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82–178PS
2003
CONDUCTING RESEARCH DURING THE WAR
ON TERRORISM: BALANCING OPENNESS
AND SECURITY
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
OCTOBER 10, 2002
Serial No. 107–90
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
JOE BARTON, Texas
KEN CALVERT, California
NICK SMITH, Michigan
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
DAVE WELDON, Florida
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota
CHRIS CANNON, Utah
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR., Washington
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
GARY G. MILLER, California
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
FELIX J. GRUCCI, JR., New York
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MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
RALPH M. HALL, Texas
BART GORDON, Tennessee
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JAMES A. BARCIA, Michigan
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
LYNN N. RIVERS, Michigan
ZOE LOFGREN, California
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina
NICK LAMPSON, Texas
JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
MARK UDALL, Colorado
DAVID WU, Oregon
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOE BACA, California
JIM MATHESON, Utah
STEVE ISRAEL, New York
DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
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MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
C O N T E N T S
October 10, 2002
Witness List
Hearing Charter
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Sherwood L. Boehlert, Chairman, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Written Statement
Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Written Statement
Statement by Representative Constance Morella, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Written Statement
Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Research, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
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Written Statement
Statement by Representative Nick Smith, Chairman, Subcommittee on Research, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Written Statement
Statement by Representative Brian Baird, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Prepared Statement by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives
Panel I
Dr. John H. Marburger, III, Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President
Oral Statement
Written Statement
Biography
Panel II
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Dr. Ronald M. Atlas, President, American Society for Microbiology; Dean of Graduate School, Professor of Biology, University of Louisville
Oral Statement
Written Statement
Biography
Financial Disclosure
Dr. M.R.C. Greenwood, Chancellor, University of California–Santa Cruz
Oral Statement
Written Statement
Biography
Financial Disclosure
Dr. Sheila E. Widnall, Institute Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Oral Statement
Written Statement
Biography
Financial Disclosure
Discussion
Categorizing Research as ''Sensitive But Unclassified''
Curriculum/Research Restriction for International Students
Classified Research and Student Involvement
Funding for a NAS Study on Balancing Openness and Security
Classified Research at Lincoln Laboratory
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Determining the Vulnerability of Research
Uniformity of Agency Classification Policies
Percentages of International Graduate Students at American Institutions
Encouraging Science, Mathematics, and Engineering Education Among American Students
National Security Implications of Research
Is a National Security Focus on American Universities Warranted?
Protecting Civil Liberties While Ensuring National Security
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Dr. John H. Marburger, III, Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President
Dr. Ronald M. Atlas, President, American Society for Microbiology; Dean of Graduate School, Professor of Biology, University of Louisville
Dr. M.R.C. Greenwood, Chancellor, University of California–Santa Cruz
Dr. Sheila E. Widnall, Institute Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record
Charles M. Vest, ''Response and Responsibility: Balancing Security and Openness in Research and Education,'' Report of the President for the Academic Year 2001–2002, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, September 2002
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''In the Public Interest,'' Report of the Ad Hoc Faculty Committee on Access To and Disclosure of Scientific Information, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 12, 2002
CONDUCTING RESEARCH DURING THE WAR ON TERRORISM: BALANCING OPENNESS AND SECURITY
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 10, 2002
House of Representatives,
Committee on Science,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:09 a.m., in Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sherwood L. Boehlert (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
82178a.eps
HEARING CHARTER
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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Conducting Research During the War on
Terrorism: Balancing Openness and Security
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 10, 2002
10:00 A.M.–12:00 P.M.
2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
Purpose
On Thursday, October 10, 2002 at 10:00 a.m., the House Science Committee will hold a hearing on how to balance the need for greater security with the need for open scientific communication. Since the September 11th attacks and subsequent anthrax incidents, Congress, the executive branch, and the scientific and technical communities have begun discussions on how to prevent scientific research results and information from becoming national security risks. This hearing will focus on the treatment of sensitive information and of foreign faculty and students.
The hearing will focus on several overarching questions:
1. What elements of a particular research project or publication trigger concern about the ''sensitive'' nature of the work or findings?
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2. When a research project or publication is thought to include ''sensitive'' elements, who should determine who is allowed to engage in the work and which findings will be published in the open literature?
3. While there is an assumption that science requires complete openness to thrive, there are many examples of excellent scientific research conducted in a restricted environment, for example, classified defense research and proprietary industrial research. Does science truly require openness and are there differences in the need for openness in different scientific communities?
4. Are the national security threats of today significantly different from those in our pre-September 11th history, including the Cold War era? Why and in what ways do today's threats demand a different kind or level of scientific vigilance than those of the past?
Background
Balancing Openness and Security, Round I—The Cold War
During the Cold War, there was heated debate about how to balance the desire of academic scientists to maintain open communication with the need to consider national security concerns. At the time, Soviet scientists were attending scientific conferences and probing the open scientific and technical literature for information that would advance the their weapons program and strengthen the capacity of their military. This siphoning of scientific and technical information and know-how from the U.S. prompted the Department of Defense (DOD) to propose restrictions on the dissemination of some unclassified basic research results and to deny foreign nationals access to ''sensitive'' research facilities and campuses. The academic community was disturbed by the DOD's move to restrict the flow of unclassified information and eventually several universities (MIT, CalTech, and Stanford) notified the Administration that they would refuse to engage in ''sensitive'' but unclassified research if prepublication reviews were enacted.
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In 1982, largely in response to concerns voiced by the academic community, a DOD–University Forum was established to encourage communication between the academic and defense communities about balancing openness and security. Shortly thereafter, the National Academy of Sciences convened a Panel on Scientific Communications and National Security chaired by Dale R. Corson, physicist and President emeritus of Cornell University. The panel was asked to examine the various aspects of controls on scientific communication and suggest how to balance competing concerns. The Corson panel concluded that a substantial amount of technological information with military applications had been transferred to the USSR, but that the majority of such information had not originated in the open literature. In addition, the committee concluded that, ''the long-term security of the United States depends in large part. . .on the vigorous research and development effort that openness helps to nurture.''
In response to continued discussions about the restrictions on access to scientific research results and the recommendations made in the Corson Report, the Reagan Administration issued National Security Decision Directive 189 (NSDD–189) in 1985. This directive stated that the only mechanism for restricting the dissemination of fundamental research results was classification.
The end of the Cold War, however, did not end concerns about weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or concerns about the transfer of technology to enemies. With the break-up of the Soviet Union, there were reports of thefts and sales of WMD by and to rogue nations and terrorist groups.
Recent Federal Efforts Regarding Access and Control of Scientific Information
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Even before September 11, 2001, Congress had enacted laws that sought to enhance the security of some activities relating to science, technology, and higher education in response to terrorist events during the 1990s. Since September 11, 2001, Congress and the executive branch have adopted additional security measures to counteract terrorism. The September 11 attack, perpetrated in part by foreign students, and the subsequent anthrax attack brought to a head issues related to restrictions on visas, access to hazardous biological agents, and restrictions on scientific studies that could be used as ''blueprints'' for terrorists.
Student Visas and Monitoring
Terrorist incidents during the past decade have raised concerns about which foreign students should be permitted to study in the U.S., what courses they may study, what research they should conduct, and how they should be monitored once in the U.S. This is in response to such events as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, in which one of the terrorists had entered the U.S. on a student visa, dropped out of school, and yet stayed in the country, and concerns that foreign students could gain technical skills while studying in the U.S. that could then be turned against the U.S.
In 1994, Congress acted to direct the State Department to develop a ''Technology Alert List'' of categories of study that students from countries identified as ''state sponsors of terrorism'' should not be admitted to the U.S. to study. Currently, 16 sensitive categories are on the list ranging from nuclear technology to information security. In addition to denying visas to students from ''state sponsors of terrorism'' (Cuba, Libya, Iran Iraq, North Korea, Sudan and Syria), consular officials are instructed to use additional scrutiny with students from countries subject to Nonproliferation Export Control regulations (China, India, Israel, Pakistan and Russia) who wish to study these fields. There have been recent discussions of expanding this list to include new sensitive areas in microbiology and biotechnology, but it is more difficult to differentiate which courses are sensitive in these fields because even techniques taught in basic courses may be used to create biological weapons.
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More recently, the October 29, 2001 Presidential Homeland Security Directive, Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies, stated that ''[t]he Government shall implement measures to. . .prohibit certain international students from receiving education and training in sensitive areas.'' In May 2002, White House officials unveiled a proposal to create a panel that would screen foreign graduate students, post-doctoral fellows, and scientists who apply for visas to study ''sensitive topics. . .uniquely available'' on U.S. campuses. The screening would be done by the Interagency Panel on Advanced Science Security (IPASS), composed of representatives from the major U.S. science agencies as well as the State, Justice, and Commerce departments. (The Department of Homeland Security would participate if it is created.) The Administration is in the process of formulating the final IPASS directive.
Concerns have also been raised about ensuring that foreigners who enter the U.S. as students follow the approved course of study. In 1996, Congress directed the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to create an electronic foreign student tracking system. The Student Exchange Visa Information System (SEVIS), authorized by the Congress, was intended to make readily accessible to immigration officials the names, residences and educational status of foreign students. The program was not fully implemented before September 11, 2001, due to both lack of funding and objections from the higher education community about financial costs foreign students would incur as the system was implemented. SEVIS has been strengthened and expanded by two recent laws—the USA Patriot Act and the Enhanced Border Security and the Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002. These Acts fully fund the program, expand the information included in the system to include the courses of study of students, and are mandated to be operational in January 2003.
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Restrictions on Access to Hazardous Biological Agents
The bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma in 1995 spurred the Congress to address the risks of hazardous biological agents falling into the wrong hands. In 1996, the Congress directed the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to identify hazardous biological agents and require registration of laboratories that transported these agents, called ''select agent.'' The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) was charged with implementing this program, but before September 11, the program was under-funded and under-staffed.
Two recent pieces of legislation, the USA Patriot Act and the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act, significantly strengthened and expanded provisions relating to ''select agents.'' The Acts require registration not only of the transport, but also the possession of ''select agents.'' The Acts expand the government's ability to restrict access to hazardous agents in three ways: 1) allowing prosecution of persons suspected of possessing biological agents to be used for terrorist acts; 2) providing for fines or imprisonment for any person who knowingly possesses any biological agent that is not justified by prophylactic, protective, bona fide research, or other peaceful purpose; and 3) criminalizing possession by persons under indictment, who have been imprisoned for more than a year, fugitives from justice, unlawful users of a controlled substance, illegal aliens, aliens not admitted for permanent residence from certain terrorist countries where trade is controlled by the Export Administration Act, persons who have been adjudicated as a ''mental defective'' or have been committed to a mental institution, or those who have been dishonorably discharged from the Armed Services. No exemptions are permitted and no appeals process was included.
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Sensitive Information
The anthrax incidents prompted concern that scientific studies published in the open literature could be used as ''cookbooks'' for terrorists. In response to such concerns, the Executive Branch has released several proposals and issued Executive Orders regarding restricting access to sensitive information.
On March 18, 2002, Andrew Card issued a memo for the heads of Executive Departments and Agencies not to ''disclose inappropriately'' government information (regardless of age) relating to weapons of mass destruction ''as well as other information that could be misused.'' The memo also created a category of ''sensitive but unclassified information'' for information that cannot be classified, but is too sensitive for dissemination. However, there are no detailed criteria for considering when information is ''sensitive but unclassified,'' and it is unclear how the memo is being implemented.
Last spring, The Department of Defense (DOD) proposed a policy that would have restricted scientific publication. Under the proposal, scientists using funds from the Department would have needed authorization to disclose research findings or results. This could have been extended to unclassified studies involving basic research, and criminal sanctions could have been imposed against scientists violating the policy. There has been bitter opposition to this proposal from the research community and a scathing critique from U.S. Naval Research Laboratory. In response to this opposition, the DOD has withdrawn the policy and is revising it.
Currently, the Administration is considering a policy that would allow federal pre-publication review of sensitive federally funded research. Few details are available at this point, though Condaleeza Rice stated in a letter to Dr. Harold Brown, Co-Chairman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, that while the Administration was reviewing policies pertaining to sensitive but unclassified research, ''. . .the policy on the transfer of scientific, technical, and engineering information set forth in NSDD–189 shall remain in effect, and we will ensure that this policy is followed.'' In addition to the policies under review by the Administration, several federal agencies are considering policies pertaining to the open exchange of scientific information. Recently, the Department of Health and Human Services, the United States Department of Agriculture, and the Environmental Protection Agency, agencies that sponsor civilian research, were given the authority to classify documents by Executive Order. As a result, access to scientific information that several years ago would have been openly available may now be restricted through classification.
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Academic and Research Community Response
The academic and research community has also been struggling with how to respond to new threats. The National Academy of Sciences (NAS), the American Society for Microbiology (ASM), the American Association of University Presidents (AAUP), and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) have convened panels to study balancing national security concerns and access to scientific information and research materials.
The ASM, the publisher of 11 scientific journals, recently established formal guidelines for the pre-publication review and publication of ''sensitive unclassified'' research results and information. Under these guidelines, reviewers will flag manuscripts that may pose security concerns and then the editor and publications board will make a final decision as to whether to continue the review process or reject the manuscript. At the request of Dr. Ronald Atlas, the President of the ASM, the National Academy will hold a meeting in January of publishers dealing with biology research that could have public safety implications. This is in addition to a panel chaired by MIT professor Gerald Fink, to study research standards and practices to prevent destructive application of advanced biotechnology, and a series of science and security roundtables the Academy will convene around the country to solicit input from the scientific community on how best to balance the competing requirements of national security and unfettered scientific inquiry.
MIT recently published a report entitled In the Public Interest, which states its policies on access to, and disclosure of scientific information. The scope of the study included treatment of classified research and materials, consideration of developing restrictions on access to, and disclosure of sensitive scientific information, treatment of select agents, and export controls. While reaffirming their concerns about security, MIT stressed the importance of an open intellectual environment on campus.
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In deciding how to publish a recent report, the National Academy of Sciences struggled with the issue of what information should be restricted. Due to concerns about ''sensitive unclassified information,'' the National Academy of Science recently released a report entitled Countering Agricultural Bioterrorism in two parts, one available to the general public and a second part containing the ''sensitive unclassified information'' available only to the Administration and Congress. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) asked that publication of the report be delayed indefinitely because of possible national security-related concerns, even though the U.S. Army, the F.B.I., and the Office of Homeland Security raised no security concerns. After discussions between the Academy and the USDA, the Academy agreed that the portions of the report that the USDA was concerned about would be withheld from publication.
Current Issues
Balancing Openness and Security, Round II—The War on Terrorism
The current debate on security issues that may require restrictions on the conduct of research, including limits on the dissemination of ''sensitive but unclassified'' information and restrictions on the number and activities of foreign-born faculty and students, is similar to the Cold War debate about openness and security. Important differences, however, include an enemy that is more difficult to identify, the new tools in biotechnology that can turn basic agents and technologies into powerful weapons, and the vast amounts of information available on Internet. Two emerging issues are the focus of this hearing—the dissemination of sensitive information and restrictions on foreign students.
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Restrictions on the Flow of Scientific Information
There is an ongoing discussion about when unclassified scientific results and information should be subjected to pre-publication review in order to prevent the inadvertent publication of information that could be used by a terrorist in an attack.
Several recent research publications have stirred the debate about restrictions on the open publication of sensitive but unclassified research results. In one case, scientists in Australia working to boost the immune system in response to a viral infection inadvertently discovered how to turn a virus turn into a deadly pathogen. In the second case, researchers at the State University of New York–Stony Brook synthesized the virus that causes polio from scratch using common chemicals and biological agents and techniques. In each case scientists published in the open literature scientific findings that could be used by a terrorist to create an enhanced bio-warfare agent.
It is clear that terrorists could use research results currently published in the open literature to cause harm. However, in each of the above cases, scientists and editors weighed the benefits gained by disseminating the study with the risks, and decided that the benefits outweighed the risk. These benefits include advancing the science in an area where vaccines and cures are discovered for diseases. Scientists worry that in attempting to protect the U.S., the government could impose laws that would restrict publication of sensitive research (including research not funded by the government). The adverse effects of this may include slowing scientific progress, and dissuading students and faculty from studying and working in sensitive areas where research is needed.
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Foreign Students
Another key question is what courses, research and materials foreign students should be permitted to be involved in or access. In science and technology, foreign students make up about a third of all graduate students and contribute to the U.S. scientific effort in this capacity. In 1998, foreign students made up 30 percent of graduate students studying science and engineering in the U.S. and 33 percent of U.S. science and engineering doctoral recipients (52 percent in engineering, 49 percent in mathematics and computer sciences and 40 percent in physical sciences). Many of these students remain in the U.S. upon graduation. Others return to their native countries, becoming leaders of the scientific efforts in those nations. However, the potential exists for a foreigner to gain scientific and technological skills as a student that could be used in planning and executing a terrorist attack. This was a concern during the Cold War, and it persists today, especially in the area of biotechnology.
As discussed earlier, Congress has recently passed laws to enhance foreign student monitoring and the White House is considering a program that would restrict certain students from studying sensitive courses and conducting sensitive research (IPASS). Such efforts are aimed at assuring that foreigners cannot enter the U.S. on student visas in order to cause harm to the U.S. and that foreign students cannot receive education in sensitive areas that they could then turn against the U.S. However, the academic community worries that passing such restrictions may dissuade foreign students from coming to the U.S., and thereby cripple our scientific research efforts. In addition, many have pointed out that U.S. citizens can pose similar risks, noting the likelihood that a U.S. citizen propagated the anthrax incidents.
Witnesses
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John Marburger, Ph.D., Director of the Office of Science and Technology (OSTP). As Director of OSTP, Dr. Marburger also co-chairs the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology and oversees the National Science and Technology Council. Prior to joining OSTP, Dr. Marburger served as President of the State University of New York–Stony Brook and as Director of the Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL). Before becoming President of SUNY–Stony Brook, he was Professor of Physics and Electrical Engineering at the University of Southern California, serving as Physics Department Chairman and Dean of the College of Letters, Arts and Sciences in the 1970's. In the fall of 1994 he returned to the faculty at Stony Brook, teaching and doing research in optical science as a University Professor. Three years later he became President of Brookhaven Science Associates, a partnership between the university and Battelle Memorial Institute that competed for and won the contract to operate BNL.
Ronald Atlas, Ph.D., President, American Society for Microbiology (ASM); Dean of the Graduate School and Professor of Biology, University of Louisville (Louisville, KY). Dr. Atlas is co-director of the Center for the Deterrence of Biowarfare and Bioterrorism at the University of Louisville, has been chair of the ASM Task Force on Biological Weapons for past 7 years and has advised the U.S. government on policy issues related to the deterrence of bioterrorism and to the medical response to bioterrorism. He received the ASM Award for Applied and Environmental Microbiology. His other research honors have included being elected a fellow in the American Academy of Microbiology, receiving the Edmund Youde Lectureship Award in Hong Kong, and being appointed Extraordinary Professor of Microbiology at the University of Pretoria, South Africa.
M.R.C Greenwood, Ph.D., Chancellor, University of California, Santa Cruz. As chief executive, Chancellor Greenwood oversees a research university with an uncommon commitment to undergraduate education, and with combined undergraduate and graduate enrollments of nearly 12,000 matriculated students and an annual total budget of approximately $350 million. In addition to her position as Chancellor, Dr. Greenwood also holds a UC–Santa Cruz appointment as Professor of Biology. Prior to her UC–Santa Cruz appointments, Chancellor Greenwood served as Dean of Graduate Studies, Vice Provost for Academic Outreach, and Professor of Biology and Internal Medicine at the University of California–Davis. Previously, Dr. Greenwood taught at Vassar College where she was the John Guy Vassar Professor of Natural Sciences, Chair of the Department of Biology, and Director of the Undergraduate Research Summer Institute.
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From November 1993 to May 1995, Dr. Greenwood held an appointment as Associate Director for Science at the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) in the Executive Office of the President of the United States. In that position, she supervised the Science Division, providing direction on a broad array of scientific areas in support of the President's objectives, such as budget development for the multibillion-dollar fundamental science national effort, and development of science policy documents, including Science in the National Interest. In addition, she was responsible for interagency coordination.
Sheila Widnall, Ph.D., Institute Professor, and Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Chair, Ad Hoc Faculty Committee on Access to and Disclosure of Scientific Information, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Prof. Widnall received her B.Sc. (1960), M.S. (1961), and Sc.D. (1964) in Aeronautics and Astronautics from MIT. She was appointed Abby Rockefeller Mauze Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics in 1986. She served as Associate Provost, Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1992–1993 and as Secretary of the Air Force from 1993–1997. Professor Widnall stepped down from her position as Secretary of the Air Force on October 31, 1997 to return to her faculty position at MIT. As Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. Widnall was responsible for all the affairs of the Department of the Air Force including recruiting, organizing, training, administration, logistical support, maintenance, and welfare of personnel. Dr. Widnall was also responsible for research and development and other activities prescribed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Since returning to MIT, she has been active in the Lean Aerospace Initiative with special emphasis on the space and policy focus teams. Since returning to MIT, she has been active in the Lean Aerospace Initiative with special emphasis on the space and policy focus teams. Dr. Widnall chaired the recent MIT ad hoc faculty committee that produced the report, ''In the Public Interest,'' which addressed access to and disclosure of scientific information.
