SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS Tables
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64–354
2000
VISA WAIVER PILOT PROGRAM
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
IMMIGRATION AND CLAIMS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
FEBRUARY 10, 2000
Serial No. 52
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
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For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., Wisconsin
BILL McCOLLUM, Florida
GEORGE W. GEKAS, Pennsylvania
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
CHARLES T. CANADY, Florida
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
BOB BARR, Georgia
WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
EDWARD A. PEASE, Indiana
CHRIS CANNON, Utah
JAMES E. ROGAN, California
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
MARY BONO, California
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida
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DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
JERROLD NADLER, New York
ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
ZOE LOFGREN, California
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
MAXINE WATERS, California
MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., General Counsel-Chief of Staff
JULIAN EPSTEIN, Minority Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chairman
BILL McCOLLUM, Florida
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ELTON GALLEGLY, California
EDWARD A. PEASE, Indiana
CHRIS CANNON, Utah
CHARLES T. CANADY, Florida
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
ZOE LOFGREN, California
BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
GEORGE FISHMAN, Chief Counsel
JIM WILON, Counsel
LAURA BAXTER, Counsel
CINDY BLACKSTON, Professional Staff
LEON BUCK, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
HEARING DATE
February 10, 2000
OPENING STATEMENT
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Smith, Hon. Lamar, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims
WITNESSES
Ashbaugh, Robert L., Acting Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice
Cronin, Michael, acting associate commissioner for office of programs, Immigration and Naturalization Service
Liang, Elisa, associate deputy attorney general, U.S. Department of Justice
Merry, E. Wayne, director, Program on European Societies in Transition, The Atlantic Council of the United States
Norman, William S., president and CEO, Travel Industry Association of America
Ratigan, John, immigration consultant, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison
Ryan, Mary A., Ambassador, assistant secretary for consular affairs, U.S. Department of State
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LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Ashbaugh, Robert L., Acting Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice: Prepared statement
Cronin, Michael, acting associate commissioner for office of programs, Immigration and Naturalization Service: Prepared statement
Jackson Lee, Hon. Sheila, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas: Prepared statement
Liang, Elisa, associate deputy attorney general, U.S. Department of Justice: Prepared statement
Merry, E. Wayne, director, Program on European Societies in Transition, The Atlantic Council of the United States: Prepared statement
Norman, William S., president and CEO, Travel Industry Association of America: Prepared statement
Ratigan, John, immigration consultant, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison: Prepared statement
Ryan, Mary A., Ambassador, assistant secretary for consular affairs, U.S. Department of State: Prepared statement
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Smith, Hon. Lamar, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims: Prepared statement
APPENDIX
Material submitted for the record
VISA WAIVER PILOT PROGRAM
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2000
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Immigration
and Claims,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to other business, at 1:20 p.m. in room 2226, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lamar Smith [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Members present: Representatives Lamar Smith, Sheila Jackson Lee, and Barney Frank.
Staff present: George Fishman, Bill Griffith, Kelly Dixon, Leon Buck, and Nolan Rappaport.
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OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SMITH
Mr. SMITH. Thank you all for returning and thank you for being here today.
I will call on Ms. Jackson Lee for an opening statement.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to acknowledge the presence of Mr. Frank in this hearing as well.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you. I have indicated that I am being called to the Floor for debate and hope to be able to return. And thank you for yielding to me for my opening statement in regard to the hearing on the visa waiver pilot program. Let me thank all the witnesses in advance. I look forward to reading your statements anew, but as well, being able to hear some of you.
Ordinarily, an alien coming to the United States as a visitor must have a non-immigrant visa in addition to the other documents that everyone must have to be admitted to this country, such as a passport. The visa waiver pilot program allows aliens traveling from certain designated countries to come to the United States as temporary visitors without having a non-immigrant visa.
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According to the State Department's testimony for today's hearing, this program has increased travel, tourism and business for the American economy, enhanced relations with participating countries, produced greater efficiency and productivity for the United States Government. Some people fear, however, that the program may foster non-immigrant visa overstays and other immigrant violations, such as unauthorized employment. These are the kinds of issues that we should be addressing today.
I am aware, however, that there are qualifications. And so we note that the countries must extend reciprocal privileges, the countries must have a low non-immigrant refusal rate for 2 years. Participating countries must have or be developing a machine readable passport program. Participating countries must not compromise U.S. law and participating countries must maintain a low visa refusal rate to continue in the program.
Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the complete aspect of my testimony be submitted. But as I looked at the 29 countries that we have graciously encouraged in this process, and I do believe, Mr. Chairman, there should be reauthorization of this legislation, and work with all of those who are interested, our very fine tourism industry, which I certainly advocate and promote. I think they generate a great deal of resources for this country, and we probably don't give them as much applause as we should.
But I am raising concerns that countries that many of us enjoy the loveliness of, the continent, Africa, and the Caribbean, as I have looked at the list, seem to be visibly and conspicuously missing. And for those who have had the opportunity to enjoy the hospitality of the Caribbean, many people, I believe, in this countries, could meet the criteria. So I hope any reauthorization bill will look seriously at the missing numbers of countries that would increase the viability and the opportunity for better relations, increased economic support and input, and certainly would put a smile on the faces of those involved in those industries that are impacted.
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With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time and ask that my statement in its entirety be submitted to the record, and ask to be excused and will hopefully be able to return.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. SHEILA JACKSON LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS
Thank-you Mr. Chairman for revisiting the subject of the visa waiver pilot program. Ordinarily, an alien coming to the United States as a visitor must have a nonimmigrant visa in addition to the other documents that everyone must have to be admitted to this country, such as a passport. The Visa Waiver Pilot Program allows aliens traveling from certain designated countries to come to the Untied states as temporary visitors without having a nonimmigrant visa.
According to the State Department's testimony for today's hearing, this program has increased travel, tourism, and business for the American economy; enhanced relations with participating countries; and produced greater efficiency and productivity for the United States government. Some people fear, however, that the program may foster nonimmigrant visa overstays and other immigration violations such as unauthorized employment.
In order to participate in the Visa Waiver Pilot Program the qualifications are as follows:
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1) Participating countries must extend reciprocal privileges to U.S. citizens;
2) Participating countries must have a low nonimmigrant refusal rate for 2 years;
3) Participating countries must have or be developing a machine readable passport program;
4) Participating countries must not compromise U.S. law enforcement interests; and
5) Participating countries must maintain a low visa refusal rate to continue in the program.
QUESTIONS FOR RANKING MEMBER JACKSON LEE
Panel I
Questions for Ambassador Ryan
Background: Ranking Member Conyers and other Members of the Congressional Black Caucus have raised the issue of the lack of African countries in the VWPP program. Unfortunately, South Africa may be the only African country with a high number of travelers to the United States and a low overstay rate to qualify for the VWPP. You should ask the following questions:
1. Under the current criteria isn't South Africa a possible candidate for the Visa Waiver Pilot Program?
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Possible Follow-up Question if Ambassador Ryan's response includes a reference to ''high demand'' at the visa office of a prospective country:
2. You stated that a high demand for visas is a consideration for the program. However, countries such as Liechtenstein, Monaco, Andorra and San Marino, which have far fewer travelers to the U.S. than South Africa, are included in the program, so isn't fair to say that a high demand for visas is only one criteria?
Background: Ambassador Ryan will probably mention in her testimony the devastating effect on the US. Embassies and Consulates around the world if the VWPP expired But you may want to give her an additional opportunity to expound upon how the Department will adjust if it had to assemble an intensive visa processing center at some of our busiest Embassies in a short period of time. FYI—Ambassador Ryan's staff reports that it could take up to three years to get every Embassy and consulate properly staffed and funded to provide short-term visas if the VWPP expired.
3. What would the impact be on international tourism to the U.S. if the Visa Waiver Pilot Program were to lapse, or not be renewed at all?
Background: Current law only requires that the participating country certify that it has or is in process of developing a program to issue machine readable passports to its citizens. As an additional security measure, Chairman Smith wants to mandate that all countries in the program have machine-readable passports. The industry is supportive of this program change (if the statutory language allows a ''phase end'' period) if it helps them to get Chairman Smith's support on program permanency.
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4. Would a mandated deadline for issuing machine-readable passports put the U.S. at a disadvantage vis a vis other countries where travelers could potentially visit
Panel II
Questions for Mr. Norman, President and CEO of the Travel Industry Association
Background: Most international travelers plan in advance to travel to the United States. In choosing their vacation destinations, they take in consideration whether they have to go through the hassle of getting a visa. The United States will lose a lot of visitors if the short-term visa process is in a state of flux. The following question will permit Mr. Norman to elaborate.
1. We have heard some make the argument that the Visa Waiver Pilot Program is ''de facto'' permanent because it is always a must-pass program. What would be the real benefit of statutorily making the program permanent?
Mr. SMITH. Without objection, the rest of your opening statement will be made part of the record, and thank you for it.
I will recognize myself for an opening statement as well.
Today, the subcommittee will consider the Visa Waiver Pilot Program, often referred to as the VWPP, which is scheduled to expire on April 30. This is not a new topic for the subcommittee. Since its initial passage is part of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, the VWPP has been reauthorized four times. In addition, the program has been extended on a temporary, emergency basis on several occasions when Congress has not completed action on reauthorizing legislation.
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The VWPP authorizes the Attorney General to waive the ''B'' visa requirement for aliens traveling from certain countries as temporary visitors for business or as tourists. To qualify for consideration for the program, a country must first extend reciprocal visa-free entry privileges to U.S. citizens; second, have a low non-immigrant visa refusal rate; and 3, have or be developing a machine readable passport. Before a country can be admitted to the program, the Attorney General must determine that the admission of the country to the program would not compromise U.S. law enforcement interests.
Many of the issues regarding the VWPP are familiar to the members of this subcommittee. We know that the travel industry strongly supports the VWPP. According to INS statistics for 1998, more than 17 million visitors utilized the VWPP to visit the United States.
It is clear that this program is a major asset to the travel and tourism industries and that spending by foreign visitors makes a significant contribution to our economy. On the other hand, there have been ongoing concerns that the VWPP makes the United States more vulnerable to visa overstayers, and that it could facilitate the entry of criminals or terrorists.
While the basic arguments are not new, more than 2 years have passed since we last considered the VWPP and there have been some new developments. A March 1999 report by the Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector General called ''The Potential for Fraud in the INS' Efforts to Reduce the Risk of the Visa Waiver Pilot Program'' highlighted the vulnerability of the program to fraud, particularly to the fraudulent use of passports of VWPP countries by nationals of non-VWPP countries. The report characterized as inadequate INS procedures for handling available data regarding stolen VWPP passports, and recommended that the INS make several changes in the procedures for handling information on stolen passports.
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Three new countries joined the VWPP last year—Portugal, Singapore and Uruguay. One other country, Greece, was nominated, but has not been able to qualify for the program.
The nominations of the four countries were evaluated by an Interagency Working Group chaired by the Department of Justice's Executive Office of National Security. As a result of concerns raised during the evaluation process, Greece has not been permitted to join the program. We have a government witness who will describe how the interagency evaluation process works.
We need to revisit the question of how we monitor the countries in the program. Unfortunately, the INS has been unable to develop either a mechanism for tracking the departure of temporary visitors from VWPP countries, or any other country for that matter, or to develop reliable estimates of overstays based on secondary sources.
When Congress last extended the VWPP in 1998, the legislation included a provision that required the INS to begin collecting data on overstays and to prepare an annual report for Congress providing estimates of overstays. Although the first report was due on June 30th, 1999, the INS did not provide a report by that date. On February 1st, 2000, the INS said that it is still not able to produce reliable overstay estimates.
The machine readable passport is another requirement that should be examined closely. A country nominated for the VWPP must issue or be ''in the process of developing'' a machine readable passport. Yet some countries admitted to the program as long ago as 1991, Belgium and Switzerland, still have not developed a machine readable passport.
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This afternoon, we will examine these and other issues related to the visa waiver pilot program. And I will yield now to the gentleman from Massachusetts for his opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. LAMAR SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND CLAIMS
The Subcommittee will once again consider the Visa Waiver Pilot Program, often referred to as the VWPP, which is scheduled to expire on April 30. This is not a new topic for the Subcommittee. Since its initial passage as part of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, the VWPP has been reauthorized four times. In addition, the program has been extended on a temporary emergency basis on several occasions when Congress had not completed action on reauthorizing legislation.
The VWPP authorizes the Attorney General to waive the ''B'' visa requirement for aliens traveling from certain countries as temporary visitors for business or as tourists.
To qualify for consideration for the program, a country must 1) extend reciprocal visa-free entry privileges to U.S. citizens; 2) have a low nonimmigrant visa refusal rate; and 3) have or be developing a machine readable passport. Before a country can be admitted to the program, the Attorney General must determine that the admission of the country to the program would not compromise U.S. law enforcement interests.
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Many of the issues regarding the VWPP are familiar to the members of this Subcommittee. We know that the travel industry strongly supports the VWPP. According to INS statistics for 1998, more than 17 million visitors utilized the VWPP to visit the U.S. or approximately 55% of all visitors for business or tourism.
It is clear that the VWPP is a major asset to the travel and tourism industries and that spending by foreign visitors makes a significant contribution to our economy. On the other hand, there have been ongoing concerns that the VWPP makes the United States more vulnerable to visa overstayers and that it could facilitate the entry of criminals or terrorists.
While the basic arguments are not new, more than two years have passed since we last considered the VWPP and there have been some new developments.
A March 1999 report by the Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector General (OIG), ''The Potential for Fraud and the INS's Efforts to Reduce the Risks of the Visa Waiver Pilot Program,'' highlighted the vulnerability of the program to fraud, particularly to the fraudulent use of passports of VWPP countries by nationals of non-VWPP countries. The Report characterized as inadequate INS procedures for handling available data regarding stolen VWPP passports and recommended that the INS make several changes in its procedures for handling information on stolen passports.
Three new counties joined the VWPP last year—Portugal, Singapore and Uruguay. One other country, Greece, was nominated, but has not been able to qualify for the program.
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The nominations of the four countries were evaluated by an Interagency Working Group chaired by the Department Justice's Executive Office of National Security. As a result of concerns raised during the evaluation process, Greece has not been permitted to join the program. We have a government witness who will describe how the interagency evaluation process works.
We need to revisit the question of how we monitor the countries in program. Unfortunately, the INS has been unable to either develop a mechanism for tracking the departure of temporary visitors from VWPP countries (or any other country for that matter) or to develop reliable estimates of overstays based on secondary sources.
When Congress last extended the VWPP in 1998, the legislation included a provision that required the INS to begin collecting data on overstays and to prepare an annual report for Congress providing estimates of overstays. Although the first report was due on June 30, 1999, the INS did not provide a report by that date. On February 1, 2000, the INS advised that it is still not able to produce reliable overstay estimates.
The machine readable passport is another requirement that should be examined closely. A country nominated for the VWPP must issue or be ''in the process of developing'' a machine readable passport. Yet some countries admitted to the program as long ago as 1991 (Belgium, Switzerland) still have not developed a machine readable passport.
Mr. FRANK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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I believe this to be a very important program and I hope we will be able quickly to reauthorize it, so that there is not any uncertainty or interference. I confess to feeling a little bit guilty that I hadn't realized it was about to expire. We are talking about less than 2 months from now, and I think we should be moving very quickly.
I will say that I have had a particular interest in this obviously with regard to Portugal, as people know. I am very pleased that that seems to be working out well. And Portugal was admitted after some legislative action. And the results have been very good for us.
I was struck by reading the Inspector General's report, frankly, by the apparent paucity of horror stories. I am encouraged by that. We had 17 million people get here. That is a lot of people. And we have, I realize it is not a conclusive list, but assuming it is a representative list, it does not seem to me the Republic is in any mortal peril here.
