SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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50–471 CC
1998
H. CON. RES. 227, H. RES. 361, H. RES. 364, AND H.R. 2870
MARKUP
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
MARCH 10, MARCH 11, 1998
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
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DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JAY KIM, California
STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio
MARSHALL ''MARK'' SANFORD, South Carolina
MATT SALMON, Arizona
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
TOM CAMPBELL, California
JON FOX, Pennsylvania
JOHN McHUGH, New York
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
ROY BLUNT, Missouri
KEVIN BRADY, Texas
LEE HAMILTON, Indiana
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
HOWARD BERMAN, California
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GARY ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PAT DANNER, Missouri
EARL HILLIARD, Alabama
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
STEVE ROTHMAN, New Jersey
BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee
BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
JIM DAVIS, Florida
RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff
MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Democratic Chief of Staff
HILLEL WEINBERG, Counsel and Senior Professional Staff Member
MARK KIRK, Counsel
CHARMAINE V. HOUSEMAN, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
LEGISLATION
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March 10:
H. Con. Res. 227, A concurrent resolution directing the President, Pursuant to Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
March 11:
H. Res. 361, a resolution calling for free and impartial elections in Cambodia
H. Res. 364, A resolution urging the introduction and passage of a resolution on the human rights situation in the People's Republic of China at the 54th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
H.R. 2870, A bill to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to facilitate protection of tropical forests through debt reduction with developing countries with tropical forests
WITNESSES
Mr. Michael Klosson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Department of State, Bureau of Legislative Affairs
Ms. Mary Chaves, Director, International Debt Policy, Department of the Treasury
Mr. James Hester, Environmental Coordinator, United States Agency for International Development
APPENDIX
H. Con. Res. 227
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Amendment to H. Con. Res. 227 offered by Mr. Campbell
H. Res. 361
Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H. Res. 361 offered by the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
H. Res. 364
H.R. 2870
Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 2870 offered by the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
Letter from Wei Jingsheng submitted by Hon. Christopher H. Smith
Human Rights Watch/Asia Report, ''China, Chinese Diplomacy, Western Hypocrisy, and the U.N. Human Rights Commission
MARKUP OF H. CON. RES. 227
TUESDAY, MARCH 10, 1998
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:28 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman GILMAN. [presiding] The Committee will come to order.
Today we will be considering several measures in open session, and our first measure today is H. Con. Res. 227, relating to the withdrawal of troops from Bosnia. This resolution is privileged in the House, and we should report it either with or without a recommendation by the end of this week. The Chair lays the resolution before the Committee.
The clerk will read the title of the resolution.
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Ms. BLOOMER. ''H. Con. Res. 227, directing the President pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to remove U.S. Armed Forces from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.''
Chairman GILMAN. The clerk will read the text of the resolution for amendment.
Ms. BLOOMER. ''Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),
''Section 1. Removal of United States''——
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, the resolution is considered as read and open for amendment at any point.
[H. Con. Res. 227 appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. The Chair will shortly recognize the distinguished gentleman from California, Mr. Campbell, for purposes of debate only, to introduce the measure.
For the benefit of Members, I'd like to have a general debate on the measure for a few minutes, and then I understand Mr. Campbell has one or more amendments to offer, and we'll recognize him again to offer and introduce them.
I ask unanimous consent Mr. Campbell have 10 minutes in favor of the resolution, and then Mr. Hamilton and I will divide 10 minutes in opposition to the resolution, and then we'll be open to debate on the regular order.
Is there any objection?
[No response.]
If not, it is so ordered.
Let me add that, unless I indicate otherwise, Members are being recognized only to debate the resolution of the amendment under the 5-minute rule.
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Mr. Campbell.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your courtesy on this occasion and throughout this process.
Colleagues, I'd like to draw your attention, please, to a folder, a binder, which I prepared, my staff has put before you. If you'd kindly turn to the first tab after A, the first tab gives an index—after that, we have the section ''Hostilities exist in Bosnia.''
Hostilities exist. Imagine how difficult it would be to say that there are no hostilities in Bosnia. There are hostilities in Bosnia. It's a different question whether we should be there, and it's a question that ought to be voted on by this Congress. But there really should not be a question that there are hostilities.
The definition is given there from the House Committee Report. So take a look at that. The best way of interpreting the legislation history in terms of defining a word is what the Committee that reported it out said. The word ''hostilities'' was substituted for the phrase ''armed conflict'' during the Subcommittee drafting process, because it was considered to be somewhat broader in scope.
I'm jumping ahead. ''Hostilities also encompasses a state of confrontation in which no shots have been fired, but where there is a clear and present danger of armed conflict.''
That has two important points here. First of all, that you don't need firing to have hostilities, but, second, at least by a negative pregnant, if you have shots fired, then that surely would be hostilities. That seems to me a fair reading of the history of the phrase.
I'm going to leave for later discussion the constitutional requirement about war, the declaration of war, but there is a very good reason to have a broad definition, rather than a narrow one. So that what starts out as a small war doesn't become a great war, and that the people's representatives are included at the start, and not simply after it's too late.
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I then refer you to the second heading there: ''Hostilities Since December 1995.'' If the shots don't have to be fired—and if shots are fired, it's conflict in constituting hostilities, I have a list of these events that have occurred in which American soldiers have been shot, and American soldiers have died in Bosnia.
Once again, I put to you, it's very difficult to maintain that there are no hostilities when Americans are dying in Bosnia. I emphasize, by the way, that the definition does not require a nation to be at war with another nation, and it does not require that there be a formal declaration. Obviously, that would moot the whole purpose here.
Third, if you turn the page, please, to the heading, ''Inferences of Hostilities by Casualties to Non-U.S. NATO Troops,'' the framers of the War Powers Resolution were careful to include the situation where there was no damage done to American troops, but where the context was such that we were fighting on the side of other countries, and that they were subject to harm, to casualties, and that's for the obvious reason, that that is what you would contemplate by a condition of hostilities.
And there on section 3 I list those again, just that have come to the attention of the press, instances where NATO forces were shot at, wounded, killed in action in Bosnia.
Incidentally, we will, I know, hear from the Administration, but in the Administration's letter, Ms. Larkin, who's here to speak for herself, of course, refers only to deaths, and obviously, death is not the only way of defining hostility. Indeed, as I will say in a minute, it's an extremely dangerous way to define hostility because you then give a perverse incentive to somebody to kill an American in order to get a vote in Congress. That's the danger of defining this after we've already put our troops into a condition where hostilities are likely.
Please turn the page to No. 4, ''The inference of hostilities from combat pay.'' It's a very fascinating argument here that was originally raised, at least in my research—I see the 4-minute light, so I assume I've got 6 more to go.
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Chairman GILMAN. We will give you the additional time.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
It came to my attention in regard to El Salvador, and there it was a big argument that the troops, that the military personnel were actually getting combat pay, but the phrase is ''pay related to a hostile fire zone.'' I think the word ''hostile'' is of great importance and significance, and I found out, by calling the Secretary of the Army's representative, and I report it there, that our soldiers in Bosnia have been receiving hostile fire pay. So it's going to be very hard to argue that there are no hostilities in Bosnia.
Last, section 5, as you see at the bottom of that page and carried over to the next one, I anticipate the argument—I anticipate it; we'll hear it, of course, from the Administration—that, well, there may once have been hostilities, but there aren't anymore. The danger of this argument is that if that's the case, then it's very perverse because you evaded your obligation to get the approval of Congress at the time you put the troops in, and somehow the evasion matures into a right. That seems to be exactly contrary to logic.
Rather, at the time the President put troops in, in December 1995, the question should be asked: Was that a condition of hostilities or a condition where hostilities were imminent, as indicated by the circumstances? Both of the phrases, by the way, in the War Powers Resolution. And the answer is, yes, of course, there were hostilities at the time the United States put in troops; that's why we put them in.
Interestingly, even in the letter, to which I'm sure the Administration's representatives will shortly refer—this is dated March 10, by Assistant Secretary of State Barbara Larkin—she refers now that, if my resolution passes, she's against it, and there could be a return to genocide and war. And I emphasize the phrase in the Administration's own letter, ''a return to genocide and war.'' I mean, they've got to admit there was war; there was a situation of hostilities.
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And if you take a look at the next page in your binder, you'll see a letter from Under Secretary of Defense Slocum. After I had asked Secretary Cohen, are there hostilities in Bosnia, I got this answer back. And the answer was, well, no, there are not, but we're hopeful that the troops will prevent a recurrence, a return to hostilities—the phrase ''a resumption of military hostilities.''
So in each case we have a recognition by the Administration that there were hostilities, and what they would have us believe—and I think very dangerously—is that, despite the fact there were hostilities, they ended some moment before the United States put in troops, perhaps an instant before, perhaps a week before. That's a very difficult point to define for them, I guess. And if that's the case, I believe that it is, nevertheless, true that the War Powers Resolution applies, because the imminent recurrence of the clear and present danger of the recurrence of hostilities would qualify as hostilities under the definition, if you go back to the initial page, where we have ''hostilities also encompasses a state of confrontation in which no shots have been fired, but where there is a clear and present danger of armed conflict.'' And I repeat, shots have been fired, and Americans have been wounded, and NATO troops have been shot at and killed.
Turn, please, if you will, to tab B—''B'' as in boy. The argument might be raised that, well, we have appropriated funds, haven't we? And, therefore, that has been an approval by Congress. This gets to the constitutionality issue, which is certainly not our business today, but I'm happy to address it, perhaps later, if any Members would like.
But it does bear upon this question, in that the War Powers Resolution was prescient. It knew that Administrations to come, Democrat and Republican, would claim that appropriations made it unnecessary to invoke the War Powers Resolution, and so the framers of the War Powers Resolution said, no, no, you may not infer approval from an appropriation. And whatever else in the War Powers Resolution is alleged to be unconstitutional, surely, this is not; namely, that Congress can say what it will term for its own resolutions. And there is a severability clause in the War Powers Resolution, so that even if the entire rest of the resolution falls, this stays. No appropriation can do the job that is required by the War Powers Resolution.
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Turn, if you will, please, now to C, which is the last substantive tab, and this deals with the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution. At the appropriate time, I'm going to introduce an amendment, and the amendment is going to change the time of my resolution. My resolution now says June. It says, pull the troops out as of June. The amendment will say: Pull the troops out as of 60 days following a final judgment ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction. That, I think, should take care of the best argument against proceeding today; namely, that there is a difficulty in Kosovo that it comes at the wrong time, that it might be right, but not now.
What I want to do is to get a court resolution of the War Powers Act. I want to know if it's constitutional or not, and I can't find that out without invoking it. Congress can't find it out without invoking it. You can't test the case without having the case presented.
And there is one other part which is critical, and then I'm done, Mr. Chairman. I'm coming up on 10 minutes. I'm probably going to go a minute over. So, with your indulgence, I'd like to do so.
We really need to find out if this is constitutional or not. If it's not, then let's get something else. Because what we have right now is really unfair to both the President and the Congress. And I'm going to suggest to you that we might have had this back in 1990, when our former colleague, Ron Dellums, brought a lawsuit against President Bush. I was in Congress then, and former Congressman Dellums brought the case, saying, the buildup in Saudi Arabia required congressional approval under the declaration of war authority. And the Court threw out his case, and it didn't throw it out on political question grounds. Judge Harold Green of the District of Columbia District said, it is not to be thrown out because of political question, not to be thrown out because of ripeness—excuse me, because of standing, but it will be thrown out because it's not right because Congress has not passed a resolution.
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I've got to do this. I'll be thrown out of court if I don't have a resolution. And when I get into court, God willing, and on behalf of you, colleagues, I will argue not only 5(c)—and we'll hear about Chadha, and I'm happy to argue that, give any insight I can on it, but I'll also argue 5(b). 5(b) says, with no action by Congress, the President is obliged to remove troops, if he has not obtained the approval of Congress.
In the lefthand pocket of your folder, I put a text of the War Powers Resolution, and if you'd be so kind, please take a look at 5(b). You'll see it on the third page. Within 60 calendar days after a report, or when a report is required to be submitted, the President shall terminate any use of Armed Forces unless the Congress has given its approval. So 5(b) is probably going to be my better stand in court—that the President should have issued the report to Congress as of the time he put the troops in. He hasn't. Therefore, I ask the court to mandamus the President to withdraw the troops, unless he gets our approval. And that wouldn't involve Chadha at all.
But I can't get there because of ripeness, unless I have a resolution. A War Powers Resolution gives me the chance to bring this resolution privilege—I don't think I'd get a rule otherwise; I don't think I'd get to the floor otherwise; I've got to go this way. I've got to use 5(c) to get a vote from you, colleagues, and then to the floor, and then from there to court.
And I conclude by drawing your attention to the very final part of my resolution. I do not today at all urge any criticism of the Administration's policy in Bosnia. I explicitly am neutral about it. I don't cast any judgment as to whether we should be there or not, except to say that we should be there only with our approval, the people's representatives.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Hamilton.
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Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to discuss this matter, and I want to say that my friend, Tom Campbell, is always a gentleman and has proven himself this afternoon to be a legal scholar of the highest order. I appreciate the very strong case he has made. He really is doing a service to this Committee and to the Congress by raising the question of Congress' war power authority, and I have always aligned myself with the general viewpoint that Congress does have a very important role to play in the question of war.
I have been deeply concerned about—and I think Mr. Campbell has as well—the manner in which the Congress over a period of years has simply ceded power to the President with respect to war powers, and there's been a very serious erosion of our power because of our unwillingness to act. And so it's good to force this Committee, as Mr. Campbell has done, to address the question.
Now I'm not going to support Mr. Campbell's resolution, and that causes me some personal pain, and as I've suggested to you, I think there are good reasons to question this resolution. I think my objections are basically two. One is a policy objection, and the second is a legal objection. Let me address the policy question first.
Whether the resolution before us, the underlying resolution, is amended or not, I believe that this resolution really does jeopardize U.S. policy in Bosnia. I'll address the legal question in just a moment. This resolution is not a freebie for Members. This is not just a sense-of-Congress resolution. It is a resolution that will direct the President to remove U.S. forces from Bosnia. The important thing here is that Mr. Campbell argues that 5(c) is constitutional, and that is why he wants to move this resolution out of Congress and into the courts. If his argument prevails, the resolution would be binding on the President, and it would require the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Bosnia. An aye vote on the Campbell resolution, then, has enormous policy consequences for this country, and I think those consequences are largely negative.
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I think that U.S. participation in so-called SFOR is absolutely vital to the peace and the stability of Bosnia. We are the acknowledged leader in Bosnia. Let's be very clear about it. If U.S. troops leave, the other nations will leave. There will be no NATO force in Bosnia without the United States. We are the backbone of that force in Bosnia, whether we have 30,000 troops or whether we have 7,000, or whatever the figure is, after June.
