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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses by David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, General Accounting Office
Coordination Between DOE Science and NSF Research
Q1. You and the NASA Administrator recognized that it would require five to seven years for NASA to transform its workforce and meet the goals of its Strategic Human Capital Implementation Plan. Does NASA's Strategic Human Capital Implementation Plan include an appropriate set of goals and a sound strategy for addressing NASA's human capital challenges? Do you have any recommendations that would strengthen this plan?
A1. Because our work has not entailed a detailed analysis of NASA's Strategic Human Capital Implementation Plan, we are not in a position to report on the appropriateness and soundness of the goals and strategies at this time.(see footnote 10) However, in response to your question, we observe that NASA's Strategic Human Capital Implementation Plan contains a number of goals and strategies, as well as specific improvement initiatives that the agency is implementing or is committed to implementing. The goals, strategies, and improvement initiatives are organized under five human capital pillars. Furthermore, the plan contains milestones for achieving the improvement initiatives and metrics for assessing their progress.
Until recently, NASA's Strategic Human Capital Plan and companion Strategic Human Capital Implementation Plan were in draft form and were being reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). OMB and OPM approved those plans subsequent to the Subcommittee's hearing—in August 2002. According to NASA, it developed its plans based on OMB's scorecard of human capital standards, OPM's scorecard of supporting human capital dimensions, and our human capital model.(see footnote 11) The pillars and goals are described in Table 1.
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One of the things that I pointed out at the Subcommittee's July 2002 hearing that agencies must do to successfully address their human capital challenges is to ensure that their strategic human capital plans are results-oriented and data-driven. This includes developing appropriate information on the number and location of employees and their key competencies and skills, as well as data on the profile of the workforce, and performance goals and measures for human capital approaches. Further, this data must be used effectively to develop strategies that continually ensure that agencies have the right mix of employees to meet their future needs. A key to success in this area will also be NASA's ability to implement its new financial management system, because it will encompass the integrated workforce planning and analysis system that NASA includes as an improvement initiative in its Strategic Human Capital Plan and plans to implement in 2005: The workforce planning and analysis system is expected to track the distribution of NASA's workforce across programs, capture critical competencies and skills, determine management and leadership depth, and facilitate gap analyses. Currently, NASA has limited capability for personnel tracking and planning, particularly on an agency-wide or program-wide basis. Based on the numerous initiatives NASA will need to undertake, transforming the agency will likely require a multi-year implementation period.
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Q2. How effectively is NASA using existing authorities to meet its human capital goals?
Q3. Do you have any recommendations for how NASA can more fully utilize the existing authorities?
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Q4. If fully utilized, are the existing authorities sufficient to meet NASA's goals? If not, what goals cannot be met without new or expanded authorities?
Q5. Which proposed new or expanded authorities, if any, are required if NASA is to meet its human capital goals?
A2–5. Our work associated with NASA's human capital challenge has focused primarily on following up on the agency's actions to respond to its shuttle program workforce challenges. At this time, without having performed a more detailed analysis of NASA's human capital plans, we are not in a position to assess NASA's use of existing authorities, the sufficiency of those authorities, and their relationship to its agency-wide human capital goals.
However, we will soon issue a report on human capital flexibilities that could be of significant use to the Subcommittee as it considers NASA's request for additional authorities and flexibilities to recruit, train, and retain critical skills. The report emphasizes that federal agencies should first identify and use the flexibilities available under existing laws and regulations. If additional flexibilities are desired, agencies should develop sound business cases to justify the need for the additional authorities. In this regard, the report discusses agency and union officials' views on the most effective flexibilities for managing their workforces and additional flexibilities that would be most helpful in managing their workforces. It also identifies key practices that agencies should implement to use human capital flexibilities effectively.
According to interviews we held with agency officials at numerous federal organizations and union representatives of several national organizations, work-life programs, such as alternative and flexible work schedules, transit subsidies, child care assistance, and employee assistance programs, are among the most effective human capital flexibilities available in federal agencies for managing the workforce to achieve agency missions and accomplish agency goals. These flexibilities—all of which are currently available to NASA—are effective because they serve as important recruitment and retention tools as employees weigh the balance between their work life and leisure time. In addition, agency and union officials frequently cited monetary recruitment and retention incentives, including recruitment and relocation bonuses for hard-to-fill positions; special hiring authorities, such as limited term appointments and student employment and outstanding scholar programs; and incentive awards to employees for superior job performance and specific accomplishments, including cash and time-off awards.
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Categories of additional flexibilities suggested by the officials that would be the most helpful in managing the workforce, if authorized, include (1) more flexible classification and pay approaches, (2) greater flexibility to streamline and improve the federal hiring process, (3) increased flexibility in addressing employees' poor job performance, (4) additional workforce restructuring options, and (5) expanded flexibility in acquiring and retaining temporary employees. These suggestions would provide a starting point for executive branch decision-makers and Congress to consider as they seek to reform federal human capital policies and practices. Key aspects of these additional authorities are included in various legislative initiatives under consideration by Congress. In other cases, however, additional analyses may be needed to ensure that any new authorities are granted and implemented consistent with a focus on program results, merit, and other important federal employment goals.
Our forthcoming report also emphasizes the importance of effectively implementing human capital flexibilities, noting that by more effectively using flexibilities, agencies would be in a better position to manage their workforces, ensure accountability, and transform their cultures to address current and emerging demands. To ensure the most effective use of human capital flexibilities, it is important that agencies
plan strategically and make targeted investments;
ensure stakeholder input in developing policies and procedures;
educate managers and employees on the availability and use of flexibilities;
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streamline and improve administrative processes;
build transparency and accountability into the system; and
change the organizational culture.
With regard to NASA, we plan to periodically monitor the agency's human capital planning and implementation efforts and report to Congress as appropriate. We will be pleased to meet with the Subcommittee in this regard.
Q6. What meaningful objectives and measurable goals would you recommend to track progress over the next five years as NASA implements its human capital plans?
A6. It might be better to address this question in terms of the supporting metrics in the human capital plans that NASA has established for assessing its human capital goals. NASA's human capital plans refer to a hierarchy of metrics to assess the agency's progress toward achieving its goals. The plans state that the highest level of metrics are those ''critical few'' that NASA's senior management and stakeholders care most about and have identified as most appropriate for incorporation into the agency's Government Performance and Results Act-related annual performance and reporting process. Two specific metrics, which the plans state cover a number of goals, have been identified as critical to helping NASA assess its progress toward achieving its human capital aims and assisting it in analyzing root causes of problems and issues. Recognizing that we have not performed a detailed analysis of NASA's human capital plans, these metrics seem meaningful and reasonable to track over the next five to seven years. However, this does not suggest that NASA's commitment to achieving the remaining human capital goals and measures in its human capital plans should be lessened or that the remaining goals and measures should not be tracked. The two critical metrics are:
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(1) NASA's progress in closing gaps in critical competencies. Using this metric, NASA will be able to determine, on an agency-wide basis, whether the gap between the strategic competencies it has and those it needs is no greater than 10 percent by the end of fiscal year 2004 and that, within the same period, no gaps exist in those competencies identified as ''mission critical.'' Thereafter, NASA will reduce the strategic competencies gap to no more than five percent within two years and maintain at that level, except there will be essentially no gaps in competencies identified as mission critical.
