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80–444PS
2003
CREATING A DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JUNE 27, 2002
Serial No. 107–73
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
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HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
JOE BARTON, Texas
KEN CALVERT, California
NICK SMITH, Michigan
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
DAVE WELDON, Florida
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota
CHRIS CANNON, Utah
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR., Washington
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
GARY G. MILLER, California
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
FELIX J. GRUCCI, JR., New York
MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania
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JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
RALPH M. HALL, Texas
BART GORDON, Tennessee
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JAMES A. BARCIA, Michigan
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
LYNN N. RIVERS, Michigan
ZOE LOFGREN, California
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina
NICK LAMPSON, Texas
JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
MARK UDALL, Colorado
DAVID WU, Oregon
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOE BACA, California
JIM MATHESON, Utah
STEVE ISRAEL, New York
DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
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C O N T E N T S
June 27, 2002
Witness List
Hearing Charter
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Sherwood Boehlert, Chairman, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Written Statement
Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Jr., Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Written Statement
Prepared Statement by Representative Nick Smith, Chairman, Subcommittee on Research, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Prepared Statement by Representative Gary G. Miller, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
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Prepared Statement by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Prepared Statement by Representative Michael M. Honda, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Witnesses
Dr. John H. Marburger, III, Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President
Oral Statement
Written Statement
Biography
Dr. Raymond L. Orbach, Director, Office of Science, Department of Energy
Oral Statement
Written Statement
Biography
Mr. John S. Tritak, Director, Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce
Oral Statement
Written Statement
Biography
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Discussion
Need for a DHS Under Secretary for R&D
Creation of a Homeland Security Institute
Transfer of NIST Computer Security Division to DHS
Setting the Homeland Security Research Agenda
The Role of Silicon Valley in Aviation Security
Creating a Modern, Agile Department
Flight Control Technology
Cyberspace Capabilities
Timeline for Establishing DHS
Organizational Structure of DHS
Protecting Our Critical Infrastructure from Cyber-Terrorism
Prioritization of the Homeland Security Agenda
Importance of Governor Ridge Appearing Before the Committee on Science
Role of NASA in Securing the Homeland
Homeland Security Capabilities of OSTP
Core Components of the Homeland Security Initiative
Broadening the Scope of DHS
Transitional Challenges in Creating DHS
Psychological Aspects of Terrorism
Role of Academic and Research Institutions in Protecting the Homeland
Transfer of NIST Computer Security Division to DHS
Openness of the Administration to Outside Suggestions Regarding the Proposed Department
Homeland Security R&D at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
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Student Visas: Balancing Security Concerns with University Needs
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Answers submitted by Dr. John H. Marburger, III, Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President
Responses to questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood Boehlert and Ranking Minority Member Ralph M. Hall
Responses to questions submitted by Representative Judy Biggert
Responses to questions submitted by Representative Felix J. Grucci, Jr.
Responses to questions submitted by Representative Lynn Rivers
Responses to questions submitted by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee
Responses to questions submitted by Representative Joseph Hoeffel
Responses to questions submitted by Representative Michael M. Honda
Answers submitted by Dr. Raymond L. Orbach, Director, Office of Science, Department of Energy
Responses to questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood Boehlert and Ranking Minority Member Ralph M. Hall
Responses to questions submitted by Representative Judy Biggert
Responses to questions submitted by Representative Felix J. Grucci, Jr.
Answers submitted by Mr. John S. Tritak, Director, Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce
Responses to questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood Boehlert and Ranking Minority Member Ralph M. Hall
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Responses to questions submitted by Representative Felix J. Grucci, Jr.
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record
Letter to Chairman Sherwood Boehlert from the Software & Information Industry Association
''Report of the 2002 Silicon Valley Blue Ribbon Task Force on Aviation Security and Technology,'' Executive Summary, June 17, 2002
''NASA's Contributions to Homeland Security,'' submitted by Dr. John H. Marburger, III
Analysis of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
The Homeland Security Act of 2002
CREATING A DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
THURSDAY, JUNE 27, 2002
House of Representatives,
Committee on Science,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sherwood L. Boehlert (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
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80444a.eps
HEARING CHARTER
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Creating a Department of
Homeland Security
THURSDAY, JUNE 27, 2002
10:00 A.M.–12:00 P.M.
2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
1. Purpose
On Thursday, June 27, 2002, the House Science Committee will hold a hearing to examine the President's proposed legislation creating a Department of Homeland Security. The hearing will focus on issues within the jurisdiction of the Science Committee, including the organizational structure for research and development (R&D) within the new department, and the transfer of functions within existing agencies to it. The hearing will help guide the Committee in drafting its legislative proposal regarding the establishment of a Department of Homeland Security. The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) will testify. Officials representing the Department of Commerce and the Department of Energy may testify as well.
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The hearing will explore a number of overarching questions, including:
1. How should R&D be organized in the Department? Does it make more sense to have a central entity run most of the R&D effort and coordinate the rest, or should R&D be vested only in the individual sections of the Department?
2. To what extent should the Department conduct its own R&D as opposed to ''purchasing'' R&D from other government agencies or merely coordinating R&D across government agencies? Should the Department's R&D responsibilities be broader than those of the individual programs that are proposed to be transferred into the Department?
3. What is the rationale for transferring some federal R&D functions related to security into the Department—for example, the Computer Security Division of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and various programs within the Department of Energy—while not transferring others, such as those within the Department of Health and Human Services?
4. How will the transferred R&D functions be integrated into the Department? Will the transferred entities maintain their individual identities? How will the transfer of these organizations affect the departments from which they are taken?
5. How will R&D activities within other agencies that are relevant to homeland security be coordinated with those of the Department of Homeland Security? What role will the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) play in that coordination process?
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6. How will the Department maintain functions of transferred agencies that are unrelated to Homeland Security, for example, the earthquake programs of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)?
7. How will the Department interact with the Department of Energy's (DOE) labs, given that the labs are run by private contractors under agreements with DOE not Homeland Security?
2. Background
On June 6, 2002, President Bush announced his intent to create a new Department of Homeland Security. Office of Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge delivered the President's legislative proposal for creation of this new department to Congress on June 18, 2002. The Administration's proposal, introduced by Mr. Armey as H.R. 5005, has been referred to 11 committees with jurisdiction, including the Science Committee. Speaker Hastert set July 12, 2002 as the deadline by which each committee must report out the bill, and created a Select Committee for Homeland Security whose purpose will be to consider the recommendations made by the various committees of jurisdiction and to subsequently report a bill to the House.
The President's Proposal for a Department of Homeland Security
H.R. 5005 designates four primary operational units, each led by an under secretary, within the cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security: (1) Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection; (2) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures; (3) Border and Transportation Security; and (4) Emergency Preparedness and Response. The functional core of each of these secretariats would be culled from existing agencies. A section-by-section summary of the President's proposed legislation, which details these functions and the agencies from which they would be taken, is attached.(see footnote 1)
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Almost all of the R&D functions of the new Department are contained within the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures secretariat—one exception being cyber security R&D, which would occur within the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection secretariat. The R&D activities within the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures secretariat come from a number of agencies, including the Departments of Energy, Agriculture, and Defense. Generally speaking, research functions within the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) would not be formally transferred. Instead, these functions would be carried out within DHHS at the direction of, and with funds from, the Department of Homeland Security. Similar authority to carry out research and development activities through other federal agencies is also granted to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security in the President's bill.
Other Legislative Proposals
Bills authorizing a cabinet-level Department of National Homeland Security were introduced on May 2, 2002 in both the House (H.R. 4660, sponsored by Representatives Thornberry, Harman, Tauscher, and Gibbons) and in the Senate (S. 2452, introduced by Senators Lieberman, Specter, and Graham). While there are many similarities between these bills and the President's proposal, key differences, particularly with respect to the organization of R&D functions within the new department, also exist.
For example, the Lieberman/Thornberry bills proposed creation of an Office of Science and Technology (OST) within the new department to advise the Secretary on research and development issues—providing a department-wide mechanism for directing R&D that is absent from the President's proposal. Their legislation would also establish an Acceleration Fund for Research and Development of Homeland Security Technologies to support homeland security research and accelerate the development of critical homeland security technologies, thus providing a department-wide mechanism for funding research and technology development—another function absent from the President's proposal. The Senate's Committee on Governmental Affairs plans to report out a revised version of the Lieberman bill next month. That product will be considered by the Senate later in July.
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Other models for integrating and coordinating R&D within a large, mission-focused department—such as those employed by the Department of Defense or the Environmental Protection Agency—also exist. The hearing will consider the organizational mechanisms for R&D in the President's proposal in light of other models, including those mentioned above. In addition, the transfer of agency functions currently within the Science Committee's jurisdiction will be examined.
3. Witnesses:
John H. Marburger, III, Ph.D., Director of the Office of Science Technology and Policy in the Executive Office of the President.
Raymond L. Orbach, Director, Office of Science, Department of Energy.
John S. Tritak, Director, Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce.
Chairman BOEHLERT. I want to welcome everyone here today for our second hearing in preparation for drafting our bill to establish of Department of Homeland Security. The need for such a department is as plain as the front page of today's Washington Post, with its talk of an al Qaeda plot against our nation's computer systems. And the need for the Department to have a strong research and development component is equally plain. Just two days ago this Committee was told yet again, this time by the President of Stanford University, that cyber security has become has become a backwater and that as a result the Nation lacks the tools it needs to foil a cyber attack. There is simply no question that in the long run our Homeland Security efforts will fail if R&D is not at their core.
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Unfortunately, I have come to the conclusion that the Bill the Administration has sent us simply does not give research and development a high enough profile to enable the Department of Homeland Security to accomplish its goals. The Bill does not even explicitly mention R&D in some critical areas such as cyber security and transportation security. It creates no slot for an official whose primary concern would be research and development and it does not follow any successful model of R&D coordination. We're going to have to do better if the R&D portions of the Department are to be transformed from a hodgepodge of unrelated agencies and program fragments into a critical mass with the leadership and credibility to attract the best scientists, make the most reliable decisions and sit comfortably and effectively at the table as an equal with other federal R&D agencies.
So the bill we will mark up when we come back from the Independence Day recess will have an under secretary for research and development with a broad but clear mission and the tools he or she will need to carry it out. I believe the Senate is moving in the same direction. To do that, we still have many questions that need to be answered, hence the need for today's hearing.
The Administration bill was written in haste, understandably, and there are many aspects of it that are unclear. For example, how will the disparate units being moved into the critical infrastructure unit be melded together and reorganized? How will the Department of Homeland Security interact with the national laboratories, which are run through contracts with the Department of Energy? How will we ensure that we continue to get the most out of scientific disciplines like microbiology when the work is split along lines that make more sense politically than scientifically?
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Truth be told, I don't think anyone has yet even fully thought through the most basic questions. In what ways do we want research related to homeland security to be different after the reorganization and is the reorganization truly geared to accomplish those goals. The only thing I know is that we have the right people before us today to help sort through these questions.
As everyone knows, I couldn't think more highly of Jack Marburger, but now I am even more in his debt because he took time to travel to my district for a field hearing earlier this week. John Tritak also made the trip and was an excellent witness as I am sure he will be again today. We also today welcome Ray Orbach before the Committee as a witness for the first time. Dr. Orbach is always winning rave reviews for his thoughtful and activist leadership at DOE and for his candor. Two things we admire, leadership and candor. We're going to need that candor today if this is to be a useful discussion.
We all want the same goal, to make the President's proposed department a success so that our Nation is safer. I look forward to working with my colleagues on this panel and in the administration to accomplish that. The Chair now recognizes the ranking minority member, Mr. Hall.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Chairman Sherwood Boehlert follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SHERWOOD BOEHLERT
I want to welcome everyone here today for our second hearing in preparation for drafting our bill to establish a Department of Homeland Security. The need for such a Department is as plain as the front page of today's Washington Post, with its talk of an Al Qaeda plot against our nation's computer systems.
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And the need for that Department to have a .strong research and development (R&D) component is equally plain. Just two days ago, this Committee was told yet again—this time by the president of Stanford University—that cyber security R&D has become a backwater and that as a result the Nation lacks the tools it needs to foil a cyber attack. There is simply no question that, in the long-run, our homeland security efforts will fail if R&D is not at their core.
Unfortunately, I have come to the conclusion that the bill the Administration has sent us simply does not give R&D a high enough profile to enable the Department of Homeland Security to accomplish its goals. The bill does not even explicitly mention R&D in some critical areas, such as cyber security and transportation security; it creates no slot for an official whose primary concern would be R&D, and it does not follow any successful model of R&D coordination.
We're going to have to do better if the R&D portions of the Department are to be transformed from a hodge-podge of unrelated agencies and program fragments into a critical mass with the leadership and credibility to attract the best scientists, make the most reliable decisions and sit comfortably and effectively at the table as an equal with the other federal R&D agencies.
So the bill we mark up when we come back from the Independence Day recess will have an undersecretary for R&D with a broad but clear mission and the tools he or she will need to carry it out. I believe the Senate is moving in the same direction.
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To do that, we still have many questions that need to be answered—hence the need for today's hearing. The Administration bill was written in haste, and, understandably perhaps, there are still many aspects of it that are unclear.
For example, how will the disparate units being moved into the critical infrastructure unit be melded together and reorganized? How will the Department of Homeland Security interact with the National laboratories, which are run through contracts with the Department of Energy? How will we ensure that we continue to get the most out of scientific disciplines like microbiology when the work is split along lines that may make more sense politically than scientifically?
Truth be told, I don't think anyone's yet even fully thought through the most basic question—in what ways do we want research related to homeland security to be different after this reorganization? And is the reorganization truly geared to accomplish those goals?
The only thing I know is that we have the right people before us today to help sort through these questions. As everyone knows, I couldn't think more highly of Jack Marburger, but now I am even more in his debt, because he took time to travel to my District for a field hearing this past Monday. John Tritak also made the trip and was an excellent witness, as I'm sure he will be again today.
We also today welcome Ray Orbach before the Committee as a witness for the first time. Dr. Orbach is already winning rave reviews for his thoughtful and activist leadership at DOE—and for his candor.
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We're going to need that candor today if this is to be a useful discussion. We all have the same goal—to make the President's proposed Department a success so that our nation is safer. I look forward to working with my colleagues on this panel and in the Administration to accomplish that.
Mr. Hall.
Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I'll put my statement in the record. I have to say that as usual you've covered the waterfront and I think it is very important that we have—if we are to do the job right that we're going to need clear forthright answers. And I thank you again. If I can turn this damn thing off. It is the reason I am on the Science Committee. I know how to operate these things. But I look forward to working with you and with Dr. Marburger and other senior members of the President's Science and Technology Team in perfecting this proposal and in ensuring that our country's vast technical talents and our resources are going to be fully harnessed to the greatest challenge of our time. And with that, I'll put my statement in the record. And I think we have a vote on. I thank you and I yield back my time.
[The prepared statement of Representative Hall follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE RALPH M. HALL, JR.
Today is a very important day in the history of this Committee, as we hear testimony on the Administration's plan for ensuring the security of our citizens in their homes and workplaces.
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The President has proposed the creation of a Department of Homeland Security. If passed by Congress, which I fully expect to occur by September 11th, this legislation would create the biggest restructuring of the Federal Government since the 1940's.
In general, I support the President's plan. I believe that the defense of our homeland is best served by the judicious coordination of relevant assets in a new federal department. However, I do have some concerns about the specific proposal before us that I hope our distinguished witnesses will be able to address.
I am concerned that the new Department seems to minimize the importance of research, technology, demonstration, and evaluation. In his testimony, Dr. Marburger refers to the importance of these elements in only one of the four structural titles in the bill.
I would submit that science and technology is integral to the entire enterprise of homeland security. As Senators Hart and Rudman put it in their 2001 Commission report: ''The inadequacies of our systems of research and education post a greater threat to U.S. national security over the next quarter-century than any potential conventional war that we might imagine.''
I agree with the Chairman that this Committee will need to address the failure of the plan to provide for Undersecretary of Research, Technology, Demonstration and Evaluation. On Tuesday, we heard strong testimony from a blue-ribbon panel of the National Academies endorsing this worthwhile concept. Without strong leadership at the creation of the new Department, I fear that science will take a back seat to implementation. That is a recipe for wasted effort and flawed deployment of our limited resources.
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I am also concerned that the legislation is vague and arbitrary in the selection of the technical agencies included in the new department. To cite an extreme example—what logic was used to determine that the Department of Homeland Security should oversee the welfare of circus animals? In a more serious vein, we will need to review today why certain agencies within the Commerce and Energy Departments are transferred, while similar agencies in other Departments are not. These transfers may make sense, but their logic is not apparent.
Mr. Chairman, I realize the Administration compiled this bill very quickly, and that we in the Congress are destined to work our will expeditiously as well. However, if we are to do the job right, we are going to need clear, forthright answers today and in the coming weeks. I look forward to working with Dr. Marburger and other senior members of the President's science and technology team in perfecting this proposal and in ensuring that our country's vast technical talents and resources are fully harnessed to the greatest challenge of our time.
We are undertaking an awesome task today. Together, I believe we can do it in a way that benefits the American people and makes us all safer.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE NICK SMITH
I would like to thank Chairman Boehlert and Ranking Member Hall for holding this hearing today to review the Administration's proposed legislation creating a Department of Homeland Security. This is the third hearing this Committee has had this week examining this issue. The previous two were very enlightening, and I hope that today's testimony and discussion with executive branch witnesses will help us to begin to piece together safe guards to minimize chaos and maximize efficiency.
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The Academies report reviewed on Tuesday outlined a wide range of threats—critical infrastructure, computer and communications systems, agricultural and food systems, and of course, human lives—all areas where science and technology can help us defend ourselves against terror. There are significant challenges as well as opportunities before us. We need to bring it all together with a cohesive and workable plan for the establishment of an agency responsible for improving our total national security.
As Chairman of the Research Subcommittee, which maintains oversight of the National Science Foundation and the United States Fire Administration, I am looking forward to hearing how we can most effectively formulate a restructuring plan that will allow these agencies to maximize their contributions to greater assured safety to our people and systems without losing sight of their core missions. We have an incredibly strong scientific enterprise at our disposal, not only within the Federal Government, but also in our colleges, universities and the private sector. We must take full advantage of these indispensable resources.
I hope the changes we make will streamline and de-fragment the muddle of government agencies with a role in homeland security. However, we have a relatively short time to answer many questions about the new Department. We will need to determine the best way to integrate transferred R&D functions; we will need to understand how those transfers affect the departments from which they are taken; we will need to understand how R&D activities relevant to homeland security within other agencies outside of the new department will be coordinated; and we will need to sift through many other questions.
It is our job on the Science Committee to sift through these questions and report out legislation that optimizes the role of science and technology in the war against terrorism. The Nation's science enterprise will play no small role in this effort, and in the end, I believe will be a crucial component of the overall effort. I look forward to a productive discussion today on these very important issues.
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE GARY G. MILLER
Mr. Chairman, I know I speak for the American people when I say I look forward to the development of the Department of Homeland Security—finally giving our nation an agency wholly focused on the protection of America and its citizens.
There is not a day that goes by when we do not count on science and technology to improve and save lives. With our nation's war on terror, we are specifically relying on science to provide us with the greatest protection, and most efficient and effective response to the possibility of nuclear, biological, and chemical attack.
Fortunately, with a robust and innovative scientific community, the United States has the human resources necessary to support our national security needs. I have no doubt in my mind that we can depend on them to provide for effective homeland security. And further, I have no doubt in my mind they will play an indispensable role in the Department of Homeland Security.
It's clear to all of us that establishing an effective homeland defense is the highest priority Congress has before it. And I thank the Chairman for holding these hearings before the July recess so we may begin constructive dialogue on the Department of Homeland Security.
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE JERRY F. COSTELLO
Good morning. The events of September 11th have had a profound effect on America in many ways. In addition to reevaluating our safety and security, we have been left with many unanswered questions in regard to a unified federal response. I want to thank the witnesses for appearing before our committee to discuss the creation of a Department of National Homeland Security.
As you know, there are currently over 80 agencies that are involved in homeland security. At times, actions in these agencies are duplicative. Because of this, I am particularly interested in learning more about how we can improve our coordination and accountability to create a unified effort, particularly in the area of research and development, as well as the cost of providing resources to address deficiencies in our homeland security preparedness.
I believe the President's proposal is lacking research and development components that would greatly benefit a new Department of Homeland Security. Other proposals, such as the legislation offered in the Senate, create an Office of Science and Technology within the Department of Homeland Security to advise the Secretary on research and development issues and provide a department-wide mechanism for directing research and development. Research and development is essential to the new department and must be integrated into the new agency to ensure America is truly prepared for prevention of any type of terrorist attack.
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In addition, we must optimize coordination between the Department of Homeland Security and the hundreds of thousands of local police officers, firefighters, emergency response workers, and public health officials on the frontlines in our states, counties, and municipalities. These individuals are critically important not just as first responders but also as intelligence gatherers. They must be involved in the process, not on the sidelines, as we formulate this new agency. And these first-responders need to receive significant additional funds to do the job that we are asking them to do.