I think there are very grave risks to the United States if we withdraw these troops, and the resumption of war is likely. I also believe that a withdrawal of these troops at this particular moment puts at risk a lot of very impressive accomplishments of the last few months—more so, I think, than most Americans are perhaps aware. We've stopped the fighting. We've demobilized the armies. Local governments have been elected. There is steady progress in the formation of Bosnian institutions. Refugees are returning in larger numbers. Local police forces are being established, and training is going forward. As we read in the paper this morning, war criminals are being indicted and convicted, and there is for the first time, even in the Bosnian Serb leadership, support for the Dayton peace process.
A vote for the Campbell resolution at the very time when we're beginning to see substantial progress in Dayton would have, I think, a devastating impact on what has happened there. And I think the parties in Bosnia are watching very carefully what we do here.
Finally, with regard to the policy, before I get to the legal aspect of it, we've always understood that Bosnia's more than just Bosnia. It's also about the future of NATO and the stability of Europe, and our allies and the people of Europe have looked to us for leadership, and we've supplied it. The credibility of the United States is at stake, and all of us on this Committee understand that broader point.
Now let me turn to some of the legal aspects of this. Tom Campbell, Congressman Campbell, has told us that his intent here with this resolution is to force the courts to examine the war powers authority. I understand that. He's right when he argues that we ought to have legal clarity here. But may I suggest that, even if his resolution passes, I think it is highly unlikely that it would resolve the broader question of Congress' war powers.
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So far as I am aware, no President has accepted the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, while many, if not most, Members of Congress, including myself, have maintained the opposite. Congress has side-stepped this issue again and again. We're reluctant to take responsibility by voting for an authorization. We didn't do it in Haiti. We didn't do it in Somalia. We didn't do it in Bosnia. We did do it in the Gulf War, but, more often than not, we don't do it.
The question here is, would this resolution put forward by Mr. Campbell resolve the question of Congress' war powers authority? I think the answer to that question is, no, the resolution, if it were to go to the courts, would be judged, I believe, on fairly narrow grounds.
The first would be the Supreme Court Chadha decision. It has been widely accepted that a concurrent resolution that mandates the President to take action, but does not go to the President for his signature or win a two-thirds vote to override the President's veto, is going to violate the Constitution.
Second, the courts have been very reluctant to get into the question of what constitutes hostilities, which would trigger 5(c). I think the Administration's position is, in the letter they have sent to us, they do not believe that hostilities are present in this situation, because there haven't been casualties from hostile action. So if Congress were to pass a concurrent resolution to remove U.S. troops from Bosnia, pursuant to section 5(c), it seems to me that if a court were to rule, it would likely base its decision on the narrow grounds that I have indicated without resolving the larger question of war powers authority.
When Mr. Campbell says we need to find out if the war powers resolution is constitutional, I think he's quite right about that. I share his frustration on that point; I really do, and that's why I commend him for making this Committee confront it. But I don't think supporting this resolution is going to get the kind of judicial review of the war powers authority that he seeks. So while I have the highest regard for Mr. Campbell, I'm not able to support this resolution as the right vehicle for two reasons. The policy implications of this are just enormous at this point in time, and second, I don't think in the legal aspects it gets what Mr. Campbell wants, because the court would decide the question on narrow grounds.
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I thank the Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.
I might note for our colleagues that at 5 o'clock there will be one 15-minute vote and two 5-minute votes. So about 5 o'clock, we'll recess until 5:30. Please bring back with you another Member, so that we can have a quorum and resolve this measure—[Laughter]—before we wind up, and we'll wind up at an early hour.
This resolution presents a number of interesting, pertinent issues to our Members, not the least of which is the question of our continued military presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which this and the previous Congress have grappled with extensively. I must confess a certain degree of patrimony for the unusual procedure which utilizes provisions of the War Powers Resolution that require an expedited consideration for this measure, both within the Committee and on the House floor.
In 1993, I introduced the similar resolution concerning Somalia, drawing upon War Powers Resolution which called upon the President to withdraw forces from that country with certain exceptions similar to those in the measure now before us by a date certain. The gentleman from California, Mr. Campbell, is now emulating our effort, and we accept his invitation of our Somalian measure as the sincerest form of flattery. I regret, however, that the circumstances that now obtain, as the Committee considers this concurrent resolution, significantly differ from those at the time when the 103d Congress considered our Somalian measure. At that time we were facing a failed policy and a foreign military venture that had in 1 day led to the death of 18 of our finest troops in a vain effort to search for and siege so-called warlords who were held to be responsible for obstructing the U.N. operation in Somalia. The Clinton Administration had, for political reasons, denied requests from our commanders in the field for heavier armor to better protect our troops and have subordinated our troops to the U.N. command at that time.
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We're grateful that these are not the conditions that now face NATO forces in Bosnia. Our troops in Bosnia have been the heart of a NATO force under U.S. command that has successfully put a stop to a conflict in the center of Europe that killed hundreds of thousands and led to more than 2 million refugees. In the past few months we've seen the glimmerings of success in regenerating a stable civil society in all Bosnia and the replacement of extremists with moderate political forces.
Moreover, we've expended in excess of $7 billion to implement our peace plan in Bosnia. Withdrawal now would place considerable investment at risk, with no guarantee that we would not be called upon in the future to again introduce our forces if the conflict were to re-ignite. I remind the Committee that I opposed the initial deployment in 1995 of our troops in Bosnia because I rejected the Administration's assertions that their job would be completed swiftly within 1 year, because I saw little preparation for the costs that I felt doing the job completely would really entail.
I also was concerned then that our troops would face hostilities and that the American people had not been told what interests were at stake that justified those risks. I have voted for measures to terminate funding for our troops, most recently, last June, as we acted upon the defense appropriations bill, when I supported the Buyer amendment and I offered an amendment to last year's emergency supplemental that contained a similar provision.
I do believe, however, that the Congress essentially acquiesced in our Bosnian deployment when they agreed to the Conference Report on defense appropriations that adopted a Senate-authored, sense-of-Congress provision that funds should be terminated as of July 1, 1998, but allow the President to waive this provision with the full knowledge that he would utilize his waiver.
I commend the gentleman from California, Mr. Campbell, for including a provision that makes it clear that his measure is not reflective of either agreement or disagreement with our Bosnia policy, and I understand his intent in putting his measure before us, to reinforce and test the war-making prerogatives of the Congress. I do not believe, however, that an affirmative vote for this resolution would be understood in that context. Instead, I think it would be interpreted by friends and foes alike as a sign that the Congress does not support what our troops are doing in Bosnia, and that this country cannot muster its resolve even to continue a policy that seems to be succeeding.
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I understand that Mr. Campbell has an amendment that substitutes for his June 30th deadline a definite period following a ruling by the courts to enforce this resolution. I'm willing to consider his arguments and see if they address the concerns that I just expressed.
Well, we still have time to hear a Member or two. Mr. Clement.
Mr. CLEMENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I must concur with both the Chairman and Ranking Democrat, Mr. Hamilton, and their comments concerning the Campbell resolution. I do not think it is in our best interest to approve this resolution, as Mr. Hamilton said, on policy issues, as well as legal issues.
Just recently, I had the opportunity to visit Bosnia with the National Security Committee, and I didn't spend most of my time with the generals and the colonels. I spent most of my time with the troops concerning the morale of our troops, as well as where do we go from here—knowing that we're going to vote somewhere between now and June the 30th concerning whether we keep our troops in Bosnia.
And I was real interested in the comments of our troops because many of them are homesick; many of them want to be back with their family, but then when I would ask them the question, without exception, every one of them said—and these are the rank-and-file troops that we have in Bosnia—they said, ''Congressman Clement, we need to stay in Bosnia.''
As the Chairman said a while ago, and Mr. Hamilton, we do have a major investment in that area. We also know that if it wasn't for the United States, and the Dayton Accord and the Dayton Agreement, they would still have fighting, and war would still be ongoing in that part of the world. And, yet, it was the U.S. leadership and the Clinton Administration's leadership that was responsible for bringing all parties to the table.
I think very strongly that the Europeans ought to have been more upfront much earlier. I still don't understand why the Europeans wouldn't show more leadership earlier, and could have saved many lives.
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I am pleased that the United States has moved expeditiously from having 20,000 troops to 8,000, and now the announcement that they're going to even draw it down further. That's in our best interest.
I hope now, from being a veteran myself and a colonel in the Army National Guard, I'd like to see in the Bosnian area that we put a lot more emphasis on civil affairs-type people than combat arms personnel. And, also, to have not only more intelligence information, but better intelligence information, and I think it's going to come to a point in time that we're going to have to be more aggressive to bring these war criminals to justice. But it is in our best interest to keep a presence in Bosnia with this multi-national force, and I do agree with my colleagues that have spoken, even though I respect Mr. Campbell highly, and I know he surely is very knowledgeable on constitutional questions and all, but this resolution of Mr. Campbell's I cannot support. I do think it's in our best interest to continue our presence in Bosnia after June the 30th.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Clement.
Mr. Sanford.
Mr. SANFORD. I would respectfully disagree with my colleague from Tennessee, in that it seems to me that this debate, this discussion we're having today, is ultimately not at all about Bosnia. Bosnia is certainly tangential to this overall discussion, but it seems to me that the overall argument is one of process, and it's one of a question that has long been debated here in this Congress and here in Washington, and that is, who is ultimately responsible in the event that a young man or a young woman finds himself overseas? In that, ultimately, each of our respective congressional districts are the places where blood is shed. It is from our districts that a young soldier goes off to Bosnia or Yemen, or who knows where, to be engaged as part of a larger effort. At some point, based on the discussion that took place here in Washington, after the Vietnam—or through the middle of the Vietnam aftermath, it was determined that Congress ought to be a part of this. The Constitution I think makes it fairly clear.
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And I would just like to yield my time, if I could, to Representative Campbell, in that there have been a number of points raised that—I'm not a constitutional scholar; I don't understand the maybes on it. I just see it from a common-sense standpoint on what I read the Constitution to mean, and who I think ought to ultimately bear this responsibility. It seems to me the Congress, but I'd be curious if you could refute a couple of these points that have come up.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I sure appreciate my colleague yielding.
Mr. Hamilton had two points. First, that an aye vote is against the Bosnia policy. It is not. An aye vote is that the Congress shall decide whether or not to support the Bosnia policy. Please don't make that mistake. And if this passes, the President may continue his Bosnia policy with no change, provided the Congress approves.
Second, Mr. Hamilton said that it would not yield a definitive legal judgment because it would surely be decided on the narrow grounds of Chadha. I wish I could predict courts that well. But he doesn't anticipate the other two grounds of the lawsuit that we shall bring. It won't be under 5(c) exclusively; it will be under 5(b), and directly under the Constitution, as I said in my opening remarks. So even if the Court rules 5(c) unconstitutional, passing this resolution gets me past the ripeness barrier to bringing a lawsuit.
And then I simply straightforward argue, Mr. President should have come to Congress at the time you put the troops in Bosnia under 5(b); forget Chadha. And, third, as Ron Dellums argued, directly under the Constitution, the President should have, because it constitutes war.
So, truly, Mr. Hamilton, for whom, in his absence, I will say, even to his face, I have equally high regard, but he can't be right that we shouldn't pass this, because he expects the Court will only rule on a narrow base.
Mr. Gilman, our chairman, says this is different from Somalia because Somalia was a failed policy. Yes, you're right, I am imitating you, Mr. Chairman, jot and tittle. It was the idea of a member of your staff for whom I have great gratitude and regard—not to bring the idea, but I asked him, how could I, and he helped me.
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But, surely, we cannot be at difference on the basis of whether one is a successful policy and one is a failed policy. If it's a failed policy, vote no; if it's a successful policy, vote yes. But, for God's sake, vote.
And, last, our chairman says that this was handled by an appropriation. No, it can't be, because the War Powers Resolution itself says an appropriation cannot satisfy the War Powers Resolution, and that part is not in constitutional doubt, and there is a severability clause.
I thank my colleague for yielding.
Mr. SANFORD. Certainly. I yield back.
Chairman GILMAN. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Davis.
Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to ask Representative Campbell if he could further elaborate on exactly what alternatives would be available to Congress in the event your lawsuit were to succeed. In other words, what are the timeframes?
Mr. CAMPBELL. Sure.
Mr. DAVIS. And what would you reasonably expect by way of congressional action, given the compelling history of inaction?
Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Davis.
The President would be mandated by the Court to issue a 4(a)(1) report, and that means he would have to say, look, we have introduced American forces into hostilities or into a situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances-–4(a)(1).
Then under 5, after that report is submitted, the Congress shall decide within 60 days whether to approve the use of force or not. If the President wants, he can get an additional 30, so totaling 90 days. At the end of that, according to—and there is priority for that, Mr. Davis, so it goes right to the floor. If at the end of that the U.S. Congress has not approved, then under 5(b), the President has to withdraw the troops.
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So he issues the report because the Court orders him to. We have 60 to 90, probably 90, days in which to consider it. The President asks for our approval. If we give it, no change. If we don't, the troops come home.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Davis.
Since we have a series of votes, I will adjourn the hearing until 5:30. Please bring two other Members back with you.
[Laughter.]
The Committee stands adjourned.
[Recess.]
Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order.
Let me notify our Members that there will be no vote tonight on the resolution. We will put the amendment before the Committee, and then we will recess until tomorrow morning at 10 a.m.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I want to just say how much I respect my good friend from California, and reluctantly rise in opposition to his resolution, H. Con. Res. 227. I believe that the Congress should play a role in critical foreign policy decisionmaking, especially when there is the utilization of——
Chairman GILMAN. Will the gentleman withhold?
Mr. SMITH. Sure.
Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order; the gentleman is speaking. Please take your conversations out to the anteroom.
Mr. CAMPBELL. And, Mr. Chairman, point of order, if I may, just while we're stopping anyway. Did you want me to offer my amendment at some point?
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Chairman GILMAN. Yes, we do.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I'll do so—obviously, Mr. Smith has the floor.
Chairman GILMAN. We'll finish the general debate.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Fine, thanks.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Smith, please proceed.
Mr. SMITH. It's more important than ever that we be involved when U.S. Armed Forces are under consideration.
I also have serious questions regarding those U.S. policies toward Bosnia which led to the Dayton Agreement and the subsequent deployment of U.S. troops there. I think, as you know, Mr. Chairman—and I think you were very much a part of this, as were people like my good friend Steny Hoyer, the co-chair of the Helsinki Commission—we felt that lifting the arms embargo, and going another route, was the means to the end, but now that that's water over the dam, how do we best make this policy work?