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Appendix I: Summary of Legislation
1994 Amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act
This amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 212(a)(3)(i)(II) ) required consular officials to deny visas for U.S. study in sensitive fields. Pursuant to this Act, the State Department developed the ''Technology Alert List'' which lists 16 categories of study that students from countries identified as ''state sponsors of terrorism'' should not be admitted to the U.S. to study.
Anti-terrorism and Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104–132)
This Act, which was passed partly in response to the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, required the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to identify hazardous biological agents and require registration of laboratories that transport hazardous biological agents. The law did not require registration of laboratories that used any of the ''select agents'' or reporting of existing inventory in laboratories. In addition, researchers and laboratories that possessed stockpiled strains in freezers but did not plan to transport them did not have to register and report to the government. The provisions in this act were strengthened and expanded by two recent pieces of legislation, the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) of 2001 (107–56) and the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (P.L. 107–188).
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Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996
This Act was passed in response to concerns that terrorists could use foreign student status as a way of entering the U.S., after one of the 1993 World Trade Center terrorists had entered the U.S. on a student visa, dropped out of school, and yet stayed in the country. The Act authorized an electronic foreign student tracking system. The Student Exchange Visa Information System (SEVIS) was intended to make readily accessible to immigration officials the names, residences and educational status of foreign students. The program was not fully implemented before September 11, 2001, largely due to objections from the higher education community about financial costs foreign students would incur as the system was implemented. The provisions of this Act were strengthened and expanded by the USA Patriot Act and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (P.L. 107–173).
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) of 2001 (107–56)
This Act increased foreign student monitoring, restricted access of potential terrorists to hazardous biological agents, and gave the government access to some information about students and their Internet usage. In addition, it authorized $36 million in appropriations to implement the SEVIS foreign student monitoring system authorized in 1996.
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (P.L. 107–188)
This Act, which was signed into law on June 12, 2002, expands upon the Antiterrorism and Death Penalty Act of 1996, and, among other things, requires the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) Secretary to register facilities and individuals in possession of biological agents and toxins that pose a severe threat to public health and safety. It requires the DHHS to transmit new safety and security requirements for such facilities and individuals. In addition, the act grants authority to the Secretary of Agriculture to establish a parallel set of requirements for facilities that handle agents and toxins that threaten crops and livestock.
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Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (P.L. 107–173)
This Act was signed into law on May 14, 2002. Among other things, it expands the foreign student monitoring system (Student Exchange Visa Information System) requirements of Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996 and requires that the SEVIS system be fully operational by January 30, 2003. In addition, it requires the Immigration and Naturalization Service to periodically conduct a review of educational institutions enrolling foreign students to monitor their compliance with foreign student reporting requirements.
Chairman BOEHLERT. The hearing will come to order. I would like to welcome everyone here today to this vitally important hearing. I believe that this is the first hearing Congress has held since September 11 on this central question of balancing security and openness in the conduct of research.
As everyone here knows, I am fond of pointing out that the War on Terrorism will be won in the laboratory just as much as on the battlefield. I have made that line my byword to argue for a well organized, well staffed, and well funded science enterprise. But the sentence also highlights some critical tensions that the War on Terrorism has brought to a head. For if the laboratory is the theater of war, then what are the rules of engagement? War demands secrecy. Science thrives on openness. How can a free society balance those competing demands?
This is not a new question. As my catch phrase also indicates, the Cold War raised the same issue. And during the decades of the Cold War, the Government and the research community gradually developed a comfortable modus operandi, although it needed periodic fine-tuning and almost broke down several times.
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The Cold War's rules of engagement for science continue to guide us, as they should, but our current situation, in many ways, makes the Cold War look like the good old days. Today we face an enemy who is more insidious and dispersed and a global communications network that is far more difficult to control. Perhaps more importantly, we live in a time when additional fields of science present security risks.
For the first time, the biological sciences are caught on the horns of our security dilemma just at the point when that discipline is reaching new heights of productivity. And to add to our difficulties in biology, more than any other field, the exact same research may be needed for benign and malevolent purposes.
So what is to be done? As a Nation, we are just beginning to sort that out, and we hope that this hearing will contribute to that process. All I know is that we must arrive at a finely tuned and constantly recalibrated balance. And we can only do that through open, honest, and trusting discussions between the Government and the research community. I see this committee as an honest broker in those discussions.
With that in mind, we will focus on two aspects of the problem today: the treatment of sensitive but unclassified information, and the treatment of foreign students and faculty. That should be more than enough to keep us busy.
I am interested not only in our witnesses' conclusions on the issues before us, but even more so in the reasoning that led them to those conclusions. That is what would help us most in grappling with these stunningly difficult matters. I expect we will have many more hearings on this subject.
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In the past year, since the terrorist attacks, I think many of us have turned to Shakespeare's exclamation, ''Oh, brave new world that has such people in it.'' It is going to take a while to figure out how science should operate in this brave new world.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Boehlert follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT
I'd like to welcome everyone here today to this vitally important hearing. I believe this is the first hearing Congress has held since September 11th on this central question of balancing security and openness in the conduct of research.
As everyone here knows, I am fond of pointing out that ''the war on terrorism will be won in the laboratory just as much as on the battlefield.'' I've made that line my byword to argue for a well organized, well staffed and well funded scientific enterprise. But the sentence also highlights some critical tensions that the war on terrorism has brought to a head.
For if the laboratory is a theater of war, then what are its rules of engagement? War demands secrecy; science thrives on openness. How can a free society balance those competing demands?
This is not a new question. As my catch-phrase also indicates, the Cold War raised the same issue. And during the decades of the Cold War, the government and the research community gradually developed a comfortable modus operandi—although it needed periodic fine tuning and almost broke down several times. The Cold War's rules of engagement for science continue to guide us, as they should.
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But our current situation, in many ways, makes the Cold War look like the ''good old days.''
Today we face an enemy who is more insidious and dispersed, and a global communications network that is far more difficult to control. Perhaps more importantly, we live in a time when additional fields of science present security risks.
For the first time, the biological sciences are caught on the horns of our security dilemma—just at the point when that discipline is reaching new heights of productivity. And, to add to our difficulties, in biology, more than in any other field, the exact same research may be needed for benign and malevolent purposes.
So what is to be done? As a nation, we're just beginning to sort that out—and we hope that this hearing will contribute to that process. All I know is that we must arrive at a finely tuned and constantly recalibrated balance—and we can only do that through open, honest and trusting discussions between the government and the research community. I see this committee as an ''honest broker'' in those discussions.
With that in mind, we will focus on two aspects of the problem today—the treatment of ''sensitive but unclassified'' information and the treatment of foreign students and faculty. That should be more than enough to keep us busy.
I'm interested not only in our witnesses' conclusions on the issues before us, but even more so in the reasoning that led them to those conclusions. That's what would help us most in grappling with these stunningly difficult matters.
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I expect we will have many more hearings on this subject. In the past year, since the terrorist attacks, I think many of us have turned to Shakespeare's exclamation: ''O brave new world, that has such people in it.'' It's going to take a while to figure out how science should operate in this brave new world.
The Chair recognizes the distinguished gentleman from Texas, Mr. Hall.
Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And I thank you for holding the hearing at this time. I think it is a very appropriate time to have this hearing. And later today, we are going to make one of the most difficult votes that any of us will ever cast. I think any time you vote to send U.S. men and women into harm's way, you do it with a heavy heart.
Today's historic floor vote that will be here, probably in the early or the later part of the afternoon, is going to enable the President to use force in Iraq if the UN fails. This will not make our enemies very happy. They will do all they can to disrupt our plan and to hurt our citizens.
It doesn't take the most advanced technology in the world to terrorize our nation. Right now, within 30 miles of here, a low-life with a rifle is keeping children inside schools and adults from going about their daily routines. This coward is making millions of people quake as they fuel their cars, as they send their children out into the streets or into the schools.
All of this ties back to today's hearing. As the Chairman likes to say the War on Terrorism, like the Cold War, is going to be won in the laboratory as much as on the battlefield. I have heard him say that many times, and I totally and thoroughly agree with it. Today, we are going to hear from our distinguished panel on how to strike the delicate balance between denying our enemy access to information that may inadvertently harm the United States and lead us to draw upon the best and brightest minds in the world to advance science and technology and to design our very best defensive and offensive weapons.
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Defensively in World War II, we had signs that were posted. We didn't have the opportunity to communicate as we have today with computers and everything else. But we had signs, such as a sailor with his index finger across his lips on a poster saying, ''A slip of the lip might sink a ship,'' and other signs like that. We have to ensure that we don't train or aid the enemy. We did just that for the 9/11 cowards by allowing them to go to flight schools. If we do that again with biological or chemical agents, the price would be absolutely unthinkable.
However, we also must not indiscriminately deny foreign students access to scientific education here. During World War II, one of the most decorated units was comprised of Japanese Americans fighting in Europe. That spirit of love for this country persists in many of the foreign born scientists.
I do not envy you, Dr. Marburger, the choices that you have to make, but I will, as others will, be viewing them critically to ensure that they help our country, because these decisions could very well be life or death. And what a burden to put on your shoulders for the life that you have lived and the way you have prepared yourself to serve this country, the time you are giving this country at this very moment.
In reviewing material for this hearing, I have concluded that the Administration is asking the right questions and consulting broadly. I hope their review of these matters does not drag on too long or that the decision-making process becomes impenetrable. We owe American scientists to set up clear and unambiguous guidelines so that they can contribute their talents most effectively to our common cause.
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George Washington is famous for saying, ''When you go down through the Augean stables of government, put only Americans on guard.'' We have a lot of Americans that weren't born in this country that came to this shore that chose this country. We have got to be very careful and delicate as to how we use their genius to carry out our thrust.
Thank you very much for your testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE RALPH M. HALL
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing at this time. Later today we will make one of the most difficult votes that any of us will ever cast. Anytime you vote to send U.S. men and women into harm's way, you do it will a heavy heart.
Today's historic vote will enable the President to use force in Iraq. This will not make our enemies happy. They will do all they can to disrupt our plans and hurt our citizens.
It does not take the most advanced technology in the world to terrorize our nation. Right now, within 30 miles of here, a low-life with a rifle is keeping children locked inside schools and adults from going about their daily routines. This coward is making millions of people quake as they fuel up their cars.
All of this ties back to today's hearing. The Chairman likes to say that the war on terrorism, like the Cold War, is going to be won in the laboratory as much as on the battlefield.
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Today we will hear from our distinguished panel how to strike the delicate balance between denying our enemy access to information that may inadvertently harm the United States and allowing us to draw upon the best and brightest minds in the world to advance science and technology and to design our best defensive and offensive weapons.
We must ensure that we don't help train the enemy. We did just that for the 9–11 cowards by allowing them to go to flight schools. If we do that again with biological or chemical agents the price would be unthinkable.
However, we also must not indiscriminately deny foreign students access to a scientific education. During WWII one of the most decorated units was comprised of Japanese-Americans fighting in Europe. That spirit of love for this country persists in many of our foreign-born scientists.
I do not envy Dr. Marburger the choices he must make. But, I will be viewing them critically to ensure that they help our country, because these decisions could very well be life or death.
In reviewing materials for this hearing, I have concluded that the Administration is asking the right questions and is consulting broadly. I hope that their review of these matters does not drag on too long, or that the decision making process becomes impenetrable. We owe America's scientists a set of clear and unambiguous guidelines so that they can contribute their talents most effectively to our common cause.
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I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Hall. The Chair recognizes the distinguished gentlelady from Maryland, Mrs. Morella.
Ms. MORELLA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks for holding this hearing to shed light on an issue that hasn't received enough attention as of late. And as tradition would have it with your chairmanship of the Committee, we are forging ahead in areas that need to have the attention.
It has been said numerous times that September 11 changed nearly every aspect in America and the scientific community is no exception. Scientific research is at the very core of our nation's progress. From the Industrial Revolution to the Internet Revolution, science has moved forward on the ability to build on itself over time. Scientific knowledge is passed from generation to generation, and that often results in tremendous innovation. However, scientific knowledge can be a double-edged sword. We must now face the fact that the very knowledge which helps us to innovate and progress as a nation could be used to cause us great harm. We need to explore the question of where to draw the line between the need to freely share valuable scientific information and the need to restrict it from those who may intend to use it to the detriment of mankind.
We should examine how to define sensitive information, how to deal with terrorist threats from within the scientific community, and how best to physically secure our research facilities. And as we have seen, the potential for terrorism from within the scientific community is really a very grave threat. Foreigners account for almost one third of all graduate students studying in the areas of science and technology. And although we must take steps to prevent foreigners from using student visas to cause harm to the United States, we must also be careful not to dissuade foreign students from coming to the United States, potentially crippling our scientific research efforts.
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I want to bring out another point that is kind of tangential to our hearing today. Our research facilities are also faced with supplementing their physical security. At least two of the Nation's premier scientific research facilities, the National Institutes of Health and the National Institute of Standards and Technology, are located in my District. And the National Institutes of Health are proposing to erect a security barrier around its facilities. I know that the National Naval Medical Center is planning to do the same thing. And there are appropriate barriers, also, at NIST. And while the issue may seem simple on the surface, it is complicated by the fact that many residents are concerned that the barrier would diminish the quality of their community. At the same time, they are concerned about what is going on inside that maybe we should know more about. And in this situation, it is easy to understand how increased security measures can be simultaneously helpful but also problematic. So I think finding a balance between openness and security in the scientific community is a challenge that we must accept, and I think that this hearing today will help us begin a dialogue leading us in the right direction.
Dr. Marburger, if you don't have a chance to respond to this, since this is not specifically the topic, I hope that at some other point we could have a conversation with that in mind. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Morella follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE CONSTANCE MORELLA
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Thank you Mr. Chairman for holding a hearing that will shed some light on an issue that has not received enough attention as of late. It has been said numerous times that September 11 changed nearly every aspect of life in America. The scientific community is no exception. Scientific research is at the very core of our nation's progress. From the Industrial Revolution to the Internet Revolution, science has moved forward on the ability to build on itself over time. Scientific knowledge passed from generation to generation, often results in tremendous innovation. However, scientific knowledge can be a double-edged sword. We must now face the fact that the very knowledge which helps us to innovate and progress as a nation, could be used to cause us grave harm. We need to explore the question of where to draw the line between the need to freely share valuable scientific information and the need to restrict it from those who intend to use it to the detriment of mankind. We should examine how to define sensitive information, how to deal with terrorist threats from within the scientific community, and how best to physically secure our research facilities.
As we have seen, the potential for terrorism from within the scientific community is a very real threat. Foreigners account for almost one-third of all graduate students studying in the areas of science and technology. Although we must take steps to prevent foreigners from using student visas to cause harm to the United States, we must also be careful not to dissuade foreign students from coming to the U.S., potentially crippling our scientific research efforts.
Our research facilities are also faced with supplementing their physical security. At least two of the Nation's premier scientific research facilities, the National Institute of Health and the National Institute of Standards and Technology, are located in my district. The National Institute of Health is proposing to erect a security barrier around its facilities. While the issue may seem simple on the surface, it is complicated by the fact that many residents are concerned the barrier would diminish the quality of their community. In this situation, it is easy to understand how increased security measures can be simultaneously helpful and problematic. Finding a balance between openness and security in the scientific community is a challenge we must accept. I feel strongly that this hearing today will help us begin a dialogue leading us in the right direction.
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Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Mrs. Morella. Ms. Johnson.
Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you scheduling this hearing today. I have a special interest in this area: balancing openness and security in scientific research. And I know that you and Ranking Member Hall and the Research Subcommittee Chair, Mr. Smith, and other Members of the Science Committee understand the importance of science and technology to the health of our economy and the quality of our lives.
It is imperative that in these difficult times we find a way to preserve the open discourse that is the hallmark of modern science. It is my hope that today's hearing will provide some insight into how policy-makers, such as ourselves, should proceed with a science policy in an age where international terrorism has reached our shores.
Despite the fact that a sound proven policy for dealing with classified research exists at other agencies, the policy has not been adopted for the new Department of Homeland Security that passed the House in August. And when our Committee marked it up, I offered an amendment that would have aligned federally-funded research at the new department with existing policies at the Departments of Defense and Energy. And my amendment was adopted by a bipartisan majority of almost two to one, yet when the Homeland Security legislation proceeded to the Select Committee, my amendment was stripped from the Science Committee's mark.
But I asked my dear friend and District neighbor and colleague from North Texas, Mr. Armey, why an amendment that passed in Committee with overwhelming support was not included, and he told me that the Science Committee did not support the amendment. I was unable to offer my amendment on the floor of the House, presumably for the same reason, so as a result, once the Department of Homeland Security is signed into law, we will have federal agencies that conduct classified research in two very different ways, regardless of the fact that one of these ways has been proven to be a sound policy in its almost two decades of use.
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Despite my disappointment with the debate over the Department of Homeland Security, I am pleased that the Committee has worked together to address the issues related to science and security in other ways.
I will stop there, Mr. Chair, and ask for unanimous consent to include my entire statement in the record.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Without objection, so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for convening today's hearing on balancing openness and security in scientific research. I know that you, Ranking Member Hall, Research Subcommittee Chairman Smith, and other Members of the Science Committee understand the importance of science and technology to the health of our economy and the quality of our lives. It is imperative that in these difficult times we find a way to preserve the open discourse that is the hallmark of modern science. It is my hope that today's hearing will provide some insight into how policy makers such as ourselves should proceed with science policy in an age where international terrorism has reached our shores.
One of the most serious challenges our scientists face in this post 9/11 world is how to conduct both classified and non-classified research. When we provide clear guidelines to our researchers, we are able to attract the best available talent to pursue research that is vital to our national security. Two federal agencies, the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy, have been awarding both classified and non-classified research grants to scientists for years. Both Departments follow former President Ronald Reagan's National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 189 from 1985. This directive requires the classification status of research to be determined before a grant is awarded; it prevents the arbitrary classification of research midway through a project; and it requires the Departments to review classified programs on a regular basis to determine if classified status is still required. NSDD–189 has proven to be a sound policy over the years and is one that has protected our national security and allowed our nation's research enterprise to flourish.
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Yet despite the fact that a sound, proven policy for dealing with classified research exists at other agencies, this policy has not been adopted for the new Department of Homeland Security that passed the House in August of this year. When the Science Committee marked up the Homeland Security legislation in July, I offered an amendment that would have aligned federally funded research at the new department with existing polices at the Departments of Defense and Energy. My amendment was adopted by a bipartisan majority of almost 2 to 1. Yet when the Homeland Security legislation proceeded to the Select Committee, my amendment was stripped from the Science Committee's mark.
When I asked my friend and colleague from North Texas, Mr. Armey, why an amendment that passed in committee with overwhelming support was not included, he told me that the Science Committee did not support the amendment. I was unable to offer my amendment on the floor of the House, presumably for the same reason. As a result, once the Department of Homeland Security is signed into law, we will have federal agencies that conduct classified research in two very different ways, regardless of the fact that one of these ways has been proven to be sound policy in its almost two decades of use.
Despite my disappointment with the debate over the Department of Homeland Security, I am pleased that this committee has worked together to address issues related to science and security in other ways. We have forged a bipartisan consensus on how to encourage more young Americans to pursue careers in science and engineering, especially those from groups traditionally under-represented in these fields. With more American researchers, we will have fewer problems with stalled research because of delays in student visa authorizations. We have also spoken with one voice on the importance of robust funding for the National Science Foundation and how basic research benefits our economy, our standard of living, and our national security. It is my sincere hope that we can continue to work together to address other ways in which security impacts science research.
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Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Smith.
Mr. SMITH. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. You know, today we meet to try to face up to an important challenge. There is probably no perfect answer. My guess is, depending on the future of terrorist attacks, that we will probably go a little further than might be necessary in trying to protect some of the confidentiality of some of this information, some of the processes.
But certainly while this larger issue is likely the subject of a series of hearings that I am sure this committee and other committees are going to undertake in the coming months, I am especially interested in the two questions we will focus on this morning: How do we handle sensitive research where the process or the data and results of that research may well later be classified, especially as we deal with fundamental research. The other is how do we decide who may or may not participate in that research. And though today's discussion is a result of the new realities generated by the events of last September a year ago, the topics we will explore today are not novel, certainly. Balancing the need for security with the desire for scientific openness was an important aspect of World War II, the Cold War, and more recent conflicts. However, research security during the War on Terrorism presents a number of fundamental distinctions when compared to previous conflicts. For one, our enemies are not necessarily other nations, but may, instead, be small groups in this country or within the boundaries of the countries of our allies. Second, the range of threats facing the country is no longer limited to large-scale military weaponry.