I again want to thank the witnesses for appearing before this committee and I look forward to their testimony.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lee follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE SHEILA JACKSON LEE
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for organizing this important hearing to delve into the ways that Science and scientific research should be utilized to strengthen the proposed Department of Homeland Security.
After the tragic events of September 11th, obviously national security is foremost in everyone's mind. As is appropriate, the entire Federal Government is working at a fast and furious pace to help design a Department of Homeland Security that will address the vulnerabilities of our nation today, and prepare for the challenges of tomorrow. Unfortunately, it is impossible to equip the new Department with a laundry list of measures that can be taken to make us safe and secure. We have ideas based on past experience and proven technology. However, our enemies have proven to be quite resourceful, and I believe we can count on them to push the envelope of new technology and use it against us. They will be a moving target, and we need to be ready to hit that target.
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Therefore, the Department of Homeland Security should always remain on the cutting edge. Instead of using commercially available technologies off of the shelf, the Department must drive the R&D that that will keep us one step ahead of the enemy. As we learned at an excellent field hearing in Utica, NY on Monday—our computer networks are at risk and we must design next-generation software and hardware firewalls to protect our flow of information, our financial systems, our power grids, our satellites. Such protections will depend on good science and technology.
On Tuesday, we had the privilege of hearing from the National Academy of Sciences as they released their new report on the role of Science and Technology in countering terrorism. Their recommendation of founding a Homeland Security Institute seemed to be a smart way to formulate the strategy to meet the challenges of the future. Obvious areas of active research should include finding vulnerabilities and finding creative ways to shut off opportunities for terrorists.
However, what good will this new knowledge be—if this new knowledge is not disseminated to local governments, and to all of the American people? Research must also be directed toward finding efficient and effective means to communicate with all citizens, regardless of language, or culture, or whether they are online or not. Furthermore, terrorism involves terror. In the battle to save our infrastructure, we should not lose the psychological war. We must also do good research to anticipate the human and emotional needs of the people.
Developing smart strategies to deal with these issues will require good data, from good research.
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So our job today is to get a feel for kind of scientific research the Department of Homeland Security will need to ensure success in the war on terrorism. We also must determine where this research should be carried out, and what it will cost.
I look forward to your statements.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Honda follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE MICHAEL M. HONDA
I thank Chairman Boehlert and Ranking Member Hall for holding this hearing and their leadership in advancing the role of science and technology in homeland security. I would like to bring to the attention of the Committee and the witnesses this report of the Silicon Valley Blue Ribbon Task Force on Aviation Security and Technology.
In October 2001, I first sat down with Silicon Valley business leaders and airport representatives to discuss the development of a comprehensive, technology-driven security system to keep our airways safe. It was my strong belief that any future security solutions for our air travel system would have to include a strong technology component, and that Silicon Valley was poised to deliver that technology.
The Silicon Valley Blue Ribbon Task Force on Aviation Security and Technology was convened in March 2002. It tapped the energy and innovation of Silicon Valley technology, business, policy and aviation experts to address the challenges of aviation security. The Task Force was charged with identifying the tools and technology to help improve security and air traveler convenience at airports, while protecting constitutionally guaranteed individual rights.
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On June 17, the Task Force presented me with its final report. The recommendations, found on Page 1 of the Report, focus on four key areas for using existing and emerging technologies: validate and manage the security of the airport and aviation workforce, such as the use of biometric authentication; strengthen airport facility and airplane security with video monitoring systems, driver and vehicle authentication, and access control; integrate and secure aviation and airport communications infrastructure, including networked digital technology; and ensure passenger respect and rights with appropriate and efficient technology applications.
I believe that one of the most important achievements of the Task Force (particularly for the Department of Homeland Security) is the process it used to identify technologies (page 12) and the operational framework it used to evaluate these technologies (page 14). Earlier this week, the National Research Council recommended that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) establish a strategic research and planning office. It also suggested that the office build a strong foundation of research on human factors and transportation operations and make the evaluation of security system concepts a central element of its research program.
Do the witnesses agree with these recommendations? Considering how important the process of technology evaluation was to my Task Force, what mechanisms do the witnesses feel should be put in place to ensure that research supported by the new Department is coordinated with related research carried out by other federal agencies and the private sector? What do the witnesses believe are the budget implications for establishing a vigorous research program both in-house and through contacts with industry and academia?
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Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Hall. And with your indulgence, we will respond to the call of the House and we will be back as soon as we can. Would you like coffee or something? Can we accommodate you in any way?
[Recess]
Chairman BOEHLERT. Military construction, Department of Defense, authorization, prescription drug plan and there are some differences of opinion as you might suspect. And so we're told they are going to be a lot of procedural votes. So we're going to start. And let me apologize in advance. If we are interrupted, you know the drill as well as I do, it is something over which we have no control.
Our witness list today consists of Dr. John Marburger, director of the Office of Science and Technology in the executive office of the President; Raymond L. Orbach, director of Office of Science, Department of Energy; and John Tritak, director Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, which we affectionately call CIAO. Dr. Marburger, you're first up.
STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN H. MARBURGER, III, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Dr. MARBURGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I am pleased to testify today on this important issue before us. Our Nation is engaged in a historic endeavor: the creation of a single department whose primary mission is the critical task of protecting the United States from catastrophic terrorism.
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Today, no one single Government Agency has homeland security as its primary mission. In fact, responsibilities for homeland security are dispersed among more than 100 different Government entities. America needs a single unified homeland security structure that will improve protection against today's threats, and yet be flexible enough to meet the unknown threats of the future.
President Bush recognizes that only Congress has the authority to create a new Government Department. During his June 6 address to the Nation, the President asked Congress to join him in establishing a single permanent department with an overriding and urgent mission: to secure the homeland of America and protect the American people.
Mr. Chairman, my oral remarks will be brief in order to allow time for questions. I ask that my more extensive testimony be included in the record.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Without objection so ordered and may complete statements of all the witness will appear in the record and we appreciate your desire to summarize. That is helpful to all of us because we get right to the questions.
Dr. MARBURGER. Let me address the role of science and technology in this new department. In the President's vision, the new Department of Homeland Security will have four primary missions: it will control our borders and prevent terrorists and explosives from entering or country; it will work with state and local authorities to respond quickly and effectively to emergencies. It will analyze intelligence and law enforcement information from all Government Agencies; and lastly, and of most relevance to today's discussion, it will bring together the Nation's best scientists and engineers to develop and deploy technologies that detect biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear weapons, and to discover the drugs and treatments to best protect the American people.
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President Bush recognizes that America's vast science and technology base provides us with a key advantage in the war against terrorism. That is why an entire division within the proposed Department of Homeland Security would be devoted to this enterprise.
The Under Secretary for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures is responsible for coordinating the science and technology component of the new department. The broad mandate for this under secretary includes four priorities that I want to emphasize. The first is to secure the United States from acts of terrorism involving chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons, and—this is important—and other emerging threats. Secondly, and not less important, is to conduct homeland security related research and development as well as to develop national policy for and coordinating federal efforts to counter terrorists' threats. Third is to establish priorities for directing funding and conducting national R&D and procurement of technology and systems related to countering these weapons of mass destruction; and finally, to establish guidelines for state and local Government efforts to counter these threats.
The new department would also incorporate and focus the intellectual energy and extensive capacity of several important scientific institutions, including activities conducted at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and other laboratories within the Department of Energy. My colleague, Dr. Orbach, will address some of these.
The lab would be the hub for work devoted to scientific and technological counter measures to terrorists' threats involving weapons of mass destruction. It would also coordinate the R&D activities with other national labs engaged in homeland security R&D.
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Mr. Chairman, the current labyrinth of more than 100 different Government Agencies prevents our homeland security infrastructure from adapting quickly to new and changing threats. The new department would enjoy maximum flexibility for many reasons. For example, today many federal agencies share responsibility for developing technologies relevant to homeland security such as emergency communications, systems interoperability and critical infrastructure protection. In the President's proposal, a number of these organizations would be integrated into the Department of Homeland Security. The new department must be an agile, fast-paced and responsive organization that takes the advantage of 21st Century technology and management techniques to meet a 21st Century threat.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that the President's proposal can accommodate the kind of leadership and centralization of science and R&D policy for homeland security that you and the other Members of the Committee—and indeed we too—want to see in the R&D component of homeland security. We're looking forward to working with you and your colleagues on this issue.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Marburger follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN H. MARBURGER, III
Chairman Boehlert, Ranking Member Hall, and other Members of the Committee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today. I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to Governor Ridge and his staff at the Office of Homeland Security for their tireless efforts and dedication to the President and the Nation to protect the homeland.
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And thanks to Members of Congress for your own efforts in regards to homeland security; for your support of the President's homeland proposal; and for your receptivity and commitment to enacting legislation expeditiously to create a Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
The United States is engaged in a historic endeavor: the creation of a single government department whose primary mission is the critical task of protecting the U.S. from catastrophic terrorism. The current system is a labyrinth spread among more than 100 government entities, none of which has homeland security as its primary mission. The President's bold proposal is intended to create a structure that protects against today's threats and ensures a level of flexibility that would counter the unknown threats of the future.
President Bush recognizes that only Congress has the authority to create a new government department. During his June 6th address to the Nation, the President asked Congress to join him in establishing a single, permanent department with an overriding and urgent mission: secure the homeland of America and protect the American people. The President desires to work with Congress on this government reorganization to make Americans safer. The proposal to create a Department of Homeland Security is one more key step in the President's national strategy for homeland security.
I am pleased to speak today, because the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) works in close coordination with the Office of Homeland Security (OHS). Science and technology are critical to defending our homeland. OSTP's role of coordinating science and technology efforts across the Federal Government enables us to provide necessary support on these issues to OHS.
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
In the President's vision, the new Department would have four primary missions:
It would control our borders and prevent terrorists and explosives from entering our country;
It would work with state and local authorities to respond quickly and effectively to emergencies;
It would bring together our best scientists and engineers to develop and to deploy technologies that detect biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear weapons, and to discover the drugs and treatments to best protect the American people; and
It would analyze intelligence and law enforcement information from all government agencies.
The main science and technology component of the new Department is largely organized under the division headed by the Under Secretary for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures. The broad mandate for this Under Secretary is:
to secure the U.S. from acts of terrorism involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons or other emerging threats;
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to conduct homeland security-related research and development, as well as to develop national policy for, and to coordinate federal efforts related to, countering terrorist threats;
to establish priorities for directing, funding, and conducting national research and development (R&D) and procurement of technology and systems related to countering these weapons of mass destruction; and
to establish guidelines for state and local government efforts to counter these threats.
I would like to highlight some of the science and technology programs proposed to become part of the new Department, as defined in Title III of the President's proposed legislation. Section 302 would transfer functions from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Department of Agriculture (USDA).
The Office of Health and Safety at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has been in charge of maintaining a list of select agents, ''capable of causing substantial harm to human health,'' including infectious agents and toxins. The regulations specify procedures for interstate shipping and proper registration and documentation of facilities involved in all transfers. The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (PL 107–188) updated and expanded the responsibilities of the CDC and created an analogous select agent program in USDA. The law will expand oversight to all possessors of select agents. OSTP is participating in an interagency working group with representation from the CDC, USDA, DOD, the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Institutes of Health, the Food and Drug Administration, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Transportation (DOT). The interagency working group is creating guidelines for the new regulations at HHS and USDA, and it will update the select agent list and issue a notice of registration for possession of select agents. Following this update, the interagency working group will also consider laboratory security issues and exemptions to the permitting process (e.g., research, diagnostics, and emergencies).
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The new Department would incorporate and focus the intellectual energy and extensive capacity of several important scientific institutions, including activities conducted at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The new Department would assume responsibility for a central management and research facility located on the LLNL campus, with satellite Centers of Excellence located on the grounds of other DOE laboratories. These facilities would become the focus of activities to develop and implement scientific and technological countermeasures to terrorist threats involving weapons of mass destruction, and would provide a multidisciplinary environment for developing and demonstrating new technologies for homeland security. They would maintain a critical mass of scientific and engineering talent with a deep understanding of the various operational and technical issues associated with homeland security systems.
Envisioned activities for the laboratories include developing, demonstrating, and then transitioning to the field new technologies and system concepts for countering the specific threats of nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorism; reaching out to various regional, state, and local homeland security efforts, gaining familiarity with their issues, and providing them core research, development, test and evaluation expertise; providing, in consultation with state and local governments, and with the private sector, a capability for analyzing, validating, and setting standards for homeland security equipment, and developing comprehensive protocols to be used by industry for certification of compliance with these standards; and conducting and supporting threat and vulnerability analyses.
The mission of the National Bio Weapons Defense Analysis Center is to develop countermeasures to potential attacks by terrorists who threaten to use weapons of mass destruction. The Center has two major components:
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to evaluate national requirements for analysis of emerging biological threats and assessment of countermeasures against those threats; and
to create and to deploy a national, multi-component, multi-organization defense capability targeted to urban areas, other high-value assets, and special events.
The goal is to provide an integrated capability to detect, to mitigate and to respond to biological-related incidents.
The Plum Island Animal Disease Center, currently part of USDA, is the location of all highly infectious foreign animal disease research. Jointly staffed by the Agriculture Research Service and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Plum Island is charged with research to support new methods for diagnosis, new vaccines and veterinary treatments, and diagnostic investigations. It is responsible for assuring the disease-free state of imported animals and animal products, and it provides training for animal health professionals to diagnose foreign animal diseases. The facility is one of two animal-disease biosafety-level-3 labs in the U.S.
Science and technology cut across all divisions of the new department. For example, OSTP has been working with OHS to assess technology solutions for urgent needs, such as baggage screening at the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the evaluation of biometrics and other technology to be deployed at the borders. TSA, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the U.S. Customs Service would come under the proposed Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security. Technology solutions would prove important for all the missions contained within this division.
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Science and technology obviously play a vital role with interoperable systems, data-mining, and data-fusion, which lie within the purview of the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection.
Some of the key areas in which R&D is required in the new Department include:
Advanced technologies for border security;
Emergency communications;
Systems interoperability;
Data integration and analysis;
Surveillance;
Critical infrastructure protection;
Emergency preparedness and response;
Timely detection and tracking of chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological threats;
Medical treatments; and
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Event modeling.
Today many federal agencies share responsibility for developing these technologies. In the President's proposal, several of these organizations would be integrated into the Department of Homeland Security. But the new Department would prove a major customer for technologies developed in other parts of the Federal Government, such as the national labs, the intelligence community, and DOD, as well as technologies developed in the private sector.
This prospect is an exciting one for us, and we look forward to working with the Department and OHS to ensure the newly focused homeland security research efforts are coordinated with agencies that are still involved but have not been transferred, such as DOD, the Federal Aviation Administration, the National Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Department of Commerce. Together, OHS and OSTP will continue their traditional roles of coordinating interagency efforts related to homeland security science and technology.
INTERIM STEPS
While the new Department is being created, we need to ensure important technology work continues.
Soon after the 9/11 attacks, OSTP launched an Anti-terrorism Task Force to focus on research and technology within the Federal Government. The Task Force began to assemble a better inventory of agencies' current work relevant to homeland security, not only to reduce unnecessary duplication and to increase cooperation, but also, more importantly, to determine what gaps and opportunities exist.
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OSTP has formed four interagency working groups under the Anti-terrorism Task Force that focus on specific technologies:
Biological and Chemical Preparedness;
Radiological, Nuclear and Conventional Explosives Preparedness;
Protection of Vital Systems; and
Social, Behavioral, and Educational Issues.
OSTP will continue to rely on all of the interagency working groups to track progress and to develop priorities as we move into the FY 2004 agency budgeting process. This activity will continue while Congress debates the legislation and during the transition period, as needed.
CONCLUSION
The Nation will benefit from a single department whose primary mission is a coordinated effort to protect our homeland. Part of that coordinated effort will include a larger systems approach toward the role of science and technology at all levels of homeland security. The new Department of Homeland Security must be an agile, fast-paced and responsive organization that takes advantage of 21st century technology and management techniques to meet a 21st century threat. R&D will continue in agencies outside the Department, and OSTP and OHS will continue to play an important role in interagency coordination of those ongoing efforts.
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BIOGRAPHY FOR JOHN H. MARBURGER, III
John H. Marburger, III is the President's Science Advisor and Director of the Office of Science and Technology. Dr. Marburger is the former Director of the U.S. Department of Energy's Brookhaven National Laboratory and President of Brookhaven Science Associates. He is presently on a leave of absence from the State University of New York at Stony Brook where he served as President and Professor from 1980 to 1994 and as a University Professor of Physics and Electrical Engineering from 1994 to 1997. Dr. Marburger served as the Dean of the College of Letters, Arts and Sciences at the University of Southern California from 1976 to 1980. He has been a member of numerous professional, civic and philanthropic organizations including the Universities Research Association, the Advisory Committee to the New York State Senate Committee on Higher Education and the Board of Directors of the Museums at Stony Brook. He is a graduate of Princeton University and received a Ph.D. in Applied Physics from Stanford University.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Dr. Marburger. Dr. Orbach.
STATEMENT OF DR. RAYMOND L. ORBACH, DIRECTOR OF OFFICE OF SCIENCE, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Dr. ORBACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here and I thank you for inviting me today to speak on behalf of Secretary Abraham to discuss Title III of the Homeland Security Act as it applies to the Office of Science and the Department of Energy. The President's proposal to organize the Department of Homeland Security will significantly improve the way the Government responds to threats against the United States. The President's plan simply makes good sense. We, at the Department of Energy, are proud of our role in the fight against terrorism and we look forward to working with the Congress and the Administration to make a smooth transition to a new department.
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The Office of Science has attracted and developed many of our Nation's finest scientists and engineers. They are patriotic. They wish to contribute to homeland defense. And part of our proposal will be to create a structure by which using our national laboratories. Their talents and energies can apply to the issues that this new department will face. We also will be transferring from our own programs an area of distinct importance to the new department, and that is in the area of pathogenic agents. We need to see that the new department has the in-house capability of understanding the nature of the threat and the ability to respond to that threat. So we are proposing to transfer from the Office of Science our program in pathogenic microbes. This will be accompanied, not only by DNA sequencing, but also by technology development, computational tools, and databases and then advance scientific computation. We view the four of those as being an integral whole which will enable the new department to react to the subtleties associated with pathogens and meet the demands that the Department has placed upon it.
We have appointed in each of our national laboratories, ten of them, a Director of Homeland Security. And as I have been going around the country to do my site visits at these national laboratories we have been inviting scientists and vice chancellors and vice provosts for research to attend those meetings and to request their participation in homeland defense. The Homeland Security director in each national laboratory is a single point of contact for universities in the regions that surround that particular national laboratory and will serve as a single point of contact for the Department of Homeland Security through my office. In this way, we hope that the needs of the Department can be transferred in addition to their own capabilities through our national laboratories to the scientific strength of our Nation directly. And in return, the ideas and insights and guidance from our scientific community as a whole can be made available to the new department. We are committed to working with the Department in every aspect of its responsibilities and look forward to its creation.
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[The prepared statement of Dr. Orbach follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF RAYMOND L. ORBACH
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure to be here today, on behalf of Secretary Abraham, to discuss Title 111 of the Homeland Security Act as it applies to the Office of Science and the Department of Energy.
The President's proposal to organize the Department of Homeland Security will significantly improve the way the Government responds to threats against the United States. The President's plan simply makes good sense. We at the Department of Energy are proud of our role in the fight against terrorism and we look forward to working with Congress and the Administration to make a smooth transition to a new department.
The Office of Science has attracted and developed many of our Nation's finest scientists and engineers. Their capabilities and assets are currently being applied toward our homeland security and counter-terrorism challenges. Several DOE Science-related activities will be transferred to the Department of Homeland Security, including:
1. DNA SEQUENCING—High throughput DNA sequencing is used to determine the sequences of pathogenic microbes that can be used by bio-terrorists and related microbes. Each pathogen has many close genetic relatives that do not cause disease but that need to be characterized so that more accurate detection methodologies can be developed that avoid unnecessary and alarming false positives.
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2. TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT—We are now using computational tools to compare the gene sequence from an organism to the database of existing gene sequence. This research can be redirected to aid in anti-terrorism research and development.
3. COMPUTATIONAL TOOLS AND DATABASES—Faster, more robust computational tools are being developed for searching the rapidly expanding databases of microbial (and other) DNA sequence data. In addition, dedicated, secure databases may be needed in some cases to prevent sensitive information on potential bio-threat agents or on methods for their detection from falling into the hands of terrorists.
4. ADVANCED SCIENTIFIC COMPUTING AT LAWRENCE LIVERMORE—The Advanced Scientific Computing Research program supports researchers at LLNL in applied mathematics and computer science to achieve optimal efficiencies from large scale computing systems.
Further, we have identified a Director of Homeland Security within each Office of Science laboratory that would be a single point of contact within the national laboratory, and would act as the vehicle for transmitting anti-terrorist research and development needs of DHS to the laboratory, and opportunities within the laboratory to DHS.
Again, it's a pleasure to be here with you today and I look forward to answering any of the questions you or other Members of the Committee may have.