As a matter of policy, I believe the continued presence of the troops remains a prerequisite for the objective of achieving a sustainable peace in the former Yugoslavia. With respect to the well-intentioned resolution before the Committee, I must oppose it for the following reasons:
One, like it or not, the troops are there. The possibility of their withdrawal in June hung like a thick fog over Bosnia, compounding the international community's tenuous resolve and halting progress as a result. The question of a post-S–4 renewal of fighting and even a division of Bosnia loomed large. The President's March 3rd notification of the U.S. intention to stay this time without setting a date certain for their withdrawal has made a stable peace much more likely.
U.S. policy has become much more assertive, as a creation of a more stable and lasting peace is a prerequisite for departure of the forces. Persons indicted for work crimes have been captured, and some are even surrendering themselves.
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More people have sought to return to their original homes. The Bosnian Serbs are seeing a brighter future with political moderates instead of being allied with the Nationalists. Unfortunately, the pace of the progress remains slow, too slow, but if the troops were withdrawn during this critical period or sometime thereafter, as I think the substitute may envision, I am convinced that progress would cease.
Second, passing this resolution at this time would, without a doubt, send the wrong signal. Threatening withdrawal before the situation is stable is seen by those on the ground as a sign of weakness. Those that would prefer the troops out of Bosnia are more inclined to test our troops and our resolve, if they feel there is political weakness in Washington, DC. And, Mr. Chairman, the recent events in Kosovo are a stark reminder of Mr. Milosevic's inclination to violence and the volatility of that region.
And, finally, ultimately, this resolution is more than a statement on the need for congressional authorization for troop deployments abroad. It also implies opposition to any authorization regarding Bosnia. The ''Dear Colleague'' circulated by the advocates of the resolution states that our troops, ''face an endless period in a hostile region with an undefined mission of forging an unstable peace.''
If those who advocate the need for authorization are really seeking to withdraw the troops from Bosnia, we need to seriously consider the consequences of a premature withdrawal. No matter how much we have had reservations or even opposed the Administration's decision to deploy in the first place, the reality is that the Congress would be held responsible for the consequences, and should be held responsible, if there is a premature withdrawal.
The United States, in my view, has a national interest at stake in Bosnia's future and the success of the Dayton Agreement. In Bosnia a few political leaders who desire political power seek to convince the world that division of the country is inevitable. If we let them succeed, there will be consequences in the region, and there will be a definitive impact on the viability of NATO, which is now successfully reshaping itself for the post-cold war era.
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Finally, just let me say, Mr. Chairman, that I have family there. As a matter of fact, one of the members of my family is there for the second deployment. I have spent hours talking to him about what's going on, and I think, as my good friend from Tennessee, I think it was, mentioned earlier, you talk to the troops; they do believe that they are providing a very useful service to humanity by being there. Yes, we all had misgivings at first, but I think now we all need to pull together and do what is in the best interest of the region, and in the best interest of our own troops who are there.
So I would oppose, reluctantly, because Mr. Campbell is a good friend, the resolution that he has offered today.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Smith.
Do any other Members seek recognition?
[No response.]
If there are no other Members seeking recognition, I now recognize the gentleman from California to offer an amendment.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have an amendment. It's not only at the desk, but it's already in your black folders on the lefthand pocket.
Chairman GILMAN. The clerk will report the amendment.
Ms. BLOOMER. ''Amendment offered by Mr. Campbell.
''Page 2, strike line 15, and all that follows through line 3, on page 3, and insert the following:
''(b) Removal of Armed''——
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, the amendment will be considered as having been read.
[The amendment to H. Con. Res. 227 appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman from California will be recognized tomorrow on his amendment. There will be no votes tonight and no further discussion.
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We will be recessing until 10 a.m. tomorrow morning, and we'll recognize at that time Mr. Campbell on the amendment.
[Whereupon, at 5:59 p.m., the Committee adjourned to reconvene at 10 a.m., on Wednesday, March 11, 1998.]
MARKUP OF H. RES. 361, H. RES. 364, AND H.R. 2870
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 11, 1998
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:09 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order.
The Committee is required by statute to provide its views and estimates on the President's budget each year at this time. So we will interrupt our proceeding on the Campbell resolution while we are awaiting Members to come in order to dispose of this business.
At my direction, the Committee staff has prepared a draft letter. The letter sets out the view that we support 98.5 percent of the President's recommended spending, cutting his budget request for the next fiscal year by about $200 and $300 million.
Neither the Budget Committee nor our Committee, through this document, makes recommendations at the program level. We are only supposed to make aggregate spending recommendations. These figures were built up from emotional spending on some programs. I am sure no one would agree with all of our ideas, but I would hope they represent a consensus view of where we ought to be in general terms.
I would recommend that by unanimous consent we agree to send this letter and any other views to the Budget Committee.
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Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I have reviewed the draft letter which you propose with regard to the 150 account, and let me say that I appreciate very much that your recommendation for this account for Fiscal Year 1999 is an increase of about a billion dollars over the amount appropriated thus far in Fiscal Year 1998. That is certainly a step in the right direction.
So far as I am concerned, I support the President's recommendation, and I think we need to provide the President the resources that are commensurate with American leadership in the world. I also think we are just at the beginning of the budget process and each step of that process will almost certainly involve further cuts. Thus, I would like to start with a higher number.
So may I request that, pursuant to the House rules, the chairman include, in his submission to Chairman Kasich, the Minority recommendation which I have prepared. I think it is straightforward and self-explanatory.
We support the President's request. Thank you very much.
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, we will include the Minority report. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.
Without objection, that will be transmitted to the Budget Committee.
Now, I think we can—do you want to do the Cambodian one?
We will now consider House Resolution 361, relating to the Cambodian elections. The Chair lays before the Committee the resolution. The clerk will report the title of the resolution.
Ms. BLOOMER. ''House Resolution 361, calling for free and impartial elections in Cambodia.''
Chairman GILMAN. Now, this resolution was considered by the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific and reported from them with an amendment in the nature of the substitute that is now before the Members.
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[H. Res. 361 appears in the appendix.]
Without objection, the Committee print will be considered as an original text for the purpose of amendment, and without objection the clerk will read the preamble and operative language of the Subcommittee amendment in the nature of a substitute for amendment. It is so ordered the clerk will read the resolution for amendment.
Ms. BLOOMER. ''Whereas, Cambodia continues to recover from years of political conflict, civil war, the era of Khmer Rouge genocide, and subsequent''——
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, the amendment in the nature of a substitute is considered as having been read and is open to amendment at any point.
[The amendment in the nature of a substitute to H. Res. 361 appears in the appendix.]
I now recognize the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Bereuter, to introduce the resolution.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I apologize for being in the Banking Committee, where we are conducting activities.
Seven months after the violent coup ousted the democratically elected First Premier Prince Ranariddh from power, Cambodia's prospects for democracy remained a shattered dream.
The fragile coalition government finally disintegrated last July when Prime Minister Hun Sen violently expelled First Prime Minister Ranariddh from the government.
Many prominent opposition leaders fled into exile. Most of those politicians have subsequently returned to Cambodia to prepare for the elections scheduled for July 26th. However, because of continued intimidation by forces close to the Hun Sen regime, these politicians have been unable to conduct normal political activities.
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Today, 7 months after the fact, Hun Sen's regime has yet to investigate many instances of extrajudicial killings that have taken place since the coup, despite repeated calls for accountability from domestic and international groups.
H. Res. 361 cites the coup d'etat of July 1997 and subsequent extrajudicial killings and other improper activities as evidence that conditions do not exist to conduct free, fair, and credible elections.
In response to these problems, H. Res. 361 urges the Cambodian Government to fully enforce the Paris Peace Accords, to restore a nonviolent and neutral political atmosphere, to allow all exiled opposition leaders, including First Premier Ranariddh, to return to Cambodia and engage in political activity without fear of physical or political reprisal and to take further measures to ensure a credible election.
H. Res. 361 also states the unwillingness to accept as legitimate or worthy of U.S. assistance a Cambodian Government resulting from fraudulent elections.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your support and the Subcommittee Members for their unanimous support. We adopted the amendment in the nature of a substitute, which made a number of modest textual changes. For example, the amendment corrects the value of the European Union's contribution to the elections and so on.
At the request of Mr. Hamilton, an additional clause was added that calls upon the Cambodian Government to work with the U.N. Center for Human Rights in Phnom Penh.
In addition, a ''final resolve clause'' was included that states the U.S. unwillingness to accept as legitimate any Cambodian Government that arises out of a flawed election.
Mr. Chairman, I urge adoption of H. Res. 361.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. Berman.
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Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, this resolution passed unanimously out of our Committee. It is strongly supported on a bipartisan basis, and I urge its adoption.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just express my appreciation to the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Bereuter, for his leadership. I appreciate the manner in which the Majority worked with the Minority to get a strong resolution.
This is an important resolution. It represents a vote for democracy, and with a little luck and a lot of effort by the Cambodian people we may yet get democratic governance in that country.
So I strongly support the resolution. I urge my colleagues to vote yes on it.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.
I want to commend the chairman of the Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee, Mr. Bereuter, for introducing this resolution calling for free and fair elections in Cambodia and for keeping this issue in the forefront of our work on our Committee.
The people of Cambodia who had expressed their overwhelming commitment to the democratic process in 1993 deserve the unflagging support of this body, the American people, and the U.S. Government, and the entire international community.
But as you know, democracy is in danger in Cambodia. The illegitimate Government of Hun Sen continues to impose its political will on the people of Cambodia and threatens the legitimacy of a democratic process that many, both inside and outside of Cambodia, have worked so hard to create.
The people of Cambodia deserve much better. With only four short months until the July elections, H. Res. 361 is an extremely timely resolution. It is critical that this body continue to bring to the attention of the American people and to the world the plight of Cambodia.
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We should also call on others, such as ASEAN and the European Union to do the right thing and support the real democratic process in Cambodia embodied in free, fair, and fully representative elections.
Although I believe my views on the subject are well known, I want to express my strong support for the democratic forces in Cambodia and for the Cambodian people who have suffered so much. We are all disappointed in the current state of affairs, but we are committed to bringing democracy, justice, peace, and freedom, once again, to the kingdom of Cambodia and the Khmer people.
There is much work to do between now and then, but this resolution, expressing the sense in Congress, I think is an appropriate start.
I am proud to be a co-sponsor. I look forward to bringing it to the floor expeditiously for consideration.
Is any other Member seeking recognition?
[No response.]
Chairman GILMAN. If there are no other Members seeking recognition, I recognize the gentleman—if not, the question of agreeing to the Subcommittee amendment, as amended, any that are in favor of the amendment say aye.
Those that are opposed say no.
The amendment is agreed to.
The gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Bereuter, is recognized to offer a motion.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleagues for their support and your support.
I move that the Chairman be requested to seek consideration of the pending resolution on the suspension calendar.
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Chairman GILMAN. The question is now on a motion by the gentleman from Nebraska. As many in favor of the motion signify by saying aye.
As many as opposed, signify by saying no.
The ayes have it. The motion is agreed to.
Further proceedings on this measure are postponed.
And now we will return to the Committee's consideration of the Campbell resolution. When the Committee recessed Mr. Campbell had introduced his amendment. We now recognize Mr. Campbell on the amendment.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, thank you and colleagues.
The amendment deals with the timing of when the President would have to implement the War Powers Resolution. The initial draft said June 30th and what this amendment does is to strike the reference to June 30th and instead say ''60 days following a determination of a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction.''
My purpose in making this change is so that we completely remove the question of any date that would impact a particular policy.
Almost all of the discussion that I heard yesterday dealt with the question about the policy, is the policy right? I respectfully suggest that probably that was the wrong direction to be taking because this resolution doesn't deal with the policy. It deals with who shall decide, and so by removing the June 30th date and placing in reference to a court determination, we make it clear that we are not going to have any impact until such time as a court has ruled, which is the secondary purpose, I should say, but important purpose of this resolution.
I checked with the parliamentarian, Mr. Chairman and colleagues, and I have checked with the Office of Legislative Counsel, and they inform me that this amendment is appropriate formalistically; that it will preserve the special status, the priority status, of this amendment.
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I will just take the remaining moment or two to say what I would intend to do. In that it is 100 percent likely the Administration will not change and give a vote to Congress upon the passage of a concurrent resolution by itself, I thought why, and they will have to take it to court anyway, I thought why not have the triggering effect when the court rules, and that is what this resolution does.
In the remaining time, I would just say for those who weren't able to attend yesterday's hearing, that the fundamental point is there are hostilities in Bosnia. You can't deny there are hostilities. I put at everybody's desk a black binder, which I prepared, with my staff's help. The most important provision I think to look at right now is under Tab A, where we define hostilities with reference to the House Committee Report.
So in that black binder you have the bill, and you have this most recent amendment, and you have the definition of hostilities: ''Hostilities also encompasses a state of confrontation in which no shots have been fired, but where there is a clear and present danger of armed conflict.''
I would submit that all of the discussion about what is happening in Kosovo suggests that this could start up once again any moment and, in that sense, hostilities are, indeed, present, as they are defined in this resolution.
So, Mr. Chairman, I offer my amendment for the purposes of removing any suggestion that we are dealing with the policy about our troops in Bosnia, but leave the issue so that I may take it to a court.
And in one remaining moment, if I still have the time, I wanted to explain the strategy of bringing this to court.
I need a resolution. When Congressman Dellums brought his case to court in 1990, Judge Greene ruled that he was able to bring it—he had standing—that it was not a political question, but that it was not ripe.
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I have behind Tab C, if you take a look at that, the second page, a description of Judge Greene's decision. The lawsuit ran aground on the fourth finding by Judge Greene, ''That unless and until the plaintiffs could get a majority of their colleagues to join their challenge, the case was not ripe for decision.''
Chairman GILMAN. Where are you reading from?
Mr. CAMPBELL. Page 2 behind Tab C, Professor Ely's summary of Judge Greene's opinion, holding that there was standing, there was no political question, it was appropriate for adjudication, but not ripe due to absence of a resolution.
And so what I am proposing here is the resolution. From here I then would go into court with the ability to argue under both 5(b) and 5(c) and the Constitution.
This, I would respectfully suggest, is my answer to Mr. Hamilton. You were not present when I offered my rebuttal, my attempted rebuttal, and I would like to just repeat it if I may.
The court will likely have presented—because if I am involved in this I will present not only 5(c), but 5(b)—and 5(b) does not require an action by Congress, but I would be thrown out for lack of ripeness by not getting a resolution by Congress.
I hope we will bring the case under the Constitution directly, which is how Congressman Dellums brought it. But I can't get into court without a resolution. So I am using 5(c) to get a resolution because that gives me a privileged motion on the floor. I won't get a rule, God knows, otherwise.
Once the Congress gives me the resolution, we then can argue 5(b), which does not require any action by Congress. It says the President shall submit that report upon introducing troops into hostilities and if he does not, 60 days thereafter he has got to bring them out by himself, no action needed, and I will argue directly under the Constitution, as Ron Dellums did.
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Berman.
Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I have had a brief conversation with the gentleman on the telephone about this issue, but I have not given it the study I should. It is a fascinating issue. I have a few questions just based on what you have said, and I think they are probably very easy answers to straighten out.
My recollection of the War Powers Act is that, when certain conditions are met, a report is required, and if Congress does not speak within a certain number of days after, I guess, that report has been filed, any existing authorization to have our forces in harms way or in the midst of hostilities—I thought, at one point, it was even the imminent threat of hostilities was the standard—that there would be no authorization for those forces to remain there more than a certain number of days.
So what I can't understand is, on this ripeness issue, if either the report has not been filed or Congress has not within a certain number of days provided the authorization, what is there about passing your resolution that makes the case more ripe than just the factual situation and the existence of the War Powers Act?
Mr. CAMPBELL. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BERMAN. Yes.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I would have ruled the same way as you if I were Judge Greene, but Judge Greene ruled ripeness. I agree with you. I think he was wrong to rule that ripeness required a vote by a majority of the House.
But when Ron Dellums brought exactly that argument, he brought it under the Constitution, but it was exactly the same argument, right? If the Constitution requires that the President get approval before going into war, why would you need a resolution of Congress to say that? One Congressperson standing alone, one soldier standing alone ought to be able to bring the case to court. Judge Greene ruled contrawise.
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I would have agreed with you, but we do have his opinion.
Mr. BERMAN. Well, I actually like my case better than Ron's case because if Ron was not using the War Powers Act and was simply using the declaration of war, I think both historically and, perhaps, legally a court could skirt that.
Obviously, Judge Greene wanted a case under the War Powers Act. That is why you think he is asking for this resolution. But if the War Powers Act had been used, you are saying Dellums didn't use the War Powers Act?
Mr. CAMPBELL. Right.
Mr. BERMAN. So why don't you sue, but use the War Powers Act?
Mr. CAMPBELL. I will, as soon as you give me a resolution.
Mr. BERMAN. Why do you need a resolution? You have the War Powers Act. You have conditions. By the way, why are those conditions in Bosnia any different than the conditions in Korea or in the Gulf or in several other places which creates a problem for me because you have chosen an area that might be a source of controversy, where I so much agree with what the President is now doing, that I hate to pick that as the test case.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Indeed, and it is a point—again, will you continue to yield?
Mr. BERMAN. Yes.
Mr. CAMPBELL. It is a point that has been shared by many colleagues. If it were a Vietnam, I would have a different case before this Committee, and one of my colleagues came up and said, ''Can you give me a Vietnam? I would like to bring this motion but under a Vietnam,'' and you can't. You have got to use what is available to the existence of hostilities.
If Judge Greene held that Ron Dellums could not proceed under the Constitution without a resolution of Congress, and that is what he held, a fortiori, he is not going to hold that you can proceed under a statute without a resolution.
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Mr. BERMAN. Your goal here is to get a constitutional determination that on the War Powers Act, or at least on the placing of people in harms way and hostilities, the functional equivalent of war, that a President cannot do this.
Mr. CAMPBELL. That is right.
Mr. BERMAN. That makes me nervous.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I think it is our constitutional obligation. I was nervous when I took the oath of office.
[Laughter.]
Mr. BERMAN. All right, well, Comrade Nervous, we will—thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Houghton.
Mr. HOUGHTON. I would like to talk against this amendment, but prior to doing so I would like to say there is no more distinguished, no more honorable man in this House. Isn't that the way things begin when you disagree?
Mr. CAMPBELL. Motion to strike.
[Laughter.]
Mr. HOUGHTON. But I do not understand many of the legal or the constitutional niceties here. It seems as if we are refining something which is already reasonably clear to me, in terms of the War Powers Act.
The thing that I worry about, and maybe you can help me on this, is that it is a technical agreement. You have been sitting here and have been countering and explaining, and it is difficult to understand, and it seems to me that, with that amount of difficulty at this particular time, it will send the wrong signal, not only to the country, but to the rest of the world because it is not easily explainable.
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If you are right, which you may be, and I don't know, why not another time? Why right now, where the troops have been brought down from about 20,000 to about 7,000, the proportion of our troops to the others are significantly lower, and we have got a very volatile situation there. I just think it sends the wrong signal. Maybe you have an answer to that.
Mr. CAMPBELL. If you would yield.
Mr. HOUGHTON. Yes.
Mr. CAMPBELL. You yield. Thank you.
You cannot bring a case unless there are hostilities. You cannot bring a case unless the War Powers Resolution applies. If I were to bring a case in a theoretic way, the court would throw it out for lack of case or controversy.
I am stuck. I have to wait for a situation where the War Powers Resolution applies, and the War Powers Resolution applies only when there are hostilities or the imminent likelihood of hostilities.
So it is a Catch 22, but it is one that I think we know how to answer. I can try a case when the world is calm. We can wait for that nanosecond—maybe longer than that—but then I would be thrown out of court, and then any time I bring a case when there are hostilities, I will be met with your point.
Indeed, one of the arguments that is made right now is Kosovo, and maybe we are going to have involvement of hostilities in Kosovo. Maybe the Administration is going to put troops into Kosovo. It is better that we decide it now before we put the troops in.
So among differing periods of hostilities this one is relatively calm.
How about the Persian Gulf? Maybe the War Powers Resolution applied when we were building up troops in the Persian Gulf. For heavens sake, let us do it now before that resurfaces.
Mr. HOUGHTON. If I could just reclaim my time for a second.
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You may be right. I just think it happens to be and, of course, we are all victims of the age in which we live, a very, very sensitive time, and the thing I am worried about, again, and, I don't know, maybe if the world is all calm you don't have an opportunity to bring this into court. But I just think there is a potential of sending a signal there, and we have got a lot of bad signals in the world.
Mr. HOUGHTON. Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Houghton.
Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I think I said most of what I wanted to say yesterday on this but I do want to raise one further question. I think Mr. Campbell is arguing that a vote for his resolution does not raise policy problems because his amendment would not require a troop pullout until after a court decision has been made.
Now, one of the big problems with that is that it cedes a large part of American foreign policy to the courts. It leaves the courts to decide American foreign policy. Rather than helping to definitively assert the congressional War Powers authority, the resolution cedes to the court the decision over if, when, how, and why you remove troops from Bosnia.
Chairman GILMAN. Will the gentleman yield?
May we give the gentleman attention? He has the floor. If there are any conversations, please take them to the anteroom.
Please proceed.
Mr. HAMILTON. Now, what happens if a District Court rules in favor of the resolution and then the Justice Department decides they are going to appeal it? You have got a situation where the conduct of American foreign policy is in the hands of the court, and there is utter confusion.
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Do you have a final judgment or don't you have a final judgment? Do we have to wait until a higher court overrules the decision?
I don't think we can put this kind of a cloud over the conduct of American foreign policy.
Now, I know the gentleman also argues that his amendment does not raise policy questions, but I really do differ with him on that point. With or without the amendment, this is not a sense of the Congress resolution. It does not suggest, it does not encourage, it directs the President to remove U.S. forces from Bosnia.
If you accept Mr. Campbell's argument, the resolution, with or without amendment, requires the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Bosnia at some point, with all of the attendant policy ramifications that we were talking about yesterday, and I will not repeat them because I think Members are familiar with them.
I have already expressed my view that if the resolution were to go to the courts, I think it would be judged on narrow grounds, it would be judged to violate the Constitution under the Chadha ruling. The courts have always been reluctant to get into the question of what constitutes hostilities, which triggers the 5(c) paragraph.
So I oppose this amendment, as I do the underlying resolution. I think that it does not stand the test either on policy or legal grounds, and I strongly oppose the amendment.
Mr. BERMAN. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HAMILTON. Yes, I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. BERMAN. I thank you for yielding.
Just following up on this, two more questions. First, I think slower than you, so I am now thinking about what you were saying.
This seems absurd to me that a judge would say the passage of a resolution, which says nothing other than, unless you pass another resolution authorizing it, something comes out is different than a law which says, unless you pass something, the troops must come out.
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If that is Judge Greene's decision, I cannot understand for the basis for it. I can't understand why passing this resolution is any different than simply re-enacting the War Powers Act in terms of getting this before the court, Question 1.
Question 2, why would things stand on something which seems sort of crazy to me as a basis for such a fundamental question of whether you contest the constitutionality of the law?
Second, Chadha, I know you think this is not Chadha, but I don't know why you think it is not Chadha. It is a concurrent resolution. It is not a joint resolution. It is an effort to circumvent the President—well, without describing its motive—it circumvents the President in this process. Why, given Chadha, do you think this could work?
Mr. CAMPBELL. I need someone to yield to me and the amber light is on.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman still has a minute left.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Hamilton has not yielded to me.
Mr. HAMILTON. I would be happy to yield.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.
On the first point, and I may not have time to get to Chadha, so, please, somebody else yield to me. I want to get to Chadha.
On the first point, you are right. That is why I think Judge Greene was wrong. He should have allowed the case to go ahead straight under the Constitution. But in that he has said it is not ripe for one Member of Congress to bring the case, you need a majority of the Congress to be with you, I am stuck.
I agree with you it is a very difficult position for Judge Greene to have held. Logically, I would not have agreed with it. I criticize it. So does Professor Ely, on whose work I have been relying heavily. But I cannot change it, and I know fairly likely, given how much we have squirmed to get around the difficulty of having to declare war, so courts have squirmed to get around having to make a decision.
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Give me the means to force the court to decide.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. I will be happy to yield to you a minute after I have finished my questions. But let me note that there is no more distinguished and no more honorable a gentleman than you, Mr. Campbell, but I agree with what you are trying to do today, as well as express those sentiments.
I not only support the amendment, Mr. Chairman, but I support the resolution.
Mr. Campbell, is not your purpose to try to remove the troops in Bosnia as soon as possible? Is that your end goal here?
Mr. CAMPBELL. If the gentleman will yield.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes.
Mr. CAMPBELL. My goal is to have a vote in Congress to determine whether our troops should be there. That is my goal.
My secondary goal is to find out whether, and to what extent, the War Powers Act is constitutional. If you wish my view on the policy, I would be happy to share with you that I do think——
Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is what I am asking you.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I do not hide my position on the policy. I do not think our troops should be there. But I am trying my best to abstract from that. It is not in the resolution.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. So someone who wants to get the troops out of Bosnia would support this resolution and this amendment; is that correct?
Mr. CAMPBELL. I would hope so. I think it is correct.
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Mr. ROHRABACHER. But even if you don't support that, those people would like our fundamental policy of the United States in the post-cold war era to be that the President of the United States is not able to put troops into hostilities for long periods of time without congressional support. If they support Bosnia, but still would like that position, they still might support your amendment.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Indeed. If the gentleman would yield.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, I do.
Mr. CAMPBELL. The very best way to support the policy in Bosnia is to have Congress ratify it. President Bush took this position in the Persian Gulf buildup of 1990, and I voted in favor. I know my colleague did as well.
So that is the answer. Whether you support it or not, let's get Congress on record.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, we just went through a meeting among all of the Republicans, and we were briefed about the terrible crisis that we have in our military; that we are billions of dollars short, that we are developing a hollow military, where planes are not going to be able to take off and our troops are not going to be able to defend themselves because weapon systems have not been maintained.
This was given to us in great detail, and what it indicates to me is not that we should be voting for supplementals as what the purpose of our conference was, but instead it indicates to me that we should be supporting some fundamental change in the way we do things around here to make sure that our troops are not put in jeopardy.
What we have in Bosnia is a situation where we are overextended. The United States is overextended throughout the world. Bosnia is not vital to our national security, and we are spending billions of dollars. The reason we have been put in this situation is that the fundamental law of the land is not being heeded.
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Mr. Campbell is right on target to try to make sure that that law is defined and goes through the legislative and judicial process as well, so that we don't get entangled in any more Bosnias. So I am 100 percent behind what Mr. Campbell is doing, and if you would like to answer the last question, go right ahead.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I appreciate the gentleman yielding.
Mr. Chairman, if I might have Mr. Berman's attention.
It is difficult and it is going to take longer than the time now, but let me at least begin. Do you know Professor Ely, former dean at Stanford, professor at Harvard, and professor at Yale? This is his book ''War and Responsibility. Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and its Aftermath.''
I am quoting from—yes, put the whole book in the record.
[Laughter.]
Mr. CAMPBELL. I am quoting from page 119.
''My personal opinion is that Section 5(c) is not unconstitutional. Even assuming that Chadha makes sense...'' he drops a footnote ''...it seems distinguishable''——
Mr. BERMAN. Wait, wait, wait. You can't say even assuming Chadha makes sense when you say Judge Greene doesn't make sense, but I am following him. Chadha makes sense for this purpose.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I am quoting, right? So what can I do but quote? I will do a running commentary if you would like.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. BERMAN. I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman, Mr. Rohrabacher, have an additional minute.
Chairman GILMAN. An additional minute is agreed to.
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Mr. CAMPBELL. So quoting Ely, and then I will give you my view if you would like, but I think Ely is pretty ''dang'' impressive, and he has written at length and studied the issue.
''So even assuming Chadha makes sense, it seems distinguishable. Section 5(c) does not fit the profile of the standard legislative veto, wherein Congress has delegated certain powers to the executive branch and then attempted to pull them back by reserving a right to veto executive exercises of the delegation. Instead, it should be read in the context of Sections 4(a)(1) and 5(b) as part of a package attempting to approximate in concrete terms the accommodation reached by the founders that the President could act militarily in an emergency, but was obligated to cease and desist in the event Congress did not approve as soon as it had a reasonable opportunity to do so.''
End quote, but it goes on for two more paragraphs. So that I have got at least a minute or some time to tell you what I think it means.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Blunt.
Mr. BLUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Campbell, I would like a minute or so left at the end of my time, but I would like to hear your explanation of what that means at the front part of my time.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you. The problem with Chadha is where you have an expansive delegation and then an executive agency really legislates and Congress looks at and says we don't like that legislation, and we are vetoing it by a single House or by a concurrent resolution, by two Houses.
The infirmity, the legal infirmity is that it is not given to the President for his signature. That is the presentment clause that was the basis of Chadha.
What John Ely says, and he is right, in my view, is that declaration of war is very different from a piece of delegated authority to an executive agency, and the reason why it is different is that the Constitution requires Congress to approve war, and so it isn't, ''here we will give you this general area of authority. You do what is right. We will sit back, look at it, and pick this one and not pick that one by a single house,'' which was Chadha.
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It was a single House, the House of Representatives, that vetoed the delegated authority to the Attorney General regarding one poor immigrant who was being deported.
War is very different, as Ely points out. You do not just delegate broad authority. Rather, what you have is a reality that the Congress must approve it in advance. But in the modern world, there are going to be emergencies. So the War Powers Resolution says 60 days, Mr. President, handle the emergency, but then the original intent of the Constitution resumes. There has to be an approval by Congress. It is not a delegated authority. It is always our obligation, but we recognize the emergencies of the modern world for 60 days, and that is very different than the situation in Chadha and the reasoning in Chadha.