Terrorists have explored weaponizing bio-agents, attacking our agricultural food system, and crippling commerce by cyberattacks on our computer infrastructure. I think these realities, coupled with our desire to maintain a relatively free and open society in an increasingly globalized world, certainly have created security vulnerabilities.
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Just let me point out, as I finish, a good example of the type of instance that we may be vulnerable to occurred in my Congressional District—just next to my Congressional District. Cultures of a bacterium harmful to swine were stolen from our Michigan State University laboratories along with the notebooks for experimenting on this process. I mean, the contagious and viral bacterium that was stolen being used by researchers could have been very harmful to the agricultural and swine industry. And so it just brings to light the challenge that is before us even in what has been considered in the past just standard good research trying to deal with disease and improve our methods. The fact that it was stolen means—I think it raises the question of how much more secure should we be, even in our university research efforts in terms of when we are dealing with the kind of pathogens and the kind of research that could result in being weapons of destruction to us.
I would move that the rest of my comments be entered into the record at this point, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Without objection, so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE NICK SMITH
Today we meet to examine an important challenge that is perhaps as complex as the cutting edge scientific research that this committee funds: striking the appropriate balance between the need to improve research-related security measures with our desire to ensure a maximum degree of openness that is critical to maximizing scientific progress.
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While this larger issue is likely the subject of a series of hearings that the Committee will undertake in the coming months, I am especially interested in the two questions we will focus on this morning—(1) how do we handle sensitive research where the process and the data that results from it may well be classified, and (2) how do we decide who may or may not participate in the research?
Though today's discussion is a result of the new realities generated by the events of last September, the topics we will explore today are not novel. Balancing the need for security with the desire for scientific openness was an important aspect of our World War II and Cold War strategies, and also more recent conflicts.
However, research security during the war on terrorism presents a number of fundamental distinctions when compared to previous conflicts. For one, our enemies are not necessarily other nations, but may instead consist of a small faction of people hostile to American interests but living within the borders of our country or that of our allies. Second, the range of threats facing the country is no longer limited to large-scale military weaponry. Terrorists have explored weaponizing bio-agents, attacking our agricultural and food systems, and crippling commerce via cyber attacks on our computer infrastructure. These realities, coupled with our desire to maintain a relatively free and open society in an increasingly globalized world, have created security vulnerabilities that we have not dealt with before, but that must be addressed.
A good example of the type of incident that we may be vulnerable to occurred near my Congressional district recently. Cultures of a bacterium harmful to swine were stolen from a Michigan State University research laboratory, along with lab notebooks and computer disks. This contagious and virulent bacterium, which was being used by researchers working to develop a vaccine to a common swine disease, could have potentially been used to wreak havoc on the American hog industry. I think this incident highlights two important points:
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Scientific and technological advances that bring about great positive societal changes (such as new vaccines) may also be used by our enemies to harm us; and two, we clearly need to make improvements to the physical security of public, private, and university labs containing agents that may not have previously been considered to be potentially dangerous, but now are.
I think we can all agree that changes will need to be made to our current system of overseeing researchers, the research they conduct, and the dissemination of the results of that research. We need to carefully approach this however, because too much control over research efforts could result in hindering one of the best tools we have to defend against terror—the world's strongest scientific enterprise.
I think that the witness panel we have before us today illustrates that the university community takes this challenge very seriously and is committed to working with Congress and the Administration to help us find solutions. I look forward to today's discussion, and I am confident that it will bring us one step closer to a reasonable resolution to this problem.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much for that opening statement.
Mr. Baird.
Mr. BAIRD. I thank the Chairman and I want to commend the Chairman for hosting this important hearing. Dr. Marburger, good to see you again. You have always offered thoughtful testimony to this committee.
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I will be fairly brief, and I am not really asking a question; I just want to apprise you of an issue that is important to our software industry. And it pertains to Dick Clark's national strategy to secure cyberspace.
As you know, it has been long-standing federal policy that government-funded technology research should be made available to U.S. industry to promote innovation and commercialization. We have a number of examples of that that have been highly successful. Chairman Boehlert and I have drafted legislation to improve cyber security. One of the results of that should be some software that will help address cyber security gaps. The challenge is, however, that if government-funded R&D for software is released under restrictive licenses, such as the General Public License, we may paradoxically create a disincentive for commercial software industry producers to use that government-funded research. We would, in effect, be imbalancing the scales toward open source software, but unfortunately imbalancing the scales against commercially developed software. And that may be paradoxically precisely the wrong outcome, because otherwise we would leave our commercially available software vulnerable or put them in a Hobson's choice where they use the fix developed by government resource, but in so doing, make their product vulnerable to distribution and piracy essentially. And we don't want to see that happen. So I hope and urge you to look at the national strategy to secure cyberspace. And I would encourage you to strongly consider removing the premise of the General Public License from that, as I believe it disadvantages commercial software products.
And I thank the Chairman.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Baird. Here is the situation: we have an important amendment on the floor dealing with the Iraq Resolution. There is a call of the House, so we will respond to that and then come back rapidly. And we have got about seven or eight minutes left, Dr. Marburger, and I don't want to be too restrictive. This is a very important subject, and so we will have a temporary recess.
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE JERRY F. COSTELLO
Good morning. I want to thank the witnesses for appearing before our committee to discuss conducting research during the War on Terrorism and balancing the needs of openness with security. The Bush Administration's efforts to improve security have placed limitations on research. This has presented itself in two ways: limitations on publications of sensitive but unclassified research results and limitations on foreign nationals' ability to participate in sensitive but unclassified research enterprises.
While we must continue to deny scientific and technical information to terrorists and enhance laboratory security, we must avoid limiting the exchange of scientific information in a manner that inhibits scientific research and medical progress. This could have devastating consequences on public health. As the scientific community, the intelligence community and Congress continue to review policies, we must remember that these policies cannot stifle research and must take a balanced approach. I am interested to know how you believe we should define sensitive but unclassified information and what, if any, limitations you believe are reasonable to place on this type of research.
Furthermore, the question of foreign nationals' ability to participate in sensitive but unclassified research continues to pose a significant obstacle between the scientific and intelligence communities. With an astounding 30 percent of our current students participating in research coming from foreign countries, limiting who can come into our country and/or placing restrictions on the type of research they can participate in is an impractical solution. I do, however, believe universities must adhere to existing rules regarding alien documentation that have been ignored in the past by both government and academia.
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I again welcome our witnesses and look forward to their testimony.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lee follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE SHEILA JACKSON LEE
Mr. Chairman,
I would like to thank you once again, for yet another thought-provoking and timely hearing. Science itself has always been at the boundary of exploration, education, ethics, understanding, and philosophy. I am glad to see that the Science Committee is there as well.
Indeed we have a difficult problem before us today. Since 9/11, we have come to realize that danger lurks in many odd corners. It seems possible that what has been a great strength in the United States—our ingenuity, creativity, research, study, and innovation—may ultimately be our downfall. If we ourselves develop some technology, and proudly publish it for. the world to see, and it comes to be used against us in an act of terrorism, or if yet again, we train people and give them the skills they need to slaughter our own people, this would be shameful and tragic.
But usually when a problem of this magnitude is placed before me, I start by asking experts, ''How do we begin?'' But today, I find myself asking, ''How will this end?''
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Of course we need to protect classified information, and perhaps sensitive-but-unclassified information, to prevent it from getting in the wrong hands. But where will this end? Since the attacks on the Alfred P. Murrah Building in 1995, and the attacks of last September 11, we have realized that the most deadly attacks do not necessarily come out the shaded labs of the Department of Defense, but instead out of feed-stores and flight-simulators. And the attackers come not only from so-called rogue nations, but from America and its so-called allies. So, which research do we silence, and what people do we limit?
Since the powerful blast in Oklahoma City came from a mixture of fertilizer used in a child's chemistry kit type concoction, should we classify agricultural research, and basic chemistry? After 9/11, should we keep all suspicious students out of aeronautics and aviation research, or architecture and engineering programs that might teach them the vulnerable points of a building? We have talked many times in this room about our vulnerability to cyber attacks on our information systems and power grids. Should we restrict access to our computer and software engineering research and training programs that develop encryption and security technology—what about those from the Indian Subcontinent, which is a dangerous spot on our globe today, but continues to provide us with a large proportion of our computing workforce? Do we censor the literature from microbiology and virology, which almost by definition, are devoted to the study of things that cause disease and suffering of people?
And terrorism is about inflicting terror. Should we also censor our psychology research, which might teach terrorist our emotional and social vulnerabilities? Furthermore, although I am pleased that there is a good chance that a consortium of universities in Texas will be given the opportunity to serve as the hub of the Nation's University-based homeland security research, I hope that this does not restrict those institutes from seeking the best and brightest students from around the world, or restrict those students' access to their professors, teaching assistants, and top research labs.
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I am committed to making America safer and more secure. I think we all know where to start with this program—some common sense, some prudent policy, and some open dialogues so that scientists can keep an eye on each other's work. But today I would like to explore where this will take us, where we will draw the line between openness and security, what will gain, and what might we lose?
I look forward to the discussion.
[Recess.]
Chairman BOEHLERT. We will resume now, and this is one of the days on Capitol Hill when we are frequently interrupted, but it is not unimportant business. We are dealing with the resolution on Iraq, so I think everyone can understand the desire on the part of Members to be actively participating as much as possible in debate. I was fortunate yesterday to be one of the early ones given an opportunity to speak out on this very important subject.
With that, let us proceed. Here is how we are going to proceed. Dr. Marburger, who is the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, affectionately known as the science advisor to the President, will be the first witness. Upon the conclusion of his testimony, we will then hear from the other three distinguished witnesses, and then all four will be available to the Committee during the question period. And the Committee will not be arbitrary with the five-minute guideline that we give all witnesses. Obviously, we hope that you can summarize as much as possible, but your full statement has been made available to each of the Committee Members, and I can assure you each of the Committee Members have read every single word. No, I can't assure you that. We tell the truth from the Chair, but this is an important subject, and the witnesses are exceptionally well qualified to address this important subject, so we will be very carefully monitoring any statements or submissions that you make. And as usual, your testimony will probably promote some questions that will not be asked in the time allotted, and they will follow-through with written submissions. And we would ask, as much as practical, that you have a timely response. Thank you so very much.
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With that, let me present to the Committee and to the audience, Dr. John H. Marburger, Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy. Dr. Marburger, welcome back.
Panel I
STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN H. MARBURGER, III, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Dr. MARBURGER. Thank you, and good morning, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Hall and other Members of the Committee. And I do appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you the goal of this administration and Congress to ensure an open scientific environment in the U.S. and to maintain the security of our homeland. And I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your fine opening statement, which I think frames the question of balance very clearly for us.
In the Act that established OSTP, we are specifically charged by Congress with building strong partnerships between federal, state, and local governments, other countries, and importantly with the scientific community. We take this responsibility very seriously, and we are also very serious about the need, post-September 11, 2001, to weigh elements of an open scientific environment against adverse consequences to homeland security. Given our responsibility to advise the President of scientific and technological considerations involved in areas of national concern, OSTP is the primary voice within the White House on how particular actions will impact the science and technology enterprise. We have been involved in several issues that are at the nexus of science and security. And you mentioned in your opening statement that we are going to focus on two. I would like to add a third, because it gives an important example of how we are approaching these things.
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So I will talk first about select agent registration and laboratory biosecurity on which most work has been done. Then I will talk about international students and finally sensitive homeland security information.
So on the Select Agent Rule and laboratory biosecurity, I would like to report progress toward ensuring appropriate safeguards for biological agents and the laboratories that house them. On June 12, 2002, the President signed Public Law 107–188, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002. This law requires updating the current list of select agents and developing a process for registration of possession and use of select agents. It covers select agents of concern to humans, animals, and plants. It is entirely appropriate that the Federal Government be aware of who in this country possesses, uses, or transfers these agents. Further, the law requires, and I think it is prudent, to conduct a background check on those individuals deemed to have a legitimate need for access to select agents.
Provisions necessary to enhance laboratory biosecurity will vary with each institution depending on its location and its principle function, on the nature of the agents in use, the conditions for their maintenance and vulnerabilities or types of threats most likely to be encountered. Institutions will be required, under the new regulations, to prepare a comprehensive security plan based on threat analyses and risk assessments. Now this is a potential burden to institutions and decisions to purchase security measures, ''guns, gates, and guards'' in Governor Ridge's phrase, should be thought through carefully and any security enhancements should be based on a thorough professional risk assessment. I am concerned that universities might already be taking steps that incur great expense without necessarily ensuring a commensurate increase in security. The idea was not to create a financial burden, but to have a reasonable security plan in place.
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I mentioned the select agent rule in laboratory biosecurity because having been signed into law, it does give an example of the nature of restrictions that might be appropriate for conduct of research on sensitive agents.
Let me turn to international students. In the area of international students, in October of 2001, the President directed the Government to take action on the access of international students to education and training in sensitive areas, especially those with direct application to the development and use of weapons of mass destruction. But the presidential directive also cautioned that these measures should be implemented with great care, because, and I quote, ''The United States benefits greatly from international students who study in our country. The United States Government shall continue to foster and support international students.'' The President's directive, this is where science and technology are essential contributors. We are developing ways to improve scrutiny, facilitate access to and sharing of information and hopefully to speed up the process. We will not compromise on security or on the vitality of our educational enterprise.
The Administration has chosen to implement an enhanced mechanism to review the visa applications of advanced students and visiting scholars on a case-by-case basis. This review process will focus on international students who wish to participate in sensitive science and technology areas that are uniquely available in the United States and who may use the knowledge gained to threaten the security of the United States.
Well, because of the wide array of course work and information freely available through academic institutions and other open sources, it is impossible to create a simple list, a checklist as it were, of sensitive courses or even of fields of concentration, or majors, that would meaningfully map on to the sensitive science and technology areas.
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But it is clear that some reasonably sophisticated mechanism for review must be put into place. It is logical to assume that graduate and post-doctoral researchers would be more likely to be reviewed than undergraduate students whose educational content tends to be more widely available. Therefore, the Administration will create an Interagency Panel on Advanced Science and Security, call it ''IPASS,'' to perform the enhanced review process. The Government has labored over many months to reach this end state, and I am very pleased with this as the outcome. The inclusion of science agencies and the interagency process of reviewing sensitive and uniquely available training and knowledge in the United States is new. And I believe this is an essential component toward a balanced approach that fairly weighs the requirements of homeland security against our desire to open up this country to international students.
The Office of Homeland Security and my office, OSTP, will routinely monitor the work of IPASS to ensure that the Federal Government has struck the right balance between scientific openness and homeland security.
Mr. Chairman, there are more details in my written testimony, and I trust that people can refer to that for them. But I will answer questions on this and others.
And finally, let me talk about sensitive homeland security. Regarding the protection of sensitive information, the Office of Homeland Security has asked OMB, the Office of Management of Budget, to develop guidance for federal agencies to ensure consistency of treatment of sensitive homeland security information across the Federal Government and by the recipients of such information. Recipients might include first responders, state and local law enforcement personnel, public health officials, and those responsible for developing and maintaining critical infrastructure.
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I am aware that there is an impression that the Administration is considering a policy of pre-publication review of sensitive federally-funded research. This is incorrect. This is not the thrust of the considerations. And it is important to note that this process is in the formative stage. OMB, OSTP, the Office of Homeland Security, and the National Security Council have been engaged in listening sessions with various groups of stakeholders. These meetings have been very helpful to us in understanding to how shape a guidance document for public comment, which is still months away.
We will also engage in an interagency process and the publication of the guidance in the Federal Register for comment. We believe that access to fundamental research data is critical to continued scientific advancement and validation of such results. Indeed, it is valid to argue that homeland and national security rely heavily on our ability to stay ahead of the ''bad guys'' by the open conduct of vital research and free exchange of information. We must explore the underpinnings of disease, processes, and the biology of human, animal, and plant pathogens in order to strengthen our defense against such agents. We must develop better sensors for radiological, chemical, and biological weapons and maximizing prudent opportunities for free and open research would get us there faster with better results, in our opinion.
So in closing, I would like to repeat a statement that I have made many times over the past year and which remains true today. This Administration is determined not to let terrorism deflect America from its trajectory of world leadership in science. Our research enterprise has produced the means for great strides in science and in accompanying technologies for improved health care, economic competitiveness, and quality of life. To impede this progress would be to fulfill the ambitions of terrorists to disrupt the American way of life. Having said this, we must also take measures to safeguard our research enterprise and particularly, given that terrorists have already shown the willingness to use our technology against us on our own soil. The question is one of balance, and it is one that my office will continue to work to achieve as we move forward. And I thank you very much for holding this hearing on this important subject.
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[The prepared statement of Dr. Marburger follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF STATEMENT OF JOHN H. MARBURGER, III
Good morning Chairman Boehlert, Ranking Member Hall and other Members of the Committee. I greatly appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you the goal of the Administration and Congress to ensure an open scientific environment in the U.S. and to maintain the security of our homeland.
In the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976, OSTP is specifically charged with building strong partnerships among Federal, State and local governments, other countries, and with the scientific community. We take this responsibility very seriously. We also are very serious about the need, post-September 11, 2001, to weigh elements of an open scientific environment against adverse consequences to homeland security. Given our responsibility to ''advise the President of scientific and technological considerations involved in areas of national concern,'' OSTP is the primary voice within the White House on how particular actions will impact the S&T enterprise. We have been involved in several issues that are at the nexus of science and security. Today I'd like to discuss three of these issues:
1) Select Agent Registration and Laboratory Biosecurity;
2) International Students; and
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3) Sensitive Homeland Security Information
Select Agent Rule and Laboratory Biosecurity
On June 12, 2002, the President signed Public Law 107–188, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002. The Act specifies that the Secretary of HHS shall establish and maintain a list of biological agents and toxins that have the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety (''select agents'') and requires that all facilities and individuals in possession of the select agents register with the Department. The Act created an analogous program at USDA, which is being directed through the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS).
HHS has maintained a list of select agents since April 1997 (see 42 CFR part 72, Appendix A), under the management of CDC. This rule covered the transfer of select agents, including the registration of facilities engaging in transfers and exemptions from such registration.
P.L. 107–188 extends oversight beyond transferring to facilities possessing and using select agents and specifically aims to maintain ''appropriate availability of biological agents and toxins for research, education, and other legitimate purposes.'' Under this Act, new regulations are necessary in order to enforce proper use, containment, and transfer of select agents. However, the Administration is sensitive to the need to avoid erecting barriers to legitimate scientific research. While this represents a new form of research oversight, other accepted measures are already in place to regulate the use of radioisotopes and human research subjects.
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CDC convened an interagency working group, including USDA, to review the current list of biological agents and toxins from October 1997, and revise the list as necessary. The working group has (1) proposed a revised list of bacteria, viruses, fungi and toxins, (2) identified minimum quantities of toxins requiring registration, and (3) defined genetic elements requiring regulation.
On August 6, CDC published a Federal Register notice requiring notification by September 10 of all facilities in possession of select agents. A form was sent to over 200,000 institutions for this purpose, requesting a response, even if the facilities did not possess such agents. CDC has processed over 100,000 responses so far, only a small proportion of which declare possession of select agents. Responses are still coming in.
On the same date, CDC and USDA published a list of ''overlap agents'' or those that appear on both agencies' lists because they infect both animals and humans (67FR51060). Responses to USDA's request for notification are due October 10.
The law also requires ''establishment of safeguard and security measures to prevent access for such agents and toxins for use in domestic or international terrorism or for any other criminal purpose.'' Therefore, the CDC-led working group has also been working on lab biosecurity measures, to maintain secure environments in laboratories possessing select agents. A revision to Appendix F of the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories Manual is underway, to address security issues in light of heightened awareness of potential bioterrorism.
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A key element of these provisions will be a requirement that individuals deemed to have a legitimate need for access to select agents will undergo a background check administered by the Department of Justice, in accordance with P.L. 107–188. This will consist of a check against databases including criminal, immigration, national security and other electronic databases available to the Federal Government.
Provisions necessary to enhance laboratory biosecurity will vary with each institution depending on its location and principal function, the nature of the agents in use, the conditions for their maintenance (for example, plant or animal pathogens often require facilities different from human pathogens), and vulnerabilities or types of threats most likely to be encountered.
Institutions will be required under the new regulations to prepare a comprehensive security plan based on threat analyses and risk assessments. The decision to purchase ''guns, gates and guards'' should be thought through carefully and any security enhancements should be based on a thorough, professional risk assessment. I am concerned that universities are already taking steps that incur great expense without ensuring a commensurate increase in security.