BIOGRAPHY FOR RAYMOND L. ORBACH
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Dr. Raymond L. Orbach was sworn in as the 14th Director of the Office of Science at the Department of Energy (DOE) on March 14, 2002. As Director of the Office of Science (SC), Dr. Orbach manages an organization that is the third largest federal sponsor of basic research in the United States and is viewed as one of the premier science organizations in the world. The SC fiscal year 2002 budget of $3.3 billion funds programs in high energy and nuclear physics, basic energy sciences, magnetic fusion energy, biological and environmental research, and computational science. SC, formerly the Office of Energy Research, also provides management oversight of the Chicago and Oak Ridge Operations Offices, the Berkeley and Stanford Site Offices, and 10 DOE non-weapons laboratories.
Prior to his appointment, Dr. Orbach served as Chancellor of the University of California (UC), Riverside from April 1992 through March 2002; he now holds the title Chancellor Emeritus. During his tenure as Chancellor, UC–Riverside grew from the smallest to one of the most rapidly growing campuses in the UC system. Enrollment increased from 8,805 to more than 14,400 students with corresponding growth in faculty and new teaching, research, and office facilities.
In addition to his administrative duties at UC–Riverside, Dr. Orbach maintained a strong commitment to teaching. He sustained an active research program; worked with postdoctoral, graduate, and undergraduate students in his laboratory; and taught the freshman physics course each winter quarter. As Distinguished Professor of Physics, Dr. Orbach set the highest standards for academic excellence. From his arrival, UC–Riverside scholars led the Nation for seven consecutive years in the number of fellows elected to the prestigious American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS).
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Dr. Orbach began his academic career as a postdoctoral fellow at Oxford University in 1960 and became an assistant professor of applied physics at Harvard University in 1961. He joined the faculty of the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) two years later as an associate professor, and became a full professor in 1966. From 1982 to 1992, he served as the Provost of the College of Letters and Science at UCLA.
Dr. Orbach's research in theoretical and experimental physics has resulted in the publication of more than 240 scientific articles. He has received numerous honors as a scholar including two Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Fellowships, a National Science Foundation Senior Postdoctoral Fellowship, a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship, the Joliot Curie Professorship at the Ecole Superieure de Physique et Chimie Industrielle de la Ville de Paris, the Lorentz Professorship at the University of Leiden in the Netherlands, and the 1991–1992 Andrew Lawson Memorial Lecturer at UC–Riverside. He is a fellow of the American Physical Society and the AAAS.
Dr. Orbach has also held numerous visiting professorships at universities around the world. These include the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium, Tel Aviv University, and the Imperial College of Science and Technology in London. He also serves as a member of 20 scientific, professional, or civic boards.
Dr. Orbach received his Bachelor of Science degree in Physics from the California Institute of Technology in 1956. He received his Ph.D. degree in Physics from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1960 and was elected to Phi Beta Kappa.
Dr. Orbach was born in Los Angeles, California. He is married to Eva S. Orbach. They have three children and seven grandchildren.
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Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much. Mr. Tritak.
STATEMENT OF JOHN S. TRITAK, DIRECTOR, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ASSURANCE OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Mr. TRITAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. I'll obviously try to keep my remarks brief along with my colleagues. You know, through my various activities as director of CIAO, I have come to appreciate the need for greater coordination in efforts to secure our homeland, and protect our critical infrastructures.
The President's proposal creates a new Homeland Security Department, which is a key step in enhancing that degree of coordination. The Commerce Department fully supports the President's plan and stands ready to facilitate the creation of the new department. In the President's plan, one of four divisions of the new department would focus on information analysis and infrastructure protection. The plan calls for consolidating the key federal operating units that deal with critical infrastructure protection and cyber security issues within this division.
Two of those operating units will be transferred to the new division from the Department of Commerce, my own office, the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, and the Computer Security Division of NIST. And I would like to briefly state something about each of those, and then look forward to more questions as we go forward.
The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office was created in 1998 by Presidential directive and continued under an executive order under this Administration. Our responsibilities focus in three key areas: promoting national outreach and awareness with the private sector and State and local government; assisting federal agencies in analyzing their dependencies on critical infrastructures, a program called Project Matrix; and finally, coordinating the preparation of an integrated national strategy for critical infrastructure assurance. I would touch on a couple of those very quickly.
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Because there are no boundaries in cyberspace and because a vast majority of the Nation's critical infrastructure are privately owned and operated, Government action alone cannot secure them. Only an unprecedented partnership between private industry and Government is going to work here, and forging this broad based partnership is an essential element of what the CIAO has been doing and will continue to do. With respect to the private sector, we have developed a nationwide outreach effort that targets senior corporate leadership who are responsible for setting corporate policy and company resources. Our job and one of the focuses of our activities is translating the concerns of critical infrastructure assurance into terms that business leaders understand. This is a business case for action. It has direct applicability to the fiduciary duties and oversight functions as corporate leaders.
Another area that CIAO is going to be focusing on in the next fiscal year is the creation of an information integration program. The President's 2003 request, he would establish an Information Integration Program Office within the CIAO to improve the coordination of information sharing essential to combating terrorism nationwide. The most important function of this office will be to design and help to implement an interagency information architecture that will support efforts to find, track and respond to terrorist threats within the United States and around the world in a way that improves both the time of response and the quality of decisions.
I would like to give my remaining remarks to the Computer Security Division. I have a feeling that is what is most near and dear to your hearts. NIST Computer Security Division supports the President's vision of strong cyber-security and its crucial role both in homeland security as well as E-Government. The CSD works with industry and Government to establish secure interoperable information technology systems and networks in four key areas: in developing cryptographic methods for protecting the integrity, confidentiality and authenticity of information resources; in researching, developing and applying current and emerging technology to protect the integrity, confidentiality, reliability and availability of IT systems; in developing security management guides and promoting awareness of security threats, requirement and work products; and finally, in developing, managing and promoting security assessment tools, techniques and services that support programs for testing, evaluation and validation.
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In addition to these activities, NIST has specific statutory responsibilities under the Computer Security Act and the Government Information Security Reform Act for developing standards and guidelines to assist federal agencies in protection of sensitive and classified systems. In support of this mission, the CSD conduct standards and research to help industry produce more secure yet cost effective products for the marketplace. Having more secure products in the marketplace benefits federal agencies because agencies use commercial products to secure their systems. In carrying out its security responsibilities under GISRA and the Computer Security Act, the CSD works very closely with the Office of Management and Budget.
In concluding, Mr. Chairman, today no single agency can carry all the responsibilities of homeland security and no single one has to date. Responsibilities for homeland security are distributed among more than 100 different agencies in the Federal Government. The proposal set forth by the President is an attempt to strike a balance between consolidating multiple functions under one agency and coordinating the remaining agencies in their efforts. Clearly, by moving various elements of the Commerce Department into the Homeland Security Department is not going to end the need to coordinate the R&D community with lead agencies. It is simply a matter of giving our focused attention to a particular concern that has been a concern of mine and many others for several years. Obviously, the ultimate bill is going to have to be a product of a consensus between the Administration and the Congress and there is going to have to be a give and take on both sides. I look forward to working with you as you work through this process. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tritak follows:]
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN S. TRITAK
Introduction
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am honored to appear before you today representing the Department of Commerce. I look forward to discussing with you the important role that the Department of Commerce—and two particular units within the Department—would play in the new Department of Homeland Security. It is very clear in this current environment that the country needs a single, unified homeland security structure that will improve protection against today's threats and be flexible enough to help meet the unknown threats of the future.
A topic of this hearing—cyber security and its role in our nation's overall homeland security strategy—is a subject that I have been involved with intimately for many years. assuming office last year. I am the Director of the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) in the Department of Commerce. In addition, I am a member of the President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, and I work closely with Board staff in conducting and coordinating critical infrastructure protection activities. I have spoken to the private sector and to State and local government officials on the topic of critical infrastructure assurance and cyber security on several occasions. Through these activities, I have come to appreciate the need for greater coordination of efforts to protect our homeland security including cyber security.
President's Proposal for a Department of Homeland Security
The President's proposal to create a new Department of Homeland Security is one key step in the President's national strategy for homeland security that would significantly enhance this coordination. His decision to take this monumental step—the most sweeping reorganization of our national security establishment in over 50 years—was made on the basis of careful study and experience gained since September 11. Under the President's plan, for the first time, we would have a single Department whose primary mission is to secure our homeland. The Secretary of Commerce, the Under Secretary and I—as well as all other senior management at the Commerce Department—fully support the President's plan and stand ready to undertake necessary efforts to facilitate the creation of this new Department as soon as possible.
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In the President's plan—which builds on the strong bipartisan work that has been conducted by many Members of Congress—one of the four divisions of the new Department would be the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Division. In addition to intelligence and threat analysis, one of the primary missions of this Division would be to identify and assess the vulnerabilities of, and take steps to protect, the key resources and critical infrastructures of the United States—including cyber assets and infrastructures. In order to most effectively accomplish this goal, the President's plan calls for consolidating the key federal operating units that deal with critical infrastructure protection and cyber security issues within this Division. The new Division will combine functions that are currently fragmented and inefficient, minimize duplication or redundancy of efforts, and ensure that critical infrastructure and cyber security activities can be more closely directed and coordinated.
Two of the operating units that would be transferred to the new Division currently reside in the Department of Commerce—my office, the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (known as the ''CIAO'') and the Computer Security Division of NIST's Information Technology Laboratories. In my remaining time, I would like to discuss the principal activities in which these two units are involved so you can more fully understand why the transfer of these units to the new Department would greatly benefit its mission to protect our nation's critical infrastructures and enhance cyber security.
Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office
The CIAO was created in May 1998 by Presidential Decision Directive 63 to serve as an interagency office located at the Department of Commerce to coordinate the Federal Government's initiatives on critical infrastructure assurance and cyber security. In addition, pursuant to the Executive Order (October 18, 2001), the CIAO began serving as a member of and an advisor to the President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, which was created to coordinate federal efforts and programs relating to the protection of information systems and networks essential to the operation of the Nation's critical infrastructures.
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The CIAO's responsibilities for developing and coordinating national critical infrastructure assurance policy focus primarily on three key areas: (1) promoting national outreach and awareness campaigns, both in the private sector and at the State and local government level; (2) assisting federal agencies to analyze their own risk exposure and critical infrastructure dependencies; and (3) coordinating the preparation of an integrated national strategy for critical infrastructure assurance.
Outreach and Awareness
As you know, securing the Nation's critical infrastructures against cyber attacks goes well beyond the government's traditional role of physical protection through defense of national airspace and national borders. Because there are no boundaries in cyberspace, and because the vast majority of the Nation's critical infrastructures are privately owned and operated, government action alone cannot secure them. Only an unprecedented partnership between private industry and government will work. Forging this broad based partnership between the private sector and all levels of government lies at the heart of the CIAO's mission.
With respect to the private sector, the CIAO has developed and implemented a nation-wide industry outreach program targeting senior corporate leadership responsible for setting company policy and allocating company resources. Part of this task involves translating our concerns regarding critical infrastructure protection and cyber security into terms that corporate boards and CEOs will understand. The basic message is that critical infrastructure assurance is a matter of sound corporate governance, and corporate boards, as part of their fiduciary duty, must provide effective oversight of the development and implementation of appropriate security policies and practices.
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In addition to infrastructure owners and operators, the CIAO's awareness and outreach efforts also target other influential stakeholders in the economy. The risk management community—including the audit and insurance professions—is particularly effective in raising matters of corporate governance and accountability with boards and senior management. In addition, the investment community is increasingly interested in how information security practices affect shareholder value—a concern of vital interest to corporate boards and management. With these audiences, the CIAO's outreach efforts focus on the fact that cyber threats can and will affect operational survivability, shareholder value, customer relations, and public confidence.
Because State and local governments play a significant role in critical infrastructure assurance, the CIAO also has developed an outreach and awareness program for State and local governments. Similar to its program for industry, the CIAO has laid out a plan to implement outreach partnerships with respected and credible channels within State and local government. CIAO also has met with the National Governors Association and the National Association of State Chief Information Officers to encourage input into the National Strategy for Cyberspace Security. As part of its State and local government outreach effort, the CIAO has began a series of four state conferences designed to collect lessons learned and applied from the events of September 11, with the end result being a compendium of community best practices that can be used by State and local governments to increase protection of their critical infrastructures.
Project Matrix
In addition to outreach activities, the CIAO also is responsible for assisting civilian federal departments and agencies in analyzing their dependencies on critical infrastructures. The purpose of this exercise is to ensure that the Federal Government continues to be able to deliver services essential to the Nation's security, economy, or the health and safety of its citizens, notwithstanding deliberate attempts to disrupt such services through cyber or physical attacks.
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To accomplish this goal, the CIAO developed ''Project Matrix,'' a program designed to identify and characterize accurately the assets and associated infrastructure dependencies and interdependencies that the U.S. Government requires to fulfill its most critical responsibilities to the Nation. Project Matrix involves a three-step process in which each civilian federal department and agency identifies (i) its critical assets; (ii) other Federal Government assets, systems, and networks on which those critical assets depend to operate; and (iii) all associated dependencies on privately owned and operated critical infrastructures.
Once such critical assets and associated dependencies are identified, federal departments and agencies must assess their vulnerability to physical or cyber attack. If they are determined to be vulnerable, departments and agencies must develop and implement plans to manage the risks posed by potential attacks to the performance of essential functions and services. These plans should seek to deter attacks from happening in the first place, protect critical assets from damage or destruction if attacks occur, mitigate the operational impact of attacks if protective measures fail, restore operations if attacks disrupt services, and reconstitute any assets damaged or destroyed during attacks.
Early experience with the CIAO's Project Matrix process has demonstrated such significant utility that the Office of Management and Budget has recently issued a directive requiring all federal civilian agencies under its authority to fund and perform the analysis.
Homeland Security Information Integration Program
The Administration is proposing in the President's Fiscal Year 2003 budget request to establish an Information Integration Program Office (IIPO) within the CIAO to improve the coordination of information sharing essential to combating terrorism nationwide. The most important function of this office will be to design and help implement an interagency information architecture that will support efforts to find, track, and respond to terrorist threats within the United States and around the world, in a way that improves both the time of response and the quality of decisions. Together with the lead federal agencies, and guided strategically by the Office of Homeland Security, the IIPO will: (a) create an essential information inventory; (b) determine horizontal and vertical sharing requirements; (c) define a target architecture for information sharing; and (d) determine the personnel, software, hardware, and technical resources needed to implement the architecture. The foundation projects will produce roadmaps (migration strategies) that will be used by the agencies to move to the desired state.
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The Office of Homeland Security and the CIAO's Information Integration Program Office will also define near-term pilot projects and proof of concept initiatives that can immediately address short-term OHS requirements. These short term efforts can offer immediate results while putting in place the foundations for continuous improvement. They will also introduce new and emerging information technologies as appropriate and relevant to the agreed objectives of each pilot project.
National Strategies for Infrastructure Protection
Finally, the CIAO also plays a major role with respect to the development and drafting of the two national strategies relating to critical infrastructure protection—the National Strategy for Cyber Space Security and the National Strategy for Homeland Security. Specifically, the CIAO coordinates and facilitates input from private industry, as well as State and local government, to the national strategies. The Office of Homeland Security has enlisted the CIAO to provide coordination and support for its efforts to compile information and private sector input to its strategy to protect the physical facilities of critical infrastructure systems. The CIAO, working with its private sector partners, also has been instrumental in coordinating input from the private sector to the cyberspace security strategy.
NIST Computer Security Division
NIST's Computer Security Division (CSD) supports the President's vision of strong cyber security and its crucial role both in homeland security as well as in E-Government by enabling improvements in service to our citizens through secure electronic programs.
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CSD receives approximately $10 million of direct Congressional appropriations, funding a NIST staff of about 51 full-time-equivalents (FTE's), which support both its federal and industry computer security responsibilities. CSD focuses its attention on a few key areas, including cryptographic standards and guidelines; public key infrastructure; security research; agency assistance, and the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP), which is jointly managed by NIST and the National Security Agency (NSA) to focus on increasing the number and quality of IT security products.
CSD works with industry and government to establish secure, interoperable information technology systems and networks in four key areas:
(1) Developing cryptographic methods for protecting the integrity, confidentiality, and authenticity of information resources. The division addresses such technical areas as: secret and public key cryptographic techniques, advanced authentication systems, cryptographic protocols and interfaces, public key certificate management, smart tokens, cryptographic key escrowing, and security architectures;
(2) Researching, developing, and applying current and emerging technology to protect the integrity, confidentiality, reliability, and availability of IT systems. The Division is involved in technical areas such as advanced countermeasures, intrusion detection, firewalls, and scanning tools, vulnerability analysis/mitigation, access control, incident response, security criteria/metrics, assurance methods, and Internet security;
(3) Developing security management guidance and promoting awareness of security threats, requirements, and division work products. It addresses such areas such as risk management, security program management, training and awareness, contingency planning, personnel security, administrative measures, and procurement. It also serves as the focal point for division support of outreach activities and services to support expert review team security support to federal agencies; and,
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(4) By developing, managing, and promoting security assessment tools, techniques, services, and supporting programs for testing, evaluation, and validation. The division addresses such areas as development and maintenance of security metrics, security evaluation criteria and evaluation methodologies, security-specific criteria for laboratory accreditation, guidance on the use of evaluated and tested products, research to address assurance methods and system-wide security and assessment methodologies, security protocol validation activities, and appropriate coordination with assessment-related activities of voluntary industry standards and bodies and other assessment regimes.
In addition to the activities described above, NIST has specific statutory responsibilities under the Computer Security Act and the Government Information Security Reform Act (GISRA) for developing standards and guidelines to assist federal agencies in the protection of sensitive unclassified systems. In support of this mission, CSD conducts standards and research to help industry produce more secure—yet cost-effective—products for the marketplace. Having more secure products available in the marketplace benefits federal agencies because agencies use commercial products to secure their systems.
In carrying out its security responsibilities under GISRA and the Computer Security Act, CSD works very closely with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). CSD's experts work with OMB representatives on the Federal Chief Information Officers Council, the Federal Computer Security Program Managers' Forum, the Committee on National Security Systems, and will soon also serve on the newly formed Committee on Executive Branch Information Systems Security.
Conclusion
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As the President and Governor Ridge have noted, today no federal agency has homeland security—including cyber security—as its primary mission. Responsibilities for homeland security are dispersed among more than 100 different agencies of the Federal Government. The President's plan would combine these various operating units with responsibility for cyber security—including the CIAO and NIST's Computer Security Division from the Commerce Department—into a single division so that the operations and activities of these units could be more closely directed and coordinated. This will serve to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the Federal Government's critical infrastructure assurance and cyber security efforts.
Thank you, and I welcome any questions that you may have.
BIOGRAPHY FOR JOHN S. TRITAK
John S. Tritak is Director of the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO). Mr. Tritak is a member of the President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board and is responsible for coordinating the development of the Administration's National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection to address threats to the Nation's communications and electronic systems, transportation, energy, banking and finance, health and medical services, water supply, and key government services. He is also responsible for assisting federal departments and agencies in identifying their dependencies on critical infrastructure under the Project Matrix program, and coordinating national awareness and outreach efforts to private industry and State and local governments.
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Before joining the CIAO, Mr. Tritak was an attorney with the law firm of Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard, McPherson and Hand, Chartered. As a member of the firm's federal practice group, Mr. Tritak provided advice and counsel on wide range of legal, legislative and policy matters, including critical infrastructure protection, to domestic and international clients in the defense, telecommunications, and transportation industries.
Mr. Tritak served as Deputy Director for Defense Relations and Security Assistance in the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, where he was responsible for coordinating U.S. efforts in security assistance and defense trade in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. As Deputy Director of the Bureau's Office of Policy Analysis, he advised on matters relating to postwar Persian Gulf security.
He also served as a State Department adviser to the U.S. delegation negotiating the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in Geneva, Switzerland, and was a deputy political adviser to U.S. Central Command in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, during Operation Desert Shield. Mr. Tritak previously served as a consultant on national security and military matters at Pacific Sierra Research.
Mr. Tritak received a B.S. in political science from the State University of New York at Brockport, an M.A. in War Studies from the University of London, Kings College, and earned his J.D. from the Georgetown University Law Center.
Discussion
Chairman. BOEHLERT. Thank you very much. To all of our witnesses, we're on the fast track here as we all can appreciate. So we're going to have some written questions and I would hope that if we get them to you by the end of the day, we might be able to get a response by next week. It is very important. We've got a July 12 timetable, we're going to meet on this committee.
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Need for a DHS Under Secretary for R&D
Dr. Marburger, do you agree that it is essential the Department have a clear R&D mission led by someone with a background and accountability to carry it out? And wouldn't that be easier to accomplish with an under secretary assigned exclusively for the R&D function across the new department?