I note that this apparently facilitates qat, that people are smuggling qat in here, a leafy narcotic from Africa. Maybe there are parts of the country where people staggering under the influence of qat are a menace. I am not aware of any. And if that is the worst problem we have got, that some qat smugglers are sneaking in, I am prepared to, while hoping that we can crack down on this menace, live with it in terms of the benefits it otherwise pursues.
The fact that, we also noted that apparently INS had trouble telling a Japanese person from a Chinese person, and maybe they can work on that, a little bit of cultural diversity education might be helpful there. But in general, it does seem to me that we are benefiting from this program overall.
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I must say, and I will apologize because it was nobody's fault, but the hearing obviously went later, and we thought we had roll calls, and we can't always accommodate everything in the narrow space we have. So I am going to have to leave.
But I am interested, and obviously we are worried about terrorists. I will confess to the view that if people are seriously interested in terrorism, getting someone into the U.S. probably is not the hardest part of what they are trying to do. And yes, there are some people who probably could not get visas.
But I would think if you were a sophisticated terrorist organization, you probably would be able to find someone who could meet the visa criteria, or have someone who would have a family that could be temporarily left behind, etc. Or a fake one. You know, if people are prepared to lie about who they are under the visa waiver program, presumably they would be prepared to be in a situation where they could get a visa by coming up with a wife and some kids who are staying behind and meet those visa things.
So I hope we move it quickly. I think this is a very useful thing. It is obviously economically beneficial to the United States. It is extremely beneficial to the many people who live in this country who have close family ties and cultural ties elsewhere. I think it is an example of a pretty good government program.
I am glad to see that there appears to be some consensus on things we can do to improve it, and I think the Inspector General's report is a very useful one in that regard. So I would hope, it did seem to me, if I was correct, that none of those really required legislative efforts, but to the extent that they did, I would be prepared to cooperate with them, and I hope that we can very promptly reauthorize the visa waiver program, which has been so beneficial.
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Thank you.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Frank. We will go to our first panel, and let me introduce you all. Robert Ashbaugh, Acting Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice; Ambassador Mary A. Ryan, assistant secretary for consular affairs, U.S. Department of State; Michael Cronin, acting associate commissioner for office of programs, INS; and Elisa Liang, associate deputy attorney general, U.S. Department of Justice, accompanied by James McAtamney, counsel to the deputy attorney general for national security.
We welcome you all. I hope I pronounced the last two names—Mr. Frank.
Mr. FRANK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just would note, maybe this is the consequence of being in the last year of an administration, but I don't think I have seen so many acting people since the last time I was at the theater. [Laughter.]
Mr. SMITH. Mr. Ashbaugh, we will start with you.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. ASHBAUGH, ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. ASHBAUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the work of the Office of Inspector General with respect to the visa waiver pilot program.
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By way of a very brief background, as you know from prior hearings, back in September 1997, my office examined INS' monitoring of non-immigrant overstays and assessed the non-immigrant information system, which is known by the acronym NIIS, pronounced ''nice,'' which is INS' primary data collection system for non-immigrant overstay information.
Our report found that INS cannot identify the individuals who have overstayed their visas, nor can it describe the characteristics of the overstay population residing in the United States. Most significantly, NIIS cannot identify the countries from which overstays originated.
This has significantly hindered INS' efforts to develop an overstay plan. It impedes Congress' ability to make policy. And given the unreliability of the NIIS data, it means that INS cannot provide the Attorney General with the information she needs under the statutory framework to certify the countries enrolled in the visa waiver pilot program are fully complying with the program's mandates.
The conclusions that we reached in that report about the visa waiver pilot program became the genesis, then, for an effort to dig deeper into the program which resulted in the 1999 report. And it is to that that I will spend the remainder of my time.
As the visa waiver pilot program has grown, so has the potential for its abuse. Because the passport is the only document required for a visa waiver applicant to enter the United States, passports from visa waiver program countries are in high demand on the black market. We have found that the theft of passports, particularly of blank passports, is a serious problem associated with the visa waiver pilot program.
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At the time of our review, INS estimated that there were more than 100,000 blank passports from visa waiver pilot countries that had been stolen and that were potentially in circulation. Of those, approximately 80 percent are not machine readable, which means that under normal circumstances, the provenience of the passport will not be checked during that brief 1-minute inspection that occurs at an American airport.
As part of our review, we selected a sample of the stolen blank passport numbers from 10 visa pilot countries. We queried them against NIIS records to determine whether aliens had used these passports to enter the United States illegally. From our sample of 1,067 stolen blank passports, we found 40, which is 3.7 percent, had exact matches to NIIS records, which shows that the passport had been used to successfully enter the United States.
If you were to project these, and we were using a statistically valid sample, you could estimate then that there were approximately 2,350 successful entries based upon our universe, which was a total of approximately 61,000 stolen blank passports.
In addition to the exact matches, we found another 61 passports, or another 5.7 percent, that were highly likely to be possible matches and highly likely to be additional examples of the successful use of a stolen passport to enter the United States. That is based upon a data entry problem that I will discuss in a minute.
But in sum, based upon this sample, it appears that something on the order of one in ten stolen passports have been used to successfully enter the United States. And we have reason to believe from some of the other evidence that we have seen that the passports have been used on more than one occasion and that they have been used to bring in more than simply the holder of the stolen passport. In many cases we found examples in which children have been brought in under a stolen passport.
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The reason that this could occur is because INS did not systematically collect information on all the stolen passports, and it did not create lookout records based upon the information that it did receive. We found that no single entity within INS was responsible for the collection of information about stolen passports, and we found no single office within INS that had responsibility for entering such information into its lookout systems.
Going back to our sample, out of the roughly 1,000 stolen passports that we found, we found 567 of them, over half, had no lookout record at all. And with respect to the passports that had been entered into the lookout system, we found transposition errors with respect to the numeric and alphabetic characters that are used to record the passport in roughly one out of four cases. So that even if a manual entry by the inspector had been made at the airport, because of the transposition error there would not have been a match and therefore no ''hit.''
As a result, our March 1999 report made three recommendations. We recommended that INS should modify its primary inspection policy to ensure that the passport numbers of all visa waiver pilot program applicants are queried, whether they are manual or machine readable, to be an automatic part of the process that occurs every time an entrant appears for passage into the United States at an airport. That INS should designate a unit to systematically collect the information and be responsible and accountable for the timely and accurate entry of stolen passport numbers into the lookout system. And finally, that INS should develop guidelines for the entry of passport numbers when creating lookout records.
Yesterday afternoon we received INS' formal response to that report. While I am not pleased with the delay, I can at least report that it appears that INS has concurred with all three recommendations. And it may have taken action with regard to the conduct of passport checks that even exceeds the scope of our recommendation.
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That concludes my remarks. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ashbaugh follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. ASHBAUGH, ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Jackson Lee, and Members of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims:
I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee to discuss the work of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) with respect to the Visa Waiver Pilot Program (VWPP). The VWPP, a joint responsibility of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the Department of State, waives visa requirements for visitors from 29 countries who travel to the United States for business or pleasure. In FY 1997, 14.5 million visitors entered this country under the VWPP.
The OIG examined the potential for fraud in the VWPP and assessed the INS's efforts at air ports of entry to minimize illegal immigration and national security threats posed by abuses of the VWPP. We reported our findings in an inspection report issued in March 1999. During our inspection, we focused on VWPP issues for which the INS has direct responsibility, although we recognize that issues outside of the INS's control can affect the INS's operation of the program.
My testimony today will summarize the major findings in our inspection and report on the status of the INS's efforts to implement our recommendations.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. VWPP Requirements
The VWPP was created by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 and implemented two years later. Congress created the VWPP to enhance U.S. foreign relations, to promote effective use of government resources, and—without posing a threat to the welfare or security of the United States—to facilitate international travel, thereby increasing the number of foreign visitors to this country.
Many foreign travelers who wish to enter the United States must first obtain a visa. Obtaining a visa requires that individuals submit written applications and may require interviews and background checks by U.S. Department of State personnel. These interviews and checks are designed to minimize national security threats and prevent illegal immigration.
In contrast, visitors traveling for business or pleasure under the VWPP do not have to obtain a visa to request entry into the United States. Instead, VWPP applicants present their passports and completed I–94Ws (Nonimmigrant Visa Waiver Arrival/Departure Forms) to INS inspectors at U.S. ports of entry. The INS inspectors observe and question the applicants, examine the passports, and conduct checks against computerized databases to make decisions on whether to allow applicants entry into the United States. This review by the INS inspectors is the principal and, in many cases, the only means of preventing illegal entry; the INS inspectors have, on average, less than one minute to check and decide on each applicant.
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Under the VWPP, visitors may remain in the United States for up to 90 days per visit but may not work while in this country. In addition, they must possess a roundtrip transportation ticket and must maintain a foreign residence. Finally, VWPP visitors waive their rights to appeal immigration officers' determinations of admissibility or contest any deportation actions.
B. Non-Immigrant Overstays
A country seeking to qualify for VWPP status must meet statutory requirements for a low refusal rate for its citizens who apply for U.S. nonimmigrant visas and it must have a machine-readable passport or be in the process of developing one.
The Secretary of State is responsible for nominating countries to the VWPP and the Attorney General is responsible for determining whether nominated countries should be allowed to participate in the program. The Attorney General must certify that a country nominated for the VWPP does not compromise the law enforcement interests of the United States, and she also must monitor the continued eligibility of VWPP countries.
The INS has several responsibilities related to the VWPP, the most important being the day-to-day operation of the program, including inspection of VWPP visitors at ports of entry. In addition, once countries become participants in the VWPP, the INS must provide the Attorney General with information regarding the countries' continuing eligibility.
However, we found that INS was unable to perform this responsibility because it could not accurately report the number of VWPP visitors who overstayed their authorized periods of admission. Consequently, the Attorney General cannot make informed decisions about countries' continued eligibility for participation in the VWPP using this overstay data.
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In a report issued in September 1997, we examined the INS's monitoring of non-immigrant overstays and assessed the Non-Immigrant Information System (NIIS)—the INS's primary data collection system for non-immigrant overstay information. What we found was disturbing.
We reported that the INS's Statistics Division began seriously questioning the quality of NIIS data in FY 1993 when overstay rates for certain classes of visitors—such as visa waiver entrants—rose significantly compared to the preceding year. This finding, coupled with unusual and unexplained fluctuations in overstay rates by class, month of admission, and country of admission, led INS to conclude that NIIS data after FY 1992 was unreliable for estimating overstay rates.
Our report also found that the INS cannot identify individuals who have overstayed their visas nor can it adequately describe the characteristics of the overstay population residing in the United States, such as countries of origin, occupations, and work sites where overstays are employed. This has significantly hindered the INS's efforts to develop an overstay enforcement plan. It also hampers Congress's ability to make informed immigration policy. Two factors contribute to these shortcomings: serious inadequacies in NIIS and a failure to tap potentially rich data developed by INS benefits and enforcement operations.
After our report was issued, the INS formed a team to develop a plan to revise, reload, and analyze NIIS data for fiscal years 1995–1997. In May 1998, INS informed us that their reexamination of the data continued to raise significant concerns about its validity. The INS did not specify what was wrong with the data. We have yet to receive formal notification of their findings, although this is an outstanding recommendation for which we expect to receive a report of corrective action. However, informal contacts with INS staff suggest that the data continues to be unreliable and therefore unusable for accurately estimating overstay rates.
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Given the unreliability of NIIS data, the INS cannot provide the Attorney General with the information she needs to certify that the countries enrolled in the VWPP are fully complying with the program's mandates. The disturbing conclusions of our 1997 report caused us to decide to dig deeper into the VWPP, which is the genesis for our 1999 report.
C. VWPP Inspection Process
To facilitate the inspection process at air ports of entry, airlines supply blank I–94Ws to all VWPP applicants en route to the United States. VWPP applicants complete and present these forms, along with their passports, for INS inspectors' review during the inspection process. The INS sends the I–94Ws to a data entry center where clerks enter selected information into NIIS, the INS database that tracks arrivals and departures of non-immigrant foreign nationals. As discussed earlier, if NIIS operated as envisioned it could provide the INS information on whether visitors are overstaying their periods of admission. However, we found during this inspection and other reviews that shortcomings with this system undermine its potential.
During the inspection process, the primary tool available to INS inspectors to prevent applicants from making fraudulent entry into the United States is the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS), which is maintained by the U.S. Customs Service (Customs) and commonly referred to as the lookout system. This computerized system allows access to various automated databases that contain records of individuals who should not be allowed entry into the United States. The INS and other federal agencies, such as Customs and the U.S. Department of State, have access to and can enter data into this lookout system.
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During primary inspection, an INS inspector examines the applicant's passport and checks the applicant against the IBIS lookout system. If the visitor's passport is machine-readable, the INS inspector scans it into a reader and the applicant's first name, last name, date of birth, and passport number are electronically checked against the lookout system. When a passenger does not have a machine-readable passport, the INS inspector types in the applicant's first name, last name, and date of birth—the only elements the INS requires be checked during primary inspection—and this biographical information is checked against the lookout system. INS inspectors told our inspection team that they manually enter an applicant's passport number that is not machine-readable only if they are suspicious of the applicant.
II. FINDINGS
A. Threat From Passport Theft and Alteration
We found that as the VWPP has grown, so has the potential for its abuse. Because a passport is the only document required for a VWPP applicant to enter the United States, passports from VWPP countries are in high demand on the black market. For example, the INS reported that the price of Slovenian passports increased tenfold on the black market when Slovenia joined the VWPP in September 1997.
We found that the theft of passports, especially blank passports, is a serious problem associated with the VWPP. According to the INS, few countries reported significant problems with thefts of passports prior to implementation of the VWPP. However, at the time of our review, INS estimated that more than 100,000 blank passports from VWPP countries had been stolen in the previous few years. Of those passports, approximately 80 percent were not machine-readable, which means that they would not have been checked automatically against the lookout system.
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In addition to stolen blank passports, altered passports and counterfeit passports are used by impostors who falsely claim to be citizens of VWPP countries. For example, we found that citizens of Poland (a non-VWPP country) have presented themselves as Germans (a VWPP country); Albanians have posed as Slovenians; Nigerians have falsely claimed to be citizens of the United Kingdom. Other impostors present genuine passports—often stolen—that belong to citizens of their own countries and attempt to pass themselves off as those individuals.
This evidence from the INS indicates that the VWPP is targeted for abuse and could pose threats to U.S. national security and increase illegal immigration. We also found evidence that a variety of groups, including terrorists, criminals, and alien smugglers, are abusing the VWPP to fraudulently enter the United States. The INS inspectors we interviewed told us that terrorists and criminals apprehended while attempting to enter the United States believed they would receive less scrutiny during the inspection process if they applied under the VWPP. Several of these terrorists and criminals had records that would have prevented them from obtaining a visa, so the VWPP provided an alternative avenue of entry into the United States. Consider the following examples:
One of the conspirators in the World Trade Center bombing entered the country on a photo-substituted Swedish passport in September 1992 (Sweden is a VWPP country). When the terrorist arrived at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City, an INS inspector suspected that his passport had been altered. A search of his luggage revealed instructional materials for making bombs; the subject was detained and sentenced to six months' imprisonment for passport fraud. In March 1994 he was convicted for his role in the World Trade Center bombing and sentenced to 240 years in prison and fined $500,000.
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Two Irish VWPP applicants attempted to pass through an INS pre-inspection facility in August 1998. INS inspectors questioned both applicants, one of whom admitted that he had served jail time for possession of explosives and had been a member of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Irish immigration authorities informed the INS that this applicant was a current member of the Real IRA—a terrorist group that has broken away from the original IRA. The INS inspectors denied admission to both applicants.
