SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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50–674 CC
1998
KOSOVO: CURRENT SITUATION AND FUTURE OPTIONS
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JULY 23, 1998
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
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DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JAY KIM, California
STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio
MARSHALL ''MARK'' SANFORD, South Carolina
MATT SALMON, Arizona
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
TOM CAMPBELL, California
JON FOX, Pennsylvania
JOHN McHUGH, New York
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
ROY BLUNT, Missouri
KEVIN BRADY, Texas
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
LEE HAMILTON, Indiana
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
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HOWARD BERMAN, California
GARY ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PAT DANNER, Missouri
EARL HILLIARD, Alabama
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
STEVE ROTHMAN, New Jersey
BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee
BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
JIM DAVIS, Florida
LOIS CAPPS, California
RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff
MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Democratic Chief of Staff
JOHN HERZBERG, Professional Staff Member
MARK KIRK, Counsel
KIMBERLY ROBERTS, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
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WITNESSES
Ambassador Robert S. Gelbard, Special Representative of the President and the Secretary of State, Department of State
The Honorable Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense
APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
Ambassador Robert S. Gelbard
The Honorable Walter B. Slocombe
Additional material submitted for the record:
Report of Staffdel Garon mission to Kosovo, submitted by Congressman Gilman
KOSOVO: CURRENT SITUATION AND FUTURE OPTIONS
THURSDAY, JULY 23, 1998
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin Gilman (chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman GILMAN. [presiding] The Committee will come to order.
We welcome our two witnesses to today's important review of the fast-changing situation in Kosovo. Ambassador Robert Gelbard was appointed last year as the Administration's point man for implementation of the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia, and issues related to the former Yugoslavia. Under Secretary of Defense Walter Slocombe is in charge of planning and policy formulation at the Pentagon. Together, our distinguished panel should be able to enlighten this committee on the present situation and where U.S. policy is heading in Kosovo.
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Several weeks ago, we were apparently facing the imminent possibility of NATO intervention. And now, with the recent success of Kosovo Liberation Army, the UCK on the ground and the reluctance of the UCK to take part in negotiations with Serb authorities, the possibility of a NATO role seems to have diminished. Above all, events in Kosovo have demonstrated the situation is still very fluid and the circumstances affecting our policy can shift rapidly, making it exceedingly difficult to fit today's assumptions to tomorrow's reality in Kosovo.
This is, however, what we pay our two witnesses to do, and we appreciate them making themselves available for us today. I'd also like to note that former Congressman Joe Dio Guardi, who is the president of the Albanian-American Civic League, is with us in the audience today, along with several of the League's board members. Many of their associates have relatives in Kosovo or Albania and, of course, are highly concerned about U.S. policy in that region.
In order to get as much information to our Members as possible in the time we have with our panel today, I intend to keep this hearing as short as possible. I ask our Members to be brief in their comments and their questioning. Immediately following the adjournment of the hearing, we'll invite our panel to provide us in a closed meeting whatever information they feel is inappropriate for public disclosure at the time. And I appreciate everyone's cooperation on this.
I'll now recognize our Ranking Minority Member, the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I'm very pleased to join you in welcoming the Secretary and the Ambassador. I look forward to their testimony. Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.
We'll now proceed with the testimony, and gentlemen you can submit your full statement for the record and summarize, or whatever you deem appropriate.
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We'll start with Mr. Gelbard.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR ROBERT S. GELBARD, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador GELBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Congressman Hamilton, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee and continue our dialog on the ongoing crisis in Kosovo, which remains a very high foreign policy priority for the Administration.
We welcome your views on the situation in Kosovo. High-profile congressional interest helps us underscore with Belgrade and elsewhere the importance the United States attaches to the issue and reinforces our leverage with the parties in pursuit of a peaceful settlement.
The conflict in Kosovo has entered now a new and potentially more dangerous phase, given Belgrade's continued refusal to take the steps necessary to stabilize the situation and the resultant rapid growth in both size and capability of the armed Kosovo Albanian resistance. Louise Arbour, the lead prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, recently announced that the situation in Kosovo met the definition of armed conflict under relevant international law. This terminology may sound self-evident, but, in fact, it brings the conflict more clearly under the Tribunal's jurisdiction. There is clearly an urgent need for both meaningful dialog and immediate tension-reducing measures, including a comprehensive cessation of hostilities.
Although we are concerned about the actions of the Kosovo Liberation Army—commonly referred to by the Albanian acronym UCK—we mustn't lose sight of that fact that Belgrade initiated the confrontation in Kosovo, and President Milosevic and his government have primary responsibility for taking the steps necessary to bring an end to the violence. Belgrade's obligations to the international community have been clearly spelled out in the Contact Group statements, most recently of June 12 and July 8. These demands must be met for Belgrade to be able to normalize relations with the outside world and for the FRY to be welcome in the community of nations. Milosevic must:
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First, pull back the security forces engaged in repressive actions in Kosovo;
Second, initiate a meaningful dialog with the Kosovar Albanian leadership aimed at producing a political settlement;
Third, reach agreement with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Commission for the Red Cross on a program for the return of refugees and displaced persons;
Fourth, ensure complete freedom of access for international personnel, including NGO's, journalists, and humanitarian aid workers;
And finally, support the efforts of the international community to monitor events on the ground in Kosovo with complete and unfettered access.
Access in Kosovo for international personnel and NGO's has improved in the last month. However, Belgrade has done nothing to meet our other demands, particularly on security concerns and dialog. In fact, President Milosevic has attempted to redefine his obligations by offering a number of more limited commitments to Russian President Yeltsin in Moscow on June 16. We have not, however, moderated our views in any way. Milosevic must meet all of his obligations to the Contact Group, or we will continue to look for ways to increase the pressure on Belgrade to move in a positive direction.
In truth, President Milosevic has failed to produce real progress even on the more limited commitments he made to President Yeltsin in Moscow. Our view on this is quite honestly different from that of the Russian Government. This is one reason why the latest Contact Group statement on Kosovo does not, in our opinion, go far enough in making clear to Belgrade exactly what is expected.
One area in which we are cooperating closely with the Russians as well as with a number of European Governments is in putting a significant international presence on the ground in Kosovo. The establishment of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission, the KDOM, is a major diplomatic development that will significantly enhance our ability to gather real-time information about developments in Kosovo, as well as demonstrate international concern to all residents of Kosovo—Serb as well as Kosovar Albanians. Already, 23 American personnel have been assigned to the U.S. embassy in Yugoslavia to serve as observers and support staff for the KDOM, and 10 are already participating. Other countries, including members of the EU, Russia, and Poland, have or will soon have assigned personnel to this task. However, despite continued promises of full cooperation, Belgrade authorities continue to create obstacles to the full deployment of the Mission, most recently by refusing to grant flight clearance to four U.S. transport aircraft carrying needed vehicles, communications equipment, and medical supplies for the KDOM.
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KDOM observers travel through Kosovo and speak to officials, combatants, and private citizens to ensure that we have a complete picture of what's happening. The Mission also serves as a concrete international commitment to remain engaged in Kosovo until a political settlement is reached.
Accurate, up-to-date information is important. But, that information must support a policymaking process that advances the cause of peace. Our own diplomatic efforts are continuing. Ambassador Christopher Hill, who continues to be very active on this issue, has been shuttling back and forth between Belgrade and Pristina in an effort to revive negotiations. One aspect of Ambassador Hill's mission has been to work with the Kosovar Albanian side to promote the development of an authoritative negotiating team that represents the full spectrum of political opinion in the Kosovar Albanian community, including extremists elements. Unless the views of those on the Albanian side engaged in the fighting are represented, it is unlikely that either a cessation of hostilities or a comprehensive political settlement can be negotiated. This is why we have opened a dialog with the Kosovo Liberation Army. The UCK is a reality on the ground, and however much we condemn the use of violence by either side, they will have to be a party to any cessation of hostilities or any settlement.