(2) Alignment of NASA's human capital strategy with its mission, goals, and organizational objectives. This metric will allow NASA to determine whether it is achieving an overall combined score that is in the top 10 percent of all scores government-wide on the OPM-administered government-wide survey. This metric will assess NASA's performance relative to whether (a) people have the resources they need to perform their jobs, (b) the performance management system is effective in identifying poor performance and taking steps to improve performance, (c) awards and recognition programs incentivize and reward the behaviors the agency wants to foster, (d) the workforce has adequate opportunities for learning and improvement, and (e) NASA fosters an environment of inclusiveness.
According to NASA's Strategic Human Capital Implementation Plan, the results of the two critical metrics will serve as guideposts for evaluating the overall health of NASA's human capital management effort. NASA believes that they cover directly or indirectly agency progress in addressing all of the areas of concern expressed by internal and external parties regarding the agency's workforce, including:
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identifying and managing competencies needed to carry out the mission and eliminating gaps in mission critical competencies;
succession planning;
strategically using existing personnel tools, flexibilities, and technologies;
differentiating between high and low performers through appropriate incentives and awards and merit-based human resources management; and
appropriately considering skill mix, technology, electronic government, and competitive sourcing.
Q7. Could NASA meet its goals solely through the use of the proposed alternative personnel system demonstration authority? Are there risks associated with solely using the demonstration authority? Would this present any special challenges for congressional oversight?
A7. NASA's legislative proposal for streamlined demonstration and alternative personnel system authority would provide a mechanism for converting a successful demonstration project,(see footnote 12) upon approval by OPM, to a permanent alternative personnel system, without the need for special legislation and without any limitation on the number of employees that would be covered by the project as is under current authority. It is our understanding that the NASA Administrator believes that it would be difficult for the agency to meet its goals solely through the use of this proposal. He testified at the July 2002 hearing that the legislative provisions when taken individually would only help NASA deal with its human capital strategic threats to a limited degree. The Administrator stated that when taken together as an integrated package, the provisions would form a strong nucleus in support of NASA's Strategic Human Capital Plan and the President's Management Agenda and would enable NASA to avert a serious human capital crisis.
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Without having fully analyzed this proposal in relation to NASA's unique human capital needs, it is difficult at this time to state whether NASA could meet its goals solely through the use of the proposed alternative personnel system demonstration authority. Also, to identify the risks associated with solely using the demonstration authority would require an assessment of the pros and cons of using such an option, particularly if it means bypassing Congress in creating permanent alternative personnel systems and allowing OPM approval without the need for special legislation as proposed by NASA. However, a number of federal agencies have taken advantage of options provided by Congress to test or implement innovative human capital policies, programs, and practices that operate outside the framework of Title 5, United States Code, and regulations under this title, as evidenced by a recent study by The Partnership for Public Service.(see footnote 13) The study notes that in most cases these innovations have proven successful in improving the agencies' ability to attract, motivate, or retain a highly qualified workforce while still adhering to the basic principles of a merit-based system. Many of the successful practices were developed through the use of OPM demonstration projects. Pay banding is an approach that has been successfully used in a number of federal organizations, including GAO. It provides the flexibility to offer greater competitive starting salaries and rewards to high-performing employees with financial incentives. As I testified before the National Commission on the Public Service in July 2002, Congress may wish to explore the benefits of providing OPM additional flexibility that would enable it to grant government-wide authority for all agencies to use broadbanding for certain critical occupations and/or allowing agencies to apply to OPM for broadbanding authority for their specific critical occupations. Agencies should be required to demonstrate to OPM's satisfaction that they have modern, effective, and validated performance management systems before they are allowed to use broadbanding. However, the prerogative of congressional oversight must be maintained.
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Q8. Could adopting NASA-specific provisions as opposed to taking a government-wide approach lead to a situation wherein scientific and engineering personnel leave other agencies to take advantage of incentives and flexibilities granted to NASA? If so, what would need to be done to prevent such a situation from developing?
A8. When individual agencies are provided flexibilities to address their own strategic human capital needs, it can create a change in the competitive balance for selected personnel. The significance of any related impact would depend on the nature of the flexibilities granted to the agency. For example, expedited hiring authority or early-out and buy-out authority would not have the same impact as higher compensation level authority. Importantly, most federal workers make their employment decisions based on the nature of the job, the mission of the agency, the difference they can make, and the environment within an agency.
Any potential competitive imbalance could be mitigated by limiting the number, amounts and/or term of certain individual flexibilities. Alternatively, government-wide flexibility could be provided in certain areas (e.g., limited-term appointment authority for early-out and buy-out authority and additional compensation authority for selected highly skilled and competitive occupations and positions). This would serve to help level the playing field for attracting and retaining top talent among federal agencies.
Q9. NASA workforce restructuring is being pursued as part of a ''results-oriented'' management strategy. However, what constitutes a desired result typically is a function of the policies being pursued by whatever Administration is in power. The civil service system was established to help insulate the federal workforce from politics. How do we ensure that the proposed NASA legislative provisions don't weaken civil service protections and lead to increased politicization of the workforce?
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A9. The Federal Government's existing human capital policies and procedures are based largely on a workforce and labor market that existed in the 1950s. Much has changed in the past 50 plus years and the Federal Government's human capital strategies must be modernized if it is to attract, retain, and motivate top talent in the 21st century. This should include basing federal employment decisions more on the skills, knowledge, and performance of individuals rather than the passage of time and the rate of inflation. However, certain policies should be retained in order to prevent the politicization of the career civil service and to promote certain national goals and policies (e.g., veteran's preference, inclusiveness). Importantly, any human capital system should have appropriate transparency and adequate safeguards (e.g., appeal rights for employees) in order to help ensure that it is efficient, effective, credible, and equitable.
We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional committees. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Website at: http://www.gao.gov. If you have any questions about this report or need additional information, please contact Allen Li, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, at (202) 512–4841. Key contributors to this report were Cristina Chaplain, Jerry Herley, Shirley Johnson, and Edward Stephenson.
ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses by Sean O'Keefe, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Questions submitted by Chairman Dana Rohrabacher
Q1. How effectively is NASA using existing authorities to meet its human capital goals?
A1. NASA has been aggressive and innovative in using all existing authorities and flexibilities to meet our human capital challenges. NASA was one of the first federal agencies to hire individuals under the Federal Career Intern Program—a program established by Executive Order in 2000 that allows for a more streamlined recruitment process in filling trainee positions in a variety of occupations. NASA also was one of the first agencies to use the new Student Loan Repayment Program to offer an attractive incentive to prospective hires.
NASA's Field Centers are knowledgeable about all available human capital flexibilities and incentives and use them whenever possible and appropriate. For example, the existing recruitment, relocation, and retention bonus authority as well as the superior qualifications appointment authority are incentives long-used by all Centers to attract and retain high quality employees. The use of these incentives has increased in the recent past, but their limitations became apparent as NASA encountered greater difficulty in competing with other employers for needed talent. This led to NASA's legislative proposal to enhance the current recruitment, relocation, and retention bonus authorities to make them more effective financial incentives.
To streamline the lengthy and cumbersome recruitment process that often causes the Agency to lose candidates to the private sector, NASA implemented its Automated Staffing and Recruitment System in FY 2001. This system has simplified and expedited the hiring process by using a computer-assisted rating and referral system and allowing candidates to apply on-line. Despite the significant improvements NASA has seen by using this automated system, existing hiring and selection rules impose unnecessary constraints. The need to further improve these processes led to the proposals for a category rating system and a direct hire authority for positions for which NASA has a critical need or a severe shortage.