U.K. citizens traveling under the VWPP are smuggling khat, a leafy narcotic from Africa, into the United States. Drug smugglers solicit help in local pubs, finding unemployed people who need to make extra money. The ''mules'' are told that they are transporting a plant or vegetable rather than an illegal substance. When Customs officers discover the drugs hidden in luggage, they refer the passengers back to INS for removal. INS inspectors with whom we spoke identified khat smuggling as a problem related to the VWPP.
It is highly improbable that the individuals in these illustrations could have obtained a visa at a Department of State consulate.
In addition, our inspection team observed the following case during our July 1998 field visit to Honolulu International Airport. The INS intercepted a Chinese citizen seeking entry under the VWPP by posing as a Japanese citizen and presenting a Japanese passport (Japan is a VWPP; China is not). The INS inspector noted that the Japanese passport contained characteristics consistent with recent trends in altered Japanese passports. The inspector also reported that the Chinese citizen appeared nervous. A forensic check revealed that the passport had a counterfeit biographical data page and a counterfeit back cover page.
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During questioning, the Chinese citizen admitted that he was attempting to enter the United States illegally. He explained that a Japanese citizen on the flight was his escort and that a third man back in China had provided the escort and arranged his travel. The man in China had instructed the Chinese citizen to pay the escort $1,000 when they arrived in Honolulu; the Chinese citizen's family would then pay the man in China $10,000 when he successfully entered the United States.
B. Lookout System Not Queried for all VWPP Applicants
The IBIS lookout system is the INS's principal tool for helping inspectors identify aliens attempting to enter the United States illegally. As I mentioned previously, if VWPP applicants present passports that are not machine-readable, INS inspectors are required to manually enter applicants' names and dates of birth—but not passport numbers—and check them against the lookout system.
According to INS officials, manually entering passport numbers for all passports that are not machine-readable would hamper INS's ability to comply with the congressionally mandated requirement to inspect all passengers within 45 minutes of a flight's arrival. Depending on the volume of applicants at a port of entry, INS inspectors may have to perform quick, rather than thorough, inspections. INS inspectors told the OIG that they manually enter passport numbers only if they are suspicious of an applicant. Therefore, the full benefit of the lookout system is lost for many VWPP applicants whose passports are not machine-readable.
As part of our inspection, we selected a sample of stolen blank passport numbers from 10 VWPP countries and queried them against NIIS records to determine whether aliens had used these passports to enter the United States illegally. While fraudulent entry can be achieved using a variety of methods, we limited our test to stolen blank passports because it was possible to compile a list from which to draw a statistically valid sample.
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From our sample of 1,067 blank passports reported stolen from VWPP countries, 40 passports (3.7 percent) had exact matches to NIIS records that showed the passports had been presented for successful entry into the United States. These 40 successful entries project to 2,350 successful entries based on our universe of 61,836 stolen blank passports.
An additional 61 passports (5.7 percent) had possible matches to NIIS records. For these 61 passports, the NIIS record listed a passport number that was slightly different than the number reported as stolen (e.g., the passport numbers in the NIIS record were missing one or more alphabetic characters). Despite the absence of an exact match, we conclude that it is likely that these cases also reflect the use of stolen passports to enter the United States under the VWPP.
C. A Case Study: Stolen Icelandic Passports
We queried all 138 stolen Icelandic passports from our sample universe because INS intelligence reports indicated that a significant number of these passports were being used by organized rings to smuggle children into the United States. We found that VWPP applicants had used 46 of these Icelandic passports to enter the United States successfully. Twenty-seven of the passports were used by more than one person (i.e., an adult traveling with one to three children). Some records indicate that the adults left a short time later but the children did not. The adults returned to the United States (sometimes at different ports of entry) with one to three additional children.
For example, NIIS records indicate that a woman accompanied by two children entered the United States via JFK Airport on July 14, 1996. NIIS records indicate she left the United States via Hartsfield International Airport in Atlanta on July 15, 1996, but the children did not. She again entered the United States through Newark International Airport on October 13, 1996, accompanied by two children. She left through JFK on October 15, 1996, but NIIS records indicate the children did not depart. In total, 116 VWPP applicants (adults and children) entered the United States using the 46 stolen passports.
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The passports themselves were stolen from the Icelandic Embassy in Paris, France, in March 1996. The U.S. Department of State issued a cable on May 28, 1996, reporting the theft and the INS created a lookout record for the entire block of stolen blank passports on May 30, 1996. However, the INS's efforts to prevent illegal entry using these passports proved unsuccessful. Even after creation of lookout records and issuance of an alert to INS field personnel, VWPP applicants continued to enter the United States using stolen Icelandic passports—applicants successfully used 22 additional stolen Icelandic passports to enter the United States.
The fact that Icelandic passports are not machine-readable contributes to the success of applicants presenting stolen Icelandic passports. As with all passports that are not machine-readable, it is reasonable to assume that INS inspectors will not routinely check Icelandic passport numbers against the lookout system. Because the lookout record for these (and other) stolen blank passports is based on the passport numbers, INS inspectors will not get a match to a stolen passport record when they enter only applicants' names and dates of birth.
D. Problems with Entry of Data on Stolen Passports
Even if INS checked all passport numbers against the lookout system, the effectiveness of the checks is reduced by problems we identified in the INS's entry of stolen VWPP passport information into the IBIS database. We found that VWPP applicants using stolen passports have entered the United States without being intercepted because INS did not systematically collect information on all stolen passports and did not create lookout records based on the information that it did receive. We also found problems with the timeliness and accuracy of the lookout records that the INS did create.
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We found that no single entity within the INS is responsible for the collection of information on stolen passports. While the INS Forensic Document Lab (FDL) receives cables and faxes from foreign governments and the Department of State about stolen passports, the INS LookOut Unit and various ports of entry also receive reports from the Department of State and INS headquarters. We could find no policies instructing these INS components to systematically obtain information on stolen passports from outside sources. A limited review of reports of stolen passports received over a nine-month period at the LookOut Unit and the FDL showed only one block of stolen passports that was reported to both offices. This suggests poor coordination among the various INS entities receiving stolen passport information.
Similarly, we found that no single office within INS was responsible for systematically entering stolen passport numbers into the lookout system. Personnel at the LookOut Unit, the FDL, and ports of entry were all creating lookout records. The result of so many different people entering lookout records is predictable—of the 500 stolen blank passports from our case sample of 1,067 that had lookout records, 202 passports (40.4 percent) had more than one lookout record. Without delegating the responsibility for creating lookout records to a single entity, duplication of effort among the various offices is inevitable.
We found that the remaining 567 stolen passports in our sample (53.1 percent) had no lookout record. In one case, a Dutch passport was stolen in August 1990. The FDL received information about the theft in December 1990. No lookout record was created at the time, and a Chinese alien used this passport to enter the United States in September 1993. Using the same stolen passport, the alien attempted another entry at a different port in March 1996. Although the alien was refused entry on this second attempt, his prior entry could have been prevented had INS created a lookout record. The stolen passport was finally entered into the lookout system by the INS more than five years after INS was alerted to the theft.
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The INS inspectors we interviewed did not know who was responsible for entering stolen passports into the lookout system. Some suggested that the FDL should be responsible for entering this information because it already has contacts with foreign agencies and already receives much of the information on stolen passports. Others suggested that the LookOut Unit should be responsible. While there was no consensus for who should have this responsibility, there was support from the INS inspectors we interviewed that the process should be centralized at INS Headquarters.
Finally, passport numbers may contain both numeric and alphabetic characters; alphabetic characters may occur at the beginning, the end, or in the middle of a passport number. Because the lookout system searches for exact matches, the correct placement of these alpha characters is crucial to searching for stolen passport numbers. Of the 500 stolen passports in our sample that had lookout records, 112 (22.4 percent) had discrepancies between the placement of the alpha characters in the actual passport number and the way it appeared in the lookout record. Consequently, if an INS inspector queried the lookout database using accurate passport numbers, there would be no match and it is likely that INS inspectors would admit the individual.
E. Derivative Citizenship
In addition to fraudulent use of VWPP passports, INS Inspectors we interviewed described ''derivative citizenship'' as a potential source of abuse in the VWPP. Some countries automatically bestow derivative citizenship on children and grandchildren of citizens irrespective of where the children or grandchildren were born or reside. The INS officials specifically noted that Brazilians who have Italian parents or grandparents often obtain Italian passports. Therefore, these citizens and residents of Brazil (not a VWPP country) can enter the United States using passports from Italy (a VWPP country).
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Derivative citizenship was described by some INS inspectors as a loophole and an unintended consequence of the VWPP. Using a VWPP passport obtained through derivative citizenship—rather than a passport from their country of residence—allows aliens who are not eligible for a U.S. visa because of economic reasons or a criminal history to circumvent the visa process and enter the United States under the VWPP. INS regulations require that a VWPP applicant must be a citizen of a VWPP country; however, the regulations do not include residency requirements.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The VWPP clearly expedites the entry of legal visitors to the United States, as intended. However, we found that the VWPP provides an avenue for terrorists, criminals, and other inadmissible applicants to enter the United States by removing the requirement that they first obtain visas.
We realize that some issues related to the VWPP are beyond the INS's control, such as the Department of State's ability to nominate countries for the VWPP, participating countries' passport issuing processes, and participating countries' reporting of stolen passports. In particular, we note that the law, as revised, states that ''[t]he government of the [VWPP] country certifies that it has or is in the process of developing a program to issue machine-readable passports to its citizens.'' No time frame is specified for actually developing a machine-readable passport. At the time of our review, six countries had been in the process of developing a machine-readable passport for more than seven years.
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Nonetheless, in the context of its role of administering the VWPP, the INS has clear responsibilities that it must meet. Our inspection found several areas in which INS's efforts to address the risks posed by abuse of the VWPP were insufficient. Our March 1999 inspection report made three recommendations:
The INS should modify its primary inspection policy to ensure that the passport numbers of all VWPP applicants are queried against the lookout system;
the INS should designate a unit to systematically collect information on stolen blank VWPP passports and to ensure timely entry of stolen passport numbers into the lookout system; and
the INS should develop guidelines for the entry of passport numbers when creating lookout records.
The INS concurred or concurred in part with all three of our recommendations and proposed corrective actions for each.
With respect to our first recommendation, the INS said that it planned to send guidance to the field by the end of the Fiscal Year 1999 that will direct INS inspectors to search all VWPP applicants' passport numbers in the lookout system, even those that are not machine-readable. As of the date of this hearing, we have not received formal notification that such guidance has been disseminated, although INS officials informed us that a memorandum to that effect was distributed to the field on October 4, 1999. We received this week an unofficial, draft copy of the INS's follow-up response to our inspection report together with a copy of the memorandum sent to the field. We are in the process of determining how the INS' actions respond to our three recommendations.
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The INS agreed with our second recommendation to designate a unit to systematically collect information on stolen blank VWPP passports and ensure timely and accurate entry of stolen passport numbers into the lookout system. INS Headquarters officials planned to meet with staff from its Inspections Branch, Office of Intelligence, and LookOut Unit to determine the most effective method to complete this task, which it expected to implement by the end of FY 1999. To date, we have not received confirmation of INS action in this regard.
Finally, the INS agreed with our third recommendation to develop clear guidelines for the entry of passport numbers when creating lookout records. The INS said that such guidelines would be developed and implemented in conjunction with its designation of a unit to systematically collect and enter information on stolen, blank passports into the lookout system. Similarly, we have not received official confirmation that such guidelines have been developed or implemented.
This concludes my prepared remarks, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to answer any questions you or members of the subcommittee might have.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Ashbaugh.
Ambassador Ryan?
STATEMENT OF MARY A. RYAN, AMBASSADOR, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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Ms. RYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Frank, I am honored to appear before you to offer the views of the State Department on the nonimmigrant visa waiver program, or the VWPP. This highly successful program is now more than 11 years old, and it has provided all the benefits that I believe the Congress intended.
I last appeared before this committee in support of the visa waiver program in June 1997. What I said then to you is just as true today. The VWPP provides increased travel, tourism and business for American economy, enhanced foreign relations with participating countries, and greater efficiency and productivity for the Department of State.
Importantly, all of these benefits have been gained without sacrificing the integrity of our borders. Mr. Chairman, in 1998, the travel and tourism industry was once again the Nation's leading services export. According to travel industry data, 46.4 million foreign visitors to the United States generated $91.3 billion in direct expenditures and contributed $18.7 billion to the industry's trade surplus that year.
These visitors directly sustained 1 million jobs for working Americans, and indirectly supported millions more. Eighty-eight percent of all overseas arrivals from the top 10 inbound markets in 1998 were from countries in the visa waiver program.
The most recent statistics from the Immigration and Naturalization Service reflect that more than 17 million foreign nationals entered under the VWPP, accounting for 55 percent of all business and pleasure travelers. In addition to stimulating tourism and commerce, the integrity of the nonimmigrant visa issuance system has been greatly enhanced by our ability to redirect resources and to better equip and to train our personnel.
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Mr. Chairman, while it is true that the visa waiver program has stimulated tourism and business travel to the United States, I am also pleased to report that the security of our borders has been maintained. The established criteria for admission of countries protects our borders by giving all relevant agencies a voice in the nominating process.
A waiver applicant seeking entry at our border is checked through the INS lookout system just as a visa applicant is checked through the Department's lookout system. And the VWPP has permitted the State Department to reallocate much-needed resources to countries with a high incidence of fraud.
If the program were to end, its benefits to the American people and to the American economy would be lost, and the cost of reallocating State Department personnel and resources to visa waiver countries would be very high. Since my prior testimony, the Department of State and the Department of Justice have greatly improved the selection process for participation in the waiver program.
In September 1997, we adopted an interagency protocol which established procedures and standards for nomination, review and approval. Under the protocol, several actions must be taken before a country is selected. There is a 90 day advance notification period, and a review by all elements of the Department of Justice, including the FBI, the INS and other interested offices.
Following formal nomination, an interagency team conducts an on-site visit to the country. The team prepares a report which is used by the interagency group to make its recommendations to the Attorney General. The new protocol was tested with the latest round of nominations, and we believe it worked well. Still, we recognize that as with all programs of this size and importance, not all aspects have worked exactly as we would have wished. The machine readable passport requirement is one such matter.
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To be considered for participation, waiver countries must have or agree to establish a machine readable passport program. The vast majority have complied. Four countries have not yet complied, but I am pleased to report to you that all of them have given us timelines for the development of the machine readable passport. Two, Portugal and Liechtenstein, will begin issuing machine readable passports by this coming summer, summer 2000, Belgium by early 2001 and Switzerland, the last country, by 2003.
We understand that there may be concern over the possibility that a participating country might suddenly undergo a destabilizing event that could raise questions about its continuation in the program. We are certain that reasonable approaches can be found to deal with such a situation, and we look forward to working with our interagency colleagues and with your committee in this regard.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, given the importance of this program and the very brief time before its current extension expires, I would ask that you not delay its renewal. Even a short delay will have terrible consequences for U.S. business and the travel and tourism industry, as well as for our embassies and consulates, which would have to respond very quickly to high impact changes in how we do our business. And of course, the Department of State would have to have the assistance of the Congress to get the additional resources necessary to address the logistical and financial ramifications of a sudden reimposition of a wide-scale nonimmigrant visa requirement.
This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before your committee. I will be happy to answer any questions you might have.