Ambassador Hill has also met several times with President Milosevic, including at this moment, to press him to meet his obligations and take the steps necessary to revive the prospects for dialog. The pressures on Milosevic are mounting. The new sanctions, the most important of which is the investment ban agreed to by the Contact Group last month, have further undermined an already shaky Serbian economy. A recent assessment of the FRY economy prepared by our Treasury Department concluded that the economic and financial condition of Yugoslavia has brought it to such new lows, firmly establishing the country as the ''sick man of Europe.''
In addition to the Contact Group, we are working in other multilateral fora to raise the stakes for Belgrade. In New York, we are consulting with friends and allies about possible action in the U.N. Security Council to reinforce the Contact Group demands. As part of our broader, regional strategy, we already have renewed the mandate for U.N. operations in Bosnia, on the Prevlaka peninsula, and in Macedonia. In NATO councils, planning for possible NATO action is nearly completed.
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While no decision has been made regarding the use of force, all options, including robust military intervention in Kosovo, remain on the table. NATO planning is on track and Milosevic understands that this is not an idle threat.
The deteriorating situation in Kosovo is a threat to regional peace and security. The potential for spillover into neighboring states remains a paramount concern, and we and our allies have made clear to President Milosevic that spillover of the conflict into Albania or Macedonia will not be tolerated. Albania is particularly vulnerable. Albanian authorities have little control over the northern third of their country, a situation that fuels, and is also fueled by, continuing instability in Kosovo. We are working with the Government of Albania to shore up security in the north, including through international training for Albanian police and a precedent-setting NATO cell in Tirana to coordinate cooperation through Partnership for Peace. The recent and intense violence in the Orahovac region and reports of Serbian shells falling on Albanian territory underscore the urgency of the situation and the regional ramifications of continued conflict.
There are nearly 14,000 registered refugees in northern Albania, who have fled the violence in Kosovo. More than 80,000 have been internally displaced in Yugoslavia, including almost 22,000 in Montenegro. The United States has made available substantial assistance—currently $8.5 million—to help international relief agencies cope with this crisis. The efforts include protection of refugees and displaced persons as well as contingency planning in Macedonia.
We need to protect our investment in Macedonian stability and promote the continued development of democratic institutions there. The UNPREDEP Mission continues to play an important role, and there is general agreement that the mandate should be extended. We have increased our bilateral assistance efforts in Macedonia, from $2 million last year to more than $11 million this year. And we have organized a NATO clearinghouse on Macedonian security to stimulate multilateral aid.
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We are also concerned about the safety of the civilian population of Kosovo—ethnic Albanians, ethnic Serbs, and all others. The United States and others in the international community have highlighted the abuses of the Serbian security forces in Kosovo, and the use of indiscriminate and excessive force against Albanian non combatants. We have also condemned attacks against Serb civilians by the UCK, including kidnaping. The Kosovo Observer Mission will continue to track these reports and provide timely information to the international community.
The Hague Tribunal has pledged to investigate reports of possible war crimes in Kosovo by both sides. In one instance, three Serbian refugees, who were on their way to Belgrade to apply for immigration to the United States, through the International Organization for Migration, were pulled off a bus by armed Albanians and held hostage. Two of those kidnaped have now been released, but one, 26-year-old Djurdje Cuk is still reported missing. Our disgust over the actions of the Serbian security forces in Kosovo does not mean that Albanian extremists should be given a free hand. Further violence, no matter who is responsible, will only make it more difficult to achieve a negotiated political settlement. We have made this clear to UCK leaders in our discussions to date, and will continue to emphasize the importance of restraint in any future meetings.
Reports that Serbian police are responsible for disappearance of a large number of Kosovar Albanians are extremely troubling. We have put considerable emphasis on the need for Belgrade authorities to accept independent forensic investigators to look into allegations of summary executions in the Drenica region of Kosovo. We expect the International Hague Tribunal as well as our allies to make this a priority issue.
Belgrade's imposition of a food blockade on Kosovo further exacerbates an already perilous situation for the ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo. We have seen credible reports that Belgrade has instructed food suppliers to deliver only to state-run stores in Kosovo, which are all controlled by Serbs. We have seen this kind of intimidation tactic before, and condemn such actions as violations of human rights and a cynical manipulation of Kosovo's most vulnerable.
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We continue to believe that a solution for the problems of Kosovo can and must be found within existing international borders. The entire international community recognizes that only meaningful self-government for Kosovo can address the legitimate grievances of the Kosovar Albanian community, and promote stability in that volatile region. The UCK will not be able to shoot its way out of Yugoslavia. But neither can Belgrade maintain its authority in Kosovo with a nightstick clutched in an iron hand. There is no battle field solution for either side. Only open dialog and sincere negotiations can resolve the current impasse.
There is no quick fix in Kosovo. This is a difficult and complex problem, bred by years of Belgrade's intransigence and lack of democratic institutions. U.S. leadership will remain essential to move this issue forward.
The United States has made a significant investment in Balkan stability. Continuing unrest and violence in Kosovo threatens that investment. We must act early, and we must act decisively to put an end to the conflict in Kosovo, beginning with an agreement on a cessation of hostilities.
A truly stable and lasting solution to the problems of Kosovo will require the development of strong, democratic institutions in Serbia and Yugoslavia as a whole. A new generation of political leaders, with a greater understanding and respect for the traditions of European democracy must emerge and take charge of their destiny. In Montenegro, President Milo Djukanovic has already begun this process. His reformist policies and those of his new government have our full support. Serbia is lagging behind, obviously. But even in Serbia, there are some promising young political figures, and we are doing everything we can to promote their development as genuine leaders.
I would like to thank you once again, Mr. Chairman, for your Committee's attention to this issue. We want to continue to work closely with you and other Members of the Committee and Congress to promote a peaceful solution to the problems in Kosovo.
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Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Gelbard appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Ambassador Gelbard.
We have now turned to Walter Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. You may proceed, Mr. Slocombe.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WALTER B. SLOCOMBE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Mr. SLOCOMBE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for the opportunity to appear again before the Committee with colleagues from the State Department and the Joint Staff to discuss Kosovo and specifically Department of Defense and NATO contributions to the search for a resolution of the problems there.
In my written statement, I outline U.S. interests in the conflict and the status of NATO military planning. During the classified portion of the hearing, my colleagues from Joint Staff will present an intelligent update on the situation and give more details of the NATO planning effort.
I want to focus my oral remarks in the interest of time on the NATO military planning issue. And I want to begin by emphasizing that while NATO military planning is proceeding on a contingency basis, no decisions have been made, either by the United States or by the Alliance as a whole, to commit NATO forces. Indeed, there is universal agreement that the primary instrument of policy must be the vigorous diplomatic and political effort, one that has the support of our European allies and of Russia. Ambassador Gelbard has described that effort, and I will not expand on what he said, other than observe that the past month's development since our last briefing, almost exactly a month ago to this committee with the National Security Committee, has made it all but clear that this conflict should be resolved by negotiation, not military force.
