Segment 3 Of 5 Previous Hearing Segment(2) Next Hearing Segment(4)
SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS Tables
Page 184 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
READINESS AND PERSONNEL: VIEWS FROM THE FIELD
House of Representatives, Committee on National Security, Military Readiness Subcommittee, Meeting Jointly With Military Personnel Subcommittee, Washington, DC, March 4, 1997.
The subcommittees met jointly, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn Senate Office Building, Hon. Herbert H. Bateman (chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Readiness) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HERBERT H. BATEMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. BATEMAN. The subcommittees will please come to order.
Today, the Subcommittee on Military Readiness and the Subcommittee on Military Personnel are meeting jointly to get the view from the field on readiness and personnel issues from several groups of military personnel from a wide range of geographic areas.
Yesterday the Subcommittee on Readiness conducted a field hearing at Langley Air Force Base, VA, which was very informative. At that hearing, we concentrated on readiness issues that directly affect the capabilities of our military services.
Today we will continue to look at these issues and also look at many of the readiness issues that affect people, quality of life and families. We are here today not so much to ask questions, but rather to listen to our witnesses give their own personal perspectives on current readiness and to give us their views on life in the military today.
Page 185 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
There are several reasons why it is important for the members of the committee to hear about these important readiness issues. As many will remember, 2 years ago, while the Pentagon leadership was claiming that U.S. forces were more ready than they had ever been, the committee found indications of a serious readiness problem in the military services. At that time, the committee determined that the services were in the early stage of a long term, systemic readiness problem that was not confined to any one quarter of a fiscal year.
Some of the indicators that led us to an awareness of these problems were that all of the F–15E and two-thirds of the F–15C air crews based in Europe needed waivers from the training requirements. Two of the six Army contingency corps units, the most ready in the force, reported significantly reduced readiness ratings, and 28 Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation squadrons had to ground more than half of their aircraft during September 1994.
Although anecdotal, the committee believed that these indicators were indeed earning signs that could not be ignored. In response to these concerns, the Clinton administration began taking heed of these warning signs. They have given significant attention to protecting military readiness as one of their primary objectives in the formulation of subsequent budget requests, including the fiscal year 1998 budget request that is currently before the Congress.
In an attempt to measure the administration's success these past few years, the committee staff conducted a comprehensive readiness review during the fall of last year. In addition, I and many other Members of Congress have been meeting with the members of the military services over the past few months.
Page 186 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
The preliminary results of the review and the meetings indicate that readiness is not improving and may be in a decline. In this context, it is essential that we test the Pentagon claim that the U.S. military is as ready as we have ever been.
One of the possible reasons there is such a disparity in the establishment of assessment of readiness by our military leaders and a more accurate, real world assessment of readiness may be founded in the way we measure readiness. The systems currently in place to measure readiness do not take into account many of the indicators that would give a more accurate readiness picture. Some of these indicators may be the amount of time individuals are away from home, the stresses of working harder and longer and doing more with less, the quantity and quality of military training and other measurements that are not currently used to assess readiness.
Readiness is a perishable commodity; by the time you find that it is broken, it is already too late. It is important that we hear what is really going on from a cross-section of our military service members who are in the know on these issues.
Our aim today is to hear from those who have to deal with the day-to-day challenges with keeping readiness at an acceptable level while continuing to maintain preparedness for high-intensity combat operations in a resource-constrained environment.
We are very fortunate to have four panels of individuals representing each of the military services and family members from all levels of command and supervision. The first panel is composed of commanders from major operational commands to give us their view from the big picture point of view.
Page 187 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Our second panel will consist of senior noncommissioned officers from units represented on panel 1. I am convinced that the views of senior NCO's, which many consider the backbone of any operational unit, are essential to an accurate assessment of readiness at the working level, and I look forward to their unique perspective on these important issues.
The third panel, which will lead off our afternoon session, will have commanders of individual training commands. One of the first indicators to show a decrease in readiness is difficulty in meeting training objectives, and I believe that our major training center commanders will be able to give us their views in this area.
Our fourth panel will consist of spouses of military members. It is interesting to note that 65 percent of all military personnel are married. As a result, the health and readiness of the military today can be gauged through the perspective of the spouses of the service members.
Before we hear from our first panel, I would like to yield to the Honorable Steve Buyer, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, for any comments he wishes to make. I will then yield to the Honorable Norman Sisisky, the ranking Democrat on the Subcommittee on Readiness, for any statement he would like to make; and last, but certainly not least, I would like to yield to the gentleman from Mississippi, the Honorable Gene Taylor, the ranking Democrat on the Subcommittee on Personnel.
Mr. Buyer.
Page 188 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
STATEMENT OF HON. STEVE BUYER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM INDIANA, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. BUYER. Thank you, Mr. Bateman.
I would like to join you in welcoming the first panel of witnesses and all witnesses here today. Whenever there is a notice of no votes, it is difficult to get Members back to this town, and I can understand that, and I am highly appreciative of Members who are here. This is a very important joint hearing between the Readiness and the Personnel panels.
I especially welcome General Iverson, who has come a long way, from Korea, to be here, and I appreciate that, especially at great strain upon the service, because they wanted to substitute a whole bunch of other people rather than hearing your testimony today, which only made me more eager and excited to have you here today. When they want to substitute someone whom we desire, then we know that that is the person to whom we want to talk.
The briefing that you gave us, General Iverson, and to other Members—Chairman Spence, Chairman Hunter, Owen Pickett, myself and some others went to Korea—and we were impressed by you and your staff and your frankness. You command an Air Force that is just moments notice from combat, exist in a world of severely constrained resources where tough choices are made every day about what gets funded and what does not, like your other witnesses who sit here at the table with you.
For example, in operations and maintenance funding, the Air Force ran short recently. General Iverson's operations and maintenance budget was cut by 7 percent. The choice he made was to cut quality of life programs in his command in order to maintain the flying hour program.
Page 189 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Some might say about that decision, ''So what? Don't we pay commanders do make those kinds of calls?'' Sure, we do, but I would argue that as agents of the branch of Government charged by the Constitution with providing for and maintaining our Nation's Armed Forces, we need to understand more fully why a commander, closer to combat than most other senior commanders in the military, was compelled to make such an explicit choice between preserving his ability to carry on with his mission and taking care of his people.
Moreover, we ought to understand the implications of that decision for the people in the command whose quality of life was knocked down not more than one peg, so to speak, but by a tradeoff as field commanders must make.
If General Iverson's case of being forced to make hard tradeoffs was unique, there would be no reason for this hearing today. However, what we are finding out is that General Iverson's case unfortunately is not unique to the military.
Take General Schwartz, commander of the Army's III Corps at Fort Hood, one of our witnesses today. His assessment upon taking command of the corps was that his unit, representing 37 to 42 percent of the active Army's ground combat power, was heading for a train wreck in fiscal year 1998. That train wreck—in his words, not mine—was coming because he was charged with maintaining the combat readiness for high-intensity combat operations while conducting operations other than war at a blistering pace in the face of a budget cut of at least 17 percent.
Added to that cut were decreasing numbers of personnel, decreasing money for quality of life, and increased demands to provide for force modernization. Within his units on average, soldiers were spending 150 days a year away from their homes and their families.
Page 190 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Since then, General Schwartz has made some choices and some tradeoffs across the board in his command to try to avoid the train wreck, and I am sure he will tell us about those today. We need to understand and evaluate them because each has significant implications not only for the Army, but for the Congress in how we help make decisions. In making these decisions as to how we allocate defense funding, we need to get underneath the top-line assessments and understand the dynamics of what is going on in the field of operations throughout the world.
Let me give you a couple of examples of the kind of tradeoffs that are going on in III Corps, as I understand it, to help avoid this train wreck. First of all, General Schwartz cancelled the training rotation of a major unit at the National Training Center. Such cancellations are extremely rare, and many commanders will tell you that they would not cancel a rotation for any reason. In this case, though, as I understand it, General Schwartz felt the unit's operational tempo was too high due to a recent relocation of a whole unit from one installation to another, and as a result, the unit was unprepared to get a full training value from the NTC.
Was that the implication for the unit of not going to the NTC? General Schwartz can answer that best here today. However, in the larger context, as the Army begins a budget-saving strategy of reducing the number of annual NTC rotations from 12 to 10, what are the implications for overall readiness on war-fighting capability for the entire Army?
There are many of us here on this panel who are very concerned that when we send our troops in missions other than war and in peacekeeping operations, how long must it take for them to be combat-ready and capable.
Page 191 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
The second measure being adopted at Fort Hood, one of many to help generate savings that might be applied to quality of life, is the increased use of simulation for combat training. Here is how it works. In his budget, General Schwartz receives enough money to allow his tanks to drive 800 miles per year with 800 miles being the accepted budgetary shorthand measure of resources required to maintain combat readiness. To save money, it is General Schwartz' estimate that increased use of more effective simulators will allow him to get the same training benefits as if he had driven or used ''60 miles of resources, actually training out in the field on ranges and field maneuver exercises.'' The 60 miles worth of resources saved through increased simulation will be diverted to quality of life efforts at Fort Hood. The strategy has risks because no one knows for certain, in a quantifiable way, the degree in which simulation can be substituted for actual training in the field. Is the tank battalion that simulates 60 miles of training just as ready and capable as one that does all of its training in the field? If General Schwartz' guess is wrong, the 60 miles of simulated training does not produce the same combat proficiency as the dirt training his resource level leaves him little ability to recover. If he guesses right, his quality of life programs will be helped, and he will maintain his combat capability.
There is a complication that has developed for General Schwartz' strategy, a complication that is systematic of the growing budget pressures across all services. Apparently, the Army has decided that in the fiscal year 1998, it can no longer pay for the National Training Center rotations out of the centralized source. Heretofore, the 800 miles given to General Schwartz were his to use to prepare his units for going to the NTC. Funding of about 250 additional miles were provided to units for use at the NTC. Now it seems units like III Corps will be required to fund NTC rotations out of their 800 miles.
Page 192 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
In short, the Army seems to have moved the budget goalpost significantly on General Schwartz. The implications of such a move for training, readiness and quality of life at Fort Hood are issues that need to be explored here today.
My fear, Mr. Bateman and colleagues, is that the budget pressures will continue beyond fiscal year 1998, as each service seeks funds for modernization. The budget squeeze on training, readiness and quality of life will continue to intensify as evidenced by the experiences of General Iverson and General Schwartz that I have already described.
A larger concern of mine is that already in the resource-constrained environment, the only fungible resource remains the people. We will hear today from the NCO's and the spouses, who can give us some insights into the price that people are paying as each service attempts to do more with less. We and the services should also be vitally concerned about the impact on recruiting and retention if it begins to appear to the people in the services and those who are considering joining that the sacrifices being required by the services are no longer worth the perceived rewards.
If the draw-down continues, contrary to the promises made by all services that it will soon be over, I think many people in the services may conclude that the Department of Defense can no longer be trusted. This, coupled with a growing perception of the loss of benefits among the force that is 65 percent married, continuing financial strain resulting from inadequate pay and allowances, and marginal quality of life, will cause major stress cracks in the force.
Mr. Chairman, I know that the witnesses here today understand that the fundamental law of nature is to seek peace, even though you are dressed as a warrior. But peace is not defined by passive action, but by the vigilance of soldiers, whose life has been to the call of the flag. We appreciate your service to the country, and we will anticipate your frank remarks.
Page 193 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Thank you.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Buyer.
Mr. Sisisky.
STATEMENT OF HON. NORMAN SISISKY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. SISISKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join with Mr. Bateman in welcoming you to this joint Readiness and Personnel Subcommittee hearing today, and with that, Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent that my entire statement be placed in the record, and I look forward to the testimony today.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Sisisky.
I would now recognize Mr. Taylor.
STATEMENT OF HON. GENE TAYLOR, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSISSIPPI, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE
Page 194 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Along the same lines, in order to move this hearing along, I would like to ask unanimous consent to submit my remarks for the record.
I would also like to take this opportunity to remind people that I think what we are going to hear today is that our armed forces are underfunded. Perchance this committee ought to be the one to say that, rather than rushing toward tax breaks that we cannot afford, maybe we ought to spend some of that money on upgrading our military.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Taylor.
As our first panel of witnesses, we have Lt. Gen. Thomas A. Schwartz, commander, III Corps, Fort Hood, TX; Lt. Gen. Ronald W. Iverson, commander, 7th Air Force, Osan Air Force Base, Korea; Vice Adm. Charles Abbot, commander, 6th Fleet; and Lt. Gen. Carlton W. Fulford, commander, First Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, CA.
We welcome all of you and thank you very much for your participation and for the assistance your testimony will give us.
General Schwartz, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. THOMAS A. SCHWARTZ, U.S. ARMY, COMMANDER, III CORPS, FORT HOOD, TX
Page 195 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the joint subcommittees, it is an honor for me to appear before you today. As commander of the III Armored Corps, I am please to report that the corps is trained and ready; morale is high; the discipline is the best ever. Maintenance is excellent. III Corps is capable of quickly projecting heavy forces worldwide in support of the Nation's vital interests.
We are a ''team of teams,'' compared of America's finest soldiers, armed with the world's most lethal weapon systems, backed by a dedicated civilian work force, and supported by a great community of central Texans.
III Corps is proud to be a large part of the greatest army in the world. We are very busy. But our success in accomplishing numerous, diverse missions has instilled incredible confidence and pride in our soldiers. Nevertheless, the corps is stretched. We are stretching our soldiers, their families, and our budget with a blistering operational pace.
Many soldiers share these thoughts with us before choosing to leave the Army. Retention is becoming a problem, and I believe it will be our greatest challenge this year. The key to meeting this challenge is to balance readiness by keeping our focus on our people.
The current trend in III Corps people is to do less better, not to do more with less. This philosophy is best captured in the statement: ''We do not go to the field to train; we train to go to the field.'' Our training challenge is to train leaders and soldiers prior to using valuable training resources—time and money—in the mud. To accomplish this, we focus on the basics: live fires, movement techniques, and first-line supervisor training.
Page 196 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
We work hard to make our training environment predictable in terms of our soldiers' time. We are sensitive to the fact that 64 to 65 percent of our soldiers are married and spend on an average 140 days away from their families every year. The few weekends that each soldier is on Fort Hood is called fenced. This means that during home station training, we do not train on weekends. It is amazing what a few small efforts at predictability and preserving the time mean to our soldiers.
We continue to rely increasingly on training simulation strategy, one that balances the time we spend in the field with the time we spend doing simulations. This has proven to be an effective way to train, and it save us dollars.
The Army is currently able to maintain a corps-wide personnel strength of about 98 percent. However, I am not sanguine about the future personnel picture. We are working through challenges to recruiting and retention that if not successfully met could cause personnel readiness to drop in the near term. This may cause units to break authorized readiness levels in several of our major subordinate commands. Additionally, a continued shortage of mid- and senior-grade noncommissioned officers will make training new soldiers and maintaining our equipment more difficult.
Currently, the PERSTEMPO in III Corps is one of our greatest challenges. While we initiated a number of programs to reduce the PERSTEMPO associated with home station training, an average of 15 percent of Fort Hood's soldiers are routinely deployed for operational missions.
We currently have 6,334 soldiers deployed in nearly 20 countries around the world. This is projected to rise to 8,000 soldiers in the next few weeks. The risk of damaging the long-term readiness of the corps remains one of my concerns.
Page 197 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
All of the corps' maintenance trends remain positive. We currently exceed or meet prescribed readiness rates for our major combat systems. However, we continue to have difficult maintaining older, low-density combat support and service support systems. There is a moderate risk that personnel shortages in key maintenance-related military occupational specialties will impact readiness as well.
Just over a year ago, the senior leadership of the corps met to assess the reality of the environment we were operating in and to develop a plan to meet the needs of our soldiers and their families. There was not a good deal of great news about our operating environment. It was fast-paced; we were burning out our soldiers.
We realized that readiness was more than training. It was a balance of many interrelated components. To us, balanced readiness is training, equipping, maintaining, caring for, and deploying the force while retaining the ability to recruit and retain quality, professional soldiers and their families. We also knew that quality of life was a major consideration for soldier retention.
The budget trend at Fort Hood has been down. In fiscal year 1996, we had a budget of $741 million; in fiscal year 1997, $657 million; and a projected fiscal year 1998 budget of $618 million. This downward trend stretches training as well as our ability to fund what we call base operations. Current BASOPS funding represents approximately one-third of our total budget. It keeps the lights on, but it does not adequately support the installation. Currently, we are funded at 76 percent of our BASOPS requirement. We need an additional 8 percent of our total budget to keep quality of life programs in line with soldier expectations. This translates to a shortfall of about $46 million.
Page 198 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Again, our assessment took the declining budget and the plight of our soldiers into account. With a common corporate vision and goals for the future, everyone pitched in. The results were enormous. During the remaining months of fiscal year 1996, the corps gained significant efficiencies from its training and maintenance strategies. The bulk of these efficiencies were realized from optimizing logistics operations. Other significant efficiencies came from maximizing our state of the art training devices and simulations.
Initiatives like these helped us generate dollars for reinvestment into a better living and working environment in our motor pools, in the offices where our soldiers work, in our dining facilities, barracks, youth centers and gymnasiums. The return on these investments is huge. Just ask our soldiers how they feel.
The cumulative effects of long deployments, inadequate pay, and an unpredictable schedule place great stress on soldiers and their families. If we are not careful, this will adversely impact on our readiness.
While there is no direct correlation, I am happy to report that some of the programs that we have initiated at Fort Hood have made a difference. Reenlistment reflects the real impact of some of our initiatives. Last quarter, 43 percent of our reenlisting mid-term soldiers and their families chose Fort Hood for their next assignment in comparison with only 24 percent in the prior year.
III Corps remains trained and ready. We are busy, but at the same time, we are very successful. The key to our continued success is our ability to focus on what we call balanced readiness. Balanced readiness, as we define it, will sustain us in our efforts to remain trained and ready, while focusing on our most important asset—our people. It is our soldiers who made this Army great, and it is our soldiers who will keep the Army great.
Page 199 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Let me close by saying that III Corps is a proud, caring, combat-ready ''team of teams.'' This concludes my testimony, and I am prepared to answer any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Schwartz can be found in the appendix on page 289.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, General Schwartz.
Now, Vice Admiral Abbot, please.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. CHARLES ABBOT, U.S. NAVY, COMMANDER, 6TH FLEET, ITALY
Admiral ABBOT. Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to be with you today. I have prepared a statement for submission to the record.
Mr. BATEMAN. All of the written statements will be made a part of the record without objection.
Admiral ABBOT. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I can report to you that naval expeditionary forces in the U.S. 6th Fleet are mission-ready. They deploy to our theater properly manned, well-trained and ready to maintain regional stability and resolve conflict. They are persuasive in peace and would be decisive in war. They are recognized by friends, allies, and potential adversaries as the preeminent naval force in the European theater.
Page 200 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
We are presently maintaining high readiness levels while at the same time achieving greater engagement with our friends and allies. We have fewer deployed forces than we did 5 years ago, but we are operating more efficiently and taking advantage of innovative training opportunities.
OPTEMPO has been substantially reduced in the Mediterranean theater for our operating forces, and we are meeting the OPTEMPO goals established by the Chief of Naval Operations. At the same time, by efficient scheduling and better operations, we have increased our participation in bilateral and multilateral exercises. The reduction in OPTEMPO has actually improved the quality of life for our deployed men and women and has enhanced maintenance of the fleet units. The increased interaction with other navies has promoted interoperability and contributed to stability in the region.
Although fewer in number, the shifts, the aircraft, and the people who come to 6th Fleet today possess greater capabilities than their predecessors. Greater capabilities give the commander a wider range of choices for employing these assets.
Just over a year ago, 6th Fleet forces demonstrated their combat readiness and interoperability during Operation Deliberate Force. The NATO air forces supporting Deny Flight and Deliberate Force involved aircraft from eight different countries including the United States.
Following the Sarajevo mortar attack in August 1995, NATO and U.N. leaders agreed upon a retaliatory use of coalition force. Sixth Fleet units were an integral part of the operations that ensued. Included as the firing of Tomahawk cruise missiles in support of Deliberate Force. We were able to successfully execute real world operations due to proper training, joint standardization initiatives, and coordination among staffs.
Page 201 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Eighteen months later, we maintain the same preparedness in the southern region to respond quickly with a naval striking force. In fact, with the enhancements achieved in theater training and targeting, we are better today.
Our recent participation in operations other than war in Liberia, Central Africa, and Bosnia has demonstrated naval expeditionary force capabilities—flexible, sustainable, and shaped for joint operations.
Far from dulling our sword, we have sharpened it with these engagements. We have increased regional security through a plan that has steadily enlarged the number of nations that seek to exercise with our forces. We have developed plans to fit each of the friendly countries in the region, and with these plans, we tailor our exercises to meet host nation requirements and to build bridges to better relationships. Sixth Fleet forward-deployed forces are on the scene, flexible, and cost effective in shaping this evolving environment.
Prior to 1992, 6th Fleet engaged 12 countries. Today we are working with 9 additional countries in the theater and thus have plans with 21 of 26 maritime nations in the AOR.
This is not a one-way street. By gaining access to new training ranges and areas, we have operated more efficiently and reduced the transit time for our forces between exercises and increased the frequency with which our forces practice the specific, critical combat skills that are required for contingency operations. A greater percentage of our flying and steaming time is devoted to quality training, enabling us to maintain readiness despite our reduced OPTEMPO.
Page 202 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Our engagement with these states pays direct dividends in unit readiness because our readiness can be measured in improved combined war-fighting skills with our NATO allies. In NATO, I command the Striking and Support Force in Southern Europe, where we have taken strike and amphibious warfare training to new levels. Most recently, we exercised with the French carrier Clemenceau and the U.S. aircraft carrier U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt in dual carrier battle group operations.
In the area of amphibious training, we now have established bilateral training programs with Greece and Turkey, which are in addition to our NATO exercises with those countries.
We are not satisfied with the status quo. We are seeking additional efficiencies in order to reduce costs without degrading our ability to execute assigned missions. For example, we are currently doing a systematic and detailed study of court costs, and the results will guide our port visit plans and reduce the overall costs of operating.
Across the board, we are looking for organizational structure enhancements that we can evaluate and become structured in a more efficient manner. We are focused on eliminating those organizational redundancies and finding efficiencies in how we do business day-to-day.
The units that we are receiving from U.S. force providers are ''full-up rounds.'' The number of casualty reports we experience has remained relatively stable over the last 5 years. Our in-theater maintenance capabilities have been augmented with battle group intermediate maintenance activities and amphibious ready group intermediate maintenance activities embarked in those platforms.
Page 203 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Sixth Fleet forces, as they enter and operate in the AOR, are at a high level of readiness and are ready to accomplish the complete spectrum of missions. The measure of this readiness does not come exclusively from material assessments or personnel counts, but also from the operational enhancements gained through expanded theater engagement. Our forces remain versatile, have maintained their war-fighting skills, expanded their scope of engagement, and contributed to increased regional stability.
A final but most crucial measure of readiness is the morale and quality of our people. Sixth Fleet sailors and marines continue to be the best in the world, and they are our highest priority. Their quality of life is the absolute foundation of our readiness. The 6th Fleet today is ready. We are ready to take on the full spectrum of military missions for which we are responsible.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity. I look forward to responding to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Abbot can be found in the appendix on page 301.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, Admiral Abbot. Let me say just parenthetically that I understand the French are interested in your job; I hope they do not get it.
Admiral ABBOT. Thank you very much, sir. I share that same feeling. [Laughter.]
Page 204 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. We are now pleased to hear from General Iverson, whom I suppose wins the ''man mile award'' for the most distance traveled to be with us. We are indeed pleased to have you, General.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. RONALD W. IVERSON, U.S. AIR FORCE, COMMANDER, 7TH AIR FORCE, OSAN AIR FORCE BASE, KOREA
General IVERSON. Mr. Chairman, honorable members of the committee, it is my pleasure to be here, and I thank you very much for this opportunity to speak to you. I too have submitted a statement for the record.
In my oral words, in light of the testimony yesterday and rather than reading a prepared oral statement, I would like to make some comments in a couple of different areas.
First of all, though, Congressman Buyer, it is not that the service did not want to send me. Everyone is concerned about Korea and the constant threat. General Talely is also here in town today, and we try not to be out of country at the same time together, but because of the importance of this testimony, he thought that I should attend also.
OPTEMPO is a concern—a great concern—throughout the services. We do not deploy in Korea outside of Korea. The forces there are there to fight the Korean war. But our OPTEMPO is defined in 1-year remove tours. Ninety-two percent of the people at Osan are on remote tour. At Kunsan, another main operating base, 100 percent are on remote tours.
Page 205 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
I define this as OPTEMPO because these young men and women come to Korea for a year, away from their families, trying to maintain two households, and then they go back to the family, back to the States, and back to their next assignment, and now they are on a TDY/TAD OPTEMPO problem which you have heard about in other testimony. So it is very, very difficult for our young men and women to maintain their families and to maintain the readiness necessary based on OPTEMPO in that area.
I know the issue before the Congress and specifically the committee as you work your way through this is readiness versus modernization. I would like to make a statement in that area, because in my 32 years in the military, we have seen readiness versus modernization issues before. This is not a new issue before us. I recall in the late 1980's, when the Air Force looked at what we needed to do and decided to downsize very quickly. It was important because that was modernization for us. We had old weapon systems, and they were becoming very costly to maintain, so that gave us the opportunity to get rid of the old systems and stick with the new.
And of course, Desert Storm came along, and we maintained about a 92 percent fully mission-capable rate in all airplanes during combat operations. That operation was very important at that time.
I see that occurring again, because today in Korea, I look at fully mission-capable rates, and 2 1/2 years ago, the F–16's at Osan were on average 92 percent ready to go. The day before yesterday when I left, we were at 88 percent. It is usually about 1 percent per year degrade in capability as the systems age. Certainly, we will do midlevel upgrades to the systems and will put them back and start over again, but we see that degrade happening today.
Page 206 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
The units in Korea are fully mission-capable and ready. We are ready to fight. My concern is that I am watching this gradual decline. As Congressman Buyer said, the tradeoffs are very difficult to make, but I have to make them because we must stay combat-ready because of the threat, which is there each and every day. And the only tradeoff we have is quality of life—quality of life and infrastructure tradeoffs—civil engineering dollars to fix those old systems that we have. I am talking basics—sewer, water, power. We have no MILCON in Korea although, thanks to you all, we do have some dorms coming up for the Army and one for the Air Force each year.
But those dollars, you must have water—you do not have a choice. But we are thinking about the $14 million—which I believe is the figure in PACEF—out of civil engineering to make sure that our readiness is good. At Osan, I am about $14 million unfunded for 1998; $6 million of that is for exercises in training. $8 million is for infrastructure upgrades that we must do in order to provide the quality of life for our people who live there.
So I know it is a difficult issue. My point is that modernization is going to be very important to us down the road because 10, 15 years from now, the current systems that are at 88 percent fully mission-capable will be down in the seventies, like our old F–4's were 10 years ago, and we cannot generate new systems immediately; it takes time.
So the difficult thing, of course, for all of us is how much do we modernize, how fast, and how ready do we have to be. I have no answers for you, sir; I am sorry. But I know that that is General Fogelman's and Secretary Woodnall's job; they are looking at it very, very closely, and in the past, I think their judgment has been very wise, and they are carefully balancing that tradeoff between modernization and readiness. And sir, I would say we need to modernize.
Page 207 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Thank you for the opportunity to comment, sir, and I am ready to take your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Iverson can be found in the appendix on page 321.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Now we look forward to hearing from General Fulford.
General.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. CARLTON W. FULFORD, U.S. MARINE CORPS, COMMANDER, 1ST MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, CAMP PENDLETON, CA
General FULFORD. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, I am indeed honored to be here today to talk to you about the readiness of the marines and sailors and their families that I am privileged to lead in the 1st marine Expeditionary Force.
Our home is in five bases in southern California and Arizona. Two of those are being closed as a result of recent BRAC decisions, and we are in the process of that closure now. We number over 45,000 marines and sailors and include about 35,000 family members; a pretty sizable number.
Page 208 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
We routinely support CENTCOM and PACOM with forward-deployed forces. Today, as every day, over 30 percent of my force is forward-deployed, either on the Unit Deployment Program in Japan, on ships in the western Pacific and the Persian Gulf, or on exercises. We also periodically support the Southern Command with medical, dental, and engineering exercises and training, and we support USACOM in support of JTF–6 drug surveillance missions and domestic disaster relief missions, such as the wild fires in Oregon last fall.
Again, as measures—and they are only measures—about 30 percent of my marines and sailors are deployed all the time, with a mean time away from home of about 159 days a year—and I say again, a mean time, not an extreme.
Gentleman, that is our job. Our mission is to be ready to fight and win our Nation's wars and to forward deploy our forces in support of war-fighting CINC's. I will tell you, sir, that today we are ready. Our ground readiness is in excess of 92 percent, and our mission-capable aviation readiness is in excess of 77 percent.
Our people are as good as I have ever seen. Our training is challenging and robust, and the commander feels the esprit of his marines and sailors is as good now as I have ever known it.
We are, however, challenged. Our equipment is aging. General Iverson talked about the routine or the expected decline in readiness over time as our equipment ages. Today, we have not seen that decline because we have worked our people harder. Increasing amounts of our operation and maintenance account is going from maintenance of vehicles and equipment and longer hours when our marines and sailors come home from these deployments, spend maintaining our readiness.
Page 209 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
We work our people very hard to maintain this readiness. We are doing OK with less. This committee provided plus-ups for our individual equipment, and our marines go to the field and train today happier than they did a year ago because of that. Our major end-items of equipment are ready, but as I said, it takes effort to keep them that way. You provide us state-of-the-art simulation that has been talked about here before, that gives us good, realistic feedback. A pilot can fire 10 missiles in one afternoon and get the training value of that, whereas firing a live missile, you might only get 1 per year. The simulation is good and is indeed an enhancement to our training, not a replacement for it.
In conjunction with some of the academic institutions in California and some of the major businesses there, we are working very hard on better business practices for our maintenance for our combat support. We are doing better on order/ship times and repair cycle times for our equipment, and my maintainers tell me that they promise me that within a year, two points in readiness as a result of these better business practices.
We are focusing on our exercises to make sure we only do what supports our mission. We are more selective, more scrupulous in the use of our time and our resources for training exercises, and we are incorporating both the Reserves and our family volunteers to a greater extent than ever before in maintaining the readiness and the operational efficiency of our organization.
We stopped doing large field exercises. More and more of our exercises are smaller, focused, and we do more CPX's and tactical exercises with troops than we might have done 3 or 4 years ago.
Page 210 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Our replacement and replenishment of individual equipment is not as good as I would like to do be, and that is a danger sign that I am watching very carefully.
In terms of compensation, our marines and sailors for the most part are young; over half are unmarried, which is different from the statistics that we talked about earlier, and therefore, they are on the lower end of the pay scale. But when I talk to them, pay is not the compensation issue they are concerned about. They are concerned about a place to live, be it BEQ's or family housing, when they come back from these deployments; they want this to be safe, to provide them adequate privacy, to be able to enjoy their time either with their friends or with their family; and they are concerned about medical care.
In summary, sir, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force is ready today. Our equipment is getting older, and it takes more time and more dollars to keep it ready. Our manning is meeting our commitments because of a very high-quality course, but we are indeed working very hard, sir.
I am prepared to take your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Fulford can be found in the appendix on page 330.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, General Fulford, and thank you all.
One of the things that I am mystified about as we look at the macro picture here from the committee table, and we see the President's 1998 budget submission, and I think it increases O & M accounts by about $1 billion plus over fiscal year 1997, and we thought we had increased O & M accounts for fiscal year 1997 over 1996. But several of you have mentioned the fact that your budgets that you have to operate your units, your forces, have decreased.
Page 211 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
What is happening to the O & M budget that it does not show up? If it is stable or increasing, why doesn't it show up that way when it gets down to your level of operations?
Does anybody have any insights to share with us on that?
General FULFORD. Sir, if I may, my O & M account has been relatively stable for the last 3 years, but an increasing proportion of that O & M account is going for maintenance, double-digit increases in the cost of maintenance over the last 3 years.
My ground combat element, the 1st Marine Division, is spending 22 percent more for maintenance this year than it did last year. So as the cost of maintaining our aging equipment goes up, the funds available for operations and training are necessarily going down.
Mr. BATEMAN. Which brings us back to the necessity for modernization if we are going to lick this problem in the long run.
General FULFORD. Yes, sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. If you were to gauge your readiness 18 months ago compared to your state of readiness today and then look into the future assuming what we now can see, are you going to be as ready 18 months from now, or is it likely to be a degradation in readiness if we do not do some things between now and then?
Page 212 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General IVERSON. Mr. Chairman, I will throw out a point on that. As I mentioned in my remarks, I think history will show that we go down about 1 percent a year with older systems for maintenance—it takes more money, more parts; it is just a factor of life. So I think that 18 months from now, our readiness will be down 1 or 2 percent from what it is today.
General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, I would say this. It was mentioned earlier what I said was a potential ''train wreck'' of 1998, and of course, what I was talking about in that potential train wreck was exactly what you asked about in your question—what will things look like in, let us say, 18 months. And as I assessed this with my commanders, as I looked at the shortage of people that we are experiencing right now, and if you look at the readiness reports of our commanders throughout—there are 79 battalion commanders at Fort Hood; it is a large operation—all of them talk about personnel shortages.
If you look at the increased PERSTEMPO and OPTEMPO—and I am talking about deployment as well as a 300 percent increase in missions—if you look at the declining budget that we have—and I have integrated that quite well in my statement in terms of going from $741 million in 1996 to a potential $618 million in 1998—if you look at the challenges we have in retention and I would also say in recruiting, it is a combination of all of this, and then the quality of life challenges we have in our installations. If we do not focus on and meet these challenges, I think we could have problems. But I would say that we are looking at those. We are looking at them in terms of a balanced readiness. We are looking at what we can do as installation commanders. We are looking at what we can do as an army, and I think we are trying to balance that, and we are trying to create the efficiencies internally—all of us are trying to do that—so we can take some of those dollars and efficiencies and put them back on the quality of life, back into the base operations account that is underfunded.
Page 213 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
So I would say that we are meeting the challenge, but we need to continue to address the problems that I just explained head-on because those are our challenges over the next 18 months.
Mr. BATEMAN. General Iverson, you made reference to the fact that the Air Force had made a very wise decision to draw down the forces in order to protect its ability to modernize, and I whole-heartedly agree with your statement. The concern that I have is given the personnel operating tempo that all the services are now experiencing, we are not at a point where we can pay for modernization by further downsizing unless we are going to downsize missions.
So it seems to me we have got to have an infusion of some new capital if we are going to make things work. Unquestionably, modernization is key to future readiness; quality of life is critical to near-term and long-term readiness. It seems to me that we have an inordinate challenge, much of which cannot be met without just a plain old infusion of some additional financial resources.
With that, although I have some other questions, I will suspend in fairness to others.
Mr. Buyer.
Mr. BUYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Page 214 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
What I am trying to figure out is when you testified and you mentioned readiness levels and percentages, I am not so certain I understand what all that means, especially across the services. So that when General Iverson testifies and says that ''readiness has moved in a degradation from 92 percent to 88 percent,'' I am not so certain what all you used to measure that, so if you could share that with me.
And then, in the Marine Corps testimony, ''ground readiness at 92 percent, aviation at 77 percent''—I am not so certain what that means, either, if you are using the same type of formula, or does the DOD have a formula. And I do not even know how the Navy measures that. I do not know.
So if you could share that with me, and the Army the same way, that would be helpful. What is it presently?
General IVERSON. I will start, Congressman Buyer. We base the 92 percent figure on the full mission-capable rate. You look at all the mission elements that an airplane has to do in its wartime mission, and we measure that—it is a metric we use in maintenance to evaluate how well we are doing. So we either have a fully mission-capable rate, or a mission-capable rate, or it is nonmission-capable—nonmission-capable for maintenance, for supply, for whatever reason.
So the fully mission-capable rate is an overall measurement of what the capability of your fleet is at any one given time. That is what fully mission-capable is. It has decreased about a percent per year, a little more than that with one squadron that I have.
Page 215 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BUYER. All right. General Fulford.
General FULFORD. Sir, my ground readiness is measured in terms of the standard of readiness and training in the SORTS report, which is 92-plus percent over the last year, and right now, today.
My aviation readiness is mission-capable, and I am not sure we use the same criteria as General Iverson, but it means that that aircraft is prepared and can lift off right now to perform its mission.
Mr. BUYER. And are we in a declining scale on these numbers in aviation?
General FULFORD. I am not sure. My historic average is about 78–79 percent. I did decline a bit this year because of a unique rotor blade problem with my CH–53 Echo helicopters. That has been fixed, and therefore my readiness is coming back up. And I would think that about 79 percent is where I will be by the end of the quarter.
Mr. BUYER. What does the Navy do?
Admiral ABBOT. Mr. Buyer, my impression is that all the services do it differently, and that there is no standard metric, so comparisons between us would not be useful; that it is more useful in terms of identifying trends.
In the Navy, we look at——
Page 216 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BUYER. That is what I am trying to do, and I do not understand metric, OK?
Admiral ABBOT. I can tell you that on the Navy's measurement of readiness, we look at the percentage of time, in the case of ships, that they are free of C3 and C4 CASREP's, mission degrading or limiting CASREP's, casualty reports, and for aircraft, we use measurements which are similar to the Air Force for mission-capable and full mission-capable rates. We look at the amount of flying that pilots achieve in a given period as a percentage of the required rate of flying as another measurement for readiness. And those trends in the Navy have been either steady or positive in recent years.
Mr. BUYER. Would your testimony here today be that yours is not in a declining scale, then, in your readiness for your fleet?
Admiral ABBOT. That is correct, sir.
Mr. BUYER. What is the Army right now?
General SCHWARTZ. In the Army, we look at measuring readiness in probably four areas, if I could just quickly cover those, because we all do evidently look at it differently. In the people side of it as we measure our readiness, we look at the overall fill rates, and I indicated that III Corps, for example, is at a 98 percent fill rate. But that is overall an indicator of readiness. But when you go into the critically short or low-density MOS's, you can find a different story.
Page 217 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
For example, our 11–MIKES, our infantrymen who do the fighting for us, we are at an 85-percent assigned strength, and we are projected to go to a strength of about 80 percent. Traditionally and historically, we know that about 10 percent of our soldiers are not available out of an assigned strength, so that could put us at about 70 percent strength.
I have 246 dismounted squads, infantrymen that deploy out of the back of Bradley vehicles. We only have 14 of those squads that are not manned. That is not too bad. We have 100 percent of our tanks manned and 100 percent of our Bradley fighting vehicles manned.
So in the people arena—there is an other factor, too, which is deployment and how many days they are deployed in their stretch, and that is about 140 days a year, so that is an indicator of readiness and stretch on our people.
Resources, budget trends, are down. We look at that, and we know that it is down—from $741 million to a projected $618 million.
Training is another area where we look at readiness. Our training right now is assessed as very good. We are getting smarter with the things that we do. We are getting better with simulation devices and balancing that all off. Also, many of us are making those tough choices about how we spend our dollars, and when given the tough choice, most of us choose to fully fund training and underfund base operations. But the training side is good.
On the maintenance side, the trends are good. We have an operational readiness rate of our vehicles across the board of plus 90 percent on our combat vehicles. That is excellent, and historically, that is very good. But with the shortage of mechanics and the increase of OPTEMPO in terms of the number of miles that we go and the missions we get, that puts stress and strain on the future.
Page 218 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
So the trend there—if you ask me for an overall trend, I think it looks like we will be able to cope with this by efficiencies and other things, but we need the dollars. I think that that is the big thing—the infusion of dollars to continue to deal with the challenges in the BASOPS arena.
Mr. BUYER. Many of us, even in our personal lives, have coping skills to cover for some of our own personal inadequacies. You also are going to have coping skills, and at what cost. That is the reason why the chairman and I decided to have this joint hearing, because your tradeoffs are at what cost?
General Iverson, you said it very well. You said how much, at what rate, and how ready, and that you do not have the answers. We have got to look to you for some of those answers because we have to come up with those kinds of decisions, all of us here, collectively, making those decisions.
So I have some further questions, but I will yield to my colleagues, and I will followup.
Thank you.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you.
Proceeding under the 5-minute rule, Mr. Sisisky.