I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. BLUNT. Thank you, Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Chairman and Mr. Hamilton, no one has higher regard for the two of you on this Committee than I do, but I intend to vote for the resolution, for the amendment. I think this discussion has been good for this Committee. I think this discussion will be good for the Congress. I really don't see the negative policy implications of the Congress having this discussion about the Congress' responsibility.
Is it negative to our European allies to say you need to be thinking about your portion of the burden being shared here? Is it negative to the people in Bosnia saying that the Congress is asserting its right to consider the President's policy of committing troops?
Just a month ago, we were rushing toward another military commitment that clearly did not involve the nuclear precipice. It did not involve the need of someone in our country to be able to respond overnight to a nuclear threat. It involved the committing of American resources and American lives to advance a world position.
I think the Congress has that constitutional responsibility. The War Powers Act may or may not be the right way to assert that, but having that decided, I think would be a helpful thing, and I yield back my time.
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Mr. BERMAN. Would the gentleman be willing to yield for one moment just for a question?
Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Berman, I would.
Mr. BERMAN. I appreciate that.
Then why not offer a resolution pursuant to the War Powers Act authorizing or opposing the placement of troops in Bosnia, and let's have that debate on the merits?
Mr. CAMPBELL. Would the gentleman yield to me?
Mr. BERMAN. You can do whatever you want. I would just like to add to that. You can have it one way or the other, but I think it is wrong to say, this is not a debate about Bosnia policy. It is a debate about our institutional power. I happen to be offering a resolution which serves my policy purposes, but we aren't debating the policy, and then to say we have to pass this so that the American people can have a debate about our Bosnia policy.
Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Berman, I really would see that as a debate on the principle, not the policy, and then I think the policy debate follows, but I am certainly not the legal strategist of how we advance the War Powers Act.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Gejdenson.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you.
Mr. Campbell, don't you think to be consistent you ought to add Korea, Haiti, and every other place that American forces are in danger?
Mr. CAMPBELL. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. GEJDENSON. Yes.
Mr. CAMPBELL. In each case you would have to establish whether hostilities exist, and the definition to which I have been constantly referring, refers to either the presence of shots at troops under fire or the clear and present danger thereof.
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I think that the case in Bosnia is stronger than in the other two instances you have given. Why? Because we have hostile fire pay. Yesterday I pointed out——
Mr. ACKERMAN. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. GEJDENSON. I would be happy to yield.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I am almost—well, fine. If you want me to finish.
Mr. ACKERMAN. For the record, I believe that there are more people killed in Korea, where we have 37,000 troops, than in Bosnia, in any given week, in any given year for the past 39 years and more people are dying of heart attacks, and more people are dying of accidents, and more people are killed.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Let me reclaim my time.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Sure. Thanks.
My burden is to establish that there are hostilities in Bosnia. Whether there are in other places is for another resolution. I don't think it is my burden to say one way or the other.
Mr. GEJDENSON. I am reclaiming my time. I think that we have a responsibility here that is beyond simply academically reviewing the current decisions. If we are going to create this kind of turmoil, particularly in an area where so many people have died, I can remember people on both sides of this aisle in torment on the floor of the House and this Committee after village after village of people was raped, burned, and murdered, and I think you have got to make a decision here.
If you want to get the troops out of there and you think they are going to be better off and we are going to be better off without the troops there, then maybe you ought to support this resolution.
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But if you think that this is simply just a discussion, it seems to me, there is a danger you will encourage those, as we have seen this week, that have brought death back into that community.
Now, none of us like to see American troops in harms way, but I don't know anybody in this chamber who can honestly believe that the people in that region will be better off if we pull American troops out of there or believes that the Europeans will handle it on their own.
So what we have here is a debate, frankly, that Congress, as Mr. Berman pointed out, could take action on immediately. If you think we ought to get the troops out of there, put a resolution on the floor pulling the troops out.
If you are complaining about the President's use of power and diplomacy in the last confrontation with Iraq, the leadership is on your side of the aisle. We could have had a resolution in both Houses to vote whether or not to support the President. The choice is ours, as Members of Congress, if we want to take that action.
I think, in some ways, this causes more trouble than a real assault on the policy because it keeps those who harbor desires to wipe out their neighbors and say, well, maybe this is going to work, and if we just dig in, instead of cooperate for another 4 years, we will be able to go back to taking back what we won. I hope that we can get people on both sides of the aisle to reject this.
Congress can exercise its authority when it has the courage to do so. We, clearly, did not want or have the courage to do so, as the President was confronting Saddam Hussein. We have not done that in Korea. We have not done that in Haiti, if that is the way——
If you want to end those troops, we can do that by legislative action. But it seems to me that taking this action here is—it can't simply be written off as an academic review of the constitutional relationship between the Congress of the United States and the Executive and how the courts interpret our authority. This creates, I think, real mischief in what happens on the ground.
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Now, there are some places where I might agree with you that we ought to pull out. I think we ought to then take the action, and I think that is what the court is going to say in the final analysis. I am no constitutional lawyer.
If Congress wants to get out of here, Congress could do something to get us out of here. Put a resolution on the floor, cut off the funds, demand the President bring the troops home. That is what the court will tell us.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Sanford.
Mr. SANFORD. I would respectfully disagree with my colleague in that it seems to me—again, this simply goes back to process—I think it is a way of avoiding mischief because you set a clear and consistent pattern by which the Congress is going to approach these issues.
I would simply yield my time to Mr. Campbell, should he like to respond to any of the last conversations that have come up.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I thank my colleague.
Please do look at the language of the resolution, and I would ask, particularly, my good friend and colleague, Mr. Hamilton, because it was Mr. Hamilton who said that this was a policy judgment.
It is in the amendment, but it is also in the underlying text. The Congress does direct the President to remove troops, but look at Line 9 to 12 of the amendment: ''Unless a war or specific authorization for such use of U.S. Armed Forces has been enacted.''
The President is, indeed, directed to withdraw troops unless Congress does its job. The clear implication is the vote happen.
As to the point made by my good friend from Connecticut, I cannot get a vote on the floor every time I want. Yes, I am a Member of the Majority, and I am proud to be a Member of the Majority, but I cannot. What does a person in my position do who wants to see this taken up on the Congress floor for exactly the reasons that you do, whether it is a yea vote or a nay vote? All I have got available is 5(c) because that is the only provision that allows me to get a privileged rule.
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If the leadership of both parties is content to let the U.S. Congress' power atrophy, I am not, and I don't think you are.
I thank my colleague for yielding.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time?
Mr. SANFORD. I yield back.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Hastings.
Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank my colleague from California, my good friend, for bringing his resolution.
Most respectfully, Mr. Campbell, I am opposed to the amendment and to the underlying resolution and for different reasons than I have heard.
I think you bring to our attention a very serious matter of some consequence. I came to Congress with the thought in mind of having paid attention to the previous undertakings on behalf of Ron Dellums and his lawsuit that I would like very much to get on a track to address the War Powers Act, and Bosnia and Haiti immediately came on the radar screen, and there was some general discussion.
My objection is that we haven't had enough time. I know you bring your amendment and your underlying resolution when you can.
I know the Chairman schedules hearings when he can. But quite frankly this is, perhaps, as critical a matter regarding the overall policy of the United States as it pertains to action in hostilities or however you define them as we are likely to have. We need extensive debate. We need intellectual discussions, hearings from academia, from intelligence or from the military, and I mean intense.
Now, there are some Members here in this body and in the International Relations Committee who have exacting understanding of the War Powers Act, as I believe you do, as I believe Howard Berman and, certainly, Lee Hamilton and Ben Gilman, and Doug Bereuter do.
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But there are other Members here that don't have a clue, and that would then go to the floor of the House of Representatives, where a whole clueless lot are there. They all have exacting sympathies about Bosnia and whether or not we ought to get the troops out. I agree with my colleague from Connecticut. If we do, all hell is going to break loose. So I would question whether or not we want to take this kind of action and cause that kind of slaughter that is likely to take place.
You mentioned Kosovo, and it is bubbling right there likely to spill into Macedonia, Albania, that entire range. But that is another issue. I do not think we have had enough time, and I do not like voting on things when I have not had enough time to give careful consideration to it. That is not your fault. That is not the Chairman's fault, but the body ought to give serious consideration to undertaking matters of this consequence, and it is for that reason that I oppose your amendment and the underlying resolution.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Manzullo.
Mr. MANZULLO. The reason I am going to vote for Mr. Campbell's underlying bill and the amendment is that I believe that Congress is relevant.
We can't just sit back, let the President send troops wherever he wants. I have heard in conference that the President has done this 25 times in the past 5 years. He always comes back for a supplemental. The President always submits a Defense bill that is never enough.
If you look in yesterday's Times, there is an article that talks about how underprepared our fighting forces are, how we can't get people to enroll in the Armed Services, and how the President gets whatever he wants.
I have been here for 5 years, and we debate this, we vote on the floor, and it does not seem to do any good. So why don't we exercise the constitutional powers that we have with the power of the purse and get on the floor, debate this.
Mr. Hastings, I appreciate the fact that there are other senior Members, but I take great exception that those of us that haven't been around as long as Mr. Bereuter and others don't know enough about the War Powers Act to intelligently debate it on the floor. I think that is a——
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Mr. HASTINGS. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. MANZULLO. I am almost done. But I think that all of us have the obligation to debate this. It needs a thorough flushing on the floor.
All Mr. Campbell wants is to say let's have a vote on it. He is not even taking a position. He just says let the world and the American people at least be heard on the floor.
I would be glad to yield.
Mr. HASTINGS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
My remarks were not intended for Members of the International Relations Committee. But, Don, you would be terribly remiss if you believed that there are Members in this body who really understand the War Powers Act that came in mine and your class and below. Many of them do not—I am not saying they don't have feelings, but I will be doggone if they don't understand.
Mr. MANZULLO. Reclaiming my time. I think it is our obligation to understand it, and one of the reasons we have debate is so people bone up on it and get there and debate in an intelligent manner. We represent the people.
Mr. HASTINGS. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. MANZULLO. Yes.
Mr. HASTINGS. Is 2 days enough time for that? I came here on an airplane yesterday afternoon at 5 p.m. and saw the Chairman on the floor and was asked to come here to try to get a quorum, had other meetings going on. We have not had enough time.
Mr. MANZULLO. I yield back.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Manzullo.
Mr. Ackerman.
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Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much. I really did not come to speak. I came to vote, but I feel I am getting sucked into it.
Chairman GILMAN. Are you ready to vote, Mr. Ackerman?
Mr. ACKERMAN. I will be ready as soon as I finish my time, Mr. Speaker. If we can reset that clock, I think I have 5 minutes left. Thank you.
This is a very, very serious amendment that has dire policy consequences cloaked in a constitutional question, and we are not just going to resolve a constitutional question here if, indeed, we do that, but certainly it is going to affect U.S. policy.
The lines that you just quoted, Mr. Campbell, and I really respect the way you have made your presentation today, although I disagree with you on the issue, in Lines 9 through 12, where it says, ''Unless a declaration of war or specific authorization,'' the declaration of war was the original thing that got us into this mess, where Presidents would bring us into situations of war historically, recent history, without coming to the Congress.
One of the reasons I supported President Bush and the use of force in the Persian Gulf is because he did come to Congress. But there is a difference between that situation, as well as a different situation with Korea and Vietnam, and those situations that led us to the original resolution was that the President was leading the country possibly into war where the United States would be a partisan player on one side.
This is a very different situation. You began yesterday by talking about the definition of the word hostilities and tried to define what that means. I am not sure what it means either. Hostilities occur everywhere. In this Committee once in a while we have hostilities, but that doesn't mean that there is a declared war going on where you need an army of partisans.
The United States, clearly, is not fighting a battle in Bosnia. They are there as peacekeepers, part of an international peacekeeping force. I could not agree with you more on the constitutional questions and the prerogatives of this body and the meaning of the Constitution.
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Surely, in our country and anywhere in our municipalities, the police can't break into somebody's home to seek evidence as a partisan political player, but they don't need a warrant if there is a hostage situation, if they are going in as peacekeepers, coming in to do something for which they feel they have a just responsibility.
We are not in Bosnia as a player on one side or the other in this instance, neither are we in Korea, although we have favorites, I assure you. But if this passes, it would set so dangerous a precedent because our troops anywhere you send them there are hostilities. If they are called upon to be in the Middle East, which they are, between Egypt and Israel to this very day, some could argue there are hostilities because once in a while somebody dies.
Whether it is on the border of North and South Korea on the 39th Parallel, where many people die every year, whether it was and is in Germany when there were hostilities, no declaration of war, nobody ever called for that.
We should not insert this argument, based on trying to effect a policy, and some of us may agree with you on the policy, but let's have the policy argument. This takes away our ability and has others internationally read what we are doing as a policy decision. They do not know that you want to go before a court or something.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. ACKERMAN. This is an amendment that affects policy.
Chairman GILMAN. As we conclude our debate, I have just a few brief comments.
We have listened carefully to the debate on Mr. Campbell's amendment to this resolution. I agree with the gentleman from California the founding fathers carefully debated where to put our war power in the Federal Government, and they clearly came down on the side of placing it in the Congress and not in the executive branch.
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I have been a long-time supporter of the War Powers Resolution. I voted for it when it became law of the land and recently resisted efforts to repeal it. It is regrettable, however, the gentleman chose this particular time to use his prerogative.
The Congress set our policy on the deployment of our troops in Bosnia last year during consideration of the Defense Appropriation Bill, and we clearly gave the President the option to remain in Bosnia, and a majority of both Houses supported that legislation. The Dayton Plan is now finally showing signs of working and war criminals are even turning themselves in.
I understand the gentleman's concern about how this resolution will be seen here in the Congress. He is also concerned how it will be seen in the Supreme Court. But I am more concerned how it will be seen in Sarajevo, the Serb capital of Banja Luka or the war criminal capital of Pale. Passage of this resolution at this time, I think, would be interpreted as a vote of no confidence in our Bosnian policy and send confusing signals about our national resolve to persevere to friend and foe alike, pulling the rug out from under our troops and commanders in the field who justly take pride in what they have been accomplishing in Bosnia.
Mr. Campbell's amendment replaces a date certain with some time that is beyond the control of both the legislative and executive branches of our government. Moreover, it would be an automatic withdrawal of our troops within 60 days of the eventual court ruling on the resolution. No one can tell now what circumstances in Bosnia or elsewhere might be that could have bearing on such an important issue at such time as we have a court ruling, nor would we be certain that a court calendar starting the clock and the resolution ticking would recognize all of the particulars to be considered at that time to assure that our troops can be removed safely.