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The Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) authority is another tool available to federal agencies to meet their human capital needs. NASA has long-recognized the value of the IPA authority as a means of strengthening the workforce by leveraging outside talent from academia and the nonprofit sector; its use within the Agency has been extensive. The legislative proposal to allow IPA assignments to be extended up to six years (rather than four) reflects the importance we place on IPA assignments as a means to sustain the intellectual capital of the Agency. Indeed, this program has proven to be so valuable that we also have proposed creating a NASA Industry Exchange Program, modeled on the IPA, to enable the Agency to engage in mutually beneficial, collaborative ventures with industry to infuse new ideas and perspectives into the Agency, develop new skills within the workforce, and strengthen mission capabilities.
The term appointment authority is another tool that NASA uses to provide greater organizational agility. Term appointments have been very beneficial, particularly in supporting programs and projects of limited duration. Their utility, however, would be enhanced greatly if the appointments could be extended to six years (rather than four) to accommodate the length of some NASA programs and projects. In addition, term appointments would be more attractive to potential candidates if the authority allowed for conversion to permanent positions without the need to go through the same, burdensome hiring process they faced in being appointed to the original term position. This enhancement would encourage a wider pool of high quality candidates to apply for such opportunities. The legislative proposals would provide for these enhancements to the current term appointment authority.
NASA makes extensive use of student employment programs as sources of candidates critical to building a workforce of the future. After a decade of downsizing, we began re-establishing recruitment networks and rebuilding our Cooperative Education Program. We use many other student-oriented programs to develop a future pipeline of talent from which we can draw—such as the NASA Undergraduate Student Research Program and the NASA Graduate Student Research Programs. The recognition of the importance of building the science and engineering pipeline led to our legislative proposal for a ''Scholarship for Service'' program, which would allow us to support the development of a high-quality science and engineering workforce by awarding scholarships in return for a commitment to work for NASA after graduation.
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NASA's most recent buyout authority, which authorized buyouts without losing the corresponding FTE, enabled the Agency to reduce its workforce in areas in which the need for certain skills had diminished and used the FTE's to recruit in areas in which there was a need for different skills. This is an important flexibility for reshaping the workforce to meet changing requirements, and NASA will continue to need it.
The above examples represent just a few of the tools NASA employs to address the Agency's human capital challenges. NASA uses all appropriate human capital authorities and flexibilities, including those that represent long-range as well as short-term strategies. As an indication of the proactive and extensive efforts and achievements we have made in this area, other agencies routinely contact NASA for guidance and assistance as they begin using authorities or programs that already have been tried in this Agency.
Q2. Does NASA have plans to more fully utilize the existing authorities? If so, please explain how these authorities will be more fully utilized?
A2. NASA uses existing human capital authorities and flexibilities to the maximum extent permitted within the legal and regulatory parameters. The Agency uses a wide range of hiring authorities, streamlining the processes associated with them wherever there is discretion to do so. To get the greatest benefit from these authorities, NASA aggressively networks with appropriate institutions and associations to ensure that potential applicants know the Agency's employment opportunities. The emphasis senior management places on effective recruitment resulted in establishing the National Recruitment Initiative in FY 2001 to focus on developing recruitment enhancements, more effective strategies, and improved marketing techniques.
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To ensure that effective use of them is not constrained by internal processes or rules, NASA initiated a major ''Freedom to Manage'' effort this year to review internal (as well as external) barriers and impediments to human capital management. This resulted in delegations of authorities to lower levels, reducing levels of review on some actions, streamlining processes, and making more effective use of automated tools to improve operations.
These efforts will enable NASA to reduce the time it takes to accomplish processes associated with using the existing authorities, and will enable the Agency to use them as effectively as possible, but it does not change the nature or scope of these authorities. Our legislative proposals seek to do that.
Q3. If fully utilized, are the existing authorities sufficient to meet NASA's goals? If not, what goals cannot be met without new or expanded authorities?
A3. The existing personnel authorities and flexibilities are not adequate to address NASA's human capital challenges: lack of depth in critical competencies, skills imbalances, intense competition from the private sector for technical talent, a shrinking science and engineering pipeline from which to draw the talent the Agency needs, and a lack of diversity among some of the Agency's occupations.
Many of NASA's legislative proposals represent enhancements to authorities that already exist; these enhancements are proposed because we have found that the current authorities are not sufficiently broad or flexible to deal with today's challenges. The solutions of the past are not adequate for reshaping and reconfiguring NASA's workforce for the challenging programs and technologies of the future, especially in emerging technical areas like nanotechnology and biorobotics. The limitations of current flexibilities will become even more apparent in the coming years as NASA faces more workforce challenges posed by the continuation of several trends: a reduction in the number of science and engineering graduates, an increase in competition for these shrinking resources from traditional private sector technical employers and the newer competitors for technical talent from other employment sectors (e.g., the banking and entertainment industry), and the potential loss of substantial corporate knowledge to projected retirements of key personnel.
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Without additional tools, NASA will continue to face significant strategic threats to our efforts to attract, hire, and retain the workforce we need to fulfill the Agency's mission. These tools are needed to ensure that the Agency has the scientific and technical expertise necessary to preserve the Nation's role as a leader in aeronautical and space science and technology, and a highly competent professional workforce that can address NASA's financial, acquisition, and business challenges.
Q4. Which proposed new or expanded authorities are required if NASA is to meet its human capital goals?
A4. NASA needs all of the authorities submitted in its legislative package. A single human capital tool, flexibility, or authority will not be sufficient to address the diverse strategic threats we face, particularly if we hope to respond quickly and effectively to the dynamics of the marketplace. In certain core areas we need to enhance our ability to recruit and retain highly technical employees. Since this need may encompass all levels of employees—fresh-outs, mid-level, and senior-level—we need different tools and incentives appropriate for these different categories of individuals. Sections 204, 205, 206, 207, and 208 of our proposal are targeted for that need. We also need ways to leverage external expertise more effectively to strengthen NASA's mission and technical capabilities. Sections 202 and 203 are designed to meet that need. At the same time, NASA needs tools to rebalance skills and reshape the workforce. In areas in which we have a diminished need for certain skills we need tools to encourage voluntary attrition so that we can recruit in other areas in which competencies are needed. Sections 209 and 210 will enable NASA to accomplish this. NASA must continue to encourage students to pursue science and engineering careers to ensure a steady pipeline of technical talent for the future. Our proposed Scholarship for Service Program, submitted in the NASA Science and Technology Career Enhancement Act of 2001, will support this goal. Finally, we need to be able to try out new flexibilities, more quickly and efficiently than we now can, in response to future program and organizational changes as well as labor market shifts. Section 211 would help us with this challenge.
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Our provisions represent an integrated set of human resources flexibilities that will allow the Agency to address the multiple challenges it faces without in any way affecting the important protections or entitlements in areas of merit principles, equal employment opportunity, employee benefits, veterans preference, and labor relations.
Q5. What meaningful objectives and measurable goals would you recommend to track progress over the next five years as NASA implements its human capital plans?
A5. In developing the Agency's Strategic Human Capital Plan (SHCP) and accompanying Strategic Human Capital Implementation Plan (SHCIP), NASA was influenced by a number of factors: internal and external reviews touching on the Agency's human capital issues; the Administration's emphasis on human capital through the President's Management Agenda; legislative branch interest in Government wide human capital challenges; and current nationwide and internal trends that threaten NASA's ability to maintain a highly skilled workforce. Using OMB, OPM, and GAO standards and tools as guidance, NASA established an overarching human capital architecture structured around five ''Pillars''—Strategic Alignment, Strategic Competencies, Learning, Performance Culture, and Leadership, the last of which provides the foundation for all the others. Each pillar was further defined in terms of high-level goals and strategies. Once the architecture was in place, a team of senior NASA managers did an assessment—or ''gap analysis''—of the Agency's current strengths and weaknesses in human capital management.