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But since this crisis began, the Administration has been working hard in cooperation with our NATO allies to craft a comprehensive strategy that will result in peaceful negotiated resolution of the problem. Our primary instrument is diplomatic. But the hard fact is that the prospect of NATO intervention, joined in by the United States, is the best inducement for Belgrade to seriously consider a political solution. NATO foreign and defense ministers, during their annual meetings in May and June, respectively, have separately approved a series of immediate measures and planning efforts aimed at promoting stability in the region and averting the spillover of the Kosovo violence into Albania and the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia. They also directed detailed military contingency planning for a variety of types of possible action. More specifically in May, the foreign ministers tasked the NATO military authorities to study options, including the possibility of providing support for OSCE monitoring of the border between Albania and Kosovo; support for monitoring enforcement of the arms embargo; and preventative deployments to Albania and Macedonia.
At their meeting, about a month later in June, the defense ministers expanded the scope of the previous tasking, asking the NATO military authorities to study the full range of potential military options, with the mission of halting or disrupting a systematic campaign of violent repression and expulsion in Kosovo, supporting international efforts to secure a cease-fire, and helping to create the conditions for serious negotiations toward a political settlement. The defense ministers also directed the military authorities to provide their advice on the employment of NATO military forces to monitor and enforce a cease-fire and negotiated peace settlement.
In addition to these military planning efforts, the NATO policy coordinating group is developing a political-military framework, which provides the critical linkages between NATO's and the Contact Group's political objectives and various possible military scenarios. NATO planning is, therefore, presently focusing on three distinct areas: various preventative options to avert a spillover; phased air operations to stem a systematic campaign of repression and violence; and possible operations to help implement a cease-fire or peace settlement.
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NATO planning will ensure that there are options to respond if a policy decision is made to act, based on developments in situation. Those developments could range from reaching an agreement to a dramatic worsening of the conflict or its spread to neighboring nations. And in my prepared statement, I outline in somewhat more detail what's going on under those three categories.
The various aspects of this comprehensive planning effort are now underway at NATO. The military plans are now ready for political review by the North Atlantic Council, which is the ambassadorial level of the senior political level in NATO. And they should all be in place by the end of the month for air options, and by September 1 for all the options. If an emergency arises, the pace can be accelerated.
Once that planning process is complete, the military plans will, in effect, be put on the shelf so that a decision to execute, if the need arises, will be able to be made against the background of detailed military plans, which will facilitate both an intelligent political decision on whether to take military action and the rapid execution of that action should it become necessary.
Let me emphasize again that NATO's planning activities, either for air action or for implementation of ground options to implement a settlement, do not indicate any predetermined plan or decision to intervene militarily in the Kosovo conflict. The primary as well as the most effective tool for resolving the problem is to diplomacy, not military action.
NATO's role is to plan appropriately in support of these ongoing diplomatic efforts, and like all military organizations to be ready with concrete plans that can be rapidly and effectively executed should unlikely but dangerous military contingencies arise. These planning exercises are both demonstrative of the Alliance capabilities in the region and precautionary should NATO be called upon to respond.
We will continue to refine and update our planning efforts. We will stay in close coordination with our allies and partner countries that might join in an operation, and with the Congress as the situation develops.
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I should make the point that we must not in our focus on Kosovo forget that the paramount U.S. national interest in the region is ensuring the successful implementation of the Dayton Accords in Bosnia. We cannot let the situation in Kosovo distract us or the international community from full implementation of the Dayton peace agreements, and particularly from continued progress on civil implementation.
In sum, finding a diplomatic solution to the Kosovo problem while protecting our national equities in Bosnia remains our focus. NATO planning continues at various levels of specificity, but there are no imminent decisions on the use of military force. As always, consultation with the Congress, exemplified by this hearing and the briefings to follow and the ones that have taken place in the recent past, will be an integral part of the process.
And I look forward to answering your questions, and also to presenting some additional information in the classified briefing.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Slocombe appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Slocombe. And thank you, Ambassador Gelbard.
Ambassador Gelbard, your colleague, the nominee for U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Richard Holbrooke, has attracted a lot of attention in the press recently for his attempts to help resolve the Kosovo situation. And we have the greatest respect for your ability and your work in the way you've conducted yourself in a very difficult situation for more than a year now. But can you tell us who is the principle point man in the Clinton Administration for the problems in the former Yugoslavia? Is it your office, as the Special Representative for the President, or is it Dick Holbrooke in some informal Presidential emissary role? Could you clarify that for us?
Ambassador GELBARD. These are very complicated issues, Mr. Chairman, in Yugoslavia. I am the President's Special Representative and am deeply engaged in a wide range of the issues in a variety of places in the former Yugoslavia. For example, just yesterday, the foreign minister of Croatia came to Washington, met with me, and met with Secretary Albright. Today, President Zubac, the Croat member of the Bosnian Presidency is in town, and I think he'll be meeting with you.
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Chairman GILMAN. And we met with the foreign minister yesterday.
Ambassador GELBARD. Yes. And, so there's a wide range of issues that are involved here. In fact, I asked Dick Holbrooke to help on these issues related to Kosovo, and he accompanied me on a trip in mid-May to Yugoslavia in significant part because of the fact that he has spent a great deal of time negotiating with President Milosevic in the past. We have been working as a team on all these issues. Chris Hill is handling the day-to-day shuttling back and forth on the negotiations. I have been, of course, deeply involved in many aspects of the diplomacy. As Under Secretary Slocombe just said, our primary goal and priority remains full implementation of the Dayton agreements. And I am focusing the overwhelming percentage of my own work these days on the upcoming Bosnian elections, which will be taking place in 6 weeks. We have had, as you know, Mr. Chairman, enormous success in Bosnia over the course of the last year or so. We want to continue to lock this progress in. This is a critical national election. We want to make sure it goes smoothly and successfully. So I'm now focusing much more of my time on this.
But we work very much as a team. I was just on the phone with Ambassador Holbrooke yesterday, and this is an Administration-wide team effort, involving a range of departments, agencies, and people.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you. Mr. Gelbard, do you, and Mr. Holbrooke, and Mr. Slocombe sit down together to review your progress?
Ambassador GELBARD. Yes, we do. Most recently, there was a cabinet-level principals committee meeting, about a week and a half ago, at which all the issues were reviewed at the cabinet level. Under Secretary Slocombe was there. I was there. Dick Holbrooke, Secretary Albright, Senator Cohen, General Shelton, and, of course, Sandy Berger, who chaired the meeting. We are very, very much in synch and in harmony on these issues.
Chairman GILMAN. And can you tell us the relationship between the new diplomatic group and the Contact Group? How do they function alongside each other?
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Ambassador GELBARD. The Kosovo Observer Mission is being coordinated in Belgrade by the embassies of the Contact Group. However, we have invited all embassies that have representatives, all governments that have representation in Belgrade to participate in this mission. And direct coordination is taking place in Pristina, but overall coordination is taking place among Contact Group countries. It's working very smoothly among all of us, but as I mentioned in my statement in spite of the absolute guarantees and assurances we've had from President Milosevic and his government about total cooperation on this, we are seeing obstacles now in getting equipment, such as vehicles, to staff our mission. And that's something that Chris Hill is addressing with President Milosevic today.
Chairman GILMAN. So then is the Kosovo diplomatic observer mission subservient to the Contact Group?
Ambassador GELBARD. It's being coordinated by the Contact Group countries, yes.
Chairman GILMAN. And, Mr. Slocombe, we realize that NATO is only in the planning stage, and nearing the end of possible options, but are there any present plans, contingency or otherwise, for U.S. troops to participate in a possible NATO mission in Kosovo, including possible strikes or enforcement in the no fly zone?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. There are certainly no decisions to do that. But there is a matter of prudent planning at the NATO headquarters by the military staffs for what it would be necessary to do in military terms if a political decision were made to take certain actions. It would be a separate decision, whether the United States would participate, as it would be every NATO ally, whether they would participate—whether any country—Belgium, or Germany, or anybody—would participate in such an operation. But the contingency plan certainly exists and one of the things which is being done now is to determine what forces would be required and to address what specific types of units, types of aircraft and so on.