Page 219 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. SISISKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Yesterday's hearing was somewhat similar to this. It is very strange in a readiness hearing that everybody agrees, and yesterday everybody agreed, on quality of life issues. I agree that they are extremely important. But I have a difficult time—now, we know that if you leave your family in bad housing when you go overseas, that is bad. We also know that we need gymnasiums. All of us know that. We need good health care.
But there is another quality of life issue. I worry, General Fulford, when you talk about 159 days. Yesterday, your counterpart in the 2d Marine Expeditionary Force out of North Carolina talked about 177 days. And General, you talked about—was it 140?
General SCHWARTZ. One hundred and forty days, sir.
Mr. SISISKY. Now, somewhere along the line, I believe that the Navy and, I think, the Air Force, have settled that. When they deploy 6 months, they can rest assured—I am sure with some exceptions like an airplane or something that happened in New York sand—but they can spend a year.
Now, are the Marines doing that? That is a real quality of life issue. I mean, that is the nuts and bolts, and it just seems to me that if we are deploying that much, then something else is wrong. You need more than 174,000 people in the Marine Corps, and you certainly need more in the Army, because you cannot keep that up. That is the true quality of life in a peacetime scenario. In a wartime scenario, we all know what happens, but to do that in peacetime—and in the Air Force, General Iverson, I assume that if they do a year—again, with some exceptions—they can be assured of some time back with their families; am I correct in that?
Page 220 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General IVERSON. No, sir, not necessarily. If they spend a year in Korea, and they come back to a unit that is getting ready to deploy, they could go for another 120 days in that next year. One hundred and twenty days is what we shoot for. In all but 4 weapon systems right now, we are under 120 days, but no, sir, they can——
Mr. SISISKY. Then, I could say that the Navy is the only one that really has a standard thing—and I will say that if we ever do more than 180 days, I think there is going to be another problem in the Navy. They tried that—am I correct, Admiral?
Admiral ABBOT. That is absolutely correct, Mr. Sisisky. The Navy, as you know, went through a very difficult period in the 1970's where we had extended deployments in the 9-, 10-month range, and short turnaround times, and people voted with their feet. We have successfully limited deployments to 6 months and time under way to 50 percent over a 5-year period. That has been very successful for us.
I think I am in complete agreement that although these other issues are very important to Navy people in terms of quality of life, separation from family is unquestionably No. 1.
Mr. SISISKY. I just want to ask one more question. I believe that when you have had a problem with civil service employees as well as uniformed personnel—it used to be that you took a civil service job, and security was the big thing—are you experiencing any problem with civilian employees and their morale because you know how many of them have been forced out of the military into early retirement and other things.
Page 221 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
I believe that there is a problem there, too. Do you see it as a problem—of course, you are continental—do you have a problem at Fort Hood?
General SCHWARTZ. Sir, at Fort Hood, we have 6,500 civilians who work on base. I think that that is the largest number of civilians that work on any CONUS installation or any base that we have, so it is a tremendous challenge there with respect to our civilians to keep them informed and to have that predictability in their jobs that you are talking about.
As we are forced more and more every day to become more efficient—let me give you an example in our director of logistics operations, where most of our civilians work—in excess of 1,000 civilians work there. We were forced to take a hard look at how efficient we were in that operation. As we looked at it, we contracted out to have people come in and help us look at it, and we got all the experts we could. Through this study, we found that to be the most efficient organization we could, we needed to let go 100 civilians. So we are in the process of trying to streamline that operation, and that is not good news for those folks in terms of having to let go of some civilians in a particular operation.
So we have to handle this very delicately, and we have to become smarter and better and more efficient. So it is a challenge for us, particularly on these large installations, every day, and to keep people well-informed.
But I would say the morale of the civilian force is high and good, and we would not know how to operate at Fort Hood without these great people.
Page 222 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. SISISKY. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Taylor.
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate all the panelists being here today. I was curious and concerned about your comments about how often the people under each of your commands are away from home, and it obviously is going to have a negative impact down the line, with people choosing not to reenlist, and we pay to train another person, only to leave 4 years later.
To what extent could that probably be solved—and I am going to open this up to the panel—budgetarily? What percentage of your budget would have to be increased, and increased by how much, to help solve this problem? How much of it could be solved, especially for those shorter, 120-day rotations, by greater use of the Guard and Reserve?
What comes to mind is that I recently visited Joint Task Force Bravo in Honduras. It is my understanding that what was to have been a 180-day deployment is now up to 1 year on a company. And I got the impression that that was budget-driven, so my question is could not another way of solving that have been greater use of the Guard and Reserve there on 6-month deployments?
Page 223 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
I will just open it up to the panelists.
General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Taylor, with respect to the Army, I do not have the exact numbers available in terms of the numbers of Guard and Reserve that are operationally deployed, but I have read them, and they are significant. The Guard and Reserve have a surge, and they are meeting the challenge to help balance of all of these operations other than war challenges that we have. So I think they are doing above and beyond, or more than their fair share, from what I understand; they are doing a tremendous job of helping us meet that challenge, and we are working together as partners in this, and it is very effective.
But I think the challenges we have down there with respect to money, and I would particularly like to comment on the pay for the soldiers, because I think we are going to face a challenge in the future of how much do we pay our soldier, particularly if you go to the married soldiers. The force is 65 percent married, and it was, for example, at Fort Hood at one time 67.5 percent married. We have a married Army force, and it has changed dramatically from when the pay scales were derived to pay the force years ago. They are married, and they have new challenges.
We can impact on the life of these married soldiers in particular by the VHA derivative, by the BAS that we pay them when they are separated from their families. Those are two ways that we can impact on it. So I think we need to look at ways like that that we can help our married families deal with the tremendous stress and what I would say is inadequate pay they receive right now to deal with these financial stresses they experience.
Mr. TAYLOR. General, may I interrupt?
Page 224 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General SCHWARTZ. Sure.
Mr. TAYLOR. What came to my attention at this one instance was that while they were there for 6 months on a company, they got TDY pay. Now I am being told the tour is extended to 1 year, and they do not get the TDY. So if you are gone from your family for 180 days, you get a little extra in your paycheck, but if you are gone for a year—which I would think would be even worse—that is taken away from you.
Is there any movement within the Armed Forces to try to address that, or at least find some sort of middle ground where, if you are gone longer, it does not come with the addition of a smaller paycheck?
General SCHWARTZ. There is a tremendous effort on the part of all of us to make known exactly what the plight of the soldier is with respect to some of these things they have to pay when they are deployed. We need to bring them in line with their expenses back home—for example, BAS.
If they are gone downrange in field exercises, National Training Center, they lose $210 a month that they would normally have gotten had they had been at home station. So we take that out of their pay, and that makes it tremendously difficult for the spouse to manage the budget back home when she—she or he—has to balance that budget and go without $210.
There has been some compensation, I might add, for some of our deploying soldiers overseas. Originally, a couple of years ago when we deployed the soldiers, they automatically lost the BAS, the $210 a month. Now we have made some recompense there, and we are able to pay these soldiers in some deployments and not take away the $210. So we are starting to move toward a solution, but I think we need to look harder at our soldiers who are deployed downrange of being on the installation as well as the National Training Center because they still lose the money.
Page 225 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
So we are moving toward a solution, but we are not there yet.
Mr. TAYLOR. Will you offer any suggestions along those lines this year in time for us to try to address it in the authorization bill?
General SCHWARTZ. The BAS is one that I would say is something that we need to address across the board. Do not take that money away from our soldiers. I am an advocate of that. Another way is VHA. We need to look at how we calculate the variable housing allowance, or VHA, that we give our soldiers, because right now it is calculated at only giving a soldier 80 percent of what we think his or her expenses are. I would maintain that we probably ought to look at a VHA allowance that looks at 100 percent of their expenses, because it is very difficult from State to State and location to location to get a good handle on exactly what their expenses are already, and we already shortchange them 20 percent of that allowance from the start, and it makes it very difficult for the soldiers to figure all of that out.
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General IVERSON. Congressman Taylor, just quickly, if I may.
Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, if he may.
Mr. BATEMAN. Yes; go ahead.
General IVERSON. The directors of personnel from the services will be with you next week. They are probably the best to ask that of. But I would ask you to look at family separation allowances. They have not been increased in years and years, and for those folks who are gone for a year remote, I think that that needs to be looked at and possibly increased.
Page 226 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Taylor.
Next, Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate all of the witnesses' testimony. All of you have testified that you are ready, but there are three elements that affect readiness, and I would hope each of you could kind of prioritize these for us. We would like to plus-up all of these accounts.
You have all mentioned O & M; you have mentioned modernization, and you have mentioned quality of life. So I would like for each of you to do two things. One is to prioritize those as one, two, three; if you had a choice as to whether we could plus-up accounts, which ones should we plus-up first. And secondly, are you experiencing problems with retention and recruitment, and if so, what do we need to do to alleviate these problems?
Let us just start with the Army. If you can, would you prioritize O & M modernization and quality of life as one, two, three, and then I will ask each of the other services to do the same.
Page 227 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir. I think the real challenge of the future is hopefully not to prioritize those one, two, three, but to try to balance those. I personally think that that is the challenge——
Mr. BARTLETT. In getting the balance, where do we need to provide increased funding?
General SCHWARTZ. I think in all three, sir.
Mr. BARTLETT. And you cannot prioritize them for us?
General SCHWARTZ. If I were forced to prioritize——
Mr. BARTLETT. If we have limited funds, we cannot plus-up all of them, perhaps, but we need your counsel so that we know where to put the emphasis.
General SCHWARTZ. I think for the record, I would say I would attempt to balance them, absolutely. But if I had to, and I were forced to make a choice and prioritize them, then I would say, going back to my contemporaries here, that the modernization account and its need to keep our equipment modern and capable of fighting the wars of the future has got to be addressed. We cannot let it go down. We know the degradation and readiness when we neglect our equipment, and we do not keep it modern and capable of fighting the wars of the future. So, modernization is very, very high.
Right behind that is our O & M accounts, because I think that our BASOPS—we call it BASOPS in the Army—that account really is intermixed with the quality of life account because out of that BASOPS account, we get our money for our quality of life; I think they are a close second, both of them, so we need to work on that.
Page 228 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
And my comment on retention and recruitment—I said in my statement, and I still think it is true, that I think it is really one of our greatest challenges, maybe over the next year or the next 18 months, to be able to not only retain—and I am talking about reenlisting our soldiers in terms of the quotas that we are given and making it through this year—we have made it the first quarter, and we have exceeded our quotas by 120 percent. We are now looking at the second quarter, and we do not know if we are going to make it or not. We are working hard on it. But if we roll in the aggressiveness of the first quarter, it looks good that we will make it the first and second quarters. The third and fourth quarters of this year will be a tremendous challenge for us when we look at the challenge in terms of bringing in 90,000 soldiers, recruiting them and bringing them into the force this year to keep us at an end-strength of 495,000.
So we are doing everything in our power, sir, to work on post to send the right signals to soldiers that we care about them, that we understand their needs and the quality of life expectations that they have, and to balance that all out, to send the right signals, so they raise their hands and say, ''Sir, I want to stay at Fort Hood. I want to reenlist for Fort Hood. I like what I see here. I like the way the Army takes care of me and my family.'' So we have got to send those right signals, and I think we are doing that, so there is positivity in what we are doing, and there are some tremendous challenges out there, too.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much, and thank you for giving us some counsel.
Would the Navy change this prioritization?
Page 229 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Admiral ABBOT. I think I would attack it in a similar fashion. It is a Hobson's choice, of course, as presented in that I think that for the budget that we have, we are as balanced as we can be, but there in fact are some problems that need to be dealt with. And in all three of those categories, they relate to the issue of recruitment and retention, which is I think ultimately the issue.
I therefore, perhaps, on an incremental dollar would say that quality of life would come first as the issue which would most rapidly affect retention and recruitment. But immediately behind that, both operations and maintenance and modernization ultimately affect recruitment and retention, in my opinion.
There are some concerns that we have about what we are seeing with retention. I will give you an example. We are experiencing slower than anticipated take-up rates on our aviation pay and our aviation bonuses. That is a complex thing that relates to airline hiring and other factors. But we come back to pilots saying we are going to make a decision here, and we are looking at one quality of life—we talked about length of deployment and separation from families—we are talking about the amount of time we are flying, the amount of dollars that are dedicated to funding those flying hours, and we are looking at modernization of the aircraft fleet—if I am going to be out there turning and burning, I want to do it in modern equipment that is good enough to go up against the best that they might encounter.
So I think all of those relate to recruitment and retention, which is the place where we will see it first as a degradation in the overall force.
Page 230 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. My time has expired. Could the Air Force and the Marines quickly give us their prioritization?
General IVERSON. Yes, sir. I do not say—it is not balancing, it is risk management, and it is very difficult balancing those three together. But either pay me now or pay me later, and I think that modernization, readiness and quality of life, from my viewpoint of being ready to go to combat, are what are important.
Retention is pilot retention. There is a big problem around the corner, and we are in trouble.
Mr. BARTLETT. And the Marines?
General FULFORD. Sir, I would say that modernization would be my first priority. With increased modernization, the amount of O & M that I spend for maintenance would decline, and that would better balance. And then, of course, quality of life. We have got to look after our people. We are meeting both our retention and our recruitment goals in the Marine Corps right now, and we do have very high-quality people.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you all very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you.
Page 231 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. Pickett, followed by Mr. Skelton.
Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to ask a question on this issue of the operations tempo. I have heard the quote of I think it was 179 days, 160 days, or something of that sort. Is that the average of just your units, or is that the average across the Army, or is it the average across the Marines, the average across the Navy, the average across the entire Air Force—the entire military department?
General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir. When I spoke of 140 days deployed, it was an average for III Corps soldiers. I think the Army average is approximately the same, by coincidence. But we measure this in terms of the number of days the soldiers are deployed away from their families, so we take an average.
Some units, of course, when we say average, that means 50 percent probably might be deployed more than that. Some of our engineers, for example, our MP's, for example, and our combat service support units sometimes exceed 140 days.
So the Army in general and III Corps is 140 days, and I think that that is pretty close to the Army average. I do not know about the other services.
General FULFORD. Sir, the number I used, 159, is the mean for my command. My aviation element is the most deployed, and their average is about 177, to there are extremes; but 159 is the mean number of days.
Page 232 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. PICKETT. How about for across the entire Marine Corps, the 174,000 or so marines who are there; what would the average be for those?
General FULFORD. Sir, I think it is pretty consistent. I think you heard testimony yesterday from my counterpart on the east coast.
Mr. PICKETT. Yes.
General FULFORD. His was a little bit higher than mine is. And then we have our forward-deployed forces, which are always in the Western Pacific, who are forward-deployed.
Mr. PICKETT. The other issue that came up had to do with the fact that the military departments are now the force providers and that the theater commanders in chief, the theater CINC's, are actually the so-called ones at war that actually use the forces. And there seems to be a little bit of a tension here in what the theater CINC's want and what the force providers are able to provide. Is there an adequate process to rationalize this so that demands that are not absolutely essential are not made, or if they are made, they can be rejected?
General IVERSON. I will take that one on, sir. The Joint Staff is working that very, very hard. General Shalikashvili works those critical weapon systems and problems that we have, at least where the Air Force is concerned, which would be AWAC's and U2 and a few of those, and does it very well; they are the ones who are the gatekeepers.
Page 233 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. PICKETT. There was some discussion yesterday about some competition between the theater CINC's for certain types of the units provided by the force providers, and that situation seems to be one that needs some attention from some authority. I am not sure who is in the position to take care of that, but I would hope somebody is going to be looking at that one.
The other issue is that someone quoted the other day—and it is the reason why I asked my first question—that there are 150,000 uniformed personnel within 50 miles of Washington. I was wondering if those 150,000 get the same degree of deployment as the people in the units that you gentlemen here this morning are representing, and I would like to hear some comments on that, please.
General IVERSON. No, sir. Their punishment is that they have to live here. [Laughter.]
General FULFORD. I would add that every one of those marines who are here wishes he was out in southern California.
Mr. PICKETT. The hardship tour is in Washington.
General FULFORD. Yes, sir.
General IVERSON. That is right.
Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Page 234 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Skelton.
Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was intrigued, Admiral Abbot, by your positive testimony. I think you have just read the book, ''The Power of Positive Thinking,'' because your testimony was quite upbeat.
Laying that aside, I wish to touch on various issues here, and it appears to me that the four of you gentlemen have only touched on two of the three problems that cause people to want to change their uniform to civilian clothing. You have talked about deployment, you have talked about quality of life.
I had a rather interesting conversation, Admiral, with Vice Admiral Fallon recently, and he pointed out to me the uncertainty of service in uniform today. And in talking with people at various posts and installations, I think the staff sergeant, the corporal, the second-class petty officer, as well as those in the officer corps, think about their future as well as the number of deployments and how that is going to affect their families, the quality of life, whether the lights go on and off when they should. I think the uncertainty is probably more telling than the other, and I would like for you to briefly address that.
I am the only one here—and I just asked my friend from Virginia when he came to Congress—I am the only one here today who experienced the bitterness of the young folks aboard the U.S.S. Forrestal, at Fort Benning and other places throughout the country in 1977, 1978, 1979, and it slowly began to change in 1980; how good people—and you were in the military then—recall the uncertainties, the quality of life, the deployments, the unhappiness of the young folks in uniform; the lack of spare parts, where the captain of a ship—properly so, I understand—refused to take his ship out because it did not have the right ratings to man all of the departments.
Page 235 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
So my question of you is based upon the three elements—deployments, quality of life, and uncertainty—Are we approaching what we had in 1977, 1978, and 1979? That is my question. I would put as a footnote that the Navy offers up an 11,000 cut; the Air Force offers up an 11,000 cut in personnel; the Marines will defend to their last marine the 174,000, and the Army feels exactly the same way about 495,000.
But are we, gentlemen, approaching a return to the late 1970's? General, we will start with you?
General SCHWARTZ. I think not, sir. The reason I say that is because in the 1970's, we had a completely different Army than the Army we have now. I was that part of that 1970's Army, and of course, I am part of it now.
The Army of the 1970's, if you try to compare it with the Army today, is not much of a comparison. It pales in comparison, because the Army during that particular time that I remember had low morale, it had tremendous maintenance problems, it had equipment problems, it had dollar problems, and the discipline was not good in that Army at that particular time.
So, if we compare that to the Army of today, where we have tremendously high morale, where the discipline is the best—and, as I said in my statement, the best that I have ever seen—the training pace is up, the challenge is there, and soldiers do stay in the Army and in all the services because they like the challenge that they see, and there is a tremendous challenge on their plate today.
Page 236 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
But the challenge of predictability that you talk about is certainly a major concern, because I always say in the leadership philosophy that I have that predictability is important to soldiers. The word ''when'' to a soldier is incredibly important, to himself, herself, or to their family—when will I go, when will I come back? When will I go down-range, and when will I come back? The ''when'' word is important. So when you are deployed all the time, and you do not know where you are going or when you are coming back, you do not know how many days you are going to stay, those are tremendous stress factors on our young people today. So in that arena, I think there is more stress in this Army today than in the past. So, I think the comparison of the two is not a fair one, because I think the Army of today is tremendously more capable and better trained, better able to meet the challenges that we face in the near term as well as in the long term.
Mr. SKELTON. Admiral.
Admiral ABBOT. Sir, I sincerely believe we learned a lesson in the seventies in the Navy. It caused us to adopt the rules that we have followed with respect to OPTEMPO, PERSTEMPO, and it has reduced the uncertainty that you discussed for sailors and their families, because they know when they leave home port that they are going to be gone for 6 months, and they will be back, as they have been repeatedly in the past, on schedule.
The uncertainty that I see is not so much with deployments these days as far as the Navy is concerned—and I recognize that we are in a sense a special case and that the positive nature of my report to you is tied up in the Navy's rotational pattern of deployments such that we have dealt with the contingencies of the last several years with no significant disruption to the normal deployment pattern—but there are some uncertainties for our men and women, and they relate to advancement, for instance, in a force which has gotten smaller and could conceivably become smaller still.
Page 237 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
I believe that we can find efficiencies in our personnel structure that will allow us to further eliminate billets. We are undertaking, as you know, some experimentation with smart ships and smart bases to find where technology can point us toward reducing manpower at no cost in efficiency and operational effectiveness. I sincerely believe that they will bear fruit.
General IVERSON. Sir, I think the potential is there for us to have those things happen to us again. I hope we have learned the lessons. We need to look at those indicators, whether it be a hollow force, higher accident rates, low retention; the potential certainly is there, and I think we are smart enough not to do that.
I see the uncertainties down the road, whether actual or perceived, as loss of benefits, worrying about medical care for their families after retirement, those kinds of things for the career force.
General FULFORD. Sir, the deployment time that we have talked about, I would just like to qualify it and say that I have been in periods when our time away from home was greater than it is today, and many of our young men and women join the Marine Corps to deploy, and they would be disappointed—in fact, I have had marines come to me and ask, ''Why can't I deploy? My unit is not going until next year or the year after.''
What I see that is different today is that when they return from deployment, rather than having a more measured pace and quality time with their families, we are having to work them harder and longer when they come back from those deployments.
Page 238 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
In terms of uncertainty, I would agree with General Iverson on long-term medical care and I think there is a concern particularly in our midterm force about the downsizing in general. They are at a point in their lives where they have got to make a decision on their careers, and they are looking at the future, and they are very concerned that if we have to get smaller, there will not be a role for them, and then they will be out on the job market, which may not be as attractive as it might be today.
Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. McHale.
Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, good morning. This is a distinguished panel, and I warmly welcome all of you to the hearing room. However, I would be remiss if I did not offer a special greeting to an old friend, Lieutenant General Fulford.
General Fulford is today a 3-star general, but 6 years ago, he was the commanding officer of Task Force Ripper. He led the first wave of marines into Saudi Arabia. His marines breached the Iraqi minefields. He led from the front the U.S. forces which liberated Kuwait. He wears the Purple Heart, the Bronze Star, and the Silver Star from Vietnam, and the Legion of Merit with the Combat V from the gulf war. He is my former commanding officer, my friend, and one of the most distinguished and respected marines of this generation.
Page 239 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General, welcome.
General FULFORD. Thank you, sir.
Mr. MCHALE. Now that I have said nice things about you, let me ask a few questions if I may. General, 6 years ago, you were the commanding officer of one of the principal maneuver elements of the MEF during the gulf war. Today you command the MEF. Could you compare and contrast the capabilities of the MEF, the war-fighting capabilities of the MEF, as they existed immediately prior to the gulf war with the capabilities that you command today? What is the difference in perspective 6 years and three stars later?
General FULFORD. Sir, thank you again for those comments and for that question. Twice, I have deployed to combat from this organization, as a captain to Vietnam and as a colonel to Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Unequivocally, this force is as ready in all respects, and more ready in most respects, than at any other time that I have been involved with it.
I would say that my only concern today as opposed to 6 years ago is that most of our equipment is the same equipment we had 6 years ago. We do have a new tank, the M1A1 tank, but everything else in my inventory in terms of major end-items is the same equipment that we took to war 6 years ago.
Mr. MCHALE. Let me follow up on that, General. You are flying the same CH–46's today that we had 6 years ago.
Page 240 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General FULFORD. Sir, the same CH–46's that we had 29 years ago when I was in Vietnam.
Mr. MCHALE. All right. The budget last year provided authorization for the acquisition of the initial five V–22's. The budget as submitted by the Secretary a few weeks ago again requests authorization for five V–22's. They are replacing a fleet of 250 CH–46's. Do we need to increase the rate of acquisition? Can we effectively replace the CH–46 at only five aircraft per year?
General FULFORD. Sir, that will take an awfully long time. I have a son who is a captain in the Marine Corps, and he will probably be sitting here when we are still flying CH–46's at that rate.
Mr. MCHALE. General, I think that that is one area where perhaps we in the Congress can be of assistance. I have absolute confidence in the war-fighting capability of I–MEF. Do you have confidence that there is sufficient lift capability to echelon your force into theater were they to be committed?
General FULFORD. Sir, as you know, 6 years ago, we had over 60 amphibious ships; today, we have 36. They are more capable, they are ready, they are providing tremendous support.
My only response to you is the strategic lift would be a CINC determination, and if the CINC determined that we were the priority, then there is no doubt that there is enough left to get us there. But the CINC will be the one who has to make that determination.
Page 241 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. MCHALE. And General, there will be quite a few others competing for that same priority; is that correct?
General FULFORD. Yes, sir.
Mr. MCHALE. General, could you explain the importance of the MPFE Program, and specifically, then, three ships that we are now considering—it is likely that we will provide funding for those ships—will bring the capability of an expeditionary airfield during the early stage of the transitioning of forces into theater. Could you explain, as somebody who has been there, what it means to have an expeditionary airfield at that stage of combat and what the effect of having that airfield would be on the shaping of the battlefield?
General FULFORD. Sir, the first additional MPF ship comes online in fiscal year 1999, and it will be in support of our organization. We are looking very hard at the additional flexibility and combat power of that, but more specifically, the expeditionary airfield gives us the ability to put our air in theater where it can support our combat marines on the ground without dependence on host nation support. A great degree of flexibility and war-fighting capability is the enhancement as a result of that ship.
Mr. MCHALE. Gentlemen, my final question is really—I have asked you for guidance before, and this will not be the first or the last time—now I guess I am really asking for guidance to the Congress as an institution—what single act could the Congress undertake which would most significantly enhance the war-fighting capability of the MEF? What one thing could we really do right?
Page 242 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General FULFORD. Sir, the most important element of the MEF is its people. Help us look after our people, and help us make sure that we do not decline in our manning of the people that we have who serve our American Nation today.
Mr. MCHALE. General, gentlemen, I thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Buyer.
Mr. BUYER. Thank you, gentlemen.
I have some followup questions after having listened to my colleagues. I want to get now down to the nitty-gritty. We have said the nice stuff and the fluff and so on.
When you used your top-line numbers, listening to that, it sounds like there are no problems. Then, as I become a good listener, I hear that in the Army, of 246 infantry squads, 14 are not manned. Ike Skelton asked some real questions—is it beginning to look like the 1970's. Well, we know what that means. Is it hollowing out the force, are some things happening? Tradeoffs are being made. Decisions are being made.
So now, I think we need to ask some questions about where are some of the shortages; where are some decisions being made, like why do we have 14 unmanned squads; what other shortages are there? Tell me, where else are you having shortages?
Page 243 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General Schwartz, I am going to start with you. You mentioned that you have some moderate risk in personnel shortages. Where? What are they? Now I want you to define and get into the nitty-gritty here with me. What else do you have in shortages and why, and what can we do to fill in those gaps, and where are you at risk in your personnel shortages?
General SCHWARTZ. OK. I would start by saying one of the areas that I defined earlier was, of course, our infantrymen, which led to some of those figures that I quoted. We are short—we have an 85-percent assigned strength in our 11-MIKE's, which are our infantrymen; we are projected to go to an 80-percent strength this summer. So that is a real shortage of real fighting soldiers. That is foxhole strength. That is the number of people who come out of the back of Bradleys, that do the fighting on the ground. So that is a serious challenge for us.
Another serious challenge is the retention of our mid- and senior-grade NCO's. If we do not retain them, reenlist them at the rate we need to, and meet our goals, we already have a shortage in that area in terms of our numbers, and we are asking younger soldiers to step up and do some of their jobs, particularly in the combat support MOS's. Like our mechanics, we have a shortage of some of those critical, low-density MOS's like that that is causing us a major concern because when a soldier is deployed, he or she is not back there maintaining their equipment; it is in most cases left behind. So, that just increases the demand on these low-density MOS's like mechanics who are left behind, because they have got to continue to maintain that equipment. So that is another area.
Another area, of course, is the area of money. You know, we are short BASOPS dollars, and at Fort Hood, we are short to the tune of about $46 million, and we are funded at 76 percent of what we figure we need to create what we call the enduring installation—that installation that meets the quality of life needs of our soldiers. So that is another area where we are critically short.
Page 244 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BUYER. You are leading me right into something else, and I do not want to get too far off. But you have to make some command decisions saying that you can make up for these shortfalls by making decisions locally, and you are taking some risks here—and I applaud you; I think that that is wonderful, and every commander should be able to save money where appropriate. No. 1, are you going to be able to keep that money, and are you going to be able to maintain the quality of life by making certain sacrifices to do that?
I mean, we would love to just give you the money, but I want to know what kinds of decisions are being made.
General SCHWARTZ. We are all making those tough calls every day in terms of how many dollars we put into quality of life versus training, and we wish we did not have to make those decisions. If we were fully funded at 100-percent BASOPS, for example, it would make it much easier on us, and we would not have to make some of those tough calls that we have to make now in terms of fully funding training at the expense of quality of life and BASOPS maintenance and repair decisions that we make every day.
So, I think we would ask you up front to fully fund us in terms of some of those O & M or BASOPS accounts.
Mr. BUYER. Admiral Abbot.
Admiral ABBOT. To answer your question, I think I would come at it from a different point of view which I think is a result of my location and the fact that the forces under my command are principally rotational forces which come to me properly manned. But I see some potential difficulties with what I call the fragility of the force, and it relates more to a question of sustainment of the force if it were required to ramp up to very high OPTEMPO operations.
Page 245 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
You may be aware that in the Navy, we have made some very good progress with modern practices of just in time supply for parts and what we call continuous maintenance for our ships, and they have resulted in efficiencies, but efficiencies which I think we need to continuously monitor to make sure that we do not create a situation where, if we had to turn up the wick and begin to operate at very high OPTEMPO in a conflict, we have not created a condition in which the units would become nonoperationally ready due to these practices.
Mr. BUYER. Admiral, I need to know whether you have any shortages in your personnel.
Admiral ABBOT. I do not experience at this point any significant shortages in personnel.
Mr. BUYER. All right.
General Iverson.
General IVERSON. Sir, I think if there is one thing I am most concerned about in the Pacific, not just in my numbered Air Force, but in my fellow numbered Air Forces, it is engines. Fighter engines are a problem we have been concerned about across the board.
The second thing would be suppression of enemy air defenses capability. We rely on the Navy, the Marines, to provide us EA–6B's in the Pacific, and they are not going to be able to do that it looks like in the future; we will have to give them 96 hours before they can come forward from the States to support us.
Page 246 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
So those are my two concerns.
Mr. BUYER. General Fulford.
General FULFORD. Sir, in terms of manpower, the one area that we are watching very carefully is our midterm air crew. The major lieutenant colonel level who represents a great degree of professionalism in training, right now, their resignation rate is higher than we would like to see, and we are watching that very carefully.
Outside of that, sir, I do not have any specific items to mention.
Mr. BUYER. General Iverson, I would like you to share with Mr. Bateman and others that when we were in Korea, you talked about the realities of some of those tradeoffs. You mentioned in your testimony about the civil engineering. Would you please share with the committee here some of the realities of an infrastructure that is in erosion and in decay and having to try to live and exist with a decreasing O & M budget?
General IVERSON. Yes, sir. Osan Air Base was built during the Korean war, and very little has been done since to upgrade it. Last year, we had over 300 water main breaks, so there were people out of water up to 24 hours in 1 day. We have power problems. Any time a large windstorm comes through, it knocks down some lines. When you try to put the power back on, the old insulators blow when they take that head, so all of those need to be replaced.
No one really knows when this is going to occur, but you have got to fix those, so we use O & M dollars to fix those instead of having military construction dollars or burden sharing dollars out of Korea to upgrade those systems. They are a great drain on the O & M dollars.
Page 247 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BUYER. Thank you.
There are three areas I must cover, Mr. Chairman. One, I cannot figure out what the Army and the Marine Corps are doing with the NTC and how you are funding this—at Twentynine Palms, I am sorry.
The Army, as I understand, is considering no longer essentially funding unit rotations. The Marine Corps had been through that and is now centrally funding. Why do we have two different services flip-flopping in their decisions? I do not know. Do you agree with this system of moving to decentralize, and then I am going to figure out why the corps is moving to centralize.
General SCHWARTZ. Are we talking about the transfer of funding for the NTC Model 250 OPTEMPO miles?
Mr. BUYER. Right.
General SCHWARTZ. You know, we have not fully assessed the impact of that yet. In fact, I am having my staff look at it now to try to assess the exact impact of it, because if it means to us—and it will mean less home station OPTEMPO miles driven—but how we pay for those is critically important. Do we pay up front and lose the dollar equivalent of those miles? Do we pay for the actual miles driven out there? We are still assessing that, and I am not quite sure what we will come to in terms of how we do that and how we implement that.
Page 248 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
But I would tell you that the home station training portion of being trained and ready is critically important. It is important that we have the sufficient miles at home station to train and that we balance that with the number of miles we go at the National Training Center, so it is important that we do not lose too many of our OPTEMPO miles at home station training because it will impact our readiness.
Mr. BUYER. So you have not been able to do this assessment of its readiness impact upon units. This is a decision that is being driven upon you?
General SCHWARTZ. It is a decision to transfer some of the miles, but we have not fully assessed its impact, so I could not share its impact with you yet.
Mr. BUYER. I think we will need some readiness on that one, Mr. Bateman.
All right. Now, the Marine Corps at Twentynine Palms, you have shifted to another decision. Can you tell me why you have shifted that decision, and is that being driven by commanders, please?
General FULFORD. Sir, the commander of Twentynine Palms will speak to you later, and I will let him also address that. But from my perspective, because of the proximity to Twentynine Palms, most of my equipment supported the training there in the past, so units would come from North Carolina or elsewhere in the Marine Corps, they would temporarily borrow my equipment, and they would train at Twentynine Palms.
Page 249 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
As part of this centralization, we had built an equipment allowance pool that now supports that kind of training without using and increasing the usage of my equipment.
Additionally, the centralized management of funds is for a standard CAX, and any commander who wants to add to that to meet whatever training objectives for his organization can do so using his own O & M funds.
So I would go to Twentynine Palms; the standard CAX that is centrally managed is there, and if I wanted to add additional training opportunities or training enhancements to that, then I could do that, using my own operation and maintenance account dollars.
Mr. BUYER. All right. Now, for the second question, I will shift to exercises. How many exercises, other than at your own facilities, are you doing in conjunction with other nations? How many exercises does III Corps do a year?
General SCHWARTZ. I guess it depends whether it is in terms of joint exercises or internal exercises. We do one major joint exercise a year, and that is Ultra-Focus Lens with our Korean counterparts, so that is our major joint exercise. But when we also do directed joint exercises, like Joint Endeavor, that is coming up, that is a CINC-directed joint exercise. So we have those on our plate, but this past year, the only joint exercise we did was Ultra-Focus Lens. This coming year, we will do Ultra-Focus Lens again and one major joint exercise, so in terms of joint, I think that that is a good definition there.
Page 250 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General IVERSON. And that is a command post exercise, not a unit deploy-in, flying units, and those things. That is——
Mr. BUYER. I am trying to figure out movement of people, units, and its impact.
Admiral Abbot.
Admiral ABBOT. Yes, sir. We are stabilized at about 65 to 70 exercises per year in the 6th Fleet AOR. That number is large, but some of the exercises are very small. Some of the exercises, for instance, are part of the Partnership for Peace Program with the newly emerging states, and they are typically not very sophisticated in terms of length or the number of units involved.
We also, as you know, do multilateral and bilateral exercises as well as our own training. The exercise program has been stable as far as NATO exercises are concerned and our own training, but has ramped up in terms of bilateral, multilateral, and certainly PFP exercises in the last several years.
Mr. BUYER. General Iverson.
General IVERSON. Ultra-Focus is the big one. General Schwartz and General Fulford come over with their folks, and it is the war-fighting headquarters exercise. We have RSONI, a huge exercise, we have Full Eagle, which is a security exercise, FTX, where units deploy. Then, we exercise each of our wings every 2 months; because of the high turnover of people, we have to do that to keep current. And off-peninsula, when the tensions are down, we would like to have two deployments to Alaska to Cope Thunder.
Page 251 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BUYER. General Fulford.
General FULFORD. Sure, we support two war-fighting CINC's, both CENTCOM and PACOM, so we participate in the Korean exercise, Ultra-Focus Lens, as well as internal look in PACOM, maritime preposition force exercises in CENTCOM. I have about 30 exercises a year in support of JTF–6 on the border, where I have a company-size unit doing drug surveillance work.
All total, there are in excess of 80 exercises a year, varying in scale from a company-size unit to the larger, Ultra-Focus Lens, and an internal look, which is every other year, in CENTCOM.
Mr. BUYER. Mr. Bateman, the reason I asked that question is because in CINCPAC, they have well over 300 types of exercises of all different sizes, and we almost get the sense that we have to get a hold on how many exercises we are doing throughout the world and how stretched we are with the fragility of the force that you are talking about. If it is that thin and that fragile, then how far are we being stretched in its impact upon readiness, personnel, recruiting, and retention? We are stretched globally throughout the world.
My last point—and I appreciate the endurance of my colleagues—General Iverson, I want to be very up-front with you—I am very concerned about the budget that came over for about $105 million for construction of barracks and residences in Korea. You have got two of them.
Page 252 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General IVERSON. Yes, sir.
Mr. BUYER. And I laid down a marker that I may oppose the building of all of those barracks in Korea. That is not because I do not care for the soldiers and the airmen who are there. I am very concerned about the Korean Peninsula itself, and I am very concerned about the burden-sharing issues with regard to Korea as a Government. Those are high-pay-level decisions that we want to force Korea to carry more of the burden. Japan provides a lot of the building of those barracks for us, and if we close our eyes and try to envision what the peninsula is going to look like, I am thinking we can spend some of those dollars in other ways. If you disagree with that, please tell me now.
General IVERSON. Yes, sir. I look at the facilities that the Army has north of the Han River, and it is absolutely deplorable. We need to put those troops in better barracks up there. The Korean Government should pay more. They are paying some and building some barracks, but it is not at a rate that will get our people into the good-quality facilities.
Now, we clearly need to look to the future. Where are we going to be 10, 15 years from now? What is the relationship? What is the presence on the peninsula? I think we ought to look toward that.
I think U.S. forces in Korea will be in the Osan, Camp Humphries area. That is where we should focus long-term quality of life. But in the interim, those poor troops upon the DMZ, Camp Red Cloud, Camp Casey, have got to be helped.
Mr. BUYER. Thank you.
Page 253 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Thank you, Mr. Bateman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Skelton has a followup question, which I would ask if he could expedite because we have another panel we would like to hear before lunch.
Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Very briefly, in memory of our friend who just retired, Sonny Montgomery, I feel I must ask this. I noticed in my visit to Hungary at Thanksgiving time in particular, General Schwartz, the very solid presence of National Guard and Reserve troops—an entire Alabama company doing an outstanding job in vehicle maintenance. Our escort officer, working for Maj. Gen. Jim Wright, was a captain reservist accountant from Ohio, and in the stretching and the stresses, which Ted Stroop testified about 3 years ago, and which continues today, using your words, ''soldier stretch,'' and ''burning out soldiers,'' are you able to alleviate the situation with the Reserves and the Guard?
And I would ask that of the other services. I know of the Air Force implementation because we have an A–10 wing out of Whiteman Air Force Base in our district back home, but what about the Navy and Marines—are you able to plug those holes, either as units or as individuals, from the Reserves? Let me limit my question to the Navy and the Marines because of time.
Page 254 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Admiral ABBOT. Mr. Skelton, in the case of the Navy, one principal case comes to mind, and that is that the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy is preparing to deploy to the Mediterranean, and she will deploy with a substantial percentage of her crew from the Reserve component. We could not continue to operate in the pattern of deployments that we have now without Kennedy, and so I consider that contribution significant.
We have other areas where reservists are making important contributions in the Mediterranean, including from my own staff. I mentioned, in fact, the study that was being done of port costs and using that study to reduce what we spend on port visits in the AOR. That work is being done by a Reserve unit in Atlanta. We are leveraging the Reserves every day in the theater, and it is having an effect, and it is having an effect on the cost of operations.
General FULFORD. Sir, I could not meet my requirements today without the Reserve forces of the Marine Corps. Every exercise, every commitment I have, is heavily supported by Marine Reserves who do a superb job.
I would say that there are individual skills that I do not tap as well as I could or should—language skills, perhaps, where we have Farsi speakers, for instance, who are available throughout the Marine Corps, maybe not in an Active Reserve unit, but an inactive Reserve unit, that we could call on more aggressively to support our deployments to that part of the world. I am working to do that.
But our Reserves are superb. They support us every day, and I am very proud of them.
Page 255 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Bono.
Mr. BONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am trying to absorb everything I can, so I will reserve questions and comments.
Thank you.