Dr. MARBURGER. I believe that the assignment of responsibilities under Title III to the Under Secretary for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures effectively accomplishes that. Clearly, the intention is for that area to provide leadership in R&D for the entire department. I believe that is explicitly stated under item 2 under section 301. And so my response is that I do believe that in the general framework set forth in the President's proposal there is a capability of addressing this need for R&D leadership.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Well, that may be the intent, but it is the framework, but we got a lot of refining to do. And I think for openers, it would be better to say unequivocally an ''Under Secretary for Research and Development.'' The under secretary outlined in the draft legislation or the legislation submitted to the hill has some non-R&D responsibilities. And if you have somebody in charge of R&D across the Department, you don't have any time left over for anything else and it doesn't deal with some other areas. So we're going to do our level best to have our fingerprints all over this bill, particularly in this area, to clearly designate an Under Secretary for Research and Development and do as much as we can to get a clear roadmap of where we want to be in this area. Let me ask you, where do you envision that the R&D for cyber security and transportation security would fall?
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Dr. MARBURGER. I believe that R&D for those functions will be performed in a variety of departments, as they are now, coordinated under coordinating structures within the Department of Homeland Security that would fall within the purview of the R&D policy organization under Title III. There is no question that each of the lower divisions within the new department has R&D needs and a technical component. The intention is to coordinate those under the science division that is recognized as a box in the organization chart that accompanied the President's original disclosure of the intention to form the Department of Homeland Security. There is a box for science and technology development under the Title III Under Secretary.
Chairman BOEHLERT. I have the much read report of late; we're all thumbing through our report from the National Research Council.(see footnote 2) But there is a very specific recommendation and I embrace it: an under secretary for technology will be needed in the proposed new department to provide a focal point for guiding key research and technology development programs across the Department, and most importantly, engaging commitments from the major science, engineering and medical science agencies that will remain outside the proposed new department. So that is something, Dr. Marburger, I hope we can work with you on because I think that is critically important.
Creation of a Homeland Security Institute
The National Academy recommends that the President should immediately establish a private non-profit federally funded research and development center, which the Academy refers to as a Homeland Security Institute that would operate as a sole source contractor to the Federal Government providing analytical research, systems analysis, and economic and policy analysis to both the White House Office of Homeland Security and the new cabinet level secretary. The Academy emphasizes that this institute should be established outside of the new department as an independent contractor operated organization. What's your view on their recommendation and would we need the special legislative language to establish such an institute?
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Dr. MARBURGER. I think it is an interesting idea. I think it is premature to attempt to define what an organization like that would do or even the extent to which it is necessary until we find out what the capabilities will be under the proposed arrangement with the Department of Energy and the Lawrence Livermore operation. I am not sure that we can come to a conclusion about that now, but it is an interesting idea. We look forward to working with you if legislation would seem to be necessary.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Dr. Orbach, do you have a comment on that?
Dr. ORBACH. I would concur with Dr. Marburger. The independence of such an effort, though intellectually is attractive, may not help the Department in terms of its initial and rapid response. And so it would—I need to have a better understanding about how it would interface with the need for the Department to deal with real issues in real time. The President's structure under that under secretary includes the R&D component in a program, which also is responsible for response. That is actually the title of the under secretary. And to me, that makes some sense because the R&D is essential. The under secretary has to understand the subtleties of the science because some of it will be very difficult, but there is a responsibility namely to do as best they can to stop the action and to remediate it. And so to the degree that the science is separate from that function I get a little nervous that the ability to rapidly respond may be injured.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Tritak, do you have any——
Mr. TRITAK. I have no further comment.
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Chairman BOEHLERT. Let me tell you. I just so much appreciate the outstanding work of the National Research Council. What a valuable resource for America. And I am telling you, as we're going forward, at least from this Committee, we're going to make decisions that are based less on politics and more on sound policy and we're going to take the guidance from the very people we're looking to to give us some direction. So thank you very much. With that, the Chair recognizes Ms. Lofgren.
Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be brief. I appreciate your comments that we will work on a policy basis and not a partisan basis. And I certainly appreciate that. And you have set a record for that really in this Congress and that is why we respect you so much as Chairman of this Committee.
Transfer of NIST Computer Security Division to DHS
I want to raise an issue and I would like to ask unanimous consent that we make a part of the record this Software and Information Industry Association letter——
Chairman BOEHLERT. Without objection, so ordered.
Ms. LOFGREN [continuing]. Relative to this subject. And that has to do with the moving of the Computer Security Division currently in NIST to the Department of Homeland Security.(see footnote 3)
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Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, point of order or a question, if I may. Does that—may I?
Chairman BOEHLERT. Yes.
Mr. SMITH. Can we do it by reference or does that mean that the whole document has to be reprinted and typed into the record?
Chairman BOEHLERT. Oh, no. It is a two-page letter.
Ms. LOFGREN. It is a two-page letter.
Mr. SMITH. Okay.
Chairman BOEHLERT. It is a two-page letter.
Mr. SMITH. Oh, I thought we were talking about the report.
Ms. LOFGREN. Oh, no. It is a letter just received from the Association.
Mr. SMITH. Okay.
Ms. LOFGREN. And I would be happy to make a copy available to all the members and make it part of the record.
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Mr. SMITH. Thank you. And excuse me. I misunderstood.
Ms. LOFGREN. That is all right. I probably misspoke. But there is bipartisan concern about this proposal. And we touched on it yesterday in the Judiciary Committee with Governor Ridge, myself and Mr. Goodlat in particular, because we spent so much time trying to get ourselves in a good spot with NIST and I think we've succeeded. And my sense of it and I think—I don't want to speak for Mr. Goodlat, but he told me I could—it is his sense as well that we should not break what is not—is working so well. As you are aware, we have had great industry cooperation witnessed on standard setting. And that comes after years and years of back and forth before NIST was vested with this responsibility.
As you referenced in your testimony, Mr. Tritak, we need to rely on the private sector. Most of what needs to be protected is not the Government; it is the private sector. And if we do something, not intentionally, I am sure, that really deters a good collaboration with the private sector, I think we will be endangering our country, which none of us, including all of you, want to do. So I am hoping that we might step back a little bit from this proposal. And I guess the question to whoever is able to ask it, can we reach out to the private sector actors in the high technology sector who have appreciated so much the expertise of NIST in this arena and solicit their input. We are on a tight timeframe. If we don't move off hand-in-hand with those who we are relying on, we are going to have a problem. Is there a process for you to do that, whoever needs to answer this?
Mr. TRITAK. Well, certainly. I am prepared to take that back. I have heard these concerns. I do want to make one point if I may, Congresswoman. The Homeland Security Department is not going to become some new version of the Defense Department. It is going to be a civilian agency whose very culture has to be one of collaboration with private industry. The very mission of homeland security requires a real partnership between Government and the owners and operators of our economy since they are the ones, in fact, under attack. So the entire Department as a whole is going to be organized precisely to foster those kinds of relationships.
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The question of what went into Homeland Security and what remains outside is a difficult balancing act. We are not talking about creating a single agency that takes care of all aspects of this. But the question that was put under consideration in making this proposal by the Administration was where is the center of gravity really in the core competency of a unit and does that seem to be mostly in the Homeland Security domain? And I think the conclusion that was drawn was that the very nature of the Computer Security Division is precisely to deal with the problems not only within the Government systems but also to work with industry in developing products and standards and the rest. So I would only say to you first that I will take your concerns back, and I think they are legitimate. But I would also add, there is a conscious decision in creating this department. It is not a law enforcement agency. It is not the military.
Ms. LOFGREN. Well, let me just—my light is about to go off, but I talked to four CEOs of extremely large technology companies yesterday. None of them believe that that is the way this is going to work out, and so whether or not they are right or you are right, there is no way for me to say. But if there is no confidence in the private sector in this move, then we are not going to have the collaboration that we need. And since NIST is doing such a great job on this issue right now, I think that is a risk that we should not take.
Mr. TRITAK. Well, again, I will take those concerns back. I want to make it clear doing this was not meant to be a punishment to NIST. It was really to foster—the other thing is I have also had companies come to me and say, ''finally you are consolidating this stuff into one place.'' There is one point of entry to discuss these matters between Government and industry and they are not going to have to run around to four different agencies. So I am just—that is another issue.
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Ms. LOFGREN. Well, I would be happy to assist in any way I can in this dialog, but my E-mail is full up with cryptographers and technology companies who are very, very alarmed about this.
Mr. TRITAK. Thank you.
Ms. MORELLA.[Presiding] Thank you, Ms. Lofgren. I would like to pick up on that because obviously that is an area——
Mr. TRITAK. True
Ms. MORELLA [continuing]. Of major interest to me too. Mr. Tritak, I am very pleased to hear in your statement that you have highlighted the great work being done in cyber security at NIST and this Committee is very aware of the work going on at NIST. And as you know, I have sponsored and the House passed legislations over in the Senate along with a lot of other bills over in the Senate, H.R. 1259, that would expand NIST's role in implementing computer security across the Federal Government and in the private sector. And I think this is a vital mission of NIST.
You have talked about how the culture would automatically be one that would not only retain but perhaps expand the involvement with the private sector. I hope that we will be able to continue with its current mandates and perhaps even further. But I will ask you how would the proposed transfer of the NIST through the Security Division to the Department of Homeland Security work? For instance, do you plan to physically move the Division out of NIST's information technology laboratory, and if so, would its functionality have to be replicated within the laboratory? Would the Division still service industrial customers from its new home in the Homeland Security Department? See if you can handle those, Mr. Tritak.
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Mr. TRITAK. That is easy, no. Actually, in terms of the location, I am not aware of any decisions having been made one way or the other on this particular aspect, in fact, or others in the Department. It is something that is obviously being considered, but I am not aware at this point whether a decision has been made to keep NIST where it is physically and just organizationally have a link back or whether there is any contemplation of a physical move. So simply at this point I am not aware of it.
Ms. MORELLA. Who would make that decision?
Mr. TRITAK. Well, I would think ultimately it would be the product of the Administration working with the Homeland Security people. I am not sure at what stage those kinds of decisions will be made. I think, quite frankly, the focus right now is to develop a transition process that begins to contemplate bringing people together organizationally. But at this point, I am not aware of a physical move.
Secondly, I think it is absolutely intended that the Computer Security Division would retain its close working relationships with the private sector in computer security. I mean, frankly that is the reason—I suspect it was one of the reasons why it is being brought up in the first place, at least organizationally.
And in terms of the replication function, I think—you know, I am not a scientist, so I don't understand quite necessarily how all of this would work in the R&D area. But I think part of the purpose here is not to create duplication of efforts. At the same time, let me underscore that there is no intention of severing the close ties with NIST in any case, regardless of where the Computer Security Division would be. They would need to preserve those tight working relationships just overall in the IT security labs as they do with the National Security Agency.
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Ms. MORELLA. How would the Department's cyber unit interact with NSA?
Mr. TRITAK. Well, the National Security Agency has a broad mandate and it is largely to support the national security functions in connection with communications, and as you know, NIST and NSA work very closely in the partnership programs that they have done. My guess is, is that the functions that would be performed in the Homeland Security would not be all that much different from what they are today, working with the Computer Security Division (at NIST). I think it is simply a matter of where the points of entry would be.
Ms. MORELLA. From what I understand, the private sector kind of sees interaction with NSA as sort of a chilling effect barrier.
Mr. TRITAK. But also I would say the NIST–NSA partnership has been rather successful, and as you have indicated, people have been very comfortable working with the NIST side.
Ms. MORELLA. With the NIST side.
Mr. TRITAK. Yes.
Ms. MORELLA. Right. Right. Well, again, I reiterate what I know this entire Committee feels and that is we want to work so this is done smoothly, seamlessly, and that we are not missing out on any important factor.
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Setting the Homeland Security Research Agenda
I think I probably have another—maybe I will start with Dr. Marburger. Under the current proposal, will the responsible—who will be responsible for setting the research agenda for Homeland Security?
Dr. MARBURGER. The responsibility for setting the research agenda for Homeland Security rests with the under secretary under Title III, and that is explicitly stated in the proposed legislation.
Ms. MORELLA. Would direction come from OSTP?
Dr. MARBURGER. OSTP would continue to provide interagency coordination of research and it would presumably continue to have a coordinating function, which it is currently carrying out in cooperation with the Office of Homeland Security. Under the proposal, the Office of Homeland Security would continue to exist within the White House and OSTP would continue to provide technical support to it. Our role would change slightly, however, in that now there would be a new department, which would have a research component. We would assist in the coordination as necessary with other agencies.
Ms. MORELLA. Thank you. My time has expired and I am now pleased to recognize Mr. Honda.
Mr. HONDA. Thank you very much. And I do appreciate, as other Members appreciate, the leadership of Chairman Boehlert and of Ranking Member Hall for holding this hearing and for their leadership in advancing the role of science and technology in homeland security. And I appreciate the witnesses here today.
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The Role of Silicon Valley in Aviation Security
First of all, I would like to bring to the attention of the Committee and the witnesses this report of the Silicon Valley Blue Ribbon Taskforce on Aviation Security and Technology, and I would like to submit this to the witnesses and also to our Committee and make this a part of the record as a point of reference, and not in its entirety but as a point of reference for research.(see footnote 4)
In October, I sat down with the Silicon Valley business leaders and airport representatives to discuss the development of a comprehensive technology-driven security system to keep our airways safe. It was my strong belief and my personal belief that any future security solutions for air travel system would have to include a strong technology component and that Silicon Valley was well poised for that task.
The Blue Ribbon Taskforce on Aviation Security and Technology was convened this past March, and we gave them a hundred day timeline in order to come back with a report. And so we tapped the energies and the innovation of those members in our community to be able to address the challenges of aviation security. The taskforce was charged with identifying tools and technology to help improve security and air traveler convenience at the airports while protecting the constitutionally guaranteed individual rights. And that is one component I think that I would be looking at all the time in terms of new and emerging technologies, whether it is currently used or being looked at in terms of research and development.
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This past week, the taskforce presented us with their final report, which I showed you, and the report focused on four key elements using existing and emerging technologies. One of them was validate and manage the security of the airport and the aviation workforce such as the use of biometric authentication, management software and things like that. Second was strengthen airport facility and airplane security with video monitoring systems and driver vehicle authentication and access control. The third was integrate and secure aviation airport communication infrastructure, which is probably in your area, Mr. Tritak, the cyber systems, including the network digital technology. And then the fourth was to ensure respect of passenger and their rights with appropriate efficient technology application.
I would like the witnesses and members of community to look at this report in the light of R&D. And I think that the achievements of the members of this Committee has in it some of the concepts and principles of processes that we need to look at in order to provide security because I don't think that one technology in itself will provide a secure system, but layers and redundancies. In my efforts, I think that I would be looking for how technologies would be interoperable in order to provide that sense of security so that in its totality we will be able to provide that sense of security for our community.
Earlier this week, the National Research Council recommended that the GSA establish a Strategic Research and Planning Office. It also suggested that the Office build a strong foundation for research on human factors in transportation operations and make the evaluation of security system concepts a central element in this research program.
I have about three questions I have written down. Perhaps you can respond to them later on. But I do associate myself with the question that the Chairman had asked regarding R&D transportation. And I guess the question and the response I would like to have at this moment would be what are some of the ideas or thinking in terms of what should we put in place in order to assure that we have continuous evaluation, continuous improvement, and the continue of searching out new and emerging technology and its applications so that we will always be current, we will always be on top and in front of, if you would, the bad guys so that we can, you know, one, prevent, detect and also intervene if required in terms of our protection. And I would appreciate a response on that.
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Dr. MARBURGER. I will take that one. First of all, I would like to say that we very much appreciate the efforts of industry organizations and other groups to provide good advice and recommendations through reports such as the one that you have cited. We look forward to seeing that report and incorporating its recommendations where appropriate in the path forward. As I responded to Chairman Boehlert, the responsibility for ensuring that the responses to the terrorist threat include technology and are based on sound science does rest with the secretary of the new department. He will require his staff to develop a research policy and research program. That function in the legislation is assigned under Title III to the under secretary with that long title.
Mr. HONDA. Madam Chair, if I may ask two more quick questions and it has to do with human factors.
Ms. MORELLA. You will have to ask them very quickly then.
Mr. HONDA. Okay. In the development of that office and that one person, how do you assure, in terms of the human factors, that we will continue to exchange information and stay on top of the technology and the emerging technologies to assure that securities system, in light of the way we procure revenue so that we can acquire these technologies.
Dr. MARBURGER. The human factors dimension of the technology is no different from other dimensions that also need to be continually validated and improved and updated. And the responsibility for doing that is clearly defined, I believe, in the legislation. I would be glad to answer further detailed questions, including this one, in writing.
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Mr. HONDA. I thank you, Madame Chair, and I think that is the human factor that I am concerned about that we seem to talk about, but we don't seem to address in terms of information exchanged between agencies. And I think that is one critical area that we need to deal with. Thank you.
Ms. MORELLA. We will have another round of questioning too Mr. Honda. I am now pleased to recognized Mr. Ehlers for his questioning.
Creating a Modern, Agile Department
Mr. EHLERS. Thank you, Madame Chair. And I will address my first questions and comments to Dr. Marburger.
Dr. Marburger, in your testimony, at the end, you made an extremely important statement. You say the new Department of Homeland Security must be an agile, fast-paced, and responsive organization that takes advantage of 21st Century technology, I might add science there, too, and management techniques to meet a 21st Century threat. That, in a nutshell, to me, is the essence of the management philosophy that department needs.
A few days ago, we had a panel in this same room headed by Dr. Lewis Branscomb about the NAS study on making the Nation safer, the role of science and technology on countering terrorism. And we received excellent testimony there. And Dr. Branscomb, whom I have known for many years beginning at GILA some years ago, is an outstanding scientist and administrator, who has worked both inside and outside of government, and I place a great deal of credibility in his comments. He said, in a sense, what you said, but went further and stated, ''This is a golden opportunity to make a model department whose management is structured for the next century and not simply take in the structure that has been traditional in government agencies.''
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I think that is absolutely essential. This does have to be, as you said, an agile, fast paced department. And if it goes into the traditional structure that we have for departments, it is going to be dead from the start. It is just not going to be as productive or as effective.
And so I welcomed your verification on it. The question is how to achieve that, and particularly our role is how do we achieve that in the area of science and technology?
First of all, I agree with Chairman Boehlert and with the report, that we should have an under secretary of science and technology, something related to that. I believe the title that you mentioned, you referred to it as the long title, is longer and yet limiting; more limiting than it should be, because they are really going to have to get into a lot of areas beyond that.
I would also say—and this is not just a scientist who is egotistical about his field—but I would also say that may end up being the most important part of the department; just as in many ways the research arms of the Defense Department have emerged as the most important, not the largest, and not the greatest in terms of contributions in a specific battle. But can you imagine the Defense Department today without the laser-guided bombs, without all of the technology they have, much of which developed out of the research arm? And I think that is precisely what we are going to need in Homeland Security.
So I don't know if Secretary Ridge recognizes that, but I am sure you recognize that incredibly important role that science and technology is going to play in this battle. And that has enabled us to win in Afghanistan that will enable us to win the battle eventually in counter-terrorism.
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Having said that, I think the best approach for science and technology is not pull everything into this agency, but to remain fast and flexible, become primarily a grant making agency, providing grants, whether to Government or to the private sector. I think it would be a horrible mistake to move the cyber security into this, the disruption of the move, the delays encountered, the fact that some people would leave, because they prefer staying in NIST, etcetera, all of this would be disruptive, whereas it could be accomplished very easily through a grant approach from Homeland Security to have the cyber security folks at NIST do what they want, and similarly, NIST would have them do what they want. And there would be additional money to be able to do both. I am certain that if that group is moved to Homeland Security, they are going to lose much of their function with NIST no matter what our good intentions may be or whether—no matter what NIST's good intentions may be.
What I am basically advocating is—to use a common parlance, a virtual department. It would be a department in the sense that it does have a full secretary. It has some undersecretaries. It has an administrative structure. But it doesn't have a staff of thousands. It may not even have a staff of hundreds. You need that kind of flexibility to deal with the flexible threat that we have. And I would hope that this Committee would certainly move in that direction with the science component, and I would hope that the Congress move in that direction with the entire structure. But I have far less hope of that.
But I would appreciate your comments, as well as those of others on the panel, how do we achieve that goal that you have, the agile, fast paced, and responsive organization? We need something that is flexible, quick, easily accountable, easily assembled. And the operation in Livermore, I have no objection to that, even though that is part of a Government lie, but again, that is leaving it in place there.
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If the new department is to collect other agencies, why don't they start with the FBI and the CIA, which is where the problem has been? But I notice the Administration has chosen to leave the big things in place and collect all of these little things. And I think the theory is there will be less objection to collecting all of those little pieces. That is a political judgment, but I think it is the wrong approach. I appreciate your responses.
Dr. MARBURGER. First of all, I think the objective of agility and rapid response and even many of the specific recommendations or views that you have, Mr. Congressman, are consistent and compatible with the structure that is outlined in the President's legislated proposal. Certainly the objective is not simply to collect departments, but to give the new department certain capabilities that it has control over and can command to be responsive to the needs and priorities of Homeland Security. Governor Ridge has had the experience now for several months of coordinating assets and resources for Homeland Security among many different departments. And he has encountered the difficulties that one would expect in making sure that the agencies are properly responsive because of conflicting missions and priorities that these agencies have. I believe that it is important for the new Department of Homeland Security to have some in-house capabilities that give it the expertise to evaluate and plan and be responsive and particularly to convert science and technology ideas into implementation and policy. So it is important.