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Chairman GILMAN. So then, Mr. Slocombe, no decision has been made at this point about any U.S. involvement?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. That is absolutely correct and no decision has been made about NATO involvement?
Chairman GILMAN. Ambassador Gelbard, the Senate last week adopted a resolution calling for the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia to indict Serbian President Milosevic as a war criminal. What are your views of the culpability of Milosevic for what has occurred in Kosovo, and do you believe that it's appropriate for us to continue to negotiate with him based on this kind of a resolution?
Ambassador GELBARD. Well, first, Mr. Chairman, as I said in my statement, the Tribunal announced 2 weeks ago, I believe, a formal declaration of internal armed conflict. Now that may seem to be an obvious view on the state of affairs there. But it is trigger language in terms of the ability of the Tribunal to begin formal investigations and carry out indictments. We have urged the Tribunal to take action on investigations of ethnic cleansing, and other war crimes. And in fact, we have contributed to a special fund for hiring additional investigators to look into precisely these issues.
It is crystal clear, as I said in my statement, that Yugoslavia and President Milosevic are the ones who instigated this great tragedy. There's no question about that. I personally warned President Milosevic about taking action in Kosovo when we knew that they were massing their paramilitary police about to go into Kosovo. It's up to the Tribunal to make its own decisions about indictments, but, of course, it's worth noting that for all the tragedies, all the atrocities that we have seen in the Balkans over the course of this decade, his name features prominently—whether it's in the Kriena in Croatia, whether it's in Bosnia or now Kosovo, we have seen President Milosevic involved. And we believe that there is no question that the absence of real democracy in Yugoslavia can be blamed directly to him. So we are supporting the Tribunal in all their efforts, and in all their investigations throughout all of the former Yugoslavia. And we deal with him because he remains in power in Belgrade, and he is the President of Yugoslavia. If there is to be a negotiated peace settlement, for better or for worse, it has to be negotiated with him.
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Chairman GILMAN. Have you considered, Ambassador Gelbard, making any frozen Serbian assets under our control available as restitution for those in Kosovo who've lost or incurred damage to any of their property as a result of the conflict there?
Ambassador GELBARD. We would be reluctant to use any of the funds that are currently frozen in the United States or elsewhere for this. There are obviously many claimants on these funds, from all of the former Yugoslavia, including, of course, particularly Bosnia. It would legally be a bad precedent to break into these funds at this time, because that would lead the way to many other lawsuits. Instead, what we are doing is working on resolution of all of the assets of the former Yugoslavia so that they can be decided and shared among the new states. But the Government of Yugoslavia has committed, and we are trying to make sure they live up to this commitment to reconstruct the housing and other areas that have been damaged or destroyed within Kosovo.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you. Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I just want to get clear on U.S. policy. And I'm going to make a few statements up here about what I think our policy is, and you correct me if I'm wrong. Or, you may want to make some additions.
First of all, I think all of the options, diplomatic and military, remain on the table, and we don't rule anything out. We want to try to get a cease-fire. We want a negotiated and not a violent settlement of the problem. We do not support independence for Kosovo. And we believe that a solution for the status of the province should be within the borders of the current Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
At that point, I'll pause and ask you a question. You favor self-government for Kosovo. What do you mean by self-government?
Ambassador GELBARD. We feel that there needs to be significantly enhanced autonomy. This did exist under the 1974 constitution, which President Milosevic repealed. And there are a variety of ways in which the local authorities could again return to a situation where they have control over a wide range of governments in Kosovo.
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Mr. HAMILTON. The details of self-government would be worked out among the parties?
Ambassador GELBARD. That's correct, sir.
Mr. HAMILTON. But we would see, as you suggest, a large degree of autonomy for Kosovo?
Ambassador GELBARD. We believe it needs to be territorial as well as substantive.
Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.
With regard to the use of force here, the Christmas warning of 1992–1993 was that we would use unilateral military measures to prevent Serb violence against the civilian population of Kosovo. And that remains in place? Am I correct?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. The United States has not ruled out or ruled in any action, and that applies to the action contemplated by the Christmas warning as much as to anything else.
Mr. HAMILTON. So we're prepared to act alone if necessary?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. We haven't ruled it out.
Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.
Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think it is essential. There's a distinction between when the United States believes that it has the legal authority to act alone and whether it would, in fact, in a concrete situation actually do so. I think it is essential for our leadership and our ability to defend our interests around the world that we recognize that we have, under the U.N. Charter and under international law, very broad authority to act when we believe it is necessary in self-defense or the defense of the interests of our allies and friends around the world.
So that's quite a distinct question. That is quite a distinct question from whether or not in a particular situation it would be in our interest to act unilaterally.
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Mr. HAMILTON. Now, Mr. Berger has emphasized that—and I guess you have too in your statements—that NATO is prepared, if needed, to take steps necessary to stop a serious escalation of the violence here. It's my understanding, and you correct me if I'm wrong, that several of our key allies here—the United Kingdom, France, Germany—think that we need to go to the U.N. Security Council; that that's a necessary step before taking military action in Kosovo. Am I correct about that?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. That may be somewhat overstating their position. There is no question that everybody agrees that there has to be an appropriate legal basis for military action if military action were to be taken. And everybody agrees that one form of such legal basis would be a U.N. Security resolution.
Mr. HAMILTON. As a practical matter, with the Russian and the Chinese opposition, you wouldn't get a U.N. mandate, would you?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. I wouldn't concede that at this point, because whether anybody, beginning with the United States, would be interested in seeing NATO military action in Kosovo would depend on the situation on the ground. And I certainly would not approach this from beginning by assuming that the Russians or the Chinese would veto action.
Mr. HAMILTON. Would you prefer a U.N. mandate?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think it is always better from the point of view of international support to have a U.N. mandate. That doesn't mean that it's essential. And, as I say, I think we may be slightly overstating the British and French position if we attribute to them a judgment that it's absolutely essential.
Ambassador GELBARD. If I could add to that, Congressman. First, the United States is quite clear that we do not need a U.N. mandate, and we have made that very clear to all our allies. We believe that we have obviously a complete basis under our domestic law to act.
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The circumstances involving Kosovo are somewhat new ones for some of our European allies, and they're still in the process of thinking some of this through because it's an out of area NATO mission. It would be out of area.
Mr. HAMILTON. But the bottom line here is that the United States is prepared to act alone. We're prepared to act in a coalition of the willing. We're prepared to act within the NATO context. We're prepared to act within a U.N. context. In other words, we're open to all of those. But, when all is said and done, the United States is prepared to act unilaterally here.
Mr. SLOCOMBE. There's no question that we maintain that we have the right to act unilaterally. I don't want to play on the words. There's a difference between preparing in the sense we're getting ready to do it, and it's our preferred course of action. We're saying if it came to that, and we thought that was what our interests required, that's what we would do.
Mr. HAMILTON. One other question, Mr. Chairman. Just in listening to your statement, Ambassador Gelbard, you put all of the blame, or most of the blame on Milosevic, it seems to me. And that might be appropriate. But I've had the impression lately that the focus of our policy efforts in the region was not so much to press Belgrade to modify its policies, although I understand we're trying to do that, as it is to try to moderate the UCK behavior. In other words, that's where we've really been putting energy and resources. Can you comment on that generally?