Mr. BATEMAN. I think, then, in fairness to the panel, who have been at the witness table for some good while now, as well as the panel that is coming up——
Mr. TAYLOR. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, for a very quick one.
Mr. BATEMAN. A very quick one.
Mr. TAYLOR. And General Fulford, I am going to ask you to respond to this in writing. You talk on page 16 of your testimony of the uncertainty when I presume the husband is away, and the spouse needs medical care under TRICARE. Could you please tell me what that translates to in out-of-pocket expenses for that young marine? Is it 10 percent of the bill? Is it 20 percent of the bill? Is it taken care of entirely?
Page 256 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General FULFORD. Sir, it is not taken care of entirely, and I will respond to you in writing in answer to that question.
Mr. TAYLOR. If you could respond in writing, because I know Mr. Bateman is in a hurry.
General FULFORD. Yes, sir.
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. I regret very much having to be in a hurry; it is driven not by my desire, but by necessity.
We thank you all for your testimony. It is appreciated.
Mr. BATEMAN. OK. If I may, let me introduce the second panel of witnesses, from whom we are looking forward to hearing.
We welcome Command Sgt. Maj. Roy Thomas, U.S. Army, 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX.
Senior Chief Legalman Renee S. Scheetz, U.S. Navy, U.S.S. Simon Lake, AS 33, Lamaddalena, Sardinia, Italy. I hope I got some of that right.
Chief SCHEETZ. You have it all right, sir.
Page 257 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. Senior M. Sgt. Gary Simmons, U.S. Air Force, 25th Fighter Squadron, Osan Air Force Base, Korea.
And we welcome Sgt. Maj. Charles E. Constance, U.S. Marine Corps, Regimental Sgt. Maj., 1st Marine Regiment, Camp Pendleton, CA.
We welcome all of you and look forward to your testimony, and we will turn first to Command Sergeant Major Thomas.
STATEMENT OF COMMAND SGT. MAJ. ROY THOMAS, U.S. ARMY, 2D BRIGADE, 1ST CALVARY DIVISION, FORT HOOD, TX
Sergeant THOMAS. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the joint subcommittees. I am honored to have this opportunity to appear before this distinguished group to discuss some of the issues and challenges we face in the Army in the future.
I am Command Sgt. Maj. Roy Thomas and have served over 28 years in the U.S. Army. Currently, I am the command sergeant major of the 2d ''Blackjack'' Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, and have been command sergeant major for this unit for over 21 months.
During the past several months, I have witnessed two battalion task forces deployed to Kuwait on intrinsic action and two brigade combat team rotations to the National Training Center. During these training exercises and deployments, I have seen trained, competent, and confident soldiers ready to do their best and, if called upon, give their lives to serve their country. I have looked most of these soldiers in the eye, and I can tell you that the 1st Cavalry Division's goal that ''no soldier goes into harm's way without the best training'' has been met.
Page 258 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
My daily interaction with these soldiers affords me the unique opportunity to not only listen to, but to deal with, the issues that are most important to them. Today, soldiers deal with the day-to-day pressures of high OPTEMPO, PERSTEMPO, and the financial pressures of trying to stretch their paychecks until the end of the month.
The average soldier in the Blackjack Brigade is deployed 150 days a year, which includes a rotation to Kuwait of at least 120 days and a 30-day deployment to the National Training Center. This does not include the train-ups for the deployments or other training exercises such as gunnery and company sustainment training, which also keep soldiers away from home.
I see the effects of this when I counsel young soldiers and noncommissioned officers about reenlistment. The bottom line is that most are proud to serve, and many would like to continue to serve but are not sure they can afford to because of the family sacrifices required.
The most pressing concerns soldiers have are safe, affordable family housing, quality, predictable time off, better facilities for leisure activities such as gyms and community centers, medical, retirement and commissary benefits, the desire to attend college, and the continued talk about the loss of another 20,000 soldiers.
The key to retaining outstanding soldiers, who are about 64 percent married, is the spouse. If we provide an environment that is safe, predictable, enriching and fulfilling to the family, we keep the soldier. They are our future.
Page 259 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
In closing, I would like to say that today's soldiers represent the finest qualities of America's citizens, and they stand trained and ready to defend America's principles. They deserve the best support America can provide.
Sir, this concludes my statement. I am prepared for your questions.
[The prepared statement of Sergeant Major Thomas can be found in the appendix on page 350.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, Sergeant Major Thomas.
Senior Chief Scheetz.
STATEMENT OF SENIOR CHIEF, PO RENEE S. SCHEETZ, U.S. NAVY, U.S.S. SIMON LAKE, AS 33, LAMADDALENA, SARDINIA, ITALY
Chief SCHEETZ. Good morning. First, let me say I am honored to be here today to testify in front of you concerning resources, manning and training and the quality of life of personnel assigned to the 6th Fleet area of responsibility.
Let me start by giving you a little background information concerning my interactions on board the U.S.S. Simon Lake. The Simon Lake is my first shipboard tour which required me to face the challenges of sea duty that most personnel experience early in their naval careers.
Page 260 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
I made it a point to learn everything there was to know about sea duty, the personnel who make it work, including the jobs they perform, hours they work, and the work product they provide.
As the departmental leading chief petty officer, I am actively involved in personnel issues both in my department and in other departments on board. I am a member of the Professional Development Board and a quality advisor for several process actions teams, ranging from quality of life to ship decommissioning. I provide training to junior personnel on a myriad of issues and ensure that I meet with newly reporting personnel by addressing them within their first week onboard in shipboard indoctrination.
This is not my first assignment overseas, and it is my second tour in the 6th Fleet area of responsibility. My first tour was in Naples, Italy from 1989 to 1992.
Training and quality of life are among the most important issues senior enlisted face on a daily basis. Training has a direct impact on our quality of life and the quality of life of our personnel. Although advancements are slightly above average onboard the Simon Lake, we still face the problems associated with requiring advancement materials and training manuals in a timely manner. It often takes 6 months to a year to receive required rate training manuals.
At professional development boards, our sailors address the difficulty in obtaining materials. Some take leave and pay for their own transportation to go to Naples to take an exam or complete advancement requirements.
Page 261 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Other personnel explain the difficulty they have understanding and passing the advancement exam, and just recently, funding for a computer learning center onboard was cancelled. This would have motivated our personnel and had a positive impact on training. When personnel advance, they receive more pay; when they receive more pay, this directly affects their quality of life.
Training, which is often offered at a reasonable cost in the United States, is not offered at overseas locations due to the high cost; firefighting and damage control are just some examples of that training, which is essential in our day-to-day operations.
Other courses such as leadership training are available in the European theater, however, they are mostly located in Naples, Italy, and Roda, Spain, where Government berthing and messing is not available. These same issues pertain in the training teams if they are willing to travel to Lamaddalena. This high cost makes the training not available.
Senior enlisted manning has always been an issue onboard Simon Lake. It is difficult to get senior enlisted members to commit to a tour onboard. One of the major factors behind this problem is that there is no high school available in Lamaddalena. Personnel with children of high school age, such as senior enlisted personnel, must send their children to high school in London, England, a difficult decision for any parent. It is also a concern for most of our personnel who have children of school age.
I also feel that more female senior enlisted personnel would have a positive effect on daily operations. Junior female personnel often come to me and address personal issues that they feel uncomfortable speaking about with my male counterparts. This is not a reflection of their leadership ability, but more a matter of personal issues that they would rather discuss with a female. I feel that having a senior enlisted female as a role model is imperative.
Page 262 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Quality of life is something that is near and dear to every sailor in the Navy. As the quality advisor for the Quality of Life Board, I am exposed to all quality of life issues that affect our personnel. Most of these issues are not new, which shows that although we have made some great improvements in the quality of life, we still have some way to go.
Pay and entitlement—the cost of living overseas is difficult for anyone; however, it directly impacts our junior personnel. There have been some improvements in this area, but there are still shortcomings. Most overseas housing surveys ask the standard questions about cost of rent and utilities, but they fail to ask questions concerning basic housing needs that members are required to pay out-of-pocket. For instance, in Italy, most homes do not have heating, thereby requiring members to purchase kerosene heaters. They do not have closets, cupboards, refrigerators, stoves, washers, or dryers. Although the Navy now supplies these, they are of limited number, and most sailors have to purchase additional items out of their pockets. There is no wall-to-wall carpeting, and throw rugs are a necessity.
Finally, repairs that are often required to be completed by tenants or by landlords in the United States are required to be paid for and completed by tenants overseas.
All of these hidden expenses coupled with the high cost of rent, electricity, automobile insurance, gas and issues like that leave our sailors living from paycheck to paycheck.
Child care: There is a small child care facility available in Lamaddalena, which barely meets our child care needs. Full-time child care drop-off and part-time drop-off is on a case-by-case basis. Being in an overseas environment where local child care is not available adds a whole new dimension to the need for adequate child care. Single parents and dual military couples find this an extremely important quality of life issue.
Page 263 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Spouse employment is virtually nonexistent in Lamaddalena. The small size of the naval support activity, the need to employ a percentage of local national personnel, and the lack of available jobs impacts our sailors in more than one way. They are in a high cost-of-living area without the additional income of their spouses, and they become single-income families. It also adversely affects the tour satisfaction for dependents, who are forced to become housewives. Additionally, Third World nationals are prohibited from working in Lamaddalena, even if they were currently GS employees.
Medical care: The U.S.S. Simon Lake provides adequate medical care to military members. However, the branch medical clinic is only able to provide limited military care to dependents. Their ability to handle minor medical issues often results in members or their dependents failing overseas screening requirements. Medical treatment that is normally completed at an adequate medical facility, such as minor surgery for broken bones, mammograms, or childbirth, result in military members or dependents being medically evacuated to Naples, Italy, or Roda, Spain. This is not only an expensive means of treatment, but causes an additional problem when the spouse is deployed, or working 12 to 28 hours a day.
The Navy exchange and commissary is a very important issue at any overseas location. This is the only place where members can purchase American products at a reasonable price. Based on the number of personnel assigned in the area, there is a need for a bigger commissary exchange facility in the local area.
Although I am aware that you have no jurisdiction over family housing, I must still comment that it is and will always be one of the most important quality of life issues of our sailors.
Page 264 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
The Navy has come a long way in the issues that I have addressed above. Things today are much better than they were 15 years ago when I joined the Navy. I am proud to serve with our sailors of today and look forward to the Navy of the future.
In closing, I would like to say that I consider our personnel our most valuable asset and resource, and I believe they should be our No. 1 objective.
Thank you, and I am available for questions.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Senior Chief.
Senior Master Sergeant Simmons.
STATEMENT OF SENIOR M. SGT. GARY SIMMONS, U.S. AIR FORCE, 25TH FIGHTER SQUADRON, OSAN AIR FORCE BASE, KOREA
Sergeant SIMMONS. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is an honor to have this opportunity to address you on behalf of the warriors from the ''Land of Morning Calm'' on the subject of military readiness. I would like to share with you some issues that concern us today in the 51st Fighter Wing, Operation Personnel Tempo, training, and quality of life.
Page 265 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Our tempo is very high. Most maintenance shops are undermanned for the workload they encounter. They constantly work 10 to 12 hours a day, and working 6 days a week is not uncommon for supervisors and many specialists; it is a routine part of life at Osan.
Additionally, the experience level of our troops is a significant concern. For example, at Osan, one-third of our dedicated crew chiefs on our A–10 aircraft do not meet the grade or experience requirements according to the directives in the existing PACAF instructions, and must be waived to fill those positions. Upgrade training courses are not available locally to completely meet the demands of qualified maintainers, and units do not have the funding to support the TDY commitment needed. Plus, units can ill afford to lose those people to attend those courses. Despite such hardships, people at Osan excel and overcome adversity, producing phenomenal results that translate into readiness and combat capability.
Due to the intense work schedules, educational opportunities are limited for many maintainers. It is sad to report to you today that only 4 percent of both fighter squadron people enrolled in classes the last three quarters. This is a missed opportunity that surely benefits both the troops and the Air Force.
For those who do attend classes, tuition cost is a problem. There are many unaccompanied personnel, especially E–5's and below, who have to maintain a separate household in the CONUS and simply cannot afford the tuition.
Mr. Chairman, based on some of the feedback that I have received from the troops, we need to keep the pay competitive with our civilian counterparts. Please compensate for the actual expense based on the geographic location of family allowances—more money for education and benefits, more time with their families, less TDY's and unaccompanied career time in their careers.
Page 266 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
In conclusion, the men and women of the 25th Fighter Squadron and Osan Air Base are proud to serve and defend. These warriors will complete the mission at any cost. They are some of the best citizens our country has, and deserve our support—they have earned it. I am so proud to be part of the best organization in the world, and that is the U.S. Air Force.
Mr. Chairman and committee members, thank you very much for letting me be the voices of the warriors who are at the tip of the sphere. I will be happy to answer any questions at this time.
[The prepared statement of Master Sergeant Simmons can be found in the appendix on page 353.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Master Sergeant Simmons.
And now, Sergeant Major Constance.
STATEMENT OF SGT. MAJ. CHARLES E. CONSTANCE, U.S. MARINE CORPS, REGIMENTAL SERGEANT MAJOR, 1ST MARINE REGIMENT, CAMP PENDLETON, CA
Sergeant CONSTANCE. Good afternoon. I have not written out a statement to read to the people here. I will just state as the regimental sergeant major for the 1st Marines, I have 4 infantry battalions, 1 headquarters company, consisting of just over 4,000 marines, with an average age of 19 years.
Page 267 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
I served in Vietnam as a rifleman, and I will get to retire in an infantry unit, which is a gift from the gods, and I enjoy that. I will retire this November with my 30 years, and I am more than prepared to answer all of your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Sergeant Major Constance can be found in the appendix on page 362.]
Mr. BATEMAN. We thank all of you for being with us today, and I guess what we need to know from you is whether or not you feel that the operational and personnel tempo that the people that you lead are experiencing is something that can be sustained and still keep them motivated and willing to remain in the Armed Forces of the United States, or are we going to wear them out if we continue to make the same level of demands upon them and the same amount of time away from their families, and if we do not significantly increase their compensation and if we do not significantly improve their housing, are we going to be able to keep the caliber of people that you represent and that those who serve with represent?
Sergeant THOMAS. Sir, I would like to address that by telling you about an event that happened to me last Friday. Last Friday, I lost my commander's driver, who was a sergeant. That sergeant went to get married, and he went to work for UPS. He was a valued member of the team, and he left because the compensation, the OPTEMPO, in his case, PERSTEMPO, we could not salvage him for reenlistment, not because he was not trained and ready, and not because he was not proud to serve, but because I could not offer him the future stability that his fiancee wanted to hear.
Page 268 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
That is not an unrelated incident. It happens daily. The reenlistment rates in my brigade—and I am deployed a lot—are high. We are on a glidepath to make this year's reenlistment and retention mission. However, for the future, I am concerned. I am concerned that the compensation that we see happening within my brigade now may not continue. My brigade within the Army will be one of the most modern. As a brigade sergeant major, I am not as much concerned about modernization as I am concerned about the facilities that my families and my soldiers use and the quality of life that we offer them. I am unique in some respects because of my modernization, so I cannot speak for everybody, but quality of life is an issue for my soldiers, and compensation is an issue—pay raises, the VHA, BAS, subsistence for their separate rations.
Our soldiers on operational deployments to Kuwait do not lose their $210; however, the soldiers who spend over 72 hours deployed in the field do lose that money, and that is hard to balance the checkbook.
Chief SCHEETZ. Sir, being on the U.S.S. Simon Lake in Lamaddalena, because we are forward-deployed, we do not have a big OPTEMPO. Contrary to most people at sea duty, we were only at sea for 14 days last year.
The thing that draws most of our sailors onboard the Simon Lake out of the Navy is, of course, the quality-of-life issues that they see—advancements and their future in the Navy. Our junior personnel do very well at reenlisting in the Navy. It is our midterm people who start to question what is going to happen to them in the future.
Page 269 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
I believe we have good retention rates in the Navy. It is the nature of where we are and what we do. But there is going to be a problem in the future if we do not start addressing some of the quality-of-life issues that they see today that are drawing them to get out and go to the civilian community.
Mr. BATEMAN. Master Sergeant Simmons.
Sergeant SIMMONS. Yes; sir. As you know, I am at Osan, and there are so many young troops over there that have to make ends meet for their families back in the States. I cannot tell you how many times I have counseled these folks, in the 20 months that I have been there, about financial responsibilities and helping them out. They are holding down two jobs and trying to maintain the hours that they are doing just to make ends meet.
Again, briefly, as I stated before, we really need to look at compensation for these folks that are over there, trying to hold down two separate households. Yes; granted they are getting $75 a month for family separation, but if you think about it, that is nothing more than a couple phone calls and additional supplies, and then they are already back at ground zero, let alone if there were any kids involved.
Another issue that I am a little bit concerned about is the issue of education. As stated before, only 4 percent of my personnel were able to go to school, and that is just because of the OPTEMPO, different shifts and hours and things of that nature. But when I was gathering this data from the director of education at our very qualified schools, it was stated that many airmen, E-5's and below, simply could not take advantage of the fantastic Montgomery GI bill. They could not afford $100 a month to make that sacrifice. That concerns not only myself, but the commander as well.
Page 270 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
I do not want to get into billeting, because you already know about all those issues, so, I will leave that alone, and because of time, I will pass it on, sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. Sergeant Major.
Sergeant CONSTANCE. Being that the majority of my marines are at a young age at 19, it gives us some married couples. Quality of life is something that the Marine Corps has really, really improved in. We are on top of that at this time.
Retention at my regimental level—we can retain our marines. OPTEMPO was alluded to by General Fulford. Deployments themselves are not the beast; the 6 months is not the real problem. It is the return and the continuous this week at Twentynine Palms, this month and a half at Twentynine Palms, or wherever these marines go. So it kind of wears on a young family—it wears very hard on a young family.
In southern California, basically, both members of a couple are going to have to work to make ends meet, and you really start pushing the envelope there—you have two cars, two insurance, and now the price is starting to run.
Our housing area on Camp Pendleton, I would compare to any base in the world. It is the best I have ever seen. When I came back from Vietnam to Quantico, VA, I was in substandard quarters. I thought that was great, though—at least, it was not a poncho anymore.
But these days, we have really made improvements. We have our heads above water with this now. I can sit here and honestly tell you that my marines are housed well, married and unmarried. We have our guidelines set with FMD, the new barracks that will be coming in. If everything stays on time, and the money continues to flow, we will have success; there will be no problem. But the influx of the young married marines coming in with families is starting to become a serious problem.
Page 271 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
What the answer is, I do not know at this time.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you. Is there a problem with promotions? I am hearing that in some quarters, the lack of promotion to the mid-NCO's is looming as a problem that is affecting people's willingness to remain in the service. Do you feel that there is a problem there?
Sergeant THOMAS. Sir, if I might, for the last couple of months, promotions within my grade have for the most part opened up. That means that there is hope that others will get promoted; those promotions are for staff sergeant, and we are seeing more promotions to sergeant first class.
Mr. BATEMAN. Is that a turnaround of sorts?
Sergeant THOMAS. Yes; it is, sir. That is not the problem. The problem is that there is an uncertainty about the force structure. So the soldier who sees the 150 days a year when he returns home—and we try to give him a predictable time with his family—when he continues to hear the rumors of the loss of another 20,000 soldiers, he quickly relates to that and the fact that, ''I will spend more time. I will spend less time with my family.''
So the unmarried soldier quickly asks, ''Do I want to stay?'' So what we are trying to do is ensure that the young, unmarried soldier, the single soldier, has a quality of life that entices him to say, there is a future here, we do care about you, so, we are renovating your barracks, we are providing new gymnasiums and facilities for your use.
Page 272 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Promotions and pay raises are always accepted, but we think that the key is stability and predictable time with the family.
Chief SCHEETZ. Sir, if I may, it is a big issue in the middle management in the Navy. I have seen it, and I have heard it throughout my naval career. When we have personnel who are E–4's or E–5's, and they cannot be advanced to E–6 or E–7, and they have 12 or 13 years in the Navy, those are the people who are getting out, and those are the people that we need to keep in. So it is a problem, sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. Sergeant Major Thomas.
Sergeant THOMAS. Sir, as far as the Air Force is concerned with promotions, especially in the last few years, it has opened up, it is starting to stabilize a little bit, and those who study are going to make it, and those who work hard are going to make it as well, so we are pretty good there.
Mr. BATEMAN. Sergeant Major Constance.
Sergeant CONSTANCE. As a regimental sergeant major, that is an isolated incident where I have marines in the mid-rank sergeants who just cannot get promoted to staff sergeant.
Now, some of the enlistees I deal with do not really have that problem; more in my technical fields and the air wing field, yes, you hear of it happening. We have tried to adopt a policy where two times you are looked at, and if you are not promoted in those two times, you are out, just to break that pyramid. And I think that that will work if we can get back to that area. But this is an isolated thing in the Marine Corps. It is not going to hurt us.
Page 273 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. Yesterday, at field hearings, I was hearing that as the drawdown took place, we lost a very significant number of midlevel NCO's and that we are not able to replace them with the cadre of the same degree of experience and competence, especially in technical areas and areas of aircraft maintenance. Is this a problem?
Sergeant SIMMONS. Yes, sir. Again, based on my statement, we have to waive one-third of our troops to meet that Pacific air instruction. Now, please do not get me wrong. These are very qualified young senior airmen, the sharpest ones in the Air Force today. And I want it also to be noted that they are very qualified to do the job. However, the experience is lacking, and the grade is lacking. They are our future, but it is going to take us time, and unfortunately, because of the circumstances that we face at Osan in particular, it is a concern.
Mr. BATEMAN. I have some more questions, but in fairness to the committee, I am going to suspend, and I will ask Mr. Buyer if he will take over and preside for a few minutes, since I have something I must run and do; but I will be back in 5 to 10 minutes.
Mr. BUYER [presiding]. I am trying to get a handle on the main issues that drive people out. I think that was one of your terms, ''drive out,'' and I guess that is on the retention rate. Am I hearing correctly that quality of life and pay are the top two reasons? Yes? No?
Chief SCHEETZ. They rank right up in the top two for the Navy; yes, sir.
Page 274 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BUYER. Tell me real briefly here, on the retention, when you do your counseling with people, what are the top three?
Sergeant CONSTANCE. Pay would be No. 1; bigger career goals, because it gets very tough at the lower ranks, you know. We tend to forget that when you get moving along. So I would say pay.
I do not think quality of life is a real hit yet, not for the Marine Corps.
Sergeant SIMMONS. Sir, when you have a maintainer out there, working on an engine, and he is a young senior airman maybe making staff sergeant, he is at a point in his career that is the breaking point—should I press on, or should I accept that job in Boeing—especially if he gets certified. And usually they jump the fence, obviously because of the type of benefits they are going to be receiving in their future employment.
As far as pay, when you have a young airman who is making maybe $15,000 to $16,000 a year, compared to starting out at as much as $40,000 or even $50,000 in some of these technical fields—computers, as an example—we lost a recent computer guy, a senior airman, very, very good with computers, and the private sector over there snagged him, and now he is making $60,000.
These are small examples, but it goes on all the time.
Mr. BUYER. Pay is No. 1 also, Chief Scheetz?
Page 275 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Chief SCHEETZ. Yes, sir. As I mentioned earlier, pay and advancements are very near and dear to all of our sailors, and it is one of the No. 1 contributing factors to retention for them getting out.
Sergeant THOMAS. Sir, if I could bring you back to the earlier story, a sergeant who loves doing what he loves to do goes to work for UPS. He went to work for UPS because he is going to get a better benefit package and better pay up front and a predictable lifestyle. That is important to understand, that it is not just pay; it is several items that work into a benefit package.
Some of those benefits that he talked to me about which I cannot match with UPS include off-duty college, retaining BAS during field deployments if he is married and drawing BAS. I cannot match a predictable work schedule when we are in the first deploying brigade status, and he knows that we will be in that status this summer, routinely, when we find that we will be deployed as a whole brigade to Kuwait.
Those are just some of the things that he talks about continuously.
The single soldier is no different, because if he makes the Army, he intends to get married at some point in his future. Therefore, the benefit package, when we talk to the single soldier, very quickly, he asks, ''Is this my future? Do I want to continue this as my future because of these benefits that my wife will see?''
So a single soldier today, but a married soldier tomorrow.
Page 276 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BUYER. This is to the Navy and the Air Force. You know, or you should realize, that in the budget that was sent to us, the Navy and the Air Force have decided to reduce end-strength even further and going through levels that we, the Congress, had set to reduce the force. Are you aware of that?
Sergeant SIMMONS. A little bit, yes.
Chief SCHEETZ. Yes.
Mr. BUYER. Would you share with me how those in your command and the NCO Corps now feel about what they thought would be a stabilization, and now the Navy and the Air Force are going to reduce the force even further; what impact or turbulence is it having upon your command, in the command?
Chief SCHEETZ. If I may, sir, just onboard the Simon Lake alone, we are looking at manning reduction of 275 people in our repair department. That is a 50-percent reduction in our staffing and repair, and it has had an impact on our ship. And of course, the Navy views any reduction of personnel when they thought it was over as how are we going to continue doing what we are doing with less people.
What we are finding ourselves having to do is to look again at the way we do business, restructure the way we do business, and even possibly looking at the type of business we provide so that we are capable of doing that without any loss of manpower or any adverse effects to our manning on board the ship, the morale.
Page 277 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Sergeant SIMMONS. It is going to be interesting, sir. We are right now at rock bottom levels. We have fantastic results with what we have, and it is going to be scary if we lose even more of those people. We are going to have to find a way to do it, and we are going to do it, as I said in my statement. They are warriors, and they are going to press on with what they have got and do the best they can.
Is there a concern? Of course there is a concern about reducing the force. I just wish they would not do it, because like I said, those 10- to 12-hour work days will probably go to 12 to 14 hours, and then safety becomes an issue. And when you are dealing with aircraft, you know, lives are at stake, and if that guy is going to be so tired—yes; we are going to pull him off the line at hour 12, but what happens if it is hour 13, and he forgot a step, as mentioned in other incidents that have happened in the Air Force? I would sure hate for that to happen. Safety is a big issue and concern.
Mr. BUYER. The theme of doing more with less has impact.
Sergeant SIMMONS. Oh, yes, sir.
Mr. BUYER. That is very real, because your shoulders are only so wide.
Sergeant SIMMONS. Yes, sir.
Mr. BUYER. And in the Marine Corps?
Page 278 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Sergeant CONSTANCE. Yes, sir. I do not know what we could do if we lost more marines. It is almost like a crapshoot now, trying to get marines to—OPTEMPO, right before my battalions turn into what we call battalion landing teams, that go out on a MUSE—it is a fight for marines, and if we lost any more marines, if we cut any more, something would have to leave what we do as Marines. We just could not keep it up.
Mr. BUYER. I have one more question before I yield to Mr. Taylor, and that is on this issue about—I do not know whether it is accurate to call it a family package—and what we can do. We have a change in our force; more are married. I read your assertions, Sergeant Major Constance, on having—it is very controversial, you realize——
Sergeant CONSTANCE. Yes; it is.
Mr. BUYER [continuing]. Do you have his statement—I just want you to comment on this. Of course, it is controversial even that you would make this statement, considering that Commandant Mundy when he made this said he punted the football out of the stadium.
Sergeant CONSTANCE. Well, I told my boss that if I still had a job when I got back, I did something right, so we will see.
Mr. BUYER. That is all right. I applaud you for it. I applaud you for this, because this town does not have candor. You know, we cannot even discuss things sometimes in this town for fear that if that is what you are discussing, or if that is the question you ask, then that must be your statement, and then you are biased or prejudiced.
Page 279 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
We ought to be talking about some things. Your recommendations include: ''Work to recruit young, single marines; ensure that young families will get the support they need; no man or woman joining the Marine Corps should be allowed to marry until the end of their first enlistment or making the rank of corporal.''
Sergeant CONSTANCE. Yes, sir.
Mr. BUYER. Tell me why you make that statement.
Sergeant CONSTANCE. OK. I will explain this without getting too excited, which I have a tendency to do as a sergeant major in the Marine Corps.
In our ability to absorb and give adequate housing, medical, the whole ball of wax, is beginning to be strained at the seams where it can no longer support that volume of people; it cannot work. Something has got to go.
You know, in the Marine Corps, we pride ourselves in taking care of our own, and we have done very well at that. General Mundy stole that idea from me. [Laughter.]
Sergeant CONSTANCE. But this is not something that just happened overnight. We have some great young marines out there, and I have a family case waiting on my desk that I am going to have to deal with when I come back, where a young lance corporal does not want to deploy because of his wife and newborn baby. Here is a guy that I am sending as a regimental sergeant major, and he belongs to another battalion. You know, this just continues to go on.
Page 280 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
We are building cities on Camp Pendleton to house our people—cities. We have the largest housing area, I believe, of any base in the United States. Who is going to pay for all of that after we get it all built and the families are still coming in? Everybody in this room is going to pay for it.
I am willing to pay. I will continue to pay my taxes. I love living in this country. That is no problem. But we need to understand—and I do not know what the answer is; I am not a rocket scientist—but the services are being strained. We attract young marines, young people, male and female, who are married and come in, and it just adds to the service.
Camp Pendleton alone—now, this is just Sergeant Major Constance talking; I am not the commandant, and I am not Headquarters Marine Corps; this is your regimental sergeant major—it is overwhelming the number of families that we have coming in. At Camp Pendleton, there are over 600 children waiting to get into day care—600—and the number is growing.
Mr. BUYER. Well, there is a reason why we have asked you here. It is because you will be very candid with us, and nobody can scrub your testimony, and you are going to tell it like it is, and we appreciate you doing just that.
Sergeant CONSTANCE. Thank you, sir.
Mr. BUYER. And you are right—the stressors of the finance and the budget that this is placing on the force—it is interesting that you would make this recommendation.
Page 281 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
And to my good friend Paul McHale here, being a marine, I know that when you talk about quality of life, it is different from the Air Force when they talk about quality of life. Quality of life for you is dry socks, a warm bed, a roof over your head.
So I appreciate your frankness.
Let me yield to Mr. Taylor for any questions he may have.
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a couple of questions that I want to open up to the panel. At what point does this high OPTEMPO result in vehicles breaking down—more importantly, aircraft failing while they are in the air and people's lives starting to be lost as a result?
Second, as senior NCO's, I will remind you of a conversation I had about a week ago with General Clark down at SouthCom, braking on the NCO's, and one of the things he tells his Latin American contemporaries is their need to have a strong NCO corps like we have here and that yours should be the model of the world.
Having said that, since NCO's are so important to what we do, would any of you all like to comment on why an O–6 over 22 had a three times bigger COLA than an E–6 over 22? Did his cost of living go up three times more than yours did?
The point I am trying to make here is that every time we base COLA's on percentages, the guys at the bottom get the least, the guys at the top get a much greater increase. Is that really fair? In the case of the sergeant major, I think almost half of the people in the Marine Corps are E–4's or below, which means their COLA is absolutely minuscule.
Page 282 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Has there been any talk within the enlisted ranks about asking for some equity, at least on an occasional basis, where that COLA is given in a flat dollar amount as opposed to a percentage, so that the guys down at the bottom of the accordion receive a little fairness? And obviously, having been an enlisted guy, I can tell you that is where the budgetary pressures are. It is mighty tough. I have never been an O–4 or an E–4 with a family, but I can imagine that that is pretty doggone tough. I will bet you for an E–6 with a family, it is pretty doggone tough.
Would anybody like to comment on that? The first part is at what point are the long hours you work and the long deployments affecting the safety of the aircraft and the other vehicles out there.
Sergeant Major Constance.
Sergeant CONSTANCE. I will start. In the Marine Corps—and when I say in the Marine Corps, I am talking about the 1st Marine Regiment—the breaking point for our OPTEMPO, we have not hit yet, but we are damned close to it. Now, what do I mean by ''breaking point''? As General Fulford alluded to, we are still driving the same equipment that we raced through the desert in Desert Storm. I was an LAV sergeant major about 2 years ago, and my LAV was really—all of ours—hard to keep on line. The more mechanical equipment the thing had, the more downtime it seemed to have, and we are dealing with stuff that is 6 years old, road-hard. You put them on these ships, and you send them out into the salt seas to the Pacific, you offload them now and then, drive them through the desert again, and you bring them back and take them to Twentynine Palms—it is just not your normal Mercedes Benz driving the beltway.
Page 283 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
We have serious breakage—well, we do not have it yet, but as a sergeant major, I sit in these staff meetings and I listen to all this grand talk about money, and some of it zings over my head. Then, I go and talk to my basic mechanics up there, and they say, ''Sergeant Major, I am going to go over and get some stuff off some of these deadlined vehicles, and you know, we are not supposed to be doing that, and I do not know about that one.'' But we are right there. Our heads are above water with maintenance and safety; down the line, I see that things are going to really break and break hard.
We are still flying helicopters that I flew in Vietnam. That is incredible. That is incredible. That is almost criminal, to tell you the truth, if you want honesty from a sergeant major. I would love to have somebody ride in the back of a 46 with me. You would not comprehend all the noise that that makes and the things that rattle in the back of that thing. It is not a normal flying machine, I guarantee you.
So yes—and our NCO corps—this is what has kept me in the Marine Corps. I love getting out of my office, and when I walk around my camp, what motivates me is the young marines I get to lead. And this is a young men's outfit. I am taking medication now to make my joints work, so it is time for me to step aside, because you have got to be able to lead, and you do not lead in your office.
We are still getting quality people in the Marine Corps, no doubt about it. I just walk around the camp and talk with them, and I get a great feeling. I enjoy it very much.
Page 284 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. TAYLOR. Sergeant Major, may I interrupt—and again, this is all off the top of my head. I was informed by staff that last year's COLA budget impact was about $1.6 billion. In that, the O–6 over 22 got about a $1,750 raise; the E–6 over 22 got about a $600 raise. What kind of a morale booster would it be, just once, for you to go in front of the people you are responsible for and say, ''Guys, this year, your COLA was $1,000''—which is what you get if you divide the total force by the total dollars—''and for once, you get the same COLA as the general living on top of the hill''? What would that do for the morale of the troops?
Sergeant CONSTANCE. It would go through the ceiling. It would go right through the ceiling.
Mr. TAYLOR. I would hope you would use your organizations to try to further that point, even if we do it on an occasional basis, every other year or every third year. I believe in that practice; I use it in my office.
Sergeant SIMMONS. Sir, can I make a point? I know the light is red here.
Mr. TAYLOR. Sure, please. I am sure Mr. Buyer will be generous with you.
Mr. BUYER. Yes, please.
Sergeant SIMMONS. As far as the COLA, yes, it is very important, but if we could also address the issue of separation allowance. You know, in different geographic locations, obviously, the amount is going to change, and it is very important—please do not get me wrong. But if we could just boost up the family separation allowance to equal that. That way, family separation allowance is on an equal keel across the board. COLA is an up-and-down thing. That way, it will be even across the board, whether it is a troop in Germany, Korea, what I am facing today, or deployed in Saudi Arabia. Everybody will have equal pay, and, at least, the families could be supported.
Page 285 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Thank you.
Sergeant THOMAS. Sir, if I might add an additional comment, first, in about the fourth quarter of this year, we are going to find out whether we have done things right or wrong, because that is when I am not going to make my reenlistment and my retention goals if I cannot continue to keep showing soldiers that these packages are there or that there is hope for them to see compensation come back to them. It will be in about the fourth quarter.
Another food for thought in my particular instance is that we are not needing any more money for training. I am gone 150 days a year, training. What I need to do is to ensure that there are benefit packages, quality of life, operating money for the base so that they can continue to run the gyms so that the civilian counterpart there does not take a soldier from me to run the gym, and he does not take a soldier from me to issue out some of the equipment that is needed.
Six months is what I have to concentrate on. I have 6 months to ensure that the soldiers' quality of life in those facilities is there for him. The 6 months that I am deployed, soldiers are extremely happy; they are not distracted. For the most part, we have great family support groups.
You will hear from Vicki Olson, who is part of the 1st Cavalry Division, this afternoon. I had a battalion associated with that brigade's deployment, and we handled most of the problems that came up for soldiers, but they were normally in the realm of finances. So, whatever you do to help pay and whatever form you do to help a soldier receive more pay, it will help soldiers.
Page 286 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
We have to continue to be innovative about the way we give the soldier quality time. There was an initiative, which for my rank was unheard of years ago, to have weekends off, or to have Thursday afternoon off for family time. Those used to be unheard of, and they are now working quite well to support the family or the single soldier who has other things to do and would like to seek some type of college. So we are trying to be innovative, but in the fourth quarter, you will find out whether we make our retention goals or not.
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Buyer.
Mr. BUYER. Thank you.
Mr. Bartlett, you are recognized.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.
In response to other questions, you have indicated that some of the impediments to retention include pay, including a benefit package; the opportunity for advancement, and quality of life. Let me ask you if you could indicate just very briefly, each of the services—quality of life includes quite a variety of things—what could we help you with most in improving quality of life so that you can do better in retention?
Let us start with the Army and go down through the services. What is the No. 1 thing in quality of life that you could use our help on?
Page 287 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Sergeant THOMAS. Affordable family housing.
Mr. BARTLETT. Family housing; OK.
And in the Navy?
Chief SCHEETZ. That is a tough question. I would have to say that pay is probably one of the biggest things that has to do with our personnel and quality of life. The amount of pay that they receive directly affects quality of life. If they had more pay, their quality of life would already improve.
Mr. BARTLETT. OK.
Sergeant SIMMONS. Well, for my own unaccompanied single troops, it would obviously be billeting, and I do not even want to go into that, because I am sure you all have had an earful of that; it would be one-on-one rooms for the folks.
Sergeant CONSTANCE. I would have to say probably the improvement of the single marines' barracks, the marines who live on camp. We have a good handle on our married marines, so I would say improvement in the barracks themselves.
Mr. BARTLETT. So, at least three of the services have indicated housing as the No. 1 issue in quality of life. We need to know what your priorities are so that we can make them our priorities.
Page 288 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BUYER. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. McHale, you are recognized.
Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, my question is going to focus on combat readiness, and I am going to address it to Sergeant Major Constance and Sergeant Major Thomas.
Gentlemen, I am somebody who believes very strongly that readiness, particularly for ground combat, is best derived through sustained field operations, preferably with live fire. Whether it is a combined arms exercise out at Twentynine Palms or an evolution at the National Training Center, I do not believe there is any ultimate substitute for putting a maneuver element in the field and giving them live rounds. That comes closer to combat than anything else that I have experienced in peacetime training, and I support command post exercises and simulators and all the other options that are cost-effective, but I believe firmly you have got to get your troops to the field if you want them to feel the cohesion, the unit integrity, the closest replication of combat experience that we can have in a peacetime environment.
I am concerned when I hear that in terms of O & M funding, we are increasing maintenance at the expense of operations, and I am particularly concerned when I hear that there are field exercises cancelled for financial purposes. So in that context, let me ask a couple of simple questions that give me information that I need.
Page 289 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Sergeant Major Constance, when was the last time you ate an MRE?
Sergeant CONSTANCE. Oh, a week ago.
Mr. MCHALE. Sergeant Major Thomas.
Sergeant THOMAS. About 3 weeks ago, sir.
Mr. MCHALE. When was the last time your command element, Sergeant Thomas, went overnight to the field—the entire command element.
Sergeant THOMAS. Sir, my brigade just returned from the National Training Center less than 3 weeks ago. I personally returned on February 3.
Mr. MCHALE. Sergeant Major Constance, when was the last time the command element of the 1st Marines went to the field?
Sergeant CONSTANCE. Last week.
Mr. MCHALE. How often do your battalions go to the field?
Sergeant THOMAS. Sir, I will say that first, the average battalion will spend deployed 150 days. We will do sustainment gunnery here—and I am not talking about those deployed days away, because they get live-fire exercises at the National Training Center, and then, in Kuwait, they get other live-fire training exercises. They will do on the average two sustainment gunneries with the Bradleys and the tanks, twice a year. We will do platoon training exercises, company and battalion-level training exercises. So there will be multiple deployments to increase the training level for the soldier before his deployment to NTC or to Kuwait.
Page 290 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. MCHALE. All right. Sergeant Major, if you could just amplify that a little bit, basically, what I am asking you is how often would one of your gunners pull a trigger on a live round—on how many training exercises per year?
Sergeant THOMAS. On the average, at least three to four times a year.
Mr. MCHALE. But only three or four times a year?
Sergeant THOMAS. Sir, when I say that, I am talking about not just pulling the trigger one time, but actual sustainment gunneries.