CDC also published a notice (Federal Register, August 23, 2002) including the revised list of select agents and associated genetic elements, recombinant nucleic acid and recombinant organisms that will require registration. Similarly, on August 12, USDA published for comment its initial list of biological agents and toxins (67FR52383). The interim final rule will be published in December and will contain the regulations on select agents, the registration process for individuals and facilities (including background check procedures), and exemptions for clinical and diagnostic laboratories and approved investigational products. The interim final rule goes into effect in February.
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International Students
There is evidence that some terrorists have exploited the student visa program. One of the 19 hijackers entered the U.S. on a student visa but never showed up at school. Two other hijackers entered the country on tourist visas but applied for student visas after they arrived.
We must also consider the possibility that we are training future terrorists in sensitive and uniquely available knowledge. Of course the vast majority of international students are here for legitimate purposes, and we fully appreciate the important contribution they make to the Nation's S&T enterprise.
The Administration and the Congress want to know who is in the country and if they are doing what they claimed they were going to do. Student visa overstays are not tolerated, but until now it has been very difficult to enforce student no-shows or students who don't leave when their study is completed.
A new tracking mechanism has been put in place named SEVIS: Student and Exchange Visitor Information System. This automated, web-based computer system replaces the existing paper-based system of reporting. Instead of sending reports and updates to the INS by mail, school officials have immediate access to a database where they can update their files real time. The SEVIS system notifies a school that a student is expected; if the student fails to turn up after 30 days, the system alerts officials to take appropriate action. The SEVIS system records address changes, changes in program status, and date of graduation. A student must then leave the country or switch to a different visa category, such as an H–1B visa, if they are hired by a U.S. research lab or firm.
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Currently student and research scholar visa applicants with studies related to the 16 sensitive technologies that constitute the current U.S. Technology Alert List are forwarded to the State Department Consular Affairs Office in Washington, D.C., from foreign consulate offices for additional vetting. Most visa denials are due to the Consular Officer's judgment that the applicant is unlikely to return to his/her home country. Other visa denials are due to existing intelligence community information that may warrant exclusion on the grounds of national security concerns. Currently a name check is conducted by the State Department's Consular Lookout Automated Support System (CLASS), which includes name check information from overseas and domestic State Department offices, INS, Customs, FBI and CIA.
To prevent potential terrorists or those tied to terrorist organizations from receiving sensitive, uniquely available, training and knowledge, the President directed, through Homeland Security Presidential Directive-2, (HSPD–2) in October 2001, that, ''It is the policy of the United States to work aggressively to prevent aliens who engage in or support terrorist activity from entering the United States and to detain, prosecute, or deport any such aliens who are within the United States.'' HSPD–2 goes on to direct that, ''The Government shall implement measures to end the abuse of student visas and prohibit certain international students from receiving education and training in sensitive areas, including areas of study with direct application to the development and use of weapons of mass destruction.''
But the Directive also cautioned that these measures should be implemented with great care because, ''The United States benefits greatly from international students who study in our country. The United States Government shall continue to foster and support international students.''
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To fulfill the requirements of Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD–2), OHS and OSTP established an interagency working group that included members from the Departments of State, Justice (headed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)), Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Education, Energy, the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, and representatives from the intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement agencies. This working group labored over several months to find the right balance between scientific openness and national security in implementing the requirements of HSPD–2. The Administration adopted the Working Group's recommendations, and agencies are now developing the processes and regulations needed to implement the Administration's policy.
The Administration has chosen to implement an enhanced mechanism to review the visa applications of advanced students and visiting scholars on a case-by-case basis. This review process will focus on international students who wish to participate in sensitive science and technology areas that are uniquely available in the United States and who may use the knowledge gained to threaten the security of the United States.
The Administration concluded that given the wide array of coursework and information freely available through academic institutions and other open sources, it becomes impossible to create a list of sensitive courses or even majors that would meaningfully enhance homeland security against terrorist threats from international students. Because of the focus on uniquely available, sensitive, scientific training or knowledge, it is logical to assume that graduate and postdoctoral researchers would be more likely to be reviewed than undergraduate students whose educational content tends to be more widely available.
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The Administration will create an Interagency Panel on Advanced Science and Security (IPASS) to perform the enhanced review process. The IPASS co-chairs would be appointed by the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, and the members would be drawn from the State Department, the INS, federal science and technology agencies, and the intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement agencies.
The State Department will refer select student and visiting scholar visa applicants for advanced science programs to the IPASS for review as part of the normal process of screening student visa applications. The INS will also refer select F, M or J visa holders (and applicants for change of status to F, M or J visas) for review when they seek involvement in uniquely available, sensitive training or knowledge areas.
IPASS will evaluate a number of variables, including the individual's background and previous education and training, their country of origin or affiliation, their scientific area of study, training, or research and the nature of the work currently conducted at the U.S. educational institution, and will provide the referring agency with an advisory opinion regarding the proposed visa applicant. Both the State Department and INS will retain their statutory authority to make the final determination in each case, although some changes to the visa process may be likely when the Department Homeland Security is created.
In addition, the IPASS will assess what uniquely available sensitive scientific knowledge is emerging, where it is available, and which terrorist groups or organizations might be trying to gain access to it. IPASS will work closely with U.S. educational institutions and scientific societies in this effort.
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The Attorney General and the Secretary of State, along with OHS and OSTP, will routinely monitor the work of the IPASS to ensure that the Federal Government has struck the right balance between scientific openness and homeland security. We are aware that there are great scientific institutions around the world, which provide an attractive alternative to studying or conducting research in the United States. We don't wish to turn away scientists unnecessarily.
Sensitive Homeland Security Information
On the subject of sensitive information, OHS has asked OMB to develop guidance for federal agencies to ensure consistency of treatment of ''sensitive homeland security information'' across the Federal Government and by the recipients of such information. Recipients might include first responders, State and local law enforcement personnel, public health officials and those responsible for developing and maintaining infrastructure.
The guidance is intended to promote consistent handling of sensitive homeland security information across federal agencies. Consistent handling includes safeguarding for the proper duration, sharing via the appropriate means, and disclosing at the appropriate time. Many agencies have individual designations, such as law enforcement sensitive, but different methods for handling such information.
The designation Sensitive Homeland Security Information (SHSI) does not refer to some new category of information; rather it is the type of information that the government holds today which is not routinely released to the general public, such as law enforcement data and critical computer security threats or vulnerabilities. The vast majority of government information is and will remain publicly accessible.
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Open access to fundamental research data is critical to continued scientific advancement and validation of such results. Indeed, it is valid to argue that homeland and national security rely heavily on our ability to conduct research exploring the underpinnings of disease processes or the biology of human, animal and plant pathogens in order to strengthen our defense against such agents, or to develop better sensors for radiological, chemical and biological weapons.
Sensitive Homeland Security Information is not classified information and does not require the practices and infrastructure necessary for handling classified information. The designation would be implemented under existing law and policy, and complements and does not supersede existing mechanisms for classification and declassification of government information.
It is important to note that this process is in the formative stage. The Administration has been engaged in ''listening sessions'' with various groups of stakeholders, including scientific societies, university organizations, private industry, public interest groups, State and local government representatives, and other interested parties, to listen to advice on best defining SHSI across different sectors, as well as questions and concerns about the potential impact of policy options. These meetings have been very helpful in to us in understanding how to shape a guidance document for public comment. We will also engage in an interagency process and the publication of the guidance in the Federal Register for comment. Therefore, I am happy to take back any concerns you express today to the group working this issue but I may not be able to answer all of your questions.
In the future, we will consult with these groups to determine if there is a need for clarification in the final guidance. Once OMB has issued guidance to the agencies, it becomes their responsibility to prepare rules, directives or otherwise ensure consistent handling of Sensitive Homeland Security Information.
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Conclusion
In closing, I'd like to repeat a statement that I've made many times over the past year and which remains true today. This administration is determined not to let terrorism deflect America from its trajectory of world leadership in science. Our research enterprise has produced the means for great strides in science, and in accompanying technologies for improved health care, economic competitiveness, and quality of life. To impede this progress would be to fulfill the ambitions of terrorists to disrupt the American way of life. Having said this, we must also take measures to safeguard our research enterprise, particularly given that terrorists have already shown a willingness to use our technology against us on our own soil. The question is one of balance, and it is one that my office will continue to work to achieve as we move forward. I thank you for holding this hearing on this important subject.
BIOGRAPHY FOR JOHN H. MARBURGER, III
John H. Marburger, lII, Science Adviser to the President and Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, was born on Staten Island, N.Y., grew up in Maryland near Washington, D.C., and attended Princeton University (B.A., Physics 1962) and Stanford University (Ph.D., Applied Physics 1967). Before his appointment in the Executive Office of the President, he served as Director of Brookhaven National Laboratory from 1998, and as the third President of the State University of New York at Stony Brook (1980–1994). He came to Long Island in 1980 from the University of Southern California where he had been a Professor of Physics and Electrical Engineering, serving as Physics Department Chairman and Dean of the College of Letters, Arts and Sciences in the 1970's. In the fall of 1994 he returned to the faculty at Stony Brook, teaching and doing research in optical science as a University Professor. Three years later he became President of Brookhaven Science Associates, a partnership between the University and Battelle Memorial Institute that competed for and won the contract to operate Brookhaven National Laboratory.
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While at the University of Southern California, Marburger contributed to the rapidly growing field of nonlinear optics, a subject created by the invention of the laser in 1960. He developed theory for various laser phenomena and was a co-founder of the University of Southern California's Center for Laser Studies. His teaching activities included ''Frontiers of Electronics,'' a series of educational programs on CBS television.
Marburger's presidency at Stony Brook coincided with the opening and growth of University Hospital and the development of the biological sciences as a major strength of the University. During the 1980's federally sponsored scientific research at Stony Brook grew to exceed that of any other public university in the northeastern United States.
During his presidency, Marburger served on numerous boards and committees, including Chairmanship of the Governor's Commission on the Shoreham Nuclear Power Facility, and Chairmanship of the 80 campus ''Universities Research Association'' which operates Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory near Chicago. He served as a trustee of Princeton University and many other organizations. He also chaired the highly successful 1991/92 Long Island United Way campaign.
While on leave from Stony Brook, Marburger carried out the mandates of the Department of Energy to improve management practice at Brookhaven National Laboratory. His company, Brookhaven Science Associates, continued to produce excellent science at the lab while achieving ISO14001 certification of the Lab's environmental management system, and winning back the confidence and support of the community.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Dr. Marburger, and thank you so much for being available to the Chair and to other Members of the Committee for consultation. I really do appreciate that.
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Now we will go to the other three distinguished members of this panel as they complete their testimony. Then all four, including Dr. Marburger, will be available for questions. Our roster today of witnesses reads like a ''Who's Who.'' Dr. Ron Atlas, President, American Society for Microbiology, Dean of the Graduate School, and Professor of Biology at the University of Louisville; Dr. M.R.C. Greenwood, Chancellor, University of California at Santa Cruz; and Dr. Sheila Widnall, Institute Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. If I were to give just the highlights of their CVs, we would be here for the balance of the day. I won't do that, but I want to thank you for serving as resources to this committee. We very much appreciate the time and effort that you are expending to be resources.
With that, we will go in order of introduction. Dr. Atlas, you are first.
Panel II
STATEMENT OF DR. RONALD M. ATLAS, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR MICROBIOLOGY, DEAN OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL AND PROFESSOR OF BIOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE
Dr. ATLAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee on Science for holding this hearing today and for allowing me to testify on behalf of the American Society for Microbiology.
The ASM is the world's largest life sciences organization with over 42,000 members. We publish 11 of the premier journals in the life sciences. We also publish books and hold numerous meetings of scientists, some of which range in numbers from 12,000 to 14,000. Members of the ASM unite in a common appreciation of science and a commitment to scientific integrity. We have a code of conduct, which mandates that our members work only for the proper and beneficent application of science. Our code also calls for members to bring to the attention of the pubic and appropriate authorities any misuses of microbiology or information derived from microbiology. Our members are obligated to discourage any use of microbiology contrary to the welfare of humankind. Many of our members are actively engaged in efforts to defend against bioterrorism, and thus we have a critical stake in the subject of today's hearing.
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Since September 11, 2001 and the ensuing Anthrax attacks of a year ago, we have encountered heightened fear and increasing demands that we act to enhance the Nation's protection against future terrorist attacks. There is concern that terrorists can misuse the materials and information available within the scientific community. The ASM has responded by supporting the Bio-preparedness Act of 2002 that would increase the Nation's readiness to respond to a bioterrorist attack and also the provisions in the USA Patriot Act that restricts certain individuals from possessing dangerous pathogens and toxins.
Our position on imposing new limitations on publications, however, is more guarded. The ASM agrees that we must deny access to the scientific and technical information that might aid terrorists. But at the same time, we must avoid unduly restraining the exchange of scientific information, lest we inhibit scientific research and medical progress and thereby adversely impact public health.
In the past year, there has been a growing sense that scientists and their journals should restrict the release of ''sensitive'' scientific findings. Proposals have included managing information so that only qualified persons might read our journals, restricting access to information on a need-to-know basis, pre-agency publication review so that we only publish materials that have been determined safe by some authority.
The ASM, in fact, seeks to achieve a proper balance between national security and vital scientific research in publication. We, therefore, are urging a very careful and prudent balancing of public concern about safety and security with the need to conduct legitimate research and diagnostic testing. Policies should not stifle research nor the publication of scientific data needed to develop countermeasures. We must not impede our biomedical research effort, as this leads to sound public health processes and the well being of our citizens.
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The ASM does recognize that sound policy requires broad input. As such, the ASM has requested that the National Academy of Sciences convene a meeting of scientific publishers to examine how to strike a balance that will enable the free flow of scientific information without providing information that would be useful to bioterrorists. The Academy has agreed to hold such a meeting, and we are hoping that this results in a dialogue among scientists and the national security community, which will lead to harmonized procedures for publishing in the life sciences. As we consider our actions, we must recognize that science is an international enterprise. The United States does not have a monopoly on research and publication in the field of infectious diseases. There are numerous international journals. Constraining the education of foreign students within the United States will not reduce the risks of bioterrorism. Only harmonized international efforts within the scientific community have any real hope, in our opinion, of reducing that serious threat of a bioterrorist attack.
Because the ASM is committed to responsible and ethical publication, we have taken the lead in adopting procedures that do provide a degree of scrutiny within the peer review process of manuscripts submitted to our journals. We are paying particular attention to those manuscripts that deal with the select agents, as these are designated as particularly dangerous agents. The review seeks to determine if an article submitted to one of our journals contains details and methods or materials that might be misused or would propose a threat to health and safety. ASM is committed to not publishing papers that violate our code of ethics or that violate other widely accepted guidelines for research, such as the NIH Recombinant DNA guidelines.
As we have implemented this review process, however, I must tell you that we are really struggling to define what is sensitive information, what is dangerous. There is absolutely no common definition of what is dangerous, what is sensitive, within the life sciences. We are paying special attention to the select agents, but it is clear that that alone is inadequate to cover the publications that may be of concern. At the present time, each of our editors has been given the task of subjectively evaluating manuscripts and determining whether they contain elements that may be sensitive.
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Even as the ASM struggles to prevent the inadvertent release of information that might aid our enemies, we continue to require that research articles contain sufficient detail to permit the work to be repeated by others. This is a controversial position. We are saying that authors must continue to agree to make materials and their methods available while adhering to all laws and regulations governing shipment, transfer, possession, and use of biological materials. It is our feeling that the omission of materials or methods could lead to abuses as well as perpetuation of errors. If scientists can not assess and replicate the work of our colleagues, the very foundation of science is eroded. In our view, that would put public health, biomedical research, and our nation's citizens at risk. Our view is that the best defense against Anthrax or any of the other infectious diseases is information: information in a form that can be used by scientists and public representatives to guide rational and effective actions. Placing major barriers in the path of the flow of information ultimately will contribute to the potential threat of bioterrorism by interfering with our biodefense efforts.
Our position is consistent with National Security Decision Directive 189, which has been upheld by the Bush Administration. That directive states that to the maximum extent possible, the products of fundamental research should remain unrestricted and that no restrictions may be placed on the conduct to reporting a federally-funded fundamental research that has not received security classification. National Security Decision Directive 189 establishes two critical policies: fundamental research should remain unrestricted, and there is only one official mechanism for the control of information, that of classification. When the nature of the research warrants, a government agency can impose at the outset restrictions that will result in classification of that research.
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In conclusion, as the scientific community discusses the appropriate measures for security and undertaking the publication of research, it will need to have discussions with the national security community. Clearly, this community has legitimate objectives, and it may weigh the costs and benefits of proposed policies differently than does the scientific community. Both communities share a common goal: that of discouraging the misuse of science and the threat of bioterrorism. Our particular problem in the life sciences is that public health depends upon the advancement of our biomedical research. When we do not find vaccines and therapeutics, people become ill and people die of naturally occurring infectious diseases. Ultimately, it is the open and collaborative research that is key to U.S. technological advances to the protection of our citizenry against diseases and to our deterrence of bioterrorism. It is my strong belief that the scientific community will act responsibly, that we will develop self-policing measures, and that we can work together with the national security community to ensure the protection of the public while our scientific research continues.
I thank you very much and welcome questions later from the Committee.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Atlas follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF RONALD M. ATLAS
The American Society for Microbiology (ASM) is pleased to testify before the House Committee on Science hearing on ''Conducting Research During the War on Terrorism: Balancing Openness and Security.'' The ASM is the largest life science society in the world with over 42,000 members. The ASM publishes eleven scientific journals focusing on distinct specialties within the microbiological sciences, including Infection and Immunity, Journal of Bacteriology, and Journal of Virology. The ASM also annually publishes numerous scientific books and sponsors many scientific meetings, conferences, and workshops to stimulate research and the dissemination of experimental data.
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The Society's large and diverse membership of scientists unites in a common appreciation of science and a commitment to scientific integrity. The ASM recently affirmed the long-standing position of the Society that microbiologists will work for the proper and beneficent application of science and will call to the attention of the public or the appropriate authorities misuses of microbiology or of information derived from microbiology. ASM members are obligated to discourage any use of microbiology contrary to the welfare of humankind, including the use of microbes as biological weapons. Bioterrorism violates the fundamental principles expressed in the Code of Ethics of the Society and is abhorrent to the ASM and its members.
Prudent Balancing of Security Concerns with the Need to Conduct Research and Diagnostic Testing
Since September 11, 2001 and the ensuing anthrax attacks, there has been heightened fear and demands that we enhance our protection against such future attacks. Many worry that terrorists can subvert the normal scientific enterprise and hence there has been increasing public discussion about restricting access to materials and information that could be used by bioterrorists. Science holds enormous promise for improving health and protecting the public. Yet, it also represents opportunity for deliberate harm.
The microbiological community faces the challenge of protecting the public against the threat of infectious diseases and bioterrorism, while simultaneously facing heightened scrutiny over the misuse of science by terrorists. Expanded biodefense research on the most dangerous agents and toxins—select agents—has intensified questions about the secure conduct of scientific inquiry in areas related to biodefense and about the publication of research results in the life sciences.
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The scientific community must confront issues of improving security in research and in the publication of research results. This must be done without compromising vital public health interests that are posed by unwarranted or unwise limitations of scientific inquiries or of the publication of research results. Crucial research related to prevention of bioterrorism or the cure of infectious diseases, for example, may require the utilization of pathogenic material and the consequent placement of signs warning of a biosafety risk to protect persons working in the area. At the same time, however, placement of warning signs may alert would be terrorists to the presence of materials that may have the potential for use in bioterrorist attacks.
The ASM recognizes the legitimacy of concerns about the publication and dissemination of scientific information and supports reasonable, balanced, and sensible restrictions on access to select agents that pose a high risk to public health and safety. The ASM agrees that we must deny scientific and technical information to terrorists and enhance laboratory security. At the same time, we must avoid restraining the exchange of scientific information in a manner that inhibits scientific research and medical progress thereby adversely affecting public health. If policy measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring pathogens, equipment, and technical information are not crafted with great care, they may have a significantly adverse effect upon critically important research activities.
The ASM urges a careful and prudent balancing of public concern about safety and security with the need to conduct legitimate research and diagnostic testing. Policies should not stifle research needed to develop countermeasures or it will become too difficult to pursue this research. Thus far, Congress has responded to the scientific community's concerns and has enacted legislation that, on the whole, represents a balanced approach. Until we see the regulations for select agents, we remain concerned that those regulations will be balanced and appropriate and will be implemented in a timely and workable manner consistent with the need to move forward with important research on select agents.