Ambassador GELBARD. First, as I have said both in my statement and subsequently, there is absolutely no question that Belgrade is responsible for initiating this crisis and bears the overwhelming responsibility for the disproportionate use of violence which they employ; and the results. And President Milosevic may very well, even if we don't agree with it, end up being responsible for the dismemberment of Yugoslavia twice if this continues.
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We have put into place really serious sanctions which have affected them, on top of the outer wall of sanctions which was already in place. The result is a dramatically deteriorating economic situation, and we're supporting democratic elements, as I said in my statement. At the same time, to negotiate a cessation of hostilities takes both sides of combatants. So we have been talking to the UCK about that.
Also, to have a negotiated settlement, we feel, obviously, that we have to take into account those who control a good deal of territory in Kosovo, namely the UCK. But there is no single UCK. This is a decentralized, still not very organized, loose group of people. And so it means that we are trying to work with a lot of elements in the UCK and get them to the table. Some of the political leaders in Pristina are also in contact with them. And it's our hope, and one of our goals, that there be a united Kosovar Albanian position. So we feel this is a very intensive task on which we're embarked.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Gelbard, Secretary Slocombe, thank you for your excellent testimony.
I'd like to make two very brief points, and end with a brief question. In Kosovo today, reports indicate that the figure for the total number of displaced persons is now over 100,000 people and growing. And the fact that tens of thousands of people are seeking refuge in the poorest part of the poorest country in Europe, the northeast of Albania, means that these people need significant help. Humanitarian organizations have told me that they now must begin, not in a few months, but now, to make preparations for keeping the vulnerable alive during the approaching winter season. Reminiscent of the years of aggression against the people of Bosnia, humanitarian aid workers in Kosovo, by what they are seeing, they realize that their noble humanitarian efforts are not the answer to the problem. The most humanitarian act obviously would be to actually stop the conflict.
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While it is, of course, hard to think of a cold winter on a day like this in Washington, winter is, indeed, approaching. Given reports, which I believe the State Department has raised with Belgrade, of artificial food shortages in Kosovo for which Yugoslav and Serbian officials seem to be responsible, we must strive to end this conflict before this winter becomes a humanitarian nightmare in the Balkans. Sponsoring aid convoys, or even organizing air drops, will not be adequate, nor do they offer a solution, and humanitarian aid workers do not want their efforts to be used, as they were in Bosnia, as an excuse for not taking action to end the conflict. The more we delay, the more complex the situation will become and the more challenging our inevitable response will be. The fighting is spilling over into Albanian territory and growing ethnic tensions in Macedonia, including the recent bomb explosions which have taken place there, show that the threat of wider conflict can quickly become real.
The second point on which I would like to ask Ambassador Gelbard in particular to comment, frankly I believe Milosevic is responsible for war crimes—crimes against humanity and genocide. And I believe that it has been a mistake for the U.S. policy to have depended on our engagement with this man. This week, Congressman Steny Hoyer and I, along with a bipartisan group of members, introduced a resolution in the House identical to that which passed the Senate last week, stating that the United States has reason to believe that Milosevic is responsible for war crimes and genocide and calling for stronger efforts leading to his indictment. I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that this committee will move quickly on this resolution and that we can get it to the floor of the House as soon as possible.
If we believe that Milosevic instigated and directed the conflict and ethnic cleansing in Croatia, Bosnia, and now Kosovo, U.S. dealings with him should cease. This is more than just a moral question. Long-term policy is at issue also. Dealing with Milosevic in the wake of Dayton has clearly contributed to the perpetration of his rule. Independent voices and opposition forces in Serbia testified to this before the Helsinki Commission of which I chair and now co-chair with Senator D'Amato 2 1/2 years ago, just after the Dayton agreement was reached. And again, at a hearing I held on Serbian opposition to Milosevic in December 1996.
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Visits by former Secretary Christopher to Belgrade, without meeting any opposition figures and last year's comment by Ambassador Holbrooke that the opposition is ''stupid'' for boycotting the elections that were so obviously fraudulent indicate that this Administration is willing to go to extremes to maintain a working relationship with Milosevic. The commitment to work with Milosevic in order to achieve Dayton implementation also undermines the Administration's own praise of Republic Serbska Prime Minister Dodic, who would be further empowered by pursuing implementation of Dayton without Milosevic.
I would ask you, Ambassador Gelbard, and I do want to thank you. And all of us were very heartened when you met with opposition leaders, including Serbs from Kosovo who do not support Milosevic. All of us stood up and took note, and we do thank you for that outreach. But how do you feel, how does the Administration feel about H. Con. Res. 304, which was passed by the Senate last week?
Ambassador GELBARD. First, Congressman, let me say that I thought your first statement about the situation in Kosovo and about the dangers of the oncoming winter were absolutely on target. And I thank you for making that statement. I fully agree with you. The United States, let me just say, is deeply concerned about this, which is why we are providing an enormous amount of assistance to refugees and displaced persons. But I agree—that is a band-aid. The only real solution is to get a lasting political solution for Kosovo. But we are working with the authorities in Montenegro, and I've spent a great deal of time in my discussions with President Djukanovic, offering support, which we are providing in Montenegro for displaced persons inside Kosovo itself, and, of course, in northern Albania to do exactly this. And our refugee bureau, with which you're very well acquainted has been extraordinarily supportive, as has AID, through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. We work very closely with Mrs. Ogatta on this through the U.N. HCR.
On the issue of President Milosevic. As I said in answer to Chairman Gilman's question. We're dealing with a reality here rather than with a preference. We do not have diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia. We have been the leading country in maintaining the outer wall of sanctions against Yugoslavia, and we have outlined five conditions for the removal of those sanctions, which block Yugoslavia from joining any kind of multilateral organization, whether political, economic, or social, including the World Bank, European Bank for Development, and so on.
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We were the leaders in the Contact Group in imposing the investment ban, a ban on export credits. We recently imposed a ban on flights by the Yugoslav national airline, trying to get the Europeans now to implement that ban, and an asset freeze. The United States has been very consistent in this.
We have to recognize two things: first, we are not the ones who, through our court system, provide indictments on anybody in the former Yugoslavia. This is the territory of the Hague Tribunal. We do provide a constant flow of intelligence and evidence to the Tribunal, on a daily basis, through our liaison personnel in our embassy in the Hague. And we have two lawyers who do this on a daily basis. So we are constantly providing this information.
The problem we face here is that President Milosevic is a reality in the sense that we have to deal with him if we are, at least at this moment, to negotiate a settlement peacefully on Kosovo.
When Ambassador Holbrooke made his statement about the opposition boycotting the elections last year, frankly, I made a similar statement. And I think in retrospect it was on target. When I met with the Yugoslav opposition earlier this week in the Netherlands, they said they now agree with me, because it simply was an election, we believe, they could have won. What we are doing, though, is providing significant assistance to that opposition and have done for some time through the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute at a whole range of levels, from the municipal level up to political party level. And, of course, we have been providing significant assistance to President Djukanovic in Montenegro.
We're dealing with a reality, unpleasant though it may be. We do not consider Yugoslavia to be a democratic country. We do not consider Milosevic to be a democratic leader. That's why we don't have diplomatic relations with them. We do support full establishment of democracy. And that's one of our five conditions for removing the outer wall of sanctions for Yugoslavia.
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Chairman GILMAN. Ms. Danner.
Ms. DANNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Following up on Mr. Hamilton's comments—interestingly enough, I had underlined the same thing in my material in front of me. Mr. Ambassador, I'd like for you to look at page five, paragraph four of your statement, and I will repeat it for the audience. ''The United States has made a significant investment in Balkan security. Continuing unrest and violence in Kosovo threaten that investment. We must act early, and we must act decisively.'' We obviously are referring back to the United States.