While the Agency already has in place a wide variety of programs, initiatives, and activities to address recruitment, retention, and training and development of the workforce, NASA's internal assessment of the Agency's current state of human capital management highlighted nine major focus areas—or key ''improvement initiatives''—that merit special emphasis. These are organized under the five pillars. Together, their successful implementation will greatly enhance the Agency's ability to effectively manage its human capital and maintain its preeminence as a world-class organization with a highly motivated, skilled, productive and innovative workforce—and enhance realization of a ''One NASA.''
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Action plans have been developed for each of the nine initiatives and we are in the process of establishing success indicators to help determine whether the initiatives, once implemented, are achieving their intended objectives. These success indicators will form part of a hierarchy of measures to help the Agency assess the overall effectiveness of human capital management. At the highest level of measures—those senior Agency managers and stakeholders care most about—are those to determine 1) NASA's progress in closing gaps in strategic competencies and 2) alignment of NASA' human capital strategy with its mission, goals, and objectives. (The attachment summarizes this architecture.)
Q6. Could NASA meet its goals solely through the use of the proposed alternative personnel system demonstration authority? Are there risks associated with solely using the demonstration authority? If so, how would NASA propose to minimize these risks?
A6. NASA cannot meet all of its human capital goals solely through the use of the proposed personnel demonstration project authority. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has advised that buyout authorities or modifications to the early retirement authority cannot be implemented through a demonstration project. These two authorities are essential to NASA's efforts to rebalance skills and reshape the workforce. They provide a means to encourage targeted attrition in areas in which the need for certain skills has diminished so that the Agency can recruit and reshape a workforce that is better aligned to current and future mission needs.
The remaining legislative proposals could, theoretically, be implemented through a demonstration project authority. Implementing a demonstration project involves coordination and negotiation with OPM, employees, and labor organizations. Although we are confident that these proposals will continue to be endorsed by OPM and will be supported by the NASA workforce, there is no guarantee that we would be successful in our efforts to incorporate all of them, in their current form, in a future demonstration project.
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A more realistic and significant concern, however, relates to the time and resources involved in implementing and evaluating a demonstration project. Our proposal (Section 211) greatly streamlines the process, but it remains, nevertheless, very time-consuming and labor-intensive. NASA has major human capital challenges now, which require immediate attention to prevent their further escalation. It is unlikely that a demonstration project could be implemented in less than a year from the date legislation is passed authorizing the ''streamlined'' authority. Our legislative proposals could be implemented expeditiously, enabling NASA to address today's challenges before they become tomorrow's problems.
Implementing a demonstration project and evaluating its results represent a significant workload, and the workload increases commensurate with the number and complexity of provisions in the project. A number of the proposals in our legislative package reflect flexibilities that have been tested in demonstration projects of other federal agencies, or provided to agencies through specific legislation (e.g., The Internal Revenue Service reform legislation). Since these are ''proven'' practices, rather than untested departures from current rules, pursuing them through another demonstration project that would take more than a year to implement unnecessarily delays our efforts to address our significant, and immediate, human capital challenges.
Q7. How is NASA working with the university community to expand the pipeline of aerospace scientists and engineers?
A7. NASA believes that it is extremely important to engage the university community in efforts to expand the supply of qualified scientists and engineers. NASA's education program has recently established two primary strategies to achieve our goal motivating students to pursue careers in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). Both these strategies address the Agency's human capital needs and one—increase the number of individuals entering the STEM workforce—specifically targets the university community. To implement these strategies NASA plans to rely on partnerships with appropriate education organizations, particularly universities.
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NASA implements a coordinated and comprehensive set of programs that provide support to a diverse population of students preparing at universities for STEM careers. These programs include undergraduate, graduate, and post-graduate university support fellowships and scholarships.
The largest and most visible of NASA's education programs is the Space Grant College and Fellowship program. Space Grant provides both graduate and undergraduate fellowships through consortia of universities in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. The Space Grant Directors represent a mechanism for working with universities to expand the pipeline. For example, through our recently announced workforce development awards, NASA selected 45 consortia in the Space Grant university network to receive funding for aerospace workforce development. A total of $3.56 million is being awarded in response to proposals submitted by university consortia. The consortia were selected based on a competitive evaluation of their plans to enlarge and enhance the ''pipeline,'' or resource pool, of higher education graduates and faculty who stay connected to or become involved with NASA as employees, contractors or principal investigators.
Q8. Why are NASA's stipends for graduate students working on aerospace studies almost 20 percent less than NSF stipends for comparable work?
A8. NASA, like other agencies, determines stipend levels for programs such as the Graduate Student Research Program (GSRP) based on several factors, including a comparison of stipends at other mission agencies, perceived ''competitiveness'' of the program, and available budget.
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In FY 2002, NASA raised the award for the GSRP to $24,000 after an analysis of other federal fellowship programs indicated that the agency was no longer competitive. The award includes a stipend of $18,000, and $6,000 in student/university allowances, which can be used to help defray tuition expenses. Additional stipend increases are planned, based on continuing analyses and as program budgets permit.
Q9. Is this low stipend a disincentive for graduate students to become involved with NASA research?
A9. We do not think so. Our graduate programs, like all of our student programs, continue to be ''over subscribed''—that is, we have more applicants than we can accept, and they are of a high caliber.
It is difficult to compare NASA GSRP stipends to graduate stipends at NSF, as a mission agency like NASA has an intrinsic value that NSF cannot match—our mission, facilities, and people. More than half of our GSRP students actually spend time at a NASA center, working with a research mentor. The remainder is working with NASA Principal Investigators at their respective universities.
Questions submitted by Ranking Minority Member Bart Gordon
Q1. Have you used your authority under Section 203(c)(2) of the Space Act to establish the entrance grade for scientific and engineering personnel at a level two grades higher than the General Schedule? If not, why not? If so, how has this affected recruitment success?
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A1. Yes. NASA has used this authority to establish an entrance grade of GS–7 for scientific and engineering candidates who would otherwise be eligible for appointment at the GS–5 level. This authority is used in connection with a NASA-specific qualification standard requiring the candidates have specific academic credentials or work experience that would be appropriate for NASA aerospace technology work.
This flexibility is used along with the various federal-wide incentives and flexibilities—including tools such as accelerated promotions, special salary schedules for engineers and other occupations, and recruitment bonuses. These recruitment incentives have been effective in past years, but they are no longer adequate in today's competitive job market. New incentives and flexibilities are needed to compete successfully with the private sector to attract a world-class workforce. We believe that an effective way to address our recruitment challenge is to pursue flexibilities that reflect enhancements of well-established and successful compensation policies. For example, the legislative provision for enhanced recruitment, relocation, and retention bonuses would represent a recruitment incentive that would be effective, while remaining consistent with federal-wide qualification and classification standards.
Q1a. Do you believe that the Space Act authority cited above would allow you also to increase the step-level that could be offered?
A1a. Appointing an individual at a step above the minimum rate currently is permitted under the superior qualifications appointment authority.
Q2. With respect to the proposed Scholarship for Service program and the statutorily authorized Federal Student Loan Repayment program:
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Does NASA participate in the Student Loan Repayment program?