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Scientific Publications Security Issues and Policies
In the past year, there has been a growing sense that scientists and their journals should restrict the release of ''sensitive'' scientific findings, exercise voluntary efforts to withhold experimental data, and heighten awareness of the potential destructive application of certain experiments. Some have suggested creating a new ''regime'' to prevent destructive applications of research that has potential for developing bioweapons. Ideas have included selective dissemination of ''restricted'' information only to ''qualified'' persons on a ''need to know basis,'' or allowing sponsoring agencies to deny publication of work that could result in threatening applications. It has been discussed that those seeking access to genomic sequence data for dangerous pathogens might be required to provide evidence of their accreditation with a legitimate laboratory and that scientific articles should be edited to eliminate experimental details. Indeed, there are reports of researchers halting or abandoning research efforts for fear that results may fall into the wrong hands or may be misapplied.
The ASM is seriously concerned about proposals that may adversely impact research and publication. The ASM seeks to achieve a proper balance between necessary security and vital scientific research and publications. It urges a careful and reasoned public debate of such issues. For this reason, the ASM formally requested that the National Academy of Sciences convene a meeting of scientific publishers and encourages an examination and discussion to strike a balance that will enable the free flow of scientific information without providing information that would be useful to bioterrorists. Achieving consensus within the scientific community and among scientific publishers of biological journals worldwide on appropriate practices is critical at this time. The Academy has agreed to hold such a meeting early in 2003. The meeting will focus on developing common policies regarding review and publication of manuscripts dealing with research that could present public safety issues, and identifying ''sensitive'' information and policies to screen information in a manner that will not interfere with or jeopardize research.
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In 1975, scientists met at Asilomar and voluntarily adopted guidelines for the conduct of research on the then new technology of recombinant DNA. Some have recommended that an ''Asilomar'' meeting be held to discuss and examine issues surrounding the withholding or classification of ''dangerous'' scientific information. We feel that a self-imposed code of responsible conduct and oversight is preferable to a mandated regime. However, the issue of preventing malicious application of research and the publication of research results is different from preventing accidental release of microorganisms which was the concern at Asilomar. The ASM believes that participants in the meeting sponsored by the Academy will understand these differences and will be well prepared to discuss procedures that will balance the need for aggressive, ongoing scientific research and protection against misuse of research results for the purposes of terrorism or biowarfare.
Because the ASM is committed to the responsible and ethical publication of science, it has adopted specific policies and procedures for its Journals to provide a degree of careful scrutiny in the peer review process of submitted manuscripts dealing with select agents. This review seeks to determine if an article contains details of methods or materials that might be misused or might pose a threat to public health and safety. ASM reviewers inform editors if a manuscript contains details that in their view may be subject to misuse. If a reviewer brings a manuscript to the attention of an editor, the editor considers whether in his or her view a risk of adverse use may exist. If in the opinion of the editor a risk exists or the editor is unsure, that editor brings the matter to the attention of the editor in chief of the journal and the chair of the Publications Board, and they confer about the issues raised. If warranted, the chair brings the manuscript to the Publications Board for further review and disposition. The ASM's Publications Board, in turn, has made it clear that the ASM will not publish papers that violate the ASM Code of Ethics or that violate other widely accepted guidelines for research such as the NIH Recombinant DNA guidelines for research involving recombinant DNA. Thus, the ASM is very sensitive to research reports that might impinge on national security or be used for illegitimate purposes.
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At the same time, ASM does not support unwarranted restrictions on the free flow of legitimate scientific communications within microbiology that could lead to valuable advances in biomedical science. The best defense against anthrax or any other infectious disease is information; information in a form that can be used by scientists and public representatives to guide rational and effective actions to ensure public safety. Placing major barriers in the path of the flow of information ultimately may contribute to terrorism by interfering with our ability to prepare and respond to the threat of the misuse of science by bioterrorists. The free exchange of scientific information has contributed to the saving of human life, to increased quality of life, and to greater promise for yielding future benefits to health and the environment. Public health and safety depend on the advancement of biomedical science which could be harmed by undue restrictions on publication of research.
Thus, while ASM has modified its own procedures for publication of its journals and increased its internal awareness of the need for careful review, ASM continues to require that research articles contain sufficient detail to permit the work to be repeated by others. Authors also must continue to agree to make materials available to the scientific community while, of course, adhering to all laws and regulations governing the shipment, transfer, possession, and use of biological materials. Omission of materials and methods from scientific literature would compromise the scientific process and could lead to abuses as well as the perpetuation of errors. Independent reproducibility is the heart of the scientific process. Even within the context of heightened scrutiny, research articles must be published intact. If scientists cannot assess and replicate the work of their colleagues, the very foundation of science is eroded. Open research is essential to discovery and building on past scientific discoveries. Indeed the risk to public health and safety may be greater from restricting research than from allowing the publication of research that could be read by a wrongdoer. Restricting research findings may in fact have no effect on deterring terrorists.
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Integrity of Scientific Process and Appropriate Communication of Research Is Critical
The ASM is attempting to protect against misuse of science without undermining the integrity of the scientific process or appropriate communication of research results that is critical to sound science. Review for ''sensitive'' information is difficult and complicated. There is no common definition of what is dangerous or sensitive information and no individual is empowered to decide what is potentially dangerous knowledge. There is also the issue of dual application of scientific knowledge for beneficial and malicious purposes. Research to make new drugs sometimes might be used to develop bioweapons. Genomic data is valuable for identifying targets for therapeutic drugs and vaccines, but such information can be viewed as potentially valuable for identifying means to increase the virulence of microbial agents and to counter currently available therapies, vaccines and detection protocols.
This duality is real, and the potential for both good and evil is encoded within genomes. There has been concern that the complete genome sequence of many pathogens including the smallpox virus is publicly available, providing weapons designers with information that may enable them to increase pathogenicity. The same information, however, can be used to help develop new medical treatments or genetic fingerprinting to trace sources of bioweapons. Genome sequences are far more valuable to legitimate researchers and to the health and safety of the public than to bioterrorists. Transparency in science is also important to differentiate whether offensive or defensive research is being conducted in other countries. In addition, law enforcement and the judicial process depend on methods that must be published in the peer reviewed literature if they are to be used for prosecution of criminal cases.
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The heightened concern about publishing ''dangerous'' research results and the conviction by some that particular lines of research should be banned, emanates in part from an earlier response to experiments conducted in Australia in which the interleukin –4 gene from a mouse was inserted into mousepox virus, enhancing its virulence. When the modified virus expresses the IL 4 gene, it effectively overcomes genetic resistance to mousepox virus and suppresses immune responses to the host to a greater extent than anyone had predicted. Virus encoded IL 4 not only suppresses primary antiviral cell mediated immune responses but also can inhibit immune memory responses. Such experiments may indicate that poxviruses can be engineered by widely available techniques and equipped with readily accessible genes to render immunization ineffective. The implications for the smallpox virus were it to be genetically engineered in the same way are horrific. With hindsight, some critics have asked whether this research should ever have been permitted. They also suggest that we should have known in advance how dangerous these results might be. Others were surprised by the result and argue that this study alerts us to the need for more research on immune responses to such viruses and the need to develop antiviral drugs. In short, this incident provides one example of the difficult issues in confronting the benefits and potential dangers resulting from research related to pathogenic organisms.
Responsible oversight and reasoned discussion is important at this critical juncture. National security may be best served by allowing the free flow of all scientific and technical information that is not directly connected to technology deemed critical to national security. Mechanisms exist to control findings that have clear implications for bioweapons. National Security Decision Directive 189, formulated in l985, and recently upheld by the Bush Administration as the current Administration's policy, states that to the maximum extent possible the products of fundamental research should remain unrestricted and that no restrictions may be placed on the conduct or reporting of federally funded fundamental research that has not received security classification. This Directive establishes two important policies: fundamental research should remain unrestricted and there is one official mechanism for the control of information, classification.
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Finally, as the scientific community discusses the appropriate measures for security in undertaking and publishing research, it will also be important to have discussions with the national security community. Clearly, this community has legitimate objectives, and it may weigh the costs and benefits of proposed policies differently from the scientific community. Both communities must share a common goal of discouraging the development of biological weapons while taking into account the traditional and necessary openness of scientific research. Ultimately, open and collaborative research is key to US technological advances and to the protection of the citizenry against infectious diseases and bioterrorism.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify.
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Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you, Dr. Atlas. Your last expressed hope is one we all share. And you have the advantage of being first up on the panel, because you have hit on some of the central issues. How do you define balance? Definitions. What is sensitive? What is dangerous? We are in this together, and we appreciate your help.
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For the purpose of an introduction, The Chair is pleased to recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Honda.
Mr. HONDA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate you having this hearing on this great topic, this timely topic.
It is really my pleasure to introduce a friend from California, Dr. M.R.C. Greenwood. Well, we call her Marci there, and she is the Chancellor of the University of California–Santa Cruz. Chancellor Greenwood oversees a research university with an uncommon commitment to undergraduate education. And in addition to her position as Chancellor, Dr. Greenwood also holds a U.C.–Santa Cruz appointment as Professor of Biology. Chancellor Greenwood is a member of the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences, and is a past president of, and fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
To the point, though, in April of 2000, Dr. Greenwood delivered the AAAS William D. Carey lecture here in DC. And our talk, ''Risky Business—Research Universities in a Post-September 11 Era,'' addressed the critical role research universities, in particular, must play in informing and forming science policy at this unique moment in our nation's history, which is especially relevant in today's hearing, Mr. Chairman. And I thank you for this opportunity to introduce her. And I look forward to her sharing her thoughts on this topic.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Honda. Welcome back, Dr. Greenwood.
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STATEMENT OF DR. M.R.C. GREENWOOD, CHANCELLOR, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA–SANTA CRUZ
Dr. GREENWOOD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Congressman Honda, for that lovely introduction. And I am very pleased to be back here talking with the Science Committee on this very important topic.
I am here today both on my own behalf and on behalf of the University of California, which, as you all know, is one of the largest research universities in the country with over 160,000 students and 8,000 faculty members and assorted other staff and many others.
I am very pleased to have a chance to talk about this issue of openness and security. I just had the pleasure of spending a few days in Pittsburgh along with Dr. Marburger, who, as you have heard, is one of the most articulate scientists in the country on these topics. And those of us in the science and technology community are very grateful for his wisdom.
At the Council on Competitiveness meeting, which was on productivity and security, we had the pleasure of hearing from the Director of the White House Office of Homeland Security, Governor Tom Ridge, who said in his speech that American society is free, open, and welcome, and that innovation is our greatest asset. He also emphasized that our nation's homeland and economic security are inextricably linked and that we can't remain competitive if we can't remain innovative. I think, in many ways, that is the challenge in front of us.
Some of the questions that this committee and others in our Government are grappling with include whether and how to define sensitive areas of research and whether and how to restrict who should be allowed to engage in those research areas. So I would like to try to give you my perspective on that this morning.
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A year ago in September, the U.S. science and technology community knew that our research universities would have to play a key role in ensuring the future safety of our country, as we have done over the past half century. We also knew that we would have to reexamine the ways we operate, including considering proposals for changing the way we are accustomed to working. Maintaining the balance between openness and security could, in fact, be considered a science itself. We must take care not to tip the scales unnecessarily and then risk the enormous benefits of a free and open environment in science and research. And perhaps it is best to remember that we faced these issues before. As Dr. Atlas just quoted to you, in 1985, there was a presidential directive. President Ronald Reagan issued the National Security Decision Directive, which said, in part, ''To the maximum extent possible, the products of fundamental research remain unrestricted,'' and ''the mechanism for control of information generated during federally-funded fundamental research and science, technology, and engineering at colleges, universities, and laboratories is classification.''
As recently as 11 months ago, Condoleezza Rice, the assistant to the President for national security, cited this directive and stated, and I'll quote briefly, the rest is in my testimony, ''The key to maintaining U.S. technological preeminence is to encourage open and collaborative basic research. The link between the free exchange of ideas and scientific innovation, prosperity, and the U.S. national security is undeniable. The policy on the transfer of science, technology and engineering information set forth in this directive shall remain in effect.''
Now our universities and our research communities have and can continue to work under this construct. The general practice of the University of California, as with most of our research universities, is not to accept contracts for classified research because the restrictions on publications are contrary, as you have heard, to the freedom to publish. And at our campus in at the University of California, any classified research is conducted off-campus. I should add here that I am speaking about the University of California's research policy as it applies to our ten academic campuses. The Committee knows full well that as part of our public service mission, the University of California manages three national laboratories under contract to the Department of Energy where strict policies and practices related to national security have always existed.
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So in my view, we should consider new areas of classification only where there are real agreed upon threats. The traditions and structures of the research in the U.S. today depend on replication and refutation as Dr. Atlas has so clearly already articulated. It also, however, is important not only to prevent the leak of information to terrorists, but also to mitigate fraudulent results, sloppy science, and political biases guiding important policy decisions. And we have seen the outcome of self-policing in very positive ways in the recent past.
Now of course, there are circumstances that might warrant restrictions, but the onus for blocking publication should be on the Government through a process that is clearly defined, free of arbitrary edicts and understood by the research community, as Dr. Marburger has already pointed out. We must be vigilant to ensure the stability of our long-term Government and university partnership. We have been very good at maintaining this partnership, but we need to ensure that it continues.
But Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that it would serve the best interest of the university—of the knowledge enterprise—for agencies to create a gray area of research called ''sensitive but unclassified'' and treat that category of research differently than unclassified research. I think it is a very difficult-to-work system. Throughout much of our national security history, but especially since World War II, the national security priorities have had a strong influence on our national science policy.
In the Cold War, we focused on the control of fissile materials and the control of technology for delivering these materials. And although the details are complex, the issue was rather straightforward. Now we are dealing with a much more complicated set of issues, as Dr. Atlas has just elucidated for you, related to biological organisms and agents. The same thing that is a life-saving drug in one person's hand could potentially be a threatening—could be used by terrorists in an inappropriate way.
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In June, the National Academy of Sciences released a report of which I was a member called ''Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism.'' I will leave the details of that for you to read in my testimony, but it does make one important point, and I would like to emphasize that. A dialogue should take place between the Federal Government and the research universities on how to balance the protection of information. And it should take place before major policy changes affecting our universities are enacted.
Now let me answer one other question that you asked, which is: What has changed? First, we are no longer the only Nation that can provide access to specialized information. As the recent National Science Foundation science and engineering indicators note, several decades ago, the United States produced more than twice the number of PhDs of any other nation or group of nations. Today, the European countries out produce us and the Asian universities are approximately even. Thus, in some ways, expressed concerns about preventing international students from studying sensitive areas is a modern version of closing the barn door after the horse has already left. We would be much better advised to strengthen our overall science and technology enterprise than to try to restrict access. We are at least as likely to have to mount a response to a program, a terrorist program, that was derived from another nation's science and technology base than from our own. The only way to prepare for that is to have the very best talent, no matter what its origin, here in our country. And a short review of the national defense history will quickly show that many of the most important national security programs today had their origins in the fundamental research programs done by immigrant scientists.
Second, as so frequently noted, the current terrorists do not represent a nation state and thus the strategies of containment are not those of the Cold War. We may be able to restrict access to facilities and agents, but we will be unable to completely protect against individuals who are prepared to conduct suicide missions. Thus, while science and technology can help with hardening strategies and in new sophisticated detectors and areas of concern with cybersecurity, for example, we can not expect we will have equal success in the sporadic terrorist events that have plagued our allies for decades.
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And finally, Governor Ridge cautioned us again in Pittsburgh in his address with a quote, presumably, to—from Osama bin Laden saying to his followers, ''Concentrate on the destruction of the American economy.'' We must be sure to inadvertently not aid in this effort.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Science Committee, let me be clear. America's universities want to continue to be part of advancing our national security and prosperity, and we will do our part.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to come before you today.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Greenwood follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF M.R.C. GREENWOOD
Chairman Boehlert, Congressman Hall, Committee Members—Good morning and thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the important and timely issue of balancing openness and security in research. I am pleased to testify on behalf the University of California.
As Chancellor of the University of California–Santa Cruz, a research biologist, a former Associate Director for Science in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, a past President of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and a member of the National Academies' Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism, I have by necessity reflected on these matters, as do my colleagues throughout the research community.
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I am honored to be on this distinguished panel and to have had the opportunity to hear from Dr. Marburger this morning. Dr. Marburger, as you have heard, is an articulate and thoughtful member of the Bush Administration, and those of us in the science and technology community are grateful for his wisdom.
I just spent the past two days in Pittsburgh with Dr. Marburger, other government officials, and principles from the university and industry communities at the Council on Competitiveness meeting. The topic of this meeting was balancing national productivity and homeland security. In his address to the Council, Director of the White House Office of Homeland Security Governor Tom Ridge said that American society is free, open and welcome and that innovation is our greatest asset. Governor Ridge emphasized that our nation's homeland and economic security are intricately linked. America cannot remain competitive if we cannot remain innovative. The case for balance between the openness that fosters innovation and our concerns for security is the subject of today's hearing.
This past spring, I delivered the Carey Lecture here in Washington before the American Association for the Advancement of Science on a similar topic. My speech was entitled, ''Risky Business—Research Universities in the Post September 11 Era.'' The essence of my message remains the same as I address you today. I come before you as a member of the research community to further strengthen the partnership between the Federal Government and the research community and to build upon our many achievements.
Leading a public research university since September 11th has been an illuminating and transforming experience on many levels. My conviction remains strong that universities must continue to play a critical role in understanding and preventing terrorism in the next generation. In order to do so, we must be mindful to balance requirements for increased security with the freedoms of American academia that have benefited everyone in this room.
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Research universities play a unique role in working on the solutions to problems posed by the new threats to our homeland. Our scientists and professors educate and train students who will become the next generation of informed and engaged citizens, scholars in all disciplines, professionals and leaders in all fields, and of course, the scientists and engineers who will help us face the tremendous challenges that lie ahead.
We should take care not to break what works well and not to attempt to fix what isn't broken. Some of the questions this committee and others in our government, including Dr. Marburger, are grappling with include whether and how to define ''sensitive'' areas of research and whether and how to restrict who should be allowed to engage in those research areas. I hope to help answer some of the questions this morning.
A year ago September, the U.S. science and technology community knew that research universities would have a key role to play in ensuring the future safety of our country, as we have over the past half century. We also knew that we would have to re-examine the ways we operate, including considering proposals for changing the way we are accustomed to working.
As we consider and implement changes in how research is conducted, we should be mindful of the delicate balance that must exist between openness and security. Maintaining that balance could be considered a science itself. We must take care not to tip the scales unnecessarily and thus risk the enormous benefits of a free and open environment in science and research.
Perhaps it is helpful to remember that we have faced these issues before:
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In 1985, President Ronald Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 189, National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific, Technical and Engineering Information. The policy states:
It is the policy of this Administration that, to the maximum extent possible, the products of fundamental research remain unrestricted. It is also the policy of this Administration that, where the national security requires control, the mechanism for control of information generated during federally-funded fundamental research in science, technology and engineering at colleges, universities and laboratories is classification.
As recently as eleven months ago, Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, cited the Reagan directive in a letter:
The key to maintaining U.S. technological preeminence is to encourage open and collaborative basic research. The linkage between the free exchange of ideas and scientific innovation, prosperity, and U.S. national security is undeniable. This linkage is especially true as our armed forces depend less and less on internal research and development for the innovations they need to maintain the military superiority of the United States. In the context of broad-based review of our technology transfer controls that will begin this year, this Administration will review and update as appropriate the export control policies that affect basic research in the United States. In the interim, the policy on the transfer of scientific, technical, and engineering information set forth in NSDD–189 shall remain in effect, and we will ensure that this policy is followed.
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If a research project is designated ''classified,'' the determination about who can engage in the work and which findings will be published openly has historically been made by the Federal Government. Our universities and research communities have and can continue to work under that construct.
From the university standpoint, if a federal agency designates research as ''classified'' research, then we know we must treat that research project differently. General practice of the University of California, as with most universities, is not to accept contracts for classified research because restrictions on publication are contrary to the freedom to publish. At UC, any classified research is conducted off-campus.
I should add here that I am speaking about UC's research policy as it applies to our ten academic campuses. As the Committee knows, as part of our public service mission, the University of California also manages three national laboratories under contract to the Department of Energy. At two of these labs, Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos, the preponderance of the research is classified and the scientists in those labs work under a different set of protocols, expectations and requirements than scientists on the academic campuses. My testimony here today addresses the issues of openness and security in the campus research setting only and is not intended to reflect on the national laboratories where strict policies and practices related to national security have always existed.
Scientific openness has enabled the vast majority of advances in civilian applications and innovations in the last 50 or more years. Our scientific and technological strength is also one of our best national defenses. It is precisely because our fundamental science base is so broad that we have been and are able to respond in a sophisticated fashion to national catastrophic threats whether they are caused by terrorism or by uncontrollable natural disasters.
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I am not here today to suggest that the Nation's universities should simply be left alone but rather to try to inject a note of caution about overreacting. Trying to put into place new restrictions to prevent research in areas where an imaginary scenario might suggest a danger is probably not productive. We should consider new areas of classification only where there are real agreed-upon threats.