Explain to me why it is more in the national interest of the United States to become involved than it is in the national interest of the European countries, such as Germany, France, et cetera, who would seem to be closer to the action.
Ambassador GELBARD. Well, I would say it's equally in their interests as it is in ours, although we have to face the simple fact that American leadership predominates within NATO, and within the world. Our European allies have been working very closely with us on these issues, and we're in constant contact with them. Yesterday, Ambassador Hill, for example, briefed the North Atlantic Council at NATO on the shuttle diplomacy in which he's engaged. He has been getting outstanding support from the Europeans, and, of course, we have relied a great deal on the Contact Group support for imposing sanctions, as we have done, and as I have explained. But American leadership in the world today is a fact. And it is clearly recognized, I think, in the Balkans, including by President Milosevic, that we are the ones he has to deal with. But the western European nations continue to play a very positive role. And we're very thankful for that.
Ms. DANNER. I can appreciate what you say. By the same token, I have heard members of the military say to me that they're deciding not to re-up because they don't like the policy of constantly policing the world, spending a lot of time in Bosnia. You know, we were told Bosnia would be approximately 1 year, and $1 billion. I think we're well past that, and I think some people say as much as $10 billion at this point in time. It is true. We are the world's leaders, but we also are sacrificing something I think militarily with some of our people. I, for example, have had a phone call from a constituent of mine who tells me that he missed his first ever recurrent training in helicopter flying because his helicopter group is not given the kind of fuel that they need in order to continue the flights that they have had before to keep them proficient. So I think it is beyond the question of simply whether we're the leader in the world. We recognize that. But it's also important that we stay the leader in the world.
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I also conversed with two Air Force captains. I say captains because I guess I'm thinking of more or less the domestic rather than military. I'm not sure of their rank. But two pilots who had been in the service for 9 years, respectively, and in each case they told me they were getting out because they were not satisfied with the direction that the military was moving in world affairs. And I hear that again and again from the military when they're not surrounded by generals and others that they feel restrained in their speech.
Ambassador GELBARD. Let me say one thing and then ask Under Secretary Slocombe to respond to these issues related to the military. The mission in Bosnia has been an enormous success. I think if we had not gone into Bosnia, I would probably be sitting here now being criticized for the lack of U.S. action. And particularly, as I said earlier, over the course of the last year, year and a half, we have been extraordinarily successful in terms of building serious civilian implementation of these agreements. We're now about to have national elections on September 12 and 13 and we have seen dramatic progress across the board in Bosnia.
I have heard General Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, say that the troops who have served in Bosnia have the highest reenlistment rate in the world. We work very closely together, and what we have seen over the history of Europe is that failure to solve the security problems of the Balkans means that there will be dramatic security consequences for the rest of Europe. So we want to make sure we get this right.
Ms. DANNER. I agree, it does have implications for the rest of Europe. That's why my question is why is it so much more in our national interest than in Europe's national interest, and why do they lag so far behind in support?
Ambassador GELBARD. Well, we do have dramatic European involvement and participation in all these operations. For example, in Bosnia, U.S. troops represent less than 20 percent of the total S–4 force. U.S. police monitors represent only 10 percent of the entire international police task force. U.S. economic assistance money represents only about 13 percent of all the economic assistance money which is there, and we continue to see serious European leadership across the board there. And, as I said, we continue to see very important European participation in efforts related to Yugoslavia, related to Kosovo.
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Yesterday, for example——
Chairman GILMAN. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Ambassador GELBARD. Let me just say Prime Minister Dodic of the Republic of Serbska was invited to Paris to meet with Prime Minister Vadrine, supporting this process yet again.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Frankly, I don't see the continued presence of American troops in the Balkans as being a sign of success, especially when those of us for many years were suggesting that we permit the Bosnians and the Croatians to arm themselves to deter war themselves rather than using American military personnel. But, to my questions. We have Slovenia was part of a country called Yugoslavia. Croatia was part of a country called Yugoslavia. Bosnia was part of a country called Yugoslavia. Why do we still call it Yugoslavia? Isn't the fact that our government refers to that part of the world as Yugoslavia just to lay the groundwork for giving Milosevic the legitimacy he needs to commit acts of atrocity?
Ambassador GELBARD. We call it the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia because that's what they call themselves. We do not consider it the successor state to the former Yugoslavia.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. I think it's about time that the United States quit calling it Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia existed for a very short time period between World War II and the present day, or I guess between World War I and the present day. And Yugoslavia no longer exists. And as soon as the Serbian people understand that, and especially the Serbian leadership understand that, the sooner they will realize they can't commit acts of atrocities like they did in Bosnia, and as they are seen to prepared to do in Kosovo against people who are no longer under their legitimate authority. Isn't that the case?
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Ambassador GELBARD. Well, they are committing atrocities, but I'm not sure it's because of the name. We could call it——
Mr. ROHRABACHER. No, it's because they think they have legitimate—Milosevic thinks that he is the President of a country that includes Kosovo.
Ambassador GELBARD. Well, maybe we should call it lesser Yugoslavia.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Maybe we should call it Serbia.
Ambassador GELBARD. Well, it's not Serbia.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. I mean, that would make it very clear that the Serbians are the ones in another people's country, threatening acts of violence and atrocities.
Ambassador GELBARD. Congressman, this is a place made up of Serbia and Montenegro. They call it the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, why don't we call it Serbia-Montenegro instead of Yugoslavia.
OK, I don't think it's nitpicking because I believe that this has created a false impression to the world. Now let me get to——
Ambassador GELBARD. We don't have diplomatic relations with them, anyway.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK. Alright. That's good.
Do you believe that the people of Kosovo have a right to self-determination as other people of the world? Do you believe they have as much right as the Bosnians or the Croatians to determine their own destiny?
Ambassador GELBARD. I actually think we've had this conversation before.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. But I'm just trying to get——
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Ambassador GELBARD. Self-determination is a very complicated problem. People tend to believe in self-determination until it begins to affect their own country. We ran into this kind of problem a little over a hundred years ago in what we came to call the Civil War. This is a very complicated issue. We feel that there is enormous potential if Kosovo were to secede for significantly greater repercussions in the entire region. There are some people who call for the establishment of what they call Greater Albania. This would have enormous repercussions on Macedonia, on Albania, or the country we call Albania, and for the region as a whole, we consider it to be very serious.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Ambassador, with all due respect, there's always going to be a reason not to respect the rights of individuals if there's a price to pay with some dictator like Milosevic. And this is cowardice on our part. And we did the same thing with the Bosnians. And let us recognize that Milosevic is the problem; and Serbian aggression is the problem in that area. And it's not the desire of the people of Kosovo to control their own destinies that is the problem that's causing us to be involved, and for the world to hold their breath that another genocide might take place. And the sooner we communicate with Mr. Milosevic and the people of Serbia that they have no right whatsoever to commit acts of force and violence against the people of Kosovo and back it up—the sooner that we can rest assured that this won't happen. But until then, I'm afraid that our own unwillingness to No. 1, recognize that Yugoslavia no longer exists, and No. 2, that people do have a right to control their own destiny and determine self-determination for themselves, especially in the light of a dictatorship like we have with Mr. Milosevic, that we will continue to have conflict in this world.
The strategy you outlined is what has created the conflict in the first place.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Lantos.
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Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. When the history books will be written 50 years from now, the failure of the west in the former Yugoslavia will be clearly visible as a great tragedy. Long predating this Administration, some of us advocated publicly and privately for many years the use of NATO. I am as strong a support of NATO as there is in this body, but I don't find much use for NATO unless NATO is used and minimally if NATO's deterrent capability is used. And it was palpably not used. And we now have a couple of hundred thousand dead in Bosnia, a million and a half refugees, untold physical damage, and the process is repeating itself in Kosovo.