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[The prepared statement of Ambassador Ryan follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARY A. RYAN, AMBASSADOR, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to give the views of the Department of State on the nonimmigrant visa waiver program. Although still officially designated as a ''pilot,'' the program is more than eleven years old. During that time it has provided all of the benefits I believe Congress intended: increased travel, tourism, and business for the American economy; enhanced relations with participating countries; and greater efficiency and productivity for the Department.
Mr. Chairman, in 1998 the travel and tourism industry was once again the nation's leading services export. According to travel industry data, 46.4 million foreign visitors to the United States generated $91.3 billion in direct expenditures and contributed $18.7 billion to the industry's trade surplus that year. These visitors directly sustained one million jobs for working Americans and indirectly supported millions more. Eighty-eight per cent of all overseas arrivals from the top ten inbound markets in 1998 were from countries in the visa waiver program. The most recent statistics from the Immigration and Naturalization Service reflect that 17 million foreign nationals entered under the VWPP, accounting for 55 per cent of all business and pleasure travelers. In addition to stimulating tourism and commerce, the waiver program has allowed the Department of State to deploy scarce resources much more efficiently. The integrity of the nonimmigrant visa issuance system has been greatly enhanced by our ability to re-direct those resources to better equip and train our personnel.
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While recognizing that some adjustments may be desirable, the overall view of the Department of State is that this program has been and will continue to be an enormous success. Therefore, I would ask that you give serious consideration to renewing this program for multiple years, or even making this extremely beneficial program a permanent part of our immigration system.
The waiver program, known officially as the ''Visa Waiver Pilot Program (VWPP),'' was enacted into law in 1986. In 1988, the United Kingdom and Japan became the first participants following certification to the Congress by the Attorney General that the prerequisite automated data arrival and departure system was operational and that a visa waiver information form had been produced. On the basis of several periodic renewals and some modifications, the original three-year program has been in effect ever since. Although Congress originally limited the program to eight countries, it eventually lifted that cap and twenty-nine nations are now included. Greece's anticipated eventual participation would bring the total to 30.
When I appeared before you in June 1997, I spoke of the positive aspects of the program and why I believed it deserved your continued support. I described how the waiver of the visa requirement had stimulated tourism and business travel to the United States, thereby creating thousands of new jobs. I emphasized how the criteria for admission of countries into the program insured the security of our borders by giving all relevant agencies a voice in the nominating process. I spoke of the fact that the waiver program had enabled the Department of State to reallocate scarce resources from low-fraud visa waiver countries to countries with high-volume and a high incidence of fraud, thus helping to insure greater protection for our borders. I informed the Committee that a waiver applicant seeking entry at our border is checked through the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) lookout system, just as a visa applicant is checked through the Department's lookout system, and that a waiver applicant is subject to the same rules for exclusion as any visa applicant. I also informed you that the data-sharing efforts of the Department and the INS allowed access to each other's records for this purpose, and we continue to pursue ways to further enhance our data-sharing efforts. Finally, I advised you that, were the program to end, not only would business and tourism suffer, but the cost of reallocating State Department personnel and resources to visa waiver countries would be very high. Mr. Chairman, it is the opinion of the Department of State that what I described to you in 1997 is just as true today, and more so.
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I say ''more so'' because since I last spoke to you, three new countries, Uruguay, Singapore, and Portugal, have been designated as visa waiver countries, and Greece has been informed that upon fulfillment of specified conditions, it will be designated, also. Experience teaches us that the beneficial impact from these new participants in additional tourism and business and associated savings to the government will be considerable. As I've previously mentioned, the business generated by foreign visitors who enter the U.S. under the VWPP is a major contributing factor to the current account surplus enjoyed by the U.S. in the travel and tourism sector. Not only would these economic benefits be lost if the program were to end, but current estimates are that the cost to the U.S. Government to re-establish operations in waiver countries would exceed $130 million.
Further, since 1997, the Department of State and the Department of Justice have greatly improved the procedures under which countries are nominated and selected for participation in the waiver program. At the request of the Attorney General, who has the authority to designate new participating countries, an interagency protocol was adopted to set standards for nomination, review and selection of countries. Significantly, the Protocol calls for several actions to be taken prior to selection of a country by the Attorney General. These include a requirement for a 90-day advance notification by the Department of State to the Attorney General of intent to nominate, and a review of the proposed nomination by all interested elements of the Department of Justice. Following a formal nomination, an interagency team conducts an on-site visit to the country in question to obtain information on its immigration procedures. A trip report is prepared and used by the interagency group in making its recommendations to the Attorney General.
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The new protocol was recently tested with the round of nominations for the four countries I have previously mentioned. In general, we believe it worked well, especially under the pressure of considering four countries almost simultaneously. In any event, the joint committee that wrote and adopted the protocol continues to meet to discuss and adopt refinements to it.
Still, the Department of State recognizes that, as with virtually all other programs of this size and importance, not everything has gone precisely as we would have wished. The machine-readable passport requirement is one such matter. Countries wishing to participate in the program must have or agree to institute a machine-readable passport program. The great majority of participating countries have such a program. We have pressed the few that do not have machine-readable passports to complete their development of such programs as quickly as possible. Our most recent formal request to these few countries was made in October 1999, and this week, we have consulted again on this matter. Recently, one of the four countries has provided a timeline for issuance of machine-readable passports. We will continue to pursue this issue vigorously with the others.
We understand, too, that there may be concern over the possibility that a participating country might suddenly undergo a destabilizing occurrence that could raise questions about its continued participation in the program, regardless of the most current data on visa refusals or overstays. We are certain that reasonable approaches can be found to deal with this type of situation. We would want any solution found in this regard to take into account the logistical and financial difficulties likely to be encountered by the Department of State by a sudden re-imposition of a wide-scale visitor visa requirement. We would need the Congress's help in providing significant additional resources on an urgent basis to re-staff and re-configure our consular sections if a country were suddenly removed from the visa waiver program.
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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, we would be more than happy to discuss the matters I have raised or any others concerning the visa waiver program at your convenience. However, given the obvious importance and success of the program and the very brief time left before its current extension expires, I would ask that you not delay its renewal. To reiterate what I said at the outset of my remarks, the visa waiver program has been a resounding success for more than a decade and, I believe it is deserving of continuation.
This concludes my statement. Again, thank you for this opportunity to present our views to you. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Ambassador Ryan.
Mr. Cronin?
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL CRONIN, ACTING ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER FOR OFFICE OF PROGRAMS, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
Mr. CRONIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Frank.
As Mr. Ashbaugh and Ambassador Ryan have noted, the visa waiver pilot program has grown significantly since its inception in 1988. It has made it easier to travel to the United States. It is proven extremely popular, both with nationals of the waiver countries as well as with travel and tourism interests.
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The program has, however, produced new challenges for the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Although the program has indeed significantly reduced consular workload and facilitated travel for the United States, it has increased the burden placed on our inspectors at ports of entry. Since I last testified on the program in June 1997, and in concert with the recommendations made by Mr. Ashbaugh's office, we have improved our lost and stolen passport recording system. We have also expanded our port of entry lookout queries in an effort to intercept more passengers traveling on fraudulent passports.
Notwithstanding such improvements, the visa waiver pilot program remains attractive to prospective illegal entrants for the same reasons it is for the legitimate traveler. Application for admission into the U.S. under the visa waiver pilot program can be made with nothing more than a passport. There is no need for a visa or the consular screening that would accompany visa issuance.
Consequently, fraudulent document vendors and alien smugglers have targeted the passports of visa waiver countries. As the Department of State has increased the fraud resistance of the U.S. nonimmigrant visa, so too has the attractiveness of using a visa waiver country passport increased for third country nationals seeking illegal entry into the United States.
The attraction of smugglers, document vendors and illegal immigrants to visa waiver country passports is encouraged by several factors, including limited security features present in some passports, the existence of multiple passport issuing authorities and weak controls to protect issuance procedures in some visa waiver countries.
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In the latter case, access to blank visa waiver country passports eliminates the need to eradicate existing biographic information, thereby simplifying the document vendor's job and reducing the risk of detection. This presents serious security and law enforcement concerns.
The vast majority of visa waiver program visitors enter the United States through airports. Between 1992 and 1999, while international airport traffic increased by 43 percent, and INS staffing by 45 percent, the number of our enforcement actions at airports increased by 135 percent.
By comparison, land border traffic is up 4 percent, staffing is up 74 percent, and enforcement is up 46 percent over the same period. While we don't suggest a direct causal relationship between the VWPP and the increase in enforcement statistics, we do believe it is one factor that plays into that.
Let me take a moment to update you on what we have been doing to address the issue of overstays. When I last testified before this subcommittee, I stated that we hoped to implement improvements to the nonimmigrant information system, or NIIS, to capture nonimmigrant overstay numbers. I sincerely regret to important that tracking nonimmigrant overstays has continued to pose difficulties.
Since 1997, we have taken significant steps to improve NIIS, including the establishment of an oversight and maintenance group. We have produced an informational booklet for carriers that stresses the importance of completing arrival and departure forms and forwarding them to INS. Additionally, we have been working with our data entry contractors to reduce the number of data entry errors. However, to now, these measure have not proven sufficient to generate statistically valid overstay data.
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We are therefore continuing our efforts to deploy a new system, the arrival departure information system, or ADIS, to address the challenge of matching arrival and departure records. Since 1997, we have been field testing an automated I–94 system that will capture data for use in ADIS. Between May 1997 and December 1999, we collected nearly 205,000 automated form I–94 departure records at the four participating U.S. airports. Of those records we matched 99.1 percent of the automated departure records collected to the corresponding arrival records, of which 90 percent were entering under the visa waiver pilot program.
We anticipate that the collection of reliable complete arrival and departure data will become increasingly possible as this system expands and as we gain the cooperation and participation of airlines.
Mr. Chairman, the INS supports a renewal of the visa waiver pilot program, but remains committed to finding ways to improve the program that build upon the lessons learned from the current pilot program. We believe that working together, action can be taken to address weaknesses in the pending processes, such as foreign travel document security, and in our own border security activities, including ports of entry, to ensure the integrity of this program.
We will continue to work closely with the Executive Office of National Security and the Department of State to improve the overall functioning of the visa waiver pilot program.
This concludes my testimony. Thank you again for the opportunity to be here, and I will be happy to respond to any questions.
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Cronin follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL CRONIN, ACTING ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER FOR OFFICE OF PROGRAMS, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee. I welcome the opportunity to testify on the Visa Waiver Pilot Program.
DEVELOPMENT AND EXPANSION OF THE VISA WAIVER PILOT PROGRAM
In 1986, Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) incorporated the Visa Waiver Pilot Program into the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Program's purpose was twofold: (1) to facilitate low-risk travel to the United States and (2) to allow the Secretary of State to conserve and reallocate consular resources. Prior to implementation, the statute required the Attorney General to develop an automated system that would properly track the arrival and departure of nonimmigrants.
Under the current Program, visitors for pleasure or business from countries designated by the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of State, who meet the express statutory criteria, may enter the United States without a visa for a period of ninety days. They are required to waive in writing any right to review of an immigration officer's determination that they are inadmissible or removable from the United States. They may only contest removal on the basis of either an application for asylum or an application for withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. They are also required, if arriving by air or sea, to travel on a transportation line that is signatory to an agreement with the Immigration and Naturalization Service permitting the line to transport passengers under the Program, and they are required to possess a round-trip or onward ticket.
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The four criteria for inclusion of countries in the Program are
(1) that they offer reciprocal privileges to United States citizens;
(2) that they have had a nonimmigrant visa refusal rate of less than 3 percent for the previous year;
(3) that they certify that they issue, or are in the process of developing, a machine-readable passport; and
(4) that the Attorney General makes a determination that inclusion of the country in the Program does not pose a law enforcement risk to the United States.
The Act further provides that the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may refrain from including any country in the Program or remove a country for any reason, including national security.
Applicants for admission under the Program must complete a form I–94W, answering questions regarding their admissibility to the United States and executing the waiver noted above. Immigration officers, who are aware that these individuals have not been screened through a visa process, must examine them. Officers check the names and passport numbers of these applicants against the lookout database. Officers may also open and pursue any appropriate line of inquiry to make a determination concerning the individual's admissibility.
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Between 1988 and 2000, the Program grew from 1 to 29 participating countries. In fiscal year 1998, there were over 17 million arrivals under the Program.
THE EXISTING PROGRAM
The Visa Waiver Pilot Program has grown tremendously and has proven extremely popular with nationals of visa waiver countries and with the travel and tourism industry. The Program has made it easier to travel to the United States. The Program has also produced new challenges for the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Although the Program has significantly reduced consular workload and facilitated travel to the United States, it has increased the burden placed on inspectors at the ports-of-entry.
Since I last testified on the Program in June 1997, we have improved our lost and stolen passport recording system. We have also expanded our port-of-entry lookout queries in an effort to intercept more passengers traveling on fraudulent passports. Notwithstanding such improvements, the Visa Waiver Pilot Program is attractive to prospective illegal entrants for the same reasons it is for the legitimate traveler. This is a matter of some concern.
Application for admission into the United States under the Visa Waiver Pilot Program can be made with nothing more than a passport; there is no need for a visa or the consular screening that would accompany visa issuance. Consequently, fraudulent document vendors and alien smugglers have targeted the passports of visa waiver countries. As the Department of State has increased the fraud resistance of the U.S. nonimmigrant visa, so too has the attractiveness of using a visa waiver country passport increased for third country nationals seeking illegal entry into the United States.
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The attraction of smugglers, document vendors, and illegal immigrants to visa waiver country passports is encouraged by several factors, including limited security features present in some passports, the existence of multiple passport-issuing authorities, and weak controls to protect issuance procedures in some visa waiver countries. In the latter case, access to blank visa waiver country passports eliminates the need to eradicate existing biographic information, thereby simplifying the document vendor's job and reducing the risk of detection. This presents serious security and law enforcement concerns.
The vast majority of visa waiver program visitors enter the United States through airports. Between 1992 and 1999, while international airport traffic increased by 43 percent and staffing by 45 percent, the number of our enforcement actions increased by 135 percent. By comparison, land border traffic is up 4 percent, staffing up 74 percent, and enforcement up 46 percent over the same period.
Let me take a moment to update you on what we have been doing to address the issue of overstays. When I last testified before this subcommittee, I stated that we hoped to implement improvements to the Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS) to capture nonimmigrant overstay numbers. I regret to report that tracking nonimmigrant overstays has continued to pose difficulties. Since 1997, we have taken significant steps to improve NIIS, including the establishment of an oversight and maintenance group. We also produced an informational booklet for carriers that stresses the importance of completing arrival and departure forms and forwarding them to INS. Additionally, we have been working with our contractors to reduce the number of data-entry errors. However, these measures have not proven sufficient to generate statistically valid overstay data.
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We are therefore continuing our efforts to deploy a new system, the Arrival Departure Information System (ADIS), to address the challenge of matching arrival and departure records. Since 1997, we have been field-testing an Automated I–94 System that will capture data for use in ADIS. Between May 1997 and December 1999, we collected 204,631 automated Form I–94 departure records at the four participating U.S. airports. Of those records, we matched 99.1 percent of the automated departure records collected to the corresponding arrival records, of which ninety percent were entering under the Visa Waiver Pilot Program. We anticipate that the collection of reliable, complete arrival/departure data will become increasingly possible as this system expands and as we gain the cooperation and participation of airlines.
Mr. Chairman, the INS supports a renewal of the Visa Waiver Pilot Program, but remains committed to finding ways to improve the program that build upon the lessons learned from the current pilot program. I have described some of the challenges we have encountered and identified several critical issues that require our vigilant attention to ensure a program that safeguards both the security and economic interests of the United States. The suggested standards I have presented address what we regard as our most pressing law enforcement concerns. I have also presented objective criteria that we believe would enable us to more effectively calculate the risks associated with the participation of individual countries. We believe that, working together, action can be taken to address weaknesses in dependent processes such as foreign travel document security and in our own border security activities including ports of entry, to ensure the integrity of this program. We will continue to work closely with the Executive Office of National Security and the Department of State to improve the overall function of the Visa Waiver Pilot Program.