Earlier this year, the news media reported that in its initial attempts to assess the threat of terrorists developing harmful chemical, biological or other agents of mass destruction, the Office of Homeland Security expressed an interest in requesting, or requiring limitations in scientific publishing, especially the publication of data sets and methodologies that might lead to replication of certain results. The risks and benefits of such actions must be clearly understood.
The traditions and structure of research in the U.S. today depends on replication and refutation, which means that sufficient data and methods to allow that must be published in peer-reviewed journals. Such publication also mitigates fraudulent results, sloppy science, and political biases guiding important policy decisions. Recent, well-publicized incidents of scientific misconduct underscore the merits of this system.
Open communication of results also influences our national policies in environmental and health issues. We cannot imagine environmental or health policies that are not based on the open access and review of research data.
Of course there are circumstances that may warrant restrictions, but the onus for blocking publication should be on the government through a process that is clearly defined, free of arbitrary edicts, and understood by the research community.
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Balancing the perceived risks of open access with the risks to the health and vitality of the research community is exactly the kind of issue that calls for a new partnership between the research community and the government. To date this partnership has been sustained but in our intensity to protect our nation, we must be vigilant to ensure its stability.
Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that it would serve the best interests of the knowledge enterprise for agencies to create a grey area of research called ''sensitive but unclassified'' and treat that category of research differently than unclassified research.
The best way to sort out these issues is to work directly with experts in the various scientific fields and scientific societies. The experts are well-equipped to help determine if something is sensitive or dangerous and may need to be withheld from the public domain for any amount of time by classifying the work.
Through much of our national security history, but especially since World War II, national security priorities have had a strong influence on national science policy. The events of September 11th represent the beginning of another era of great change.
History can inform us about how to engage with our government in meaningful ways in helping to set national science policy that maintains and strengthens the science and technology research enterprise.
In the Cold War era, we focused on the control of fissile material and the control of technology for delivering those materials. Although complex in its details, the problem was rather straightforward. Now, we are dealing with a much more complicated set of issues because we are concerned about materials such as biological organisms and agents, materials which may be more commonplace and which exist in nature, materials for which there may be everyday use, materials that in one person's hands, might compose a life-saving drug, but in another person's hands, might constitute a weapon of terror.
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As President Bush reminded us earlier this week in his national address, biological and radiological threats are a grave reality in our world. We recognize that potent biological agents can fall into the wrong hands and those of us in the research community must share in the responsibility of preventing that from happening. Clearly this responsibility is recognized as you have heard from Dr. Atlas.
Our nation's scientists have traditionally stepped up to the plate when needed to work toward national goals, and clearly this happened again after last September 11th. More than 125 of our nation's distinguished science and technology experts volunteered to work together through a committee of the National Academies to develop a research agenda for countering terrorism. No one who was asked to serve, including me, declined the invitation.
In June of this year, our committee issued a report entitled, ''Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism.'' The report advises:
America's historical strength in science and engineering is perhaps its most critical asset in countering terrorism without degrading our quality of life. It is essential that we balance the short-term investments in technology intended to solve the problems that are defined today with a longer-term program in fundamental science designed to lay foundations for countering future threats that we cannot currently define. These long-term programs must take full advantage of the Nation's immense capacity for performing creative basic research, at universities, government laboratories, industrial research facilities, and non-governmental organizations. A dialogue should take place between the Federal Government and the research universities on how to balance the protection of information vital to national security with the requirement for the free and open environment in which research is most efficiently and creatively accomplished. This dialogue should take place before major policy changes affecting universities are enacted.
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I hope I have satisfactorily explained my position and our universities' policies on this topic.
Now let me turn to the issue of what has changed since the Cold War.
First, we are no longer the only nation that can provide access to specialized information. As the recent NSF science and engineering indicators note, several decades ago, the U.S. produced more than twice the number of Ph.D.s than any other nation. Today, the European countries outproduce us and the Asian universities are approximately even. Thus, in some ways, expressed concerns about preventing international students from studying ''sensitive'' areas is a modern version of closing the barn door after the horse has left. We would be much better advised to strengthen our overall science and technology enterprise than to try to restrict access. We are at least as likely to have to mount a response to a program that was derived from another nation's science and technology base as from our own. The only way to be prepared for that is to have the very best talent, no matter its origin, here in our country. A short review of our national defense history will quickly show that many of the most important national security programs had their origins in the fundamental research programs done by immigrant scientists.
Second, as so frequently noted, the current terrorists do not represent a nation state and thus strategies of containment are not those of the Cold War. We may be able to restrict access to facilities and agents but we will be unable to completely protect against individuals who are prepared to conduct suicide missions. Thus, while science and technology can help with hardening strategies and in new, sophisticated detectors and in areas of concern with cyber security for example, we cannot expect that we will have equal success in the more sporadic terrorist events that have plagued our allies for decades.
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And finally, Governor Ridge, in his Pittsburgh address earlier this week, quoted our enemy Osama bin Laden as saying to his followers ''concentrate on the destruction of the American economy.'' We must be sure not to inadvertently aid our enemy in this effort.
I am convinced that our universities have much to offer to the protection of our homeland and the war on terrorism. Mr. Chairman, it is clear that you and the Committee recognize the contributions of science and technology to the war on terrorism. The university and research communities appreciate your commitment and the commitment of this committee to work together with us to address the new challenges we all face.
Facing up to our new dangers and opportunities will require the best of America, and the best of what research universities can offer. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Science Committee, let me be clear—America's universities want to continue to be a part of advancing our national security and prosperity.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to come before you today to present this testimony and I look forward to any questions you may have.
BIOGRAPHY OF M.R.C. GREENWOOD
Dr. M.R.C. Greenwood is Chancellor of the University of California, Santa Cruz, a position she has held since July 1, 1996. As chief executive, Chancellor Greenwood oversees a research university with an uncommon commitment to undergraduate education, a research university with combined undergraduate and graduate enrollments of more than 11,000 matriculated students and an annual total budget of approximately $300 million. In addition to her position as Chancellor, Dr. Greenwood also holds a UC–Santa Cruz appointment as Professor of Biology.
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Prior to her UC–Santa Cruz appointments, Chancellor Greenwood served as Dean of Graduate Studies, Vice Provost for Academic Outreach, and Professor of Biology and Internal Medicine at the University of California–Davis. Previously, Dr. Greenwood taught at Vassar College where she was the John Guy Vassar Professor of Natural Sciences, Chair of the Department of Biology, and Director of the Undergraduate Research Summer Institute.
From November, 1993 to May, 1995, Dr. Greenwood held an appointment as Associate Director for Science at the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) in the Executive Office of the President of the United States. In that position, she supervised the Science Division, providing direction on a broad array of scientific areas in support of the President's objectives, such as budget development for the multi-billion dollar fundamental science national effort, and development of science policy documents, including Science in the National Interest. In addition, she was responsible for interagency coordination, and co-chaired two National Science and Technology Council committees.
Chancellor Greenwood is a member of the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences, a Past President and fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), and of the California Academy of Sciences. She has been honored by numerous organizations for her contributions to science and science policy. She was a Presidential appointee, U.S. Senate confirmed, member of the National Science Board.
Dr. Greenwood was Chairman of the Office of Science and Engineering Policy Advisory Board of the National Research Council. She also served as a member of the Board of Directors of the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges (NASULGC), and serves on the Advisory Board of the National. Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). She is an ex officio member of the Board of Directors of The Tech Museum of Innovation in California, and on the Board of Directors of the California Healthcare Institute. In March, 2000 Dr. Greenwood was appointed to Governor Davis' Council on Bioscience.
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Dr. Greenwood graduated summa cum laude from Vassar College and received her Ph.D. from The Rockefeller University. Her research interests are in developmental cell biology, genetics, physiology, nutrition and science and higher education policy issues. Her work over the past 25 years, focusing on the genetic causes of obesity, is recognized world-wide. She is the author of numerous scientific publications and presentations.
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Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Dr. Greenwood. Dr. Widnall.
STATEMENT OF DR. SHEILA E. WIDNALL, INSTITUTE PROFESSOR, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Dr. WIDNALL. I am happy to have the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss an issue that will have a profound effect on basic research and education in universities and on the very productivity of American science and technology itself. As you recognize, the stakes are very high. I request that my written statement be entered into the record. I also request that the MIT report, ''In the Public Interest,'' and the annual report of the president of MIT, Dr. Charles Vest, which deals specifically with the issue of international students, also be entered into the record.(see footnote 1)
Dr. WIDNALL. I am Sheila Widnall, Institute Professor and Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics at MIT. I am also Vice President of the National Academy of Engineering. I served as Secretary of the Air Force from 1993 to 1997, so I enter the discussion of basic research and national security from a variety of vantage points. I appear before you today as Chairman of the MIT Committee on Access to and Disclosure of Scientific Information established to determine if our current policies provided adequate guidance to consider MIT's role in classified research in the context of the 21st Century. We also examine the emerging regimes of other restrictions, such as the designation ''sensitive'' on research disclosure.
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Our report, ''In the Public Interest,'' was published in June and has received considerable notice within the scientific community as well as wide coverage in the media.
We did not consider the full range of issues faced by this committee nor by various government agencies. I will, however, as requested, respond to your questions from the viewpoint of my committee as well as my own experiences.
One of the gratifying outcomes of 9/11 was the articulation of American values: the recognition that our heroes were the men and women who risked their lives to protect us, the value of our open and democratic society, the work of the individual. In addressing our charge, the faculty committee focused on balancing the values that govern the operation of a great university: the obligation to perform public service for this Nation balanced with the need to protect the openness and access that supports our educational and research mission.
MIT has a long and distinguished record of public service. Our report documents that record beginning with its role in developing radar during World War II. That effort established the institutional framework for the participation of the physical science and engineering communities in research related to national security and the relationship between the open basic research on our campus and the classified regime that occurs in special laboratories. It also brought into being a scientific ''(advisory)'' committee structure, many holding security clearances, to advise government agencies on the quality of defense research and the identification of applications of new critical research results. Most faculty in the physical sciences and engineering have a detailed understanding of the relationship between their research and their teaching and its application through our industrial base to national security.
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MIT today manages Lincoln Laboratory in support of the national security mission of the Department of Defense. Many MIT faculty participate in classified research and advisory activities at Lincoln and to other government agencies. These are important forms of public service performed by MIT. Our commitment was quite clear on our willingness to do classified research in the service of the Nation on all topics within MIT's expertise.
In balance with this public service mission is our fundamental responsibility to educate the next generation and to pursue the highest quality research for the betterment of mankind. The committee was unanimous in its belief that this, the highest form of public service, requires a free and open campus for both education and research.
I will summarize a few of our findings and recommendations. We recommended that no classified research should be carried out on our campus, that no student, graduate or undergraduate, be required to have a security clearance to perform thesis research, and that no thesis research should be carried out in areas requiring access to classified materials nor itself be classified. That because there is no consistent understanding or definition of what would constitute ''sensitive'' information, that MIT should continue its policy of not agreeing to any sponsor's contractual request that research results generated during the course of a program be reviewed for the inadvertent disclosure of ''sensitive'' information. This situation opens the institute and its faculties, students, and staff, to potential arbitrary dictates from individual government contract monitors, how ever well intentioned. To date, MIT has refused in all cases to accept the restriction ''sensitive'' in any of its government contracts.
While we understand that occasionally research findings are classified after the fact because of the importance of the discovery, we believe that this should be a rare event. If this practice becomes common in the field of research, we would recommend that such research not be pursued on our campus. The committee was unanimous in its view that now is the time for MIT to articulate its values and establish a clear statement of policy that will ensure open access and free disclosure of on-campus research results and guarantee the openness of our educational environment.
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Let me share with you some of my personal reflections on the issues before you. As mentioned above, the physical science and engineering community has had a 50-year experience in dealing with the relationship between basic research and its national security applications. In contrast, the biological and health science community has little history to guide them through the current debate. As an outsider to this community, I see several emerging needs: that we should identify what portion of the biological sciences needs to be classified; that there needs to be an institutional—an agency framework to manage this process; and that there should be a mechanism to involve members of the scientific community in an advisory committee structure to guide these decisions.
These decisions should not be taken lightly, for it is likely that in the areas so identified and so restricted, there will be no university research carried out on our campuses involving graduate students and postdocs. This will significantly hamper scientific progress in these areas by restricting the free-flowing criticism, replication of research results, and vigorous challenge that is an essential feature of the scientific enterprise. But that is the nature of the balance that must be achieved, a decision not to be taken lightly.
I now focus on your two questions regarding the designation ''sensitive'' applied to areas of research and the necessity for an open environment for the progress of science.
I believe that the current approach that focuses on sensitive research as a halfway house of restriction is doomed to failure. It frames and asks questions that can not be answered. It is neither comprehensive nor precise. And in its attempt to deal with research after the fact will be an ineffective distraction. I believe that the analysis of the current issue leads to the same conclusion that appeared in the Corson Report issued by the National Academies in 1982: that the right approach to security is to identify precisely the specific areas requiring classification and to build very high walls. This debate within government and university leaders during the Reagan Administration led to NSDD–189, which has been referred to before. The distinct boundary created by this decision was fundamentally clear and effective for many years, and this remains our policy today.
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What is different today is the nature of the scientific disciplines involved, their relation to their industrial base, the time scales and the level of expertise required to apply the discoveries, and the lack of a 50-year working relationship on security issues between relevant government agencies and the biological and health sciences.
Yes, it really is true that science requires an open environment to thrive. Our scientific and engineering productivity flows from our open system of basic research combined with education. While there are excellent examples of classified and proprietary applied research that have grown from this base, their excellence is only guaranteed and sustained by the constant renewal that arises from the criticism and peer evaluation of research scientists and engineers who constitute this open and accessible research base.
The issues that you are addressing are crucial for the future of American science and engineering, and the benefits for our national security, our economic development, and the health of our people that have flowed from this productive enterprise. I wish you success in your deliberations. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Widnall follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SHEILA E. WIDNALL
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee,
I am happy to have the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss an issue that will have a profound effect on basic research and education in universities and may control the very productivity of American science and technology itself, as well as its contributions to our national security, our economic development and the health of our people; as you recognize, the stakes are very high.
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I have submitted a written statement and request that it be entered into the record. I also request that the MIT report entitled ''In The Public Interest,'' which I shall reference in my remarks, and the Annual Report of the President of MIT, Dr. Charles Vest entitled ''RESPONSE AND RESPONSIBILITY: Balancing Security and Openness in Research and Education'' be entered into the record.
I am Sheila Widnall, Institute Professor and Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics at MIT. I am also Vice President of the National Academy of Engineering, a member of the Executive Committee of the National Research Council, and a member of the National Academies' Committee on Science, Engineering and Public Policy. I served as Secretary of the Air Force from 1993 to 1997. So I enter the discussion of basic research and national security from a variety of vantage points.
I appear before you today as Chairman of the MIT Committee on Access to and Disclosure of Scientific Information. This committee was established jointly by the MIT Provost and the Chairman of the Faculty and asked to determine if our current policies provide adequate guidance to consider MIT's role in classified research in the context of the 21st Century: policies governing the conduct of classified research on our campus; policies governing participation of faculty and students in classified programs at Lincoln Laboratory and other cleared facilities; policies governing the access to classified material on our campus; and restrictions on access to research results that flow from industrially-sponsored research. We also examined the emerging regimes of other restrictions—such as the designation sensitive—on research disclosure and research materials that fall short of full classification but none-the-less restrict access to and dissemination of research results.
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Our report, entitled ''In the Public Interest,'' was published in June and has received considerable notice within the scientific and science-policy communities as well as wide coverage in the media.
There are many issues that our committee did not consider. Our charge was centered on MIT's research policies and on possible changes to these. We did not deal with issues affecting individual faculty, as they consider how best to fulfill their public service responsibilities, or how they choose to communicate their scientific findings through education or publications, or how they manage their laboratories and research groups.
We did not consider the full range of issues faced by this committee and various government agencies; I will however, as requested in the invitation to appear before you, respond to your questions from the viewpoint of my committee as well as my own experiences.
One of the gratifying outcomes of 9–11 was the articulation of American values: the recognition that our heroes were the men and women who risk their lives to protect us; the value of our open, democratic society; the worth of the individual. In addressing our charge, our faculty committee focused on balancing the values that govern the operation of a great university: the obligation to perform public service for this Nation balanced with the need to protect the openness and access that supports our educational and research mission.
MIT has a long and distinguished record of public service. Our report documents that record, beginning with its role in developing radar during WWII. That effort established the institutional framework for the participation of the physical science and engineering communities in research related to national security and the relation between open basic research on our campuses and the classified regime that occurs in special laboratories. It also brought into being a scientific advisory committee structure, many holding security clearances, to advise government agencies on the quality of defense research and the identification and the application of new critical research results. Most faculty in the physical sciences and engineering have a detailed understanding of the relationship between their research and teaching and its application through our industrial base to national security. In my case, I understand the relationship between my graduate aerodynamics course and what it takes to build an F22, and I know why we might want to do that.
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MIT today manages Lincoln Laboratory in support of the national security mission of the Department of Defense. Many MIT faculty participate in classified research and advisory activities at Lincoln. In addition, many members of the MIT faculty hold security clearances to support their participation in advisory committees to the Federal Government. We believe that these are important forms of public service performed by MIT. Our committee was quite clear on our willingness to do classified research in the service of the Nation on all topics within MIT's expertise.
In balance with this public service mission is our fundamental responsibility to educate the next generation and to pursue the highest quality research for the betterment of mankind. The committee was unanimous in its belief that this—the highest form of public service—requires a free and open campus for both education and research.
In our report we stated, ''We believe that MIT, to fulfill its mission, must have an open intellectual environment. Education and scholarship are best served through the unconstrained sharing of information and by creating the opportunities for free and open communication. Such an environment enables students to be exposed to the most current knowledge and allows scholars to build upon and to evaluate each other's work. National security, the health of our nation, and the strength of our economy depend heavily on the advancement of science and technology and on the education of future generations. The well being of our nation will ultimately be damaged if education, science, and technology suffer as a result of any practices that indiscriminately discourage or limit the open exchange of ideas. Peer evaluation of research methods and findings, an outcome of open sharing and debate within the scientific community, is a crucial mechanism to insure the continued quality and progress of science.''
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''Openness enables MIT to attract, educate, and benefit from the best students, faculty and staff from around the world. This is especially important, as competence in science and technology has grown throughout the world so that access to research and knowledge outside the United States is critical to our own progress. Over the course of many years, immigrant scientists as well as foreign visitors and students have contributed enormously to the American educational and scientific enterprises. They have enriched our knowledge and culture, promoted the growth of our economy, have become essential contributors in American companies and research laboratories, and have improved the quality of our lives. Many will return to their home countries to become leaders with an understanding of our nation and our values. We believe that no foreign national granted a visa by the U.S. Government should be denied access to courses, research or publications generally available on campus.''
Our recommendations flow directly from balancing our public service responsibilities with our belief in the absolute necessity of maintaining an open intellectual environment on our campus.
I will summarize a few of our findings and recommendations that are relevant to your concerns. We recommended:
That no classified research should be carried out on campus, that no student, graduate or undergraduate, should be required to have a security clearance to perform thesis research, and that no thesis research should be carried out in areas requiring access to classified materials.
That because there is no consistent understanding or definition of what would constitute ''sensitive'' information, MIT should continue its policy of not agreeing to any sponsor's contractual request that research results generated during the course of a program be reviewed for the inadvertent disclosure of ''sensitive'' information. Increasingly, MIT has seen the attempt by government contracting officials to include a requirement that research results be reviewed, prior to publication, for the potential disclosure of ''sensitive'' information. Such a request implies potential restrictions on the manner in which research results are handled and disseminated, and may also restrict the personnel who have access to this material. The difficulty with this approach is that the term ''sensitive'' has not been defined, and the obligations of the Institute and the individuals involved have not been clarified nor bounded. This situation opens the Institute and its faculty, students, and staff to potential arbitrary dictates from individual government contract monitors—however well intended. To date, MIT has refused, in all cases, to accept this restriction in any of its government contracts.
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That while we understand that occasionally research findings are classified after the fact because of the importance of the discovery, we believe that this should be a rare event. In the current climate, we may see a desire on the part of contract monitors to more closely oversee the ongoing research with a goal of imposing classification on emerging research results. To be acceptable, we believe that any such actions would also be extremely rare and would require great sensitivity and care to avoid damaging the process of discovery. If this practice becomes common in a field of research, we would recommend that such research not be pursued on our campus.
That the requirements under the Patriot Act involving personnel, students, faculty, and staff are not consistent with MIT's principles. It is likely that in the current climate, the number of biological agents on the list will grow and the restrictions placed on personnel, physical access, and publication of research findings may grow as well. At some point, MIT may rightfully decide that on-campus research in areas governed by these regulations is no longer in its interest or in line with its principles. We should consider applying a sunset clause to the acceptance of new contracts for research carried out under such restrictions.