Accordingly, I regret that we are now facing a clash between asserting congressional prerogative on the issue of war making and good foreign policy. Given the progress made toward peace and the position of our troops in the field, I urge the Committee to support good policy and to oppose the Campbell amendment.
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The question is now on the amendment.
As many as are in favor of the amendment signify by stating aye.
As many as opposed signify by saying no.
The noes clearly have it.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, I would ask for the ayes and nays.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Campbell is asking for the ayes and nays. Is there sufficient support for the ayes and nays?
The ayes and nays are ordered.
The clerk will call a roll on the amendment. This is on the Campbell amendment.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Gilman?
Chairman GILMAN. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Gilman votes no.
Mr. Goodling?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Leach?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hyde?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Bereuter?
Mr. BEREUTER. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Bereuter votes no.
Mr. Smith?
Mr. SMITH. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Smith votes no.
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Mr. Burton?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Gallegly?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Ballenger?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Rohrabacher?
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Rohrabacher votes yes.
Mr. Manzullo?
Mr. MANZULLO. Yes.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Manzullo votes yes.
Mr. Royce?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. King?
Mr. KING. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. King votes no.
Mr. Kim?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Chabot?
Mr. CHABOT. Aye.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Chabot votes yes.
Mr. Sanford?
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[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Salmon?
Mr. SALMON. Aye.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Salmon votes yes.
Mr. Houghton?
Mr. HOUGHTON. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Houghton votes no.
Mr. Campbell?
Mr. CAMPBELL. Aye.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Campbell votes yes.
Mr. Fox?
Mr. FOX. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Fox votes no.
Mr. McHugh?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Graham?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Blunt?
Mr. BLUNT. Yes.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Blunt votes yes.
Mr. Brady?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hamilton?
Mr. HAMILTON. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hamilton votes no.
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Mr. Gejdenson?
Mr. GEJDENSON. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Gejdenson votes no.
Mr. Lantos?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Berman?
Mr. BERMAN. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Berman votes no.
Mr. Ackerman?
Mr. ACKERMAN. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Ackerman votes no.
Mr. Faleomavaega?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Martinez?
Mr. MARTINEZ. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Martinez votes no.
Mr. Payne?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Andrews?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Menendez?
Mr. MENENDEZ. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Menendez votes no.
Mr. Brown?
Mr. BROWN. No.
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Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Brown votes no.
Ms. McKinney?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hastings?
Mr. HASTINGS. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hastings votes no.
Ms. Danner?
Ms. DANNER. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Ms. Danner votes no.
Mr. Hilliard?
Mr. HILLIARD. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hilliard votes no.
Mr. Sherman?
Mr. SHERMAN. A reluctant no.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Sherman votes no.
Mr. Wexler?
Mr. WEXLER. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Wexler votes no.
Mr. Rothman?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Clement?
Mr. CLEMENT. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Clement votes no.
Mr. Luther?
Mr. LUTHER. No.
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Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Luther votes no.
Mr. Davis?
Mr. DAVIS. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Davis votes no.
Chairman GILMAN. The clerk will call the absentees.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Goodling?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Goodling?
Mr. GOODLING. Yes.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Goodling votes yes.
Mr. Leach?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hyde?
Mr. HYDE. Yes.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hyde votes yes.
Mr. Burton?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Gallegly?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mrs. Ros-Lehtinen?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Ballenger?
Mr. BALLENGER. Yes.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Ballenger votes yes.
Mr. Royce?
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Mr. ROYCE. Yes.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Royce votes yes.
Mr. Kim?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Sanford?
Mr. SANFORD. Yes.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Sanford votes yes.
Mr. McHugh?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Graham?
Mr. GRAHAM. Yes.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Graham votes yes.
Mr. Brady?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Lantos?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Faleomavaega?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Payne?
Mr. PAYNE. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Payne votes no.
Mr. Andrews?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Ms. McKinney?
[No response.]
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Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Rothman?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Kim?
Mr. KIM. Yes.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Kim votes yes.
Chairman GILMAN. The clerk will report the vote.
Ms. BLOOMER. On this vote there were 13 ayes and 22 noes.
Chairman GILMAN. The amendment is not agreed to.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Who is seeking recognition? Mr. Berman?
Mr. BERMAN. Yes. Are there more amendments to be taken up or are we going to final passage?
Chairman GILMAN. We are going to final passage.
Mr. BERMAN. I would just like to, I will try, very briefly, just to make two points, having just voted against an amendment which made a resolution which bothers me very much, somewhat better.
You, Mr. Campbell, I think, legitimately raise a very serious institutional question. Mr. Rohrabacher, though, reminds me that there is also not just a question about Bosnia, but there is a fundamental question about America's role in the world involved in this issue.
I guess what I am saying is my disagreement with my friends', from Orange County, view of America's role in the world is so great and on a question that I think is so important that for me it overcomes my institutional concern with the issue you raised.
But the second question is, if your resolution goes down, I think Congress should reconsider the issue of substantially either repealing or making major modifications in the War Powers Act because we are at the point in the day where it is wrong for us to pretend that we want the powers that that law supposedly gives us.
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Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Hyde.
Mr. HYDE. I am gratified to hear the remarks from my friend, Mr. Berman, because it wasn't long ago at all, and it is vivid in my memory, where I attempted to repeal the War Powers Act.
Mr. BERMAN. It is vivid in my memory, too.
Mr. HYDE. I think it is wrong. I think it is unconstitutional. I think it deprives the President or attempts to deprive the President of his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief. I think there are other ways to accomplish getting the White House's attention, if they are putting our troops in harms way, and the most direct way is to pass a bill before closing the expenditure of any funds for this adventure.
But this bill, the War Powers Act is wrong, but my God you guys loved it when Reagan was here, and you loved it when Bush was here, and I tried to repeal it, and I came this close. My friend, Mr. Hamilton, made a stirring defense of the War Powers Act. So my attitude today is you must love this, and if you want it, you ought to have it. You ought to comply with it. It is on the books. It is the law, and you should live with it.
But now you are suddenly having second thoughts, now that you understand how unworkable it is; how wrong it is. As I say, a late convert is better than no convert, but I could have used your help when I wanted to repeal the darn thing.
Mr. BERMAN. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HYDE. Of course.
Mr. BERMAN. We could talk about how unworkable it is, but we also have to pay some deference to how hypocritical we are. We talk about wanting the power and every single time something comes up we run away from the resolution authorizing it or opposing it.
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Mr. CAMPBELL. Like today.
Mr. BERMAN. No. You keep saying this is not about Bosnia.
Mr. CAMPBELL. You deny me the chance.
Mr. BERMAN. What?
Mr. CAMPBELL. You deny me the chance.
Mr. BERMAN. I don't deny you the chance to offer a resolution to support or oppose our policy in Bosnia. Mr. Rohrabacher takes great pleasure in your proposal because, for him, it sets up the process for him to fight our policy in Bosnia because America, in his mind, is overextended.
My friend is a verbal interventionist, and in every part of the world my friend has very strong views. He just never wants any American power to be asserted there in a military sense because that is his view. He takes strength in this resolution you are offering because, to him, it marshals the forces against our Bosnia policy.
Mr. HYDE. Recapturing my time, although I am really hypnotized by the gentleman's rhetoric——
[Laughter.]
Mr. BERMAN. You managed to come out of it.
Mr. HYDE. It was June 7, 1995, I made my amendment to repeal the War Powers Act, and I lost 201 to 217, and I don't want to blame Mr. Hamilton for being all that persuasive, but he was.
Mr. BERMAN. He was very good.
Mr. HYDE. But some of our people also wanted to keep it in place now that Mr. Clinton was the President. So some day we will look at these things on the merits and not through the eyeglasses of a persona.
I thank the Chairman for giving me these few moments of retribution.
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Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hyde.
Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I know you want to vote, and I will try to be very brief.
Mr. Hyde and I agree that there are serious inadequacies in the War Powers Resolution. Nobody can look at the War Powers Resolution today and think that it works very well.
Mr. Hyde is right in pushing for change. Now, the problem is not do you change the War Powers Resolution, but what do you change it to? What changes do you make?
Some, like Mr. Hyde, would favor outright repeal. I am reluctant to do that because it gives up the congressional role, but I have no hesitancy in agreeing with Mr. Berman and Mr. Hyde that there are serious inadequacies with the War Powers Resolution, and that is my only point.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.
We will now move for the final consideration. Without objection, the previous question is ordered. The gentleman from Nebraska is recognized to offer a motion.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I move the Committee report the pending measure adversely to the House.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Point of parliamentarian inquiry.
Chairman GILMAN. The motion——
Mr. CAMPBELL. Point of parliamentarian inquiry.
Chairman GILMAN. Who is raising the inquiry?
Mr. CAMPBELL. I am, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Campbell.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Would the Chair kindly then explain that a vote to support my position is a no vote.
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Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Bereuter, would you explain your motion.
Mr. BEREUTER. In fact, the motion is to adversely report it. So the gentleman is right. If you wish to support his position, you would vote no on this motion on my part.
Chairman GILMAN. The motion is to report the matter before us adversely.
The question is on the motion of the gentleman from Nebraska.
As many as are in favor of the motion signify by stating aye.
As many as opposed signify by stating no.
The ayes appear to have it.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Campbell.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I ask for a recorded vote.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Campbell is asking for a recorded vote. Are there sufficient Members in support of the roll call?
Please raise your hand in favor of the roll call.
A sufficient number have expressed support. A roll call is agreed to.
The clerk will call a roll on the motion.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Gilman?
Chairman GILMAN. Aye.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Gilman votes yes.
Mr. Goodling?
Mr. GOODLING. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Goodling votes no.
Mr. Leach?
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[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hyde?
Mr. HYDE. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hyde votes no.
Mr. Bereuter?
Mr. BEREUTER. Yes.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Bereuter votes yes.
Mr. Smith?
Mr. SMITH. Yes.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Smith votes yes.
Mr. Burton?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Gallegly?
Mr. GALLEGLY. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Gallegly votes no.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen?
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen votes no.
Mr. Ballenger?
Mr. BALLENGER. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Ballenger votes no.
Mr. Rohrabacher?
Mr. ROHRABACHER. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Rohrabacher votes no.
Mr. Manzullo?
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Mr. MANZULLO. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Manzullo votes no.
Mr. Royce?
Mr. ROYCE. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Royce votes no.
Mr. King?
Mr. KING. Yes.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. King votes yes.
Mr. Kim?
Mr. KIM. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Kim votes no.
Mr. Chabot?
Mr. CHABOT. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Chabot votes no.
Mr. Sanford?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Salmon?
Mr. SALMON. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Salmon votes no.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Houghton?
Mr. HOUGHTON. Yes.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Houghton votes yes.
Mr. Campbell?
Mr. CAMPBELL. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Campbell votes no.
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Mr. Fox?
Mr. FOX. Yes.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Fox votes yes.
Mr. McHugh?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Graham?
Mr. GRAHAM. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Graham votes no.
Mr. Blunt?
Mr. BLUNT. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Blunt votes no.
Mr. Brady?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hamilton?
Mr. HAMILTON. Aye.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hamilton votes yes.
Mr. Gejdenson?
Mr. GEJDENSON. Yes.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Gejdenson votes yes.
Mr. Lantos?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Berman?
Mr. BERMAN. Yes.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Berman votes yes.
Mr. Ackerman?
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Mr. ACKERMAN. Yes.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Ackerman votes yes.
Mr. Faleomavaega?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Martinez?
Mr. MARTINEZ. Yes.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Martinez votes yes.
Mr. Payne?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Andrews?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Menendez?
Mr. MENENDEZ. Aye.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Menendez votes yes.
Mr. Brown?
Mr. BROWN. Yes.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Brown votes yes.
Ms. McKinney?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hastings?
Mr. HASTINGS. Yes.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hastings votes yes.
Ms. Danner?
Ms. DANNER. Aye.
Ms. BLOOMER. Ms. Danner votes yes.
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Mr. Hilliard?
Mr. HILLIARD. Aye.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hilliard votes yes.
Mr. Sherman?
Mr. SHERMAN. Yes.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Sherman votes yes.
Mr. Wexler?
Mr. WEXLER. Yes.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Wexler votes yes.
Mr. Rothman?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Clement?
Mr. CLEMENT. Yes.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Clement votes yes.
Mr. Luther?
Mr. LUTHER. Yes.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Luther votes yes.
Mr. Davis?
Mr. DAVIS. Yes.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Davis votes yes.
Chairman GILMAN. The clerk will call the absentees.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Leach?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Burton?
Mr. BURTON. No.
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Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Burton votes no.
Mr. Sanford?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. McHugh?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Brady?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Lantos?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Faleomavaega?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Payne?
Mr. PAYNE. Yes.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Payne votes yes.
Mr. Andrews?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Ms. McKinney?
[No response.]
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Rothman?
[No response.]
Chairman GILMAN. The clerk will report the vote of Mr. Sanford. The clerk will call Mr. Sanford.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Sanford?
Mr. SANFORD. No.
Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Sanford votes no.
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Chairman GILMAN. The clerk will report the vote.
Ms. BLOOMER. On this vote there were 22 ayes and 16 noes.
Chairman GILMAN. The motion is agreed to.
Mr. BERMAN. A point of parliamentarian inquiry.
Chairman GILMAN. Inquiry by the gentleman, Mr. Berman?
Mr. BERMAN. Under the procedure, this expedited procedure, is this resolution still entitled to a debate on the floor?
Chairman GILMAN. Yes, it is.
Mr. BERMAN. So this was just one step in the process.
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, the Chairman is authorized to make motions under Rule 20 of the rules of the House relative to going to conference on this resolution or a counterpart from the Senate. Without objection, the staff director is authorized to make technical, grammatical, conforming changes to the resolution.
The Chair announces that the Committee intends to file its report on this measure promptly within 2 days. Does any Member wish to have the right to file opposing views, Mr. Campbell?
Mr. Campbell, do you want to file opposing views?
Mr. CAMPBELL. I sure do, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman will be protected.
I now would like to remind the Members we have just one other measure we will take up now, and then we will be recessing until 2:30. We will now proceed to take up H. Res. 364, urging the introduction and passage of a resolution on the human rights situation in the People's Republic of China at the 54th Session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.
This will be a very brief discussion. I urge our Members to please stand by.
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The Chair will now consider the resolution relating to the issue of China in relation to the deliberations of the U.N. Human Rights Commission, a resolution before the Committee.
The clerk will report. The Committee will come to order. Please proceed.
Ms. BLOOMER. ''H. Res. 364 urging the introduction and passage of a resolution on the human rights situation in the People's Republic of China at the 54th Session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.''
Chairman GILMAN. This resolution was considered by the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Human Rights and on Asia and Pacific and reported from them with an amendment in the nature of a substitute now before the Members and labeled ''Committee Print.''