I've been going to Kosovo since the mid-1960's. And I recall that even as recently as the mid-1980's, there was a united peaceful Kosovo leadership under Mr. Rugova. But then since they were getting no support from us, I was pleading with the earlier Administration to establish at least a U.S. information office in Pristina, which much belatedly they did, years after the proposal was made. We now have the clearly predictable phenomenon of the extremists using military force. It seems to me that we have got to deal, at least initially, and I want to commend you on your statements, at least initially with the untold human tragedy which is unfolding in that region. These are the poorest people on the continent of Europe. You have to travel through the villages of Kosovo to sense the biting poverty that these people are experiencing. I am introducing a resolution to use the frozen assets of Yugoslavia to provide humanitarian aid and compensation to the people of Kosovo. And I ask my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to join me in this resolution.
It is absolutely preposterous that these destitute people, whose tiny little homes have been shot to smithereens, who have no employment, no possessions, are adding to the number of thousands of refugees that we already have in this region should wait for compensation or humanitarian aid until after this conflict is resolved.
I would like to ask both of you gentlemen to obtain from the Administration a view of this resolution once it is introduced. And I very much hope that the Administration will join me in demanding that the frozen assets of Serbia be used for this unquestionably desperately needed humanitarian endeavor, and I'd be grateful for a comment from both of you.
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Ambassador GELBARD. We are clearly responding—and rapidly—to this enormous tragedy involving displaced persons, involving refugees. We have allocated something like more than $24 million so far of assistance for food—emergency food assistance, refugee assistance, through a variety of parts of the U.S. Government, both to U.N. agencies, NGO's. And we will continue to play a very strong leadership role in supporting all of these efforts internationally.
Obviously, I would very much like to study any proposals that you have. But as I said earlier, Congressman, in response to a question along the same lines from Chairman Gilman, I am concerned about the potential legal implications of breaking into these frozen funds, many of which are already under litigation from a variety of the parties, coming out of the issues related to disposing the assets among the five states that have emerged from Yugoslavia. We are currently contesting one lawsuit in New York, for example, related to Bosnia on this. So I would really have to consult with the lawyers on it, because this might have some very important legal ramifications. But there's no question that the U.S. response here has been very much the most significant worldwide.
Mr. LANTOS. That's not at issue, Ambassador Gelbard. I support our government's efforts along these lines. It is palpable that no group has a greater claim to these assets than the group whose villages have been destroyed and who have been homeless, destitute refugees. And I'm unimpressed by the legal ramifications, because we have seen how playing with legal ramifications in the case of Swiss assets have dragged on for a half a century, still without a resolution. So all of these Kosovars will long be dead before we will have played through all of those alternatives. We are talking about villages destroyed, families shattered, people who are absolutely destitute, desperate, and in need of help. And our providing $24 million of humanitarian aid doesn't begin to deal with this issue, however praiseworthy that is.
Mr. Slocombe, will you comment?
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Mr. SLOCOMBE. Again, the question of the use of the frozen assets, I agree with what Ambassador Gelbard has said. There are other people with—unfortunately, Milosevic and Belgrade are responsible for a whole series of horrors. And there a lot of people with claims against this amount of money. I don't know what the amount is, but I suspect that in any event it is only a tiny fraction of what will eventually have to be paid for reconstruction and restoration, both in Kosovo and in other places where these terrible things have happened.
I wanted to underscore a point you made about the deterrent effect of the NATO planning. Everybody agrees—I'm struck sitting here that people with very different views about almost everything else in the world seem to have very strong and correct views about the importance of getting this thing settled. The problem is what are the instruments we use to settle it. And one of the important instruments is the pressure on Belgrade that arises from the possibility, I don't say the certainty, but the possibility of the use of NATO military force. That is an important part of using the military potential of the alliance, not just the United States, but of the alliance as a whole, and, indeed, of partner countries, to try to add to the political pressures, the economic pressures that are already being put on Milosevic, who is principally responsible for the fighting and the atrocities and the horrors of war. And also is the one who has the clearest opportunity by making a forthcoming offer to address the desire of the Kosovar people for self-rule and for, at least, autonomy, has the biggest opportunity to take, to do something and end this conflict.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. [presiding] Thank you very much. Mrs. Capps.
Mrs. CAPPS. I want again to thank the Ambassador and Mr. Slocombe for being here with us today and I want to also join my colleague in urging the humanitarian relief efforts that you are accomplishing. And say that that certainly has to be a high priority. And also I wasn't able to hear your beginning statement.
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I'm interested in what it will take to ensure peace there and if you are using Bosnia as a comparison—the fact that we are grudging in the Congress to keep reauthorizing and the deployment of the 7,000 or 8,000 troops—individuals that we have in Bosnia. Is this the plan that we can assume will be in place in Kosovo?
Ambassador GELBARD. These are two very different situations.
Mrs. CAPPS. Yes, and that's what I wish you would address.
Ambassador GELBARD. First, the situation is Bosnia, contrary to popular opinion, was not really an ethnic conflict. It was a problem that really had started because of virulent nationalistic movements that had been put into place after having been buried for a long time. This is truly an ethnic conflict, and it's a very complicated one. As Under Secretary Slocombe said earlier, talking about NATO planning, we're not ruling anything out. We're looking at all possibilities. What we want to achieve here, though, is a peacefully negotiated settlement. And that's what we are working on right now—literally right now. And I said earlier that Ambassador Hill is in Belgrade today meeting with President Milosevic. He will then be going back to Pristina to meet with the authorities, and our goal is on an urgent basis to get the two sides—and getting two sides together here is hard, especially in the Kosovar Albanian context to sit down and work on these issues related to a peaceful settlement.
Mrs. CAPPS. Are there then some other ethnic conflicts that we can compare and draw implications? Are you using that as a model?
Ambassador GELBARD. Well, we have been looking at a range of autonomy models from around the world, and trying to draw on these, however they can fit in. There has to be a combination of territorial autonomy, and autonomy regarding governance at a number of levels—at the top level inside Kosovo, all the way down to the municipal level. There was an agreement negotiated by the Santo Gidio movement from Rome on the education system, a superb agreement that we helped with, under their leadership. And we think it's important to get this process of implementation of the education agreement put into place.
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On the health care system, then we get into some really difficult questions regarding governance at the municipal level, ranging from such seemingly mundane issues as municipal services, normal municipal services. Will Albanians be prepared to deliver mail to Serbs? This is actually a serious kind of issue. To perhaps some of the most difficult issues relating to law enforcement and the justice system. And these are really quite critical. There are models we have looked at ranging from some of the areas inside of Russia, Tartarstand, Northern Ireland, the West Bank, a whole range of possibilities that we are studying. We have some very good academic advisors, and we're trying to look at everything possible right now to see what can fit these circumstances, and what the two parties will sign up to. Because ultimately what they agree on—anything they agree on is ultimately going to be fine with us.
Mrs. CAPPS. So are you meeting with receptivity on their part, to any degree?
Ambassador GELBARD. I think when we have a closed session, I can talk some of the——
Mrs. CAPPS. I see. Alright. Thank you very much. Then, but the bottom line is that the superficial—the comparison with Bosnia doesn't work?
Ambassador GELBARD. No, it does not.
Mrs. CAPPS. Thank you.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK, thank you very much.
Mr. Clement.