That laws governing export of scientific information and artifacts pose difficult issues for university research in governed areas. MIT should insure that the designation of fundamental research and public domain, which enjoys an exemption from the need to seek export licenses prior to disseminating information or items, extends to as much of its ongoing research activity as possible, consistent with the national interest. Any formal or contractual restrictions on the open sharing of research results should be accepted only after careful analysis of their effects upon MIT and its research program.
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That research programs designed to respond to national needs may occasionally involve a classified component such as a classified follow-on program to apply the results of fundamental research to the development of systems and/or hardware, or the need to use specialized equipment in cleared facilities to measure material or component characteristics. There are several organizations that can provide access to classified facilities to enable MIT faculty to carry out the classified portions of their research.
That we affirm MIT's current policy, which does not permit, classified theses. Moreover, we believe that no student should require a security clearance nor require or have access to classified material to perform thesis research. All thesis defenses should be open to the MIT community.
That the management and oversight of Lincoln Laboratory are major components of the public service that MIT carries out for the Nation. In its oversight role, MIT should continue its active management of Lincoln Laboratory to insure that: 1) the research meets MIT standards for independence and quality, and 2) in so far as possible, Lincoln provides an environment that enables faculty to do research with national security implications.
That there may be times when rapid near-term access to specialized MIT on-campus facilities and expertise will be required by the Nation. Examples of this would be the need for forensic analysis of biological materials, materials preparation, and the use of other facilities and expertise for significant national purpose other than research. Providing this type of assistance may require special procedures for restricted access. We believe that MIT should make such expertise available for a short-time response with a time-definite sunset clause.
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That MIT faculty play important public service roles in areas requiring access to classified materials. To support these activities we recommend that MIT hold security clearances for faculty who require them, and provide off-campus facilities to allow access to classified materials needed to engage in research or public service.
That MIT should not provide facilities for storage and access of classified materials on the MIT campus. An off-campus site should be provided for faculty to use such material, as required, utilizing the facilities of Lincoln or Draper Laboratories.
The committee was unanimous in its view that now is the time for MIT to articulate its values and establish a clear statement of policy that will ensure open access and free disclosure of on-campus research results and guarantee the openness of our educational environment. We also believe that this statement will be valuable to other universities and others who are dealing with these difficult issues.
Let me share with you some of my personal reflection on the issues before you and respond to the questions you asked. As mentioned above, the physical science and engineering community has 50-years experience dealing with the relationship between basic research and its national security applications. There is a well-developed institutional framework within government agencies for considering and carrying out the management of these issues. Members of the scientific community are active participants in providing scientific advice to these government agencies as they carrying out this mission and in evaluating the quality of the scientific work carried out in this environment.
In contrast, the biological and health science community has little history to guide them through the current debates. As an outsider to this community, I see several emerging needs: that we should identify what portion of the biological sciences needs to be classified; that there needs to be an institutional/agency framework to manage this process; and that there should be a mechanism to involve members of the scientific community in an advisory committee structure to guide these decisions and evaluate the progress of research in these areas. These decisions should not be taken lightly for it is likely that in the areas so identified and so restricted, there will be no research carried out on university campuses involving graduate students and postdocs. I believe that this will significantly hamper scientific progress in these areas by restricting the free-flowing criticism, replication of research results and vigorous challenge that is an essential feature of the scientific enterprise. But that is the nature of the balance that must be achieved—a decision not to be taken lightly.
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Drawing from my remarks, I now focus on your two questions regarding the designation sensitive applied to areas of research and the necessity for an open environment for the progress of science.
I believe that the current approach—that focuses on sensitive research as a halfway house of restriction—is doomed to failure. It frames and asks questions that cannot be answered by the people or the institutional structure that asks. It is neither comprehensive nor precise and in its attempt to deal with research after the fact will be an ineffective distraction to everyone in the system. I believe that analysis of the current issue leads to the same conclusion that appeared in the Corson Report issued by the National Academies in 1982: that the right approach to security is to identify precisely the specific areas require classification and to build very high walls. This debate within government and university leaders during the Reagan Administration led to NSDD–189, which states that scientific information is either classified or unclassified and generally exempted fundamental research from security regulations. This distinct boundary was fundamentally clear and effective for many years and this remains our policy today. As I have outlined above, the process of reaching decisions on classification requires a proper government agency framework and the active participation of the scientific community. What is different is the nature of the scientific disciplines involved, their relation to their industrial base, the time scales and the level of expertise required to apply the discoveries, and the lack of a 50-year working relationship on security issues between relevant government agencies and the biological and health sciences.
Yes, it really is true that science requires an open environment to thrive. Our scientific and engineering productivity flows from our open system of basic research combined with education. While there are excellent examples of classified and proprietary applied research that have grown from this base, their excellence is only guaranteed and sustained by the constant renewal that arises from the criticism and peer evaluation of research scientists and engineers who constitute this open and accessible research base. Cut off from such criticism and challenge, science deteriorates: subject to political rather than scientific judgments, producing fads, junk science and wishful thinking. Our strong belief is that students must be educated in this open environment to insure the highest quality of their educational experience.
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The issues you are addressing are crucial for the future of American science and engineering and the achievement of the benefits for our national security, our economic development and the health of our people that have flowed from this productive enterprise. I wish you success in your deliberations.
BIOGRAPHY FOR SHEILA E. WIDNALL
Sheila Widnall stepped down from her position as Secretary of the Air Force on October 31, 1997 to return to her faculty position at MIT. As Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. Widnall was responsible for all the affairs of the Department of the Air Force including recruiting, organizing, training, administration, logistical support, maintenance, and welfare of personnel. She was also responsible for the formulation of policies and programs by the Department of the Air Force; the effective cooperation and coordination between the Department of the Air Force and the other military departments and agencies of the Department of Defense; the effective and timely implementation of policy, program, and budget decisions; the effective supervision and control of the intelligence activities of the Air Force; and the presentation and justification of the positions of the Air Force on the plans, programs, and policies of the Department of Defense to include recommendations to Congress. She co-chaired the Department of Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment and Discrimination.
As Associate Provost at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dr. Widnall had responsibility for academic integrity including conflict of interest policy, federal relations, faculty retirement, tenure and promotion policies, and international programs. At MIT she has served as Chairman of the Faculty, Chairman of the Committee on Admissions and Financial Aid and Chair of several ad hoc faculty committees.
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Dr. Widnall is a member and the current Vice President of the National Academy of Engineering (NAE) and past president of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA). She served as a member of the NAE Council from 1992–93; of COSEPUP for 1992–93; as a member and later chair of the Draper Prize Committee, from 1988 to 1993; Membership Committee, 1992–93; member and later chair of the Aerospace Peer Committee 1989–92; Committee on Scientific Responsibility and the Conduct of Science, 1990–92; Committee on Data Needs for Monitoring Labor Market Conditions for Engineers 1987; Committee on Technology Issues that Impact International Competitiveness 1987; Nominating Committee 1986–87; U.S. National Committee on Theoretical and Applied Mechanics 1984–88; Committee on Education and Utilization of Engineers, also Subcommittee on Engineering and Technical Systems 1983–85; Member: Space and Aeronautics Board, National Research Council (1975–1978). She is currently a member of COSEPUP and the Governing Board of the National Research Council and its Executive Committee.
Dr. Widnall has been a trustee of the Carnegie Corporation, the Aerospace Corporation, a director of the Draper Laboratories, Chemical Fabrics Incorporated and a trustee of the Boston Museum of Science. She was a member of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and Government. She is a past president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. She is a current trustee of the Sloan Foundation, the Institute for Defense Analysis and GenCorp.
Prof. Widnall is currently Co-Chair of the Executive Board of the Lean Aerospace Initiative, a partnership between industry, government/DOD and MIT dedicated to a vision ''of significantly reducing the cost and cycle time for military aerospace products throughout the entire value chain while continuing to improve product performance.'' LAI contributes toward this vision through research leading to actionable goals such as facilitating and enabling enterprise wide systemic change; defining a ''lean acquisition environment'' strategy for DOD which incorporates the concept of ''best life cycle value;'' and applying the lean enterprise model (LEM) across a broad segment of the stakeholder community. She is a co-author of Lean Enterprise Value.
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Discussion
Categorizing Research as ''Sensitive But Unclassified''
Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Dr. Widnall. Dr. Marburger, would you join the panel at the witness table? And I think that we have the advantage of Dr. Widnall going last. I think she has made her answer to this question clear. I would ask the other panel members, do any of you believe that ''sensitive but unclassified'' is a legitimate category of research? Dr. Greenwood? Dr. Marburger.
Dr. MARBURGER. As a category of information, I think it already exists. And I—there are some remarks. I am just looking for them in my written testimony that add a little clarity on the thinking about ''sensitive,'' this classification.
Let me just quote from my written testimony on this point. The designation ''sensitive homeland security information,'' which is referred to in the request of the Office of Homeland Security to OMB to develop guidance for federal agencies to ensure consistency of treatment of sensitive homeland security information. This designation does not refer to some new category of information; rather it is a type of information that the Government holds today which is not routinely released to the general public, such as law enforcement data and critical computer security threats or vulnerabilities. The vast majority of government information is and will remain publicly accessible. The concept of sensitive homeland security research is not what is being considered here.
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Chairman BOEHLERT. Dr. Atlas.
Dr. ATLAS. I think the problem we would face is if we have had new government regulations that tried to control a gray area that is not well defined. However, within the scientific community, we do have a history of self-policing, of looking at things and making prudent judgments. And what we have been proposing is that in areas that are not classified that the scientific community come together and decide what areas we might want to constrain in an ethical and responsible manner. That is quite different than facing a regulatory scheme that would be inhibitory to our research community.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Well, I assume, then, that all of you agree that basic research would not fall under the category of ''sensitive but unclassified.'' Is there any disagreement with that?
[No response.]
Curriculum/Research Restriction for International Students
Chairman BOEHLERT. Okay. And do you all believe that there are students who, even once lawfully admitted to this country, should not be free to take certain courses or participate in certain research?
Dr. WIDNALL. That is sort of a double negative. Could you ask that question again? I want to make sure I understand it.
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Chairman BOEHLERT. I am asking once a student is lawfully admitted to this country, should there be restrictions on the courses or the type of research those students could participate in?
Dr. WIDNALL. Let me respond to that. That is a specific statement in our committee report that we do not believe that once a student has been admitted that they should be restricted from taking any of our courses or——
Chairman BOEHLERT. Across the board?
Dr. WIDNALL. Across the board.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Dr. Greenwood.
Dr. GREENWOOD. I agree, Your Honor. I agree with Dr. Widnall. And furthermore, I think, given the movement of the universities to put so much of their course materials up on the Web, that it is also unworkable. I think we have to depend on lawful admission. And then once admitted here, the students have the opportunity to gain what they can from our universities.
Mr. SMITH. Would the Chairman yield? Could we expand on the research part of your question, Mr. Chairman, courses as well as research?
Chairman BOEHLERT. Let me ask Dr. Greenwood and Dr. Widnall to add that.
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Dr. WIDNALL. Well, let me——
Chairman BOEHLERT. On my time.
Dr. WIDNALL. Right. Let me amplify my remark, because what I mentioned in my comments is that faculty have a rather detailed understanding of the relationship between their course work and their basic research and the industrial base and applied applications of what they do. And they really understand that at a very deep level so that—and I feel very comfortable feeling that our courses and our research should be open.
Now to say research is open, faculty members make selections of students based on the quality of the students and their backgrounds. So the question of what students have access to what research projects is the faculty choice.
Chairman BOEHLERT. There should be no governmental restrictions?
Dr. WIDNALL. No, there should be no governmental restrictions.
Chairman BOEHLERT. And——
Dr. GREENWOOD. On the other hand, I think we have said earlier that, you know, the access of students to classified, to work in classified areas, has typically been restricted by our universities. We have not allowed students to do classified theses. We have not encouraged them to work in areas which have been declared as inappropriate security risks.
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Chairman BOEHLERT. Okay.
Dr. GREENWOOD. And obviously the Government has some authority over whether students from certain sensitive countries have access to those kinds of programs, and we don't disagree with that.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Dr. Marburger.
Dr. MARBURGER. Dr. Greenwood just said what I was going to say. The premise of IPASS is that students from sensitive countries, as it were, could be permitted to enter the country to pursue a course of study on the basis that the courses of study would not pose a risk to the United States' security. But universities are also required to let the Immigration Service know when a student wishes to change a course of study. And if that happens, then presumably a review of the appropriateness of the new course of study should occur. So it is logical to expect that there might be some restriction on a student once he or she has entered the country regarding a change of course of study. I think that is a logical outcome of the IPASS process.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Does either Dr. Greenwood or Dr. Widnall disagree with that statement?
Dr. WIDNALL. Well, I am not familiar with the details of that. I do have some concern about it, because when you are talking about course of study, all of our individual subjects are open to everyone on our campus. Most of our course material is up on the Web. Textbooks exist in almost every subject you could think of, so I am not quite sure what is meant by the term ''course of study.'' I don't see how we could restrict a course of study.
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Chairman BOEHLERT. To any student regardless of country of origin?
Dr. WIDNALL. Yes.
Dr. GREENWOOD. I—and I think that what I would add to that is that the universities have been working hard, both on the SEVIS system and on the proposed IPASS system to understand the details and to—I mean, we understand the importance of us knowing who is in our country and whether they are here legitimately and whether they are doing what they should be doing while they are here, or what they say they are doing while they are here. And we are trying to be as cooperative as possible. We don't really know the details of the IPASS system extensively right now. And there are devils in the details, which have to do as on two—there are two types of details that I would just bring to your attention: one is that whether a student is taking a course in our university or not does not restrict them to having access to the information. We have libraries. We have seminars. We have all sorts of opportunities for students to study a course of information independent of whether they are actually majoring in that topic or not.
Chairman BOEHLERT. So you would make a distinction between course of study and engaging in research activities?
Dr. GREENWOOD. Well, I think, with respect to engaging in research activities, it is fairly—we are clear on the topic that if—on the issue of whether, if the research is classified, then students are restricted from participating in it. American students as well as international students.
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Chairman BOEHLERT. Can we make a distinction?
Dr. GREENWOOD. That is right. We just don't let students, at least graduate students and undergraduate students, participate in classified research in most universities.
The other issue has to do with the timing of tracking students as they change their majors. I mean, 40 percent of our undergraduates come in undeclared. Of the 60 percent who do come in, more than half of them will change their mind at least once in the course of doing their study. And some of them will do it far more frequently than that. They can change their major on any given day. And so the issue of how you are going to put together a system that allows us to comply, if this is necessary, that is realistic with respect to the capacity of our information systems, is one we will have to continue to talk about.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Which goes to the theory that students, regardless of origin, are students.
Dr. GREENWOOD. Or as I sometimes say, when you get the smartest kids in the world in your institution, you shouldn't be too smart—you shouldn't be too surprised when they outsmart you.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Yes. Dr. Marburger, you wanted to add to that?
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Dr. MARBURGER. Yes, I think it is important to recognize that we do not expect undergraduate students to be significant in the population of people who come under this IPASS review. So in other words, the restrictions on courses of study that might come out of IPASS are graduate level in research areas.
I do want to emphasize that the IPASS has not been set up yet, and that committee itself will be charged to determine its——
Chairman BOEHLERT. It is a work in progress.
Dr. MARBURGER [continuing]. The details in which the devil resides, so we do intend to——
Chairman BOEHLERT. But SEVIS is up and operating.
Dr. MARBURGER. SEVIS is.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Do you have any confidence in SEVIS?
Dr. MARBURGER. Of course.
Chairman BOEHLERT. The reason—well, let me tell you why I asked that. I also have the privilege, and sometimes burden, of serving on the Intelligence Committee, and I will tell you this, the INS hasn't the first clue on the number of nonimmigrant aliens in this country today, not the first clue. They can give you broad estimates in the millions, but they can't get very specific. And they don't have the first clue of the number of those who are legally admitted to the country who now are out of status because their visa has expired. That is a sobering and disturbing admission, but it was done, not behind closed doors in our Intelligence Committee deliberations on 9/11, but in an open forum. I will let you respond, Dr. Atlas, but my time has already expired, but some of my time was borrowed by the intervention of Mr. Smith, so Dr. Marburger, you can complete your thought.
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Dr. MARBURGER. Just very quickly, among the large number of immigrants, the immigrant students, the people on student visas are receiving an exceptional amount of attention. And I would submit that we probably know more about the student population from other countries in our country than we do about all of the other kinds of——
Chairman BOEHLERT. Maybe we should know more about all of those admitted to our country as guests of our country. Dr. Atlas, and then——
Dr. ATLAS. I think, at first, I would concur that there would be great difficulty in regulating the courses that our students take. As graduate dean, when I admit a student in English, that student is free to take courses in business and science and other areas, and vice versa. Some of our biochemistry students take courses in art. The area, though, where research comes into play, where the Congress has acted and where the President has signed, where the ASM has been supportive is under the USA Patriot Act and the Bio-preparedness Act of 2002. There are restricted individuals who are not allowed to have access to the select agents, those include individuals from the countries that the U.S. has designated as being in support of terrorist activities so that, for example, a student from Iraq cannot legally have access to cultures of Anthrax within the United States today. And in fact, the Congress decided there would be no exemptions to that, not even the President was authorized under the USA Patriot Act, to grant exemptions to that restriction. So there are some restrictions that are not classified related, but in fact, deal with not access to new information but access to materials that have been deemed to be potentially dangerous.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much. Mr. Hall.
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Classified Research and Student Involvement
Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. You know, times change as attitudes, and we are in a day and time where we are going through some type of change of attitude. I have seen this change of attitude before. I saw it at the end of World War II, and at the beginning of World War II, when we moved the Japanese citizens away from the West Coast, and no criticism of it then but criticism of it 50 years later and some compensation for it.
We kidnapped scientists and physicists that were within the German realm to bring them over here and to help us perfect the Manhattan Project, so time changes things. And I think we ought to come on in to this date and time. And I am very pro-student oriented, but I think this—I am a lot less interested in the students' rights right now and research needed by a country that is in a War on Terrorism and fear of germ warfare and things like that. And I think you have to be more careful today. And if that infringes on somebody's rights, we have got to go back to the fact that General McArthur said, ''The object of war is victory.'' And I think that is one thing we ought to all keep in mind. And I am a little concerned when you say that you urge your students not to do research on your campus that is classified as sensitive. Why should MIT be set off aside from other institutions when we may need that classified information? We may need the basic information. We may need the sensitive information for the geniuses that, admittedly, are at MIT. My God, I could never get in MIT much less get out of it. So——
Dr. WIDNALL. Well, let me——
Mr. HALL. And I have high regard for MIT.
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Dr. WIDNALL. Sure.
Mr. HALL. They save the Nation——
Dr. WIDNALL. Yes.
Mr. HALL [continuing]. And solve mysteries that, health and otherwise, we are obligated to them for.
Dr. WIDNALL. Well, now let me make it perfectly clear. Our faculty and our institution are committed to carry out classified research in any of the areas in which we have expertise.
Mr. HALL. But you are not going to have the students do it?
Dr. WIDNALL. We won't have the students involved, but clearly a student is a phase of one's career. And as you move into the senior levels of your career and you move out from the university and into your employment, you can transition into a professional environment that does classified research and with the participation of the MIT faculty to keep the environment energetic and somewhat university-like. And in fact, the people who work at Lincoln Lab have reported to us on many occasions that being associated with MIT is a strong motivator for employment at Lincoln Lab. They like that environment.
Mr. HALL. What research are any of you now doing that would be classified sensitive?
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Dr. WIDNALL. Well, we can't tell you.
Mr. HALL. Can you kind of letter it and spell it?
Dr. MARBURGER. She would have to shoot you.
Mr. HALL. And then shoot me immediately. Well, I appreciate that and I like that answer. I think it is great. I hate you, but I like that answer.
Funding for a NAS Study on Balancing Openness and Security
Mr. HALL. Dr. Marburger, last—Chairman Boehlert, our very able and capable Chairman here, our leader, we sent you a letter regarding a series of roundtables that the National Academy of Sciences is planning to conduct later this year on how best to balance the competing requirements of national security and unfettered scientific inquiry, if that is the way to put it. Specifically, I think we asked you if you would find funding for this project. I don't think we have heard from you on that, and maybe you testified to it today. First, do you support the NAS proposal, and second, when can we expect to hear from you on finding sources or funds?
Dr. MARBURGER. I do support the idea of NAS looking at this. I think it is a good idea. They have given good advice before on similar issues, and we will pursue it. I can't promise you how long it will take me to pass the hat and get some funding. And if you keep passing continuing resolutions, maybe we will be able to come up with some funding. But the fact is——
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Mr. HALL. You would tell me if you could, wouldn't you?
Dr. MARBURGER. Well, we will certainly give it a try.