And which units you pull in from other agencies in order to accomplish this, in order to have a core of capability that permits the translation of science into action, which ones you pull in is going to be a matter of some judgment. I believe that the choices that had been made, and they are reflected in the President's proposal, are based, to some extent, on the experience that Governor Ridge has had during these past months. There is a logic to each one of these, which is perhaps not immediately evident. But I think that one needs to have these. One does not want to pull everything in, but to pull in a critical mass of functions that can do what is necessary.
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There is going to have to be flexibility. We may not have it all right at this point. That is one of the reasons the flexibility provisions of this proposed legislation are in there. And we look forward to working with this Committee and others in getting it right.
Ms. MORELLA. Gentleman, your time has expired.
Mr. EHLERS. May I just respond to that? I don't disagree with what you say. You need that core of competence there. But the reason that I believe Mr. Ridge hasn't been able to accomplish everything is that he hasn't had budgetary control. And he has tried to coordinate, but you can't coordinate in this government without budgetary control. If he has that, he has a competent staff to provide the direction for these other agencies, I think what I have outlined would work very well. Thank you.
Ms. MORELLA. I am now pleased to recognize Ms. Johnson for her questioning.
Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Chair Morella and thanks to the Committee leadership, both the Chair and Ranking Member for calling this hearing.
Flight Control Technology
I serve on the Transportation Committee as well, and we have had unending hearings. We just voted out a Bill to put weapons, lethal weapons in the cockpit, and you can probably look at me and tell I was not for that, primarily because I think that navigating that plane is very important. And the airlines have spent a lot of money retrofitting the doors, and we have U.S. Marshalls on the planes. But what I really want to hear is at what point will we have our planes, in the event of an emergency be controlled from the control tower through technology that we don't have to have our pilots acting as policemen or law enforcement officials while they are supposed to be keeping their hands on the avionics area up there to keep that plane moving?
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Dr. MARBURGER. The issue of technology for flight control and making decisions integrated with some kind of more modern information system is a very important one for this Administration. There is currently a Commission on the Future of Aerospace chaired by former Congressman Walker that is investigating this, and they will make recommendations on a path forward for the kinds of innovations that would be necessary to accomplish your vision, Congresswoman.
Cyberspace Capabilities
Ms. JOHNSON. Just from my observation, I really feel that it is going to be technology that takes the lead in protecting us from various attacks. What are you expecting? And I have—if you have answered this earlier, I apologize. In this business, you have got four or five things going on at one time. As far as cyberspace, what kind of—what do we think we might be expecting, and do we have capability of—that we could put into place now?
Dr. MARBURGER. I will defer to my colleague.
Mr. TRITAK. Madame Congressman, the concerns about cyberspace and how the interface between information systems and networks and the control of vital functions is something that we have been looking at and studying for some time. I think there is clearly a greater awareness now that harms in cyberspace don't necessarily remain in cyberspace and that they can, in fact, under certain circumstances, do serious physical harm and there was a—as was discussed in the opening remarks this morning by the Chairman, an article just put out in the Washington Post to discuss this. I think that one of the jobs of this Homeland Security Department, in fact, one of my jobs has been in the last three years that I have held my position, is to draw attention to the fact that increasingly, we are depending on information systems and networks, not just the support key services, but to actually operate physical assets. This is largely being done through digital control systems.
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And what we are trying to accomplish through a variety of measures, is to make the owners and operators of these infrastructures cognizantly aware of that dependency and to manage that risk accordingly. And I think that with this new department, you are going to see a much more focused effort in dealing with the owners and operators. And as I had said before and want to underscore again, Homeland Security presents a whole paradymenic shift in the way we think about our national strategy. And if we don't develop the culture of collaboration with the owners and operators, it won't work. This is not simply a top down program; this is going to be bottom up and collaborative.
Timeline for Establishing DHS
Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. Now I will—I have been hanging around government a long time prior to coming here; State, Federal, both, and I know that any time you get ready to make a change, you have got a lot of turf battles. When do you think this department would be up and running after the Bill is passed?
Dr. MARBURGER. The President has asked for a one-year transition period. That is a goal. And I believe that given the rapid passage of legislation, the departments will put their best efforts into achieving that goal. The functions that will be performed by the departments that would be swept into the new department are in most cases, the same as, or very similar, to functions that they are performing now. So we are not asking for people to change dramatically what they are doing. We hope that the integration of a number of agencies into a new department will not be tremendously difficult or time consuming. But it is the details of the systems by which they communicate and interact with each other and coordinate their actions that will take some time to get into place, but I think it can be done efficiently without losing ground. And I believe that one year is an appropriate target.
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Organizational Structure of DHS
Ms. JOHNSON. I know my time is expired. I have one quick question left. Is this going to be run primarily by computer or Internet or will the people be situated together?
Dr. MARBURGER. I believe that telecommunications will be an important part of the functioning of this new department.
Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much.
Ms. MORELLA. I am now pleased to recognized the gentleman from Maryland, Congressman Bartlett for his questioning.
Protecting Our Critical Infrastructure from Cyber-Terrorism
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. It occurred to me that our R&D community must feel a bit like a mosquito at a nudist convention: so many opportunities and so little capability of addressing them all simultaneously. When we developed our national infrastructure, we paid little attention to security, because security was not really an issue then. When you develop infrastructure in that climate, you necessarily provide a large number of potential targets of opportunity for terrorists. There are some of those, of course, where there is an obvious quick-fix, where there would be a very large benefit-to-cost ratio, and we will do those things quickly, and it won't be hard to identify those. But beyond that, it seems that we ought to identify ourselves with the prayer of Bobby Burns and his ''Ode to a Louse'' when he said, ''Would to God the gift he give us to see ourselves as others see us.'' And what we really need to do is to see ourselves as others see us, in other words, put ourselves in the place of a potential terrorist and what does he perceive our vulnerabilities to be. And my question is, how do we do that? It is clearly some sort of war gaming, but the kinds of skilled people that do war gaming would not necessarily be effective in this arena. Do we do that with a group glean from the several government agencies? Do we do that with a blue ribbon panel? Do we do that with—as a result of responses to ROPs? How do we determine where, after looking at those pretty obvious areas where we can make big improvements with relatively little costs, where do we address our efforts, because we can't do everything at once? How do we determine that priority list?
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Dr. MARBURGER. I believe that we have to do both, Mr. Congressman. There are certainly a variety of sources of wisdom on threats and threat assessment. Those sources have to be tapped systematically, and the information has to be brought together under this new Department of Homeland Security. And analyses need to be undertaken, and the Secretary of that department accepts the ultimate responsibility for prioritizing and recommending to the President the sequence in which these threats need to be addressed and proposing a budget that accomplishes that. So this new legislation clearly places the responsibility for making those decisions within this department. And the department needs to take advantage of all of the sources of insight and analysis that are available to it. And I believe that is the intent under Title II of the analytical capabilities that are specifically referred to there.
Mr. BARTLETT. Specifically, do you have any notions as to how he might do this?
Dr. MARBURGER. Well, during the past six months, Governor Ridge has led a very talented staff of people who have had experience in considering these issues. As you know, there have been a number of commissions and studies. We are not starting from scratch at 9/11 with our understanding of terrorists and terrorism. Governor Ridge has assembled a team that has been working together to develop threat scenarios and responses.
We also have agencies within the Department of Defense, for example, that do threat assessments and scenarios. We have some of those capabilities within the national laboratories. Governor Ridge is aware of those capabilities and has tapped into them systematically for support for his efforts for the past six or seven months. It is this experience that has guided the preparation of this legislation.
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Prioritization of the Homeland Security Agenda
Mr. BARTLETT. We hope to have this department up and running fairly soon, but is there a move to address some of these prioritization problems so that they are ready to start addressing the most critical areas or are they going to have to wait for that analysis to take place?
Dr. MARBURGER. I believe that we have already seen some evidence of that prioritization in the 2003 budget request. There is a fair amount of information available regarding the areas that need to be beefed up, the provisions in there for bio-terrorism, for increasing capabilities of first responders, for various forms of infrastructure protection that have been determined to be urgently needed. The President has requested funds for this purpose.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much, Madame Chairman.
Mr. TRITAK. Congressman, if I may, just very quickly, thank you.
That process is actually underway, specifically addressing those questions you have raised in the policy planning and strategy planning process that Governor Ridge has underway, and which will be published later this year.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. And I am pleased to know that, because it appeared to me that this wasn't underway, that we would have the department in place not really knowing what to do until we had addressed that problem. So it is nice that these are running in parallel. Thank you.
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Ms. MORELLA. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett. I recognize Ms. Jackson Lee for her questioning.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Madame Chairperson, very much so. It is good to see some of the witnesses that I had the pleasure of being with just a few days ago with Chairman Boehlert looking at the issues of cyberterrorism. And I do appreciate very much your appearance here today.
Might I give to Dr. Marburger a concern? And let me share with you the respect that I have for the witnesses that appear before me. As a Member of the Science Committee since coming to Congress, and I hesitate to call myself a senior member because that dates me, so I am seeking to rise to that level. But my distinguished colleague, Mr. Wu, said a long-time member, but I have come to understand the importance of this committee.
Importance of Governor Ridge Appearing Before the Committee on Science
I think it is important for you to convey back to the President that it is important for Governor Ridge to appear before this Committee. And let me share with you why. I serve on another Committee that we had the privilege of looking at some issues. This Homeland Security has been tasked. The department has been tasked to all of us in the United States Congress. In fact, we are tasked to deal with this by July 12. And in fact, as we deal with it, we must provide our insight and our expertise. The Science Committee has oversight over science and technology. Border security has science and technology issues. Food safety has science and technology issues. Satellite vulnerability has science and technology issues. So it is key that we have Governor Ridge here as we begin to formulate our input and assessment on that. And I—let me just yield to the distinguished gentlemen to respond, will you convey that message and your understanding, and when I say understanding, are you seeing the points that I am making about the value and the importance of science and technology in the security of this nation?
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Dr. MARBURGER. I certainly do understand and agree, and I will take the message back.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank you. Let me also say that I would like to join Chairman Boehlert on the question of an undersecretary that would be dealing with science and technology along with Ranking Member Hall. I believe supporting this, I think it was in the Lieberman Bill, we would like to see a full secretary, if you will, an under secretary, on the issues of science and technology in the Homeland Security Department.
Role of NASA in Securing the Homeland
I want to ask you a particular question. And I am not sure, I think when I asked you before that you were studying the question, but let me pose it. We have oversight over NASA, and I think NASA is one of many instances the unherald secrets of ability for research and the ability to provide protection for the United States through civilian research and certainly the possibility of utilizing the research done on this—on the international space station. I think it is important for you to comment or to say that you are going to be looking at this issue or for the Science Committee to look at this issue is what vulnerabilities we have with respect to our satellites. What are we able to utilize the space station to do a variety of things? I know that we are not making pronouncements about issues dealing with intervening, if you will, in sort of getting other secrets, but satellites can provide a communication vehicle, a notice vehicle, to—if there is a terrorist threat or if we are trying to make sure that information transmits in a certain way. So I would like to have your comment again on whether you go back and do investigation with the administrative NASA as to how NASA can be a viable part or how you can utilize existing technology there.
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Homeland Security Capabilities of OSTP
And my second question is the Academy testified just a few days ago and mentioned that they thought that there was some difficulty with your office. And when I say ''your office,'' the office, not pointing to you, of not being up to speed in dealing with the Homeland Security issues and coordinating issues. And of course, we would like you to respond to that comment and if you would, I will not use the term criticism. I thank you very much.
Dr. MARBURGER. Thank you. First NASA is certainly an important actor in the R&D business and has important contributions to make to Homeland Security. And I would be glad to respond with a more specific list in writing. And we will do that.(see footnote 5)
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I would appreciate that, because I would like to work with you on making sure that is well known and that we have NASA well placed for that.
Dr. MARBURGER. I would be delighted. On the second question, OSTP, my office, has been engaged in Homeland Security issues from the beginning, and certainly, since I was confirmed on October 29 in my position. I am not aware of deficiencies. If you can bring them to my attention, of if they are embedded in the National Academy's report, I would certainly address them immediately because we would like to be on top of all of these issues.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I can refer you to that, and I would appreciate if I could get a subsequent response in writing from you. I would appreciate that——
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Dr. MARBURGER. Yes, indeed.
Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. To the Committee.
Dr. MARBURGER. Yes.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Core Components of the Homeland Security Initiative
Mr. SMITH [presiding]. I think I am next in line. Gentlemen, it is sort of like old friends as we work together in trying to solve some of these problems. Mr. Tritak, what does national—what is the Homeland Security? What does that mean? What is this or what does Homeland Security mean?
Mr. TRITAK. Well, the Homeland Security Initiative, if you break it down to its basic points, it is about defending life and property within the United States, consistent with our core values. And the challenge there——
Mr. SMITH. This is a—I am trying to entrap you, so please continue.
Mr. TRITAK. Okay. Well, so I am—I can feel the rope. All right. I think I will stop there. Well, seriously, it is a challenge to protect our way of life, recognizing that there are people who mean to do us harm who are attempting through attacks against our economy, which has been stated through Al Qaeda and others, to force us to withdraw from our global commitments overseas.
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Broadening the Scope of DHS
Mr. SMITH. Let me suggest that somehow we need a broader consideration. And as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Research, and as we move FEMA into this new department, we are looking at the responsibility of—the traditional responsibility of some of those agencies and departments in protecting ourselves against natural disasters. And so in terms of NEHERP, the National Earthquake Prevention Reduction Program, we have NSF, United States Utilogical Survey, NIST, and now FEMA, which is a big part of that earthquake hazard reduction effort, it is over in the new agency. But still the responsibilities are there for natural disasters. But also, we are—as we move some of the other agencies from USDA, we are looking at the kind of projection for non-terrorist disasters as well as natural disasters in the growing of our food crops. So I am a little concerned that we might have the impression of an overemphasis on protecting us from some outsider terrorist attack when I see this new department is being much broader on that as we try to bring these agencies together.
And the same is true in research. I think we need to guard against being too overzealous in redirecting our research efforts to maybe have less priority for basic research, Dr. Marburger, as we look for ways to more quickly protect ourselves in the kind of research that is going to—can be applied to protecting ourselves from terrorist attacks. So a brief comment, maybe, from each of you.
Dr. MARBURGER. President Bush certainly expects that the funds that are expended in support of Homeland Security can do double duty in many, many cases. We talk about dual use, but certainly making our systems for everyday life more robust and less vulnerable to terrorist exploitation is likely to make that more useful and less vulnerable——
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Mr. SMITH. Sort of like outer space in developing research that can be applied to other areas, but——
Dr. MARBURGER. Well, also——
Mr. SMITH. Is this new agency going to be responsible for tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes——
Dr. MARBURGER. Some of the units that this new agency is going to take up will have responsibilities for responses to naturally occurring disasters. FEMA, the Coast Guard, etcetera, certainly have responsibilities in that area, and I expect them to continue to exercise them.
Mr. SMITH. Dr. Orbach, any comments?
Dr. ORBACH. Thank you. In my opening remarks, I referred to the biology transfer from the Office of Science. And I referred in particular to pathogens and to understanding their function, their structure, not only of the ones that might be introduced by a foreign adversary, but also those that are just around and that can cause very severe diseases and epidemics.
Mr. SMITH. And that was a strong recommendation of the Academy study that we heard last Tuesday. We have a center for——
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Dr. ORBACH. And it was an excellent study. And the structure that we have tried to create within the Department of Homeland Security will have that function as well. There are other agencies that look in that arena, but the interaction between them will give us a stronger ability to respond and hopefully ward off such dangers.
Mr. SMITH. I served in the—and I am concerned about where we go on the United States Fire Administration with the jurisdiction that is under FEMA that we don't reduce our efforts or minimize our efforts in terms of the conventional help from the grant program that we have to make sure that they can protect against fire outbreaks or other problems in the community as well as better enhancing their ability to respond to terrorist attacks.
Transitional Challenges in Creating DHS
I served in the Nixon Administration for five years in what they called as an executive appointment. And we tried to move a few little departments and agencies around; tremendous problems. And so this is a gigantic effort. Mr. Tritak, you served in the State Department for a while, so you appreciate the challenge before us, and one of those challenges is how can we be most effective when we most need it and as that is in the transition in the next 12 to 14 months?
Mr. TRITAK. I think these concerns that you are expressing, Congressman, are fully appreciated. And the President's actions are very explicit on this point that he is not sacrificing other functions that are contained in some of these operational units to Homeland Security. He wants to ensure that those functions continue and continue to be done effectively. What he wants to do, by moving this—these operational units in the Homeland Security is to ensure that the folks whose submission Homeland Security is given focused attention. So I think it is important to recognize that this is—there is no intention whatsoever to slacken on these other issues.
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Mr. SMITH. Slack there, but also be most effective in our protection against terrorist attacks as we make the transition——
Mr. TRITAK. Absolutely.
Mr. SMITH [continuing]. Is going to be a huge challenge.
Mr. TRITAK. No one would be served by a destructive transition that actually weakens our ability to protect the Homeland.
Mr. SMITH. Well, it is going to be disruptive, and so how do we minimize that disruption? Gentlemen, again, thank you very much, and I will turn the chair back over to our Chairman.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Baird.
Psychological Aspects of Terrorism
Mr. BAIRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the panelists. Dr. Marburger, I want to compliment you on page five of your testimony. You talk about social, behavioral, and educational issues as a branch considered under OSTP.
I would really encourage, as we look at Homeland Security, to establish some agency or branch within the overall agency to look at the issue of the psychological response and impacts of terror.
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When we use the word ''terrorism,'' we often talk about infrastructure damage, be it electricity or highways or buildings, but the purpose is a psychological impact, that is why we use the word ''terror.'' And we have known interventions that can help people cope with this, but we don't necessarily have adequate training. And some of the things that are actually considered often as the gold standard as there is at least some research suggesting they actually exacerbate the problems.
So I would encourage you and others, as we look at this problem, to do a thorough review of the literature on how people cope with such traumatic events, what interventions we can provide, how we diagnose and monitor, and how we train professionals and have them ready. I know the American Psychological Association has, for example, a rapid response network throughout the country, the disaster response network. Any thoughts on how we might address that and what your agency might be involved in in that?
Dr. MARBURGER. Well, thank you, Mr. Congressman, for making that point, because it is a point that I have been trying to make during the past few months just how important the social sciences can be as a component of our response to the threat of terrorism. We do have this interagency working group within OSTP that is working systematically with agencies to identify appropriate responses and research programs that agencies can submit in their budget requests to be funded. And this would be among the research programs that the new Department of Homeland Security would coordinate. I think it is important to note that the Department of Energy actually employs social scientists in some of its programs, and I think they play a very good role there. I agree that every area has a social science component that needs to be given higher visibility and supported more strongly. So thank you very much for your support for that area, Mr. Congressman.
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Dr. ORBACH. If I could add something, our outreach to the universities may be a key element in achieving those goals as well. And so our attempt to make sure that every university scientist has an opportunity to contribute to the issues addressed by this department may help in that regard as well.
Mr. BAIRD. I appreciate that. And one of the issues that I have heard in talking with social scientists post-September 11, and we addressed this in yesterday's panel as well, is the need for a quick response mechanism for funding research. Because if—by the time you go through the normal grant process for mental health type research, you have lost the opportunity. You need to be—go in early, assess the impact, provide the interventions, monitor the folks longitudinally or you lose that opportunity to learn. And it is not just of academic interest. You lose the opportunity to learn from this experience in a way that can help you if there occurs such another experience; you can apply that knowledge. So hopefully, it will also have a rapid response mechanism for research. I really applaud you for your interest. It is often overlooked.
Dr. ORBACH. We are working through the national laboratories for the outreach to the universities for precisely that reason. The national laboratories are used to quicker response and effective response. They have very close relationships to the universities, and I think they can provide that rapidity of application.
Mr. BAIRD. Terrific. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Wu.
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Role of Academic and Research Institutions in Protecting the Homeland
Mr. Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I just have a quick comment and a brief question. It seems to me that we are rallying the country for a long-term struggle, much in the same way that we asked the country to come together in 1940. But one significant difference seems to be that in 1940, '41, '42, Congress and the then-Administration seemed to rely on our universities and research institutions in a very, very significant way.
A troubling story was relayed to me recently, and if it is incorrect, I would like to have the record corrected. What I was told was that the leaders of close to 35 or 40 universities were collected together here in Washington, DC. And instead of asking these academic and university leaders to pull together for the good of the country, which I think many of them would be—all of them would be willing to do, which many scientists have testified before this Committee that they view it as their patriotic duty to be part of this effort that these college and university leaders, all they were asked to do was to monitor their foreign students closely. And that seems to me to be shortsighted and a great-lost opportunity. Can any of you comment, if you could, on whether this occurred and whether anything is going to be done to rectify the situation so that we draw upon the patriotic, intellectual resources, which are available to us, in an appropriate way?
Dr. MARBURGER. Mr. Congressman, I have spoken to groups of university leaders more than a dozen times in the last few months, and I have always asked them to pull together and to consider how they can help in the struggle against terrorism.