Mr. MCHALE. I understand that.
Sergeant THOMAS. So, we are looking at 7 days when he is pulling triggers on a Bradley or a tank. He receives many rounds of ammunition for NTC. So we are not doing badly with live fire.
Mr. MCHALE. All right. Sergeant Major Constance, how often will your grunts from the 1st Marines go to the field for live-fire training?
Sergeant CONSTANCE. To live-fire? I had my notes all ready here——
Page 291 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. MCHALE. Give me the answer that you wanted to give me, and then we can move to the one that I asked.
Sergeant CONSTANCE. My marines are daily in the field. You know, you do not have to deploy to go to the field at Camp Horno, which is the name of the camp that I am at. It is a great location because we are right by the live-fire ranges. If I had to give you an average off the top of my head about how often a marine smells gunpowder and shoots his weapon, I would say monthly, he is out there shooting. But as I go about the camp, as I alluded to earlier, I see guys forming up on what we call our grinders, campaigning up, getting their gear together, and they will go off for 2 or 3 days, come back, clean up, maybe go out for the next day, and all during that time period, they are within patrol distance of live-fire ranges. So, I would say monthly.
Mr. MCHALE. I am sorry, Sergeant Major. Were you going to say something?
Sergeant THOMAS. Yes; I would, sir. I would like to clarify the fact that I am talking about large training exercises that will prepare soldiers, gunners, in our Bradleys and our tanks. It does not take into account that I shoot monthly with small arms ammunition. We have dismounted training that always leads up to mounted training with our dismounts. So there are other opportunities with the small arms and smaller-caliber weapons such as M–60 machine guns and .50 calibers.
Mr. MCHALE. My light is red, and I do not want to abuse the privilege, but may I ask one more question, Mr. Chairman?
Page 292 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. Yes.
Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To each one of you two gentlemen, are your soldiers ready to fight, and are your marines ready?
Sergeant CONSTANCE. Yes, sir; the Marine Corps is ready.
Mr. MCHALE. You were supposed to let him go first.
Sergeant CONSTANCE. Go ahead.
Mr. MCHALE. I like the spirit that prompted the quick answer.
Sergeant Thomas.
Sergeant THOMAS. Sir, we are ready.
Mr. MCHALE. All right. You really feel confident in your soldiers?
Sergeant THOMAS. Sir, when we deploy to Kuwait, I stand at the bottom of the airplane, I shake the soldier's hand, and I look in his eye. He is ready, he is motivated, and he willing to fight for his country.
Page 293 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. MCHALE. And the Marines are good to go?
Sergeant CONSTANCE. It is the best I have seen in 30 years.
Mr. MCHALE. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Buyer.
Mr. BUYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senior Master Sergeant Simmons, in your testimony, you said about the experience level of your troops that ''seven of the 21 dedicated crews for your A–10 aircraft do not fully meet the requirements for the position.'' That is really concerning.
Sergeant SIMMONS. Yes, sir. In my opening statement, I mentioned that because of the experience level, Pacific air instruction states that they have got to have a certain amount of time on the A–10 aircraft—we do not have that—and/or they must be a staff sergeant. We do not have that.
Now, please do not get me wrong. Those people that we do have on those aircraft are fully capable of performing those tasks to retrieve those A–10's. But what I am getting at is that the instruction states that they must be a staff sergeant. We do not have the CO's in that particular squadron to fill that requirement.
Page 294 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BUYER. And the only A–10's we have left are in Korea?
Sergeant SIMMONS. Well, I could only speak for the 25th Fighter Squadron. We have only A–10's.
Mr. BUYER. Where else are they—in the National Guard, but in active Air Force units.
Sergeant SIMMONS. We have them in Alaska and in Korea, and we have them and Pope and Svengalum and Nellis.
Mr. BUYER. OK. So, we have got them in other places.
Sergeant SIMMONS. Yes.
Mr. BUYER. So, we are dealing with some shortages.
Sergeant SIMMONS. At Osan, again, because of the——
Mr. BUYER. What other types of shortages in positions do you have at Osan that you are aware of?
Sergeant SIMMONS. I am going to have to get back with you on that, sir. I am not an expert in the maintenance field. That was just a point my chief wanted to bring up to you on behalf of the maintenance career field. But I can get back to you on that.
Page 295 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BUYER. When the commanders were here, I asked about some of the shortages. Are any of you experienced in the shortages? I know you have talked about some of the midlevel NCO's. Any else—are there shortages in maintenance or——
Sergeant THOMAS. Sir, within my brigade, I am manned at 93 percent strength with the infantrymen. Once you take off the soldier who is not there normally because of base operations, because of the undeployability of that soldier—normally, medical care—I have 50 percent of my dismounted infantrymen when I drop the ramp in a Bradley. I am significantly concerned about my maintenance noncommissioned officers. I am concerned about my first sergeants in the armor field. I am concerned about first sergeants in the infantry branch for this summer.
In our logistics field, the low-density MOS's such as personnel sergeants and supply sergeants, we do not have the midgrade-level NCO's authorized. We normally have either sergeants or specialists serving in those grades.
So, I do have some shortages in my unit in the logistics field and in the infantry and in the armor field.
Mr. BUYER. Sergeant Major Constance, at what percentage—are you filled at 100 percent or not?
Sergeant CONSTANCE. Oh, no, sir. We have done well with our shortages. What we look at here is when my battalions return from their deployments, they are pretty well destroyed. I take people out of that battalion—not me—but people depart. I have got to run my camp for 4,000 marines. I have what we call our FAP's, camp augments. So that battalion is noneffective when they first come back, but our main focus is that battalion that has just left or is getting ready to leave, and yes, sir; they are at 100 percent.
Page 296 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
So, no; they are not, but yes; they are.
Mr. BUYER. Well, that is what I am trying to get at. Sergeant Simmons, at Osan, what is your percentage of your operational unit's manpower?
Sergeant SIMMONS. Oh, we are good to go on manpower. I mean, we have the right amount of people at Osan as far as the maintenance crew. The problem is—let us say, for example, we receive an E–5 staff sergeant who meets the criteria for the grade, but he has never touched an A–10 before; he has worked U–2's. They are in the same career field; they are coded the same, but they jump, using the A–10's as well. But do not get me wrong. They go through FTD, field training detachment.
Mr. BUYER. Sometimes we get testimony that says full strength, or 100 percent personnel manned, and we have to get behind that and say, ''yes; we may have all the people, but are they the right people for the right jobs.''
Sergeant SIMMONS. That is exactly right.
Mr. BUYER. Thank you.
Mr. BATEMAN. Well, if the gentleman would yield, going back to the field hearing we had yesterday one of the concerns that seemed to go across all the services was this midlevel NCO and the shortage there. It seems to be not just something that is anecdotal, that you know of a unit, or that your unit has that problem; it seems to be fairly pervasive through the services. Is that impression that I got yesterday, some of which I am getting today, but not as much today—is that an accurate perception?
Page 297 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Sergeant THOMAS. Sir, I read the testimony from yesterday, and that is correct.
Mr. BATEMAN. Well, one of the things that we heard yesterday, and something that I thought was from a bygone era that we would never repeat again were stories about cannibalizing planes in order to keep other planes flying. Is this something you are having to do at Osan?
Sergeant SIMMONS. We do that, sir. We have practiced that a couple of times. Now, again, I am not the expert in that, but we do take parts from one plane to work on another. But our ratio on that is very well; it is just that at times, we have to go with what we have to do to get those planes up.
Mr. BATEMAN. No one is going to complain that you are doing it, but it is a concern to us that you are required to do it. It does harken back to an era where that was almost the norm of how we kept an inventory of planes flying.
Reference was made earlier today about some concerns about aircraft engines. Is that a problem of backlog at the depot level of maintenance, or is that something that is in-theater or in the operating units?
Sergeant SIMMONS. I am sorry, sir, I cannot answer that question, but I can get back to you on that. I am a first sergeant, and I deal a lot with people and not the maintenance work.
Page 298 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. Well, returning again to the spare parts to keep planes flying, we heard some testimony yesterday as I recall it, basically to the effect that a Navy air wing or squadron that should have 12 planes actually was operating with 6, and of the 6, only 4 were combat ready. This is not the kind of thing that inspires a lot of confidence, that we are consistently, across the board as ready as I think all of us feel that we need to be.
Sergeant THOMAS. Sir, I might reinforce something here that the commanding general of III Corps said the other day. ''Cannibalization'' is the term we use, and we do not subscribe to that. I am not going to say that it does not happen every once in a while when you are in the field, at the platoon or the company level. But we work maintenance real hard. If we have a problem at all, it is based on the soldier who is deployed, who leaves his equipment in the motor pool, and we have to do service on 58 Bradleys that there are no people to do services with.
So that cannibalization in the Blackjack Brigade and at Fort Hood to my knowledge is not an issue. We have parts, and for the most part, we have got the people to put them on with if we are not deployed.
Mr. BATEMAN. Are you experiencing any problem at the operational unit level with backlogs at the central maintenance depots for tanks, planes, or other equipment?
Sergeant THOMAS. Sir, speaking from my experience within the brigade, there may be some problems with some of our older equipment, our 113's, our Hemmets, which are our cargo carriers. But for the most part, our Bradleys and tanks, we are in pretty good shape and receiving the parts that we need.
Page 299 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Buyer.
Mr. BUYER. I just have one last question, and it is a readiness question, but also for procurement purposes.
Sergeant Major Constance, you were very clear in your statement when you said, ''Frequently, marines choose not to reenlist because our battalions do not have all the major end-item equipment'' when you go to train.
Would you please explain what equipment you do not have, why don't you have it for training; has it been placed in storage? What are the reasons, and what other problems besides that are you talking about?
Sergeant CONSTANCE. All right, sir. Am I allowed to say that that was a typo? [Laughter.]
Mr. BUYER. No.
Sergeant CONSTANCE. No. All right. Actually, what I was alluding to there, which did not come out——
Mr. BUYER. All right. What did you mean?
Page 300 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Sergeant CONSTANCE. I mean that that is an in-house problem. What I mean by in-house is that one battalion had a supply officer who did not correctly send for the items that they needed, and thus, marines were short gear. That had nothing to do with the use of the money. It was not requested correctly.
Our individual equipment is in great shape now. We are still using World War II shelter halves, but they are getting replaced. We are getting ready to get into Gortex. But no, there are not—I did not write that, sir, that last sentence. I will not claim that. I do get to claim foul here.
Marines are not reenlisting for that type of reason. Marines have the gear. What happened there is that I was going through a battalion inspection of their individual equipment, the gear that they carry to the field, and there were many shortcomings with individual items. As I looked into it, it looked as though what happened was that the supply officer who was supposed to stay ahead of the eightball on that had not requested the gear be there in a timely manner. The money was there. He did not use it.
Mr. BUYER. Are there any other fouls in your statement?
Sergeant CONSTANCE. No, no. It is good to go. It is good to go. Sorry, sir, about that.
Mr. BUYER. No. I am glad we clarified that. We would not want to go out and quote you if this is in fact not accurate.
Page 301 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Sergeant CONSTANCE. No, sir. This is my first time in Washington, so I am learning.
Mr. BUYER. That is all right. Thank you very much.
Sergeant CONSTANCE. Yes, sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. It is easier the first time. [Laughter.]
Time is always an element with us, but last year, when we were going through these hearings, there was testimony with reference to shortfalls in ammunition for the Marines and I think for the Army as well. We put additional dollars into the authorization bill and the appropriation bill last year for ammunition. Have those problems been solved, or are there continuing ammunition shortages?
Sergeant THOMAS. Sir, speaking from my experience over the last 6 or 7 months, I cannot remember an occasion when I did not have a bullet to fire when I was there to fire it.
Mr. BATEMAN. Several times, we have heard reference made to simulation or training by simulation, and certainly I have no preconceived notion that that is a bad thing. It is probably a very good thing provided that you are verifying that the simulated training is delivering what is needed for the troops to be combat-ready. Are we really testing simulated training in terms of its relative effectiveness to actual in-the-field training?
Page 302 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Sergeant THOMAS. Sir, I can speak to some of that. My brigade is involved in some of the simulation exercises that will use multiple variations of simulations. We routinely use what we call the unit conduct of trainer for our tanks and our Bradleys; that is every day. We are going into combat simulation for crews and can go as high as, based on the number of simulators available, to platoon and company exercises, and we hope to see that at Fort Hood pretty soon.
We routinely do command post exercises, which do train our operations sergeants and our INTEL sergeants and our soldiers who work in those command posts—we use those all I70the time. They are very good for honing those skills.
We think that—my opinion is that, based on the soldier that we are seeing today, we think he is going to learn just as much initially because he will go to the simulation, he will be able to perform almost all of the tasks that we do, except that he will not have to fix the truck that breaks, he will not have to wash the mud off the tank, and that is time consuming.
It is not just the dollars, it is the time saved for the soldier. So there are two sides to this—yes, we save money in OPTEMPO; we saved maybe 60 miles, but we saved that soldier the time so he can now go home to his family at night. And right now, quality time with the family or for the single soldier is important.
So for the future, I think simulation is going to help us in an area that we had not thought about.
Page 303 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. One last area, and then, unless someone else insists, and there does not seem to be anyone here to do so—to my surprise, I have heard testimony generally to the effect that for units who are significantly highly engaged and forward-deployed, the morale is very high; they enjoy and appreciate the challenge of having important things to do and going out and excelling at doing them. But the fact that some of the units are forward-deployed leaves people back at the home base from which they were deployed with all of the norm that has got to be done to run the base and to do the maintenance and all the other functions that are necessary to maintain and sustain a state of readiness. And it is those people back home who get stressed out because the people who used to be there to help them, and some of the skills that are very important to their operations, are no longer there because they are deployed, and you begin to see some signs of morale problems, not among those who are being deployed, but among those who are not being deployed.
Do you sense there is any reality to this, or is that any reason for concern?
Sergeant SIMMONS. Oh, yes, sir; very much so. Before I went to Osan, I was a Mobility NCO at F.E. Warren, and we used to deploy a lot of folks out of F.E. Warren, and I can tell you right now that when you send 88 people somewhere, someone has got to pick up the slack, and unfortunately, it is those folks who are still lingering around.
Those 8-hour workdays back then now become 12-hour work-days, with only 1 day off. Being in the career field I was back then, those even went further and further into the day; 16 hours was very common.
Page 304 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
So, you are absolutely right. You have hit it right on the head.
Mr. BATEMAN. Well, I have heard those statements made several times now, and you all have nothing inconsistent with it being some degree of a problem.
Sergeant.
Sergeant THOMAS. Sir, I do have a comment. Because we are deployed, I do have a lot of equipment that has to be serviced; your statement is correct. What I would like to offer is that if we are able to go to our commander and say, ''I have so many vehicles that need to be serviced; provide me civilians to do the servicing on a routine basis,'' then what I have now is the regular workday for the soldier and not the continued workday that we see when the soldiers are deployed.
So that runs into quality of life and quality time back with the family or for the single soldier.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you.
Mr. McHale, have you returned because you have another question?
Mr. MCHALE. Mr. Chairman, I do have one question for Sergeant Major Constance.
Page 305 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Sergeant Major, I appreciate the fact that your recommendations raise some fairly controversial proposals, and I think we in the Congress need to look seriously at what you have advocated.
You talked about housing out at Camp Pendleton. I was there a week and a half ago, and the housing is superb. It is the best I, too, have ever seen aboard any base anywhere in the world. Are you aware that there is a 6-month waiting list for junior enlisted married housing, and are there steps being taken to address that concern?
Sergeant CONSTANCE. Yes, sir; I am aware of that. At the lower rank, there seems to always be a waiting list. All I know is that they are continuing to build. I know they are coming down to the end of where they are going to be building new quarters.
What is the solution? I do not know if we are going to be able to build enough to house everybody that we need aboard base.
Mr. MCHALE. Just as a practical matter, what does a married lance corporal do to provide housing for his family during that 6-month delay?
Sergeant CONSTANCE. Well, he is out-of-pocket a lot of money. In southern California, it is pretty tough. There are some low areas around the Oceanside area, the Fallbrook area, which are not as expensive, but also, the lower the price of the apartment, the more unsafe it becomes for that family as well. So it becomes a hit-and-miss deal.
For 6 months, he is probably going to empty out his savings account if he had one when he came.
Page 306 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. MCHALE. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. McHale, and let me thank our panel. We do appreciate your coming, many of you from afar, in order to share some of your wisdom and perspectives with us. It is very important to what we are trying to do, and hopefully will help us do it better than would have otherwise been the case.
We are indebted to you for coming and appreciate your service, and certainly, I hope you sense that it is the intense desire of the people on the two subcommittees that are meeting today and of the full committee to see that our armed services continue to have the benefit of people of your caliber, because that is the only way we can maintain readiness and our national security requirements is by the high caliber of the people who serve the country in its uniform.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 1:28 p.m., the joint subcommittees were recessed, to reconvene at 2:04 p.m. the same day.]
Mr. BATEMAN. The subcommittees will come to order.
We are pleased to resume our hearing, and this afternoon's panel consists of Brig. Gen. William S. Wallace, U.S. Army, commander, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA; Vice Adm. Bernard Smith, U.S. Navy, commander, Naval Tactical Warfare Center, Fallon, NV; Brig. Gen. T. Michael Moseley, U.S. Air Force, commander, 57th Wing, Nellis Air Force Base, NV; and Brig. Gen. Ronald Richard, U.S. Marine Corps, commanding general, Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, CA.
Page 307 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
We are very pleased to have you this afternoon and look forward to your testimony. We will start with General Wallace.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM S. WALLACE, U.S. ARMY, COMMANDER NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER, FORT IRWIN, CA
General WALLACE. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the joint committee, good afternoon. It is truly an honor to appear before you today as commander of the National Training Center.
I am pleased to report to you that our Army continues to deploy, fight, and win on the battlefields of the National Training Center, demonstrating its force projection prowess and unique decisiveness as a full-spectrum force. I am especially proud of the unwavering dedication displayed by the hundreds of young soldiers I see fighting with all their heart every month on the bloodless NTC battlefield. They are the reason we exist. Thanks to them, the troopers of our dedicated opposing force, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, a talented and integral civilian force, and strong support from southern Californians, the NTC continues to provide world class training for the world's best Army.
It is very difficult to generalize on the readiness of the U.S. Army combat brigades as they rotate through the National Training Center. First allow me to comment on the current training regimen at the National Training Center and then offer some observations.
Page 308 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
The National Training Center, or NTC, is not in the business of readiness rating or reporting. Rather, we take a unit's baseline proficiency and seek to improve it in a 28-day training rotation that is as close to actual war as we can safely make it. In this, we have been universally successful. Every unit rotating through the National Training Center leaves much better than when it first arrived. As an integral part of the combined arms training strategies, or CATS, NTC rotations have proved invaluable to training the force, while deliberately not assessing readiness or grading results.
The training venue at the National Training Center has changed dramatically over the past 3 years, in recognition of the National Military Strategy and the Army's force projection role. The enemy on the NTC battlefield, the NTC's opposing force, has become much more flexible in its execution of battlefield tasks. Although they remain equipped with simulated former Soviet equipment, their doctrine has become more generic, drawing from the experience of commanders and their ability to see and react and to battlefield events.
We have transitioned to full-up brigade operations, both live fire and force-on-force, at the National Training Center throughout the entire 14 days of tactical operations. We have introduced civilians on the battlefield in the form of indigenous personnel and the media, and in the very near future, we will introduce terrorist threats during deployment to further train a unit's ability to exercise force protection measures.
We now conduct a 6-day leader training program 120 days prior to a unit's rotation, designed to improve leader and staff skills prior to deployment to the NTC.
Finally, what used to be purely an administrative exercise of drawing equipment from the NTC's prepositioned fleet of equipment is now a contingency scenario-based exercise during which deploying units must manage the rapid buildup of combat capability, while protecting their forces and responding to tactical missions conducted under peacetime rules of engagement. I offer this to explain the increased complexity of NTC training as it has evolved over the past few years.
Page 309 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Our success is demonstrated in recent deployments. For example, in September 1996, the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, deployed from Fort Hood, TX, to Kuwait on 12 aircraft sorties, drew equipment from Army war reserve stocks and deployed to its desert tactical assembly area in less than 120 hours. This allowed the 3d Brigade Combat Team to reinforce its forward-deployed intrinsic action task force already in Kuwait and deter further Iraqi adventurism in the area.
The 3d Brigade Combat Team had recently practiced these very same tasks as part of a National Training Center rotation in January 1996. Instead of deploying to Kuwait, they had deployed to the fictitious country of Mojavia, home of the National Training Center. There, they faced training along the entire road to war, which portrayed a deteriorating geopolitical situation that eventually led to conflict.
American soldiers then practiced their war-fighting skills in a bloodless campaign, assimilating lessons learned through the after-action review process at the NTC. These are the lessons they would have put to use had they been called upon to do so in Kuwait. Of course, we know that this shining example of a trained and ready force from our power projection Army was successful in its mission of deterrence. Therein lies the value of the National Training Center.
Key to the learning which occurs during each NTC rotation is the after-action review. It incorporates a nonthreatening learning environment to encourage introspection and self-discovery learning among the key leaders and soldiers of a unit in training. This openness to constructive criticism is a powerful tool to assimilate lessons learned. Protecting the integrity of this tremendously effective learning environment is paramount. That is why we do not compare units.
Page 310 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
I can say without reservation, however, that every unit rotating through the NTC leaves at a higher state of readiness than when they first deployed.
Performance on the NTC's battlefield is but a small part of assessing a unit's readiness. What I can offer the members of the committee, though, are my frank observations of some readiness trends we have observed and what we at the NTC think may be contributing to them.
Let me first say that I have seen no discernible overall downward trend in units' readiness to fight at the NTC; but this does not entirely alleviate our concerns. A unit's preparedness to execute a mission, whether an NTC rotation or an intrinsic action deployment to Kuwait or any of a host of other deployments, is based upon resources. These resources, of course, are chiefly people, time, and funding.
Increased worldwide deployments, dollar-constrained home station training and personnel turbulence all conspire to place increased stress on units, soldiers, families, and leaders and potentially detract from readiness. The NTC will conduct 10 rotations in fiscal year 1997 due largely to scheduling conflicts and the necessity to accommodate the Army's advanced warfighting experiment this month. In an attempt to increase efficiency and reduce unit deployments, it is possible that 10 rotations per year will become the norm for fiscal year 1998 and beyond.
Particularly detrimental to unit preparedness is personnel turbulence, whether it manifests itself as more empty seats on our armored vehicles, fewer battle-rostered crews working as a team, or fewer experienced field-grade officers filling key positions.
Page 311 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Today, for instance, the major who has served repeatedly as a battalion operations officer or executive officer is a rarity. Rather, they get one opportunity to do so for just 12 months before being reassigned to fill some other critical position. In a business where experience at the unit level is vital to mastery of the complexities of the modern battlefield, we tend to see leaders who are well educated but not well practiced. Perhaps this personnel turbulence is at the root of a phenomenon we experience every summer at the National Training Center—reduced unit ability at the height of the personnel reassignment season.
We have also noticed an increase in the number of empty seats in the troop compartments of our Bradley fighting vehicles. Beyond the problems caused by simple turbulence, this is an available strength problem. Traditionally, units deployed to the NTC at or above 100 percent strength, often by borrowing soldiers from nondeployed units. But with many units now deploying more frequently, personnel tempo demands mandate come-as-you-are policies with the resultant crew and position vacancies.
The National Training Center's opposing force regimen is not immune from this phenomenon, since they are subject to Army-wide assignment policies. As an example, during a recent OPFOR regimental attack, the OPFOR attacked with 15 fewer combat vehicles than authorized due to personnel manning levels.
American soldiers are renowned for their ability to adapt and overcome. I am proud to report to you today that they continue to do so on the battlefields of the National Training Center despite constrained resources and other detractors to unit readiness. Some units begin their rotation less prepared and therefore face a steeper learning curve than others. Regardless, they all leave far better than when they arrived, ready to deter a potential aggressor, or fight and win.
Page 312 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
It is our collective responsibility to ensure that this readiness is sustained so that any of our units can perform as magnificently as they have throughout our history.
Mr. Chairman, I stand ready to answer the committee's question.
[The prepared statement of General Wallace can be found in the appendix on page 365.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, General Wallace.
Admiral Smith, we will be pleased to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. BERNARD J. SMITH, U.S. NAVY, COMMANDER, NAVAL TACTICAL WARFARE CENTER, FALLON, NV
Admiral SMITH. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittees, I want to correct at least one part of my introduction here. I am a rear admiral, not a vice admiral, although I was hoping that perhaps you knew—this is one of the things that you know more about than what I will be discussing with you here today.
Mr. BATEMAN. I hope we are correct, Admiral.
Page 313 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Admiral SMITH. Thank you, sir.
I have submitted a statement for the record as well, and what I would like to do is very briefly summarize what is contained in that by way of the explanation of my command, which is relatively new, having been established in July of this past year. It represents a very positive step on the part of the Navy to enhance our training capability by combining Top Gun, TOPDOME, and the former Strike Warfare Center at Fallon, NV. It additionally brings to a single point the management of that very wonderful training range complex in Nevada and allows within the command, a single command, the establishment of requirements for future development as well as the dealing with all of the issues associated with the Bureau of Land Management Interaction, land withdrawals, environmental issues, et cetera.
We are also in a unique position there because of the Navy policy of providing training to every deploying air wing to evaluate and assess the performance and readiness of each of those air wings during the intermediate training point in their inner deployment training cycle.
The other part of my testimony deals with the Navy's policy of acceptance of less than the highest possible readiness at various points in that deployment training cycle. And by way of explanation, I have included a graphic which shows the distribution of some of our critical assets, from the flying hour program to personnel to aircraft maintenance factors, and so on, which reflects a tiered approach to the achievement of deployed readiness. It explains somewhat why the commander, 6th Fleet this morning was able to tell you very positively that the deployed forces to the Mediterranean in his view are at high readiness. I also verify that from my very limited perspective from where I sit, but with interaction with the commanders who are the management staff for all of these assets that are managed, I can confirm that over the past year—and have in the statement—we have seen no diminishment of readiness as a result of our management actions.
Page 314 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
I also state the concern that if we go any further into a management decrease in the assets that we have to manage this readiness, we, in fact, may not in the future be able to provide the same level of readiness to our deploying assets; or, more specifically, to respond to a situation such as was called for with the deployment of additional assets in response to a Desert Shield/Desert Storm type of scenario or a 50/27 or other contingency execution. I think that that is quite critical.
What I do not discuss in the paper but I think is also quite important is that I did not reference quality of life issues or the retention issue. It is something that concerns us all, and I do not claim to have any answers. However, my statement of concern centers primarily on the effects of all of those reduced budget impacts on all of the areas that impact the readiness of our forces because I firmly believe that while it is not usually talked about, one of the major quality-of-life issues for everyone who serves in the U.S. Navy, certainly in naval aviation, is that he have the ability to be the best he can be. If he is a pilot, if he is an aircraft maintainer, if he is a shipboard radar operator, he has got to have the equipment to operate and execute his training which we have provided him, so that he, in fact, can realize personal and professional fulfillment. And to the extent there is a reduction in assets to the point where we cannot do the unit training, and it significantly impacts on the maintenance of our forces early in that turnaround training cycle or for months in that training cycle, I believe it has a very deleterious effect on our retention rates, and I think that that is largely what we are seeing occur today.
With that sir, I am ready to answer your questions.
Page 315 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
[The prepared statement of Admiral Smith can be found in the appendix on page 372.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Now we are pleased to hear from General Moseley.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, U.S. AIR FORCE, COMMANDER, 57TH WING, NELLIS AIR FORCE BASE, NV
General MOSELEY. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee. I bring greetings from the men and women of the Air Warfare Center and the 57th Wing at Nellis.
I welcome the opportunity to appear with my colleagues here to discuss readiness issues within our respective commands.
As you know, over the last several years, the Air Force has undergone a transformation. We are a smaller force, and we are operating at a tempo that is equal to or greater than the past.
With that said, however, the graduate-level training opportunity the Air Warfare Center and the 57th Wing at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada provide the Air Force, our sister services, and our allies is better than ever before.
Page 316 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Our objective at Nellis is to ensure that our aviators are prepared to plan and orchestrate an air campaign as well as to survive the first few missions of the conflict. To meet this training challenge, the 57th Wing has the finest pilots, instructors, thinkers, planners, maintainers, logisticians, and crew chiefs that I have seen in my Air Force career.
The advanced training offered by the Air Force Weapons School, Air Warrior, Red Flag/Green Flag/Coalition Flag and Maple Flag is simply the best in the world. We are specifically organized at Nellis to provide the field a wide range of advanced training options. In the conduct of this training, we are, however, seeing a bit of a decline in the overall effectiveness of the field units, and we are seeing a bit of a degrade in the basic skills.
I believe this decline can be attributed first to a younger force, with declining experience levels in our squadrons, and second, to the current contingency tasking which keeps our units operating at a fast pace, while offering less day-to-day home station training opportunities.
I might also tell you that this decline in specific skills is being specifically addressed by the Air Force on the Nellis ranges. The advance training there provides the vital service to our field units, better preparing them for any air combat tasking. At Nellis, we are able to vary the specific threat levels as desired by the field commanders; we are also able to specifically tailor the training presentations to give them the combat edge much faster and much, much safer than before. That is why the Air Warfare Center and the 57th Wing exist—to sharpen the field commander's sword.
Page 317 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
So, in summary, we at Nellis are ready to provide advanced air combat training to the Air Force, our sister services, and our allies. That is what we do. That is our primary job. The mission is to showcase air power to the world, and we stand ready to meet that task.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you again for the opportunity to discuss these critical issues. I am looking forward to your comments and our discussion.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Moseley can be found in the appendix on page 381.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, General Moseley.
All of your prepared statements will be made a part of the record without objection, and with that, we will turn to General Richard. I apologize for the original mispronunciation.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. RONALD G. RICHARD. U.S. MARINE CORPS, COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS AIR GROUND COMBAT CENTER, TWENTYNINE PALMS, CA
General RICHARD. Mr. Chairman, I have been called a lot of things over 29 years, and so I understand.
Page 318 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss training as we prepared our forces for America's future battles.
Our first exercise at the Combat Center at Twentynine Palms, CA, dates back to 1958. Since that time, the combined arms exercise, or CAX, has evolved with the dynamics of world affairs. Today my mission is quite clear—teaching and training combined arms warfare.
The essence of what we do is live-fire and maneuver. Basically, we are the ones in the Marine Corps who are charged with doing the blocking and tackling of tactics at the grassroots level, and we think we do that very well, and I will be prepared to answer any comments you may have later on in the hearing.
Approximately one-third of our fleet Marine forces, both active and Reserves, train on an annual basis at the Combat Center. These equate to 30,000-plus marines on a yearly basis. All forces train to a single standard. You have heard our commandant say ''one Marine Corps, a total force Marine Corps''—that is true.
The CAX Program today is a come-as-you-are training event, warts and all, and I would like to explain later on how the term ''battalion cycle'' in the Marine Corps means something other than just a regular battalion as might be viewed by another service. The battalion cycle—the battalion grows, goes to deployment, comes back, reduces in numbers. It is akin to a ship that goes out on a deployment, comes back into the yard, has some work done on it, and then off she goes again.
Page 319 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Units report aboard at various points in their unit training cycle, often referred to as the battalion cycle, which I just mentioned. The methodology is ''crawl, walk, and then run,'' as determined by the unit commander. The unit commander sets the level of the bar, so to speak. We take our cue from him, and then we proceed.
Some units are better prepared than others, having to do with this battalion cycle. Regardless, the training end-state is clear; the end-state is steel on target. There is no compromise on live-fire training.
We have instituted a building block approach. From individual field skills, the progression is squad, platoon, company battalion exercises, and ultimately to a Marine Air Ground Task Force final exercise.
As a side note, our CAX Program is centrally funded. This is necessary to preserve it so that no force commander will have to weigh the consequences of shortchanging training dollars in order to support a real-world operational contingency.
I believe it is wise to comment on potential break points as I close out. The most apparent is the modernization of the force. Simply stated, our equipment is old and worn as we move into the 21st century. Without that equipment, we cannot train as we will fight.
The second break point is straight forward—unavailability of units due to commitments other than combat. That ultimately is a backbreaker when they do not come because of other things that they are not in control of. When marines are no longer able to train for combat the way they are expected to fight and win war, I see us at a break point, and the driver of that is end-strength.
Page 320 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
The operational and personnel tempo of today's Fleet Marine Force is a cold reality. Both impact on warfighting. Our commandant recognizes this impact and has energized the transformation within our ranks to attack this very issue. We have instituted a cohesion process as part of the corps' transformation; I am sure you have heard some of that. The marines will join together at boot camp and stay together throughout their first enlistment. The intent is for cohesion battalions to enter the CAX Program at a predetermined time that will make training most effective.
Additionally, in the future, modeling and simulation will enhance our ability to train more effectively—but not at the expense of live fire. The Marine Corps is very, very straightforward and adamant about that.
In closing, let me underscore that my primary responsibility is to facilitate live-fire training. There is no wrong time for a unit to come to CAX. Every marine benefits. And lastly, none of the above can happen if the training facility is without proper O & M funds.
This concludes my opening statement. I would be happy to take any questions.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Brigadier General Richard can be found in the appendix on page 392.]
Page 321 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, General.
First, let me inquire of General Wallace. You made reference to the fact that at your training center, you do not do the weighting or the grading, so to speak, of the degree of readiness of the units that go through that. That seems a little surprising to me. I would think that you would have insights to, at least comparatively, how various units would do, and that you would make a great contribution to understanding degrees of readiness if you were doing the rating.
General WALLACE. Sir, we do after-action reviews after each mission. The after-action reviews are designed to learn as much as we can about the mistakes that we made on the battlefield and impart that knowledge and, theoretically, at least, ways to improve or prevent those same mistakes from happening in future missions.
In some way, that is an evaluation, but it is given to the unit commander himself. We do not keep any record on units, nor do we compare one unit to the other, because it is our belief that in doing so, we might break down or create barriers between my trainers and the unit and therefore defeat the purpose of the after-action review and the open and free flowing self-criticism that is necessary to that process.
Mr. BATEMAN. General Richard made reference to the fact that his training center is centrally funded. My understanding—and I need to know much more about this—is that the Army heretofore operated on the basis of the National Training Center being centrally funded, but change is being made in that regard.
Page 322 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Am I accurate in that?
General WALLACE. Sir, you are accurate, although I am not sure of the actual mechanisms for the funding starting in fiscal year 1998 for the National Training Center. Previously, the NTC had been centrally funded. It is my understanding that starting in fiscal year 1998, those funds will be provided to the National Training Center out of the 800 miles of OPTEMPO that are provided to the individual units that train at the NTC. Whether that money will come directly to the NTC as a central fund, thus detrimenting the home station training funds provided to the divisions and corps, or whether it will be a percentage or an amount of money provided to the NTC directly from the divisions is still not clear.
Mr. BATEMAN. Well, it would seem to me that we have some reasons for concern and need to be checking very carefully on how this change is going to be implemented and whether it is going to be something that, to the extent that the 800 miles of training that the unit is supposed to have received is going to be degraded or depressed by virtue of the essential funding that you have got to receive in order for the training that takes place at your center.
General WALLACE. Yes, sir; I share your concern. I would point out, however, that the Combat Maneuver Training Center at Hohenfeldz, Germany has operated within the 800 miles of OPTEMPO provided to European forces for many years, and we are just trying to apply a similar model to the National Training Center.
Mr. BATEMAN. Well, has someone done an analysis that says that it works better for the European theater training center than——
Page 323 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General WALLACE. Clearly the two theaters are different. Certainly, in Europe, you have fewer local training areas within which to train, and therefore, the Hohenfeldz model is probably more applicable to Europe than it is to the United States.
Mr. BATEMAN. Admiral Smith, to what extent does your training center get involved in rating as to combat readiness of the units that train there?
Admiral SMITH. We are not in that business, sir. We provide a training opportunity and of course a very, very detailed assessment of measures of performance to the air wing commander, and then we point out any problem areas to the battle group commander, since he is going to be the officer in charge of them during the deployed operations.
What we have seen over the years—and not just since my command was formed, but in the operation over the last 14 years of the Naval Strike Warfare Center, which was incorporated into my command—is an improvement of between 15 and 20 percent in readiness points in accordance with SORTS. That does measure the fact that individuals have performed certain exercises, and certainly we watch them get better from the time of arrival to the end, and that is the subject of our assessment. But when the squadrons themselves look at their SORTS data, which is a compilation of numbers of aircraft, numbers of people, and the various mission areas that their people perform in, we have a very substantial increase in readiness. That is why that exercise out there in Fallon is regarded as very, very important by both of our commanders, the commanders Air Force LANT and PAC.
Mr. BATEMAN. General Moseley, if my notes are correct, you made some reference to some concerns that are showing up in terms of decline in effectiveness and in basic skills. Could you elaborate on that?
Page 324 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General MOSELEY. That is correct, sir. The contingency tasking that the fighter crews are experiencing now is not conducive to aggressive basic skill preservation. Those skills are very perishable, and when we are flying long missions with long average sortie durations, you do not have the time available to hone those very basic skills.
Now, that is not to say we are not combat-ready or that we could not complete our tasking. It is just finessing the notion of what is the real requirement for a squadron commander or a group commander or a wing commander.
Both at the Weapons School and also at our Red Flag, Green Flag and Coalition Flags, we do see a bit of a decline in those basic skills. When a squadron deploys to Saudi Arabia and flies those long missions over southern Iraq, when they come up, it takes a bit of a spin-up time, and then they come to Nellis, and they have not had as much time to do home station spin-up, so we do see a bit of a degrade.
Mr. BATEMAN. OK. I thank all of you very much, and with that, I will recognize Mr. Buyer for any questions he may have.
Mr. BUYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Wallace, help me here. You said in your statement, ''I have seen no discernible downward trend in units' readiness to fight at the NTC.''
General WALLACE. That is correct, sir.
Page 325 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BUYER. Then, when I look further, you also in your statement talk about constraints on people, time and funding exit, that personnel turnover is hurting the crew stability, that inexperienced officers are filling key units positions, and home station unit training is down, that there is a shortage of infantrymen to deploy on the battlefield, and that the units are coming to the NTC with less than their usual complement of supporting forces—engineers, maintenance crews, communication support, and so on.
I also know that recently the NTC leadership seriously considered the unprecedented move of canceling at least five battles for active-duty brigades at the NTC because these units were having extreme difficulty maintaining suitable operational-ready rates of their vehicles, where previously, active-duty brigades were expected to and did maintain 90 percent ready rates and thus sustained combat operations over a 2-week training period. The experience of the brigade cited was 70 percent ready rate. In addition, the new normal ready rates at the NTC have dropped from 90 percent to between 78 and 83 percent.
Given these factors, how do you say there is no discernible downward trend to units' readiness to fight?
General WALLACE. Sir, the end-state of battles that I see day-to-day at the National Training Center tell me that there has been no discernible reduction in the capability of those units to achieve their mission. And I am not familiar with the numbers that you just quoted in terms of operational-ready rates of combat vehicles at the NTC.
Mr. BUYER. All right. Let me shift over to General Richard. Welcome back to Washington. I lost and you won in the first round.
Page 326 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General RICHARD. Sir, I guess this is round two.
Mr. BUYER. Well, no, this is not round two, because I have an extension of round one.
General RICHARD. I see.
Mr. BUYER. We here in the House did not agree with the request you made of us for more general officers, and the Senate saw your way, and you ended up with the general officers. We have a study, and we are going to look at that. We, the Congress, created some requirements and placed great stress upon the corps and the other services, and we will look again at Goldwater-Nickles.
At the moment, I just cannot stomach the thought that the Army and the Navy and the Air Force are going to follow you, and they are going to pay a visit to me and ask for more general officers.
So, if you have any advice to give them out in the hall, I would appreciate it if you would share that with them; would you do that?
General RICHARD. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. BUYER. Thank you.
Page 327 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
You got my attention when you talked about the force modernization, and you talked about your old and worn equipment. Tell us what you mean by that. Are we talking about extending the life of vehicles that now are reaching a point where it is hard to justify what you are putting in in maintenance on them? Are you talking about trucks that are old? Quantify that for me, please.
General RICHARD. Thank you for asking that. Specifically, what I am referring to is rolling stock that supports the ground. That is what I am familiar with. It applies also to several of the aviation assets, our CH–46 helicopter, specifically. But what we are referring to there is that because the equipment is, in fact, getting older, the maintenance costs are going up, and some of those dollars that I could spend to maintain and keep the lights on—maybe that one light will go off because I am fixing that vehicle.