Mr. CLEMENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I've been to Bosnia. I've been in the area, and have what
you've described and what others have described to horrify me about the brutality, about the loss of life, about the houses being destroyed, and the ethnic cleansing and what do we do. And I sure agree with what Mr. Lantos said a while ago about the western world is not going to be looked upon favorably by particularly Europe not intervening. And I was sure pleased with the United States in the Dayton Accord at least showing some leadership and courage to try to bring some peace in the area, knowing that Kosovo now is another very troubled area, and being there close by in Macedonia, you can feel some of the tension.
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And what I wanted to know if just total chaos breaks out, what can we expect and what countries do you think will get involved in this conflict because of religious and geographical interests?
Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think there's no question that if the scale of fighting increases as it has been doing over—fairly gradually—but over a period of months, there is a very real risk that the situation will get completely out of control; that is, Belgrade will try to apply more and more force. The UCK will get more and more support from an increasingly radicalized population, and the fighting will spread.
The first thing that will happen is that there will be even more refugees. They will go into the immediate neighboring countries, and they will also go to places like Italy, Germany, other places in Europe. We've seen in this country with the Haitians and the Cubans and other people that large numbers of refugees—no matter how idealistic countries are—large numbers of refugees coming into a country just creates all kinds of tensions and instability, particularly when they're coming in to—at least initially—into some of the poorest part of Europe where there is, at least in the case of Albania, no effective government.
There would be cross border operations on both sides, which would immediately bring in Albania and all probability Macedonia. And, as many people have said, this is an area where there are historic tensions of all kinds—based on religion, based on language, based on nationality. In some sense, one of the tragedies of the Balkans is that every group can look back to some point in history where they at least claim that their group had control of much more territory than their nation has now.
So the potential for this spreading into a large-scale conflict across international borders involving NATO allies and other countries with whom we have very good relations and for whom stability is important to us is, I think, very substantial. And most of us manage to get through a lot of our lives without knowing there was a place called Kosovo. That's the reason that this fight in an apparently obscure, distant place, with a relatively small population really does potentially affect the vital interests of the United States, and peace and stability in the world, and in Europe, specifically.
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Mr. CLEMENT. Thank you.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much.
Mr. CLEMENT. I'd yield to Mr. Engel.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Actually, your time's up. And Mr. Davis?
Mr. DAVIS. No questions.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. And Mr. Engel.
Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As many people know, I have been very involved with the Kosovo issue for a number of years. And I want to first of all commend the fine work done by both these gentlemen. I've had particular discussions with Ambassador Gelbard, who I want to say publicly is doing a very, very fine job for our country. And I certainly appreciate the fine work that he is doing, and Mr. Slocombe as well. But I have dealt a lot with Ambassador Gelbard, and I want to publicly thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Of all the people who have spoken, I have agreed with everything they've said. But I want to particularly identify with the remarks Mr. Rohrabacher made, because I think he was right on the money in terms of our not recognizing Yugoslavia as Yugoslavia, and the right of the people of Kosovo to have self determination. I think that it is the most important thing and that American policy and the West's policy is fatally flawed—and not this Administration, because this has been the policy of all administrations. I believe it's a wrong policy, because, as the Ambassador knows—he and I have discussed this. I think that saying that somehow enhanced autonomy is the solution for Kosovo—it might have been the solution 10 years ago, but Mr. Milosevic saw to it that the Kosovars had no autonomy. I think now, 10 years later, after there's been so much oppression, particularly in recent months with the wanton killing of innocent civilians, the attacks by the Serbian police, that it's pie in the sky to think that anything other than self-determination would work. The point that Mr. Rohrabacher was making, I think, a very, very important point.
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There is no Yugoslavia. Croatia is now a country, as is Macedonia, Bosnia, and Slovenia. There is no Yugoslavia. So to somehow say that we don't support self-determination for the Albanians in Kosovo because it would change international boundaries is difficult to understand. International boundaries have been changed, and the Albanians in Kosovo have been unfortunately trapped behind borders. If self-determination was good enough for all the other components of the former Yugoslavia, in my opinion it ought to be good enough for the Albanians in Kosovo. I think that that is the only solution.
The question I really have, though, is that I have the sense from recent developments that the focus of United States and allied attention today is not so much to press Belgrade, although I know we have pressed Belgrade, to modify its policies and actions in Kosovo, as it is to try to modify the behavior of UCK, the Kosovo Liberation Army. That bothers me. Not that I think that the killing of innocent civilians, be they Serb or Albanian, is something that I want to see, because I obviously don't. But I think it is difficult to somehow place the two on par and to somehow say that what Milosevic has done to the people of Kosovo is somehow on par with the UCK who I think only are exercising the right to try to defend themselves. Many of us have argued for years that Mr. Rugova ought to be strengthened by the west and embraced by the west, because if he wasn't, you would have more radicalism in the Albanian community, and unfortunately, we weren't listened to—too little and too late. I don't think it's fair to kind of place them on par. The trouble in Kosovo will end when Milosevic and his henchmen stop their ethnic cleansing, pull out of there. It's clear that they're trying to clear towns on the borders of Albania, because they want to try to control those towns. We ought to lay the blame solely where it is, and that's with Milosevic. He needs to get out of Kosovo. It is not part of Serbia. And I'm going to introduce a self-determination resolution in this Congress, because I believe if it's good for everybody else in the former Yugoslavia, it's good for all the people of Kosovo.
I'm wondering if we could comment?
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Ambassador GELBARD. As I've made quite clear, the overwhelming responsibility for what has happened for the tragedy in Kosovo lies with President Milosevic and his government. They initiated this, as you know, Congressman, because you and I have, as you said, discussed this many times. I warned Milosevic back in February about taking action in Kosovo. We offered him the choice of joining the international community or plunging his country into further isolation and poverty if they took military action in Kosovo. And they chose the latter. And the result now is that even in the last 5 months, the economic situation of Serbia has deteriorated dramatically. We estimate that their financial reserves are probably a little more than 1 weeks worth of imports. The dinar has been plunging downward. The living standards of this country that used to be one of the prosperous in central and eastern Europe are now back way below many of the former Communist countries, and real incomes are about what they were in the early 1950's.
So there's no question where the overwhelming responsibility lies, and where the overwhelming level of atrocities and violence comes from.
At the same time, as we are trying to bring together a process which I know you support, of negotiations toward a peaceful solution, it's important that the Kosovar Albanians develop a unified position. That's a position that they have to develop on their own, and the substance of the position is not one that we determine. But they have to agree on a common position.
One of the areas where we have been putting a great deal of efforts is trying to bring the Kosovar Albanians together. And, as you know, perhaps better than anyone, this is hard, particularly with the UCK elements who are quite disparate themselves in their own views. And I would point out that there are significant numbers of the UCK leadership who are still very much Marxists-Leninists, something of great concern to us.
We cannot tolerate violence and atrocities from any side. One kidnaping, one murder, is one too many. We overwhelmingly condemn the Yugoslav security forces because that is their practice, that is their norm. But we all have to condemn any kind of kidnapings, any kind of murders of non-combatants from any side. And I know you agree with that, Congressman. And we certainly are not seeing in any way, shape, or form any kind of moral equivalence though.
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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. We're going to adjourn this part of the hearing momentarily, and we will then meet again in room 2200 for a closed briefing, a more classified briefing.
I will refrain from having the last comment, even though I'm in the chair. I want to thank you both very much, and let me say that although sometimes—I give people a lot of hell when they come here—but we have a great deal of respect for the job that you're doing. And we may have some areas of disagreement, but I am very grateful that we have people like yourself that are dedicating your lives to trying to make sure this world works out best, and share America's ideals. And so don't think because some of us are asking you some pointed questions that we don't appreciate the good job that you're doing.
This meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:02 a.m., the Committee adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]
A P P E N D I X
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