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This concludes my testimony and I will be happy to respond to any questions.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Cronin.
Ms. Liang?
STATEMENT OF ELISA LIANG, ASSOCIATE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Ms. LIANG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Frank.
It is a pleasure to appear before this subcommittee today. My remarks today will be focused on describing the process that the Departments of Justice and State have developed to implement the visa waiver pilot program.
As you know, section 217 of the Immigration and Nationality Act is the statutory basis for the program. And it authorizes the Attorney General and the Secretary of State to establish the visa waiver pilot program under which nationals of a foreign country may visit the United States visa-free for 90 days or less, if that country meets certain objective criteria and the Attorney General determines that the participation of the country in the program will not adversely affect United States law enforcement interest.
While the legislation defines the objective criteria, it does not define those law enforcement interests. The Attorney General therefore directed the preparation of procedures to provide a methodology to evaluate countries against the objective criteria and to define and assess law enforcement criteria, thereby enabling the Attorney General and the Secretary of State to carry out more effectively their statutory responsibilities.
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Toward that end, an interagency working group comprised of representatives from various components of the Departments of State and Justice prepared an Interagency Protocol for Adjudicating VWPP Nominees. This protocol, a copy of which was previously furnished to you in anticipation of my testimony today, and which is attached to this testimony, provides a road map for the nomination and approval of countries which seek to participate in the program.
As a first step in the process, the Secretary of State conducts a preliminary evaluation of a prospective nominee. The evaluation, presented in written form to the Department of Justice and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, addresses the country's visa refusal rates according to the formula provided in the statute. It also discusses the patterns of visa fraud or other abuse for the previous 5 years.
Finally, it provides a discussion of the current conditions in the country under consideration, focusing on the stability of the government and a preliminary assessment of the anticipated effect on U.S. national security of a country's participation in the program.
The Department of State conducts this evaluation based on information provided by the relevant U.S. embassies and other State Department offices that possess information which should be considered in the evaluation. It is designed to allow the Secretary of State to conduct a preliminary assessment of the country's suitability, taking into account foreign policy and other considerations.
If the evaluation suggests that the country is a good candidate, the Secretary will provide a written notice to the Deputy Attorney General and the INS Commissioner, setting forth the Secretary of State's intent formally to nominate the country for full participation in the program. Upon receipt of the notice of the Secretary's intent to nominate a country, the INS and other Department of Justice components review the Secretary's assessment to determine whether there are any law enforcement concerns that militate against the country's being nominated. This assessment is based on information that the agencies possess relating to crime patterns, visa abuse or other law enforcement information.
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If the Department of Justice does not object to the notice of intent within 90 days, the Secretary may then submit a formal nomination in writing to the Attorney General. The formal nomination triggers a more structured evaluation of the candidate country. Upon receipt of the nomination, the INS establishes an interagency team to conduct a site visit to the candidate country.
The team will be comprised of representatives of both the INS and the Department of State, as well as representatives of law enforcement agencies such as the FBI and the DEA. This team meets with appropriate embassy staff to discuss in detail the current trends in nonimmigrant and immigrant visa issuance and travel to the United States, focusing on the processing of visas, including volume of applications, refusal rates, reasons for refusal and similar concerns.
They will also discuss issues relating to document fraud, law enforcement cooperation between the nominee country and the United States, and specific conditions in the country relating to law enforcement concerns, such as alien smuggling and narcotics. Finally, the assessment team will explore the current general conditions in the country, such as the economy and demographic trends, employment or any other conditions that might have an impact on the country's stability and the existence of social unrest or the existence of separatist movements.
Consideration of these factors is necessary to assess whether conditions in the country might provide a catalyst for illegal immigration to the United States or other countries that would warrant concern that the visa waiver pilot program might be subject to future abuses.
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The assessment team will also consult with officials of the nominee country's government to discuss its programs for ensuring security of its passport and visa offices and production facilities. In addition, they will address the country's immigration laws and policies, including that country's practices concerning detention and removal of illegal aliens, as well as its overall law enforcement programs, to address narcotics, terrorism and organized criminal activities.
Among the specific issues examined are the state of law enforcement training and readiness in the areas of immigration and border control. And finally, the assessment team will actually travel to ports of entry, border control points and document production and issuance facilities to evaluate first-hand the security and integrity of the country's passport, visa and identity document process.
During this past year, as was previously mentioned, this protocol was used with the admission of Singapore, Portugal, Uruguay and Greece. And we believe that the protocol has been successfully implemented.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Liang follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF ELISA LIANG, ASSOCIATE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to appear before this Subcommittee to discuss with you the process that the Departments of Justice and State have developed to implement the Visa Waiver Pilot Program.
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As you know, section 217 of the Immigration and Nationality Act is the statutory basis for the Program. It authorizes the Attorney General and the Secretary of State to establish the Visa Waiver Pilot Program under which nationals of a foreign country may visit the United States visa-free for ninety days or less, if that country meets certain objective criteria and the Attorney General determines that the participation of the country in the Program will not adversely affect United States law enforcement interests. While the legislation defines the objective criteria, it does not define those law enforcement interests. The Attorney General therefore directed the preparation of procedures to provide a methodology to evaluate countries against the objective criteria and to define and assess law enforcement criteria, thereby enabling the Attorney General and the Secretary of State to carry out more effectively their statutory responsibilities. Toward that end, an interagency working group comprised of representatives from various components of the Departments of State and Justice prepared an ''Interagency Protocol for Adjudicating VWPP Nominees.'' This Protocol, a copy of which was previously furnished to you in anticipation of my testimony today, and which is attached to this testimony, provides a road map for the nomination and approval of countries which seek to participate in the Program.
As a first step in the process, the Secretary of State conducts a preliminary evaluation of a prospective nominee. The evaluation, presented in written form to the Department of Justice and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), addresses the country's visa refusal rates according to the formula provided in the statute. It also discusses the patterns of visa fraud or other abuse for the previous five years. Finally, it provides a discussion of the current conditions in the country under consideration, focusing on the stability of the government and a preliminary assessment of the anticipated effect on U.S. national security of a country's participation in the Program.
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The Department of State conducts this evaluation based on information provided by the relevant U.S. Embassies and other State Department offices that possess information which should be considered in the evaluation. It is designed to allow the Secretary of State to conduct a preliminary assessment of the country's suitability, taking into account foreign policy and other considerations. If the evaluation suggests that the country is a good candidate, the Secretary will provide a written notice to the Deputy Attorney General and the INS Commissioner setting forth the Secretary of State's intent formally to nominate the country for full participation in the Program.
Upon receipt of the notice of the Secretary's intent to nominate a country, the INS and other Department of Justice components review the Secretary's assessment to determine whether there are any law enforcement concerns that militate against the country's being nominated. This assessment is based on information that the agencies possess relating to crime patterns, visa abuse, or other law enforcement information. If the Department of Justice does not object to the notice of intent within ninety days, the Secretary may then submit a formal nomination in writing to the Attorney General.
The formal nomination triggers a more structured evaluation of the candidate country. Upon receipt of the nomination, the INS establishes an interagency team to conduct a site visit to the candidate country. The team will be comprised of representatives of both the INS and the Department of State, as well as representatives of law enforcement agencies such as the FBI and the DEA. This team meets with appropriate embassy staff to discuss in detail the current trends in nonimmigrant and immigrant visa issuance and travel to the United States, focusing on the processing of visas, including volume of applications, refusal rates, reasons for refusals, and similar concerns. They will also discuss issues relating to document fraud, law enforcement cooperation between the nominee country and the United States, and specific conditions in the country relating to law enforcement concerns, such as alien smuggling and narcotics. Finally, the assessment team will explore the current general conditions in the country, such as the economy and demographic trends, employment or any other conditions that might have an impact on the country's stability, and the existence of social unrest or the existence of separatist movements. Consideration of these factors is necessary to assess whether conditions in the country might provide a catalyst for illegal immigration to the United States or other countries that would warrant concern that the Visa Waiver Pilot Program might be subject to future abuses.
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The assessment team will also consult with officials of the nominee country's government to discuss its programs for ensuring security of its passport and visa offices and production facilities. In addition, they will address the country's immigration laws and policies, including that country's practices concerning detention and removal of illegal aliens, as well as its overall law enforcement programs to address narcotics, terrorism, and organized criminal activities. Among the specific issues examined are the state of law enforcement training and readiness in the areas of immigration and border control. Finally, the assessment team will actually travel to ports of entry, border control points, and document production and issuance facilities to evaluate first-hand the security and integrity of the country's passport, visa, and identity document issuance process.
The site visit by the INS-led interagency team is a time-consuming but critical step in the Protocol process. It provides an opportunity for a detailed examination of the actual conditions in the nominated country to better enable the INS and other agencies to assess whether the current conditions in the country or the law enforcement situation pose the potential for abuse of the Program such as to promote visa-free entry into the United States of persons who might threaten our law enforcement interests.
Upon the completion of the site visit, the INS produces a written evaluation of the country and a preliminary recommendation whether the Attorney General should approve the nomination. The evaluation and recommendation are sent to the Department of State, the Office of the Deputy Attorney General and other law enforcement components for their review and comment. This provides a final opportunity for the interested law enforcement components to provide an assessment of the overall law enforcement relationship between the United States and the nominee country, with the benefit, of course, of the results of the on-the-ground evaluation, and to identify any concerns that might continue to exist regarding the effect of the country's participation in the Program on U.S. law enforcement interests.
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At the conclusion of the process, the Attorney General notifies the Secretary of State of the Department of Justice's decision on the nomination. The decision could range from outright approval to disapproval, or it might be a conditional approval upon the occurrence of specified conditions.
We used this protocol for the first time last year when the Secretary of State nominated four countries—Singapore, Portugal, Uruguay, and Greece—for participation in the Program. The simultaneous evaluation of four countries was a daunting task, as you might imagine, but it provided an invaluable test for the Protocol. Each of the countries received a detailed review and analysis by the experts in both Departments, and while our interagency group is still evaluating the process we used based on the Protocol, the consensus is that the process worked as intended and served the interests of both Departments well. In the end, all four countries were admitted for participation, although conditions have been placed on Greece before full participation can become a reality.
I hope that this brief description provides a useful background against which you can exercise your oversight responsibilities concerning the Visa Waiver Pilot Program. I know that you will also be hearing today from representatives of INS and the Department of State regarding the specifics of their roles in the VWPP Protocol process, but I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have for me.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Liang.
Mr. Ashbaugh, let me address my first question to you. As we know, the INS has had since 1993, the last 7 years, to come up with a better system to collect more reliable data. They have disappointed me and not done so.
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A year ago to the month, I think, you issued a report making recommendations for how we could reduce the number of individuals who were trying to come into the country under fraudulent documents, and individuals who were from non visa waiver countries coming in on the wrong passport. As I understand it, just yesterday you got a reply back from the INS, even though your report and the recommendations had been made a year ago.
How many of those three recommendations have been complied with by the INS?
Mr. ASHBAUGH. I should say this, INS had given us a draft response some time ago, but for reasons that were never apparent, was not able to generate the definitive statement on what they were going to do until very recently.
However, that statement appears to comply with and in one case exceed the recommendations that we made in the report.
Mr. SMITH. All three recommendations?
Mr. ASHBAUGH. Yes.
Mr. SMITH. Okay.
Mr. ASHBAUGH. We only got it yesterday in its final form, so I reserve a slight judgment until we have had a chance to examine it more carefully. But that is our preliminary read on it.
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Mr. SMITH. Okay. Good.
Ambassador Ryan, you mentioned in your testimony that a couple of countries, 11, 12 years after the year that they were admitted into the visa waiver program, still do not have machine readable passports. Why has it taken them such a long time to comply?
Ms. RYAN. I can't answer that, Mr. Chairman, I really don't know why it has taken them so long. I think one of the reasons is that there was no date certain by which they had to do it.
Mr. SMITH. And that brings up my next question. In your testimony 2 years ago before this subcommittee, you favored a date certain. Would you still favor a date certain?
Ms. RYAN. I still favor a date certain, yes, sir.
Mr. SMITH. How many years after a country is admitted?
Ms. RYAN. Frankly, I think if we are going to admit new countries, they ought to have machine readable passports before they are admitted. If for whatever reason we want to admit a country that doesn't have a machine readable passport, I think they ought to have it within 1 year of admission to the program.
Mr. SMITH. Okay, good. Thank you for that response.
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Mr. Cronin, you said that the INS still considers its data regarding overstays to be unreliable. Why is that?
Mr. CRONIN. Essentially, our statisticians are unable to make projections of estimated overstay rates from the data. As I understand it, Mr. Chairman, what they have found is that the data base itself is unstable, there are fluctuations in the data. This is the same situation we reported when we testified previously.
We have taken a number of steps to attempt to rectify those situations.
Mr. SMITH. When do you expect to, I mean, how much does it take to get the airlines to give you records and you to collate the records?
Mr. CRONIN. Actually, as I indicated in the testimony, Mr. Chairman, we are much more hopeful about the successor system providing better data. The system that exists right now, NIIS, came up in 1983. In 1996, we did a complete revamping of the system, including a new systems architecture, new programming language which actually caused more problems than it solved.
We went back in subsequent to that to attempt to rectify those problems. We thought we would have good data to report by this year. And yet our statisticians still say they can't use the data we have given them.
Mr. SMITH. So it took six or 7 years to figure out the first program wasn't going to work and now you are coming up with a new program?
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Mr. CRONIN. Basically the 1996 refresh was designed to basically update the system, because it was old code language, and the system had been in existence for over 10 years at that point. As I say, the attempt to change the architecture was problematical in terms of some of the errors that it caused.
Mr. SMITH. And when do you expect to have a fully automated system?
Mr. CRONIN. All the major ports of entry, the hardware's been delivered to all the major points of entry, to bring up the automated I–94 system. The task that remains is basically training, implementation and installation of that hardware at the points of entry. We estimate at this point 2002, mid–2002, to have that system up.
Mr. SMITH. Okay, thank you, Mr. Cronin.
Ms. Liang, I don't mean to slight you, but you actually answered my two questions during your opening statement.
So that concludes my questions, and I will recognize Mr. Frank for his questions.
Mr. FRANK. Thank you.
I want to get to the overstays, because I have stressed to the community groups I work with that we really ought to make clear to people that overstays are the things that will kill this program and they have to discourage people and they have to be cooperative.
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I guess I am a little puzzled as to why it is so hard. I guess I don't have any first-hand experience, I have never been a foreigner leaving America. When people who are here as nonimmigrant tourists leave the country, do we know that? Don't they sign something?
Mr. CRONIN. Actually, in most cases we do. I mean, the persons who are actually documented.
Mr. FRANK. That is who I am talking about. There aren't that many undocumented people coming out with a visa.
Mr. CRONIN. By that I mean persons whose entry is documented with an arrival-departure card, which is not all nonimmigrants, but the persons who are documented are supposed to surrender that card when they depart the United States. Those documents are batched, sent to a data entry contractor, and the arrival and departure records are supposed to be matched.
Mr. FRANK. And why is that so hard?
Mr. CRONIN. Basically about 80 percent of records are in fact matched. But we lose about 20 percent.
Mr. FRANK. How do you lose them?
Mr. CRONIN. In various ways. There is really no good collection mechanism for persons who depart across the land border, cross the border into Mexico. Persons who depart——
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Mr. FRANK. But I would think for many of the visa waiver countries, I mean, the number of people going back to Liechtenstein by way of Mexico is probably not huge.