Mr. HALL. And you will tell us when you can?
Dr. MARBURGER. Absolutely.
Mr. HALL. Does that satisfy you, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you so much. Mr. Smith.
Classified Research at Lincoln Laboratory
Mr. SMITH. How much of the research at Lincoln is classified?
Dr. WIDNALL. Well, let me divide that into two parts. The entire Lincoln facility is what you would call a secured facility. Nobody walks onto the Lincoln property without a reason for being there. But within the research itself, my guess is that it is 80 percent. So let me make it very clear that we do have students at Lincoln Lab. They are working on unclassified research at Lincoln. We have faculty working at Lincoln who are probably doing both classified and unclassified (research).
Mr. SMITH. Explain to me how Bayh-Dole works with the patent filing of classified research.
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Dr. WIDNALL. I am not sure I would be able to do that. That is not really my field. I don't think I would be able to explain that. M.R.C., do you know the answer to that?
Dr. GREENWOOD. No. I don't know the details, Mr. Smith, but I certainly could be—I would be happy to respond to that in a follow-up, because I can certainly get the answer, because as you know, the University of California has several laboratories in which a large amount of classified work is done. And like the Lincoln Laboratories, we do have students there who are working in the laboratories but not on the classified projects. And I will be happy to follow-up with you on that. I am sure I can give you a satisfactory answer.
Dr. WIDNALL. And I will be happy to follow-up, for the record, getting a statement from MIT with respect to Lincoln.
Determining the Vulnerability of Research
Mr. SMITH. Well, you know, I agree with Dr. Hall from Texas, our Ranking Member, that things can't be normal. I mean, it is not moving ahead as usual. So whether we are talking about prioritizing spending or whether we are talking about prioritizing research, it seems to me the challenge before us is great enough that we can't just say that, ''Look, knowledge for knowledge sake, regardless of the vulnerability, is good overall.''
So Dr. Marburger, let me start with you. Do we have, in your group that you set up for the Homeland Security Presidential Directive #2, is that the kind of group that would help establish, maybe, guidelines for the kind of research that we want to give priority to or—and I—partially, I am thinking of NSF, but I am thinking of all research categories. Do we have the kind of group of people that can say, ''This is vulnerable. This kind of research is going to be somewhat vulnerable, because the potential for bad is just as great as the potential for good.'' I don't know the best way to ask that question, but it seems to me that eventually we have got to deal with that kind of a consideration.
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Dr. MARBURGER. The—if you are referring to this IPASS committee that would act on student visa concerns——
Mr. SMITH. No, no, not the student visas. I was more interested in the research and the kind of research. Maybe Dr. Greenwood, also.
Dr. MARBURGER. Currently, we don't have a process that specifically does what you are suggesting, as far as I know.
Mr. SMITH. Was the HSPD–2 a grouping that you managed? Was that strictly for students and visas and tracking? Was that the effort that you say ''the Administration adopted the working group's recommendations and agencies are now developing the process or the regulation needed to implement the Administration policy?'' Was that a——
Dr. MARBURGER. I think that was an IPASS policy, if I am not mistaken. I need to—we need to get on the same page here.
Mr. SMITH. Well, just—the group that you collected, the interagency grouping from HSPD–2, was that directed mostly at IPASS?
Dr. MARBURGER. That is my understanding.
Mr. SMITH. Okay.
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Dr. MARBURGER. That is the first IPASS. Yes.
Mr. SMITH. So I am not as interested in the student visa as our ability to develop some kind of advisory group that can look over potential research and give some opinion. Dr. Greenwood.
Dr. GREENWOOD. There is a long history of us being able to pull together such groups of experts, particularly in the physical sciences. And I think you really need the experts to be able to understand the areas that truly have real threat potential versus those that have potential long-term terrible scenarios but we don't actually know whether there is a real threat there. So I think the answer to your question is yes, there is—there are certainly the experts in this country that could help the Government make those determinations.
And I just want to say one other thing, which is I don't think that—I would certainly not want to be understood this morning as saying that the university community believes that nothing should affect science and that there are no potential threats here that we have to deal with. I don't think that is where we stand. I think our—at least my position this morning is that sensitive is an almost unworkable condition. I would—we would rather see it classified or not classified and get the right groups of experts to help determine what needs to be put into the national security arena and what does not. It may have negative effects if not done very carefully. But it is at least clearer and easier for us to work with than a fuzzy area called sensitive where we can't—where some of the determinations are done post-talk, and it is very, very difficult for us to anticipate what a government agency might see as sensitive.
Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I see you are picking up your gavel, but Dr. Marburger, sometime tell me what—how the sensitive but unclassified and what it means in the March 18 Andrew Card memo that directed the agencies not to disclose so somebody has to have a definition someplace.
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Dr. MARBURGER. It is information not research, but I would be glad to respond in detail on that issue in a question afterwards.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you. And we would like to share that with all of the Members of the Committee.
Ms. Johnson.
Uniformity of Agency Classification Policies
Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think I have heard responses that address the research and how confusing it might be. Does it even complicate it further when different departments have different guidelines? Like the Department of Defense will be different from the Department of Homeland Security?
Dr. MARBURGER. It certainly is desirable for there to be uniform policies. And my office does work with the agencies to try to make sure that the policies are uniform. We have done this in other areas of regulation, such as human subjects research, and we continued to work with the Department of Defense, for example, and other departments to make sure that their policies on classification and on the handling of sensitive information are consistent. And that is a desirable goal.
Ms. JOHNSON. In that case, then the language that I had in the Homeland Security Bill originally will be accepted and change the other departments or it will be the same as theirs?
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Dr. MARBURGER. Well, I am not familiar, specifically, with the language in your amendment, so I apologize for not getting——
Ms. JOHNSON. It was the same as the Department of Defense.
Dr. MARBURGER. I can say is it certainly is desirable to have uniform policies across agencies——
Ms. JOHNSON. Um-hum.
Dr. MARBURGER [continuing]. Because our universities, accept sponsored research from all agencies.
Percentages of International Graduate Students at American Institutions
Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. Let me see how I can say this. How intrinsic are foreign students in U.S. universities in the science and technology advancement field? Because I remember some review not long ago indicating that most of the researchers were not American born.
Dr. MARBURGER. Many are, but I will let my university colleagues answer that question.
Dr. WIDNALL. Well, let me start. It certainly varies by field, and it varies very much by university. I would say at MIT, I don't know, I am just going to throw out a number. Let me say that 40 percent of our graduate students are international students, but that is really an estimate. International students are extremely important. They are highly motivated. They are normally among the very best that their country has produced. They have an energy and a vitality that I believe is stimulating the entire research enterprise, and they are a constant challenge to the U.S. born students. If you look at our faculties, you will find that many of our faculty members, in fact, have been drawn from this pool. Many of our faculty members are foreign born. Probably at this point, most of them are U.S. citizens, but their country of origin was not the United States. So, you know, we have been successful in the United States in attracting the world's best talent in science and engineering and have benefited enormously from this.
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Dr. GREENWOOD. Let me just add that the percentage of international students at the University of California is much lower than that, but in certain fields in graduate programs, you would see a very high representation of international students. At the undergraduate level, we concentrate on California students, although we do have international students. But we are much more likely to see fewer international students at that level than the private research universities normally do. It is very field-dependent what percentage of international students you are likely to see. Some areas, we have very, very few, and others we would have percentages approaching——
Dr. WIDNALL. You know, let me correct, perhaps, a misimpression. At the undergraduate level, we restrict ourselves to five percent international students. I was really speaking about our graduate students.
Dr. ATLAS. I think the question goes well beyond the foreign students that we admit to the United States. Our science, particularly when we are combating infectious disease, is a global fight that involves international collaboration. Many of the diseases we are worried about are exotic to the United States but are occurring elsewhere, be it in Africa or Iraq even. And we need to ensure that they have sufficient trained personnel to control those diseases, or those naturally occurring diseases will emerge and come to the shores of the United States and threaten us in the same way that bioterrorism does. And that is really within the life sciences what is setting us apart from the physical sciences and the other areas. We need to fight these diseases wherever they occur in the world. And that is in the best interest of the United States.
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Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you. But how am I doing on time, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman BOEHLERT. You are—you have got eight seconds. Go to it, kid.
Ms. JOHNSON. Okay. Let me ask one more question.
Encouraging Science, Mathematics, and Engineering Education Among American Students
Is the educational basis of U.S. primary and secondary schools sufficiently funded to produce domestic scientists and engineers to replace those coming from foreign countries or is it even wise to replace them?
Dr. WIDNALL. Well, I think everyone is concerned about that. We would obviously like to encourage as many U.S. students to study science and engineering as we could. I make that a separable question.
Chairman BOEHLERT. That is what this committee is all about. We are doing the Science and Math Partnership, the Science and Math Initiative. We have got a lot of things going. But just let me share with you, Ms. Johnson and others, from the Committee Charter, this is '98 information, but I am advised that the most recent information, which is buried in a pile of data back in the Committee room, no appreciable change. In 1998, foreign students made up 30 percent of graduate students studying science and engineering in the U.S., 33 percent of U.S. science and engineering are doctoral recipients, 52 percent in engineering, 49 percent in mathematics and computer sciences, and 40 percent in the physical sciences. I mean, that tells a rather dramatic story, and there has been no appreciable change.
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Dr. Greenwood.
Dr. GREENWOOD. Chairman Boehlert, let me just—I would like to go on record with one comment. I have said this before.
Chairman BOEHLERT. You are on the record on all comments.
Dr. GREENWOOD. I know. But even before September 11, one of the greatest vulnerabilities to our long-term national economic security was our dependence on international students coming into our nation and studying. It is a very good thing, as Dr. Widnall and others have said, that these wonderful talented students come to the United States, study here, and a vast majority of them stay. But I have had the privilege of testifying in a PCAST—with a PCAST hearing not very long ago. And when the issue was discussed of why it was that some of our companies have moved their manufacturing off shore, it had to do with the growth of very good programs in other countries that could train students to the baccalaureate level for the technology necessary. There is an increasing trend, because there are well-educated scientists in other countries, as well as ours, to begin the process of moving R&D into some of these countries as well. So I think that the issue of how we change our educational system so that we bring more of our bright young people, particularly our women and minorities, into science and engineering in this country, is one of our long-term national security issues. And I do believe that it is time for a new education defense act or something that like for the future.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Dr. Greenwood, you are preaching to the faithful. We share that point of view, and this committee is committed to the proposition.
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Dr. GREENWOOD. Thank you.
Chairman BOEHLERT. We are going to do everything humanly possible to advance opportunities right here at home to provide the wherewithal and the incentives and the recognition of the importance of expanding the human capital that is so vital to this great enterprise called America, particularly in the science and math disciplines. So you are not a voice in the wilderness, although all of you on this panel have been saying the same thing for a long time. I just want you to know that some of us are on the same page. And quite frankly, you have to be happy with the direction of the Administration's ''No Child Left Behind'' Initiative. You have to be happy with the Science and Math Partnerships and the Tech Talent Act. We get the message. And we are going to continue on that.
With that, let me go——
Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Okay. Thank you. Dr. Ehlers.
National Security Implications of Research
Mr. EHLERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And obviously I agree with your last statement, Dr. Greenwood. I have spent 20 years of my academic life and the last five years here trying to improve math/science education. But we have a long way to go, and it is amazing how much opposition you meet from the most unexpected quarters, including, occasionally, the U.S. Senate, but frankly, mostly among the American people who simply don't see the need for it. And that is where the jobs of the future are, and we have to get that message out.
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This whole discussion has been very reminiscent of almost identical discussions I engaged in the 1960's when I was at Berkley and this was at the university in the radiation laboratory where I was doing research and teaching. But I also spent a summer at Livermore Laboratories. It is a weapon laboratory. Even there, there was that discussion, because they had some unclassified research.
I think what is different this time, and it is a very important distinction that Dr. Widnall pointed out. Number one, I think two things are different, one she pointed out, is that the life sciences, which tend to be the focus of the discussion now, have far less experience with this issue, because they have tended not to be as heavily involved in sensitive or classified research.
A second distinction, which I think is probably even more important and creates a greater problem for us, is that, I believe, by and large, the application of the results of life science research to making weapons of mass destruction is easier than the application of the knowledge of the physical sciences. In other words, although Saddam Hussein has tried and is still desperately trying to create nuclear weapons, it has been a long-term project, and he is still several years away from it, although getting closer and closer. However, the biological weapons he is up-to-speed with, I think, a good share of the world in what he has done.
So that, I think, puts real pressure on the life science academic community to face this issue in a new way and not use the old models that we used in the 60's and later on. There are differences, and they—the econ-emissions researchers in the life sciences have to learn the details of this problem just as the physical scientists did 30 years ago. But also, the Nation, as a whole, has to recognize that distinction about the ease in which you can transfer that knowledge into evil means. And I don't have the answer for it, but I think it is a very pressing issue. Because of my background, because I have been through these debates before, I agree totally with what you are saying. Let us not fetter research unless it is absolutely essential.
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And too often, there is a tendency among the military to want to classify everything, even notes on napkins. But we in the academic community, have to be very sensitive of this and, I think, really look at some new models. I appreciate your testimony. I appreciate your work. And I don't—I am not really asking a question, although I would welcome any comments you make on this, but it is not enough to say, ''Well, we have been through this once and we decided this and therefore that is the right answer.'' You have some very different situations today. I will ask for any comments before I go onto anything else.
Dr. WIDNALL. Well, yes. Let me make one comment. It seems to me that what you are calling for, and I agree with it, is we need to begin a dialogue, and we need to make that dialogue as precise as possible. And we need to engage the best scientists in the biological and health sciences community with people in the security field. And we need to have a very precise dialogue about the dangers that you refereed to. We really need to know, you know, what is really true about these areas.
Dr. GREENWOOD. And I think another area that we may need to distinguish, and Mr. Ehlers, let me say again how much we all appreciate your scientific perspective and having you in Congress to help us with these questions.
Mr. EHLERS. You might tell my constituents, too. I am 27 days away from an election.
Dr. GREENWOOD. Well, I am not sure I can help you that—with your constituents, but I will do my best.
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But Mr. Ehlers, one of the things I do think we might want to distinguish as we talk about these things, too, is the difference between catastrophic terrorism and, if you will, mischief terrorism. Not—no one ever wants to lose even a single life to terrorism or to the misuse of material or the use of select agents in the wrong hands. But I do think what is very important and that we really do need to understand, and can do this with genetic forensics, to understand the signatures of materials that can be gotten in large quantities or can be developed in large quantities and could be used in a way that would kill many, many thousands of people in the United States or make them very ill. And sometimes I think that we get very confused with the danger, which everyone who works in a laboratory knows that any of us could, technically, be killed or injured almost everyday if we don't observe the right rules and regulations and the safety precautions.
But what we are talking about here is the use of these materials for weapons of mass destruction. And I think we can usefully focus on the characteristics of those materials that allow them to become weapons of mass destruction, while, at the same time, carefully monitoring information for new agents.
Chairman BOEHLERT. All right. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired. Here is the situation. We have got 12 minutes and 45 seconds before a key vote on the floor. The Chair will recognize Ms. Woolsey and then Mr. Honda for four minutes each so we can complete the questioning. We will have some more submissions for you in writing. It is not fair to keep you on beyond this. We will not have the second round.
Ms. Woolsey.
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Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will not pitch Go Girl, my legislation to get girls and young women interested in science and technology.
Chairman BOEHLERT. I support it.
Ms. WOOLSEY. I know you do, but let us fund it.
Chairman BOEHLERT. We are authorizers.
Is a National Security Focus on American Universities Warranted?
Ms. WOOLSEY. Let us push it. 9/11, the real terrorist problem was that Saudi men were taught to fly in our flight training schools. And many—some of them even got their visas after they were already dead. Okay. No university system involved there. Oklahoma bomber, an American using technology available anywhere in the country blows up a federal building. So what are we talking about here? Was there anything in the university system that could have prevented either one of those by overreaching, by adding more security and doing more than we are already doing? So what I would like to know is are we overreaching? What we have in place, is that not good enough? We couldn't have prevented anything that happened that was so disastrous. And if we are overreaching, how much are we inhibiting really good research and cross-pollination around the world?
Dr. WIDNALL. Well, let me start. No, I certainly agree with your analysis, but I think as a result of 9/11, several things have happened. One, I think the university community has, in fact, stepped forward to try to analyze what it could do to help this Nation. And as a result of that analysis, is beginning to analyze vulnerabilities of lots of systems and thinking about what kind of research would contribute to making this Nation safer. And I think along with that is a natural question about as we uncover these new technologies and new ways of thinking, are some of them sufficiently critical to our national security that they need to be classified? I think that would be my analysis of it.
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Dr. GREENWOOD. Well, I agree with you that there was nothing that we were doing, nor do I believe anything we are about to put in place would have prevented what the individuals who committed those crimes from doing. So I—so no, I—because I—as far as I know, there has not been any real evidence that students duly enrolled in research universities in this country have actually committed any terrorist acts. There have been some reports that people who have been educated in the United States or the United Kingdom are active in weapons of mass destruction programs in countries such as Iraq. But I don't know of anyone who was actually here at the time that—and I don't know that the system will actually prevent that.
On the other hand, I think that we are all prepared to concede that the Government has an interest in knowing who enters and what they are doing and whether students are in the institutions that they are supposed to be in. And I think the university community is prepared to cooperate in that—on that count.
Dr. ATLAS. I don't think we are overreaching. I think we are really struggling, as Representative Ehlers indicated. We have a new challenge. We are coming to grips with it. The discussions are swinging both sides of the pendulum, and so we get concerned, very concerned as we hear one proposal on one side or another proposal on the other side. What we are doing is, as this committee is doing, is holding the necessary dialogue that will come to rational policy in the end and responsible citizenship on behalf of the scientific community.
Dr. GREENWOOD. I think—if I could have one more response to that, too.
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Chairman BOEHLERT. All right. Just a quickie.
Dr. GREENWOOD. Okay.
Chairman BOEHLERT. You've got 12 seconds.
Dr. GREENWOOD. The essential issue here is that scientists in this country want to be part of the solution, not part of the problem. And they, too, are confused about how to enter this dialogue and do it productively.
Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Honda.
Protecting Civil Liberties While Ensuring National Security
Mr. HONDA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. I don't disagree with the comments of my colleague here. And I think that that is a well-targeted comment. And if we are looking at not overreacting and not overreaching, I agree.
But there is something in our discussion today that there is an element that seems to be missing. And I can't really put my finger on it. The closest I can get to is: we have had comments about we have change of time, times have changed, but there was no comment about recognizing the mistakes we have made in the past that we corrected 50 years later. So as time changes, we should learn from the mistakes of the past. What are those things that we are able to apply today from the mistakes that we have made in the past relative to civil liberties and human rights and things like that? In—in a democracy, I think that that is probably the best place to do that, to explore that.
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I appreciate your comments about not limiting students from foreign countries, because when they come here, their children are U.S. citizens. They populate our universities. So in terms of loyalty and patriotism, all that sort of stuff, I think that becomes later discussion of ethics and who we care about and moving into a global kind of mentality. I guess my question is going toward who is not at the table today to discuss the issues about who should be and who should not be entering into this country as students? But I believe that there are people out there that could add to the discussion, add to some more precise dimension and discussions on how we can do this. I am all for keeping our country safe. And I am all for our universities to participate in this, but I am not for limiting people who could provide new information, new technology, new ideas, and the energy that you have so well described to our populations. It is not a question, I suspect. It is a comment. And perhaps you may want to respond to the comment.
Dr. GREENWOOD. Well, let me say that you are, of course, entirely correct that the vast—I mean, well, a very large part of the American economy has been created by international students who have come to this country, studied in our universities and chosen to make their life here. And their children's children, who are now first, second—and I am a first generation American myself, first, second and third generation Americans are really the bedrock of what we are doing. And so that was the basis of the comment I made earlier when I said that I thought that our strategy, which is a strategy we have taken before, of building up our science and technology enterprise and really getting the best talent in this country is, in many ways, the best prophylactic against any terrorists is to just be better, have the better people here.
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Dr. WIDNALL. And as I remarked in my testimony, I really do feel that what was so gratifying about the response to 9/11 is that it really brought us back to our values. And some of the mistakes we made—you mentioned that we had made in the past were because we did not base our decisions on a strong value framework of liberty, individual rights, education, progress in science. And so, you know, when I am faced with a tough decision, I try to go back to the very strong value framework. And——
Chairman BOEHLERT. That——
Dr. WIDNALL [continuing]. That will get us through.
Chairman BOEHLERT. That terminates this hearing on a very positive note. Thank you very much. Thank all of you for services as resources.
Dr. GREENWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Members.
Chairman BOEHLERT. I thank my colleagues for participating, and off we go for a vote.
[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
Appendix 1:
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
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Next Hearing Segment(2)
(Footnote 1 return)
These materials are printed in Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record.