If not, why not?
If so, how does the program work at NASA, and what are its effects on recruitment?
A2. Yes, NASA participates in the Student Loan Repayment program, using it as one of several recruitment tools to attract college graduates to NASA. Along with recruitment bonuses and offers of salaries above the minimum rate, student loan repayments comprise an attractive incentive to recent college graduates who may face substantial debts upon graduation. Since this incentive is one of a variety of tools available to recruiters, it is not offered in every case, and is subject to funding limitations. Each agency is required by regulation to develop an implementation plan before offering student loan repayments. At NASA this program, as most others, is highly decentralized, with each Center using a basic template to devise a program to meet its individual needs and resources. Since this program is quite new, and implementation had to await the development of the required plans, a relatively small number of loan repayments have been offered to date. According to our latest data, about a dozen loan repayments have been approved. We anticipate that loan repayments will become an integral part of the incentive package offered to prospective employees.
Q2a. With respect to the proposed Scholarship for Service program and the statutorily authorized Federal Student Loan Repayment program:
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Do you have any quantitative data as to whether a ''Scholarship for Service'' program would provide more or less incentive than a Student Loan Repayment program in attracting graduates to NASA?
A2a. Since one program is in its infancy and the other still on the drawing board, we have no quantitative data to predict their relative impact on attracting graduates to NASA. The two programs actually are quite different in intent and approach. The results naturally will be different, though they will complement each other. The ''Scholarship for Service'' program strives to encourage students currently in college to study science, engineering, and technology curricula. With the service requirement, NASA naturally hopes that a number of the participants will come to work for NASA and remain beyond their service requirements.
In contrast, the Student Loan Repayment program targets those who have already graduated or for whom graduation is imminent, and is not limited to a particular area of study. Its specific purpose is to entice graduates to NASA by offering a financial incentive. As mentioned above, this incentive can be meshed with other tools to craft a recruitment package that will attract a candidate of choice to come to work for NASA.
Q2b. With respect to the proposed Scholarship for Service program and the statutorily authorized Federal Student Loan Repayment program:
Would Scholarship for Service employees be allowed to join collective bargaining units?
Would a Scholarship for Service participant be hired as a Term employee or a Permanent employee?
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A2b. During the required period of service, scholarship recipients could be hired under a special temporary employment authority designed for that purpose, or they could be hired as regular permanent employees. This employment decision would rest with NASA management, based on staffing needs, and would reflect the desires and intentions of the individual. Service under a temporary appointment would satisfy the service requirement, and some graduates will be ready to move on to new experiences after completing their employment obligation. Others will find a permanent place in NASA's workforce; naturally, this result benefits both the individual and the Agency. The type of appointment, and whether the bargaining unit's charter covers the employee's position would determine an employee's inclusion in a collective bargaining unit. Some charters cover employees on time-limited appointments, while others limit membership to permanent employees. The employee's status as a ''scholarship recipient'' has no direct impact on his or her eligibility to join a collective bargaining unit.
Q3. Have you conducted any formal surveys of the NASA workforce on issues related to the proposed human capital provisions? If so, when, and on which provisions?
A3. Over the past several years a number of broad reviews have been conducted within the Agency that have addressed workforce issues relevant to NASA's proposed human capital legislation.
In March 2000, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and NASA engaged in a joint study to develop a strategy for meeting NASA's human capital challenges for the next decade. The team conducted an extensive benchmarking process that included interviews and focus groups with individuals at most NASA Centers including Center Directors, Senior Managers, Line Managers, new hires, and union representatives. This comprehensive review was completed in September of 2000, resulting in workforce issues and challenges and recommended actions to address the identified challenges. The recommendations resulting from this study in part led to the development of the specific human capital provisions in NASA's proposed legislation. Among the legislative proposals recommended by the joint review team were: targeted buyouts to address skills imbalances without the loss of FTEs; extensions of IPA assignments to six years; establishment of an Industry-Exchange program; expansion of the critical pay authority; conversion of term employees to permanent; and streamlined hiring authorities.
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In 2001, NASA established a National Recruitment Initiative (NRI) to develop Agency-wide recruitment strategies to attract and hire a highly technical S&E workforce. As part of its data collection effort, the NRI study team conducted interviews at seven NASA Centers with directors of science and engineering, human resource directors and chiefs of employment, recruiters, equal opportunity staff, university affairs officers, hiring managers, and new/recent hires. The interviews provided valuable information in shaping NASA's current legislative proposals by calling attention to several strategic threats now facing the Agency: the inability to offer salaries competitive with private industry; anticipated loss of critical skills over the next five years due to retirements; difficulty in attracting a diverse candidate pool; and the potential loss of quality candidates due to the current slow and cumbersome hiring process.
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's Annual Reports for 2001 and 2000 have noted that workforce concerns continue to be a focus of the Panel. These reports contained several recommendations that influenced the provisions of NASA's human capital legislative proposals, including recommendations to provide more effective incentives to retain employees with critical skills in specific technical areas and to use appropriate incentives when necessary to recruit experienced and fresh-out employees.
In addition to these NASA-focused surveys, we monitor national trends that could affect NASA's ability to maintain a workforce with the talent it needs to accomplish its mission. These include trends associated with math and science performance among students, the science and engineering ''pipeline,'' general labor market conditions, projected demands for specific skills, and surveys on perceptions of employment in the federal sector. The National Science Board's Science and Engineering Indicators 2002 Report, for example, contains important analyses and projections that are relevant to this Agency's human capital management strategies.
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Q4/5. Are there statutory precedents for NASA's proposed legislative provisions (Sec. 211):
to eliminate the limit on the number of personnel that could be included in an alternative personnel system demonstration?
A4/5. There are statutory precedents for eliminating the limit on the number of personnel that could be covered in a demonstration project.
(1) Department of Defense Science and Technology Reinvention Laboratories Demonstration Projects—The current authority to conduct personnel demonstrations is found in Title 5, United States Code, Chapter 47. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1995 (Public Law 103–337) extended the authority to conduct personnel demonstrations to the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the Director of the Office of Personnel Management. Under this statute, the Secretary is authorized to conduct demonstrations in DOD laboratories designated as Science and Technology (S&T) Reinvention Laboratory sites. The statute further stipulates that the Title 5, Chapter 47 limitation on the number of personnel that could be included in a demonstration would not apply to any of these DOD laboratories. Currently there are eight distinct demonstration projects being conducted under this authority across the Air Force, Navy, and Army. The DOD demonstration authority was further revised by Public Law 106–398, which eliminated the requirement for OPM approval of any S&T Reinvention Laboratory demonstration project.
(2) Internal Revenue Service Demonstration Project—The IRS Reform Legislation (Public Law 105–206) authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to implement a demonstration project for the IRS subject to the general provisions of Title 5, United States Code, Chapter 47, but without limitation on the number of personnel that could be included in the demonstration.
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Q4/5a. Are there statutory precedents for NASA's proposed legislative provisions (Sec. 211):
to make an alternative personnel system permanent without a demonstration and without Congressional approval?
A4/5a. Generally, ''alternative personnel system'' refers to a personnel system that provides for the waiver of Title 5 (or a rule or regulation prescribed under that title) or provides an authority not in current law, rule or regulation. If an agency seeks innovations to its personnel system that require such waivers or new authorities, it must either pursue the changes through legislation or obtain approval to test the innovations under an existing demonstration project authority. If the agency implements an alternative system through enabling legislation, the language itself will specify whether a demonstration phase is needed, specify the extent to which Congressional review/approval of the system is needed, and indicate if the system is permanent. If the agency implements innovations under the current demonstration project authority, it cannot make them permanent unless special legislation is enacted to do so.