Mr. CRONIN. Actually, there is a fair number, Congressman. That is something we encountered very early on in the implementation of the program, was that folks who enter under the visa waiver program do in fact depart to Canada and Mexico. We had to amend the regulations to accommodate that.
Mr. FRANK. So you have got 80 percent though, you say?
Mr. CRONIN. Right.
Mr. FRANK. Well, with that 80 percent, shouldn't you be able to be pretty——
Mr. CRONIN. As I indicate——
Mr. FRANK. Well, who collects these cards?
Mr. CRONIN. At the airports, just the airlines. Anybody who has that card in their passport that is departing from the U.S., the airline collects a report on that.
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Mr. FRANK. So there is no official, no government agent?
Mr. CRONIN. No.
Mr. FRANK. And the airlines give you those, or what?
Mr. CRONIN. They are given to INS at that airport.
Mr. FRANK. And the problem is the airlines don't get them to you enough, or what?
Mr. CRONIN. That may be one of the problems. That is one of the things we are working on. We think that is part of it, that they are missing the collection of these things. You also have persons departing by private air or private vessel that could cause part of the problem. And again——
Mr. FRANK. The point is, it would seem to me that wouldn't be the bulk of it?
Mr. CRONIN. No.
Mr. FRANK. And you ought to be able to—well, I am just unpersuaded that this should be that hard, and I think we ought be able to kind of insist that the airlines do this. I mean, they manage to collect what they need. So why can't they collect what we need. I think you have just got to be tougher with them.
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The other thing I would want to stress, because we should be very clear, this is not a one way street. This is not some enormous favor America does to foreigners without compensation. How many Americans benefit from this program? Have we got numbers on that?
Mr. CRONIN. A lot of the countries—Ambassador Ryan may be better placed to answer that—a lot of the countries in the program had previously permitted visa-free travel by U.S. citizens. Japan had to amend their statutes, there may have been a few others.
Mr. FRANK. Because I know we now insisted on reciprocity, that was one of the issues that we confronted with regard to Portugal, because of that agreement that made it hard. But now, anybody who gets into this program has to be reciprocating for the United States. And I would be interested in how many of these countries, in how many of these visa waiver countries would Americans face a visa problem if we didn't have this? I think it is important for us when we are making public policy.
Ms. RYAN. If I might, Congressman, try to answer that. I think that if the visa waiver pilot program disappeared, was not reauthorized, that I would bet most countries would impose on us a visa requirement for our citizens. And most Americans I think who travel abroad for pleasure and for business go to the countries that are currently in the visa waiver program.
Mr. FRANK. So this is a program that is of large benefit to Americans, as well as to foreigners, over and above the tourism industry?
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Ms. RYAN. The ease of travel, yes, indeed.
Mr. FRANK. Because it is a very significant thing. And by the way, it is going to benefit the Members of Congress, because we don't have people calling us up saying, oh, geez, I am going to so and so, and I forgot to get a visa, and I am leaving in 3 hours, can you call the Ambassador and fix me up. The fewer countries with which we have to do that, the better my staff likes it, to be honest.
Ms. RYAN. I certainly agree with you, sir.
Mr. FRANK. I would ask, when you submit some data on this, if you would give us some estimate of that. Because again, I think it is important that we not allow this to look as if it is a unilateral favor America does. And a lot of Americans travel, and travel, as you said, to these countries. Any of us who travel understand that not having to get a visa is a significant advantage, and it facilitates, it is a great convenience to Americans, without, if we didn't have this program, we wouldn't have that.
That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Just to reiterate, I hope we will move on this quickly. And I would just have one suggested amendment. How long have we had this program, 11 years, you said?
Ms. RYAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. FRANK. I think it is time to drop the pilot modifier, and just call it the visa waiver program. I think we are beyond the pilot stage. And obviously, we want to cooperate in making it better. But on the whole, it seems to me to be a fairly successful program with mutual benefits and I hope we continue it very soon.
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Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Frank. I just have a couple more questions, Mr. Cronin and Ms. Liang. What steps can we take to encourage airlines to comply with the program? What sanctions, if necessary, should we impose?
Mr. CRONIN. INS already has authority under section 231 of the Act, Congressman, to actually impose fines for failure to deliver departure cards. We are working with the airlines in terms of educating them on their requirements and——
Mr. FRANK. Have you fined anybody yet?
Mr. CRONIN. I am not sure, Congressman. The regulation is not final.
Mr. SMITH. After how many years, the regulations are not final?
Mr. CRONIN. It was actually a result of the 1996 report that we started looking at it.
Mr. SMITH. Okay, 4 years. Four years. Okay, thank you, Mr. Cronin.
Ms. Liang, any comments?
Ms. LIANG. Well, this is an issue that we know INS is looking at and they have been working on. They have a proposal that we hope will address the problem in the regulation.
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Mr. SMITH. Okay. And which have not yet been written?
Mr. CRONIN. The reg is written.
Ms. LIANG. It is a draft, but it is not implemented.
Mr. SMITH. Not implemented. Okay. Any idea when, the obvious question is when they are going to be implemented?
Mr. CRONIN. It is in clearance in INS now, the final reg.
Mr. SMITH. Being cleared now.
Mr. CRONIN. It is in clearance now, in the clearance process.
Mr. SMITH. And what is the maximum number of years it might remain in clearance? [Laughter.]
Mr. CRONIN. I would anticipate no more than a couple of months, Congressman.
Mr. SMITH. Okay, thank you, Mr. Cronin. One last question, and it is this. If you now have an 80 percent success rate, so to speak, with collecting the documents and being able to determine the amount of overstayers, that is a huge sampling. And you must have an idea now, on the basis of that 80 percent, what countries might not be in compliance with current law because of the percentage of visa overstayers. How many countries are we talking about?
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Mr. CRONIN. I am not aware of any right now that actually would hit the——
Mr. SMITH. The 2 percent based upon the 80 percent?
Mr. CRONIN. Right.
Mr. SMITH. None that you are aware of?
Mr. CRONIN. None that I am aware of.
Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you all. I don't have any further questions. I appreciate your testimony today, and we do expect to move forward with the reauthorization bill fairly soon.
Our next panel consists of William S. Norman, President and CEO, Travel Industry Association of America; E. Wayne Merry, Director, Program on European Societies in Transition, the Atlantic Council of the United States; and John Ratigan, Immigration Consultant, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and Garrison.
We welcome all three of you and look forward to your testimony. Mr. Norman, we will be pleased to receive your testimony first.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM S. NORMAN, PRESIDENT AND CEO, TRAVEL INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
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Mr. NORMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
On behalf of the more than 2,000 member organizations and the entire U.S. travel and tourism industry, I want to thank you for providing us with the opportunity to testify and urge you to permanently reauthorize the visa waiver pilot program.
Mr. Chairman, we particularly want to commend you for holding a hearing on this vitally important matter so early in the session.
Increased travel to the United States and reducing the burdens associated with that will reap great benefits to our Nation. Last year, travel and tourism generated $542 billion in expenditures, creating 7.6 million direct U.S. jobs. Forty-seven million international visitors to the United States in 1999 spent $95 billion, which supported 1 million U.S. jobs and resulted in a $12 billion positive balance of trade.
Tourism opportunities abound in and near the districts of every member of this subcommittee. They include visits to the River Walk and the Alamo in San Antonio, as well as the nearby hill country to the Walt Disney World, University and Sea World in Orlando, and the bright lights of Hollywood. In fact, visitors to these areas include not only Americans on vacation, or business abroad, but millions of international guests as well.
Mr. Chairman, the visa waiver program is a win-win partnership between the private sector and the Federal Government. The U.S. travel industry markets and advertises its various brands and destinations to world travelers. And the Federal Government eases entry by providing visa-free travel. The tourism industry and the nations win when the millions of visitors come to the United States and support a million jobs and generate nearly $100 billion in expenditures.
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The Federal Government wins since the State Department can shift its limited resources from screening millions of low risk travelers to operations in higher risk countries, where it can devote more personnel and time to checking travelers wanting to visit the United States.
If the United States is going to boost its share of international tourism, and in fact reverse our recent decline in overall market share worldwide, we must do all we can to attract international travelers and provide for a positive experience. That positive experience begins even before an international traveler leaves home for the United States. It begins by offering them the opportunity to travel visa-free to the world's third most popular travel destination.
Mr. Chairman, while the U.S. travel industry supports the broadest possible participation in the visa waiver pilot program, in order to increase inbound international tourism, and would welcome the participation of countries such as Brazil, Venezuela, South Korea and South Africa, we continue to believe the program must be based, however, on objective criteria. We recognize that the current program has been a success and has resulted in no major security threat to our Nation.
But the time is right, we contend, to strengthen the program through security enhancement and ongoing oversight processes. One of the enhancements to the program that TIA supports is a mandatory machine readable passport, with appropriate security features, to minimize fraud and improve the inspection process at U.S. ports of entry. In the past, both the INS and the Department of State have asked for this change, and TIA fully supports taking this important step.
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However, TIA does request that Congress provide a generous grace period, so this action does not create a barrier for U.S.-bound travelers from countries where machine readable passports are not currently issued or have been issued only in the last few years. TIA also supports the creation and implementation of an ongoing accounting or review process that will allow the Federal Government to monitor and report on the performance of countries in the visa waiver program.
We believe that a truly automated I–94 system at U.S. airports would provide useful information about the arrival and departure of all overseas visitors, including those traveling to the United States under the visa waiver pilot program. Our goal through the promotion of permanency is to provide for a more stable and certain program.
Frequent reauthorizations of the program creates unnecessary confusion and uncertainty for international travelers and tour operators. While those of us in Washington understand the reauthorization process, potential international guests only see an approaching deadline that results in concern and anxiety over the possible need to obtain a B–1 or B–2 visitor's waiver.
And in conclusion, we hope you share our goal of reauthorizing the program as quickly as possible. You will help multiple winners in the private and public sector, help create more jobs, and do more to help a program that costs the U.S. Treasury nothing.
The Congress is to be congratulated for creating such an outstanding program. Now we simply ask that a highly successful 12-year visa waiver program be made permanent.
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We pledge to continue assisting this subcommittee and its staff in crafting a bill that will achieve the twin results of permanency and security.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Norman follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM S. NORMAN, PRESIDENT AND CEO, TRAVEL INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today on an important matter for the U.S. travel industry—the Visa Waiver Pilot Program. In light of the April 30, 2000 expiration date for the program, we applaud the Chairman's early action on this critical issue.
I am William S. Norman, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Travel Industry Association of America (TIA), the national, non-profit organization representing all components of the $542 billion U.S. travel and tourism industry. TIA's mission is to promote and facilitate increased travel to and within the United States. It is on behalf of TIA, its more than 2,000 member organizations, and the entire U.S. travel industry, that I testify today on the Visa Waiver Pilot Program (VWPP), its importance to the U.S. economy, and the need for a permanent reauthorization of this vital program. The U.S. travel and tourism industry is a major force in this nation's economy, generating some $542 billion in expenditures and creating 7.6 million direct U.S. jobs this past year. International tourism has a significant impact on the U.S. economy. In 1999, 47 million international visitors to the U.S. generated $95 billion in spending, created 1 million direct U.S. jobs, and helped the U.S. achieve a $12 billion positive balance of trade in international tourism receipts.
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Why is permanency so important? The Visa Waiver Program is a win-win partnership between the private sector and the federal government. The private sector tourism industry markets and advertises its various brands and destinations to world travelers, and the federal government eases entry by providing visa-free travel. The tourism industry and the nation win when millions of visitors come to the U.S. and support a million jobs and generate nearly $100 billion in expenditures. This economic impact touches all states and cities, urban and rural areas, and results in billions of dollars of tax revenue as well. The federal government wins since the State Department can shift its limited resources from screening millions of low-risk travelers to operations in higher-risk countries where it can devote more personnel and time to checking travelers wanting to visit the U.S. Lastly, outbound U.S. travelers win as well since this reciprocal program allows them to travel visa-free to the participating countries.
Congress created the VWPP in 1986, and two years later the first eight countries were enrolled in the program. There are now 29 low-risk countries participating in the Visa Waiver program. We are hopeful Greece will eventually be admitted to the program when it can satisfy Justice Department concerns regarding its system for securing and issuing passports. While the U.S. travel industry supports the broadest participation possible in the VWPP in order to increase inbound international tourism, we continue to believe the program must continue to be based on objective criteria. For example, Brazil and South Korea are currently our nation's 5th and 14th largest international tourism markets, respectively, and they would be welcome additions to the program. We would also welcome the participation of other countries such as South Africa and Venezuela. At the same time, we continue to support a system that provides for objective criteria as a means of safeguarding the United States.
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Members of this Subcommittee represent districts in seven states (California, Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, Texas, Utah, and Virginia). International visitor spending in these seven states exceeds $35 billion annually. In fact, California and Florida alone account for nearly one-third of all international tourism spending in the U.S. This is big business and important trade, and the reason why the Visa Waiver Program is so critical to the economic health of this nation.
While applying and waiting several days or possibly a week for a visitor visa may not appear to be a significant annoyance, visa-free travel to the U.S. makes this nation more attractive as a visitor destination and demonstrates that our nation's welcome mat is out. International travelers who are made to feel unwelcome will vote with their feet and choose to visit other destinations such as Australia, France, or Brazil.
Worldwide travel was estimated to have reached nearly 700 million tourist arrivals in 1999. If the U.S. is going to boost its share of this booming market, and in fact reverse our recent decline in overall market share worldwide, we must do all we can to attract international travelers and provide for a positive travel experience. And that positive experience begins even before an international traveler leaves home for the U.S. It begins by offering them the opportunity to travel visa-free to the world's 3rd most popular travel destination.
How can we strengthen the program? We recognize that while the current program has been a success and has resulted in no major security threats to our nation, the time is right to strengthen the program through security enhancements and an ongoing oversight process. TIA's government affairs staff has held numerous meetings with Subcommittee staff and have identified some potential modifications to the current program.
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One of the enhancements to the program that TIA and the travel industry supports is a mandatory machine-readable passport (MRP) with appropriate security features to minimize fraud and improve the inspection process at U.S. ports of entry. Only three countries (Belgium, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland) that have been in the program for several years do not yet issue machine-readable passports to their citizens. Norway has begun issuing MRP's in some areas of the country. Portugal was admitted to the program in August of 1999 on the basis of a commitment to begin issuing machine-readable passports, and along with Liechtenstein will begin issuing them during the summer of 2000. In the past, both the INS and the Department of State have asked for this change, and TIA fully supports taking this important step.
However, TIA does request that Congress provide a generous grace period so this action does not create a barrier for U.S.-bound travelers from the five countries mentioned in the previous paragraph. It will take some time for these countries to develop a machine-readable passport and make them available to their citizens. With some 850,000 travelers coming to the U.S. annually from these five countries, we want to ensure that this new mandate does not impede inbound travel to the U.S., thereby harming the spending and jobs that are created through this important economic activity.
TIA also supports the creation and implementation of an ongoing accounting or review process that allows the federal government to monitor and report on the performance of countries in the Visa Waiver Program. The framework for just such a review system exists with the current VWPP Inter-Agency Working Group that involves the Department of State, INS, and other law enforcement agencies. We applaud the State Department and INS for the creation of this Working Group, which designed an entirely new protocol that was employed in screening the four countries nominated for the VWPP in the most recent round of designations. This new system facilitated a more rigorous and thorough inspection and review process that led to final approval for three of the four countries: Portugal, Singapore, and Uruguay. As mentioned earlier, because of this vigorous review process, Greece has been denied admission to the VWPP until they can satisfy Justice Department concerns regarding passport issuance and security.