And the OPTEMPO is such at Twentynine Palms, the CAX Program, where that equipment is in the field over 220 days a year. It is just like me and my contemporaries at a combat training center. The equipment that we use is essential equipment, so we have got to keep that equipment up. The older it gets, the more money and the more difficult it is to keep it up. The same can be said for the equipment in the operational forces—Howitzers—although a lightweight Howitzer is being looked at now—rolling stock on the ground.
Mr. BUYER. I have a followup on the chairman's question which he asked of General Wallace, so I am going to turn to you. I think the Army should raise the level of concern that some of us here have about shifting from centralized funding to putting this burden upon the units. As I understand what the Marine Corps has done, it has moved to the centralized so that the field commanders will not have to weigh the consequences of shortchanging training when they have to weigh the consequences of going into real world deployments. Those are my words. Please explain to me why the Marines have gone to a centralized?
Page 328 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General RICHARD. Simply put, the training at Twentynine Palms, the combat training that we provide to our operational forces, is so important, so very important for our combat effectiveness, that we do not want to leave anything to change that because of the lack of funds, that training would be degraded, meaning we fence off moneys, we pay ourselves early, up-front—very similar to what we teach our children, to pay yourself first. We pay ourselves first, and that locks in 10 combined arms exercises a year, and then a commander, such as General Fulford or the division commanders or Marine aircraft wing commanders can plan accordingly in that year by saying, ''I will go at this time,'' and plan their whole schedule. They have already paid, so you know they are going to come.
Mr. BUYER. The last question I have is on personnel tempo. We have had some hearings over the last couple of years, one where we had some Rangers die, and part of it went back to the cadre of personnel tempo and the training. I think 12 of us went to Aberdeen on the sexual misconduct issues, and we found out that there were no chaplains assigned to the training brigade; and we had drill instructors who should have been overseeing 50 people, but were actually having to care for 90 and up to 120, so that when you get a bad apple, it takes a long time before you find that bad apple.
Tell me about your personnel tempo. We have four training centers here. I am seeing some cracks and stresses in there in the PERSTEMPO with the requirements, pulling your people out for real world requirements. Do you have some stability there, or not?
General WALLACE. Sir, speaking for the National Training Center, those soldiers assigned to the NTC do not deploy except in extreme cases. Over the last 2 years, I have only had the occasion to deploy a total of 9 soldiers. They were MP's who were deployed to Bosnia.
Page 329 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
That is not to say that my soldiers do not spend a lot of time away from home, because they do. They spend 14 days every month out in the desert training other units.
Mr. BUYER. And nobody is picking any of your men or women from you?
General WALLACE. No, sir.
Admiral SMITH. We deal with aviation units, and primarily the retention issue would be associated with that of pilots and air crews. If we do not have a downturn in retention, which some of our major indicators indicate we are about to see, if some are not seeing it very clearly, then we do not see any impact of PERSTEMPO/OPTEMPO on our operation out there.
Mr. BUYER. So, you are adequately manned?
Admiral SMITH. We are adequately manned; yes, sir.
Mr. BUYER. And you are also, General Wallace?
General WALLACE. Sir, I do have some manning problems similar to those that were mentioned by General Schwartz earlier today with regard to 11 MIKE infantrymen in my 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, which is the opposing force regiment.
Page 330 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BUYER. And your middle NCO's?
General WALLACE. And middle NCO strength problems within that organization also.
Mr. BUYER. Thank you.
General Moseley.
General MOSELEY. Sir, the wing at Nellis is a mix. I have two operationally deployable units—the 11th Reconnaissance, which is a UAV squadron, and the 66th Rescue. Those folks are averaging those same TDY rates that you mentioned or heard about previously—for some of those folks, over 200 days.
The remainder of the wing, though, is a training focus, but even within those squadrons, I have on any given day about 300 folks deployed in support of contingencies from Turkey to Saudi Arabia to Kuwait, different places, and a difference mix of folks, from maintenance, security police, information management, pilots, navigators—just a wide range of folks that are picked to go to those contingency locations.
I would offer to you that the manpower billets that we have, I would honestly say are sufficient, the actual spaces. Marrying that with the faces is a problem that commanders have probably had since the Roman legions, and we continually work that. But manpower-wise in our force levels, I think we are OK, sir.
Page 331 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BUYER. General Richard.
General RICHARD. The training command does not deploy, sir. Therefore, we do not have that particular problem. And no one to this day has asked us to give people to support——
Mr. BUYER. I know you do not deploy. Part of the problem we are finding at some of the training centers is the rotation of people who come in, and others pull them out before they have the stability to give the training and the cadre——
General RICHARD. I understand. I understand the question now.
Mr. BUYER. Are you having that problem?
General RICHARD. The answer is, ''No.'' Once they come, they finish their training—22 days in our case.
Mr. BUYER. That is good, so you get a hold on them. That is good.
General RICHARD. Yes, sir.
Admiral SMITH. Mr. Buyer, may I clarify my answer, because I think I misunderstood your question. My command, the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, is better manned percentagewise than any of the three commands separately were prior to our combining the commands, and that is not the result of restructuring of the command. It is a higher percentage manning of authorized billets when we combined the commands.
Page 332 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BUYER. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Bateman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Next, Mr. Pickett.
Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to find out from each of you what the situation is with the funding that you are receiving to conduct both the base operations that you are responsible for in your respective training centers and also the amount that you are being allocated for the training function that you conduct. Are you getting more, less, the same? How is your funding stream working out?
General WALLACE. Sir, from the NTC's perspective in general terms, I would say the funding is adequate, although I have found it necessary to migrate some funds from the operational side to the necessary BASOPS repair and maintenance on buildings and family housing and that sort of thing.
Mr. PICKETT. In the case of your base operations, are you getting less in 1998 than you were given in 1997?
General WALLACE. Sir, I expect to get less in 1998 than I got in 1997, although I have not seen final numbers years.
Page 333 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. PICKETT. Admiral.
Admiral SMITH. I do not have any responsibility for the management of the naval air station yet. It is an issue being discussed. However, I watch the challenges to the commander of the naval air station, and they are very similar to what I experienced when I was strike fighter wing commander at Lemoore, with three naval air stations under my purview. The challenges are there.
You may or may not know that NAS Fallon is one of the few naval air stations, if not the only one, which is primarily operative through contract maintenance by civilians. Also, the maintenance of my 37 aircraft is provided by civilian contract maintenance as well, as is the FC–13's, the adversary squadron home-ported there.
It is a very well-managed naval air station. We have had the good fortune of support of Congress in providing the necessary moneys to build the Fallon complex to the point where we can adequately support those units coming there to train. If you look at it today, it is probably the newest of any of our naval air stations in terms of structure.
There is always a challenge—in fact, more than a challenge—in the maintenance aspect of that plant that you built, and certainly without additional funds, I can state unequivocally that downstream, we are going to be spending more to provide the adequate repair and upkeep on those structures.
So that yes, I think there is a challenge there. I cannot specifically tell you the degree of it at the naval air station today.
Page 334 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. PICKETT. How about the funding for your training operation in 1998 compared to 1997; are you being cut back?
Admiral SMITH. The areas that we see primary threats for cutbacks are those of maintenance of the range itself, and since that is managed through COMAVAIR PAC, with moneys coming from CINC PAC fleet, we feel certain that the moneys will be covered. If we indeed have a $ 1/2 million cut in the moneys that go into the maintenance of the electronic equipment on the range, it will have an impact on the training of the final air wing this year. We have specified the impact on up to CINC PAC fleet, and I feel certain at this point that those moneys will be reallocated to us.
So, the short answer is that we have sufficient funding; we could certainly do with more, but the shortages in the maintenance of all training ranges within the Navy are in consonance with the reduction in moneys available for the management of other assets.
Mr. PICKETT. General Moseley, how about your situation?
General MOSELEY. Sir, the initial distribution of money for this year is short of our requirement, and we have worked that through our FM system and through our MAJCOM down at Langley.
I have not seen any real figures for 1998 yet; I could try to get those for you, sir. I am not sure, but I suspect I am in the same boat that everyone else is in.
Page 335 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
As far as the facilities on the base, the Nevada delegation has been most helpful in championing some of those for us, dormitories and so on. We worked that hard for our folks. But I do not have a firm figure on next year's money or what the degrade is going to be for O & M.
I know that this year, we did get shortfalled, and we are working hard to try to get that back.
Mr. PICKETT. General Richard.
General RICHARD. Sir, concerning money for training, it is adequate, and as you have heard before, it is fenced. It is centrally funded by Headquarters Marine Corps and the operating forces.
Concerning money for base operations, it is marginal at best, and it is less than last year, and that is being addressed by Headquarters Marine Corps. I might add that I am not the only one like that in the Marine Corps.
Mr. PICKETT. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Taylor.
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Page 336 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. Chairman, I would just like to take note of page 6 of Brigadier General Moseley's testimony where he talks about the lack of spare parts; and on page 4 of Brigadier General Richard's testimony, he talks about wornout equipment.
I want to go back if I can, gentlemen, and ask you what percentage of the O & M funds that each of you requested for your own commands for fiscal year 1997 did you actually receive? And the next question would be what percentage of the O & M funds that you requested for fiscal year 1998 were included in the President's budget. If you do not have those numbers offhand, I would sure like to have them for the future.
The other question I would like to ask, since we are limited in time—and if you cannot answer up-front, I would sure like an answer in writing—General Wallace, I am personally concerned with the change necessitated because of the drawdown. We are taking a lot of Guard and Reserve units that were called up, deployed and did great work as S and S-type units during Desert Storm. I have seen many of them converting to combat units. I just do not think it is going to work for 50-year-old reservists.
So my question to you is: Have any of these units that were S and S-type units that have been converted to either armor or combat-type units, have any of them trained at your command yet; and if they have, how have they performed?
General WALLACE. Sir; the only recent Reserve component combat unit we have had at the National Training Center was the 48th Brigade of the Georgia National Guard in June of last year. Aside from that, we have Reserve component soldiers training at the NTC virtually every day. I get about two maintenance companies every rotation, every month, to the National Training Center, who become part of my theater logistics base which we replicate at the NTC for deployment training, generally, one direct support and one general support maintenance company. I also get infantry augmentation for my opposing force regiment several times per year from the Reserve component, and I also get engineer companies from the Reserve component that augment my opposing force periodically throughout the year.
Page 337 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. TAYLOR. I was probably mumbling, so I will ask it again. Of those units that were S and S units that have been converted to combat units, have any of them trained at your installation?
General WALLACE. No, sir, they have not.
Mr. TAYLOR. OK. If any of you happen to have the answer to the first question on the funds that you requested for this fiscal year that you requested and what you actually received, or what you have asked for for next year and what percentage of that was in the budget, if any of you have that off the top of your head, I would sure like to know.
General WALLACE. I do not, sir.
General MOSELEY. I do not, sir.
Mr. TAYLOR. But is that something that you can answer?
General RICHARD. Yes, sir. We can provide those figures for you.
Mr. TAYLOR. What is a reasonable amount of time in which to expect to get those answers? I know you have a lot of other things to do, but when do you think we could get those?
Page 338 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General RICHARD. In my case, I fly back tonight, and we will have them tomorrow and fax them out to you early on.
Mr. TAYLOR. That is pretty reasonable, General. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Bono.
Mr. BONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Richard, I just want to say that Palm Springs and the Cochilla Valley are very proud to have Twentynine Palms in our district.
I have a couple of questions. Is there a shortage now of senior officers and noncommissioned officers in your units?
General RICHARD. In my training command, sir, the answer is, ''No.'' I have the officers manned at approximately 80 percentile, which is adequate for what I do at the training command. There is not a shortage of staff NCO's per se for what I do at Twentynine Palms.
Mr. BONO. Thank you. What is the emphasis on the testing units that train at Twentynine Palms?
Page 339 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General RICHARD. The emphasis is based around a battalion-level exercise, and that is the hub, the centerpiece of what we do in the combined arms training. As I said earlier, it is the blocking and tackling of fighting—not real fancy in some areas; in some areas, we use high-technical-type equipment.
The essence is the combination and coordination of live fire and the maneuver of that battalion and its companies. That is the essence of it—under all live-fire conditions, I might add.
Mr. BONO. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Talent, followed by Mr. Skelton.
Mr. TALENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Wallace, let me follow up on some of Mr. Buyer's questions—and I unfortunately was out of the room, so, if I repeat any of them, you can answer very briefly, and it is my fault.
I understand you responded to Mr. Buyer and you certainly said in your statement that you have seen no discernible downward trend in the units' readiness to fight. Now, is that when they come in or when they go out? I mean, are you saying that maybe they come in less ready to fight than they have been in the past, but that when you are finished with them, they go out as ready in the past?
Page 340 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General WALLACE. First, let me say that it is very difficult to generalize because every unit is a little different; they come in with different baggage and different levels of training upon arrival. I would say that in sum, though, on average, I have seen that the units arriving are no less ready today than they were, say, 18 months ago, and they are certainly all better when they leave.
Mr. TALENT. Let me ask you this. The staff has provided us with some statistics, and I understand Mr. Buyer read them to you. I was dismayed to read them, along with some of the comments in the Army Times article, and you are obviously in a position to know. Did you seriously consider canceling five battles for active-duty brigades because the units were having difficulty maintaining operational-ready rates of vehicles? Did that happen?
General WALLACE. It has been our policy ever since I have been associated with the National Training Center, which goes back almost 8 years, that if we have a combat element that has operational-ready rates less than 70 percent, we will consider not conducting that fight that particular day.
I would also add that in my association with the NTC over those 8 years, I cannot recall any time when we had to cancel a battle as a result of operational-readiness rates dropping below 70 percent.
Mr. TALENT. Well, was there an incident when you considered cancelling a battle, or five battles, for active-duty brigades because of the difficulty in maintaining ready rates of the vehicles? This what our staff is telling us.
Page 341 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General WALLACE. Sir, I cannot recall that—I can recall it happening perhaps once in my time as the commander out there.
Mr. TALENT. OK. You mentioned the 70 percent figure. Has it been traditional that you would expect active-duty brigades to maintain about a 90-percent ready rate? Is that more in keeping with what you would expect?
General WALLACE. The 90 percent is generally what is used to categorize a C–1 unit at home station. We provide the unit a fleet of vehicles, similar to what General Richard mentioned. They draw from my fleet. That fleet is fully mission-capable when they draw from me, and they maintain that fleet, generally speaking, somewhere in excess of 80 percent and generally between 82 to 85 percent throughout the entire 14-day rotation.
Mr. TALENT. OK. Were those brigades—you do not recall any instance where you considered cancelling the battle—it seems to me we have a discrepancy——
General WALLACE. I can recall one time when we considered cancelling a battle, and that was about 2 1/2 years ago.
Mr. TALENT. So nothing in the recent past as far as you can recall.
General WALLACE. Nothing recently; no, sir.
Page 342 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. TALENT. Have the normal ready rates at the NTC dropped from about 90 percent to down to between 78 and 83 percent? Is that a fact, in your judgment?
General WALLACE. No, sir; I do not think that that is factual.
Mr. TALENT. So, if somebody gave us these facts, they were just not giving us, in your judgment, correct facts; is that right?
General WALLACE. I do not know where the facts came from, but that is not my observation of what has happened at the NTC over the last 2 years.
Mr. TALENT. Because I will just say—and you do not even have to comment on this, and I am going to close with this, Mr. Chairman—I am hearing from the field and back channel sources and friends back home in situations particularly with regard to the Army that there is greater and greater difficulty in maintaining readiness, and a whole lot of different areas are mentioned, and then, when we talk to people who are in a position to know and have the authority, we are told basically that this is not the case. And I will just say, Mr. Chairman, that I hope that is right; I hope this is not the case, because we do not know, and I do not think anything is going to change until the people who do know believe and are willing to say that there is a problem, and so far, I have not heard that, so, I do not know that we are going to get substantial change. Certainly, I do not think it is just going to happen because we go on the basis of reports we are getting from the field that are not confirmed.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and yield back the balance of my time.
Page 343 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Talent.
Mr. Skelton, you have no questions at this time?
Mr. SKELTON. No, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Gibbons.
Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and indeed, it is a great honor to welcome Admiral Smith and General Moseley from district 2 in Nevada to this hearing today, as well as General Richard and General Wallace.
I am curious—the current administration's budget proposal is about $250.7 billion for the 1998 budget, which is almost identical with the fiscal year 1997 budget. Look at the number of what I call external operations that we have, such as Bosnia or even in the Middle East, and the impact that those operations have on our budget, we are ending up seeing a continual shortfall in the modernization phase. They seem to be robbing from Paul to pay Peter.
I guess my question would be in view of those concerns, what effects will these shortfalls have on modernization, and will we continue to ultimately see a shortfall in readiness as a result of that shortfall in modernization?
General Richard.
Page 344 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General RICHARD. I will take a crack, sir. I believe that we are pushing the envelope very hard right now to maintain our readiness. You have heard, and the gentlemen have said that they hear that we are ready—all the services have said that, basically. And I truly believe, Mr. Chairman, that that is the truth today—and probably tomorrow.
But where that break point is the day after tomorrow, I do not know. Maybe some other people do; I do not. So that to specifically answer your question, I believe that we are working our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines—and in my case, I can only speak for the Marines—we are working them harder to maintain that edge than perhaps we had in the past. We still have the same edge, and in some cases, better, quite frankly, than prior to Desert Storm.
But as moneys and/or end-strength and whatever else factors into keeping the lights on all night in the maintenance bays, somewhere down the line that is the break point that you are looking for, sir, and I do not know where that is, but it is out there.
Sir, I would say that as our equipment ages, it is going to cost us more to maintain it; it is going to cost us more in man-hours to maintain it, and it is going to cost us more in dollars to maintain it.
The F–15C is a 1965 design that first flew in July 1972. The ones that we have out there are 1980 models. The F–22 is a system that is going to bring us into the 21st century, and it is going to be cheaper in the long run to maintain than the ones we have now, plus be more capable. We cannot make an F–15 as lethal or as survivable as that airplane. Our F–16's are aging, our A–10's are aging, our engines are aging, so that modernization issue for us is our bread and butter. We have got to be able to achieve air superiority for our surface brothers to do business, and we have got to be able to do that in a very high-threat world out there. And to maintain these F–15's and F–16's with these engines is costing us more, and it is taking that crew chief and that engine shop kid a whole lot longer to get that thing generated so we can fly it in the morning.
Page 345 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
So, there is where I could come down on it, sir. I would say that modernization is a big deal for us.
Mr. GIBBONS. Admiral Smith.
Admiral SMITH. I think that that has been echoed in just about every bit of testimony I have heard earlier in the day. Any time you talk about future budget, you talk about the importance of modernization; there can be no question about it.
The impact on readiness, however, I think is going to be a direct result of trying to modernize without adequate money to do that, and you therefore take from this very fragile management system that we have right now, which is showing, in the case of the Navy, deployed high readiness. It clearly has provided us a problem with PERSTEMPO, OPTEMPO, diminishment of dollars for maintenance and so on, and clearly has enhanced the challenge of our managers to build that readiness from return from deployment to actual deployment the next time around.
That is very clear, and it was based on that that I made my statement of concern for any further reduction in dollars that go into the maintenance of our aircraft, the management of our people, an increase in PERSTEMPO/OPTEMPO. It could indeed lead us to a break point, which is very, very hard to define, as you know, because of the interrelationship between all of those variables.
General WALLACE. Sir, I think the theme you have heard all through the day has had to do with the difficulties of balancing O & M, quality of life, modernization, particularly on the receiving end, where it seems like you are dealing with a zero sum game. That is the situation in which I think the Army now finds itself and into the future as well.
Page 346 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gibbons.
Mr. Sisisky indicated he had no questions, so I will turn to Mr. McKeon.
Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for missing the testimony; I was in other committee hearings earlier today.
General Moseley, when you answered the last question, you mentioned F–15's, F–16's, how old they were—1965—and how the F–22 will carry us into the next century. I did not hear any mention of bombers. What about the B–52s; how old are they?
General MOSELEY. Sir, they are a lot older than that. The B–1 is a credible system right now. The B–2, in the numbers that we have, is a credible system right now. the B–52 will be a viable option as a stand-off platform until we can replace it with something else or the force structure provides us an asset in the fighter world that can give us that range.
Mr. MCKEON. How much longer do you think we can use the B–52's?
General MOSELEY. Sir, I would have to defer to my logistics brothers on maintainability. I suspect we can fly them for a while if we stand off with them. I do not know that it is a penetrating platform now in a reasonable threat scenario.
Page 347 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. MCKEON. Are all of the B–1's now equipped for conventional weapons?
General MOSELEY. Sir, I do not know that; I can get that answer for you.
Mr. MCKEON. I would appreciate that.
Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.
Let me ask a question about retention, which I know is one of the problems across the military. In the training commands, are you able to meet your retention goals, and are you doing more poorly than, as well as, or better than the other parts of the military in meeting these goals; and what do you see in the future as successes or problems with retention?
General WALLACE. Sir, I will speak on behalf of the National Training Center. We are generally doing better than the rest of the Army at large, largely because I think, as I mentioned earlier, our soldiers do not deploy other than going into the desert for 14 days every month, but they are deploying off the installation.
Page 348 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
We also have a very predictable schedule for the soldiers at the National Training Center. They get 4 days off each month, but they know exactly when those 4 days are, and we take 2 days of max leave every summer and every year over the holiday period. I think that that predictability and the lack of long-term deployments lends itself to our retention rate at the training center.
Mr. BARTLETT. And this should continue into the future?
General WALLACE. Yes, sir. I see no reason to be concerned about it for the future.
Mr. BARTLETT. Admiral Smith.
Admiral SMITH. Mr. Bartlett, I am concerned about retention, but not currently within the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center. We are a compilation of very, very topnotch performing officers, air crew, Air Force, Marine Corps included in our bunch.
I do not see any increasing rates in retention there, but I want to make sure we differentiate between the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center as a center of excellence with that very high-quality cadre of people that does not run the gamut of quality from low to high, as you typically would get in a normal organization.
Where you see the very low-retention rates currently is in the basic training command and advanced training rate through advanced training commands that are operated by CNAT and the Chief of Naval Air Training. Also in the FRS is where you might measure the impact of our retention efforts or the factors that do impact on retention. Those fleet readiness squadrons are collocated with the type of aircraft stationing—for example, in Oceano with the F–14 and, in the future, the F–18; in Lemoore, CA, with the F–18, et cetera, and Woodby Island, with the EA–6B. Watching the retention rate of those instructor pilots, I think is critical, and it is my feeling now that we are having a downturn in the retention as measured by looking at those areas.
Page 349 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BARTLETT. Is there anything that you or we can do to change that?
Admiral SMITH. Yes, sir; I think so. Perhaps if additional funding can be provided to all those factors that impact on retention, and I think there are many of them. OPTEMPO, I do not know what you can do about; that is something that we should be able to manage. It is based on the demands for our services to the unified CINC's. That, by and large, we have had a handle on for quite some time. People come in from the Navy knowing they are going to deploy. They are proud of what they do.
The other factors—the lack of training assets that result from lack of maintenance of the aircraft—all of those other factors that impact the quality of life as it impacts their pride in themselves, the self-fulfillment and the professional fulfillment—I think that that is where we would like to see an improvement.
I would not guess, because I am not an asset manager, as to where the Navy would prioritize funding, but I certainly know that programs are in place, and giving any additional funding, I would look, at least, to acceleration of those programs to provide some relief.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.
General Moseley.
Page 350 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General MOSELEY. Mr. Bartlett, Nellis is also selectively manned. The pilots and air crew there are all handpicked, and so we would expect their retention to be higher, and that is just what we see. Last year, we had 20 eligible to take the bonus; 6 PCS'd, and I do not know what status of those, but I only had one decline. That is certainly not the story that you would hear at Langley, at Shaw, at Eglin, at Seymour Johnson, or other Air Force bases.
Our enlisted folks, first term, second term, and career, are right on line with their combat command numbers and with the Air Force, so we are holding our own at Nellis on the enlisted side, but we do a lot better with our pilots.
Mr. BARTLETT. And you do not see a future problem?
General MOSELEY. No, sir; I see a big problem.
Mr. BARTLETT. Oh, you do?
General MOSELEY. Yes, I do. But at Nellis, because we are selectively manned, it is not manifested the same as it would be at Langley or at the other Air Force bases. And it is the same issue as far as, perhaps, funding.
Mr. BARTLETT. So that although you do better than the others in your service, the general problem with retention is going to ultimately impact you, also?
General MOSELEY. Sir, I think we could selectively man Nellis and the weapons school and Red Flag and so on, almost forever because of the nature of what we do; but for our brothers at Langley and at Mountain Home and at Pope and at Shaw and at Moody, that is a problem, and it is going to be a problem for the Air Force.
Page 351 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BARTLETT. I understand. Thank you.
General Richard.
General RICHARD. Sir, very quickly, the combat center at Twenty-Nine Palms is not selectively manned on the training side of the base, but we have no retention problems for our career force. Remember the Marine Corps is a very young, young force; half of the marines are lance corporals and below, which equates to teenagers.
Mr. BARTLETT. I was impressed—the average age is 19, the sergeant major told us.
General RICHARD. Nineteen, yes, sir. We must, because of the way we are structured, have a young force, so retention—it may be apples and oranges as it relates to us.
Mr. BARTLETT. I appreciate it. Thank you all very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. I believe that completes the first round of questioning. Is there anyone else who feels he has a question which he must propound, because we do have another panel that we have been keeping waiting.
Page 352 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
[No response.]
Mr. BATEMAN. If not, I thank you all for coming, and let me just close with this observation. In the main, you command units that are rather elite units, and I think that that is to the credit of our senior military leaders that they are putting that kind of emphasis on training. You do not get quality training unless you emphasize quality on the part of the people who are doing the training. But as this member of the committee, from hearings yesterday as well as earlier field visits, and from comments, such as that from General Wallace, that he is seeing empty seats in units that are coming there, I think the committee needs more information on how many empty seats, how often we are seeing them, and in what units.
We need to come to terms with these hollow situations. It is a concern, going back to yesterday, to hear that 40 percent of the flying majors are going to leave the service in the next 6 months. I think we have some problems, and those problems are going to overtake us very, very quickly, and I am not sure that the fiscal year 98 budget submission is putting in a position to address those problems as aggressively as they need to be addressed. But there is little that we are going to be able to do unless we are able to identify that this is a problem, and the problem is real.
Thank you all for coming today. We appreciate your testimony and your interest.
Mr. BATEMAN. It is my pleasure now to introduce to the subcommittees the next panel of witnesses. We are very grateful that you have come to visit with us and to share your perspectives with us.
Page 353 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
We have as witnesses on this fourth panel of the day, Mrs. Vicki Olson, the wife of Colonel Olson, recently commander of the 3d Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, TX; Mrs. Nancy Branch, the wife of Captain Branch, U.S. Navy, commanding officer of the U.S.S. George Washington, CVN–73, Norfolk, VA; Mrs. Mary L. (Lori) Kresge, the wife of Lieutenant Colonel Kresge, commander of the 27th Fighter Squadron at Langley Air Force Base, with which I am much familiar and very proud; and Mrs. Sheri Hummer, the wife of Lieutenant Colonel Hummer, commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, CA.
Welcome, ladies. We are delighted to have you with us and look forward to hearing your testimony, starting with Mrs. Olson.
STATEMENT OF VICKI OLSON, SPOUSE OF COLONEL OLSON, U.S. ARMY, PREVIOUS COMMANDER, 3RD BRIGADE, 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION, FORT HOOD, TX
Mrs. OLSON. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the joint subcommittees, it is a pleasure for me to appear before you to represent the interests of Army family members. We are a diverse group, and no one person can speak authoritatively for all of us.
My perspective is that of one who has seen and dealt with a great number of families and one who has witnessed a great number of stresses. I am an Army spouse of nearly 25 years, and until 1989, my husband had not deployed except for training missions, although some of these were several weeks in duration. In 1989, my husband deployed for 7 months with the 24th ID to Southwest Asia and was an infantry battalion commander with over 1,000 soldiers during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. During that time, I worked with over 500 families of soldiers of all ranks who made up our family support group.
Page 354 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
In October of 1993, he again deployed, this time with the 10th Mountain Division, to Somalia. And in August and September of 1996, as an infantry brigade commander at Fort Hood, TX, he deployed with over 4,000 soldiers in support of Operation Desert Strike. This time, I headed a family support group consisting of over 2,500 families.
As you all have a copy of my prepared statement, I will attempt to focus in the short time allowed, on what I feel to be our most pressing issues.
Soldiers and their families pay a great price in the service of their Nation. They and their family members are constantly aware that this is a dangerous profession and that some will make the ultimate sacrifice, whether during training or a deployment to a hazardous zone. Hours are long, and family separations are many. Holidays, birthdays, anniversaries, and other important celebrations are held thousands of miles apart. The call to serve does not pause for births or deaths, for the first day of school, or for the first steps that a child takes, or for serious illness, or for financial problems, or for mere loneliness.
I hear people asking in an ever-increasing number whether their sacrifice is worth the cost to their family. What do they get in return? A great sense of serving their country does not always counter the negatives of the service itself. There is less and less assurance that a soldier will be able to serve the full time required for retirement. Promotions are difficult to achieve and, until very recently, were coming at a slower rate. Pay has not kept up with inflation. The budget cuts have left installations with housing that can barely be maintained.
Page 355 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
As overseas and stateside posts are closed and units consolidated, the remaining posts and towns supporting them are becoming overcrowded, resulting in inflated housing costs and overcrowded schools. Impact school aid is a yearly issue.
Let me give you some calculations based on analysis done at Fort Hood. Two-thirds of our soldiers are married. Each of these families average two children. The take-home pay of the private first class, or E–3, is $1,627 a month after taxes. The soldier's average monthly expenses are $1,610, leaving the average junior enlisted family with just under $20 disposal income. One flat tire puts them in debt.
To make matters worse, when a soldier is deployed on exercise or on field training, the law requires that the Army recoup basic allowance and subsistence at a rate of $210 a month.
So how do we cope? The commonality of being an Army family member and the changing nature of the services cause us to band together in what are now officially recognized as family support groups. We have come a long way since Desert Shield and Desert Storm and are given more support at the installation level by several organizations and activities. I have included a discussion of some of these in my prepared statement.
But the backbone of the family support group organization is the very dedicated group of family members who volunteer their time, although many are themselves dealing with the stresses of prolonged separation caused by these very deployments.
I would like to leave you with a short anecdote from our most recent deployment that illustrates how our family support group can help. Just last September, when the 3rd Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Cavalry Division was called to deploy from Fort Hood to Kuwait on short notice, a private first class just 20 years old, deployed, leaving behind a 15-year-old wife. He fully believed, based on his experience, which was limited, that he had prepared his family for departure. He reasoned that it would be best to vacate his apartment to save money, and he placed his wife and their 10-week-old child in the home of his mother-in-law.
Page 356 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Six weeks after his departure, his wife and mother-in-law got into a violent fight, which resulted in the wife and child being thrown out on the street. The unit family support group, made up of wives of other service members in that soldier's unit, came to the rescue. The battalion commander's wife obtained help from several post agencies, among them the Red Cross, Army Community Services, Army Emergency Relief and our post chaplain. Another wife in the family support group, married to a specialist, gave shelter to the family in her one-bedroom apartment while these agencies worked on the problem. Two noncommissioned officers who had been designated as command financial specialists from the unit rear detachment, spent several days helping the family, eventually finding a place for her to live, obtaining food donations, and securing for her a no-interest loan. Because she was 15, she could not legally sign a lease, nor could she legally obtain a driver's license. Several wives took turns chauffeuring her to appointments and to school, where she was a 10th grade student in a special program for young mothers.
The Army's leadership is aware of the plight of the soldier and the family and has taken steps to do something about it, and at times, with the help and resources provided through the support of Congress. Other times, the installation and unit commanders make tough choices about tradeoffs if resources are not available. Soldiers, who serve a Nation, in an Army that cares about them and their families, serve much more willingly and with fewer concerns for the welfare for their families.
To this end, your support is essential and very much appreciated. I thank you for hearing us today.
Page 357 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
[The prepared statement of Mrs. Olson can be found in the appendix on page 400.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mrs. Olson, for your very meaningful statement.
Now, Mrs. Branch, we would be happy to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF NANCY BRANCH, SPOUSE OF CAPTAIN BRANCH, U.S. NAVY, COMMANDING OFFICER, U.S.S. GEORGE WASHINGTON, CVN–73, NORFOLK, VA
Mrs. BRANCH. Chairman Bateman, members of the committee, I do not have a prepared statement today. My service told me to come and just be honest and talk with you, so I am going to be a little bit less formal than my colleagues here.
I am a Navy spouse of 27 years. My husband has had four commands, and he is what they call an operational kind of guy. We just finished our 10th cruise last summer. Currently, he is in command of the arguably best aircraft carrier in the Navy, the U.S.S. George Washington, which has a complement of over 5,000 people on it when it is deployed.
I have always been actively involved with our enlisted support group, our ombudsman, Navy Relief, and other organizations that are support systems for the families of our sailors.
Page 358 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
I think that the increased operational tempo that we are seeing right now will significantly impact our families and make their lives in the military more difficult. Let me give you an example of what is happening with the U.S.S. George Washington, which returned from a deployment last July and went into the yards at Portsmouth in early September and came out on the 28th of February to begin workups for deployment October 2.
In the time period between February 28 and next April 2, when it returns from cruise, the ship will be at sea, or deployed from their families, for 283 days out of a possible 399. That is 71 percent of the time away from families. That is pretty significant. Additionally, the ship will miss Easter, Thanksgiving, Christmas, New Year's, all of the major holidays.
Navy families have coping mechanisms, and we work very hard as a unit so that our spouses can do their jobs. But the toll taken with the increased OPTEMPO, the continuing sea duty for those who are operational, is really significant. Every time there is a headline in the paper that talks about manpower decreases, the anxiety level of the dependents just jumps up.
A couple of weeks ago, I had an enlisted support group meeting, and there had just been that headline in the paper, and of course, the word from all the spouses was, my gosh, we are going to see 7-month cruises; what is happening here? In fact, our turnaround time is significantly tighter than it was last time.
Obviously, when you have this kind of anxiety, it does trickle down. As the families are upset and anxious, if they are counting these holidays, it is going to impact retention, and we need to retain good people in the Navy.
Page 359 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
As I mentioned, we do have a good support system for the families. We work very hard with our Care Line, which is an 800 number available all the time for ship information. My husband changes that Care Line at least once a week, sometimes more frequently, while they are at sea, and we can put other information on it. We have a great support system of ombudsmen who help our families. We have now, on some of the big ships, pay phones so the sailors can call home, which is fantastic. Navy and Marine Corps Relief is a terrific organization, and of course, we have our family support groups.
Nonetheless, I think—and I think I am speaking for a great number of Navy spouses—that it is the continuing separations that are the major factor and the major anxiety factor for our families, with retention.
To conclude, just last week, a memo came out that addressed 58 enlisted rates; 49 of those rates are going to have an increased sea-shore rotation—more sea duty—from 6 to 12 months more sea duty in each rotation. That kind of thing is just really difficult to live with. We are accustomed to doing without a lot of things because we believe in our Nation and our Navy, but we love our families and our spouses, and that is the tricky part.
Thank you very much.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, Mrs. Branch.
Mrs. Kresge.
Page 360 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
STATEMENT OF MARY LORI KRESGE, SPOUSE OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL KRESGE, COMMANDER, 27TH FIGHTER SQUARDRON, LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, LANGLEY, VA
Mrs. KRESGE. Good afternoon, Congressman Bateman, Congressman Buyer and members of the committee. I am Lori Kresge, the proud dependent spouse of the 27th Fighter Squadron commander at Langley Air Force Base, VA.
My entire life has been shaped by the distinguished military traditions of our Air Force. I was raised as an Air Force dependent and proudly served for 12 1/2 years on active duty. I voluntarily separated in 1992 to provide a secure homebase for my three small children.
My decision to separate was very much influenced by the growing commitments heaped upon our defense forces. As the wife of a fighter pilot, I am keenly aware of the importance of rapid deployments for indefinite lengths of time. Such is the role of an Air Force family.
On June 25, 1996, my husband deployed with his squadron of 18 jets and maintenance personnel and was en route to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia when the news came of the Khobar Towers bombing. I immediately called the wing commander, and he was diligent in keeping the wives in the loop during the crisis. We did have 35 personnel already in the country at the time of the bombing.
There were no formal channels for keeping dependents apprised of changing world events. Every deployment is ad hoc from the information flow point of view to the families. It is very much dictated by the personalities involved at the top.
Page 361 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
What a wake-up call this was for me as the first deployment of our tour with the 27th Fighter Squadron had just begun that morning. We feel lucky to have had a handful of military members from our squadron who remained behind. That does not always happen. One was appointed as acting first sergeant and helped immensely to call the 200-plus wives. During times of crisis, people all need to be touched and reassured that things are all right.
As we knew they could, the wives dealt with the deployment very well. A lot of life just gets put on hold. The young spouses who might have been working opposite shifts to support the household and avoid child care costs gave up those essential jobs and took care of the kids full-time. Those trying to attend night classes to better themselves waited until the next semester.
Just over a year ago, two of our wives took it upon themselves to start a wing-wide organization known as Spouses-in-Touch. It was designed to fill a void in communications with the individual spouses not provided via the Air Force. Spouses-in-Touch has monthly meetings with community speakers, publishes an informative newsletter and provides free childcare to encourage attendance. They foster friendships and a time to see that everyone else is going through similar problems.
The problem was presented to the Command Senior Enlisted Advisors Conference in July 1996 and is spreading fast throughout the Air Force. The 1st Wing has officially sanctioned the program and does provide administrative supplies out of their discretionary money.
Page 362 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
The families are coping the best they know how, but how many times can they continually be asked to sacrifice?
The senior commander kept a close hold on personnel once they were in-country. Even though replacements were lined up to allow a pilot to return early to sell his house for a short notice PCS, he ended up with just 4 weeks back in the States before moving to his next base. The Air Force personnel center and the in-country commanders could have worked together a little bit better to get him back. The family elected to rent their house here at Langley instead of risking the prospect of double mortgages for an undetermined amount of time.
When the military members return, the families do expect and need a more relaxed pace and maybe some time to themselves. They were allowed 14 days off, but for most, this was in the middle of the school year and not compatible with their kids' schedule. Upon return to work, they faced 2 week-long practice exercises and odd hours and 12-hour-plus shifts, building up to the operational readiness exercise in the week preceding Christmas.
With the new year came the First Wing's commitment to cover Iceland, and the maintenance personnel were tagged for 30 days plus, and the pilots for around 2 weeks or more. Very soon, we will be into the ''let us make up for the training we missed in Saudi'' syndrome, and the norm will be demanding exercises at Nellis or long hours locally.
Many of our people are in the 30-day-plus use-or-lose leave category, and they seldom are allowed time to share with their families. Associate degrees and bachelor's degrees for the NCO's are continuously shoved to the back burner to fit in another temporary duty.
Page 363 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
We do have another 3 1/2-month Saudi deployment starting next October through Christmas and yet another one in 1998. The pace just does not let up. One of the senior NCO's pulled me aside and said, ''Ma'am, you and the colonel will be gone in 2 years, but we have to stay here for probably 8 years at a time.''
Pilots are facing the continuing frustration of on-again/off-again requirements to get their master's degrees to be competitive for promotions. They bust their tails 24 hours a day to assure a combat-ready force but have no confidence that their efforts are good enough for promotion without trying to game the latest new requirement.
Early promotions seem to hinge on professional military education completed by correspondence, which just does not fit into the schedule of flying, training, deploying and defending your country. The perception tends to be that the non-combat-ready part of the Air Force manages to steal most of the promotion slots because they look better on paper.
Many family support programs on base have been greatly improved to alleviate stress on the family. Morale calls, such as free calls to and from deployed locations, were encouraged and helped many families to get through the tough times. Corresponding through the official Internet e-mail should continue to be allowed and encouraged. The free childcare provided twice monthly to families of deployed members via the Give Parents a Break program is wonderful and increased access would be welcomed.
I will not at all be surprised when, in the next couple of years, an increased number of senior captains, young majors, and staff and technical sergeants begin filing papers to get out. They can only reprioritize their lives so many times, and before you know it, they have missed a majority of their children's daily lives, or postponed having another child for maybe 5 years at a time and maybe did not want them that far apart, waiting for that better year to come.