The Federal Aviation Administration's alternative personnel system was implemented as a permanent system without a demonstration phase. Section 347 of the Department of Transportation Appropriations Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–50) directed the FAA to develop and implement a new personnel management system by January 1, 1996 to address the unique demands of the Agency's workforce and provide for greater flexibility in the hiring, training, and compensation of personnel. The law exempted the new personnel system from the provisions of Title 5, United States Code, with specific exceptions (e.g., provisions relating to whistleblower protection, veterans preference, anti-discrimination). The FAA established an alternative personnel system as directed. An alternative personnel system was made permanent without undergoing a demonstration phase and the specific provisions of the system were not subject to Congressional review and approval prior to implementation. Nevertheless, the establishment of the alternative personnel system was done at the direction of Congress.
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There is another method by which agencies can waive Title 5 provisions that does not require testing the innovations in a demonstration phase and does not require Congressional approval. This approach involves granting agencies the authority to replace specific provisions of Title 5 with the more flexible rules of Title 38 of the United States Code. Title 38 represents a separate personnel system for certain health care occupations in the Veterans Health Administration hospitals. This system, established in 1946 to facilitate the rapid staffing of veterans hospitals at the end of World War II, contains flexibilities not found in Title 5. In 1990, The Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act (Public Law 101–509) gave the Office of Personnel Management authority to extend specific provisions of Title 38 personnel and pay flexibilities to other agencies to use in hiring and compensating individuals for General Schedule health care positions. This is now codified in Section 5371 of Title 5. Agencies using these flexibilities are not required to undergo a demonstration or ''test'' phase first. However, the authority to establish these alternatives to Title 5 laws, rules, and regulations was provided by Congress through Public Law 101–509. It should be noted, however, that this method of introducing personnel flexibilities is narrowly defined in the sense that it simply replaces specific Title 5 hiring and compensation rules with the rules from Title 38, and the flexibilities are used only in connection with health care positions.
Q6. In addition to workforce, the Strategic Resources Review was to address infrastructure requirements at the NASA Centers.
Does NASA have an excess of centers, facilities, or other physical infrastructure, or is the current level of infrastructure appropriate for the Agency's requirements over the next decade?
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If there is excess, what specific infrastructure have you identified for elimination, and what is your schedule for eliminating it?
A6. The now completed SRR identified some assets that will be closed, mothballed, or excessed (e.g., a thermal vacuum chamber, two Gulfstream 1 aircraft) as noted in the final report delivered to Congress in August 2002. NASA is continually evaluating its facility needs and other physical infrastructure as part of the President's Management Agenda and NASA's new Vision & Mission. As part of this ongoing facility and physical infrastructure evaluation, recommended changes are reviewed during NASA's internal budget formulation process. Any change to the Agency's facilities or other physical infrastructure will be provided to Congress for their consideration in future budget submissions.
Q7. Do you believe that it would be useful for NASA and the Congress to have a review that assesses the future roles and missions of each NASA Center, what facilities should be closed and what facilities should be added or upgraded, what NASA activities could be contracted out, and what future workforce levels should be?
If so, when do you plan to initiate such a review, and by what date would you expect to complete it?
If not, why not?
A7. Given the recent completion of the SRR, we do not see a need at this time for a special review of the roles and missions of each NASA center. The President's Management Agenda, in particular its Competitive Sourcing initiative, provides the direction for regularly determining whether particular activities are more efficiently conducted inside of NASA or by the private sector. We have no particular goals for future workforce levels or outsourcing—such levels should be determined through competition in performing NASA's missions.
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Q8. Could adopting NASA-specific provisions as opposed to taking a government-wide approach lead to a situation wherein scientific and engineering personnel leave other agencies to take advantage of incentives and flexibilities granted to NASA? If so, what would need to be done to prevent such a situation from developing?
A8. NASA's legislative provisions represent tools and flexibilities designed to: encourage students to pursue careers in science and engineering; enable the Agency to compete more successfully with the private sector in attracting a world class and diverse workforce; reshape the existing NASA workforce to address the current skills imbalances; and leverage expertise from academia and the private sector. Few of the incentives or flexibilities represented in these legislative proposals would provide any immediate benefit to current federal employees who might transfer to NASA from other agencies.
The provisions regarding the Intergovernmental Personnel Act authority and the Industry Exchange Program involve exchange assignments between current NASA employees and non-federal organizations. Neither provision would provide an inducement for an employee in another federal agency to seek employment in NASA since there would be no reason for the employee to assume that he or she would ever have an opportunity to participate in such an exchange. (Generally, NASA has fewer than 15 NASA employees participating in the IPA program at any given time, and participation among NASA employees in an Industry Exchange Program, if enacted, may be just as limited.)
The provisions regarding voluntary early retirement and the buyout authority are tools to reshape the existing NASA workforce; they are not recruiting incentives that would attract current federal employees from other agencies to NASA.
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The hiring authority for severe shortage/critical needs positions and the category rating authority are tools that would streamline and improve the external hiring process; they would not apply to filling NASA jobs through transfers of other federal employees. NASA's current policies and processes for hiring transfer eligibles from other government agencies remain unchanged.
The provisions regarding term appointments would not encourage permanent employees from other government agencies to seek employment with NASA since permanent employees generally would not wish to convert to term status. A very similar provision has been in place for several years in most of the DOD Science and Technology Reinvention Laboratory Demonstration Projects and the IRS.
The provisions to increase the maximum rate of pay for NASA Excepted (NEX) employees is unlikely to have any impact on other agencies since the NEX hiring authority generally is used in appointing individuals from the private sector.
The critical pay authority would have no impact on other agencies since its use is limited to retaining NASA employees or appointing individuals who are not federal employees. It cannot be used in connection with transfers of employees from other agencies.
The recruitment and relocation bonus authorities are financial incentives that NASA would use to recruit a quality workforce. Since such bonuses could be offered to federal employees of other agencies as well as ''new hires,'' they could be used to incentivize an employee to leave his or her current agency to accept an offer with NASA. However, we anticipate that our use of the bonus authority will be focused primarily on attracting external candidates to NASA. Due to funding realities and the need to use bonuses judiciously, we anticipate that guidelines for their use will be patterned after existing rules limiting them to filling ''difficult to fill'' positions. For NASA, these positions are typically filled with fresh-out graduates or individuals with specialized expertise found in the private sector.
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The authority to conduct demonstration projects has been available to agencies for over two decades and has not been circumscribed during this time due to any perception that employees are leaving their current agencies to seek employment in an agency under a demonstration authority. NASA's legislative proposal for a streamlined demonstration project does not change any of the underlying principles of the demonstration authority or revise the prohibitions against waiving certain statutes or regulations (such as those pertaining to employee benefits, merit system principles and prohibited personnel practices, ethics rules, and veterans preference). So, NASA would not be implementing any flexibilities that would not be available to any other agency under a demonstration authority. NASA's proposal simply streamlines the processes involved in implementing a demonstration project, and removes the 5,000-person limit on the number of individuals that can be included in a project.