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As part of this ongoing review process, we believe that a truly automated I–94 system at U.S. airports would provide useful information about the arrival and departure of overseas travelers, including those traveling to the U.S. under the Visa Waiver Program.
Our goal through the promotion of permanency is to provide for a more stable and certain program. Frequent reauthorization of the VWPP creates unnecessary confusion and uncertainty for international travelers and tour operators who arrange group travel to the U.S. While official Washington and the U.S. travel industry understand this to be a routine reauthorization, potential international guests only see an approaching deadline that results in concern and anxiety over the possible need to obtain a B–1 or B–2 visitor's visa.
We remain confident that the U.S. Congress will renew the Visa Waiver Program and not allow it to lapse, understanding full well the tens of millions of dollars it would cost to restaff consular facilities in the VWPP countries. We are confident that Congress recognizes that such a lapse could also result in major harm to inbound international tourism to the U.S. with a resultant loss of revenue reaching into the billions of dollars.
In closing, I wish to state again the travel industry's strong support for a permanent and enhanced Visa Waiver Program. The U.S. travel industry will do its share to market this country as the premier travel and tourism destination in the world. To help us achieve our shared goal, the federal government must continue to facilitate inbound travel and remove barriers to travel while at the same time safeguarding the security of this nation and its citizens.
The VWPP creates multiple winners in the private and public sector, results in no losers, and costs the U.S. Treasury nothing. The Congress is to be congratulated for creating such an outstanding program, and now we simply ask that the highly successful, 12-year old Visa Waiver Program be made permanent.
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Thank you for the opportunity to explain the important role the VWPP plays in facilitating and encouraging international tourism to the U.S. and our support for a permanent program. TIA pledges our continued assistance in crafting legislation that will achieve the twin results of permanency and security.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Norman.
Mr. Merry?
STATEMENT OF E. WAYNE MERRY, DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ON EUROPEAN SOCIETIES IN TRANSITION, THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES
Mr. MERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I speak as a person who is very supportive of the visa waiver program. I have been asked, however, to address the eligibility of only one country, Greece, for inclusion into this program. I want to focus exclusively on issues of law enforcement, since the visa is first and foremost a law enforcement mechanism at our external frontiers. It is a screening mechanism and deterrent to keep out criminal elements.
A year ago, the Clinton administration established two criteria for Greece to meet to qualify for the visa program. It has met neither. The first criterion was reform of the country's hopelessly outmoded passport issuance procedures to prevent large-scale fraud. Our Immigration and Naturalization Service offered assistance to their Greek counterparts to try and establish a national data base to prevent fraud without any response whatsoever. I recently made a visit to Athens where a senior official of our embassy confirmed to me there has been no Greek action on this matter whatsoever.
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Even worse, Athens has for many, many years been a major market in the eastern Mediterranean for fraudulent personal documents, including, I might add, lost and stolen American passports. This problem was enormously increased by the opening of Greece's borders with its Balkan neighbors and the breakup of the Soviet empire.
I would like particularly to draw attention to some scandals that have taken place at Greek consulates in the Balkan region and in the former Soviet Union in the issuance of fraudulent passports and other personal documents, particularly in Albania and at the consulate in Novorossiysk, which services the turbulent northern Caucasus region.
Were Greece added to the visa waiver program, obviously the incentive for fraud of this type, both by Greek consulates abroad and by issuing offices within Greece itself, would skyrocket enormously. I am not talking here about Greek citizens that might be overstaying their time here in the United States, most of whom I assume will be pretty much law abiding people while they were here, even if they overstayed their time. I am talking of the very many people around the world who seek entry into the United States for much less salubrious purposes, and who would look upon visa waiver program inclusion for Greece as a gaping loophole in our defenses.
The second criterion the administration established was that Greece should adhere to the standards of the so-called Schengen regime, the European Union's common standards for frontier control and crime fighting. And I want to make a clear distinction that while Greece, at the beginning of this year, formally became a member of Schengen, that does not mean it adheres to its standards. For 15 years, Greece was kept out of Schengen because of the poor quality of its police work. It was finally admitted largely on political grounds, against the reservations of a great many law enforcement and other officials throughout the other European Union member states.
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It is no secret that these reservations exist. In the very first month of Greek membership in Schengen, the Italian government requested a special bilateral summit meeting to try to address some of the deficiencies in Greece's behavior. Recently in Athens, I was told by one of the senior public officials of the government that full adherence to the Schengen regime would in fact require Greece to completely close its northern frontiers, something it has absolutely no intention of doing.
The problem for the United States is that much of the Balkan region and the former Soviet Union that is now open to Greece is of course a crucible for international organized crime. Many of these crime groups in that part of the world have established themselves on Greek territory. Many of them have links with Greek organizations in their own countries. And if the country cannot do a better job of controlling its fraudulent personal document issuance procedures, the United States would open up a floodgate of potential entry of criminals into our own country, if we were to extend the visa waiver program.
In addition, I believe a third criterion should be added. And that is, the fight against terrorism. I can think of no single area of law enforcement that is more basic or more fundamental in judging a country's commitment to the rule of law than fighting organized terrorism. Unfortunately, Greece has the worst counter-terrorism program in the world for the last 25 years. I am referring to the ''17 November'' terrorist group that has killed five servants of the United States and attempted to kill many dozens more; an organization that has carried out five terrorist attacks in the last year and nearly killed the Dutch and German Ambassadors; an organization that has recruited a new generation of terrorists, new weapons and tactics, and has faced not a single arrest, not a single credible piece of police work ever taken against them in their 25 year history.
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The United States Government designates five cities in the world as so-called ''critical threat'' for terrorism purposes. Athens is one of those. And the American taxpayer currently spends more money protecting our officials in Athens than we do in Beirut or in Bogota, in fact, anywhere else in the world.
One of the reasons for the visa waiver program is to reduce the cost of American consular services. But I can tell you, the money we can save by eliminating the visa is a spit in the bucket compared to the amount of money that we would save, not to mention the blood that would be saved, if the Greek authorities would arrest, apprehend and imprison these terrorists.
Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, the visa is an instrument of law enforcement. And I think we should only suspend that for governments that share our standards and our commitment to effective law enforcement. Regrettably, the Hellenic Republic fails this standard and does not qualify for inclusion in the program.
I would hope that the administration and the Congress would communicate these factors very forcefully and clearly to the Greek authorities, so they could understand what they need to do to qualify.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Merry follows:]
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF E. WAYNE MERRY, DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ON EUROPEAN SOCIETIES IN TRANSITION, THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Chairman,
Is Greece eligible for the Visa Waiver Pilot Program? Arguments in favor include encouraging tourism, reducing the costs of consular services, foreign policy considerations, and even sentiment. With a background in Greek political and security affairs, I wish to address issues of law enforcement.
The visa is first and foremost an instrument of American law enforcement at our national borders, as are Coast Guard cutters and drug-sniffing dogs in airports. The visa is a screening mechanism and a deterrent to prevent criminal and other ineligible persons entering our territory. Waiver of the visa requirement is therefore a suspension of one of our frontier defenses, the furthest forward of those defenses in fact. The United States should set aside this tool only for countries whose own standards and performance in relevant aspects of law enforcement are comparable with our own.
Last spring the Clinton Administration established two criteria for Greece to qualify for visa waiver; neither has been met.
The first criterion was reform of the hopelessly outmoded Greek passport issuance procedures to prevent large-scale fraud. At present, there is little to prevent an enterprising retailer of false passports from obtaining a new passport every day of the week in different cities; there is also little effective control of document fraud in obtaining passports. The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service offered its Greek counterparts assistance in creating a country-wide data base to deal with these problems, but to no avail. During a recent visit to Athens, a senior American official told me privately there has been no Greek action on this issue at all.
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Worse, for many years Athens has been a major regional entrepot for fraudulent visas and passports (including lost and stolen American passports). This problem has greatly increased with the opening of the country's northern borders with its Balkan neighbors. Were Greece added to the Visa Waiver Pilot Program, the incentive for passport and other document fraud would obviously skyrocket. In the absence of effective controls by Greek authorities, the result would be a flood of ineligible persons seeking entry into the United States using forged Greek passports.
Note, please, that I am not talking about Greek citizens overstaying their allotted time as tourists or taking employment inconsistent with their status in this country. I am talking about people around the world looking for a gap in our border controls who would find a gaping loophole in Greece were the visa requirement lifted. Surely, the most elemental and necessary standard of law enforcement to justify visa waiver is effective control of passport issuance. Greece has not yet attained this standard.
The Administration's second criterion was Greek adherence to the so-called Schengen regime, the European Union's common frontier and crime-fighting accord. Let me make an important distinction: membership in Schengen is not the same as fulfillment of its standards. It is no secret that Greek entry into Schengen early this year was a political decision of the European Union made despite serious reservations by many law enforcement officials of the other member states. It is no secret these reservations about Greece persist. In January the Italian Government requested a special bilateral summit meeting to address deficiencies in Greek performance and their impact on Italy. The BBC aired a program (in which I took part) on prime-time television questioning whether Greece was ready for Schengen. More recently in Athens, a top government official responsible for public order admitted to me off the record that full adherence to Schengen standards would require the complete closure of the country's northern borders.
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For many years Greece was denied entry into Schengen because it could not control the movement of illegal refugees into the European Union due to its proximity to the Middle East, its long coastal frontiers, and its notoriously poor police work. In recent years this problem has increased enormously by huge numbers of Balkan peoples fleeing south across the borders with Albania, the former Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. For the United States, this is a direct problem only insofar as these persons obtain false passports in the flourishing Greek personal documents market. However, a very real and more serious concern for us is the permeability of Schengen standards in Greece as a medium for international organized crime.
The Schengen regime is a defense structure against the global trade in narcotics, arms, prostitution, money laundering, and so forth. International organized crime groups view Greece as a weak spot in Schengen and have established themselves on Greek soil, not to exploit the modest domestic market but with the entire European Union in mind. This is the nightmare facing law enforcement officials throughout the EU with Greece only a half-hearted member of the regime. By lifting the United States visa requirement we would enter the nightmare and compound the already excessive burden on our law enforcement agencies in dealing with global crime.
More broadly, Schengen is a test of a government's commitment to standards of law enforcement. Many other European countries have met the test and thus met our standards for the Visa Waiver Pilot Program. Greece has not.
Mr. Chairman, I strongly believe a third criterion should be added and I am appalled the Administration neglected to do so. The most basic and fundamental requirement of national law enforcement in the world today is the fight against organized terrorism. Greece takes satisfaction in the fact that its domestic terrorist problem is not among the world's worst. That satisfaction has produced a complacency reflected in the worst record on counter-terrorism anywhere on earth over the past quarter century. The salience of this problem for the U.S. Congress is that the primary target of this terrorism is the United States of America and its representatives.
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I refer to the Greek domestic terrorist organization called ''17 November''. In nearly twenty-five years of lethal activity, not a single member of this group has ever been identified, apprehended, or punished in any way. Last year, this group carried out five attacks, nearly killing the German and Dutch Ambassadors (the terrorists are learning new weapons and tactics, so have had a few near misses). This group is well-organized and disciplined, has recruited a new generation of killers, and is supremely self-assured. Worse, it is unopposed. Recent public statements by the terrorists show they know they are unchallenged by law enforcement and pretty much free to proceed as they choose. During a recent visit to Athens I had occasion to raise this issue with senior responsible government officials and with some of the country's top commentators. The response was a generalized shrug of indifference. I did not hear a single firm and unequivocal statement that these terrorists should be defeated and the country's laws enforced.
Greek official passivity on counter-terrorism is relevant to the visa waiver question on two grounds. First, if a government performs so poorly and is so negligent in fighting home-based terrorism, how can it be expected to be serious or competent in any other form of organized crime fighting?
Second, ''17 November'' has American blood on its hands. Five of our country's servants have died, but had all the bombings and other attacks against Americans succeeded, that toll would be at least fifteen times as high. Our Government designates five cities in the world as ''Critical Threat'' from terrorism. Athens is one. Our taxpayers spend more money protecting our representatives in the Greek capital than anywhere else on earth. The dollar savings (not to mention the human savings) we would garner from Greek arrest of the terrorists dwarf any potential economy at the Athens Embassy from elimination of the visa requirement.
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Until the Greek Government takes the minimal step of apprehending the murderers of our diplomatic and military representatives, I believe the United States should deny approbation to Greek law enforcement through waving the visa requirement. We must not signal that passivity against terrorism is acceptable. At the most basic level, without the visa requirement as a deterrent, what would prevent the terrorists coming to this country to continue their activities on American soil if they chose?
Mr. Chairman, many people see the visa requirement as an impediment to human and business contacts or as a lack of American openness to the world. It may be these things, but the visa is also as much a tool of law enforcement in today's world as the metal detector or fingerprints. When we deprive ourselves of this tool for any country's citizens, we must be certain that country is dedicated to law not only in principle but in practice, that it has a record of strong enforcement rather than just strong rhetoric. The Hellenic Republic fails these standards and should not be admitted into the Visa Waiver Pilot Program. I urge the Administration to communicate these realities clearly and forcefully to the Greek Government so it may understand what needs to be done and why.
Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to appear before your Committee. Thank you.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Merry.
Now we will hear from Mr. Ratigan.
STATEMENT OF JOHN RATIGAN, IMMIGRATION CONSULTANT, PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON
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Mr. RATIGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
We are now in the twelfth year of the visa waiver pilot program. When this pilot program went into effect in 1988, it was supposed to have been coincident with INS' implementation of an effective ''nonimmigrant information system,'' which much like current proposals for an exit-entry system, would have tracked nonimmigrant arrivals and departures. That nonimmigrant information system has never been effectively implemented, and I emphasize ''effectively,'' and seems as far off today as it was in 1988.
Nonetheless, VWPP has worked largely as it was intended to. Unfortunately in some countries, membership in the VWPP is regarded as a status symbol, and in this country, there is a tendency to regard inclusion as a present we can give or a favor that we can do for an individual country. The program should not be regarded as a foreign policy tool.
The United States, however, is better off with the program than it would be without it when one balances workload reduction, tourism facilitation and security concerns. While there are legitimate security concerns, VWPP should not bear the blame for the insecurity of the entire visa process. The program deserves to be extended.
I would extend the program for at least four to 5 years, and would not amend the current criteria during that time. The program would benefit from a significant extension period to remove the continuing uncertainty about it. It is less clear, however, that there are additional countries which, based on current data, clearly warrant being added to the program.
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We should devote the next several years to a serious review of how the program operates and what goals we should have for it. How should we balance the sometimes conflicting goals of tourism promotion, workload reduction and security? Should the current program participants be retained and if so, on what basis should admission and retention decisions be made?
We should ask, as an earlier speaker noted, whether a country's efforts to assure the security of its passports should be made an explicit factor in determining admission and retention? The aim of this extended review period should be to find common ground that would permit Congress to end the ''pilot program'' status and make this a permanent program.
We should end the ambiguity as well surrounding the participating countries' implementation of a machine readable passport program. The law should plainly require that countries admitted in the future have a machine readable passport program in full operation. It should set a fixed date by which current participants must have such a program in full operation or face removal from the program.
Finally, the disqualification rate established in subsection 217(g) is of questionable relevance and reliability, as earlier speakers have noted, in making decisions about retention in the program. It should be replaced with a ratio which measures the number of immigrants who adjust or arrive in the United States each year from each country against the number of nonimmigrants admitted annually from the same country.
This number of immigrants per nonimmigrant arrival would directly measure a given country's propensity to immigrate, and would provide a more direct, relevant and reliable rationale for assessing the question of retention than the overstay rate or the disqualification rate, for example.