Page 364 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Going to another operational assignment, which is most pilots' dream, will mean a location change, but no real relief from the real world commitments. Preparation for the move will most likely be done while one spouse is deployed, and the stress of selling the home and 100 percent of the financial burden will be on the families since the Air Force does not compensate its military personnel for the costs of selling a primary residence as they do for their civilian work force. A lot of pride can be gleaned from the more-with-less concept, but there is a breaking point.
Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to present a spouse's point of view, and I would be happy to give you any more honest input.
[The prepared statement of Mrs. Kresge can be found in the appendix on page 411.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much for presenting that spouse's point of view.
Mrs. Hummer, we are pleased now to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF SHERI ANNE HUMMER, SPOUSE OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HUMMER, COMMANDING OFFICER, 1ST MARINE BATTALION, 1st MARINE REGIMENT, 1ST MARINE DIVISION, CAMP PENDLETON, CA
Mrs. HUMMER. Mr. Chairman, I am a U.S. Marine Corps spouse representative from Camp Pendleton, CA. I appreciate this opportunity to represent the marine families at Camp Pendleton and to address several issues that are of great importance to these families. These remarks are a summary of my formal statement which you have before you.
Page 365 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Three main issues are of importance. These include the price paid, or the sacrifice made, in a high operations tempo environment, quality-of-life needs, and the desirability of continued military service.
While the majority of young, single marines do not expect the experience to be an easy one, the high operations tempo environment is tough on young married marines and their families. Marines and their families have difficulties balancing the competing demands of their jobs and families. Long deployment cycles and the reduction in recovery time between these deployment cycles do not provide an opportunity for either quality or quantity family time.
Several major quality-of-life needs of great concern to marine families include housing, pay, medical care, and commissary privileges. All marines are entitled to a safe and affordable place to live. Many marines who are geographical bachelors live in substandard barracks. Those families that live in on-base housing often abide in quarters that are cramped and old. Insufficient numbers of on-base houses cause many families to live off base, in cramped, rundown houses in crime-ridden neighborhoods because this is all they can afford. Others pay hundreds of dollars each month out-of-pocket to live in safer neighborhoods.
A second quality of life concern is pay. Enlisted pay is inadequate, and officer pay is marginal, especially considering that a marine is on duty 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The pay received by a young enlisted marine family seldom covers basic living costs. Some marine families are on food stamps. Many marines are thousands of dollars in debt trying to keep up with expenses.
Page 366 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
A third quality of life concern is poor medical care. Care available through U.S. Naval hospitals supporting Marine Corps bases is limited and slow, particularly since hospital staffing is based on the active-duty population and not the number of dependents in the community requiring care. Complex managed health care plans such as TRICARE are confusing, dissatisfying and offer limited choice in meeting health care needs.
The final quality of life concern I will address is the commissary, which is perceived as one of the last great benefits available to the marine family. With serious efforts underway in our Government to close the commissary system, taking away this benefit may be the last straw in determining whether or not a marine stays in the corps.
Why does the marine continue in the corps or why does that marine leave? The marine who stays commits to service to corps and country. The one who leaves may do so because of incompatible job and family commitments, eroding benefits due to a shrinking DOD budget, a wish to make more money, or perhaps a desire for a stable lifestyle.
The number of marine families continues to grow, and their support is of vital concern to the readiness of all operational units. A marine needs time in the high operations tempo environment to have a fulfilling family life. Quality of life issues such as housing, pay, medical care, and commissary privileges are of great concern to the marine family. A shrinking DOD budget and eroding benefits may affect the desire of a marine to continue service in the corps.
Your decisions concerning these matters discussed today affect literally thousands of marine families. I appreciate your attention. This concludes the summary of my formal statement, and I will address any questions that you have.
Page 367 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
[The prepared statement of Mrs. Hummer can be found in the appendix on page 417.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mrs. Hummer. All of your prepared statements will be made a part of the record without objection. I want to thank each of you for coming and testifying today.
I think I can say on behalf of everybody on the committee that the Congress would do a much more adequate job in serving the interests of our national security if every Member of Congress were required to hear the testimony that we have heard from you. It is very, very compelling in terms of things that we very badly, very seriously need to do to make sure that the quality of life of the people who serve us is adequately provided in the face of what we sense to be a deterioration.
Mr. Buyer, do you have some questions?
Mr. BUYER. Thank you. I want to echo those comments.
I could not help but get a strong sense of the level of your commitment and the perseverance that it takes to keep a family together for so many, many years. I do not want to label you as a ''survivor,'' but that is also kind of what it is about.
I mean, as your husbands are out on duty, you are keeping it all together, in your support mechanisms not only for you, but you are also mentors to a lot of other women, especially wives of the enlisted, the senior enlisted, who also are mentors.
Page 368 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
So let me express a deep sense of gratitude and appreciation to you.
I have to ask you, Mrs. Kresge, were you a graduate of the Academy?
Mrs. KRESGE. Yes, sir; I am.
Mr. BUYER. I noticed, being very sensitive to you, that your voice cracked a couple of times during your testimony, so it was very easy for us to tell what touched you the most, and I had to share here with John Chapla that it must have been a very difficult decision for you when you gave up your career and chose to be with the family, and you now have three children.
Mrs. KRESGE. Yes. We have three small children; we have a 4-year-old and two 3-year-olds.
Mr. BUYER. So you kind of see this inside and out?
Mrs. KRESGE. Yes: I have seen a lot of it, and I pretty much was brought up in it, so I knew what I was getting into, so that was not a question. But it really has changed a lot from when my husband was a young captain and when I was a young captain. It is not the same Air Force. It is just a continuing having to go and go and go, where the fighter pilots that I knew as we grew up, you would go once in a while on deployment for training; maybe you would go to Europe for 5 weeks in a 3-year tour. That is about all you would really see, and that was not high stress. And people were leaving for the airlines pretty much just for money at that time; that was really about the only issue. It was not that bad of a way of life. But now it is just how do you make up for the fact that they are just gone a lot, and you see them working real hard, and you do not always see them getting the rewards. It seems like the system changes on them when it comes to promotions and things like that. It is just hard to see them going through struggles like that.
Page 369 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BUYER. We appreciate your coming here and your testimony. Here on the National Security Committee, we get to hear from generals and admirals all the time, and we were very pleased to hear from the sergeants majors who came in and testified, because they can be very frank and honest with us. And we really wanted to hear from you.
We are very concerned that from 1945 to 1991, we can have limited contingencies and then, all of a sudden, over the last 5 years, we have had an explosion of contingencies, and we are trying to get a sense and feeling from your testimony about the impact upon families in that operational tempo.
Mrs. KRESGE. Well, when 1990 hit, and the war came about, that is what really hit our family, that obviously, he could go, and I could go. And we both could not do that; there was no way that we could both be in the service and have some kind of stable family life, so somebody had to go, and it was a tough decision, but I could not see any other way right now. It would be really hard to do it. Besides just being home and taking care of the family, it would be tough.
Mr. BUYER. I noticed in the budget that was sent over to us on child care that there is only provision to build two child care centers in this budget. Are there sufficient child care centers? Are they close and available, and we do not need them?
Mrs. KRESGE. I am fairly certain we still have lists. Even for our contracted military to military care, I am fairly certain they still have lists of people who cannot get in there and would like to be able to get in.
Page 370 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. Mrs. Olson, you wanted to comment.
Mrs. OLSON. Fort Hood actually is in pretty good shape right now. We have several new centers, and we have supplemented those by onsite child care providers where we certify people to provide child care in their homes. But there is a stringent course that they must go through, and they are inspected. But that has alleviated some of the problems, so right now we are in fairly good shape.
Mr. BUYER. Mrs. Branch.
Mrs. BRANCH. The Navy has a similar system. We have on-the-base child care providers who have been certified, and we have a child care center which is filled to capacity, but they seem to make room particularly for active-duty parents or single parents who need to utilize it.
I believe they are also using some contract situations at the smaller outlying bases for child care for active-duty parents.
Mr. BUYER. Mrs. Hummer?
Mrs. HUMMER. At Camp Pendleton, we have a requirement for approximately 5,000 on-base child care slots. We have less than 1,000 available through licensed providers or in-home providers. There are efforts underway to build additional child care centers, but there is a great need for additional child care at Camp Pendleton.
Page 371 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BUYER. All four of you have shared with us many different stressors that are out there in the environment. I would like to touch on two of those because we, as a Congress, are struggling with one that deals with—and there are so many broken homes across America—one is the increase in juvenile crime.
When we deal with the military and these long periods of separation and the stresses, not only juvenile crime, but something that—I will not call it hidden, but it happens in the military, and we just do not discuss it enough—deals with spousal abuse. When we have this increase in operational tempo and the stresses and the cracks that you are beginning to see—I am going to throw this out to you—have you seen levels of concern with the increased rates with regard to juvenile crime—if you know the answer, please comment on that—and with regard to spousal abuse? It would be helpful to us on juvenile crime so we could know if there are sufficient youth activities. So, let me just throw that out to the panel.
Mrs. HUMMER. I do not have figures on juvenile crime at Camp Pendleton. I do know that last year, the legal office discussed 5,000 cases of divorce; they processed approximately 200 uncontested divorce cases a month; incidences of spousal abuse, they had 900 reported cases of spousal abuse. Those are reported cases; there are many, many hundreds more out there that have not been reported.
Mr. BUYER. Do you have friends or other spouses who are talking about children getting more active or involved in drugs or in youth crimes?
Mrs. HUMMER. There is a greater concern, especially among the enlisted families, at Camp Pendleton. They see crime and gang activity encroaching on the base from the Oceanside area, so there is a greater concern in the enlisted housing areas for that.
Page 372 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
I do not know about on-base crime itself as far as that committed by the military families themselves. I have no information.
Mr. BUYER. Thank you.
Mrs. Kresge.
Mrs. KRESGE. Sir, I do not have any statistics on the actual numbers. I know that in our spouses in touch meetings, we try to at least bring in speakers who talk about topics like that, maybe from some of the counseling centers and so on, so the wives at least have a chance to know that those agencies are out there to help them. But I really do not know how many are out there.
Mrs. BRANCH. I do not have any statistics, either, about the——
Mr. BUYER. Well, I do not want to ask for statistics, but personal knowledge.
Mrs. BRANCH. Personal knowledge. I have not seen or heard of any increase in adolescent or juvenile crime. The spousal abuse issue is an issue that is worked, and certainly, when the men are under stress, there appear to be more of these incidents, when the family is under stress.
Page 373 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
The Navy has a very active system on the ship through the chaplains and through the family service centers to help people with anger management courses. They are very proactive in working with the sailors before they come home from a cruise, helping them to understand what is going to happen when they come after being gone for, well, in the next evolution, 9 1/2 months out of 13, either on workups or on cruise.
So we do go out and try to help our sailors and their families cope with those kinds of stresses, but certainly the spousal abuse situation is a sad one and an issue that needs to be continually addressed.
Mrs. OLSON. Mr. Chairman, we have an agency called the Army Family Advocacy Program that addresses child abuse and spouse abuse, and we have had some very celebrated cases at Fort Hood and some serious cases at Fort Hood. I think it is on the decline a little bit just because we are so aware.
Part of the problem—and I was very sympathetic to the Marine sergeant major who was here, saying that we need to bring in single soldiers—what I have seen in my 25 years with the service is that, for instance, when we were stationed in Germany, there was a restriction on bringing your family over, so that the young soldiers up to a certain rank—and you will have to correct me; I think it was E–4 at that time—had to live in the barracks. So you did not see those kinds of stresses and strains.
Now what I see is, like in my case, younger and younger families coming into the service with serious problems, histories of spouse and child abuse, histories of financial problems, and we are turning into a social work services organization, and a lot of it is done by the volunteers.
Page 374 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
We are just a reflection of society, perhaps, but we cannot handle all of these problems of these people coming in. If they join the Army, they are not going to dig their way out of debt with a take-home pay of $20; they cannot do it. So the pressures are not coming from just the deployment and OPTEMPO and the PERSTEMPO; they are coming from the homes they came from and grew up in and from the situation they are joining the military in.
As far as the children being more prone to crime during times of deployment, they are very award at Fort Hood of connecting with the schools, notifying the schools of what units are deploying and to be aware of children acting out. And I think we hear a little bit more about the cases at Fort Hood because MP's are always called in, and in very serious cases, in repeat offenses, they will evict the family from family housing off Fort Hood if they are causing serious problems. We had a couple of cases of that during the deployment.
Mr. BUYER. Thank you very much for your answers.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Sisisky.
Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions. I want to associate myself with the remarks of Chairman Bateman.
I have been here for 15 years, and every year, I hear something about commissaries. There are about four or five of us on this rostrum right now who run the MWR, which is the Morale, Welfare and Recreation Committee. I promise you there is no sentiment to do away with the commissaries. There will be change. We have hired a civilian manager now, the gentleman who is heading it. And I think you see things in the press about tobacco products at a different price, but I can assure you the law is pretty well fixed at 5 percent, and I think it will continue that way.
Page 375 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
The exchange service, there is going to be a change there. They are trying to unite all the exchanges into one exchange for buying power so they can sell at a cheaper price. On the surface, it does not sound like a bad idea, but it is obviously controversial. The services want their own. But I do not think there is any risk there.
I might also add on the housing—and I was upstairs at another committee meeting, so I was not here earlier, and we were talking about family housing up there in the Military Construction Subcommittee. And it was interesting—the Navy was making their presentation, Mr. Chairman, and they were talking about how great it was with the public-private partnerships. So I just asked if it is so great, why aren't we doing more of it now? Well, they are feeling their way. And I said there are a lot of patriotic Americans who have developed apartment buildings and homes who I am sure would be willing to act in behalf of—not for a profit, because they couldn't keep it arm's length—but I am sure we could get a lot of advice.
But all of these things are working, and I appreciate what you have basically said, because what you basically said is the readiness of our forces, and from a national security standpoint, that is what it is all about, and we will try to work these things out.
Thank you all very much for appearing today.
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Taylor.
Page 376 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you ladies for being here today. I know you have extremely difficult jobs, and you have given us some great advice. If I may, I would ask you all to do something to try to help those people you care about.
Your spouses by law have to watch what they say; you do not. And I am dead serious about this. You know, everyone in public office, be it your local city council, your State legislature, the way Congress is run, are elected people responding to the voices of the citizens. And the louder those voices are, the more often they are heard.
I would think that your organizations that you represent would be the ideal people to start articulating that maybe our Nation would be much better served to take some of the money that so many influential people here in Washington are getting ready to give away and add to the deficit in the way of tax breaks, maybe we would be better served as a Nation to put that money into fixing the machines your husbands fly in, that the people they represent are responsible for and risk their lives in. And maybe we would be better served putting some of that money into the pay for those young enlistees that you are talking about, those E–3's and below in the Marines and throughout the services.
I would really encourage you to get vocal and get the organizations that you belong to be vocal, because there really is not a constituency out there saying, ''I am worried about the machine my husband is flying in.'' It is not fair to those E–3's. It is not fair to that 15-year-old mother whose husband is away on deployment.
Page 377 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
And unless you all are as loud as some of the seniors' organizations that are always calling for more Medicare and the other groups that are calling for more Medicaid and things like that, then you literally get left behind.
And I know you are thinking, ''Well, you guys ought to be fixing that.'' But we are only one-eighth of the total Congress here, so if you have every, single vote in this committee, you have still got to go out and pick up another 160-some to get a majority on the House floor.
That is why, for the things that are important to you, I would certainly encourage you, through the Navy Times, through the Army Times, through the different organizations that you belong to, to get very vocal about fixing the problems that you have articulated very, very well today. I do not think we have ever had better witnesses before this committee.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Talent, then Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. TALENT. I really very much appreciate your testimony and the passion and the sincerity of it, all four of you. I have a quick question for Mrs. Branch because I may have misheard you.
Did I hear you say that there was a cruise where the ship was out 71 percent—repeat that for me, please.
Page 378 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mrs. BRANCH. What I said was that the U.S.S. George Washington, which began its workups for crews on the 28th of February and will do workups and return to Norfolk on April 2, of 1998, will be gone 283 out of 399 days, which is 71 percent of the time; approximately 9 1/2 months out of 13, they will be deployed from Norfolk, VA.
Mr. TALENT. Is that a typical situation?
Mrs. BRANCH. That is a bit faster than it has been in the past, and that is why my point was that if the manpower changes—you know, the Navy is fulfilling its obligations, but everybody is working a little faster to do that—and our turnaround for the carrier group is faster, yes. The last time, for the last workup through deployment, the percentage of time was 62 percent.
Mr. TALENT. Because I have always been told that the Navy believes that if they are gone for more than 6 months, it begins to affect the retention rate.
Mrs. BRANCH. It is a 6-month cruise, that is correct, and the Navy has held to that and absolutely has not broken that. But you have to remember that before that 6-month cruise, you have to do workups. So the ship is out for 2 weeks, then it is in for a week, then it is out for 2 months, then it is in for 10 days, and it is out for 2 months prior to deploying for the 6 months.
Mr. TALENT. OK. So that in terms of the effect on the family, it is almost as if the cruise itself is more than 6 months.
Page 379 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mrs. BRANCH. Precisely; yes, exactly. It is a long time, and of course, we do it. We who are in the operational Navy do it constantly; that is our business, and our sailors and our husbands are happy to do it because that is their business. But it is very difficult when we have an OPTEMPO that is speeded up like it is for this one. And the average age of the sailors on my husband's ship is 19—very young, with these young girls who are—well, you can imagine.
Mr. TALENT. The Navy was telling me—and I have heard ever since I came to the Congress 4 years ago—that if they were gone more than 6 months, it would affect retention rates, and that the Navy is doing everything they can to prevent that.
Mrs. BRANCH. And they are very good about that. The last time the U.S.S. George Washington deployed, it was home 6 months to the day.
Mr. TALENT. OK. That is good to hear.
Now let me ask each of you a question, and this requires a visceral kind of response, but it would be helpful to me if you could. On a scale of 1 to 10, I am going to ask you to rate morale, with 10 being the highest and 1 being the lowest. Give me your sense of where morale is and just your opinion, on a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 the highest. And if you can give it to me where it is now and then where it was, you think, maybe 2 years ago.
I am trying to get a sense of where you think morale is and whether you think it has declined in the last couple of years. And if you think the question is unfair, do not answer it, but if you have a sense of it, I would just like to get your opinion on that.
Page 380 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mrs. OLSON. I will not give you a percentage. I will just tell you that it has declined and that it declined—it depends on the level or the rank—I think in the mid ranks and in the senior ranks, it has declined more, maybe because they have seen what it could be like, and maybe the soldiers coming in are not aware of what the possibilities were before. So it has declined, and it is making a difference in retention. We are losing people all the time.
Mr. TALENT. Thank you, Mrs. Olson. And again, answer in whatever form you want if you are not comfortable giving it a rating, but that is what I was getting at. If you others could, if you would be willing to respond.
Mrs. BRANCH. I think that that is an issue that needs to be addressed according to the community within the Navy. Right now, if I were on my husband's ship, I would know that the morale is high because those men are out at sea, doing what they are supposed to do.
With the spouses and with the families, the morale is OK right now, but wait until 3 months from now, when they have been out at sea a lot, and they are looking at a huge deployment, and they have missed Easter and all the rest, and then 6 months from now. So I think it changes.
One of the issues that I think is impacting morale—and Congressman Skelton touched on this earlier—is the perception of upward mobility for all rates and ranks within the military—where am I going from here to here, and so on.
Page 381 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
On my husband's ship, which is a nuclear carrier, one of the rates that is most important is the reactor people who work down in the nuclear area. It is a very specified area, and these men are very talented men. Where do they go? What is their upward mobility? How can we keep them in the Navy? That is part of the morale issue, I think, in terms of staffing and in terms of families, as well as the separations.
Mrs. KRESGE. I would say for the pilots and the actual people who are in the Air Force, probably about an eight. When they are there, they are really motivated to be there, and they give it more than 110 percent; I mean, they will just go and go and go.
For the families, it is probably about a six. They are hearing that they are going to go again next year, and then they are hearing that when they come back, they will probably go for some of the smaller deployments, and they are just not really happy. It is probably more the families who are unhappy. The guys are not ecstatic, but they still love what they are doing; that part, they do love.
Mr. TALENT. Do you have any sense whether it has declined or stayed the same?
Mrs. KRESGE. It probably has declined. We were not in the actual operational fighters 2 years ago, so I do not really know. I am guessing it probably has declined.
Mrs. HUMMER. Within the Marine Corps at Camp Pendleton, I would say that moral has declined. Among the senior staff and CO's and the majority of the officer rank, I would say they consider the morale to be about a seven, maybe an eight. They have made a commitment to the career, they know what comes with it, they know about the separations, they know about the quality of life; they are not necessarily happy, but they accept it.
Page 382 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
With the young enlisted Marine family, I would say they are at a three to four, basically because of the quality of life issues. They see that their benefits are eroding, and the deployment time and training cycles have lengthened, so there is less family time.
Mr. TALENT. Thank you all.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Skelton.
Mr. SKELTON. Thank you very much for your testimony. I would not only echo Mr. Bateman in wishing that all Members of Congress could hear this, but I wish that all of our countrymen could have heard you.
Out of curiosity, Mrs. Olson, is the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division known as the Blackhawk Brigade?
Mrs. OLSON. No. It is the Gray Wolf Brigade. The Blackhawk is the Second Brigade—no, Blackjack is second—I do not know who those are, Mr. Skelton.
Mr. SKELTON. OK. I was just curious.
Mrs. Branch, being connected with the carriers, I will share with you that on the 25th of November, I was at dockside watching the Theodore Roosevelt deploy for 6 months, and the young spouses and families and mothers—mothers wearing sweatshirts saying ''Navy Mom''—and the tears and the hugs were quite a sight to see.
Page 383 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
I know that you and the others in their own particular service have shared that same feeling, and we have a special place in our hearts for people like you.
The items that you mentioned, the problems that you have had and that you face, of all of them—I think Mrs. Branch used the phrase ''anxiety level''—can this first class petty officer be around for 20 years, or are they going to cut me out? I am a buck sergeant, and it seems like they are kicking out all the good staff sergeants; am I going to be around? Can I make gunnery sergeant, or will I be around?
The uncertainty that I see, I think is more telling, at least in my opinion in visiting with Vice Admiral Fallon about a week or so ago, than the deployments, although they are difficult, and the family support or lack thereof.
I would appreciate your comments on that, but my major question to each of you—and think about this—is at what point does all of this break, and the petty officers, the gunnery sergeants, the ensigns and their families say, ''It is not worth it. Let's go back to Versailles, Missouri.''
At what point does it break, Mrs. Olson?
Mrs. OLSON. Mr. Skelton, each family has to cope the best it can, and what is happening at Fort Hood—and I think this was part of Lieutenant General Schwartz' statistic about the number of soldiers who are re-upping at Fort Hood to stay at Fort Hood—I believe that part of that percentage is because what families are doing is deciding that the wife, because she must work to survive, cannot leave her job. So what the soldiers are doing is taking voluntary short tours to Korea, or maybe even to Europe, and in some cases they have gone to Bosnia; the wife stays at Fort Hood, either in housing, but more often what they are doing is buying a home, trying to gain equity for the first time in their lives, and keeping the kids in the same school district.
Page 384 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
So I think a lot of our soldiers at Fort Hood are re-upping for that reason. They re-up and try to use Fort Hood as a home station. But what happens is you have a soldier who goes off to Korea, and during those years while his children are growing and his wife is working, a lot of those soldiers are growing further and further away from their families, so when they come back, they are not always a family any longer.
So it really depends. I think an Army family can put up with an awful lot if they are appreciated. I think the first thing you have got to fix, and it takes care of a lot of the other ones, is the pay and benefits, and you have got to give them some stability, and that hits on the point that you made before—most of these people are not sure they will make it 20 years to retirement, so they are cutting and running to something more secure, like Sergeant Major Schwartz mentioned, like the UPS job.
Mr. Skelton, thank you.
Mrs. Branch.
Mrs. BRANCH. I think the straw that would break the camel's back, so to speak, would be longer cruises. I think the Navy families are being stretched about as far as they can be stretched in terms of separations. I think that that is the really crucial factor in terms of quality of life. Our lives are all happier when we are together, and we know that we have to be apart, but I think that the separations are significant.
Mr. SKELTON. When they are back, do they get enough leave?
Page 385 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mrs. BRANCH. When my husband's ship came back last time——
Mr. SKELTON. I do know that the soldiers from Bosnia without exception had a 45-day block leave. Does the Navy do anything like that?
Mrs. BRANCH. No, the Navy does not do that. My husband's ship was the ready carrier until it went into the yard, so it came home in July, and they could not let any more than 25 percent of the crew go on leave. Actually, 10 days after it got home, it had to go out to unload ammunition, so it was out for another 4 or 5 days.
In addition, while the ship is in port, our sailors stand duty every fourth day, which is on the ship every fourth day, all night, our officers and sailors both. So it is very difficult.
Whenever the carrier is ready, it has to be manned, so that it could leave if the commander in chief gave that order.
Mr. BATEMAN. Mrs. Kresge.
Mrs. KRESGE. Sir, I think that after about two tours, 6 to 8 years, people really start questioning what they have really done. After one tour, they might try it again and say, well, the next place be different. They will go ahead and go through that and then discuss with their family that, hey, this is either not great, or we are going to make it. And also at that point, they are going to look toward the retirement, and they are starting to say that promises are being broken on retirements. A lot of the things that they thought they signed up for, medical care and so on, is being cut out for the retirees, and they do not know what they really have to look forward to if they do make it to 20, so a lot of them are saying at about that point that that is really enough. It has not changed yet, and I am just not going to stick with this.
Page 386 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. SKELTON. Mrs. Hummer.
Mrs. HUMMER. The breaking point for most young enlisted Marine families is midway through that first 6-month deployment, or at the conclusion of that first 6-month deployment, because that is the first separation that the family has had. And prior to that 6-month deployment, that marine may have been away from his family for the preceding 9 to 10 months doing workups or training away from Camp Pendleton. The wife, perhaps, because there is not sufficient base housing, is living off-base in a crime-ridden neighborhood, she is paying out-of-pocket expenses in the range of hundreds of dollars. She is young. She has several children, and the support that is provided by the Marine Corps, as much as we can provide for them, is not sufficient, and they have had it, and they say ''No more.''
Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. With that, the very patient Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.
I really appreciate your testimony today. I will echo what one of our other Members said, that we really appreciate your coming here because you can be honest with us. Those who wear a uniform have responsibilities that sometimes prevent them, I think, from being as honest with us as they would like to be, but you can be, and you have been, and I thank you very much.
Page 387 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
I think all of you mentioned that the increased OPTEMPO was a problem. Not every American, and certainly not every Member of Congress, concurs, agrees, that every mission that we embark on is essential to our national security. I do not know if you have thought about it, but if the increased OPTEMPO was the result of participation in really vital missions to our national security, would it make it any easier, or is separation just separation and a stressor no matter what?
Mrs. HUMMER. I will start. I have prior experience as a U.S. Marine officer myself, so I can speak from both the active-duty and the family side, so I have seen it both ways. A separation is a separation. However, those marines who have been in service for a while, the senior staff and CO or the officers and their families, accept the separation and accept the training for what it is, and they understand why it is important. They might prefer that their husbands be put in harm's way for a good cause.
The young enlisted family will just see it as a separation, and they do not like it, and they would rather their husbands came home.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.
Mrs. KRESGE. I have to agree. The separations are just hard in general. It would certainly be nice if they really were all very, very essential, because people do talk—especially when they are at home when the guys are gone, all the wives get together and talk about why are they over there, and what is going on. It certainly makes it easier on the overall morale if it really is extremely important, and they understand why they are there. So if you can make a priority, we would hope that you can make those tough decisions for us.
Page 388 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BARTLETT. We try—and rest assured, you are essential. It may be the mission that is not essential, but you are essential. Thank you.
Mrs. BRANCH. I think the military community is a microcosm of the larger community, and if the larger community of the United States is questioning decisions about why our troops are here or there, there is a trickle-down, which certainly impacts the families whose husbands are deployed.
Everyone likes the unified America behind them and behind any situation where their loved one is in harm's way. So I think there is some impact there. I think our servicemembers accept the authority and the decisions that are made and go willingly to where they are supposed to go. But certainly the families, in terms of their understanding of it, are shaped a little bit by the influences of the greater society.
Mr. BARTLETT. I understand the tradition of the military is that yours is not to question why, but as a citizen, in addition to being a military spouse or a military person, I think that it is just very natural that you do question why.
Mrs. Olson.
Mrs. OLSON. There are a couple of factors that make a difference. One is that if we do not have two parties united in why they are deploying to where they are deploying, your constituents listen very closely to the news, and they start questioning themselves as to why their husbands or wives are deploying.
Page 389 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
So when they are glued to CNN or to C-SPAN, it causes problems with our family support group, because they start questioning also. There is a big difference between Desert Storm-Desert Shield, where the whole country was united and paying attention, and then you go to Bosnia, where we have been in Bosnia for a while now, and we are kind of out of the news. A friend of ours went over to Bosnia with the First Armored Division from Baumholder, and they did not get the support from the Nation that we got during Desert Storm, and that makes a difference.
But there are a couple of things that have helped. During this last deployment, we had a group that went for 4 months in August, and they knew they were going for a 4-month period of time, and we also got the financial benefits that my husband did not get during Somalia—we got separation allowance, which is $75 a day, but that is $75 that they did get above the $20 from before, and they also got hazardous fire pay, which was $150, and their full pay—the full enlisted pay is tax-free. And believe me, there were a few families who were kind of hoping that their husbands would stay a little longer so they could get their Christmas shopping done.
So it makes a difference; pay will make a difference, and benefits will make a difference in how people accept deployments and if the country goes someplace as a united front, and they feel that what their spouses are doing is very important. It make a difference.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you all very much for your answers. I do not think the concerns about the value of these missions to our national security break along party lines. I think that it is pretty bipartisan.
Page 390 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Thank you.
Mr. BATEMAN. Well, even good things must come to an end.
Mr. Talent, do you have a compelling question that you need to pose?
Mr. TALENT. No, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. If not, we will suspend with our very deep thanks to each of you. Your testimony has been extraordinarily helpful to us and I am sure better prepares us to better serve the people of the country and most certainly the people in our armed services.
We appreciate the long, long day that you have spent with us, and we are indeed grateful.
[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the subcommittees adjourned.]
[The questions and answers can be found in the appendix beginning on page 429.]
"The Official Committee record contains additional material here."
"The Official Committee record contains additional material here."
Page 391 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 4, 1997
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BATEMAN
Mr. BATEMAN. Reference was made earlier today about some concerns about aircraft engines. Is that a problem of backlog at the depot level of maintenance, or is that something that is in-theater or in the operating units?
Sergeant SIMMONS. Currently, the 7th AF is having supportability problems with the TF34–GE–100A engine (A–10A aircraft) and the F110–GE–100 engine (F–16C/D aircraft). TF34 supportability is being driven by part shortages which has led to production problems at the Intermediate (I) level maintenance shop and at the depot (USN JAX). The pacing item is the High Pressure Turbine (HPT). Actions have been taken to improve parts support. Get well date for the HPT is Dec. 97.
F110 supportability is being driven by a shortage of spare engines, part shortages and technical issues which has impacted I level maintenance. Funding has been received in FY97 to buy three (3) engines. The part shortages are being aggressively worked. Contract deliveries are being expedited and repairs developed to alleviate the shortages. Long term corrective actions have been identified and are being implemented.
Page 392 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BUYER
Mr. BUYER. What other types of shortages in positions do you have at Osan that you are aware of?
Sergeant SIMMONS. A snapshot of the over 5,000 authorizations at Osan AB Korea shows Air Force manning at 100.5 percent across all officer and enlisted career fields. As members rotate in and out of Osan, there are occasional short-term gaps or overlaps. Aside from these short-term vacancies, a review of all career fields revealed a shortage only in enlisted Korean linguists. Currently, Osan is 96 percent manned (423 authorized, 408 assigned) in these linguists. However, Air Force-wide, linguists are only manned at 84 percent. Of particular interest during previous testimony was aircraft maintenance manning. Osan's manning today is 94 percent (18 authorized, 17 assigned). The one vacancy will be filled in September 1997.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR
Mr. TAYLOR. And General Fulford, I am going to ask you to respond to this in writing. You talk on page 16 of your testimony of the uncertainty when I presume the husband is away, and the spouse needs medical care under TRICARE. Could you please tell me what that translates to in out-of-pocket expenses for that young Marine? Is it 10 percent of the bill? Is it 20 percent of the bill? Is it taken care of entirely?
Page 393 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General FULFORD. When active duty family members enroll in TRICARE Prime and use the military treatment facility as their primary care manager (PCM), they have virtually no out-of-pocket expenses for out-patient care. For in-patient care, they would pay $9.90 per day in the military hospital, and if referred to a civilian network hospital, they would pay $11.00 per day or a $25.00 minimum.
If a civilian network doctor is selected as the PCM, then out-of-pocket expenses for office visits would include a $12.00 copayment for families of an E–5 and above and $6.00 for families of E–4 and below.
TRICARE Extra option involves using providers from a government contracted network and includes an annual deductible as follows:
E–4 and below: $50.00 for individual, $100 for two or more family members.
E–5 and above: $150 for an individual, $300 for two or more family members.
After the deductible is met, the government will pay 85% of the negotiated rate for each out-patient visit.
TRICARE Standard option is the traditional fee-for-service where family members may choose any CHAMPUS certified civilian provider. The same deductibles for Extra apply to Standard. After the deductible is met, the government will pay 80% of the allowable charge for out-patient care. When charges exceed the government maximum allowable charge, the beneficiary is responsible for up to 115% of that allowable charge.
Page 394 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
For prescription drugs there is no charge at a military pharmacy. At a ''network'' pharmacy, there is a $5.00 copayment for a 30 day supply of medication.
For active duty family members, the maximum family liability (Catastrophic Cap) is $1,000 per fiscal year for deductibles and cost shares based on allowable charges.
Mr. TAYLOR. What percentage of O & M Funds were received for FY 97?
General WALLACE. Fort Irwin received 75.7 percent of the funds requested for FY 97.
Mr. TAYLOR. What percentage of O & M funds requested for FY 98 are included in the President's budget?
General WALLACE, General MOSELEY, General RICHARD, Admiral SMITH. Unknown at this time. We will receive Forces Command FY 98 Funding Guidance on approximately 16 April 1997.
Mr. TAYLOR. What does the average active duty family pay per year in medical costs?
General FULFORD. According to the CHAMPUS Management Information System, for FY 96, the average out-of-pocket cost per active duty family member in the Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton catchment area was $91 for the fiscal year.
Page 395 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
When making the decision of which TRICARE program to use, families need to consider cost versus choice. If freedom of choice to use any civilian provider is important to the family, then they are going to have higher out-of-pocket costs. However, if keeping costs to a minimum is important (or necessary), the families can choose to enroll in Prime at the military hospital and virtually have no out-of-pocket costs.
The answer to the question depends on which TRICARE option the family chooses. Assuming a healthy family of four elects TRICARE Prime and the military as their primary care manager, and they have no referrals outside the system or need for in-patient services, it will cost them nothing out-of-pocket. If there are in-patient requirements, it will cost $9.90 per day in a military hospital or $11.00 per day in a civilian network hospital or $25 minimum. The same costs are applicable to TRICARE Extra and Standard.
If that same family elects a civilian health care provider at nine visits per year, as an E–4 or below, it will cost a total of $54.00. If during any of those visits they are referred for other services, each referral will cost at least another $6.00. The Navy Hospital estimates that drives the cost of those nine visits up to a total of $360. Likewise, for E–5s and above, it would be a $14.00 copayment per visit plus additional referrals at about $720.00 per year. The actual costs varies based on the need for the following types of care: Maternity/Newborns/Immunizations for Preschoolers/Chronic Illnesses, etc.
If this same family elects TRICARE Extra or Standard, it will cost them an annual deductible ($150.00 for the family of the E–4 and below and $300.00 for the family of the E–5 and above). Then the government will reimburse 85% of the negotiated rate for Extra beneficiaries or 80% of the allowable charges for Standard beneficiaries. Depending on the physician used, that could add up to another $100.00 to $200.00 for those 9 visits, almost twice as much as TRICARE Prime.
Page 396 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. TAYLOR. General Fulford, what are the out-of-pocket expenses for the young Marine who is deployed and his wife seeks medical coverage under TRICARE? For example, is his responsibility 10% of the medical bills or is the bill taken care of entirely?
General FULFORD. The answer to the question depends on which TRICARE option the family chooses. When making the decision of which TRICARE program to use, families need to consider cost versus choice. If freedom of choice to use any civilian provider is important to the family, then they are going to have higher out-of-pocket costs. However, if keeping cost to a minimum is important (or necessary), the families can choose to enroll in Prime at the military hospital and virtually have no out-of-pocket costs.
Assuming a healthy family of four elects TRICARE Prime and the military as their primary care manager, and they have no referrals outside the system or need for in-patient services, it will cost them nothing out of pocket. If there are in-patient requirements, it will cost $9.90 per day in a military hospital or $11.00 per day in a civilian network hospital, or $25 minimum. These same costs are applicable to TRICARE Extra and Standard.
If that same family elects a civilian health care provider at nine visits per year, as an E–4 or below, it will cost a total of $54.00. If during any of those visits they are referred for other services, each referral will cost at least another $6.00. The Navy Hospital estimates that drives the cost of those nine visits up to a total of $360. Likewise, for E–5s and above, it would be a $14.00 copayment per visit plus additional referrals at about $720.00 per year. The actual cost varies based on the need for the following types of care: Maternity/Newborns Immunizations for Preschoolers/Chronic Illnesses, etc.
Page 397 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
If this same family elects TRICARE Extra or Standard, it will cost them an annual deductible of $150.00 for the family of the E–4 and below, and $300.00 for the family of the E–5 and above. The government will reimburse 85% of the negotiated rate for Extra beneficiaries, or 80% of the allowable charges for Standard beneficiaries. Depending on the physician used, that could add up to another $100.00 to $200.00 for those 9 visits, almost twice as much as TRICARE Prime.
Mr. TAYLOR. What percentage of O&M funds that each of you requested for your own commands for FY97 did you actually receive? And the next question would be what percentage of the O&M funds requested for FY98 were included in the President's budget?
General RICHARD. The Combined Arms Exercise (CAX) program is the cornerstone of Marine Corps live fire and maneuver training. In FY 1997, the CAX program was funded at 100% of its requirements. Similarly, the FY 1998 President's Budget provides 100% of the funding required to support the CAX program. The Marine Corps considers the CAX program vital to its training mission and will continue to support this program.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PICKETT
Mr. PICKETT. How about the funding for your (Brig. Gen. Moseley) training operation in 1998 compared to 1997; are you being cut back?
Page 398 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Brig. Gen. MOSELEY. From FY 1997 to FY 1998, Air Combat Command's overall air operations training program declines by less than 1 percent, after accounting for program transfers and price increases. Since the change in ACC's training funding is relatively minor, the FY 1998 training funding level for the 57th Wing at Nellis AFB should be similar to FY 1997 levels.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GIBBONS
Mr. GIBBONS. There are significant concerns that funding has not been adequate to provide both the short-term readiness of the force and modernization of the force. What effects will the shortfall in modernization—including shortfall in dollars of training for these new pieces of equipment—have on our readiness both today and in the future of year? Are we on a modernization downward spiral? If we continue to short modernization, will we ultimately short readiness and to what effect?
Lieutenant General IVERSON. The high operations tempo of ongoing worldwide operations other than war continues to place a significant amount of stress upon Air Force people and equipment. This has resulted in the accelerated life cycle of our aircraft and support equipment beyond their original design. The Air Force budget has been developed with careful consideration given to balancing our current needs with respect to our people and readiness and the anticipated future demands of our mission in supporting the National Strategy. Though of little immediate impact to our current readiness, any reduction in Air Force modernization funds will have far reaching implications in the out years, be significantly more expensive to recover from, and set a dangerous precedent for future administrations.
Page 399 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MC KEON
Mr. MCKEON. How much longer do you think we can use the B–52s?
Brig. Gen. MOSELEY. The B–52 airframe is certified supportable through the year 2040 by the B–52 Aircraft Structural Integrity Program. During this time various subsystems in the aircraft, not including engines, will suffer from vanishing vendors and obsolete parts. However, the B–52 System Program Office leads the Avionics Improvement Working Group, and the Product Improvement Working Group which are designed to anticipate these problems and establish replacement/enhancement programs to prevent a loss of sustainability or capability.