Questions submitted by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee
Q1. Considering the difficulty NASA is having in recruiting the best and brightest young people, and the dearth of minorities in senior level NASA positions—would you support the idea of a program which would bring promising graduate students from historically disadvantaged communities into NASA for short periods of time? In this time they could shadow NASA employees and witness the facilities at work during two launches, and thus, hopefully, get excited about building a career furthering the mission of NASA.
A1. Attracting the Nation's students, especially minority students, into the fields of science, mathematics and engineering is vital to our country's continued success in these fields and an important part of NASA's mission ''to inspire the next generation of explorers.'' One of the trends we are facing is the reduction in the number of graduates in science, math, and engineering. The resultant loss of talent for our workforce of the future poses one of our greatest challenges. Increasing minority representation in our workforce is also hampered by this trend. One of our tools for meeting this challenge is the Harriett G. Jenkins Predoctoral Fellowship Program (JPFP). This is a national, competitive three-year program for minority graduate students that provides each fellow a NASA mentor and coordinates visits to their mentor's site. Annually, all fellows compete and 10 per cohort are selected for a six-week research internship program conducted at a NASA Center. Currently, forty multi-talented fellows are in this Program. Five of the fellows have inquired about making application to become an astronaut. At least one fellow is being considered for ''Graduate Student of the Year'' through the U.S. Black Engineer of the Year Program. Through 2005, the program should contribute 11 Masters and 12 Doctorate graduates to the NASA and science, math and engineering workforce.
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In addition every one of our Field Centers offers student internship programs for minority students. For example, the NASA Scholars at Morehouse, Spelman, Florida A&M and University of New Mexico Universities participate in intern programs at all NASA Centers; the Society of Hispanic Professional Engineers internship program and Strategic Preparedness in Advancing Careers in Engineering, both at Stennis Space Center; Summer Institute in Engineering and Computer Applications Program and Public Service Intern Program at Goddard Space Flight Center; the NASA Scholars Program at the Johnson Space Center; and the Navigator Minority Outreach Program at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Minority students are also eligible for the large number of internship and fellowship programs offered by NASA to all students, including the Space Grant Scholarship Program.
We are convinced that the opportunity to come on site and participate first hand in the activities taking place at our Field Centers will indeed help inspire that next generation of explorers. For this reason the Johnson Space Center is looking into the feasibility of developing a short term internship program with Texas Southern University whereby some of its graduate students may visit JSC, work with a NASA scientist or engineer, and, if timing permits, witness the excitement at JSC during a shuttle mission.
Q2. Does NASA have a role to play in promoting Homeland Security? Are there technologies and expertise at NASA, which could be used to enhance cyber and satellite security? If yes, what would be the best method of making such technology available to the Department of Homeland Security, and facilitating cooperation, consultation, or contracts?
A2. While NASA does not directly combat terrorism, security activities at NASA's field centers and headquarters defend the agency and its mission against terrorism, thus enabling it to fulfill its role as the premier space exploration and scientific research agency, unimpeded by threats or adversarial influences. NASA has therefore made critical security enhancements to its ten field centers and headquarters, the White Sands Test Facility, and Goldstone Tracking Station. These enhancements reduce the vulnerability of NASA Centers to security threats and protect its personnel, critical assets, and mission essential infrastructure. In this way, NASA directly contributes to the security of cyber and satellite assets.
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Our indirect role in and support of Homeland Security lies in NASA's numerous partnerships with other federal agencies that have a direct role in the protection of the United States, and can take advantage of NASA's technology, research, and unique capabilities. NASA's research applications offer a variety of unique approaches to managing the many threats to homeland security. NASA has innovative programs in aviation safety, agriculture monitoring, human heath and community disaster preparedness, coastal monitoring, and biological detection and analysis being implemented at virtually every Center across the Agency. NASA has established partnerships with NIH, DOD, NIMA, FAA, TSA and several other agencies—we are using these relationships to leverage NASA's contribution to Homeland Security. NASA's most immediately available work with homeland security applications falls into three broad categories, Sensors, Air Travel and Remote Sensing:
Sensors: Whether managing the closed environments of spacecraft and the International Space Station, searching for water on Mars or making detailed observations of our own planet; NASA's long experience with sensors has led to the development of a number of small, low power, rugged monitoring and detection systems that are being shared with other agencies. Of particular interest has been NASA's miniature mass spectrometer, which can detect a variety of chemicals accurately, i.e., chemical weapons. A variety of other technologies, like the electronic nose, deep-ultraviolet imaging and DNA based sensors are also available for collaborative development. When combined in suites or deployed on semi-autonomous robots, these technologies have tremendous potential.
Air Travel: We have ongoing collaborative tasks through the TSA and the FAA to make aircraft safer and harder to crash, and to improve the Nation's air traffic control systems. We are utilizing our information technology resources to assist in passenger threat assessment, and provide air traffic management decision support; for example, identification of rogue aircraft, minimization of risk to other aircraft and ground targets. Our aeronautics researchers are focusing on 'hardening' aircraft systems: reducing the explosive risk in all systems; improving communication between aircraft and ground; and deploying intelligent systems which can detect, alert and counter dangerous flight deviations. We have developed a special partnership with the FAA for development of new sensor capabilities in detection of explosives in baggage as well as biological and chemical weapons and their components.
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Remote Sensing: Working with NIMA and other DOD agencies, NASA's remote sensing and observation resources are being used now to safeguard the Nation and fight the war on terrorism abroad. We help provide critical mapping, weather and terrain data wherever it is needed, domestically or in a foreign battlefield. Additionally, we have briefed NSA and OSTP on the global observations and prediction capabilities from NASA enabled science and technologies. Meta-data analysis, or, the synthesis of many kinds of information like maps, weather, real time measurements from field sites for use in a command center environment, is under active development at NASA
While our ability to fund and staff homeland security tasks is limited by statute, we have taken steps to incorporate information relevant to homeland security into our technology database and our interagency relations office continues to serve as a networked point of contact both inside and outside NASA. This will ensure that the widest possible number of key people will be aware of NASA technology with homeland security applications.
Q3. If NASA does have a role in Homeland Security, and if NASA does have important information systems and satellites that may be targets for hackers or terrorists, does NASA's lack of monitoring and control of contract workers make us vulnerable to inside attack?
A3. No, NASA has mechanisms in place for monitoring and control of contract workers at NASA.
NASA continues to enhance its control and access procedures for all its personnel, so as to minimize vulnerabilities to its systems at all Centers. Since August of last year, NASA has embarked on a new Security program and initiative to eliminate or reduce all vulnerabilities while minimizing the effect it would have on the Agency's mission.
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Are we as an agency vulnerable to inside attack? No organization or agency is 100 percent safe from such an attack. The solution is to minimize the threat and damage through rapid and effective alert/response/mitigation; and appropriate screening, security, and education.
ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses by Mark D. Roth, General Counsel, American Federation of Government Employees, AFL–CIO
Questions submitted by Chairman Dana Rohrabacher
Q1. What workforce issues does NASA face and to what extent are these issues unique to NASA?
A1. NASA is somewhat of a microcosm, reflecting issues and trends that many executive branch agencies face with regard to recruiting, motivating, and retaining qualified federal employees. The most important single issue has to do with contracting out. NASA has for more than two decades pursued a strategy of contracting out not only work performed competently and efficiently by its own workforce, but also virtually all new work and expansions of work. The predictable result is that the skill base and morale of the existing workforce has eroded, and young and mid-career professionals interested in aerospace engineering and astrophysics look to government contractors, not NASA, for employment. The problems are quite pronounced at NASA, but the Department of Defense and other civilian agencies face the same consequences of excessive contracting out.