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The statistics necessary for this ratio are in fact already available in the tables compiled annually in the INS Statistical Yearbook. My testimony goes into this ratio proposal at some greater length.
That concludes my testimony. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ratigan follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN RATIGAN, IMMIGRATION CONSULTANT, PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mrs. Jackson Lee, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My experience in immigration includes 25 years as a State Department Foreign Service Officer, specializing in immigration and visa matters. During that time, I served as the Consul General or supervisory consular and visa officer in Singapore, Republic of Singapore; Cairo, Egypt; Toronto, Canada; and Seoul, Korea. I also served 2 1/2 years on detail from the State Department as Counsel to the Senate Immigration Subcommittee. Since my retirement from the State Department in 1997, I have worked as an immigration consultant to the law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison. The views I will express today are entirely my own, and do not reflect the views of my firm or any of its clients.
A. EXTENSION OF VWPP.
We are now in the twelfth year of the Visa Waiver Pilot Program (VWPP). It is still a ''pilot program,'' perhaps deservedly so. When it went into effect in 1988, commencement of VWPP was supposed to have been co-incident with INS' implementation of an effective ''nonimmigrant information system,'' which, much like current proposals for an ''exit-entry'' system, would have tracked nonimmigrant arrivals and departures. That ''nonimmigrant information system'' has never been effectively implemented, and seems as far off today as it was in 1988.
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Nonetheless, VWPP has worked largely as it was intended to. Unfortunately, in some countries, ''membership'' in the VWPP is regarded as a status symbol, and in this country there is a tendency to regard inclusion as a ''present'' we can give or a ''favor'' we can do for an individual country. The program should not be regarded as a foreign policy tool.
The United States, however, is better off with the program than it would be without it, when one balances workload reduction, tourism facilitation and security concerns. While there are legitimate security concerns, VWPP should not bear the blame for the insecurity of the entire visa process. The program deserves to be extended.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS.
1. I would extend the program for at least 4 to 5 years, and would not amend the current criteria during that period. The program would benefit from a significant extension period, to remove the continuing uncertainty about it. It is less clear, however, that there are additional countries which, based on current data, clearly warrant being added to the program.
2. We should instead devote the next several years to a serious review of how the program operates, and what goals we should have for the program. How should we balance the sometimes conflicting goals of tourism promotion, workload reduction and security? Should the current program participants be retained, and on what basis should admission and retention decisions be made? The aim of this extended review should be to find the common ground that would permit Congress to end the ''pilot'' status and make this a permanent program.
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3. We should end the ambiguity surrounding the participating countries' implementation of a Machine Readable Passport program. The law should require plainly that countries admitted in the future have a Machine Readable Passport program in full operation; it should set a fixed date by which current participants must have such a program in full operation or face removal from the program.
4. The ''disqualification rate'' established in subsection 217(g) is of questionable relevance, and is based on speculative estimates of status violations. It should be replaced, in making retention decisions, by a statistic which is more relevant, reliable and easily calculated.
Congress should replace the ''disqualification rate'' with a ratio which would measure the number of immigrants who adjust status or arrive in the United States each year from each country against the number of nonimmigrants admitted annually from the same country. This number of ''immigrants per nonimmigrant arrival'' would directly measure a given country's ''propensity to immigrate,'' and would provide a more direct, relevant and reliable rationale for assessing the question of retention in the VWPP than the current ''disqualification rate.''
Such a ratio is in fact already available in the statistical tables compiled annually by INS in its Statistical Yearbook. These numbers are available in INS' Statistical Yearbook for 1996, for example, at Table 7 (immigrants admitted) and Table 41 (nonimmigrants admitted).
Dividing the number of newly admitted immigrants by the number of nonimmigrants admitted from the same country gives one an annual percentage of immigrants per each nonimmigrant admission, for each country.(see footnote 1) That small percentage number is more meaningful if considered as the number of immigrants per 1000 nonimmigrant admissions (see chart below).
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Tables 7 and 41 of the 1996 statistics provides the following information about the ''propensity to immigrate'' that year:
The baseline rate among all countries worldwide was 3.7 percent, or 37 new immigrants annually per 1,000 nonimmigrant admissions.
Among Visa Waiver countries, the ''immigration rate'' is approximately 0.32 percent, or 3.2 immigrants per 1,000 nonimmigrant admissions, less than one-tenth the worldwide rate.
By contrast, a review of nine of the ten leading immigrant-source countries (as reported by the State Department's 1996 Report of the Visa Office) shows an immigration rate of approximately 10.8 percent, or 108 immigrants per 1,000 nonimmigrant admissions.
These figures do not attempt to estimate or include overstays or illegal immigrants, but represent solely lawfully admitted immigrants and nonimmigrants. That helps to make the numbers more consistent and reliable both from year to year and country to country.
This measure of a country's ''propensity to immigrate'' is also relevant to the question of whether a country should be included in the program; it might be a useful addition to the nonimmigrant refusal rate in making that determination.
This measure of ''propensity to immigrate'' or some similar ''immigration ratio'' test reflects the decisions of aliens about immigrating to the United States, and not the decisions of U.S. immigration officials. It and not the ''disqualification rate'' should form the basis for retention decisions made under subparagraph 217(g).
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Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Ratigan.
Mr. Norman, may I address my first couple of questions to you? You endorse the idea of a mandatory machine readable passport for visa waiver pilot program entries. You heard, or I presume you heard Ambassador Ryan's testimony. Would you favor that a country have a machine readable passport system set up before they are admitted as a visa waiver pilot program country?
Mr. NORMAN. We believe that having such a machine readable passport is important. But we very much would encourage a generous grace period, that is, there should be a readable commitment to such a system, but time to get it implemented. If a passport system were a condition and a country were given one or 2 years in order to set it up and get it started, we would support that.
Mr. SMITH. The Ambassador a minute ago said her preference was that they already have them, but there might be some circumstances where they might be given a year. So that is about what you are suggesting?
Mr. NORMAN. About a year or two would seem appropriate, yes, sir.
Mr. SMITH. You also said that you wanted to keep our objective data. I am glad to hear that. Would you change the objective data? Or would you use the current objective data that we now have?
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Mr. NORMAN. Well, in our judgment, there are many ways in which an evaluation could be made to determine qualifications for the program since there are now 80 percent of all participants being tested. There may be alternative ways in addition to test the percentage of overstays and to have greater certitude that individuals are coming and leaving the USA within the specified time. We would be delighted to work with the committee.
We have no objections to the current criteria. But I think the opportunity to look for some alternative approaches ought to be approached. We would support and would be willing to work with the committee in this regard.
Mr. SMITH. And that is after we have the data that we are waiting until the year 2002 to have, is that right?
Mr. NORMAN. That is correct, sir.
Mr. SMITH. Okay, thank you.
One more question, Mr. Norman, for you. What steps can we do to get the cooperation from the airlines? What sanctions should we impose? You can tell a lot of members are impatient with their perhaps alleged lack of cooperation.
Mr. NORMAN. Well, in answering, I work very closely with the airline industry and know the head of the association and the airline executive very well. This was a surprise to me, to find out that there had been the kind of difficulties that have been expressed. I would assure you that if there is some very specific information, other than the allegations that there is a problem, then I am confident the airlines would be more than willing to work towards a solution, and we would be willing to use our good office to assist.
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Mr. SMITH. When we had a similar hearing to this one 2 years ago, we had great promises from the airlines, but we have had no results and we have had testimony from the administration suggesting a lack of cooperation. So what can you do to help us?
Mr. NORMAN. I will be willing to tell you immediately that we would be more than willing to use our good offices to assist the committee. As I indicated, I was not aware that the problem that was being mentioned even existed. I know that the airlines are supportive of making the Visa Waiver Program permanent, and they made testimony here today. We will follow up with you and your staff to make certain that we are working with them.
Mr. SMITH. Okay, thank you.
Mr. Merry, a question for you. You went into some detail in your testimony about how well the interagency working group process worked as applied to Greece. And I guess my only quick question is that I assume you feel that process is a success.
Mr. MERRY. I have to correct you in one respect. I am not myself privy to the work of the interagency review process. My testimony was based exclusively on information that I have acquired from other sources.
Mr. SMITH. Secondhand, okay.
Mr. MERRY. From what was said earlier in the hearing, my understanding is that the interagency review process has so far not found, has not been prepared to recommend that Greece be included in the program.
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Mr. SMITH. Right.
Mr. MERRY. If that is correct, I would support that, certainly.
Mr. SMITH. Okay. Mr. Ratigan, that leads me to my last question, which is, do you think that we should apply perhaps a similar procedure used by the working group and apply it to other countries at, say, 5 year intervals, something like that, so that we just periodically double check the criteria?
Mr. RATIGAN. I think one of the weaknesses of the current program is that there is really no effective monitoring and disqualification process. Certainly that working group evaluation sounds like a good idea. The suggestion that I made about substituting the immigrants-per-nonimmigrant-arrival ratio for the overstay data and the whole disqualification rate, is another that is aimed at the same end.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Ratigan.
I don't have any other questions, and I will recognize the gentlewoman from Texas for her questions.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I managed to consult with Mr. Frank as he was going to another hearing, and I am delighted that at least, I believe, he made note, and I would like to make note for the record that there is value in this waiver program inasmuch as the reciprocity that occurs for Americans.
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Mr. Norman, when I ask you a question, I would appreciate you commenting on that.
Mr. Merry, I take from your comments that what you are arguing for is caution. Are you arguing for something more than that?
Mr. MERRY. I think what I am basically arguing is that the standard of law enforcement in Greece today does not meet the standard laid down in the law, that admission into the visa waiver pilot program should not cause damage to American law enforcement, as I feel it currently would. And were Greece to be fully in adherence with European Union standards in crime fighting and law enforcement, and to deal with its domestic problem of terrorism, and of course introduce the kind of machine readable passport with fraud protection procedures, then I would have no problem with their admission to the program.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Are you asking for reconsideration of Greece's appearance on the list?
Mr. MERRY. My understanding is that Greece is not currently being recommended for inclusion by the interagency task force. If I am incorrect in that respect, then I would certainly take the view that on a law enforcement basis, Greece is not now qualified.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I am sorry, you are saying what?
Mr. MERRY. My view is that on a basis of law enforcement, Greece does not now qualify for inclusion in the visa wavier program.
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Ms. JACKSON LEE. So that is your only recommendation at this point?
Mr. MERRY. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. What do you say about the other part of the program?
Mr. MERRY. In general, I am very supportive of the program. I once worked as an American consular officer abroad myself. And I think for most of the countries that are currently in the program, it is very much to the benefit of the United States. I would think that there are probably some other countries that could be added to it. But my expertise in this case is really limited to one country.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Norman, how much time do you think the remaining countries who do not have machine readable passports should be given the opportunity to do so?
Mr. NORMAN. Well, we have indicated, Ms. Jackson Lee, that there should be a generous grace period. There are two parts to this as I see. The first is that we could have a date certain period by which countries should have a process in place. But in order to facilitate increased travel to and within the United States, it is important that once we have implemented a system, that it takes a while for all passports to become machine readable.
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As an example, France, which instituted its program more than 1 year ago, still today is trying to make all new passports machine readable, but need time to update those previously issued. So my judgment is if we could have a grace period of three to 4 years as a date certain to get it all done, then that would be appropriate.
Mr. SMITH. Ms. Jackson Lee, would you yield?
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I will yield.
Mr. SMITH. I am a little worried about Mr. Norman's testimony. We have gone from one to two now to three or 4 year grace period?
Mr. NORMAN. I was making a distinction between two things, Mr. Smith. I agree that 1 or 2 years is appropriate to have passports machine readable. But I was talking about how long it would take all the citizens within the country to have a passport that was machine readable, especially those issued several years ago.
Mr. SMITH. I see.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. He was giving me a fully explained answer, and I do appreciate that.
As you note, the grace period, what you are suggesting is that, have it implemented but don't have a heavy hammer because it is not fully implemented, or that it does not work. I think we have, as I noted, for some reason or another, I thought Greece was on the list, but as I have noted the countries that were on, except for unique circumstances, we have seemingly had a fair relationship with all of them as it relates to terrorism in the United States or any disruption from such visitors to the United States. So we can be comforted that the initial list certainly has borne fruit, positive fruit.
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Let me then ask you, and I would also like to raise that question with Mr. Ratigan, with respect to the issue that I raised initially in my opening statement, which is the creating of opportunity for other countries. I will focus particularly on the countries on the continent of Africa and of course, some of our Caribbean areas.
How would you feel the best approach would be, Mr. Norman, you are obviously representing the tourism industry, but knowing this particular act, how would you approach that or how would you offer for us to approach that opening of additional countries?
Mr. NORMAN. Well, I would like to state at the outset, Ms. Jackson Lee, that it is the position of the travel and tourism industry that if we look at our 50 largest tourism trading partners, and see that what is happening to our country in terms of the inbound revenues it generates, there is a great economic advantage to our country of having as many of the top 50 trading partners in there. And when you look at a country such as Brazil, which is our fifth largest trading partner, or perhaps South Korea, which is our fourteenth, or South Africa, which is our thirty-eighth, or the Bahamas, as an example, which is, I believe, our eighteenth largest trading partner, all of these would be very important. Because we have now found ourselves in the position as a country in which we are losing market share and in which individuals are choosing with their fee to go to those countries, which is easier. Therefore we want to make certain that we have the greatest quantity of ease.
To specifically answer your question, I think that we would have to defer to the State Department and others in terms of ways to do it. But I would like to be on record as saying that we strongly support moving in that particular direction. And there certainly are countries that are very, very logical that we can see increased travel to the United States coming from there. In terms of the specific means, if it was a combination of not only refusal rates but also some combination of other kinds of experiences, we would support it.
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Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Norman.
Mr. Ratigan, I think certainly trade is one element of it. But we can also argue that where we are trying to improve and increase trade relations, that there is something to providing incentive with respect to this particular act. What would you view as a direction that we should take, for admitting countries or in fact removing them from the list?
Mr. RATIGAN. Well, I would tend to agree with Mr. Norman that certainly the tourist impact would be one of the key factors to take into account. Those larger countries also would be most likely, I think, to have machine readable passport programs.
I am frankly at a loss about what to do with the existing criteria. My proposal was that the program be extended with the existing criteria. I would stand by that.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. So you have no offering as to criteria for removing countries? That is what I was asking you.
Mr. RATIGAN. I do: I misunderstood you. I think we should finesse the whole question of overstay rates and simply go to this ratio that I described in my testimony regarding the number of annual immigrant admissions as a percentage of total nonimmigrant admissions. It really provides a profile, I think. of the countries who are most likely to want to stay.
Regarding the discussion we have heard this afternoon about collecting I–94s from the airlines and so forth, I think that is such an awkward and cumbersome process, that frankly I am pessimistic about its ever really being successful. I think if we can finesse that whole process and go to the kind of ratio that I was talking about, I think you get a more relevant assessment of what citizens of individual countries are doing on the visa waiver program, and with numbers that are readily available, that are already captured by INS.
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Ms. JACKSON LEE. So use existing data and then analyze and make your determination from there?
Mr. RATIGAN. Exactly.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no other questions.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee.
And thank all of you for your testimony today. It is much appreciated. And as you heard me say earlier, we hope to move fairly quickly on a reauthorization bill.
We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:37 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]
A P P E N D I X
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
1. Statement of the Air Transport Association is available in subcommittee files.
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2. Statement of Robert A. Underwood is available in subcommittee files.
(Footnote 1 return)
Technically, Table 7 reports immigrants admitted by place of birth and Table 41 reports nonimmigrants admitted by nationality. The statistical discrepancy is small, however, and should not undermine the value of the data.