Without objection, the Committee Print will be considered as original text for the purpose of amendment. Without objection, the clerk will read the preamble and operative language of the Subcommittee's amendment in the nature of a substitute for amendment.
Ms. BLOOMER. ''Whereas the State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1997 state that '[t]he Government [of China] continued to commit''——
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, the amendment in the nature of a substitute is considered as having been read and is open to amendment at any time.
I now recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith, sponsor of the resolution, to introduce the resolution.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I want to thank you for being one of the principal co-sponsors and my good friend, the chairman of the Asian Committee, Mr. Bereuter, and many of my friends on the other side of the aisle, including Mr. Gephardt, who also co-sponsored the resolution.
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I urge every Member of this Committee to support H. Res. 364. This resolution urges the introduction and passage of a resolution on human rights in the People's Republic of China at the 54th Session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission, which begins next week.
H. Res. 364 has already been cosponsored by 26 Members from both sides of the aisle, and both the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights and the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific have reported the same amended version to this Committee.
If any government deserves to be the subject of a Human Rights Commission resolution, Mr. Chairman, the Beijing dictatorship does.
In his testimony before the Subcommittee last month, Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck made clear that the ''Government of China continues to commit widespread and well-documented abuses in all areas of human rights.''
He also testified that there have not been any major improvements in that situation during the last year.
As detailed in the State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in China, those abuses included extrajudicial killings, the use of torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, forced abortion and forced sterilization, the sale of organs from executed prisoners, and tight controls over religion, speech, and press. Persecution in some minority areas, such as Tibet and East Turkestan, even intensified during the past year.
I wanted to mention, in particular, the arrest and long-term detention by the Beijing regime of the 6-year-old child, the Panchen Lama. What words are strong enough to describe a government that arranges the disappearance of a little boy because he is too much loved by his own people? What measures are strong enough to take against such a government?
Now, the Panchan Lama is eight, assuming that he is still alive, and many of us are very concerned about his well-being.
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Frankly, Mr. Chairman, this resolution is the least that we can do for the Chinese and the Tibetan people. We need to stand with the oppressed and against or at least in exposing the misdeeds of the oppressor.
Unlike our annual MFN debate, it does not implicate the commercial interests of the United States. Indeed, this resolution merely urges the Administration to do what it promised to do when it delinked MFN for China from human rights considerations in 1994 and that was ''to insist that the U.N. Human Rights Commission pass a resolution dealing with the serious human rights abuses in China.'' Those abuses continue unabated and a need for a resolution is more pressing than ever.
Wei Jingsheng, the great Chinese democracy advocate and former prisoner of conscience, appeared before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights last month.
At that hearing, and again in a letter which I would be asked be made a part of the record, he wrote an open letter to Congress urging us to pass a clear resolution calling on your representatives in the U.N. Commission for Human Rights in Geneva to hold fast in their efforts supporting a China resolution.
Mr. Wei explains that, and I quote, ''The success of the Chinese Government to silence the world community has serious consequences. It is a massive blow to the Chinese people's determination to struggle for human rights and democracy. They are left with a feeling that they have been betrayed.''
Mr. Chairman, I would ask that a Human Rights Watch Asia Report entitled, ''China, Chinese Diplomacy, Western Hypocrisy, and the U.N. Human Rights Commission'' be made a part of the record and in it this group in 14 pages, single-spaced, details how the Chinese dictatorship was able to muscle its way and to buy its way into a vote last year of no action on a resolution condemning the human rights abuses by giving out money and doling out money to representative countries that were part of the U.N. Commission in Geneva.
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Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.
[The report appears in the appendix.]
Mr. SMITH. And I do ask that Members support this. It is the bare merest, least that we can do, I would submit, to make a stand on behalf of the oppressed in China.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Smith.
Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I support the resolution and I commend Chairman Smith for bringing it forward.
I think it is necessary for the United States to offer a resolution at Geneva as a sign of our very strong interest in and concern about human rights in China. China must have no doubt in their mind that we care deeply about human rights in China, and they must have no doubt that a decent relationship with the United States will certainly be circumscribed so long as the Chinese Government abuses its citizens.
Let me just add a one word of caveat, however, if I may. This resolution is headed for defeat in Geneva. That is a foregone conclusion. What worries me here is that we are pushing a resolution in Geneva that is going to be defeated and that could convince the Chinese that the world does not care about human rights.
I hope they don't take that to be the case, but we do hand at least a tactical victory to the Chinese by pushing forward this resolution and failing to even get it on the calendar, which is what is going to happen here, and the Chinese then will be in a position to proclaim a victory.
We must make very clear to the world how deeply we feel about human rights—Chairman Smith has done a very good job of that—and let them know how deeply Americans care about human rights in China, but we ought not to have any illusion here about the tactical situation that we are confronted with.
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I plan to vote for the resolution. I urge my colleagues to do the same.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I speak in support of the resolution. In fact, this resolution was considered by the Asia Pacific Subcommittee and unanimously supported by Mr. Smith, the prime sponsor of this legislation, and me, and his Subcommittee staff and mine worked very conscientiously together. We worked out a few factual differences, and added a few things that we thought should be added on both sides. So we are very much in agreement.
I think it is important to note that, while there is dispute in some cases about human rights abuses, as a minimum, the documentation provided in the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices on the People's Republic of China is sufficient for us, more than sufficient, to continue to try to use what I think is the appropriate mechanism, the U.N. Human Rights Commission, to pursue our concerns about this.
If the European Union, which has failed to support the resolution and has indicated they will support against, will not support this effort in the Commission, then let the world know that they value trade dollars more than they do principle.
I must say that last year we had to look long and hard for support among European nations, the developed countries of the world. Only Denmark was willing to stand up, and they were threatened with retribution as a result of their effort.
But I think it is important that we have this expanded dialog. Our European colleagues say they are in favor of expanded dialog, but I also believe it is important to raise the very human rights conditions and questions that the American people have raised concerning the PRC.
I want to just close by citing a March 3rd editorial in The Washington Post, which states, ''It is not too late for Mr. Clinton to support such a measure. He can still send a message that America supports or at least sympathizes with the fighters for freedom inside China. Alternatively, he can send a message that his friendship with their oppressors is too important to put at risk for any impolitic works. But for someone who hopes to become this year the first President to visit China since the massacre at Tiananmen Square, this should be an easy choice.''
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I urge support for the resolution.
Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. I want to commend the chairman of the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee, Mr. Bereuter, and the Ranking Minority Member, Mr. Berman, for their role in bringing this measure before us and commend the chairman of the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, Mr. Smith, and the Ranking Minority Member, Mr. Lantos, for taking a leadership role in crafting the resolution.
Mr. Burton.
Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, last week—I think it was last week—in New York, two people, one was Chinese American and the other was Chinese national, in New York were arrested because they were selling body parts from people who had been killed in China to people who needed those body parts in America. They were selling, I think, for $5,000 or $10,000 per cornea.
As I understand it, when they shoot those people in those prison camps over there they say be sure to shoot them in the chest because we don't want to hurt their eyes. If you are talking about a liver or a lung or whatever it happens to be, be sure to shoot them in the head because we want to make sure that the lungs or the liver is not damaged.
This is a nation, this Government of China, that does not respect human rights. They don't respect human life. They don't care.
And what is even worse, in my opinion, is that the world does not care. The world is more concerned about trade with Communist China than they are about the human rights, about the 10 million people in these Communist gulags. We have had testimony from people who have been in those gulags who tell about how horrible it is, and we don't do anything about it.
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Now, we are going to pass this resolution, and I think we should pass it, but it is not going to do much.
Mr. Hamilton just said it is likely not to get anywhere in the U.N. Human Rights Commission, and he is probably right because everybody is concerned about the almighty dollar.
We had a chance to cut off MFN to China, and did we do anything about it? No.
We had a chance to send a strong message to Communist China that we wanted some human rights abuses stopped, we wanted things changed, but we didn't do it.
So what are we going to do? We are going to pass this resolution. Well, Mr. Smith should be commended. Mr. Bereuter should be commended for running it through the Committee and getting it passed by the Congress, but it ain't enough, and it makes me sick that we pass paper that isn't going to change anything when we could really do something by cutting off MFN to China and hit them where it hurts.
We are going to have an Africa Free Trade Bill on the floor today that is supposed to help Africa. But if you read that bill, you find out that there are going to be trans-shipments through Africa and that only 35 percent of the production is required by African countries.
That means that China can trans-ship products through there and increase their exports, thus, increasing the money that they are getting through these exports and the human rights violations continue. What do we do about it? Well, we pass this resolution. I commend you for that effort, Mr. Smith. I think it is the least we can do, but we should be doing a hell of a lot more.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Burton.
Is anyone else seeking recognition?
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If not, I would like to note that since 1990 the Communist Government of China has been successful in convincing a majority of the members of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in Geneva to vote against the motion, the debate and resolution on human rights conditions in China. That is why I think Mr. Hamilton noted that we probably are not going to be successful once again.
Regrettably, the Administration appears to agree to Beijing's point of view and never seriously mounts a campaign against it. Recently, Beijing heightened its effort against a consideration of human rights issues by extending its campaign into the Security Council. On February 4th, the People's Republic of China opposed a proposal that Mary Robinson, the Human Rights Commissioner, briefed on the Security Council.
If the U.N. Commission on Human Rights cannot debate or consider the human rights conditions in China and the U.N. Security Council cannot hear about the issue of human rights around the world, it is no wonder why some of our own people are having problems with funding the United Nations.
Accordingly, I support the gentleman's resolution. I hope the Administration will begin to immediately make a serious effort to get a China resolution passed in Geneva this April.
Are there any other Members seeking any recognition or any comments?
If not, the question is now on agreeing to the Subcommittee's amendment.
As many as are in favor of the amendment signify by saying aye.
As many as are opposed signify by saying no.
The amendment is agreed to.
The gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Bereuter, is recognized to offer a motion.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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I move that the Chairman be requested to seek consideration of the pending resolution on the suspension calendar.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter.
The question is on the motion of the gentleman from Nebraska.
As many as are in favor of the motion signify by stating aye.
As many as are opposed signify by saying no.
The ayes have it. The motion is agreed to.
Further proceedings on this measure are postponed.
The Committee is now recessed until 2:30 for one more measure.
[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the Committee recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m., this same day.]
AFTERNOON SESSION
Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order.
We will now take up H.R. 2870, the Tropical Forest Protection Act.
The chair lays the bill before the Committee. The clerk will report the title of the bill.
Ms. BLOOMER. H.R. 2870, a bill to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to facilitate protection of tropical forests through debt reduction with developing countries with tropical forests.
Chairman GILMAN. The clerk will read the bill for amendment.
Ms. BLOOMER. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled: Section 1, debt reduction——
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Chairman GILMAN. I have an amendment in the nature of a substitute at the desk. The clerk will report the amendment.
Ms. BLOOMER. Amendment offered by Mr. Gilman, strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: ''Section 1, debt reduction for developing countries with tropical forests——''
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, the text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is considered as having been read as original text for the purpose of amendment and is open to amendment at any point.
I am pleased to present the Chairman's substitute to H.R. 2870, the Tropical Forest Conservation Act of 1998 for consideration by our Committee. The bill was introduced last November by Mr. Portman, Mr. Kasich, and Mr. Hamilton. Had I not been the chairman of the Committee charged with considering the bill, I would have been pleased to be a cosponsor.
By marking up this legislation and by moving it to the floor, I am expressing the strongest support I can for this legislation.
In short, this bill allows the Enterprise for Americas Initiative, EAI, proposed by President Bush to forgive debts owed by Latin American Governments in return for commitments to the environment of endowments created and managed by international boards. Under the EAI, Presidents Bush and Clinton forgave over $600 million in debt, most of which would not have been repaid, in return for $154 million paid by host governments to endowments dedicated to supporting conservation. The program has been described as the best kept secret in Washington.
This bill before us would write chapter two of this program. We would expand the debt eligible and expand the countries eligible beyond the Latin American focus of the prior program. The bill has 39 cosponsors, including 11 cosponsors from this Committee, Messrs. Brown, Faleomavaega, Wexler, Gallegly, Luther, McHugh, Ballenger, Chabot, Sherman, Lantos and Campbell.
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I would also note that Mr. Gejdenson wrote the original Enterprise for Americas Bill at the request of President Bush.
One week ago we heard from the Administration a wide variety of environmental groups endorse the bill, including the World Wildlife Fund, the Nature Conservancy, and Conservation International. While the Administration did not endorse the bill, it has expressed support for the measure's purpose and offered detailed changes to the legislation in a letter received by our Committee just yesterday.
To accommodate the changes suggested, I have been working with the Administration with Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Portman to refine the bill. In the interest of time, and working in a completely bipartisan fashion, we have incorporated most of the changes requested by the Administration into a joint Gilman-Hamilton substitute that is now before our Committee.
I would like to take a minute to describe the changes made from the bill that we introduced.
First, at the suggestion of the Administration, we have deleted debts owed to the Export-Import Bank from the bill. The substitute now before the Committee cuts $75 million from the bill from $400 million down to $325 million.
Next, we replaced the phrase ''open investment regime'' that some of the Sierra Club had been concerned with, and I understand the Sierra Club now supports the text of our substitute.
Next, we deleted the specific identification of 11 nations contained in the original bill, giving flexibility to the Administration to protect critical habitats or to take advantage of unique opportunities to relieve debt to protect the environment.
I will note that Bangladesh was not on the original list and with the flexibility offered by the substitute, Bangladesh would be able to participate in the early transactions under the bill.
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And finally, we included authority to do debt buybacks in the bill, as carried out recently by the U.S. Government and the Government of Peru, these buybacks are not scored against the budget because the purchaser pays the full market value of the debt owed. These transactions offer exciting opportunities for middle income countries to reduce their face value debt and protect the environment.
We have made other modifications that were requested by the Congressional Budget Office to tighten the budget impact of the bill to require appropriations and to clearly reference the Credit Reform Act.
I would like to consider one further modification of the bill, to be considered on the floor, subjecting each transaction to the notification provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act. We will discuss this with Mr. Hamilton and the Administration before offering such a change on the floor.
With that, I would urge our Members to support the substitute and I am pleased to recognize Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I will be quite brief.
I want to commend you and, of course, Mr. Portman for bringing this bill forward. I support it very strongly and I will not repeat my statement that I made before the Committee the other day.
I do think the Administration requests have been accommodated in the substitute bill. That includes authority in the bill to allow additional countries to be added to the program, deletes the authority for the sale, reduction or cancellation of Export-Import Bank loans. I understand that lowers the bill's scoring, so far as budget is concerned, from $400 to $325 million. And it allows, with the new amendments, the President to participate in no-cost debt swaps and buybacks.
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It also avoids duplication of administrative structures by granting the EAI board additional responsibilities for administering H.R. 2870.
I am informed, I think accurately, that the so-called open investment regime eligibility requirement has been worked out. Is that correct, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman GILMAN. Yes, I believe that is correct.