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Q2. Are some of these issues unique to NASA because of the type of workforce and skills employed at NASA? Is NASA's uniqueness a relevant factor in planning its workforce strategy?
A2. AFGE does not believe that NASA's difficulties with recruitment and retention are unique. Thus NASA does not need a separate or unique ''workforce strategy.'' NASA and other federal agencies need to pay competitive salaries, offer opportunities for career development and growth in a merit system, and stop contracting out existing and new work.
Q3. How much of NASA's workforce problem is the result of broader trends in education and the aerospace industrial base?
A3. The private contractors who have cannibalized NASA's work and workforce do not face the same ''human capital'' crisis that NASA faces. This is because they offer their employees competitive pay and meaningful career development, as well as the opportunity to do their work without the constant distraction of privatization. In addition, they get all new government work, and automatically get expansions on existing projects. Contracting out and failure to pay competitive salaries are the reason for NASA's workforce problems.
Q4. What specific skill areas represent the most critical and urgent needs with NASA's workforce?
A4. AFGE cannot answer this question with any certainty.
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Q5. What changes in size and skill mix should NASA consider over the next five years as an increasing amount of the space and aeronautics work is contracted out to industry?
A5. AFGE opposes treating increasing contracting out as inevitability. NASA currently lacks adequate in-house ability to provide taxpayers with oversight of its contracts, which are increasing rapidly in terms of both cost and quantity. NASA is unable to tell either Congress, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), or the American people how much it spends on contracts, how many contract workers it supports with taxpayer funds, or what scope of government work is being performed by those contractors. NASA has failed to train or retain an adequate in-house capacity to avoid placing taxpayers at the mercy of monopoly, for-profit contractors. At a minimum, NASA needs an adequate in-house scientific and engineering capacity performing work of sophistication equivalent to its contractors so that adequate oversight can occur. NASA, like every other executive branch agency, needs to rebuild and expand its acquisition workforce for contract management and administration as well.
Questions submitted by Ranking Minority Member Bart Gordon
Q1. Could adopting NASA-specific provisions as opposed to taking a government-wide approach lead to a situation wherein scientific and engineering personnel leave other agencies to take advantage of incentives and flexibilities granted to NASA? If so, what would need to be done to prevent such a situation from developing?
A1. AFGE strongly opposes the adoption of NASA-specific solutions to what is a government-wide set of problems. NASA's difficulties with recruitment and retention, and its inability to monitor effectively its massive and costly contracts, are the direct result of misguided government-wide policies. The failure to fund or implement the Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act (FEPCA) which mandates the payment of competitive salaries to federal employees is a government-wide phenomenon. The mandate to privatize and contract out up to half of all jobs arbitrarily designated as ''commercial'' is a government-wide mandate enforced by OMB. These two policies have conspired to create NASA's workforce problems and reversing these two policies will be necessary first steps in solving those problems. If one executive branch agency begins paying higher salaries than other agencies for a specific occupation or position, there will be nothing preventing exodus from the agency with low salaries. NASA is not the only federal agency employing scientists and engineers; the Department of Defense and other civilian agencies face similar problems.
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Q2. NASA workforce restructuring is being pursued as part of a ''results-oriented'' management strategy. However, what constitutes a desired result typically is a function of the policies being pursued by whatever Administration is in power. The civil service system was established to help insulate the federal workforce from politics. How do we ensure that the proposed NASA legislative provisions don't weaken civil service protections and lead to increased politicization of the workforce?
A2. The Bush Administration is at war with its workforce, and seems intent on creating a spoils system that moves money and jobs away from what they perceive as a unionized public sector toward their political patrons in the contracting community. The types of managerial discretion given to political appointees, and the enhanced authorities given to management generally, is not counterbalanced by any expansion in collective bargaining rights in the legislation. On the contrary, federal employees would lose the opportunity they currently have to have their views heard by their elected representatives in Congress since Congress would no longer have final authority over the range of federal salaries. Politicization would also result from an abandonment of the principle of equal pay for equal work, and the setting of pay on an individual by individual basis, rather than by classification or position description.
Q3. NASA is proposing a sweeping set of workforce-related legislative provisions. What level of consultation has NASA or the Administration had with the employee unions on these provisions?
A3. NASA management has not once contacted AFGE to describe or discuss the workforce related changes it seeks. Likewise, no representative of the Bush Administration has contact AFGE to discuss these workforce related legislative changes.
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Q4. Your testimony is critical of the Administration's proposed NASA–Industry exchange program (proposed section 203) that would allow private sector employees to work at NASA and NASA employees to work in industry. What are your specific objections to the proposal? Are there any alternative approaches that you would suggest be considered?
A4. NASA's failures to conduct adequate oversight and monitoring of the billions of taxpayer dollars it spends on private contracts are legion. As the Bush Administration continues to pursue a policy of mandatory contracting out of as many as 850,000 federal jobs it arbitrarily designates as ''commercial'' in nature, allowing favored contractors intimate access to remaining in-house operations puts taxpayer interests in peril. Assuming that OMB's privatization mandates include some measure of public-private competition (even though thus far the President's ''competitive sourcing initiative'' is competitive in name only; the vast majority of government work that is contracted out is privatized without giving federal workers the opportunity to compete in defense of their jobs), taxpayers' interests are best served if the in-house team isn't forced to share with its competitors all information on its operations. AFGE does not oppose allowing federal employees to have limited details into private firms so that taxpayers gain the benefit of any insight or innovation the private sector is willing to provide.
Q5. NASA's proposed section 204 to authorize direct hiring for positions in ''critical needs'' and ''severe shortage'' categories would appear to give NASA discretion to define those categories and to decide how many positions would be exempt from the current merit-hiring process. What are your views on the proposed provision? If you do not support it, is there an alternative approach you would suggest for dealing with critical hiring needs?
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A5. There is every reason to expect that discretion to hire directly and avoid merit system principles will be abused. That is why the civil service system currently limits such discretion. It is very difficult to disprove an assertion of a critical need or severe shortage. Likewise, it is very difficult to prove that an individual hired outside the merit system was hired due to political connections. Taxpayers have the right to expect that those hired by the government have obtained their jobs based on what they know, rather than whom they know. AFGE believes that the slowness in hiring reported anecdotally is more a function of inadequate staffing in agencies' human resources departments that the hiring system itself. Human Resources offices were affected disproportionately in the excessive and unfocused downsizing of the 1990s. Downsizing combined with contracting out have rendered many agencies with administrative systems that hamper the merit system hiring process. On-the-spot impulsive hiring that opens the door to political favoritism is not a solution to this problem.
Appendix 2:
Additional Material for the Record
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(Footnote 10 return)
The focus of our work to date has been following up on NASA's actions to respond to its shuttle program workforce challenges.
(Footnote 11 return)
U.S. General Accounting Office, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO–02–373SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002).
(Footnote 12 return)
A demonstration project is a project conducted by OPM, or under its supervision, to determine whether a specified change in personnel management policies or procedures would result in improved federal personnel management (5 U.S.C. 4701(a)(4)). Demonstration projects are conducted directly by OPM or jointly by OPM and the agency or organization. Under Title 5, OPM is permitted to waive certain provisions and regulations under this title to enable agencies or organizations to conduct demonstration projects by experimenting with new and innovative systems (5 U.S.C. 4703(a)).
(Footnote 13 return)
The Partnership for Public Service, Homeland Security: Winning the War For Talent To Win The War On Terror (July 31, 2002).