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Mr. Wu. Dr. Marburger, you are not the person that they have cited as who was running that meeting.
Dr. MARBURGER. Well, I think that different meetings have different purposes and different agendas. It certainly is appropriate, on some occasion, to ask universities to keep track of their foreign students. And I might add that the universities have responded rather well to calls from the INS, for example, to cooperate in the implementation of their new computer system, the SEVIS system, and other actions that they might undertake. So I think some meetings like that are appropriate, and we can't just isolate a single meeting and assume that that represents the total interaction between this Administration and the higher education community.
I would like to say here publicly that I am very proud of the way higher education has responded to the President's call to help in the struggle against terrorism. If there are any fences that need to be mended here, I am willing to go out and represent the President on those issues. Thank you.
Mr. Wu. Well, let me follow up by saying that I think that there is something very serious to explore in Ms. Jackson Lee's proposal about pulling together an agency or a segment of Homeland Security under an under secretary and our assistant secretary to look at science and research issues.
In addition to governmental science and research, one of the first things that I did after the events of last fall was to pull together folks from the private sector in my corner of the world, because many of them were doing things which are relevant to Homeland Security and particularly cyber security and telephonic security. And I would hate to see us repeatedly reinvent the wheel. There are clearly things that need to be done in the public sector, but in this day and age, frequently in information technology, in particular, leadership is in the private sector, and we really need to know what they are doing and what is relevant to Homeland Security. And please comment, if you wish, on what you are doing along those lines.
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Dr. MARBURGER. I completely agree with your sentiment. The private sector is absolutely essential. We must maintain contact. It is interesting in the proposed legislation, in one of the later titles, there is an explicit provision for a mechanism for reaching out to non-governmental sectors, including the private sector. In the organization chart that the President made public on July 6,(see footnote 6) that organization reports directly in at the secretary level. So I think it is important it is recognized. That is in Title VII of the proposed legislation. I think the importance is recognized in the proposal. And I completely agree with the need to reach out.
Mr. Wu. Thank you very much. And thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you. Mr. Lampson. No questions?
Mr. Ehlers.
Mr. EHLERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You probably thought I was finished, didn't you? Well, let me move from the general, which I had last time, to the specific, and then I will get back to the general again.
Transfer of NIST Computer Security to DHS
On the issue of some concern to this Committee regarding NIST, NIST accredits laboratories to test software and systems to certify that they meet the computer security standards promulgated by the Department of Commerce. The computer security provision plays a key role in providing federal assistance from NIST's accreditation program. And Mr. Tritak, you said that the new department must maintain a strong public/private partnership in the area of cyber security. The question is how is this all going to come down? How will the certification process work under the Administration's proposal? Will the new department accredit labs since your division will move to a new department? What—or do you imagine it will remain physically where it is and continue to perform that function in addition to whatever the Department of Homeland Security wants? I would appreciate your comments.
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Mr. TRITAK. I would be happy to. Let me—what I am going to do, Congressman, is tell you what I know at the moment, and I would also like to take the question to get back to you with a more comprehensive answer. Okay? The intention is to take the computer security division and its functions as they are and to bring them into the Department of Homeland Security. So what is currently being performed in the computer security division at NIST would now be performed at the Department of Homeland Security. It is not taking all IT aspects out of NIST, out of the lab; it is focusing solely and strictly on the security of—the pure security dimension.
As I said earlier, it is not clear yet, and I am not aware of any decisions having been made about how the security division is going to be postured, whether it is going to remain within NIST physically—at Gaithersburg, as it is now—or whether it will be physically moved. But the intention here is not to destroy the special relations that have been established, but to strengthen them and with it—to give it a focus, which everyone recognizes, is needed. And it is precisely because of the good work that has been done by that computer security division, the Administration, I believe, made the judgment that it probably would be best suited in the Homeland Security Department, recognizing that it is still going to have to maintain very close ties and working relationships with NIST as well as other R&D elements within the Federal Government and with the private sector.
Mr. EHLERS. Well, I can guarantee you that if it is moved physically, that in not too many years, the ties with NIST would be severed and NIST would redevelop this program. The point is, simply, it is there for a reason: to fulfill the national need. And if it is moved out, NIST will eventually have to reinstitute that in some way, because you are going to get—if you are in Homeland Security, you are going to be so tied up with the issues they have, that you are simply not going to give the attention you might, no matter how good your intentions are, NIST won't get the attention it needs.
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Openness of the Administration to Outside Suggestions Regarding the Proposed Department
I—let me get back to the general issues I have raised before. And I am a little concerned, Dr. Marburger, by—and I know it is your job and your assignment to defend the President's proposal, but at the same time, this proposal, for example, some very, very bright people worked at this and gave some very deep thought to that. And I suspect they may have given it more and deeper thought and applied greater intellect to it than what was applied to the development of the President's proposal. I would hope that the President and you and others of the Administration would be open to the suggestions of other groups who have great expertise and have much to offer and that we don't somehow regard this, the President's proposal, as an ex cathedra document that has to be defended to the death.
Dr. MARBURGER. Congressman Ehlers, we appreciate very much the contribution of the National Academies to deep thinking about the needs for Homeland Security. The President's proposal is intended to be a document that sets a general framework, and it is by no means complete in its details. It embraces certain principles of organization, which seem natural. It provides for flexibilities to modify it as appropriate. Certainly my office, and I know Governor Ridge's as well, look forward to productive engagement with Congress during this period to produce legislation that we can all support as we move ahead.
My office has been working closely with the National Academies during the period when they were preparing their report. We have had liaison staffs going back and forth. And we have been trying to learn along with them about their thinking and what might finally emerge in their report, and have tried to embed some of their principles in our thinking about this. I do not think that the National Academies report is in any way incompatible with the President's legislative proposal, but it certainly has more detail and it has some variations, which are intriguing and deserve more attention. So we do not plan to ignore the report or in any way reject its recommendations without thorough examination.
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Mr. EHLERS. Thank you. And may I just—getting back just to the NIST question, and I want to make one thing clear, this, to me, is not a turf battle. I have never been a great turf defender. And even aside from that, I suspect that no matter where it goes, it will still be under the jurisdiction of this Committee, as would most of the research in the organization. But I just think it is very important. NIST obviously has a function to perform. They need that group to perform that function. And if it is moved away, they are likely to replicate it in a few years for some other reason.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you, Mr. Ehlers. We are getting close to the end.
Homeland Security R&D at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Just to—Dr. Orbach, the Administration suggested that Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory will have a special role in Homeland Security. How will Homeland Security R&D be organized at Livermore?
Dr. ORBACH. As I understand it, there will be a headquarters, a facility, at Livermore, almost a campus that will be the principle research and development campus for the new department. Lawrence Livermore has very close contacts with the other laboratories and with universities and situated very close, for example, to the sequencing center in Walnut Creek. So it has the ability to work with facilities that can aid it. And indeed, some of the opportunities that we have transferred, I think, will be helpful in that regard just geographically by their proximity.
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The computational capability at Lawrence Livermore is quite extraordinary. They currently have the fastest, highest capacity computer currently in the United States, and they continue to develop their computational methods. In many of the areas that the department will have to consider, that computation will be critical in terms of systems, in terms of the actual science that is being carried out.
There is also their relationship to other scientists that Livermore historically has enjoyed. They have close university relationships directly with some of the campuses in the area. So I think it will serve as a convenient node, an effective node for R&D for the new department.
Chairman BOEHLERT. That prompts some follow-up questions, which we will give you. We won't take your time today.
Student Visas: Balancing Security Concerns with University Needs
One final question for Dr. Marburger. You announced a few months ago a new plan for student Visas that you were rightly proud of, because it struck, I seem to think, the balance between security concerns and university needs. How will the existence of the new department effect that?
Dr. MARBURGER. The existence of the new department should not effect any of the decisions that have been made about dealing with foreign students. I do expect the new department will have a great interest in these processes and will manage them in the future. But the agreements that have been made about IPASS in particular and the process by which students will be cleared for——
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Chairman BOEHLERT. So that will guide the Director of—the Secretary of the new department? IPASS will be——
Dr. MARBURGER. That is certainly the intent, yes.
Chairman BOEHLERT. All right. Thank you very much. Thank you all very much. And we will follow up with some written questions, and we would appreciate timely responses because of the time table we have facing us.
Dr. MARBURGER. We will try.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much.
Dr. MARBURGER. Thank you.
Chairman BOEHLERT. The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:23 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
Appendix 1:
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
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Responses by Dr. John H. Marburger, III, Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President
Questions Submitted by Chairman Sherwood Boehlert and Ranking Minority Member Ralph M. Hall
Q1. How much of the R&D conducted by the Department of Homeland Security will be—or should be—classified? Do you anticipate strict controls (on publishing, conferences, etc.) on research funded through the new Department?
A1. The mix of classified and unclassified R&D cannot be predicted, and will be determined on a project by project basis based on the Nation's policy toward classification of material. What can be said is that I expect the policy towards fundamental research to be guided by NSDD 189, signed by President Reagan in September 1985, which states in part ''. . .It is the policy of this Administration that, to the maximum extent possible, the products of fundamental research remain unrestricted. It is also the policy of this Administration that, where the national security requires control, the mechanism for control of information generated during federally-funded fundamental research in science, technology and engineering at colleges, universities and laboratories is classified.''
Q2. How would you envision the new Department's R&D portfolio in terms of the balance between basic research, applied research, technology development, and demonstration and deployment programs?
A2. It is difficult to predict exactly how the R&D portfolio will be divided. In FY03 there will be a heavy investment in basic research, due primarily to the bioterrorism work being done through HHS. However, substantial investments in technology development, demonstrations, and deployments are also imminent. For example, development of a border entry/exit system is about to be initiated, and deployment of baggage screening equipment to airports will continue.
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Q3. In what ways do you expect research related to homeland security to be different because of the reorganization? Will the Federal Government be pursuing different research questions because of the creation of the new Department?
A3. The reorganization will establish DHS as the entity in the Federal Government dedicated to conducting and coordinating homeland security related R&D. The new Secretary for DHS will be able to prioritize research needs for homeland security, and coordinate across the various R&D activities within the Department. The new Department will ensure investments in homeland security research can be evaluated against each other and better targeted, and that any gaps in existing activities will be addressed.
Q4. The research and development responsibilities of the Department under the Administration's bill seem far broader than those of the programs transferred into the Department. Is this correct, and how do you think the Department will build its R&D capacity to fit the responsibilities that the bill outlines?
A4. The Department will go through an orderly process that begins with a net assessment with the goal of providing planning and prioritization guidance. This activity will conduct comprehensive assessments of our vulnerabilities to catastrophic terrorism, and specifically on attacks designed to inflict mass casualties and on attacks aimed at our vital infrastructure. The effort will involve an assessment of current measures against these vulnerabilities, in terms of prevention, protection, response and recovery. It will include a judgment of both the near-term and long-term capabilities of the threat, and arrive at a net assessment of homeland security risks. The analyses will be fully informed and supported by the intelligence community and the federal agencies, and will be performed in consultation with representatives of State and local governments. This activity will inform the overall programming within the Department, including needed research and development.
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Q5. What criteria did the Administration use to determine which functions from other federal agencies would be transferred to the new Department?
A5. The Administration reviewed existing activities at agencies with a focus on those that are predominantly homeland security-related. We also made determinations about the core competencies that are critical to the mission of the Department of Homeland Security. By combining these factors with practical judgments, we included those activities in the legislation.
Q6. The President's bill includes a Congressional notification requirement for transfer of entities previously established by statute. Do any of the science and technology entities transferred by the bill fall into this category?
A6. Section 733(a) of the bill allows the new Secretary of DHS to organize the new Department according to the needs of the new Department as versus the manner in which various transferred components were previously organized. This sensibly allows the new Department to be organized efficiently and effectively, rather than being a disorganized, crazy-quilt patchwork. Section 733(a)(1) requires the Secretary to notify Congress if any statutory component of a transferred agency is being consolidated, altered or discontinued (e.g., if two previously overlapping statutory R&D functions are being merged into one). Because the new Department has not yet been established and the organizational details have not yet been determined, which science and technology components (that currently have a statutory underpinning) will be subject to this Congressional notice provision cannot yet be identified. If the Committee desires a listing of statutory components that could potentially be affected, we would be happy to work with the Committee in compiling such a listing.
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Q7. For budgetary purposes, will the Homeland Security Department be considered a civilian agency or a defense agency?
A7. DHS will be a civilian agency. But if the question is asking about budget function, then some portions of the DHS budget might be classified as function 054 or other ''national defense'' 050 activities. This is similar to the DOE nuclear programs that are considered ''national defense'' function 053, but are not part of the DOD-military category.
Q8. In your testimony, you stated that the Undersecretary for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures would have jurisdiction over all science, research and development within the new Department. Did you mean that this Undersecretary would have authority over research and development done under other titles of the bill?
A8. Yes. Section 301 of the President's proposal outlines responsibilities of the Undersecretary for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Countermeasures, to include ''conducting a national scientific research and development program to support the mission of the Department.'' The R&D program would include CBRN countermeasures, but also coordination and oversight of other relevant R&D programs across the Department of Homeland Security.
Q9. How will the new Department of Homeland Security's role relate to that of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) or Office of Homeland Security (OHS) in setting research priorities?
A9. OSTP will perform the same role with DHS that it performs for all R&D agencies, which is to articulate and coordinate the priorities of the Administration through interactions with the agencies and to develop explicit research tasks through interagency working groups. OHS will continue to exist in the White House and will have an important role, akin to the National Security Council, to oversee all the homeland security activities across the government. OSTP will continue to provide scientific and technical advice to the Office of Homeland Security, as it does for other offices within the Executive Office of the President.
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Q10. Governor Ridge is expected to unveil the strategic plan that he has been working on sometime next month. What are the benefits and drawbacks of focusing on structure before we have agreed on a strategy?
A10. Like the National Security Strategy, the National Strategy for Homeland Security will form the intellectual underpinning to guide the decision-making of planners, budgeters and policy-makers for years to come. There are really no surprises in the remainder of the national strategy to be released later this summer. From securing our borders, to combating bioterrorism, to protecting the food supply, the majority of the initiatives the Federal Government is pursuing as part of our strategy to secure the homeland have already been discussed publicly, with much discourse between the Executive and Legislative branches. The Department of Homeland Security is, in fact, the centerpiece of, and will be critical to, implementing the National Strategy. Because the need for reorganization is urgent and the time for Congress to act is short, the President wanted to get the proposal and the legislation to Congress as soon as it was ready.
Q11. Should the new Department establish an evaluation and testing organization to screen private sector proposals requesting federal help to develop or procure proprietary security technologies? If so, would it serve as a central portal to the Federal Government for new technology proposals? The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) currently screens and funds promising new anti-terrorism technologies. Is TSWG effective, and should it be absorbed by the Department of Homeland Security or should the Department be included in TSWG?
A11. The Office of Homeland Security (OHS) and the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) have been working with the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) to develop a central clearinghouse for evaluation of unsolicited ideas and white papers related to homeland security technology. By September 2002, TSWG will create a website that will provide a central, easily accessible point of entry for submission of homeland security technology ideas. TSWG will also expand its interagency review system so that it can track, evaluate, and respond to each submitted idea. The clearinghouse will be primarily designed for companies and individuals who are unfamiliar with, or whose ideas do not meet the requirements of, existing agency solicitations.
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Even with the formation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), there will still be a need for interagency review of unsolicited ideas, since much of the R&D for homeland security will continue to be managed by agencies other than DHS. Thus the Department of Homeland Security intends to continue the relationship initiated in the homeland security arena with the TSWG. How that relationship is constructed under DHS is to be determined. It could involve DHS becoming a third stakeholder (with State and DOD) in the TSWG, which would maintain interagency participation while ensuring that the strategic priorities of the clearinghouse remain aligned with the new Department. In any case, there is no intent to absorb TSWG and to disrupt their valuable contribution to counter-terrorism.
Q12. Section 730 of the proposed legislation gives the Secretary the authority to devise a ''human resources management system for some or all of the organizational units of the Department of Homeland Security, which shall be flexible, contemporary, and grounded in the public employment principles of merit and fitness.. . .''
A. How do you see the Department successfully competing for the services of highly desirable skilled workers such as doctors, lawyers, computer technicians or scientists?
B. Would you expect the Department to include a training and workforce development effort to assure itself of a ready source of personnel to meet its needs? How would you suggest that such a program be structured?
C. What provisions are in place to assure outreach to groups in our population that, in the past, have been ignored or discouraged from contributing their talents to national service?
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A12. Many of the existing government-wide management statutes were enacted in the 1920's and 40's and do not anticipate the needs of modern, advanced technology, high-performing organizations.
Terrorists can today strike at any place at any time and with virtually any weapon. This is a permanent condition and these new threats require the most modern management systems flexible enough to provide homeland security. The Department must have the management tools and flexibility to organize and prepare to meet this new and dangerous threat.
The President's most important job is to protect and defend the American people. The changing nature of the threats facing America requires a new government structure to protect against invisible enemies that can strike with a wide variety of weapons. The Department needs a management structure flexible enough to help meet the unknown threats of the future.
The Secretary must have:
Great latitude to redeploy financial resources;
The ability to recruit, retain, and develop a motivated, high-performing and accountable workforce;
Flexible procurement policies to encourage innovation and rapid development and operation of critical technologies vital to securing the homeland;
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The ability to manage property in a way that maximizes the resources available to the Department;
Broad reorganization authority in order to enhance operational effectiveness now and in the future.
Q13. In effecting the transfer of functions from other federal agencies, the President's proposed legislation specifies the transfer of personnel, assets, and liabilities of the transferred entities. Each of these terms is defined in the bill except for ''liabilities.'' Could you tell us what liabilities attach to the science and technology entities transferred to the new Department?
A13. The Office of Management and Budget advises that the word refers to contracts, awards, and debts owed, broadly speaking. To my present knowledge, the science and technology components of the agencies being transferred have no special liability issues outside of those arising from the normal conduct of government business. The language is intended to assure that the nongovernmental citizens and entities that do business with the transferred agencies will not be adversely affected by the transfer, and the science and technology community that supports the federal R&D enterprise should rest similarly assured.
Q14. Why does the Secretary need the ''other transactions authority'' granted in section 732 of the Administration's bill? Should the authority be limited in any way? What would the Department do with revenues received through the use of this authority?
A14. ''Other transaction'' (OT) is a shorthand expression used to refer to any instrument other than a procurement contract, grant, or cooperative agreement. The term ''other transaction'' gained currency following the 1989 enactment of section 2371 of Title 10, United States Code, which authorizes the use of instruments other than contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements for carrying out research projects. The authority's primary purpose is to help broaden DOD's technology and industrial base by allowing development and use of instruments that reduce barriers to participation in defense research by commercial firms that traditionally have not done business with the Government. Congress subsequently provided additional authority to use transactions other than contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements for certain acquisitions. Section 845 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 augmented the 10 U.S.C. 2371 authority, and authorized the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to use ''other transactions'' for prototype projects directly relevant to weapon systems proposed to be acquired or developed by DOD.
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DARPA has made a concerted and successful effort to attract new companies to DOD via its other transactions (OTs) authority. Of the OTs for Prototypes awarded by DARPA since 1994, 49 percent have involved participation by new entities. This freedom helps DARPA attract and retain relationships with some of the most cutting edge companies in America, including those that will not accept a traditional research contract, such as Hewlett-Packard and 3M. DARPA also has been able to craft very successful and beneficial arrangements with small companies that do not have the resources or inclination to adopt the Government-unique contracting system. These small companies often have few corporate assets other than their intellectual property and want to negotiate specific intellectual property protection structures that conform to their internal processes, not those of the Government.
DHS clearly has a need for the same flexibility in engaging non-traditional vendors. Instead of being the leader in all fields, the Government is now sometimes one of many customers for a technology and often not even the largest or most influential customer; a clear example is in the development of drugs and vaccines for bioterror threats. Such contractors are reluctant to work with the Government and their main issues include Government unique accounting systems, the Government's need to contract by regulation instead of by negotiating terms and conditions, and the Government's inability to freely negotiate intellectual property rights. The Government now must use flexible business deals that will accommodate the needs and desires of both parties in order to attract those high-tech companies and individuals with creative inventions and solutions. The creation and protection of intellectual property is the preeminent question in working with many commercial firms. As technology obsolescence becomes shorter, many companies choose to protect their information as trade secrets, through copyrights, or with a combination of methods, including patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets. This is particularly true in many areas of concern to DHS, such as pharmaceuticals, information analysis software, and biometric data processing schemes. Thus, there is a need for full flexibility to negotiate specialized or unique intellectual property approaches.
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There are cases, particularly in research and development, in which the program goals and interests and roles of the parties justify the Government's acceptance of lesser or different rights than those normally required by the statutes or regulations. With respect to basic, applied, and advanced research projects, Other Transactions authority should be given to DHS to allow it to reach those contractors that are reluctant to do business with DOD because of the unique Government requirements in statute and regulation. DHS should also be given statutory authority to enter into prototype projects directly relevant to major systems proposed to be acquired and developed by DHS. Furthermore, that authority should be extended to development contracts. Without OT flexibility, the Government would be able to deal only with contractors that are willing to accept the uniform, mandatory approach of the usual statutes and regulations under all circumstances. If the current trends continue, and there is no indication they will not, innovation will only become more important to the global marketplace. With this added importance comes a need to innovate quickly and jealously guard new inventions. If the Government is not able to react to this new reality by changing how it operates, it will miss out on many of the best technologies because it will not be able to offer an attractive business deal to the companies at the forefront of innovation.
