't gotten missile defense ready, but, obviously, they've telegraphed their punch that this is of vital interest to them. It seems to me it gives us a degree of leverage. But they say, ''no theater missile defense'', and it goes right to the top.
No. 2, the Chinese say, ''Why don't you buy the French Formula for arms sales to Taiwan; namely, give Taiwan what is the pipeline and then let's renegotiate the whole thing?'' With the idea again, looking for a termination. So they're thinking ahead and they're turning on the pressure for a fourth communiqué and for the three no's, as Doug pointed out earlier.
Mr. BEREUTER. Ambassador Lilley, how would you advise the President of the United States on the subject of a theater missile defense system for Taiwan? Not necessarily whether to go ahead, but you can address that, if you wish; but how should he handle the subject at a summit?
Mr. LILLEY. Well, it seems to me that perhaps theater missile defense is an internal domestic matter for the United States, and there is a lot of domestic opposition to it. It was somewhat languishing until the Chinese fired those missiles. They energized the debate. I would certainly start out by pointing that out. Thank you very much, China, for raising this problem for me.
Mr. BEREUTER. It gave us a renewed and stronger defense relationship with Japan as well.
Mr. LILLEY. That's right. And also Taiwan has made strides with Southeast East Asia. And there's a real backlash to what China did. China energized TMD discussions; the Japanese security apparatus woke up; Taiwan became more acceptable in Southeast Asia. There's this missile threat hanging over us so we need Theater Missile Defense, and China has ballistics missiles, and said it might use them on our ships; and China fired off an intercontinental ballistic missile, right around the time of 1995 they fired these SRBM's, they had an underground nuclear test; China seized Mischief Reef—these are not reassuring signs.
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Mr. BEREUTER. And so in the Oval Office, my advice to you, Mr. President, is——
Mr. LILLEY. My advice to you, Mr. President, is we have approved research and development on TMD; this is going to proceed. Those Republicans are pushing me very hard; you've just given them more ammunition; and if the missiles get fired again, there goes the ball game. You need to put a restraint on the use of missiles.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Bellocchi and Mr. Paal, I'm going to ask you the same question.
Mr. BELLOCCHI. At the very least, he should be advised not to say, ''We won't do it.'' We seem to be always saying this is what we will not do, and not get any quid pro quo from the PRC. I would certainly say, don't say we won't give them, even if we're not going to.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Paal.
Mr. PAAL. When we have the capability to protect our people and our interests from missile attack anywhere, we will do so. And we're going to pursue that globally. And I have no intention of thwarting the interest of the American people by telling them that we are going to deny our protection to American citizens or American interests from potential missile attack.
Mr. LILLEY. Mr. Chairman, can I just make one comment? I think there's one more dimension which Doug mentioned earlier which I think is worth pursuing rather vigorously.
Mr. BEREUTER. Go ahead.
Mr. LILLEY. It's the Russian military involvement with China. We have to get to the bottom of this. There's a huge mountain of data. I know this from my own experiences back in the Defense Department and in the agency.
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I think a report on this is critical because even Secretary Perry said they may be getting SS–18 technology. This is a devastating missile. And they also have the sovremminy class destroyers with the sunbeam missile, kilo-class submarines. Are they also getting specific Russian torpedoes which can sink aircraft carriers from a long distance? I think this has to be examined carefully because it changes the balance of power and it influences the way we look at our own defense expenditures and projections.
That issue has been a political issue since I was in Defense. It was constantly being swept under the rug because it was disturbing. When you looked at the facts, they weren't very pretty. I do think we have to get more on the cruise missile cooperation, it is critical to our position in the Far East and Middle East. How far has it gone?
Mr. BEREUTER. Would any of you care to speculate how Chinese missile development or acquisition of sophisticated missilery might be having an effect upon India and their nuclear development program?
Mr. LILLEY. Certainly, the Indians have pinpointed that.
Mr. BEREUTER. Do you think it's as important, or more important, to the Indians than their concern about Pakistani nuclear development programs?
Mr. PAAL. Sir, that's what they're saying. Their Defense Minister of India has got an interesting record, and he has said a lot of things. But the record of the Indian Government from his mouth is that it's the Chinese nuclear missile threat that they're concerned about.
Sir, I'm very sorry. I have foolishly made another commitment that I can't get away from.
Mr. BEREUTER. I have one last question for all of you. What is your advice as to what this Subcommittee can be doing to advance productive relationships with the PRC on Taiwan issues and with Taiwan directly?
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Mr. PAAL. In the first instance, I'd welcome the increasing pace with which you've been holding hearings on these issues, Asia-wide, not just on Taiwan. In the same way, I think with respect to Taiwan-China issues, an increased pattern of hearings allows perhaps a small American audience, but certainly a very large Taiwan and mainland audience to hear what's being thought and said. It provides a kind of transparency which I think over time does a lot to reinforce basic principles of American foreign policy. I would urge you to continue to do that, sir.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Paal. If you need to go now before the other gentlemen answer, I think they understand, and this is our last question. Mr. Bellocchi, would you like to take that next?