Mr. HAMILTON. The Administration, I think, supports the bill at least in concept. Although, as they made clear the other day, they certainly have concerns about some of the financing and we will have to keep working on that, of course, as we move it through.
I strongly urge my colleagues to support this bill. I think it is an excellent piece of legislation and I thank you for bringing it up.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.
Are other Members seeking recognition? Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank you for expediting the movement of this legislation. I thank the gentleman and commend him, the gentleman from Ohio, for introducing this important piece of legislation and for his kind remarks regarding my early involvement in the subject.
The world's tropical forests, which are biodiverse, economically crucial, and ecologically irreplaceable, are now disappearing faster than any other natural commodity. H.R. 2870 enacts measures to protect this fragile and complex ecosystem type from further exploitation.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to make sure that Bangladesh be designated as eligible for debt relief under the terms of this legislation. It is my understanding that the Treasury, the State Department, and USAID officials have looked at Bangladesh and have made an initial determination that Bangladesh qualifies under the environmental standards of H.R. 2870.
In other words, that within its borders, Bangladesh contains a tropical forest that is globally outstanding in terms of its biological diversity. The region in Bangladesh known as Chihagong and the Chihagong Hills tracts contains much of Bangladesh's tropical rain forest.
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Over the years, however, this area has suffered greatly from the effects of constant soil erosion and deforestation due to Bangladesh's ever expanding human population, as well as the effects of natural disaster.
It remains, however, the home of biodiversity as well as a variety of wild animals, to include the world-famous and endangered royal Bengal tiger.
As of the 31st of January, 1998, Bangladesh's P.L. 480 debt amounted to $501.7 million. The interest on that debt is impossible for them to pay and still provide for other necessary activities. I have looked at this situation for several years now, looking for a solution. This legislation can be part of it.
This debt accumulated over more than a decade and now requires substantial payments from Bangladesh, one of the world's poorest nations, and one it can ill afford.
My colleagues may recall that an oversight prevented this matter from being addressed in 1993 when debt forgiveness legislation was approved for many other significant debtor countries. Any financial assistance given to Bangladesh is negated by the payments it is now required to make on its P.L. 480 debt rather than being directed toward worthwhile projects designed to stabilize population growth, establish health programs, and build democracy.
Despite these difficulties, Bangladesh is making progress on structural reforms within its economy. According to a recent edition of ''Trends in Developing Countries'' published by the World Bank, these reforms include governmental efforts to open new sectors to private entry, deregulate private investment, relax exchange controls, reform business law, and downsize the state-owned enterprises.
I understand that private investment is now being encouraged in the energy, telecommunications and domestic air transport services within Bangladesh. I bring this up to show you the efforts they are making.
Mr. Chairman, I have a couple of very brief, direct questions to put to the Treasury and the State Department representatives here today, if I could ask them to be brought to the table.
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Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.
Mr. BEREUTER. I need to establish a legislative record here. Perhaps you could, for the record, introduce yourself if you have not already done so.
Mr. KLOSSON. Yes, sir. My name is Michael Klosson. I am a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Legislative Affairs.
Ms. CHAVES. My name is Mary Chaves. I am the Director of International Debt Policy at the U.S. Treasury Department.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much.
Under the environmental standards established in H.R. 2870 as you read them, do your respective agencies believe Bangladesh eligible for debt relief? I would ask each of you.
Ms. CHAVES. There are two basic questions here. One is whether this country has tropical forests and that is an issue I will leave to USAID or the State Department to respond to.
With regard to the economic and political criteria for debt reduction, that is a process which we go through interagency. There is an interagency committee that meets and reviews the specific criteria. We do not have a decision at this point because we have not reviewed Bangladesh on that criteria. But we will go through the specific criteria in the legislation.
Mr. BEREUTER. Ms. Chaves, that is not very satisfying to a Member who has this opportunity to ask for definitive answers.
Ms. CHAVES. I am sorry that I cannot give you a definitive answer at this point. We are required to go through the interagency process in determining eligibility.
Mr. BEREUTER. I would not have asked you this question if I did not have different assurances about your response.
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Ms. CHAVES. Perhaps we can address the tropical forest issue. That may help you and you may find that a more attractive response.
Mr. BEREUTER. It is only part of the response, and having relied to some extent on the cooperation and goodwill and good judgment of Treasury from time to time in the Banking Committee, I have been disappointed from time to time, so I am not complacent with your answer.
Would the gentleman from the State Department respond to that part of the question that he feels his agency can respond to?
Mr. KLOSSON. Mr. Bereuter, let me ask a member of USAID to come to the table, since he is specifically working on this issue.
Chairman GILMAN. Would the gentleman please identify himself?
Mr. HESTER. My name is James Hester. I am the Agency Environmental Coordinator for the U.S. Agency for International Development.
With regard to the forest resources of Bangladesh, Bangladesh was once 95 percent forested. Now it is 93 percent deforested. Of the 7 percent that is left, about half of it is degraded scrub forest.
However, there are three large areas of forest still, even within that small amount left, that are important biologically, and that are important economically to the country. One is in the southwest called the Sundarbans. This is a mangrove forest maintaining about 350 to 600 Bengal tigers. In addition to this area which is about 2,000 square miles—we have forest in the Chihagong Hills area which is in the southeast of the country. That is about 1,600 square miles of important forest with the largest population of elephants left in the country.
We feel these forests are important and they do need assistance. The Chihagong Hills Forest might be difficult at this point in time to do much in because this is the area where there is a certain amount of insurgency. But certainly we feel that there is enough there to make this an important site.
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On a technical basis, concerning the criterion of having valuable tropical forests, we feel that this country is one that would qualify under the terms of this particular bill.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. As you know, this is the country that perhaps other than a city state, has the largest population density in the world: 120 million people in a country the size of Wisconsin. So the pressure on the forests there, it seems to me, ought to be a factor in giving favorable consideration to it.
I am told that there are about 1.9 million acres. Does that roughly match your understanding?
Mr. HESTER. That depends what numbers one uses and what year. The most reliable numbers we have are about 5 years old. These numbers show approximately 3,600 square miles of forest left in the country, of which about half is degraded. But again that was 5 years ago.
As you say, the population is enormous which means the pressure is enormous. Of that land, perhaps only one-third, maybe slightly less, is actually in a protected status. And of that protected status, not all of it is real protected status. It may just be on a piece of paper.
So we feel the urgency to protect what is left is extremely high. There is not much time left to save what they do have.
Mr. BEREUTER. I would ask Ms. Chaves, I will try another chance with you. Do you know anything in the legislation which would lead you to believe at this point that Bangladesh does not qualify as an eligible recipient?
Ms. CHAVES. No, I have nothing in particular that would lead me to believe that Bangladesh would not qualify. In fact, based on USAID's testimony here we would look at Bangladesh as one of the countries that would be reviewed for specific action under this legislation in reviewing the eligibility criteria of the legislation.
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Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. I would ask the State Department representative if he believes that Bangladesh is eligible under the requirements, under the criteria of this legislation?
Mr. KLOSSON. Mr. Bereuter, my understanding of the facts, based on our State Department experts, is along the lines of what the representative from USAID testified to with regard to the tropical forest. Let me check on one additional point, if I might, sir.
Chairman GILMAN. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BEREUTER. I would be pleased to yield to the gentleman.
Chairman GILMAN. When we report out this bill, the report language will strongly reflect our interest in doing something about Bangladesh.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I might say, while they are conferring, to you and Mr. Hamilton, I am told that there may be a problem. That when we give debt forgiveness, the following year a country is not eligible for P.L. 480. If that is the case, I believe that we will need to consider amendatory language on the floor. Otherwise, for the countries that need assistance the most, those that have received and continue necessarily, like Bangladesh, to receive P.L. 480 funds, there would be a disincentive for them to accept debt relief.
Chairman GILMAN. That gentleman is correct. If the gentleman will yield?
Mr. BEREUTER. I would be pleased to yield.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman is correct. We will be seeking an open rule so the gentleman would then have an opportunity to present the appropriate amendment.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your support.
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Chairman GILMAN. And I would be inclined to support your amendment.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much. I would appreciate the support of the Committee.
I would return to the State Department, if they have a response to my final question.
Mr. KLOSSON. Mr. Bereuter, this is not something that has gotten, I think, a full vetting within the department. What I can say at this point is that, based on our initial look, we do not see any up front problems with doing that. But it has not gone through a full process within the department, nor through the interagency process yet.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. I would ask both State and Treasury if they will focus on this as soon as possible and make a determination so that we will have an understanding before we go to final action on the floor.
Mr. KLOSSON. Certainly.
Mr. BEREUTER. I thank you for your assistance, and I thank my colleagues for their patience and indulgence.
Chairman GILMAN. If the gentleman would further yield?
Mr. BEREUTER. I would be pleased to yield to the Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. We anticipate being on the floor with this measure next week, so whatever report you get back should be expeditious to be of help to us.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman GILMAN. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Just a couple questions. Would this bill in any way provide debt forgiveness to the Governments of Cambodia and Burma, for example?
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Chairman GILMAN. These countries are not specifically included nor excluded by this legislation.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am a little bit concerned, Mr. Chairman. I do not want to give any debt forgiveness to those bums over in Burma. That is a pretty bad regime. In both Cambodia and in Burma, they have been deforesting their countries in a very bad way.
Chairman GILMAN. I think the gentleman raises an important question and we will ask the Treasury to report to us whether there is any indebtedness of those countries.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. Would the witnesses have any record with regard to any indebtedness with relation to those two countries?
Ms. CHAVES. I do not have any specific information with me on the amount of debt outstanding and owed to the U.S. Government by those countries. Both countries, Cameroon is one country that is receiving debt reduction through the Paris Club of creditor governments on a multilateral basis at this point. That is debt reduction of up to 67 percent of its outstanding debt. Burma, to my knowledge—we would have to review and give you specific information on Burma, on the debt outstanding.
Chairman GILMAN. I think the gentleman also asked about Cambodia, if I am not mistaken. Ms. Chaves, the gentleman also asked about Cambodia.
Ms. CHAVES. Thank you. I erred in my response. Cambodia is not a country that we are treating currently in the Paris Club for debt reduction purposes.
Mr. HESTER. If I may just mention, USAID has a loan balance for Burma of $2.466 million outstanding. We have no balances showing for Cambodia.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
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Mr. Chabot.
Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief. I just want to compliment my colleague, Mr. Portman, for his excellent work on this matter.
I also want to compliment his able staff who I know has done tremendous work and been very much involved in this, particularly his chief of staff who happens to be in the room today. I know they have done a lot of the background and groundwork to make this day possible. It is very thoughtful legislation. It is environmentally friendly, obviously. And it is market driven, which I think is very positive.
And I think Mr. Kasich and Mr. Hamilton are also to be complimented. I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chabot.
Any other Members seeking recognition? Mr. Campbell.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. This is not War Powers, is it?
Mr. CAMPBELL. I wanted to amend it to add in a concurrent resolution.
[Laughter.]
Mr. CAMPBELL. My question is on page 14, if I might ask both Treasury and State's representatives, Ms. Chaves and Mr. Klosson. I am having trouble following this math. It is line 10. My colleagues might find this of interest.
There is a minimum as to how much has to be devoted by the host country to the intended purposes of the act. That is good. I understand you have got to show that they are going to ante up. But that formula, it seems to me, is unclear in the extreme.
It says, ''equal to not less than 40 percent of the price paid for such debt by such eligible country, or the difference between the price paid for such debt and the face value of such debt.'' I will give you a numerical example, and I think what is missing is the phrase, ''the larger of,'' on line 10.
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Suppose you have $100 of debt. Suppose it is worth only $70, that mathematical example. Then the host country would have to ante up 40 percent of $70, which is $28. But they have got a discount of $30. So it seems the second clause would say they have got to ante up $30.
In that we may want to clarify language before it gets to court—it probably will not get to court, but before it gets to USAID, because USAID is going to have to administer it, and countries are going to ask you. Do you not think the phrase, ''the larger of,'' belongs between ''not less than'' and ''40 percent'' on line 10 on page 14?
Ms. CHAVES. This could be either the larger of or the lesser of, depending on your interest. The 40 percent rule is one that came out of the original Enterprise for the Americas legislation. We could look back at that legislation and see what the precise language was there.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I do not know. Regrettably, I do not have your knowledge of that previous statute. But our Committee is making policy right now. I think it is consistent with the goal here that it be the larger of, but I would like to know what policy the Administration has on this, if you have any.
The author is not here, but maybe some other Member of our Committee might have an opinion.
Ms. CHAVES. Perhaps I can just add, we just undertook a buyback with Peru and in that case we used the 40 percent of the purchase price. The purchase price was approximately 32 cents on the dollar, and the local fund that was to be contributed was approximately 12 cents on the dollar above that. In that case we are using the lesser of the 40 percent or the difference, because the difference would have been 68 cents on the dollar.
It would require that the country in fact, in local currency and dollar payments combined, provide the full amount of resources of the face amount of the debt, which would be difficult in a number of countries.
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Mr. CAMPBELL. Thanks, Ms. Chaves. I think that is a good answer.
Mr. Chairman, I think that is the clear intent, but this is a confused phrase. It should say the lesser of. I think Ms. Chaves is correct. That is a good example.
Between the words ''not less than'' and ''40 percent'' on line 10, page 14 it should read, ''the lesser of.''
Chairman GILMAN. Would the gentleman want to make that in the form of an amendment?
Mr. CAMPBELL. I offer a unanimous consent request that the bill be amended so that the words, ''the lesser of'' be inserted on line 10, page 14 between the word ''than'' and the numeral ''40.''
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, the amendment is agreed upon.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Any other questions or comments?
If not, we will proceed to the question on the amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended. As many as are in favor of the amendment signify by stating aye.
As many as are opposed, state no.
The ayes have it and the amendment is adopted. We will be recessing and reconvene in room H-139 immediately following the final passage vote on the pending Africa bill, so that we can have a quorum to report the bill. It will only take a few moments. Please bring some Members with you.
Thank you very much, and the Committee stands in recess.
[Recess.]
[Hearing reconvened in room H-139.]
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Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order. The previous question has been ordered on H.R. 2870, as amended. The gentleman from Iowa is recognized for a motion.
Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee report the bill, H.R. 2870, as amended, with the recommendation that the bill, as amended, do pass.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Leach. The question is on the motion of the gentleman from Iowa. As many as are in favor of the motion signify by stating aye.
As many as are opposed signify by stating no.
The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it and the motion is agreed to.
Without objection, the Chairman is authorized to make motions under Rule 20 on the bill or a companion bill from the Senate.
Without objection, the chief of staff is authorized to make technical, grammatical, and conforming amendments to the bill.
Thank you, gentlemen, for coming.
[Whereupon, at 5:28 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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