Q15. The Administration's bill creates an exemption under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for information that is provided voluntarily to the Department of Homeland Security and relates to infrastructure vulnerability. Would this exemption extend to information regardless of whether it may have been previously provided to another agency or could have been compelled to be provided under other authority? In other words, would it be possible for someone to shield information from disclosure under FOIA by simply volunteering it to the Homeland Security Department?
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A15. Many private sector firms have indicated a great reluctance to share critical infrastructure and other homeland security information with the Federal Government unless they can be assured that it will be withheld from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).(see footnote 7) FOIA makes virtually every record possessed by a federal agency available to the public in one form or another, unless it is specifically exempted from disclosure or specially excluded from the Act's coverage in the first place.
FOIA exemptions protect information from disclosure in several for several purposes:
1. law enforcement purposes (known as a ''(b)(7) exemption'');
2. trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential (known as a (b)(4) exemption);
3. information voluntarily provided to the Federal Government and that is not customarily available to the public (known also as a (b)(4) exemption), and,
4. if disclosure would risk circumvention of agency regulation or a legal responsibility of the agency (known as a (b)(2) exemption).
While these exemptions provide considerable authority to protect information related to homeland security, they do not provide the certain and unequivocal protection of a (b)(3) exemption statute.
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Section 552(b)(3) of FOIA permits the exemption of information from disclosure if specifically provided for by statute. Sec. 204 of the legislation creating the Department of Homeland Security is a (b)(3) statute as it specifically exempts the information provided voluntarily provided by non-federal entities or individuals that relates to infrastructure vulnerabilities or other vulnerabilities to terrorism. There is ample precedent for (b)(3) statutes; there are presently over 40 such statutes, protecting a wide range of subject matter.
However, this section of the legislation is not intended to shield those companies or people who are violating of the law. If a company is found in violation of any laws, they will be prosecuted under those statutes.
Q16. At our hearing you said that the MASS process should not be affected by the creation of the new Department. How can that be the case when the Administration's bill shifts the authority for granting student visas?
A16. Given the importance of the student visa issue, I would like the opportunity to provide a more detailed and measured response to this question, but do not wish to hold up the rest of these answers. I will respond to you in writing in the next week.
ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses by Dr. John H. Marburger, III, Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President
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Questions Submitted by Representative Judy Biggert
Q1. What is the status of the Anti-terrorism Task Force's efforts to assemble an inventory of current federal research activities relevant to homeland security? Are all federal departments and agencies cooperating?
A1. The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) tasked RAND, through the Science and Technology Policy Institute, to create this inventory. RAND presented its initial findings to OSTP on June 27, 2002—subsequent to my appearance before the Committee. RAND utilized the RaDiUS database of all federal R&D funding, as well as numerous agency interviews, in order to create an initial inventory of 137 federal research programs relevant to homeland security. The initial inventory is not totally sufficient because the RaDiUS database contains data through Fiscal Year 2000 only, and is searchable through key words. Accordingly, the initial work product needs to be updated, and expanded to include relevant programs that are not described in RaDiUS through the keywords utilized by RAND. OSTP is currently discussing with RAND the best means of accomplishing the final objective—a complete, up-to-date inventory of homeland security R&D funding. The agencies have been cooperative in this effort.
ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses by Dr. John H. Marburger, III, Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President
Questions Submitted by Representative Felix J. Grucci, Jr.
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Q1. Do you see means to using university research to help combat terrorism while keeping both security and academic integrity as a priority?
A1. As emphasized in the President's National Strategy for Homeland Security, ''In the war on terrorism, America's vast science and technology base provides a key advantage.'' University research is a fundamental component of this science and technology base and will be fully accessed to support Homeland Security. The unique skills and expertise resident in institutions of higher learning have aided our nation's defense in the past and we anticipate a strong and continuing relationship. The policy of the Administration continues to be that articulated in NSDD 189, promulgated under President Reagan's signature. That policy states that fundamental research should, to the maximum extent possible, be either unrestricted, or classified. At academic institutions, fundamental research is almost always unrestricted; in rare cases, the research may fall under the rules governing classification. However, in those cases the need for protection is in general known and understood by all parties at the initiation of the project.
Q2. A coordinated effort between local, State, and Federal officials is key to combating terrorism. Does research exist at all of these levels to form a strong system, or is more research necessary at the local levels to ensure a coordinated effort? Are the key linkages among local governments or private industry, or both?
A2. Additional research and development is needed to ensure inter-operable communication, data systems, and collaborative planning tools. This research is not unique to a specific government level (local, State, or Federal) but is generally applicable to all levels. Resources for such broadly applicable research exist primarily at the federal level. For example, research related to standards for law enforcement and emergency response technologies is generally performed at the federal level; a key initiative in the President's National Strategy for Homeland Security is to provide a more comprehensive standards development activity for the Nation. One benefit of this activity will be to form strong linkages with local governments as technology standards are determined, and with the private sector, as they become better informed about needed performance criteria.
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Q3. Should different avenues of research—for example, bioterrorism related research and information security research—be organized and carried out differently? How would a homeland security R&D program interface with the scientific and technological resources in other government agencies?
A3. It is certainly the case that widely different research portfolios influence the evolution and styles of organizations that support those portfolios. Thus, NIH and DOD research organizations, for example, are organized differently to carry out their research portfolios in somewhat different ways. In time we will see DHS evolve to address its mission differently than the other federal agencies.
Interfacing with the scientific and technological resources in other government agencies is expected to occur at many levels. At the most basic level, the researchers will communicate through conferences, collaboration, and exchanges of data. Further coordination is anticipated through cross-agency coordination meetings—both informal and formal (for example, coordination arising from National Science and Technology Council contacts or interagency research initiatives). These exchanges will help coordinate the research agendas of various agencies to ensure the national needs are being addressed.
Q4. Basic research funded by non-defense agencies such as the National Science Foundation (NSF) can lead to technologies that have direct applications to security. What role should basic research performed at non-defense, non-security agencies, such as our nation's national laboratories, play in support of homeland defense?
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A4. Basic research performed at the Nation's universities and national laboratories is critical to homeland security. Fundamental work in new vaccines and therapeutics, cyber security, passive and active sensors, intelligent agents, data mining and correlation techniques, and communication protocols, are just a few examples of research currently being pursued under NSF and other basic research grants directly applicable to the homeland security mission. It is only with a strong and vibrant basic research initiative that the U.S. will be able to retain its technological advantage over our adversaries.
ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses by Dr. John H. Marburger, III, Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President
Questions Submitted by Representative Lynn Rivers
Q1. Since 9/11, I have been approached by several researchers at the University of Michigan and Eastern Michigan University about ideas they believe might be useful to the Nation. We all understand that there is money available for research, but when these researchers have approached agencies such as the National Institutes of Health, Department of Defense, Environmental Protection Agency, etc., they learn that most of the available money is targeted at development projects.
Learning this, researchers come to us and ask for help in identifying potential funding for their projects. They even seek earmarks for their research initiatives, something that I know the Administration opposes and that many Members of this Committee, myself included, oppose. I have two questions inspired by situation:
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A. Of the new monies that have been made available for R&D and anti-terrorism measures, how much is actually being designated for competitive grants and more basic and longer-term research protects—the kind of work that is often done by University researchers—and how much is going to development projects?
B. The National Science Foundation has established a web site for the National Science and Technology Council to coordinate the nanotechnology effort. A similar effort on anti-terrorism research seems sensible. Is there a way that OSTP could help us by acting as a clearinghouse on information for available competitive research funding opportunities across federal agencies?
A1. Roughly $1.7 billion of the FY03 money to HHS is going to support fundamental peer-reviewed efforts. About $27 million of FY03 funds are slated for NSF to conduct fundamental work on infectious diseases and for sequencing the genomes of pathogens. Due to the needs of the war and the urgency of immediate countermeasures, most supplemental funds for counter-terrorism were directed toward operational (non-R&D) needs. Nevertheless, funding is available from existing sources for new projects concerned with counter-terrorism.
The Executive Office of the President and agencies have been receiving concept papers and proposals for anti-terrorism R&D from small businesses and individuals. Most of these proposals have been forwarded to the Technology Support Working Group.
In order to improve the process, OHS and OSTP have developed a plan with the interagency Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) to establish a central clearinghouse for evaluation of unsolicited ideas and white papers related to homeland-security technology. TSWG will create a website that will provide a central, easily accessible point of entry for submission of homelandsecurity technology ideas. As an interim process, unsolicited ideas received by OHS and OSTP have been forwarded to TSWG for evaluation. TSWG has directed these submittals to the appropriate agencies for further consideration.
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While the existing process has worked successfully for a small number of unsolicited submissions, OHS and OSTP recognize the need to establish a central, permanent point of entry for the general public, especially for small businesses and entrepreneurs. Because of the expected large volume of unsolicited submissions to the new clearinghouse, the TSWG review system will be expanded so that it can fairly evaluate all submitted ideas, including a broad range of homeland security technologies. TSWG will establish review teams in Border Security, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement; Critical Infrastructure Protection; Conventional Threat Countermeasures; Medical Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); and Non-Medical Response to WMD. The review teams will be composed of volunteers from the relevant agencies, and will build on existing TSWG subgroups. Membership of the review teams will be open to any federal office.
The TSWG, which is managed by the joint DOD-State Combating Terrorism Technology Support Office, has along history of evaluating technologies in support of counter-terrorism, and transitioning them to the field. The TSWG has historically included Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), other bureaus of the Department of Justice, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Secret Service, and the Intelligence Community, as both evaluators and customers for their technologies. In October 2001, TSWG issued a Broad Agency Announcement for technology ideas for combating terrorism, which drew 12,500 responses during the period of the active solicitation. The TSWG has a sophisticated e-government capability, which tracks the status of proposals through the evaluation process. The new TSWG clearinghouse will build on this existing structure so that it can track, evaluate, and respond to R&D ideas in any area of homeland security.
ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
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Responses by Dr. John H. Marburger, III, Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President
Questions Submitted by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee
Q1. Dr. Marburger, the Academy report released earlier this week discussed the role of OSTP in homeland security extensively. In general terms, it emphasized the need for OSTP to beef up its capabilities and involvement. Please respond to the following criticisms in the report:
A. ''The Committee is concerned that the National Science and Technology Council (under OSTP) does not currently appear to be as active as would be necessary to effectively carry out key coordinating discussions. A revitalized NSTC Committee on National Security or a new NSTC subcommittee on counter-terrorism R&D would help OSTP and the agencies provide coordinated input to OHS and OMB''.
B. ''The Office of Homeland Security needs access to new analytical capabilities, OSTP should be strengthened, and closer linkages could be developed between all three offices (OMB, OHS, OSTP).''
C. ''More remains to be done, however, to ensure that OSTP is able to play its critical role in supporting OHS's work. OSTP needs to be able to tap the expertise of all relevant agencies to develop research priorities.''
A1. While OSTP plays an essential role in helping the President ensure coordination among agencies conducting R&D applicable to national security, our efforts reach beyond the Federal Government. My staff and I work not only with the White House, Congress and federal agencies, but also with the science community, the private sector and higher education. OSTP has worked to define an effective relationship with each sector.
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The White House and the Office of Homeland Security
Since the inception of the Office of Homeland Security (OHS), OSTP accepted responsibility to coordinate the various R&D activities associated with the OHS mission.
My Assistant Director for Homeland and National Security has filled the post of Senior Director for Research and Development within OHS. This provides OHS seamless reach-back into the scientific talent resident in OSTP staff, and provides OSTP awareness of the various issues OHS is confronting, while bringing the resources of the science and technology community to bear on homeland security issues in an efficient and timely manner.
For example, working closely with OHS, an interagency working group called the Counter-Nuclear Smuggling Working Group has been created to develop a fully coordinated program for addressing the threat of nuclear smuggling across borders, both overseas and in the United States.
This working group will develop a strategic plan with a unified set of program goals and priorities, including within its scope the programs that implement and deploy current capabilities, as well as programs that research and develop new capabilities. This group is co-chaired with the National Security Council and has been constituted under the Office of Homeland Security's Research and Development Policy Coordinating Committee.
The Federal Agencies and the National Science and Technology Council
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OSTP facilitates R&D across federal agencies primarily through the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC). Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, I created a Rapid Response Team within the NSTC structure. This team draws on technical experts within relevant federal agencies to address critical time-sensitive technical issues. An example of this was OSTP's assembling of a technical team to assist the United States Postal Service in evaluating the effectiveness of various proposals for sanitizing mail contaminated with anthrax spores.
I also established an Anti-terrorism Task Force under the NSTC. That Task Force has produced four working groups:
The Biological and Chemical Preparedness Working Group coordinates federal anti-terrorism R&D efforts and is responsible for setting a five-year research agenda in that area by August 1 of this year;
The Radiological, Nuclear and Conventional Detection and Response Working Group performs the same function within its focus areas;
The Social, Behavioral and Educational Working Group addresses social science R&D relevant to terrorism; and
The Protection of Vulnerable Systems Working Group is concerned with the Nation's physical infrastructure and is intimately connected with the coordination efforts of the Special Advisor to the President for Cyberspace Security, Richard Clarke. Together, we co-chair a Research and Development Working Group focused on this important homeland security mission.
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In support of this activity and at my request, the RAND Corporation is conducting a survey of each agency to create an inventory of anti-terrorism activities. OSTP is currently discussing with RAND the best means of accomplishing the final objective—a comprehensive, up-to-date inventory of homeland security R&D funding. This survey will provide a snapshot of efforts underway throughout the federal enterprise and should help in identifying gaps or duplication of effort.
OSTP also is engaged fully in such interagency groups as the Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group, led by the Department of State, and the Counter-proliferation Program Review Committee, chaired by the Department of Defense. These groups serve to coordinate programs in the treaty verification and counter-proliferation areas.
The Science and Technology Community Outside of the Federal Government
My office and I are working closely with the Nation's science and technology community to bring its resources to bear on national and homeland security issues. For example, NSTC's Anti-terrorism Task Force was deliberately designed to be compatible with a similar structure formed by the National Academy of Sciences. This arrangement allowed OSTP to communicate effectively with some of the best and most experienced scientists in the Nation—many of whom had been thinking about domestic terrorism prior to September 11th. OSTP continues to work with these experts since the release of the NRC report, Making the Nation Safer, the Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism.
I also am working with Floyd Kvamme of the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, which we co-chair, to study ways in which the Nation's private R&D sector can be better engaged in the fight against terrorism.
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OSTP also maintains regular contact with numerous science, engineering and technology societies, as well as with higher education organizations, such as the American Council on Education and the Association of American Colleges and Universities.
As these examples indicate, the Office of Science and Technology Policy is fully engaged with the White House, federal agencies, and the Nation's science and technology community in coordinating the variety of science and technology efforts underway.
ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses by Dr. John H. Marburger, III, Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President
Questions Submitted by Representative Joseph Hoeffel
Q1. Do you believe that the President's Information Technology Advisory Committee (PITAC) could serve in an advisory role to the IT mission of the new Department? Why has no one been appointed to this commission during the Bush Administration? Can we expect appointments soon?
A1. Clearly the PITAC has an important role in advising the President and hence the Executive Branch in the IT area. The recommendations of the PITAC are widely read and discussed across the Federal Government, and will certainly be of significant value to the Department across its IT enterprise.
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The President expects to make a set of appointments in the near future.
ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses by Dr. John H. Marburger, III, Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President
Questions Submitted by Representative Michael M. Honda
Q1. The National Research Council report on R&D for countering terrorism released this week recommended that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) establish a strategic research and planning office. It also suggested that the office build a strong foundation of research on human factors and transportation operations and make the evaluation of security system concepts a central element of its research program.
A. Do you agree with these recommendations?
B. If so, what are the budget implications for establishing a vigorous research program both in-house and through contacts with industry and academia?
C. What mechanisms are necessary to ensure that research supported by the new Department is coordinated with related research carried out by other federal agencies and the private sector?
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A1. Many DHS components, including TSA, will have research and development activities. These activities in many cases will develop and change over time, so the budgets evolve to reflect the priority of this need. The Undersecretary for CBRN within DHS has been provided oversight responsibility for the overall Departmental R&D enterprise, and furthermore is the Departmental senior leader responsible for external agency coordination. It is expected that the Executive Office of the President, through the R&D directorate of OHS, through OSTP, and through OMB, will continue the coordinating role they have historically played.
Q2. If the TSA is moved into a separate Homeland Security Department, how do you intend to ensure that its R&D activities are appropriately coupled to the Nation's transportation modes?
A2. R&D activities across the Nation's transportation modes are characterized by close interaction between providers and operators. These close links will ensure that all R&D activities, including those carried out in TSA, remain relevant to all transportation modes.
Q3. How should the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) go about determining the relative priorities of its security-related R&D activities across the transportation modes?
A3. R&D prioritization should ensure that all activities include a detailed threat analysis that is supported by the intelligence community and the federal agencies. It is expected that R&D activities will be constantly reviewed and evaluated as new threats are identified and prior threats eliminated.
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses by Raymond L. Orbach, Director, Office of Science, Department of Energy
Questions Submitted by Chairman Sherwood Boehlert and Ranking Minority Member Ralph M. Hall
Q1. By transferring research on pathogenic microbes to the new department, the Administration's bill effectively separates research on benign and pathogenic microbes that is currently carried out in an integrated fashion. Does this separation make sense from a research point of view?
A1. By funding much of its R&D work on bioterrorism through NIH, DHS is in fact taking advantage of the scientific synergies between bioagent pathogens and the more conventional pathogenic microbes. However, there is a need for a portion of the DHS biosciences effort to focus exclusively on such non-traditional research areas as engineered (for increased virulence) pathogens, weaponization and dissemination techniques, specific treatments for these pathogens, and the like. Thus, the DHS portfolio represents a balance between the need to exploit the larger scientific enterprise in the war against bioterrorism, and the need for focused, perhaps classified, work on specific issues not likely to be addressed by the broader community.
Q2. What legal instrument will govern the relationship between the Department of Energy's national laboratories and the new Department of Homeland Security?
A2. This issue has not yet been worked through in detail. The nature of any legal instruments between DOE and DHS will be dependent on the provisions enacted into law. A primary objective in determining the form of any such instruments should be achieving DOE and DHS missions in an efficient manner that does not unduly complicate operation of the national labs.
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Q3. Would the Department of Homeland Security contract for R&D from the Department of Energy beyond that contained in the functions being transferred?
A3. The new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will take advantage of the wide-ranging scientific and technical capabilities at the DOE national laboratories in addition to what is being transferred to the new agency.
Q4. The Administration has suggested that a homeland security R&D campus will be established on the grounds of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. It is likely that many of the personnel that staff this campus will be involved in dual-use R&D that serves both homeland security and the other energy and defense responsibilities of Livermore? If the homeland security functions are segregated in a separate facility, how will these researchers carry out their non-homeland duties?
A4. Most of the transferred activities in fact involve researchers that are full time to the program, so in most cases this will not be an issue. Discussions with the laboratory directors and between DOE and DHS have indicated the need for researchers to see their careers and professional interests coupled to the DHS mission, but at the same time where appropriate to allow fairly easy ''dual-hatting'' and sharing mechanisms for DOE researchers wishing to engage in DHS work or visa versa. For example, this could simply involve splitting time between projects with supervisor approval, much as is currently done today when researchers cross project-based boundaries, and is not expected to be a significant issue. Both DOE and DHS are committed to maintaining the professional values and interests of the individual researchers with as little disruption as is possible. Again, this likely will be worked out in a detailed Memorandum of Understanding between DOE and DHS.
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses by Raymond L. Orbach, Director, Office of Science, Department of Energy
Questions Submitted by Representative Judy Biggert
Q1. Dr. Marburger mentioned in his testimony that, ''the new department would assume responsibility for a central management and research facility located at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.''
Is the new Department of Homeland Security going to focus more on central management and be a virtual agency that coordinates homeland security research across departments and agencies, or will the new department have the facilities and capabilities to actually conduct research? Will the Department of Homeland Security have the budget authority to coordinate and fund research, the physical capabilities to conduct research, or both?
Q1A. If the Department of Homeland Security will be conducting research, how do we avoid duplicating research capabilities and facilities that already exist at other federal agencies or departments with a research mission?