Mr. BELLOCCHI. I was trying to think—I thought you meant, what could Taiwan do in terms of——
Mr. BEREUTER. No, what could we do to advance U.S.-Taiwan relations, and what can we do to improve our relationship with the PRC regarding Taiwan?
Mr. BELLOCCHI. Regarding Taiwan, I think first of all is to continue to encourage and to open up that channel of communications between the two sides. I think that's absolutely critical. Without getting into the business of negotiations on political issues, simply get the communications open.
Mr. BEREUTER. What do you think we can do in that respect?
Mr. BELLOCCHI. What we can do?
Mr. BEREUTER. This Congress, this House of Representatives, especially this Subcommittee—there may not be an answer to that.
Mr. BELLOCCHI. Well, I think something to come out of the Committee to say how much the Committee would want that to happen would have an effect, certainly in Taiwan.
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Mr. BEREUTER. What else would you have, if anything, that you can think of? What do you want us to do with respect to this Administration or the executive branch generally on Taiwan-PRC-U.S. relationships?
Mr. BELLOCCHI. What the Committee can do is to open up more dialog, in my view, even with Taiwan as they are doing with China. But that is something you can only recommend and not pass.
Mr. BEREUTER. I can come back, of course, to the issue I pursued with Mr. Paal with respect to reports upon arms sales where we have a role under the TRA.
Ambassador Lilley, you have the last opportunity here.
Mr. LILLEY. We always like to talk about things in principle because that's the way the Chinese always start, not that I necessarily follow their model. But unity and sovereignty are their sacred cows. You don't really tinker with them; you stay away from them. These are their sacred cows. We have one, too. It's sacred to our most fundamental principle, that you do not overthrow a democracy by the use of military force when we can do something about it. We'll leave your unity and sovereignty alone. We don't want to get involved with principles as Clinton managed to do, then let's move onto the next step, that we will make relations move ahead on two fronts.
This was done during the Reagan Administration, with success, after 1983. We at that time opened up our military arrangements with China—F–B avionics, ASW torpedoes, large bore caliber artillery, ANTPQ radars. We moved ahead and were at the same time pressing for Taiwan frigates, Sikorsky helicopters, and it all moved ahead.
We have our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to supply defensive equipment to Taiwan, and it seems to me this is explicit. It's spelled out in the Taiwan Relations Act, Congress should play a key role in this. I think that is important.
Moving to the other side, military-to-military contacts with China are also important. They should be advanced. I don't think we want to get into selling arms yet. But we want to keep talking with their military; we want to have exchanges; we want to talk to them about all manner of things. And they're particularly important in areas like North Korea, Cambodia, Middle East, et cetera, and India-Pakistan. We have to keep talking with them actively on these because they're a key player. And it seems to me if you get balance into the military relationship and not have this jerking around and playing games with licenses and missile shots, and campaign donations—it can become a rather sordid thing.
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We've got a policy that makes a lot of sense and that has worked—at least variations of it have worked—in the past. We know what works, and what doesn't work. And Congress plays a key role in this. Congress has to get briefed on their contacts with the Chinese military and briefed thoroughly on arms sales to Taiwan, et cetera.
Mr. BEREUTER. I do have a follow-up question in light of the sacred cow you described we stand against any overthrow of a democracy—in an armed overthrow or military overthrow.
Mr. LILLEY. That's fundamental to us.
Mr. BEREUTER. Yes, and I agree.
Mr. LILLEY. But we can do something about it.
Mr. BEREUTER. We can do something about it, and I agree that's the case and should be an abiding principle. For both of you, then, is it still appropriate for the Congress to express itself a sense of the House or a sense of the Congress that, while we support a one China policy, we require that any unification would be a peaceful unification that we have an abiding interest and a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue. Does that create any difficulty for us to reiterate that kind of statement?
Mr. LILLEY. I'd leave out the word ''issue''.
Mr. BEREUTER. Leave out the word ''issue''?
Mr. LILLEY. The ''Taiwan issue'', I think that's a pejorative comment which downgrades Taiwan to a problem in U.S.-China relations, and it is much more than that.
Mr. BELLOCCHI. Let us say their relationship rather than signifying whether for unification or not—not because we favor one over the other, but because of the politics in Taiwan. That's much more acceptable.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your assistance to the Subcommittee today. We very much appreciate your time and your thoughts on these important issues.
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The Subcommittee will conduct a markup tomorrow on a resolution related to Taiwan at 2 p.m. in this hearing room.
The Subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]
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