A1. The new Department will in fact have a capability for conducting research. This will be through several structures envisioned for the new Department. The President has specifically called out a National Laboratory for Homeland Security, modeled on the NNSA labs that provided expertise in nuclear weapon design throughout the Cold War, that would provide a multidisciplinary environment for developing and demonstrating new technologies for homeland security. It will maintain a critical mass of scientific and engineering talent, with a deep understanding of the various operational and technical issues associated with homeland security systems. Each year this Laboratory, in consultation with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), will propose new efforts, and review ongoing efforts in these areas. The new Department would assume responsibility for a central management and research facility located on the LLNL campus, with satellite Centers of Excellence located at other DOE laboratories. Envisioned activities for the laboratories include: Developing, demonstrating, and then transitioning to the field new technologies and system concepts for countering the specific threats of nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorism; reaching out to various regional, state, and local homeland security efforts, gaining familiarity with their issues, and providing them core research, development, test and evaluation expertise; conducting and supporting threat and vulnerability analyses. Other structures can also be expected to be created within DHS, such as a capability to fund extramural research, and to perform innovative research leveraging the private sector.
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Prevention of duplication in terms of research and facilities will be accomplished as it is elsewhere in the federal enterprise: coordination activities led by the principal agency (in this case DHS) providing a venue for other departments to gain insight into each other's efforts; through the coordination functions performed by OSTP and OHS, and the crosscuts performed by OMB; and through Congressional oversight.
Q1B. Will research institutions like national laboratories, other government laboratories, and universities have to worry about having their research projects or programs hijacked if they have any sort of applicability to homeland security?
A1B. The Department of Homeland Security will leverage existing facilities and expertise at LLNL, and the other national laboratories, as it pursues R&D efforts that support homeland security. The new Department will neither incorporate nor reorganize LLNL in its entirety. Rather, the reorganization that takes place in the affected national laboratories will be limited to those programs that are specifically marked for transfer, associated work for others programs, and other programs that will support both the homeland security and NNSA missions. The President's legislative proposal specifically excludes ''programs and activities relating to the strategic nuclear defense posture of the United States.'' which constitutes approximately two thirds of the LLNL budget. The remaining work elements—nuclear nonproliferation, energy efficiency, environmental management, fossil energy, and work for others that is associated with these elements would also, for the most part, remain under the control of the Department of Energy. The Department will work cooperatively with Homeland Security and other federal agencies to ensure that the leading edge research and development activities carried out by the laboratory will continue to benefit the Nation.
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Q2. How much and what kind of research do you envision occurring at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory? How much and what kind of research do you envision occurring at other national laboratories? How much and what kind of research do you envision occurring at the ''Centers of Excellence'' located on national laboratory campuses nationwide?
A2. I will be pleased to provide you with the information. (The information follows.)
Introduction
Under the President's draft legislation for a Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the new Department will leverage existing facilities and expertise at LLNL, and the other national laboratories and work with centers of excellence at several laboratories to develop and implement scientific and technological countermeasures to terrorist threats—including threats involving weapons of mass destruction. The specific objective is to provide a multidisciplinary environment for developing and demonstrating new technologies for homeland security, and to maintain a critical mass of scientific and engineering talent, with a deep understanding of the various operational and technical issues associated with homeland security systems. To achieve this objective, the President has proposed legislation to ensure that the research and development activities at the Department of Homeland Security are designed in the following manner:
Structure
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NNSA labs will dedicate a portion of the physical plant to DHS activities. Current contracting relationships between the operating organization (e.g., University of California) and the workforce will not be disrupted. DHS will assume control of the overall funding for homeland security-related programs, and allocate it as necessary to meet homeland security goals. It is expected that the associated workforce will be dedicated to DHS activities, but that procedures will be available to allow the workforce from both DHS and DOE activities to easily support each other's efforts; this can only enhance the quality of the programs for both agencies. It is expected that workforce, physical plant, and other issues will be spelled out in a detailed Memorandum of Agreement between DHS and DOE, to be developed as soon as possible. Envisioned activities for the laboratories include: Developing, demonstrating, and then transitioning to the field new technologies and system concepts for countering the specific threats of nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorism; reaching out to various regional, state, and local homeland security efforts, gaining familiarity with their issues, and providing them core research, development, test and evaluation expertise; conducting and supporting threat and vulnerability analyses.
Many activities in this proposal span the entire complex of laboratories operated by the Department of Energy. This implies that centers of excellence will reside at a number of the laboratories. Approximately $123 million in programs will be transferred to DHS in this plan.
Advanced Scientific Computing Research at LLNL
The Advanced Scientific Computing Research program at LLNL ($3M) supports researchers in applied mathematics and computer science to achieve optimal efficiencies from large scale computing systems. This activity is expected to provide a capability at DHS in advanced simulation, computer science, and scientific modeling to support such activities as complex nonlinear systems analysis, traffic flow modeling, and information extraction and analysis.
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Intelligence
LLNL, along with other DOE laboratories, maintains an in-house intelligence capability for assessing nuclear weapons and other WMD technologies throughout the world. This capability makes use of the scientific expertise resident at the laboratories, and is augmented with funding from the intelligence community for their support for National assessments and analyses. The LLNL effort ($5.5M) includes analyses of third world chemical, biological, and nuclear programs, and thus is expected to be invaluable to the DHS for guiding research and development activities to counter the use of these weapons against the homeland. This activity is expected to provide a capability within DHS focused on the technical capabilities of third world nations and non-state actors, as well as proliferation issues from more technically advanced nations. It is expected that this LLNL activity will continue to provide uninterrupted and seamless support to the National community in this area while providing in-house threat expertise.
Assessment, Detection, and Cooperation Programs
The Nuclear Assessment Program ($6M) leverages the scientific talents and system engineering skills of the laboratories in areas of central relevance to homeland security by tracking and assessment of nuclear smuggling events; assessment of communicated nuclear threats; and technical assistance and training support.
Energy Security and Assurance
This DOE-wide program ($7M) develops and maintains a capability for assessing vulnerabilities of the national energy infrastructure, and provides technical assistance on emergency response plans. Activities include funding for the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) ($20M), a key homeland security research and development activity, located at Sandia National Laboratory with the participation of Los Alamos National Laboratory. Under the reorganization proposal released on June 6, NISAC was included as part of the infrastructure protection division of the new Department.
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Environmental Measurements Laboratory
DHS is assuming control of the Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML) located in New York City. EML ($5M) provides program management, technical assistance and data quality assurance for measurements of radiation and radioactivity relating to environmental restoration, global nuclear non-proliferation, and other priority issues. EML currently provides an unbiased and responsive technical capability to assure quality in sampling, measurements and analyses, and risk assessments of human exposure to radioactivity and other energy-related pollutants; conducts scientific investigations and develops technologies related to environmental restoration, site and facility characterization, and environmental surveillance and monitoring; and provides an in-house, high quality scientific capability to address important issues related to national security such as nonproliferation. EML is expected to provide DHS capability in research and development activities associated with environmental sampling, facility protection, and standardization protocols for crisis response technologies.
Office of Science
Office of Science (SC) has designated single points of contact at the DOE national laboratories to facilitate access to the laboratories regarding homeland security; and they can be used to facilitate communication on science and technology issues, and in interacting with universities and the private sector in areas of mutual interest.
Q3. Do you envision the new Department of Homeland Security providing funding in the form of grants to research institutions like national labs, other government laboratories and universities, or will it simply fund its own in-house research? Will the DOE national laboratory system's science laboratories conduct research on behalf of the Department of Homeland Security under a ''work for others'' arrangement?
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A3. The new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will take advantage of the wide-ranging scientific and technical capabilities at the DOE national laboratories in addition to what is being transferred to the new agency. However, specific contracting or financial arrangements have not been determined yet.
Q4. If research or technology has dual applications, or ''ancillary benefits to society,'' (Testimony of Branscomb and Klausner on the National Research Council report, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Counterterrorism) including applicability to homeland security, what department will fund the necessary research and development—the Department of Homeland Security or some other federal department or agency?
A4. The Department of Homeland Security must have central responsibility for homeland security strategy and coordination. There will be many opportunities for technological collaboration where missions intersect. The ability to create, maintain, and draw from a vast reservoir of science, engineering, and medical knowledge has underpinned many of the Nation's efforts to combat adversaries. This was the basis for the great science, engineering and medical contributions made during World War II. The growing technical capability of the USSR, then our adversary, and the Cold War required a sustained effort by this community for over four decades. The recent national and international response to AIDS by scientists and physicians has again demonstrated that science can mobilize to respond to a threat. The response benefited from a reservoir of knowledge accumulated through two decades of sustained biomedical science that has been well supported financially in the United States and other industrialized nations. A successful response to the threat of terrorism will require the same long-term dedication and focus.
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Opportunities for dual-use solutions:
Sensor and filtering technologies designed to protect buildings against chemical attack will be useful in monitoring building ventilation systems for other types of pollution and for improving indoor air quality, and may also allow more efficient control of these systems.
Techniques to detect biological infections prior to clinical symptoms would help slow outbreaks of all infectious diseases, not just those introduced into the population maliciously.
A security system concept for shipping containers whereby shippers certified as having secure loading facilities are granted faster passage through key megaports has a variety of possible collateral benefits, including a decline in the use of containers for the movement of contraband and an increase in the overall efficiency of the shipping system.
Improved security architecture and cryptography that can protect SCADA systems and other critical infrastructures, such as telecommunication systems, would enhance commercial security (i.e., reduce cybercrime) and help protect privacy. More robust network architectures could increase the reliability of important systems.
Technologies already developed for responding to natural hazards (e.g., earthquake, flood, hurricanes, wind and fire) could be adopted for homeland security and counterterrorism efforts.
Low-cost electronic accelerators developed as sources of radiation for detection of nuclear or explosive materials could also be used to replace intense radioactivity sources currently used in commerce and medicine.
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Biometric identification technologies could be useful for commercial security and authentication methods could help facilitate e-commerce.
Q5. Will national, government, university laboratories, or similar institutions that are conducting research or developing technologies with dual applications have to worry about having their research projects or programs hijacked if they have any applicability to homeland security?
A5. Queries #4 & #5 are addressed together.
ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses by Raymond L. Orbach, Director, Office of Science, Department of Energy
Questions Submitted by Representative Felix J. Grucci, Jr.
Q1. Do you see means to using university research to help combat terrorism while keeping both security and academic integrity as a priority?
A1. Absolutely. Our nation's universities have an important role to play in contributing both fundamental scientific knowledge and new technological capabilities to the protection of our country. Universities, with their free flow of ideas and vibrant research communities, are a major source of the new knowledge that will ultimately be brought to bear on our security challenges through application in industry, or via partnerships with our national laboratories. Their academic integrity and excellence will be central to strong leadership in the science and technology underpinning security—over and over we have seen that exchange and competition of ideas creates healthy and excellent science, while closed, insular communities breed poor science. Ensuring that university capabilities are included in addressing the homeland security challenges will require a mechanism, a structure, that enables the university to understand sometimes classified technology needs—without involving the universities in classified work directly. I see the Office of Science and our laboratories as playing a key role in providing an interface between the unclassified research pursued at universities, and classified research conducted at the DOE/NNSA laboratories and work that will be sponsored by the new Department of Homeland Security.
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Q2. A coordinated effort between local, state and federal officials is key to combating terrorism. Does research exist at all of these levels to form a strong system or is more research necessary at the local levels to ensure a coordinated effort? Are the key linkages among local governments or private industry, or both?
A2. A critical need that is yet to be addressed rigorously is the necessity of including the user community—the state, local, and regional entities and first responders—as an integral part of the technology requirements definition process as well as in the testing, prototyping, and assessing of technologies. The tight integration of the user community with the R&D endeavors will ensure that technology products will find rapid avenues to deployment and use, a prime goal of the proposed DHS. History has shown that to do otherwise will severely limit the acceptance of new technologies and slow the development-to-deployment process. DOE/NNSA laboratories can play a very important role in this process because they are already integrated with and trusted members of their regional communities, and in many cases already have relationships with local/regional governments, emergency responders, universities, and industry.
Q3. Should different avenues of research—for example bioterrorism related research and information security research—be organized and carried out differently? How would a homeland security R&D program interface with the scientific and technological resources in other government agencies?
A3. Different avenues of research typically, and historically, have drawn upon different organizational structures (depending on a variety of factors such as the extent to which they are single vs. multidisciplinary in nature or focus on more fundamental research vs. technology development and deployment) to succeed. The Department of Homeland Security R&D program will interface with the scientific and technological resources of other government agencies in two ways: First, through program-to-program interactions and coordination modeled on many of the ways we currently coordinate R&D programs at the intersection of various government agency missions. DOE/NNSA already has a group established and ready to help coordinate with the new Department when and if they request. Second, the new DHS will interface with the resources of other agencies through the grants they fund and the researchers they support. These scientists and engineers will form an important interface at the ''grass roots level.'' Also, it is broadly recognized that a portion of the R&D that DHS will require will be dual-benefit in nature and in many cases will share synergistic missions with enduring R&D programs carried out by other federal agencies. An example of this dual-benefit nature is nuclear detector applications, which have deployment purposes for enduring NNSA missions as well as homeland security missions. These synergies can be exploited for the benefit of DHS and other federal agencies by creating and maintaining senior level strategic councils staffed by representatives of the various equity holders to establish coordinated, if not integrated, R&D efforts.
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Q4. Basic research funded by non-defense agencies such as the National Science Foundation (NSF) can lead to technologies that have direct applications to security. What role should basic research performed at non-defense, non-security agencies such as at our nation's national laboratories play in support of homeland defense?
A4. The basic research performed at our nations non-defense agencies will play a critical role in advancing the security interests of our nation on three primary levels. First, the fruits of the basic science endeavors (e.g., advances in our understanding of materials, biological, and physical processes) will provide the building blocks that allow new and more advanced (and sometimes classified) technology applications to be developed. History has shown that without these advances in the basic sciences, opportunities for technological advances are slim. Second, the non-defense research agencies will contribute through advances in dual-use technologies for which they (the non-defense agencies and laboratories) presently play a key role. An example is the Office of Science laboratories' focus on energy research. This research includes areas such as energy production, radiation detection, genomic sequencing, and other important elements that directly intersect with the homeland security mission, in much the same way as the advances in basic nuclear science in the early part of the last century drove both military and commercial nuclear applications. As the Nation's stewards of much of the expertise in the non-military applications of these technologies, these agencies can and should provide valuable expertise to support the protection of these National assets. Finally, the non-defense agencies and laboratories, through their core expertise in energy systems, materials, computation, biology, critical infrastructure, transportation systems, etc., will participate directly in the technology development calls extended by DHS.
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses by Mr. John S. Tritak, Director, Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce
Questions Submitted by Chairman Sherwood Boehlert and Ranking Minority Member Ralph M. Hall
Q1. Information security and critical infrastructure protection are widely recognized as homeland security functions. Several information security functions from other federal departments would be transferred to the new Department if the President's proposed legislation were enacted. These include the National Infrastructure Protection Center at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Communications System at the Department of Defense, the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) at the Department of Commerce, the Computer Security Division at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center at the Department of Energy, and the Federal Computer Incident Response Center at the General Services Administration. Do these organizations work together now on information security and critical infrastructure protection? Do you foresee new synergies if these organizations are amalgamated within the new Department?
A1. All of the organizations listed above have worked together, and will continue to work together, as appropriate, on matters relating to homeland security and critical infrastructure protection. Of course, some of these organizations work together more frequently than others given their complementary roles and responsibilities. For example, the Director of the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) and the Director of the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) often communicate on a weekly basis to ensure a coordinated approach in their respective outreach efforts with private industry. Bringing these organizations together under a single division within the new Department of Homeland Security will indeed create new synergies, as well as enable a greater leveraging of their core competencies.
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Q2. What will be the role of the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) of the FBI in the new Department? We understand that most of the transferred employees from the NIPC will be FBI agents who are detailed to the Department. What is the point of the transfer if most of the staff will remain employees of the FBI?
A2. The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), other than the Computer Investigations and Operations Section, will become part of the new Department of Homeland Security's Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Division, where it will bring experience and expertise in the areas of threat warning and assessment, and industrial outreach.
I will defer to my colleagues at the FBI on any questions relating to the transfer of personnel associated with the NIPC.
Q3. Would the information security and critical infrastructure protection functions transferred from other federal agencies lose their separate identities in the new Department?
A3. The Administration is reviewing options for organizing the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Division, as well as the other divisions that will constitute the new Department. The Administration currently is focusing its efforts on getting the President's bill passed and developing an effective process for an orderly transition. As you know, the President recently established a transition office in the Office of Management and Budget headed by Governor Ridge for this purpose. Whatever the ultimate organization of the new Division, I am confident that the core competencies of all the organizations comprising it will be fully and effectively utilized.
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Q4. Title II of the President's proposed legislation creates an Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. Information Analysis is an intelligence function, while Infrastructure Protection deals with securing assets. What is the rationale for combining these two disparate functions within one Under Secretariat?
A4. All four divisions of the proposed new Department would have—by design—some overlap of responsibilities with other divisions, as well as some clear separations. This is because our history of dealing with homeland security issues has fostered ''defense in depth'' at Federal, State, and local levels, on the one hand, and some clear divisions of responsibility among the same entities, on the other.
There would also be overlaps and divisions of responsibilities within the new Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Division of the new Department of Homeland Security. For example, some of the intelligence and threat analysis connected to homeland security would be tied directly to protecting America's critical infrastructure, and some would not. Merger of the two functions into a single Division will create a natural synergy and improved communication between those working intelligence analysis issues, and those translating that information into actionable steps to better protect the country's critical infrastructures. At the same time, the proper distinction between those two functions—as represented in the Committee's question—is maintained.
Q5. The NIST Computer Security Division has a dual role: to formulate computer standards for federal agencies and to work with industry to improve the security of commercial products.
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A. How will this role change once the Computer Security Division is moved to the Department of Homeland Security?
A5A. The role of the Computer Security Division will continue to be the same after it is moved to the Department of Homeland Security. NIST's Computer Security Division will continue to interact with the private sector in the Department of Homeland Security as it has done within NIST. The President's plan would combine the various operating units within the Federal Government with responsibility for cyber security into a single entity so that the operations and activities of these units can be more closely coordinated which will serve to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the Nation's critical infrastructure and cyber security efforts. The mission of the new Department will require the close cooperation between the Federal Government, State and local government, and the private sector.
B. In addition, the Computer Security Division provides support to other elements of NIST's Information Technology Lab. Will NIST have to re-establish this expertise if these Computer Security Division is moved to the Department of Homeland Security?
A5B. There are aspects of computer security, which are not related to homeland security, that are integrated with other NIST information technology research and services programs. Thus, NIST will continue to collaborate with the Computer Security Division at the Department of Homeland Security on matters of computer security.
C. If not, how will computer security research results be integrated into NIST's efforts?
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A5C. As stated above, NIST will continue to collaborate with the Computer Security Division at the Department of Homeland Security on matters of computer security.
D. The Senate version of the FY 2002 supplemental appropriations bill includes $40 million for computer security research at NIST. Are you assuming this funding will be available for the new bureau? Will it be included in the FY04 baseline?
A5D. We will not specifically comment on the Senate's proposals since the Congress has not finalized agreement on or passed the FY 2002 Homeland Security Supplemental Appropriation. The FY 2004 budget formulation process has just begun therefore it is premature to comment on ''baseline'' budgets. In general though, any supplemental appropriation by definition is a one-time augmentation of budgetary resources and thus are not to be included in future baseline budget projections.
Q6. The National Research Council's (NRC) report presented to the Committee on Tuesday, June 25, emphasized the importance of conducting risk analysis and threat assessments from a systems perspective. What capability will exist within the proposed Department for this purpose if the President's proposal is adopted?
A6. While the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has considerable expertise in risk analysis, the National Infrastructure Protection Center's (NIPC) strength lies in threat analysis. When NIST and NIPC are integrated in the new Department of Homeland Security, they will be able to produce the systems analysis envisioned by the NRC report. Moreover, it is important to realize that this is a fundamentally new approach to analysis that may require additional structural changes to facilitate optimal development.
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses by Mr. John S. Tritak, Director, Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce
Questions Submitted by Representative Felix J. Grucci, Jr.
Q1. Do you see means to using university research to help combat terrorism while keeping both security and academic integrity as a priority?
Q2. A coordinated effort between local, State, and Federal officials is key to combating terrorism. Does research exist at all of these levels to form a strong system, or is more research necessary at the local levels to ensure a coordinated effort? Are the key linkages among local governments or private industry, or both?
Q3. Should different avenues of research—for example, bioterrorism related research and information security research—be organized and carried out differently? How would a homeland security R&D program interface with the scientific and technological resources in other government agencies?
Q4. Basic research funded by non-defense agencies such as the National Science Foundation (NSF) can lead to technologies that have direct applications to security. What role should basic research performed at non-defense, non-security agencies, such as our nation's national laboratories, play in support of homeland defense?
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As of the close of the 107th Congress, Mr. Tritak's responses to Representative Grucci's questions were not received.
Appendix 2:
Additional Material for the Record
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80444c.eps
80444d.eps
80444e.eps
80444f.eps
Next Hearing Segment(2)
(Footnote 1 return)
See Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record, pp. 81–96.
(Footnote 2 return)
The report to which Chairman Boehlert referred, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Combating Terrorism, is available online at www.nap.edu
(Footnote 3 return)
See Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record, p. 83, Section 202.
(Footnote 4 return)
See Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record, p. 78.
(Footnote 5 return)
See Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record, p. 80.
(Footnote 6 return)
Dr. Marburger clarified that the correct date is June 6.
(Footnote 7 return)
U.S.C. 552 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)