The B–52 carries sophisticated direct attack and stand-off munitions. The B–52 can attack light to medium defended target areas with general purpose munitions, cluster munitions, laser guided bombs, and starting in FY98, Sensor Fused Weapons, the Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser, and the Joint Direct Attack Munition. The B–52 can attack targets in highly defended areas with stand-off munitions such as the Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missiles, the Harpoon anti-shipping missile, and the AGM–142 Have Nap, stand-off precision missile. In the future the B–52 will employ the Joint Stand-off Weapon (IOC FY00) and the Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile (IOC FY01) against heavily defended targets.
Page 400 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. MCKEON. Are all of the B–1s now equipped for conventional weapons?
Brig. Gen. MOSELEY. Yes, all 95 B–1 aircraft have the capability to deliver conventional weapons. The B–1 can deliver 84 Mk–82 500-lb bombs or 84 Mk–62 sea mines. In addition, B–1s have recently gained the capability to deliver 30 CBU–87 (combined effects munitions), CBU–89 (Gator mines), or CBU–97 (Sensor Fused Weapons). The B–1 will begin flight test at the end of FY97 to deliver the Direct Joint Attack Munition (JDAM), 2000-lb GPS-guided munition.
MEASURING READINESS
House of Representatives,
Committee on National Security,
Subcommittee on Military Readiness,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 11, 1997.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m. in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Herbert Bateman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HERBERT H. BATEMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
Page 401 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. The committee will come to order.
This morning, the Military Readiness Subcommittee continues its look at the military readiness of our forces both now and into the future. The administration and the senior leadership in the Pentagon continue to claim that our forces are more ready than ever before. Yet when we visit with various units throughout the military and hear testimony before the subcommittee, as we did just last week, we get a different picture. We continue to hear some disturbing stories.
On March the 3d this subcommittee conducted a field hearing at Langley Air Force Base, VA; and on March 4 we held a joint hearing with the Military Personnel Subcommittee here in Washington. We heard testimony from every level of the military—from senior commanders to middle grade officers to noncommissioned officers—and, finally, we heard testimony from some military spouses.
We were told of personnel shortages in units resulting in 10- to 12-hour delays, with weekend duty and training being the accepted norm. A number of witnesses told us of PERSTEMPO so high that major units are averaging over 175 days per year deployed, and this figure does not take into account the training days required for the unit to prepare for deployment. It must be pointed out, however, due to the reduced number of personnel available and the long hours required to keep up with the workload, there is a perception that personnel who deploy actually have it better than those who must remain at home station and have to take care of 100 percent of the unit's equipment. This often results in extremely long days with little recognition for their contribution to the deployed force.
Page 402 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
At our hearings, we were repeatedly told that the military is working harder, and OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO are higher than at any other time in recent memory. The commander of the III Corps at Fort Hood stated that he is ''stretching soldiers, their families and the budget with a blistering operational pace * * * retention is becoming a problem and will be a challenge this year.'' He tells us that a unit at Fort Riley had to borrow 226 soldiers, 30 percent of the unit's personnel, from outside the battalion to meet a deployment requirement.
The commander of the 108th Air Defense Artillery Brigade testified that, ''manning a battalion for deployment took soldiers from the entire brigade and support from all across all of Fort Bliss as well as 12 additional soldiers from across the XVIII Airborne Corps.'' He further stated that in order to outfit the deploying task force they had to strip from the rest of the brigade almost every cook, mechanic, supply specialist, generator mechanic and long-haul truck driver inside the brigade as well as every Patriot missile training officer in NCO. If given another requirement, he told us that he could not outfit another battalion for at least 6 months. In order to man the deployed battalion, the remainder of the units in the brigade are currently manned at 65 percent.
We were then informed that many Marines are spending in excess of 177 days per year away from home. A Navy spouse told the subcommittee that, although the Navy is very good about keeping its word with regard to 6-month deployments, due to ship ''work-ups'' her husband's next 6-month deployment will actually mean that the ship's personnel will be gone 9 1/2 months during a 13-month period. These extended separations, the quality of life shortcomings at many of our installations, have perceived continued attack on military benefits, exacerbate the anxiety experienced by spouses who are left alone, often with small children, to fend for themselves for long periods of time.
Page 403 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Marine Corps Col. John Sattler, Commander of the 2d Marine Regiment, summed it up, saying, ''we are playing a shell game. We are ready to answer the Nation's 911 emergency calls but not all at the same time.''
We know there has been an ongoing effort within the Pentagon to upgrade the process to measure readiness. However, we continue to be puzzled by the conflicting signals we get between what we hear in Washington and what we hear when we talk directly to the men and women who serve in the units in our military services.
It is the perception of this committee that, although the Pentagon has made some effort to broaden the readiness assessment process, the criteria used to determine the status of readiness in the force is still fundamentally the Status of Resources and Training System, or SORTS, reporting system. SORTS may work well for what it was designed to do, but it doesn't go far enough. It has been stated in the past that any readiness evaluation system needs to be comprehensive and include all known indicators.
The General Accounting Office has pointed out that important disconnects have existed historically between formal readiness reports provided by the SORTS system and other information obtained from military personnel in the field. The military personnel data often suggests that readiness is not as good as the SORTS reports indicate. GAO has stated that continuing shortcomings in SORTS need to be addressed if we are to have a credible foundation upon which to build a more comprehensive readiness reporting system. Efforts to address deficiencies in SORTS should include not only efforts to develop additional readiness indicators for building toward a more comprehensive readiness system but also efforts to ensure that they are used to effect readiness assessments on a unit level basis within each of the services.
Page 404 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
We want to find out today if the current readiness assessment system takes into account indicators such as the amount of time individuals are away from home, the stresses of working harder and longer and doing more with less, the quality and quantity of military training being reduced due to lack of skilled key-level personnel and having to migrate money from training to quality of life demands on our installation, the impact of having to plug holes in our assigned strengths by borrowing personnel to get a unit up to theater-deployment standards.
We are very fortunate to have three panels today that we hope will be able to help us understand where we are with regard to upgrading our readiness evaluation and reporting system. For our first panel, we have Mr. Mark Gebicke, Director of Military Operations and Capabilities, the General Accounting Office, who will give his assessment of the current system for measuring readiness. The second panel includes Mr. Louis Finch, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness; and Brig. Gen. Stephen B. Plummer, U.S. Air Force Deputy Director, Current Readiness and Capabilities, Joint Chiefs of staff.
We have also asked this panel for an update of their efforts to develop a process that takes into account all the known readiness indicators, especially the efforts the Pentagon is making to find predictive data that will give a good indication of readiness in the future.
Our last panel will consist of Major General D.C. Grange, Director of Operations, Readiness and Mobilization, Department of the Army; Rear Adm. John Craine, Jr., Director of Assessments, Department of the Navy; Maj. Gen. Donald L. Peterson, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, Department of the Air Force; and Brig. Gen. Matthew Broderick, Director of Operations Division, Plans, Policy and Operations Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Each of the military members of this panel has been asked to address readiness trends and their initiatives to capture readiness indicators that more accurately depict the true statement of readiness.
Page 405 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Before we get into hearing from our panel, I would now like to yield to the Honorable Norman Sisisky, the Ranking Democrat on the Readiness Subcommittee, for any statement he would like to make.
STATEMENT OF HON. NORMAN SISISKY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. SISISKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join with you and welcome all of you to this Readiness Subcommittee hearing today. Your views on how the Department views the readiness of the forces, along with those we heard in earlier hearings this session, are very important as the subcommittee seeks to provide the best national security that we can for the dollars available.
I want to thank the chairman for including this session on readiness assessment and measurement in the readiness hearings we will be participating in this session. The views of our witnesses here today will help us to further understand the impact and implications of the many decisions and actions taken that make a difference in force readiness.
To date, we have heard the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testify before the committee that readiness remains their number one priority. The chairman further acknowledged that today the operations and training tempo is high, the force is considerably smaller and doing more, and that there is little remaining flexibility. The service chiefs recently testified that the forces were busy but ready.
Page 406 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
I also note that readiness expenditure per capita is at an all-time high, even higher than during the gulf war era. We also heard the readiness perspectives from some of the operational forces, representing different theaters and commands.
Mr. Chairman, we all recognize that force readiness is the product of a complex process. Your approach this session in addressing the process is most helpful. These and future hearings will help clarify some of the questions and concerns you expressed in your opening remarks.
I am personally and particularly interested in understanding the impact of some of the decisions made and actions taken within the Department that ultimately drive readiness; and they include the privatization initiatives being undertaken within the Department that directly impact readiness; the impact of the drawdown on the civilian work force on the ability of the maintainers to keep the equipment ready; the adequacy and balance of the budget top line as it relates to readiness matters; and the relationship between the resources applied to readiness and the results achieved.
While I do not expect our witnesses here today to address all of these concerns for the Department, I remain concerned that we here in the Congress might not fully understand the impact of some of these issues on combat readiness, and I intend to address these issues in later hearings. In that light, I look forward to hearing our witnesses here today address the following concerns:
How do we, as Members of Congress, understand the disconnects between the reported best-ever readiness reports we received from the military leadership, the anecdotal data we have been receiving during the contact of unit visits and hearings, both here and in the field, and the fact that readiness expenditures per capita are at an all-time high?
Page 407 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Now, how can we get past the current SORTS data in understanding current and future readiness of those activities that directly affect your ability to implement national strategy? That would include not only the readiness of the service combat forces but also the training bases' depot maintenance activities and other essential infrastructure necessary for sustaining readiness. And how does the Department measure the readiness of multi-service forces to engage successfully in the conduct of joint or coalition operations?
I have been informed that the morale and quality of life of the uniformed personnel is somehow factored in the SORTS report. How does the Department assess and report on the morale and quality of life of the civilian work force? And what is the process for measuring the impact of the drawdown of the civilian work force on depot readiness and on broad military manpower requirements? How does the Department assess and monitor the adequacy of repair parts and inventory to maintain mission-essential equipment? And what can we do to assist the Department in achieving the readiness goals?
I thank you for coming. Your testimony here today will help us understand more about these pressing issues and thereby help ensure that we preserve our Nation's security, and I look forward to your testimony.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Sisisky.
Now I welcome our first witness, Mr. Mark Gebicke from the General Accounting Office, with hopes that I have not mispronounced your name.
Page 408 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
STATEMENT OF MARK E. GEBICKE, DIRECTOR OF MILITARY OPERATIONS AND CAPABILITIES, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Mr. GEBICKE. It is very close. I have been called a lot worse than that, Mr. Chairman. It is actually Gebicke, but thank you.
We are very pleased to be here and thank you for affording this opportunity; and, Mr. Sisisky, thank you for allowing us to be here; and welcome to other members of the subcommittee.
What I would like to do, if you would permit me, is just to briefly summarize my longer statement, which I assume will be read into the transcript.
Mr. BATEMAN. Without objection, it will be.
Mr. GEBICKE. Thank you.
I would like to introduce Mr. Sid Carroll, to my right, and Mr. Barry Holman, to my left. These two gentlemen probably know more about readiness and how it is measured in DOD than anybody else in the General Accounting Office. I am pleased to have them with me at the table here today.
We have been looking at military readiness for quite some time in GAO, and we are looking at how it is reported—not so much what is reported but just how it is reported. And what I would like to talk about today, very briefly, and summarize my longer statement, is concerns that we have about accuracy, validity and comprehensiveness of what is being reported.
Page 409 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Now, let it be said that the services, particularly JCS, OSD, and several of the services individually, are working very diligently to try and improve the readiness reporting system, but we still believe that they have a ways to go and there is significant opportunity for them.
I think it is fair to say, as you pointed out in your opening remarks and Mr. Sisisky did as well, that today's military is clearly one of the best, if not the best, in the world. There is no doubt about that. So I think that what we have to keep in mind, as we discuss readiness today, is that we are really talking on the margins to some degree. We feel that they are clearly trained well, and they are trained to do their missions.
However, having said that, it is clear to us when we go in the field—and I know when you go in the field and members and staff members from this subcommittee go into the field and you hold field hearings like you did last week, you get a little different signal. That signal, I know concerns you; and it concerns us as well. What I hope to do, in my time that I have with you today, is to share with you why we think some of those disconnects actually occur.
Historically, as you pointed out, measurement of readiness of the military services is hinged on SORTS, Status of Organization, Resources and Training System. It is the underpinning for everything that we are going to discuss with you today, not just in our panel but in the other panels as well; and I think that is a very important point for us to make to you, because you will hear a lot of discussion this morning about other systems that are designed to measure readiness in little different ways. I want you to make sure that you understand that SORTS is the underpinning for all of those systems. That is the current status at the unit level to perform their mission, and that is very important.
Page 410 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Now, we have said before that SORTS needs to be comprehensive, it needs to be predictive, it needs to have an element of jointness to it, and we pointed out that SORTS is just a snapshot in time. It is just the current status of that particular unit's capability.
Now, let me just focus my opening remarks around three questions. What disconnects are associated with readiness reporting and why do those disconnects exist? I guess there are a number of factors that would explain the reason for the disconnects, and we are talking about disconnects between the C ratings, as we hear about them, and what you are told when you go out into the field. And one of the reasons has to do with the objective and the subjective nature of the system that is used to report readiness.
Let me give you some examples. Personnel readiness, for instance, objectively measures the authorized level to the actual number of individuals in a unit. So it is a very objective measure; and, depending on what your percentage turns out to be, that will indicate whether you are rated personnel 1, 2, 3, or 4.
Training readiness, on the other hand, is totally subjective. I mean, that is an assessment of the commander's judgment as to how well a unit is trained based on his or her personal observations and various internal and external reports that the commander has at his disposal.
Now, the second reason is that a commander can be aware of problems and might describe those problems to you or I; and these problems will involve issues affecting readiness of his unit, but the system, the SORTS, is not designed to capture that information objectively.
Page 411 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Let's take, again, the personnel area. In the personnel area, the unit might have its full complement of people; but even though it has a full or close-to-full complement of people it might have a group of people that have not been together very long and maybe are not trained and the unit is not cohesively ready. The commander has no discretion on the P rating. The P rating would clearly be a P–1 in that case, because the math would be a simple—a high factor.
This type of situation exists, we find, in a number of cases. One case that comes to mind is units who go to the National Training Center in the Army. Typically, individuals in a battalion, before they go to the National Training Center, are usually held over for a little while. In other words, they might be extended for a period of time. You want to make sure that you have got a good cohesive unit at the time that you go. Consequently, you go for several weeks and you return; and what typically happens, quite frankly, is the unit is decimated. I mean, all of those people that you have been holding back from reassignment now suddenly need to be reassigned; and over the next several months you will see a very significant turnover in the number of individuals that come to the unit that are new.
Now, 3 or 4 months after the NTC experience, that unit, to use this as an example, will have probably a high complement of soldiers. But are those soldiers really ready to perform their mission as a unit? Probably not at that particular point in time. Third, the commander does have the discretion to change subjectively the unit's overall rating; and that is the overall C rating that you see or hear about most publicized. The difficulty is that when the commander changes that overall readiness rating—and he has discretion to do that—it might mask some individual problems that are taking place or occurring within certain factors of the unit in maybe the personnel area, the equipment area or the sorting area or the supplies area.
Page 412 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
One of the explanations or one of the examples I would like to give you there deals with units that participate in peace operations. Now, units that go on peace operations, particularly units that are combat-type units and units that are heavily dependent upon equipment, may or may not be able to exercise or to train while they are in a peace operations environment. In some cases, they can't even take their heavy equipment. So they are, obviously, at a handicap right there. So you would expect, in those type of units, combat units, artillery units and others, that when they return from the peace operations that their readiness would be somewhat degraded.
When we look at those units—and most people that we talk to would say, yes, probably they are going to be degraded for around 3 to 6 months, it is going to take to get our training back up to speed, but when we look at the SORTS ratings for those types of units that have been deployed, we don't see that dip in readiness. We see pretty much a constant state, generally speaking.
As you know, in working very, very closely with this subcommittee over the last few years, we have developed a historical database of SORTS data that we use to track DOD's readiness assessments. That database, Mr. Chairman, we have goes back to 1990; and we have information on each—at the time, about 10,000 units were reporting, and we had information on each of those 10,000 units back as far as 1990 in terms of their SORTS ratings overall and the individual components of SORTS within that.
And up to recently, we have only been looking at the overall numbers, the C numbers, the personnel numbers, the equipment numbers, the supply and the training. More recently, we have had a renewed interest, primarily because of the interest of this subcommittee, in looking at some of the commander's comments that are written in narrative at the bottom of the SORTS submission; and we are finding, like you have found, what appear to be disconnects between what the commander explains as difficulties his or her unit might be having and what the overall C rating might indicate.
Page 413 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
We are considering a body of work or at least an additional review that would maybe do an in-depth analysis of a disconnect that we see between the comments that are narratively made, which probably are very similar to the comments that you and I hear when we go to the field, versus what the SORTS rating actually indicates.
I would like to talk very briefly, in a second question, about what the services and the DOD and the JCS is currently doing with regard to improving their readiness system. Now I am not going to dwell on this, because I have a feeling that the witnesses that will follow me will do a much better job than I could possibly do in giving you the details of the systems, but suffice it to say that the Office of the Secretary of Defense has created a Senior Readiness Oversight Council. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has created his own Chairman's Readiness System.
These two organizations meet independently, but they are coordinated on a monthly basis. They basically begin with a scenario, if you will, a deployment; and they then discuss it in a very coordinated fashion, because this brings together the top leaders both from the military and the civilian side in the Pentagon, to discuss the readiness of our troops collectively to take on the scenario that has been placed before them.
The OSD also has an initiative under way called the Readiness Baseline where they are in the process of beginning to gather some specific indicators, not on a unit basis but collectively; and these indicators are indicators that are currently available within the DOD. This is to help shed some light, again, on the overall readiness of the forces.
Page 414 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
At the service level, what we found, generally speaking, is that the Army seems to be in the forefront of identifying more specific indicators to supplement their SORTS data. Some of the other services are doing—have some initiatives under way, but in discussions with the Army over the last several weeks that seems to be the one, in our mind, that stands out.
Let me conclude by just responding to a third question; and that is, what further actions are needed, as we see them, in the General Accounting Office? We still remain concerned that not enough attention is being devoted to SORTS, and the reason that we are concerned about that is, in my initial remarks to you here this morning, and that is SORTS is the underpinning for everything that is being done in the DOD. Now, if that SORTS system is not comprehensive and it is not predicted and if the information gathered isn't complete, then you have got a weak foundation upon which everything else is built.
There are a number of things that we think need to be done. These are not totally new items. We had recommended several years ago that DOD needed to take a look at the various components of the SORTS rating. They needed to take a number of the indicators that we had presented to them at that point in time. We presented about 26, and we had a list of about 600 indicators.
And I want to mention that these were not indicators that we dreamed up. These were indicators that we got from units and commanders in the field. They told us these factors, if retained—and some of the units retained these factors at a local level. If these indicators were retained, that they were very, very important, would lead to a more comprehensive measurement system and would allow some element of predictability by the services.
Page 415 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
We think once the DOD decides on which indicators indeed need to be added to SORTS that there needs to be some criteria established to ensure that we are gathering like information across all the services, and in order—once that is done, then we will be able to have some trend analysis; and we will be able to compare and contrast between the services.
Mr. Chairman, that is a real brief synopsis of my longer statement. We will be glad to respond to any questions you or other members of the subcommittee might have.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much. Your testimony is certainly appreciated and is helpful to us.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gebicke can be found in the appendix on page 493.]
Mr. BATEMAN. You made reference to commanders having discretion to change objective ratings. Could you give us some of the things where changes are most likely to have been made?
Mr. GEBICKE. Sure. There are two areas where the commander has an opportunity to exercise subjectivity. One is in the rating for training, and that is required. The other is in the overall C rating.
Now, if you think of the four components, we have personnel, equipment, supply and training. Now, the rule says, in order to get an overall C rating, that overall C rating, at least initially as reported, can't be any higher than the lowest rating for the four components. So let's suppose that they are all C–1, with the exception of personnel, which is at a C–2 level. So that means, initially, the overall rating is at a C–2. Now, the commander, based on knowledge that he has, can subjectively upgrade that C–2 to a C–1.
Page 416 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
I guess what we are saying, in a number of the reports that have been submitted, is we will see a lengthy discussion, for instance, to follow through on this example, of personnel issues which affect the unit: Undermanned, understaffed, the number of people deployed, by the loaned number of people out, and when we read those things and then we look at the overall C rating, we scratch our heads and say, that seems to be inconsistent.
Now, one explanation could be that when you look at a unit in isolation, that commander feels that if my unit is the one that gets called, I will get what is called cross-level. In other words, they will pick and choose people from other units to make me whole. That probably would work if you have just one unit or several units to go; but if we are in a situation where a number of units have to deploy, because we are in a major regional contingency or possibly two major regional contingencies, then that thinking is not going to prevail.
Mr. BATEMAN. Are there any instances where commanders have exercised their discretion to lower the C rating?
Mr. GEBICKE. There are some examples, although they are few and far between.
I think Sid might be able to elaborate. But, for the most part, in the overall assessment we have done, we have found upgrades in about 10 percent of the cases; and we have found downgrades in a fraction of 1 percent.
Mr. CARROLL. That is correct.
Page 417 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. Where that happens, what is normally the basis for it, where they downgrade?
Mr. GEBICKE. Where they downgraded?
Mr. CARROLL. It may be, sir, that by objective measurement they have all of the people that they are allowed or were called for by their table of organization and equipment [TO&E]; but they may know that they are going to be tasked within the near future to supply those people either for a contingency operation or to some other event. So they would, in that case, downgrade their rating.
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Sisisky very appropriately made reference to the fact that funding on a per capita basis is at a high level, I think he even said a record level.
We have seen the budget submission for O&M accounts; and you could, I guess, make the case that there shouldn't be any funding problems. But yet when commanders appear before us they speak in terms of 18 percent less money this year than we used to have. What is happening to the money if we are appropriating at higher per capita levels than ever before?
Mr. CARROLL. We have done a lot of——
Mr. BATEMAN. Is somebody moving the money?
Page 418 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. GEBICKE. You hit the nail right on the head. The O&M account is an account that provides quite a bit of discretion as to how the funds are actually spent; and what we found in the work that we have done, that one area in particular, which is very, very much underfunded, is in infrastructure. That is your building repair, maintenance and all of those activities that need to take place.
Now, those expenditures come out of the O&M account, the same place where tank miles and steaming days and everything else has to be paid for. It is also the same place where quality-of-life issues have to be taken care of in terms of fixing up the facilities that are available to the soldiers and sailors and airmen.
So, I mean, you hit the nail right on the head. I couldn't have said it any better. I mean, if you look at how the funds are being budgeted and then at the end of the time—and we have done that, the end of the fiscal year you look at where those funds actually were spent, I mean, you will see that many of the funds migrated from what are traditional readiness areas into, say, infrastructure type areas.
Mr. BATEMAN. Well, from the comments that have been made by various witnesses, it would appear that everything doesn't move in the same direction; that some commanders feel under their circumstances they are forced to take funds and divert it into quality-of-life and base operations and support functions because the need has become acute, even at the expense of training. Others will tell you that they can't maintain their base. They can't attend to quality of life, because they have got to protect the money for training.
Do you have any picture as to which is the most likely scenario and whether or not there is any direction that OSD ought to be giving to the services?
Page 419 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. GEBICKE. No, I really can't be totally responsive to your question.
I would say that we do leave the commander quite a bit of discretion as to how to spend that money. I think that is wise for the most part. I think the commander has got to be in the best position to make the trade-offs as to where the money needs to be spent, and he—obviously, his first responsibility is to make sure that the troops are ready, that they can do what it is they are called upon. That is his principal mission.
He has also got to factor in, as you said, those tangentially related items of quality of life, because he knows that if your people are happy, if they are in, you know, housing units that have been repaired and if they have adequate day care facilities and all the other things are taken care of, he can focus more of his time on the task at hand. So it is a difficult tradeoff that has to be made every single day.
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Sisisky.
Mr. SISISKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
When you were talking about this readiness, you are talking about just combat forces?
Mr. GEBICKE. I am talking about all units.
Page 420 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. SISISKY. All units?
Mr. GEBICKE. All units in all four services.
Mr. SISISKY. All units are graded, even the school system, the training and doctrine [TRADOC] system, they are all graded as to readiness?
Mr. CARROLL. No.
Mr. GEBICKE. Go ahead.
Mr. CARROLL. No. We are only talking about the forces that have a role in one of the contingency operations, in one of the operation plans. We are not talking about ratings for the school houses under TRADOC. We are not talking about that. All of the major combat——
Mr. SISISKY. But that may play a part. I mean, you know, you can have all the troops you want, but unless the logistics takes place to move not just the troops but the supplies, too, therein lies a problem. So how do we grade that, or do we?
Mr. CARROLL. At the present time, sir, the information that deals with the capabilities of our various installations and the capability of the school system is not formally integrated with the readiness system under SORTS.
It is interesting that you should ask. The Army has a program under way called ARMS, which is the Army Readiness Measurement System. Over the next 4 years, they are attempting to develop a system that would provide them a more comprehensive base upon which to judge readiness by combining installation status reports with the TRADOC installation status reports and SORTS, which would give them a more comprehensive picture in terms of what is the current readiness, what is the state of readiness of the factors that we would need in order to train and mobilize the forces, and what is the capability of the Training and Doctrine Command to provide the additional trained people we would need.
Page 421 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
So there is movement under way to integrate these things that you have addressed; but at the present time, it is not a system that is fully operational.
Mr. SISISKY. You talk about subjective and objective. Are they rated the same as you rate things? In other words, personnel—if you use a 1 to 10, would personnel be 1 and the subjective of the training readiness would be rated 1 also?
Mr. GEBICKE. Well, that would be dependent. I mean, the personnel is an objective number.
Mr. SISISKY. That is exactly right.
Mr. GEBICKE. I mean, the training is a subjective number.
Mr. SISISKY. That is exactly right. You know——
Mr. GEBICKE. We think there could be some——
Mr. SISISKY. If you were rating from 1 to 10 or 1 to 100, would it be the same type of thing between subjective and objective?
Mr. GEBICKE. Well, you would expect that there would be some consistency between the two ratings, but that doesn't always appear to exist, if I am getting at your question.
Page 422 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. SISISKY. Yes.
Mr. GEBICKE. Do you want to elaborate?
Mr. CARROLL. I could expand upon that a little bit, sir.
If you look at the ratings that are provided in the areas of personnel, equipment and supplies, they measure what they have on hand against specific criteria. In the personnel area, for example, they would compare the number of people that are actually assigned against what is authorized by their document, their table of organization and equipment. They convert that into a percentage.
Criteria is provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that if you are at a certain percentage you rate yourself a 1. If you are at a different, lower percentage, you rate yourself at 2, and so on. For example, in the area of assigned personnel, if you are 90 percent—if you have 90 percent or higher of the people that you are authorized, you are authorized to rate yourself a P–1 in personnel.
In the training area, there are three primary indicators that a commander provides information on; and it is primarily in the Army. In the Army, they would have to provide their best estimate of the number of training days that are required to reach a C–1 level, where that unit is proficient in all of its mission-essential tasks. If it requires 14 days or less, they would rate themselves as a T–1 in training.
Page 423 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
The other factor that they would consider in training is the estimated percentage of mission-essential tasks that they have reached proficiency in. So, in both cases, the commander is applying a subjective judgment as to how many training days he is going to need to reach a fully trained status and a subjective judgment in terms of the number of mission-essential tasks he is actually proficient in.
So whereas in the personnel area you have very specific, finite numbers that you are comparing to come up with a rating of 1 to 4, in the training area you are providing a subjective assessment to, again, come up with a 1 to 4. So the range of 1 to 4 is the same in all instances. It is simply the type of information that you use to derive where you are.
Did that answer your question?
Mr. SISISKY. That may be a weakness—I said maybe. I am not sure.
Where does quality of life come in? Everyone mentions quality of life.
You know, this is an interesting thing. Of all of the hearings that we have had, that is the most consistent item that comes up in readiness. It is strange. You would not think that. You would think training and people and things like that, but not quality of life. Does it come into the readiness in any direction? I don't know.
Mr. GEBICKE. It really doesn't factor in.
Page 424 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
One of the—I was just referring to a report that we issued several years ago, and one of the factors that frequently pops up is that personnel morale should be an item that is measured, that it does have a lot of significance in terms of determining whether or not a unit is ready; and that is one of those indicators that we suggested that DOD look at very, very carefully, to see if there is some way to measure personnel morale.
Mr. SISISKY. Well, the only service that has really measured readiness and how long it takes to get back to a C–1 or a C–2 has really been the Navy. Am I correct in that? I think you mentioned it somewhere in your testimony. In other words, when they go to sea, when a carrier battle group goes out for 6 months, they know it is going to be a year and a half before they do it again, so they can build up.
Mr. GEBICKE. Exactly. What you see in the Navy readiness ratings for a ship are very cyclical. I mean, if they are deployed 6 months out of 18, you would expect during that 6-month period, unless they have difficulty with the ship at sea, that that ship would be rated C–1. Then once that ship comes back, it may be undergoing repairs or refurbishment and your crews might be disbursed; and then it probably drops and the level of readiness is maybe C–2 or C–3 and then it builds back up gradually to C–1 when it is ready to ship out again.
Mr. SISISKY. But I note that you said in your testimony that senior defense officials have stated that it is difficult to estimate the time—the amount of time required to restore a unit's combat readiness. You also go on to say 3 to 6 months. Is that valid? Because I understand it is a lot longer than that.
Page 425 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. GEBICKE. Well, you know, I don't think anybody knows for sure; and it probably depends on the unit and how much the unit has been impacted.
In the case of, like peace operations, where a combat unit is deployed to help us out in a section of the world, it really depends on, you know, where they go, how many people they take, how long they are there, whether or not they have been able to take their equipment with them so they can train, whether or not there are even facilities available for the training to take place. Once they get back, then all of those things are factored in; and, in addition, you may be losing some personnel to reassignment. So, I mean, longer than 6 months would not surprise me.
Mr. SISISKY. I imagine it is pretty hard for floating marines to drive a truck on board of a ship.
Mr. GEBICKE. Not unless he likes driving in circles.
Mr. SISISKY. Thank you very much.
Mr. BATEMAN. You mentioned—next I will go to Mr. Pickett, but you mentioned the fact that units will go to the National Training Center; Army units will go there. They will come back in a high state of readiness but almost immediately significant numbers of the personnel will be outsourced to other units, and someone else comes in who wasn't on the training exercise at the National Training Center. Is that captured immediately in terms of the status of readiness as reported for such a unit?
Page 426 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. GEBICKE. We didn't find that it typically is captured. I can't give you statistics on that.
I don't know if you can, Sid, or not.
Mr. CARROLL. We have monitored a number of rotations, brigade level rotations to the National Training Center; and almost universally—now the information I am giving you goes back a couple of years. In terms of how it is done now, I can't tell you because we haven't done any work at the National Training Center in about a year and a half or 2 years.
But at that point in time, when a unit returned from its training exercise at the NTC, there is no doubt it was the best trained that unit could possibly be because of the training environment that is provided at Fort Irwin.
We did find that a significant proportion of the leadership of every brigade was reassigned almost immediately after the NTC experience was completed but that the status of resources and training documents for those units continued to report a high level of readiness.
Mr. BATEMAN. In terms of the subjective rating of training as a factor, say a unit goes to the National Training Center and it comes back and immediately a readiness report has to be submitted by the commander, including the status of training, does the leadership at the National Training Center do any evaluations of the performance of the unit at the Training Center that affect how the unit is graded in terms of the status of its training?
Page 427 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. GEBICKE. Yes. There is a significant amount of feedback that is provided to the unit as to how they are performing. It takes place the whole time that the unit is there, and it is as constructive as it can possibly be. So, yes, that does occur.
Now, to go a little bit further, the evaluation at the National Training Center of that unit's performance does not factor into SORTS.
Mr. BATEMAN. It doesn't officially.
Mr. GEBICKE. It does not.
Mr. BATEMAN. But, presumably, it would factor into the commander's thinking as he does the evaluation.
Mr. GEBICKE. It may. But, you know, our experience has been, in watching the units that go through, that to varying degrees the units do not perform that well when they are there. In other words, they perform well—I don't want that taken out of context—but what I mean is that you have a force there that knows the facility, knows the topography of the land. They know what they are doing, and they are working cohesively there at the NTC to make that training as challenging and as difficult as possible. Mistakes are going to be made and what have you, and that is part of training, and that is why the NTC is such a great experience.
So I think all units—and the degrees probably vary, you know, have some difficulties as they work through. Now, what you would expect—and we have certainly seen this—at the time the unit leaves the NTC, they have learned a lot of valuable lessons through that experience.
Page 428 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. Well, say a unit has been to the training center and it is below the norm that other units experience while it is there. That information presumably is passed on to the unit commander. Do you see evidences that that is impacting upon how he is subjectively grading the readiness of that unit?
Mr. GEBICKE. I don't think it is factored in.
Mr. CARROLL. It is not. During the course of training exercises at the combat training centers, the National Training Center we are talking about, after each mission an after-action review is conducted to sort of provide information to the leadership in the units as to how well they did in executing the mission that was assigned.
At the end of all of the missions, the commander is provided what is called a take-home package. It is a summary of his performance against Army standards in all of the battlefield operating system areas. He can take that information with him, along with the videotapes that accompanied all the battles, take it back home, and they can actually relook at all the battles and what was accomplished.
The problem, sir, in using that information is that the unit that is depicted in that take-home package is not the same unit that is at home station when they return. So you are trying to apply lessons learned and look at how well they did some things and how badly they did other things for a unit that may be completely different.
You are looking at the cohesiveness of mechanized maneuver forces that trained, let's say, 2 weeks ago and trying to compare that with the capability of forces that are new, that weren't at the National Training Center.
Page 429 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
The flip side of that is that there is a lot of tradeoff benefits of units, people that deploy from a unit that has had the NTC experience and go to other units, because they take those lessons learned with them. But in terms of using that document, sir, as a future basis for their training rating, you are probably trying to compare apples and oranges; and I haven't seen that they use that that much.
Mr. BATEMAN. Well, let me thank Mr. Pickett for his indulgence; and I will recognize him for any questions that he might have.
Mr. PICKETT. Thank you. The more we listen, the more confused we become—which I become, I mean.
You said in your remarks that the SORTS can mask specifics, matters like skill levels of the people in the various ranks and grades. You also pointed out the human element here about whether you, in making a subjective assessment, you feel good that day or feel bad that day and the idea that many of the unit commanders are reluctant to grade their units because of their feeling of a can-do spirit. Then the point that was just made in the remarks, and that is that the SORTS information is out of date almost as soon as it is accumulated.
So where do we go from here in trying to get some accurate, reliable, timely and dependable assessment of the readiness of our forces? Who is going to do it? When should it be done? Is there some kind of separate organization that needs to be looking at this, other than the chain of command? Did you all look at that?
Page 430 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
The morale issue that Congressman Sisisky brought up is certainly a critically important factor in the success of any organization, and if that is not being measured it seems like to me you are missing—a major point is being missed.
Mr. GEBICKE. I think we have the structure in place in SORTS. In other words, I think SORTS needs to be—the system for measuring unit readiness has got to begin at the unit. There is no doubt about that.
I think the individuals at the unit are in the best position to, both objectively and subjectively, determine what their readiness is for that particular unit; and I think the timing of doing it on a monthly basis is as reasonable as anything, a monthly basis. I mean, you need to recognize that it is always going to be—one of the problems that we found and we continue to talk about is that there are some factors that, if they were built into SORTS, would give you some capability to be predictive.
And if I could just answer your question, build a little bit on the personnel, to use that as an example, I mean, we have talked about that several times. But, basically, it is just a simple ratio that is being calculated. What am I supposed to have and how many people do I have? So that you could be at the 90-percent level, which is P–1 for personnel, but you might have a number of other problems in the personnel area that are not factored into that calculation.
We had a number of indicators, I guess nine—eight total, that we suggested could be added to that one very objective rating for personnel that would shed a lot more light and give you a more comprehensive picture of what the personnel situation is.
Page 431 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
For instance, personnel deployability—how many of the people that I have in my unit right now are not deployable for one reason or another, whether they are—they have a broken ankle or they are pregnant or they have got a hardship situation at home or what have you and just can't go?
Then there are a number of other factors that we have identified as well that would then take a lot of the subjectivity that is currently—that we are seeing in the comments at the bottom that deal with personnel and would make those comments then become more objective measures within the P rating itself.
So there is an opportunity here, we believe, to take a number of the things that we are seeing in the comments; and people are very honestly and candidly writing those comments down because they concern them. I think the commanders are to be commended for that; but, at the same time, those comments they write really don't affect nor do they have any control over how their personnel are rated in terms of readiness. That is a strict mathematical calculation.
The only thing that they can do is to change the overall C rating, and to change the overall C rating is something that just isn't done that often, particularly when it is dropped, when it is decreased. If anything, it is increased.
Now, a lot of that has to do with the optimism that we have in our military and the fact that they are a good fighting force and they believe that they can overcome obstacles if they have to deploy and they will figure out work arounds and they will get it done. It is that can-do, positive, optimistic attitude that is probably coming through there.
Page 432 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. PICKETT. Is this information filed electronically with computers or is it some other way?
Mr. GEBICKE. It is, yes, and that is how we actually get it from the services. So it is computer to computer or through a tape medium, I believe.
Mr. PICKETT. So it is almost instantly available once it is determined?
Mr. GEBICKE. Within—we get it—if you are asking us how long it takes us to get it, it takes us about 30 days.
Is that correct, Sid?
Mr. CARROLL. We are about a month behind. We accumulate it on a quarterly basis. We have the services accumulate 3 months of information, and then we go pick it up.
In terms of instantly available, SORTS is a JCS system, and the overall results are reported to the JCS electronically. Now, each of the services have, in some instances, added additional indicators; but those indicators are not required to be reported to SORTS.
For most of the services, they report their SORTS readiness information directly to JCS electronically; but in the Army it goes through a series of review levels before it is transmitted to JCS. So, normally, there is a delay in time of JCS getting the Army information, where there is not a delay of time on the part of other services.
Page 433 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. PICKETT. So how much time elapses between the day that the assessment is made and the numbers are computed and the day that it gets to JCS?
Mr. CARROLL. I would say in the Army—I don't know an exact date, but I would say it would be 3 to 4 weeks.
Mr. PICKETT. And the other military departments?
Mr. CARROLL. Some of it is almost instantaneous. For example, ships that are deployed, whenever their readiness status changes, that information is electronically forwarded in for a realtime assessment.
Mr. PICKETT. I noticed in your remarks you mentioned that the Army is the only one of the military departments that has taken significant action to identify and collect data to provide a more comprehensive assessment. Is that slowing down the process of getting the data up to the upper management levels?
Mr. GEBICKE. Not to our knowledge. They are in the initial phases of a 4-year plan, and we don't find that that is a problem. It is putting more of a burden on their unit commanders to report some additional information, but the Army is convinced that this information is very important and very relevant to helping them determine not only the current state of readiness of that particular unit but also to help them predict what the readiness might be maybe 6 to 12 months out to 2 years, they even suggest, in the future.
Page 434 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. PICKETT. Well, just off the top of my head, unless this data is subject to being changed above the unit level, why would it not be simultaneously communicated both up the chain of command and to the joint services—the joint command?
Mr. GEBICKE. We haven't—we have not compared the reports as prepared at the unit and as finally reported out through the chain of command to the JCS, so I couldn't comment on whether or not there is complete consistency between what the unit reports and when it actually leaves the Department of the Army. That would be a good question for the Army witnesses this morning.
Mr. PICKETT. Mr. Chairman, if we don't get that answer, I would like to have it for the record.
Mr. BATEMAN. Yes.
Mr. PICKETT. I think that is very important, because there is a time delay in the joint command getting this information.
Mr. BATEMAN. I hope that question will be taken for the record.
[The information can be found in the appendix beginning on page 509.]
Mr. BATEMAN. And as a refinement on that question, your references to the Army data being supplied to headquarters Army before it is transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Readiness Oversight Committee, for lack of the precise term, I would be interested in knowing what happens to that data in the interim. Is it upgraded, downgraded, remain the same? And if it does remain the same, what is the reason for the delay in the reporting?
Page 435 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. GEBICKE. OK.
Mr. BATEMAN. With that, Mr. Gibbons.
Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your enlightenment.
I guess my question goes to your assessment in the comprehensiveness of your readiness study. Did you look at, in your study, a comparison of the readiness of the Guard and Reserve affiliates in these studies? Was there any comparison that you have done in terms of the readiness of those components versus readiness of active duty units?
Mr. GEBICKE. Would you like to take that?
Mr. CARROLL. We have been tracking approximately 95 units throughout the services since 1995. What we have been looking for is changes in the readiness trend that has been reported, rather than a comparison of the Reserve component units with the active component units.
What we have seen is that the readiness of the Reserve component units is normally steady, but it may be at a lower level than the active component units. But that was not the purpose of our assessment, to compare the two.
Page 436 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. GIBBONS. Well, did you see—then I know you pointed out armor in here as one of the trends with a deficiency in terms of its readiness when it goes off to a peacekeeping mission other than that which it is trained to do.
In that regard, did you see trends in other areas, similar to armor, from the utilization of components, such as Guard and Reserves that are called up, to supplement these peacekeeping missions?
Mr. GEBICKE. Units where you would—and I don't know that we had these units in our study, so I will answer hypothetically, if you don't mind.
I mean units where you would expect to see a degradation in readiness due to deployment might be in your units that are heavily used and deployed often. So units such as your military police units, your AWACS units, your heavy-airlift-type units would also be units where you would expect that when you begin to look at the SORTS reports—because not always does the whole unit actually deploy but some people, as you mentioned in your opening remarks, are left behind to do 100 percent of the work, that you would see a degradation in the capability of the unit to perform because it has lost a portion of its unit.
Mr. GIBBONS. Well, we see an increasing reliance, an increasing dependence upon Guard and Reserve units to comply or to fill in and assist with these peacekeeping operations.
I am concerned, because as I look at the Army's budget, especially with the Guard and Reserve units, I see a number of glaring errors which pertain specifically to some of their readiness problems. For example, I think the overall Guard budget on the Army side is about $743 million short of what they have asked for to maintain a readiness status, which will allow them to comply or to complete their mission alongside of their active duty counterparts.
Page 437 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
My question to you is: Due to the increased dependence on the Guard and Reserves, especially in the Army, is there any justification for the cannibalization, as I see it, by the Department of Defense to the Guard and, say, some Reserve units—at the expense, let us say, of the Guard and Reserve units for these peacekeeping missions?
In other words, let me ask—the question is: As I see it, OPSTEMPO, on a comparison level, for the active duty, is funded at 100 percent; for the Reserves, it is 56 percent; for the Guard, it is 51 percent. That is what they say they need. And yet we are sort of cannibalizing their budgets to supplement some of these peacekeeping; yet we are depending on them more and more. Can you justify that for us?
Mr. GEBICKE. I can't really respond to your observation, but I would say that, you know, what you are finding is that sometimes the units that we need most often, that deploy most frequently, are—the preponderance of those units are in the Guard and the Reserve. And those are the units that we are constantly drawing from, because they either don't exist or they don't exist to the level that we need them in the active forces. And I guess civil affairs would be one example in the special operations forces——
Mr. CARROLL. That is right.
Mr. GEBICKE [continuing]. That are heavy deployers.
Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Page 438 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gibbons.
Mr. Underwood.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was very interested in your testimony in talking about the disconnect, and you offered some possibilities for disconnect I guess between a subjective and an objective criteria. I want to get closer and see if you could give me kind of a summary or a summation of whether you think one way of looking at that is that they are disconnected from each other and how do you hook them up, or another way of looking at it is that somewhere out there there is a true picture of readiness in which the subjective criteria is maybe less disconnected from that and the objective criteria is more disconnected from that.
So if we are trying to gain a true picture of readiness and there is a disconnect, where is the disconnect? Is the objective criteria more disconnected from that, the subjective criteria more disconnected from that? Or are you just talking about the relationship of the two levels of criteria?
And, in answering that, could you also give us a sense of what you think the role of subjective criteria is in—the role of subjective assessments is in the process? What relative role should it play?
It has to play a role somewhere in there. Yet I get—the nature of your discussion seems to suggest that it is somehow divorced from the reality of a true readiness picture.
Page 439 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. GEBICKE. It is clear to us that subjectivity has got to play a very, very important role in any ratings system that is used.
What we would like to see happen is we would like to see the system designed in such a way that there is less subjectivity and a lot more objectivity in each one of the components that comprise the SORTS system. But we do believe that the commander, as I have stated before, is closest to the unit and probably is in the best position to really determine what the overall level of readiness is for that unit, whether he decides to upgrade or to downgrade the overall C rating.
But to use personnel again, I mean, that is an area where we think there are a number of additional indicators that could be objectively measured that would, quite frankly, eliminate the need for the commander to write those types of comments in a narrative, because they are already factored in to the objectively derived P rating.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. Well, if you are arguing for more objective criteria, how do you validate these criteria? You know, I mean we could argue that we should have more and more objective criteria that somehow feed into a data system which will create a summative assessment, but how do we validate that?
Mr. GEBICKE. Well, what we did in terms of attempting to validate is we went out to a number of units and we asked some very basic questions. We said, what indicators do you think are important to providing for a comprehensive measurement system?
Page 440 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. UNDERWOOD. You asked for a subjective assessment of that?
Mr. GEBICKE. We asked for their views of objective measures; and we asked for whether or not those measures, in their view, also had predictive capabilities. We got—as you can imagine when you go out and ask people that question, we got 600 indicators; and we were then able to boil those indicators down to 26 or so.
Then we went back to the same commands, and we said, OK, here is the consensus of what we have heard. Now help us determine what you believe are—of these 26, are the indicators that have a predictive capability.
In our report, we lay out a number of indicators, a handful, that they indicated in at least half the commands that they thought had a predictive capability.
So I think there is—and what we need to keep in mind, too, is that many of these units are keeping additional indicators anyway. Because these are indicators that maybe the command feels are very important to track, but these are not indicators that are required as part of the SORTS submission.
So when we went to them and they were able to pull out a sheet of paper and said, well, we tracked for this, this, this and this, and we think this is more important and this is less important, then we were able to proceed in that way.
But let me give you like a real-life example, and I will disguise this a little bit because if I got into specifics it could be classified, and I don't want to do that.
Page 441 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
But let's suppose that there is a unit and in the narrative comment you read something like this: We have a serious degradation of readiness because of personnel shortfalls. I am very short of people. In addition, I have got serious shortfalls in my critical military occupation specialities, critical. I have got funding shortfalls which I need in order to better train and to fully train my unit.
Now, the P rating for that unit came out at a 2 level, again only because the percentage was such that it was dictated objectively. The training level was assessed at a 2, reasonable. Do you know what the overall rating was by that commander? A 1. I don't know why.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. Well, it seems to me that that still begs the question of trying to figure out where—what the role of subjective criteria is.
You know, you use a term that I find very interesting because the only comparison I can make is to educational assessment. On the one hand, you talk about assessing, and it implies that you are assessing previous performance. Yet readiness must be a predictive enterprise, is it not? Isn't the whole idea of readiness not to assess previous performance but to suggest that you are assessing the predictability of a unit in combat or a unit in performing its mission?
So what is—how do you get at the predictive nature? How do you validate that?
Mr. GEBICKE. Any ideas?
Page 442 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. HOLMAN. In some respects, I think you do it at times with hindsight.
One of the interesting things we see when we look at readiness data, you will frequently see commander's comments—they will say—as Mr. Gebicke indicated, they will talk about readiness being difficult to attain because of training problems in personnel. And then it will say, if these problems continue we will have, you know, a lower readiness rating.
Well, those problems are already there, but for some reason—and you used education—maybe it is grade inflation, I am not sure. But for some reason they are continuing to rate them high while they are predicting themselves in the future it should be lower, but then you don't see the lower.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. But, you know, in education what they do is they try to sort out, perhaps not with a great deal of success, but they try to sort out tests which predict success as different from those tests which assess what you have learned. And I submit that the way it is being described, it is all kind of fuzzy in my mind, because what you do institutionally—and issues have also been brought up about morale, which is kind of an organizational health measure, which also may affect it, but I don't know how it affects that. I don't know if you could devise a formula for doing that.
And in any event, if you devised a formula for doing that, how would you assess the predictive nature of that and how would you validate that?
Page 443 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
I think it is inevitable that we have to articulate a—perhaps maybe there has to be more effort devoted into getting unit commanders to assess on a more accurate basis, and I think we can't really get away from that. I always tend to resist the idea that you could quantify something and then issue a summative assessment, especially when there seems to be—the biggest disconnect here is between using a measurement to predict success versus using a measurement that assesses previous performance. Because those two things are somehow connected, but they are not perfectly connected. And I think most people who do testing and evaluation will point that out.
Mr. CARROLL. If I could, Mr. Underwood, I would like to elaborate with an example that ties your question together with a question that Mr. Sisisky asked earlier.
Let's take the training area of readiness measurement, for example. For the most part, as SORTS exists now, it is a subjective assessment on the part of the commander. Suppose we could develop a predictive indicator that would take some of that subjectivity out? And you can.
I don't think that you would find many people inside or outside the military that would disagree with the statement that units and leaders are trained better after a National Training Center experience than they were before. So perhaps one of the predictive indicators that should be included in SORTS, that would provide some more objective measurement, future objective measurement of training, is the percent of personnel assigned to the unit that have had a National Training Center experience. And you could establish criteria that say if 50 percent of the NCO's have had NTC experience or joint readiness training experience, then you should rate yourself in training as C–1.
Page 444 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. If I may, I would like to break in at this point because we are running short on time and we need to give Mr. McKeon an opportunity to ask some questions.
I want to make it clear to all of the members that any questions they would like to submit for the record will be very much welcome, and if you will submit them to staff we will see that they get to the witnesses.
Mr. McKeon.
Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have just one short question.
Both the White House and the Pentagon leadership are on record as saying we are as ready now as we have ever been. Is this the picture you get from your reviews of readiness reports and indicator data?
Mr. GEBICKE. Yes, it is very consistent with what we have seen and know about the threats that are out there. It is interesting that you ask that, because I know the Pentagon right now, and others, are struggling with the annual review that is taking place and, you know, that might influence what we are ready to actually do in the future. Right now, it is to fight two major regional contingencies; and depending on what comes out of that study and what the Congress agrees should be the initiatives that our forces are designed to counter, you know, we will just have to see. But, yes, we would concur with that statement.
Page 445 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. MCKEON. Well, then maybe comments I have heard people make that we couldn't go back and do a Desert Storm right now, how does that jibe? Is that just incorrect, just people talking?
Mr. GEBICKE. I think so.
Mr. MCKEON. So in your opinion we could go back and have a Desert Storm right now with our forces, the same as we did then?
Mr. GEBICKE. I think so.
Mr. MCKEON. Thank you.
Mr. BATEMAN. Well, because of the time, we are going to have to preclude further questioning at this point. But I would like to make one last request of the witnesses.
You have been monitoring readiness over a period of time and in the process you have come up with certain specific recommendations as to how you could improve upon the readiness rating system. This document may already exist, but we would like to have the specific recommendations made, those on which the Department of Defense has taken affirmative action, those which it has under evaluation and any of those which they have rejected.
Mr. GEBICKE. Be glad to do that, Mr. Chairman.
Page 446 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. We thank you very much.
Mr. GEBICKE. Thank you.
Mr. BATEMAN. We next turn to our second panel, consisting of Mr. Louis C. Finch, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness; and Brig. Gen. Stephen B. Plummer, U.S. Air Force Deputy Director, Current Readiness and Capabilities, Joint Chiefs of Staff, J–38.
Welcome. We appreciate your being with us here today.
Mr. Finch, you may approach.
Mr. FINCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Sisisky and other members of the subcommittee, as well as others, particularly my colleague, Steve Plummer from the Joint Staff, as well as the various service witnesses that will follow. It is good to be, in part, personally back here again—it brings back many fond memories of the time we spent together on the committee. We appreciate your having invited us up.
Mr. BATEMAN. We are pleased to have you back.
STATEMENT OF LOUIS C. FINCH, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (READINESS), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Page 447 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. FINCH. In terms of our remarks today what I would like to do is briefly read through my comments here and perhaps reflect briefly on a couple of the points that were made in the earlier discussions.
I would note that your subcommittee is an especially important forum for readiness and that we really appreciate your supports and efforts, and I will also admit, you know, bringing some very important issues to our attention as well as the Department.
We indeed share the subcommittee's commitment to readiness. As Secretary Cohen recently said, ''Having highly ready forces that can go anywhere, at any time, really spells the difference between victory and defeat.''
And it also spells the difference between being a superpower, as opposed to not being one. And today, I think perhaps even as suggested by our GAO colleagues and others, today America's forces are ready.
We prove this readiness every day in meeting numerous challenges throughout the world. And perhaps, reflecting on Mr. Underwood's comment about, ''How do you validate readiness?'' to me, the ultimate validation is how it is that we perform day to day in the various tasks that we undertake. While occasionally there will be—you will have a problem that surfaces here and there, I think we would all agree that the performance has really been excellent.
In fact, perhaps I could draw upon the words of our Chairman, Gen. John Shalikashvili, who said that, you know, ''We are considerably smaller today than we were in the cold war, but pound for pound we are as ready today as we have ever been, and I don't think that anyone can quibble with me about the readiness of the force today.''
Page 448 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
And indeed I personally cannot. Keeping the forces ready is a goal above public dispute, and it is one that certainly this subcommittee and the Department of Defense and others are dedicated to continue to uphold.
We are here today to discuss with you how it is that we in the Department assess readiness, and at least in my introductory remarks, I wondered if I might cover three general areas. First of all is the major transformations that have occurred over the last 2 or 3 years and how it is that the Department assesses readiness; second are some of our readiness assessment tools; and finally, some of the improvements that we have under way and how it is that we assess readiness.
To begin with, you know, how the Department assesses readiness has changed really quite remarkably, and much for the better over the last 2 years. I think, as in the discussions prior, as well as some of the points that we will make here, we have yet to reach perfection. I think we can all agree with that, but at least in terms of where we are coming from, a very big change.
You may recall, for example, that in late 1994 we had several readiness concerns that had surfaced and were triggered primarily because of some of the cash-flow problems that we had associated with contingency operations. And these concerns have been a matter of focused attention both for the Department and the subcommittee, and among other things, they provided a very useful wake-up call for us in the Department that triggered several initiatives to improve how it is that we stay on top of readiness and how we assess it. And if you would permit me, maybe I can run through at least a few of these major changes.
Page 449 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
First and foremost, we have the focused attention of the Senior Readiness Oversight Council, known in our jargon as the SROC, and it is really very, very highly committed to looking at current readiness. The SROC is a body that is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, John White; it has membership of all the senior leaders in the Department that have any significant responsibilities with respect to readiness. This includes the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the service chiefs, all of the Under Secretaries in OSD and the Military Departments.
Each month, the SROC meets to consider in depth some aspect of current readiness. Its agenda runs in a 3-month cycle. The first month includes briefings on joint readiness by the Vice Chairman, and the services—service chiefs also provide briefings on service readiness. It covers assessment of the current as well as 12-month projected readiness and considers whether our forces are ready to carry out their operations in a variety of scenarios of interest.
For example, we have recently considered readiness for major regional conflicts starting from our current posture of engagement in Bosnia, as well as looking at the effects preparedness for antiterrorist measures might have on our overall readiness.
The second month covers readiness topics of special interest. And I might depart slightly by saying that I note that one of the examples of the usefulness of the SROC and its interaction with this subcommittee is reflecting upon the hearings that you all conducted last week, that there were several important questions that arose; and I would expect that at the next SROC meeting, at the direction of Dr. White, those issues will be up on our screen and we will come up with some very good, forthcoming discussions on how to address them.
Page 450 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
For the third month, the vice chairman presents an assessment of all of the various readiness deficiencies that have surfaced over a period of time and, where appropriate, lays out courses of action on how it is that we might solve these problems.
The net effect of the SROC activities is to ensure that those with responsibility for readiness have a forum to raise problems and propose solutions directly to senior members of the Department.
The second innovation is the Chairman's creation of a responsive infrastructure for readiness assessments that culminates in the Joint Monthly Readiness Review, something that affectionately is known as the JMRR. It is the Joint Monthly Readiness Review that provides the bulk of information that is presented to the SROC. My colleague, General Plummer, can provide some more details on that, but I, however, find that this process is particularly significant, providing an unprecedented direct line of communication on readiness between our joint commanders in the field, the CINC's, and the Department's senior leadership.
A third area of innovation is reflected by the improvements each of the services have made in their own readiness assessments. My teammates sitting behind me will give you, I am sure, some more details on this, but as a continuing consumer of their assessments, I find their approaches are giving us a much better understanding of readiness of our forces than we have had in the past.
A fourth and final innovation that I would like to cover is the quarterly readiness report to Congress, and I would note that this subcommittee, in promoting its inclusion in law, should take full credit for this initiative. And as a result, every 3 months, as you know, we summarize and bring forth to you the readiness assessments developed through the Joint Monthly Readiness Review, through the—and presented through the SROC. Beyond assisting you in your oversight and legislative responsibilities, I believe this report is an excellent means to promote legislative and executive branch collaboration in meeting the challenges we face.
Page 451 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Now, in terms of future improvement of readiness assessments, and our innovations today notwithstanding, readiness assessments do indeed need further improvement. I think we can all agree with that. And if you would, please permit me to cover at least two of the many initiatives that we have under way.
First, the readiness assessment that we have today, as exemplified by our SORTS system, is designed, set up and measures largely inputs. And as you know, the system, covers levels of personnel, equipment, supplies, training, and resources available to each of our units.
Now, this information is useful if you are trying to compare resource levels of the past with the inputs of those of today. It does not, however, tell us really whether a unit has too few or even, in some cases, too many resources to produce the output we need. It does not tell us whether a unit can transform in time available from its current status to a state where it is fully prepared to carry out its mission.
Moreover, it does not tell us much about the health of the pipelines that feed the resources to the unit and its effects on the ability to transform that unit from a peacetime state to war. And particularly knowing the interests of this subcommittee on the health of our depots, as an example, this is a particularly relevant point.
As part of our work in the Quadrennial Defense Review, we have been working on a proposal to make improvements in our readiness assessment system. There is now a general consensus in the Department of what needs to be done. We intend to put forth a plan over the next several months to be able to carry out those necessary changes.
Page 452 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
A second area where, I believe, we need improvement involves the high rate at which some of our people deploy away from home station in the conduct of day-to-day operations, the so-called PERSTEMPO concern. If I personally would pick one area where I think, you know, we probably have it less than right, that involves the PERSTEMPO question.
At any given time we have perhaps 20,000 to 70,000 people that are out there engaged in a variety of activities. The good news is that out of a force of a million and a half active duty personnel, as well as nearly a million reservists, it would seem as though in terms of this burden overall that it is something that we should be able to shoulder. However, we do occasionally run into problems, and I think that more than anything else it is as much a matter of distribution of the load rather than the total load. And one of the things that we need to do is to consider very carefully, do we have the distribution of this load right?
In addressing this question, we have made some good progress. First, we are starting to measure PERSTEMPO more completely across all of the services. Until perhaps a year ago or so, there were some of the services, particularly our maritime services, that did a very consistent job of it, but we are now in a position where we are measuring it consistently across the force. And you know, before you can begin to uncover problems that need solutions, you first need to be able to measure whether or not you have problems. And so the first good news is that we are doing a lot better job at being able to do that.
The second is, at the initiative of the Chairman, the Secretary last summer put in place something called the global military force policy. Again, my colleague, General Plummer, can give you some more details on this, but I believe this policy is going to have an effective way over time of regulating PERSTEMPO.
Page 453 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Basically what it does is it covers for the units that are affected most, what we call high demand-low density units, ones that are used a lot but relatively small in numbers. It sets thresholds which say, you know, in normal times you shouldn't go above this certain level of activity or PERSTEMPO.
If the thresholds are violated, then we go through a special decisionmaking process to make sure that the demands on these units are, no kidding, very, very important before we go ahead and decide to violate those PERSTEMPO norms. We are just beginning to go into the implementation phase of this, but I would expect over time that things will hopefully be better as a result of this policy.
Beyond this, we need to assess whether the readiness posture—and even our force structure, for that matter—is right in order to be able to keep forces within reasonable PERSTEMPO grounds.
Much of the work of the QDR, I believe, will be directed at this question. We will be looking at alternatives to our current way of doing business to see if we can discover better, affordable approaches that ensure that we do not overburden our men and women in uniform.
In conclusion, let me close by thanking you for this opportunity to speak to the subcommittee and to reemphasize that keeping our forces ready to fight is collectively the administration's, the Congress' and the public's first priority. We face many challenges in meeting this objective, but I am confident that we will succeed, given the full commitment and the creativity and cooperation from the subcommittee and the organizations represented by those who will be joining me today from the Department of Defense.
Page 454 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
With that in mind, maybe I could also turn the—yield to my friendly colleague, Brig. Gen. Steve Plummer, to offer his introductory perspectives from the Joint Staff.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Finch can be found in the appendix on page 510.]
Mr. BATEMAN. I welcome your remarks, General.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. STEPHEN B. PLUMMER, USAF, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CURRENT READINESS AND CAPABILITIES, JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF (J–38)
General PLUMMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, for inviting me here today. I am pleased to have the opportunity to discuss military readiness from a joint perspective.
Traditionally, the Department of Defense viewed readiness from a unit perspective, that is, the readiness of individual battalions and squadrons and ships to do their designed missions. Today, we have a broader perspective. In addition to unit readiness reports, the Chairman's readiness system relies on inputs from the commanders of the unified commands and the directors of the Department of Defense combat support agencies. This joint readiness perspective focuses on the ability of the CINC's to integrate and synchronize the battalions and squadrons and ships into an effective ready-to-execute force assigned mission.
Page 455 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
The central component of the Chairman's readiness system is, as Mr. Finch said, the joint monthly readiness review, or the JMRR. This report incorporates from the services—reports from the services, the CINC's and the combat support agencies. The JMRR provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a current and broad assessment of the military's readiness to execute the full range of the national military strategy, including peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention and winning our Nation's wars.
In the JMRR process, unit readiness is reported by the services in accordance with their title 10 responsibility. Joint readiness is assessed and reported by the unified commanders. Depth is added through assessments from combat support agencies. Although based on objective measures, these readiness assessments are, by design, subjective. Metrics alone do not define readiness. They are assessment tools used by commanders who are responsible for assessing and maintaining current readiness.
JMRR reports are based on three criteria: a current assessment, a 12-month projection and a war-fighting scenario. The scenario is specified to ensure a robust assessment of the most demanding missions. As the process has evolved over the past 2 years, we have varied the scenarios to cover the full range of the national military strategy from two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies to lesser contingencies on the scale of a Bosnia peacekeeping operation, to a look at readiness to respond to and combat terrorism on a global scale. In fact, the Bosnia scenario was assessed twice, before the actual deployment began, to ensure that we had visibility on the full range of readiness issues involved in just such an operation.
The JMRR process, like the SROC, runs on a 3-month cycle. In the first month, full reports are received from the services, the CINC's and the combat support agencies. The second month is used to analyze issues raised in these reports. During the third month, functional experts provide feedback on what is being done to address any deficiencies as a result of the first 2 months.
Page 456 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
It is important to note that the process focuses on identifying near-term readiness deficiencies, on finding and implementing near-term solutions or on articulating risk if the deficiency cannot be resolved in the near term. For example, a shortage of combat skills training for units deployed to Bosnia led to the development of training ranges in Hungary. However, many deficiencies can be only addressed through programmatic action. For example, shortages in mobility and communications, these are addressed through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, or the JROC process, supported by the joint warfighting capabilities assessments, the JWCA's. The JROC has emerged as a principal forum in which senior military leaders, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Vice Service Chiefs address requirements from a joint perspective. Just as the JMRR fills the need for a recurring analysis of current readiness and near-term readiness projection, the JWCA's, under the purview of the JROC, includes a systematic analysis of the capabilities and requirements for future forces.
The JMRR process provides readiness information to senior decisionmakers and the Senior Readiness Oversight Council, DOD's principal readiness forum. The SROC brings together both civilian and military leadership for review and assessment of significant readiness topics. And finally, the quarterly readiness report to Congress is founded on the material that is discussed in the SROC.
Readiness assessments for the SROC and other forums are based on a variety of inputs. The primary automated system used to gain visibility on the status of units is the status of resources in training system, or SORTS, which has been the subject of great discussion over the past hour. SORTS is the single automated reporting system within the Department of Defense that functions as the central registry of all operational units. We recognize that SORTS, as an automated system, must be improved to meet our needs, especially in the current ''information age.'' For this reason, the Department of Defense has designed a comprehensive plan to enhance SORTS. The first component of this plan includes technical fixes to ensure the information reported by a unit commander enters the central database in a timely and accurate manner. The second component includes a rewriting of reporting policy to ensure the system remains relevant and responsive to the CINC's. For example, we are focusing a renewed emphasis now on reporting of deployed units to get a better picture of their ability to execute their wartime mission, as well as their deployed mission.
Page 457 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
A third component includes enhancing the system with advanced information management tools to ensure users can extract the proper information and present it to the decisionmakers inside the decisionmaking cycle. Execution of this plan began 2 years ago and will continue for approximately 32 more months. Upon completion, SORTS will be a more efficient and reliable tool for monitoring unit status.
I would now like to take a moment and describe the current readiness picture for you. As you will hear from our service colleagues, unit readiness remains strong. However, as we have reported in the quarterly readiness report to Congress, the current pace of operations has resulted in some short-term readiness degradations. We monitor these cases very closely and have implemented a policy, the global military force policy, to better manage operating tempo impacts. The high operating tempo can place heavy demands on our people and accelerate wear and tear on our equipment. These impacts are particularly evident in those units and skilled people that are in short supply but are always in demand and are most likely to be used in peacetime operations. We call these high demand-low density systems, or HD/LD systems. The global military force policy provides guidelines on how to manage these valuable assets by setting standards for employment and providing a process to deal with excessive demand. As a result of this policy, we have reduced day-to-day tasking for some systems, such as the U–2, and highlighted other systems that require management attention. Providing a manageable deployment schedule for our people is a top priority.
From a joint perspective, we continue to keep close track on those capabilities that enable a theater commander to integrate and synchronize forces. Capabilities such as mobility, intelligence and logistics systems are assessed very closely in the JMRR to ensure that we are ready to execute the full range of the strategy.
Page 458 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
We continue to work readiness issues as they occur. The bottom line is that today's force is ready to execute the full range of the strategy. A more complete assessment is provided in the classified appendix to the quarterly readiness report to Congress, which I believe you have.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks, and I welcome your questions.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, General.
The report to Congress that comes to us from the JROC, that is done quarterly?
Mr. FINCH. Yes; that is correct.
Mr. BATEMAN. So I assume we will have another one in something like an April 1 time frame for the first quarter of 1997?
Mr. FINCH. That is right.
General PLUMMER. Yes.
Mr. FINCH. Yes; and I think we were to make that time frame.
Page 459 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. You mentioned PERSTEMPO, that you were making an effort to measure and to have some predictability as to the consequences of the personnel operational tempo. I was gratified to hear you say that this has some implications for how you are going about the quadrennial review.
In that context, I view with some alarm the press accounts that the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were being tasked to do some rather draconian things that even spoke in terms of the possibility of eliminating two divisions from the Army.
Nothing I have heard about the personnel operations tempo would seem to me to be consistent with that kind of a further drawdown of the force, unless you are going to very seriously change the number and nature of the missions the remaining force is called upon to conduct.
Do you have any observations on that?
Mr. FINCH. I think we are certainly not here in a position to talk directly about some of the internal discussions in the QDR. But I think I can fairly characterize one major change that has occurred.
As many of you know, one of my duties in a prior life was to be deeply involved in the Bottom-Up Review, and while I will defend much of that as being a very good, useful exercise, I will also admit that one of the things that we did not get right was the relationship between balancing the force to meet the needs of major warfighting from our major regional conflict strategy versus balancing the force to meet the day-to-day continuing level of activities that are going on. And I can assure you that in terms of, certainly the focus of the attention in the internal deliberations, that it is much, much more focused on the balance between these two sources of demand.
Page 460 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Recalling back again to the Bottom-Up Review, I can remember never the question of, you know, do we have enough force to meet reasonable PERSTEMPO guidelines? I can never recall the question even being raised, much less addressed. And I think Steve and I can attest that this is something that we are giving a great deal of attention and time to; and, you know, without getting into the details of what may come out of this, I am quite confident that the question will be addressed in a major way.
Mr. BATEMAN. In our field hearings and some of our visits with units, we hear that there are numerous instances where a unit, in order to—an aviation unit, in order to deploy, is having to cannibalize planes, that a squadron that is authorized for 12 planes may have only 6 planes that are operational and only 4 of the 6 may be at the state of readiness for combat operations.
Are you picking up those kinds of things in the evaluations that are coming through the system?
Mr. FINCH. Yes. Generally, those types of issues and questions and concerns do come forward. I think it is also useful, however, to think about them in context, and I think that it also reflects back to some of the points made by our earlier witnesses.
In terms of looking at a unit, determining whether it is ready to go out and do its job, units typically have some status in peacetime. They have a certain number of assets that are there today, and indeed our SORTS system is really designed to measure those assets there today.
Page 461 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
It is also true that many of our units are not expected to go out the door instantly, that there is some period of transformation where they go from where they are today to build up to a higher state of readiness before they deploy.
And what is often the case is that you will have a unit in the example that you cited where you will have shortness in supply, shortness in people, just in order to be able to cope with day-to-day operations which if that unit had to go out the door today, then it would be a serious readiness concern, but if that unit has, you know, 30 days or 60 days to change its status, to bring in more supplies, to bring in more people, to train up, to refurbish itself to get ready, then that may not be a readiness problem. And so in our system, we do have means through SORTS and other means to be able to detect problems of that nature.
In terms of their seriousness and significance, however, you have to look at it in terms of, you know, what is the job of that unit, how long does it have to take to go out? And in many cases, you will find it seems—things that seem to be a shortage at the unit level, the commander says, oh my gosh, I don't have all that I need, but when you look at it in terms of assets that could be brought into that unit to make it more ready, then it is less of a problem.
Steve, do you have something?
General PLUMMER. I can't speak, of course, to the specific incident of 4 aircraft missions ready out of, I think you said, a total of 12, but I can speak overall generally to the issue of cannibalization of parts; and that is a fairly common maintenance practice. It is a way to provide flexibility in the system and, generally speaking, most units will cannibalize parts occasionally to get an aircraft or another piece of equipment up, mission ready when it needs to be mission ready.
Page 462 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. So you don't have any concerns about the necessity for cannibalization in order to keep things flying?
General PLUMMER. Well, I would not—I would not say that I have no concerns about it. Obviously, having been a commander in the field, I can tell you that if there were any other way to get an aircraft ready to fly, short of cannibalization, we would have done that first.
Mr. BATEMAN. Yes.
General PLUMMER. But it does happen occasionally.
Mr. BATEMAN. I guess it would be fair to say you don't program cannibalization.
General PLUMMER. That is correct.
Mr. BATEMAN. But it has to occur, or it does occur, we would hope not frequently, but we got the impression that there are certainly some significant incidents of it.
I take the point that all units, 100 percent, are not going to be 100 percent at the peak of readiness all the time. But we hear too many stories of units, especially if you are talking to senior noncommissioned officers, who point to serious deficiencies in junior-level NCO's who have just been promoted to a position, but who are substantially lacking in the skills, the experience, the confidence to do their jobs, particularly technical jobs, especially in maintenance areas.
Page 463 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Is that being reflected in the readiness reports that units are submitting?
Mr. FINCH. I am sure that the point you raise is particularly important with respect to the Army, and I am sure that my colleague, General Grange, will give you some details on it. But I think that perhaps that is an outstanding example of the current reporting system working very well; that I personally receive every month from the Army their monthly readiness report that goes to the chief, and it goes through sometimes, frankly, in mind-numbing detail, unit by unit, what is going on in each of the units.
And the NCO shortage has been visible. It has been reported monthly by the commanders, and it is the type of thing that the Army has recognized the problem. You know, once you have a problem like that, there is no magic switch that you can instantly gain experience and train people to be able to fill in the gaps. But it is certainly one that, you know, A, came up through the reporting system; and, B, one that the Army, recognizing it through that, has gotten on top of it and taken some important measures to be able to correct the problem.
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Sisisky.
Mr. SISISKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Do both of you go to the SROC meetings?
Mr. FINCH. That is correct.
Page 464 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General PLUMMER. Yes, sir.
Mr. SISISKY. I wonder if you would ask a question, and maybe you know it already. I believe—and you have heard the witnesses before and I hear from everybody that we are as ready as we have ever been. What we hear is that in 18 months, we are not, and that is what this committee is very concerned about.
Would you ask the question, are we going to be as ready 18 months from now?
I associate myself with the chairman's remarks about the QDR, and I am particularly, Mr. Finch, concerned by what you said. And this is what really bothers me: As part of our work in the Quadrennial Defense Review, we work on a proposal to make improvements in our readiness assessment system. Fine.
Then you say a second area involves the high rate at which some of our people deploy away from home stations, and then you say, at any given time we have 20,000 to 70,000 people in uniform engaged in these activities.
I don't believe that is correct, and I am worried if they are getting that figure—I mean, I know the Army has got 33,000 people. I look at this right here where the Army is deployed—you know, that is not counting the Navy and that is not counting the Air Force forward deployed, and that is not even counting the 100,000 people we have in Europe that you might say the families are with them in Europe, no, they are not. They haven't been in Bosnia.
Page 465 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
So I want to be sure that the SROC uses the right figures because, if not, and they are feeding things to the QDR, then we are really going to be in serious, serious trouble, in my opinion. That doesn't mean I am right, but I would rather err really on the side of caution.
As I said, I associate myself with the chairman's remarks. When they talk about two divisions cut in the Army, some more wings in the Air Force and, of course, two carrier battle groups out, these are draconian issues which really affect the tempo of our people. We have to keep people at sea more and we have to keep Air Force overseas longer than we should. So I would hope that the SROC is getting the information.
And I know you have told me that the hearing that we had at Langley would be a topic of conversation. And I believe and I hope you do, I hope you do, and listen to the people out in the field. And I am not talking about just the people that command the XVIII Corps and the Air Force people, but I am talking about the senior and not-so-senior NCO's and, of course, dependent wives.
One of the questions, as you know, Senator McCain is talking about tiered readiness over on the Senate side. Is that happening, de facto, in any way, already happening, in your opinion?
Mr. FINCH. One has to be a bit precise in terms of what you mean by tiered readiness. If you mean it in kind of a general sense of anything less than keeping all of our units at the highest levels of readiness, tiered readiness, in that sense, yes, we do.
Page 466 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
I mean, if you look at, for example, our maritime services, in the Navy and the Marine Corps, as you know, given their forward deployment schedule, at any given time perhaps a third of the force is out forward deployed; there is a third of the force that is building up readiness to be prepared to deploy; and then there is a third of the force that is standing down and recuperating and restructuring. And so certainly, with those two services as an example, we tier for readiness today.
In the Army, they have a concept of force packages where you have some forces that are ready to go very early and some, perhaps more than anything else, driven by lift constraints, or don't need to be ready to go until later on, that—and there is some differential in resourcing among these forces.
I might add that it is not so much in the training area, that—any force in the various force packages in the Army, they try to keep the training fairly uniform, but, for example, in terms of a rate at which you fill in personnel for the ones that are designed to go out the door very early, they have very high fill rates and it tends to be a little bit less appropriately for some of the later deploying units.
So in that sense, yes, today, in a variety of ways we tier readiness. I think the question perhaps Senator McCain poses is, you know, can we do some more? And again one of the aspects of readiness that we are looking at in the QDR is to address that question. There is a proposition he puts on the table that if you can lower readiness in various tiering schemes that perhaps you can save a substantial amount of money and that sort of thing. I am not prepared here today to comment on exactly how that comes out, but at least in terms of addressing the question, it is a question that is on the table that we are looking at.
Page 467 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. SISISKY. I am going to come back to the SROC because I think that is where the important things are.
Now, you know, you heard us talk about quality of life. People are worried—health care in itself, I mean, we have cut so much out of health care that people in the service now—not retirees; that is another story—are very concerned about health care, very concerned about commissaries, beautiful things up there that you can cut out. That is not what we promised the people. All these affect morale, but there are other things happening, and that is why I said, please ask the question of 18 months.
I just read a story—I was going to ask the Army about this—about the number of AWOL's today in the Army, just in training camps, an unbelievable amount of people. The Army Chief of Staff, they are having recruiting problems now. They are going to spend a lot more money to recruit. These are all signs that somewhere along the line we are going to drop in readiness. And I will tell you, if you drop two more divisions in the Army, you are going to really know what a drop in readiness is, in my opinion.
I just think it is—if that QDR, you know, Mr. Chairman, I raised it in the conference, that it may not be the best thing in the world because of the politics of defense, but I am telling you if that thing is budget driven, which I think it may be, we are going to be in serious trouble in this country, in my opinion.
Thank you.
Page 468 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you.
Congressman Pickett.
Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Plummer, in your statement, you mention that you are talking about the variety of inputs on page 4 and you said, the primary automated system used to gain visibility on the status of units is the status of resources and training systems, or SORTS.
Now, is that system automated in the sense that the reports come in electronically from the field, directly to your staff?
General PLUMMER. That is correct. They do.
Mr. PICKETT. And how long does—how long is the period of time between the date that the data is developed and the date that it is in your hands, in your office?
General PLUMMER. It depends on the service that is actually providing the data right now. The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force—correction—the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps data is received very quickly, sometimes in as little as 24 hours. The Army data takes a little bit longer. That has been previously discussed.
What I would like to add to that discussion is the fact that we are working with the Army and we have consensus on a—way ahead such that the Army data, when it is transmitted, will also be received in a similar time as the other services. So that is being worked, and there is progress being made on that issue.
Page 469 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. PICKETT. The meetings that you speak of here with the SROC, how soon after the receipt of the data do you have your meetings to review and analyze and evaluate the data?
General PLUMMER. We time—we schedule the SROC meetings to occur after the JMRR meetings, within a week or 10 days, so that the data is still current and we have had an opportunity to properly staff the data and make sure that everyone is aware, and prepare the right briefings for the Deputy Secretary.
Mr. FINCH. If I might add, too, beyond the formal reporting process, Steve and his colleagues conduct a video conference involving 200 people or so, literally all over the world, to be able to discuss and negotiate and figure out exactly what is going on. In terms of getting quite timely current information from all of our CINC's and others, it is a very impressive process.
Mr. PICKETT. General Plummer, when you get the information from the field, do you have established mathematical or numerical criteria to extrapolate into the future, or do you just take the data and then mentally adjust and project that into the future?
General PLUMMER. Are you referring to SORTS data?
Mr. PICKETT. Yes.
General PLUMMER. OK. We take the SORTS data exactly as it is provided to us from the services. We do not try to second-guess what the commander of a unit says to us about the readiness of his unit. We report the readiness of his unit forward the way that he reports it to us.
Page 470 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. PICKETT. Do you see that as a weakness in the system?
General PLUMMER. I actually see that as a strength in the system. There has been a lot of comment today made about objective versus subjective and the fact that we do need some subjective criteria in the reporting system. I know of no other person in the chain that you can go to and get a subjective call better than the commander of the unit, the person who actually eats and sleeps and lives with the troops and is responsible for the accomplishment of that unit's mission.
Mr. PICKETT. Let's go back to where we were about extrapolation and how you project this into the future to satisfy yourself that—and we have commented up here—that in 6 months and 12 months and 18 months from now this unit is going to be able to perform its functions.
General PLUMMER. We do. In fact, the services—we asked the services to tell us during the JMRR what their current readiness status is, as well as project into the future 12 months and tell us what their status will be in 12 months, based upon everything that the service has visibility over and the summation of all of the reports that come up from the various commanders throughout the service chain.
Mr. FINCH. I wonder if I might comment on that as well.
Mr. PICKETT. May I follow up on this first?
Page 471 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
You say you project out for 12 months; not 18 months, but 12 months.
General PLUMMER. The services do for 12 months, that is correct.
Mr. PICKETT. And this is for each reporting period. So each time you are looking at the data you are looking at the current data plus what they believe for the next 12 months?
General PLUMMER. That is correct.
Mr. PICKETT. What are they telling you for the next 12 months from the latest report that you prepared? And when was that, by the way?
General PLUMMER. The latest report was done—it was done within the last couple of weeks. I can't give you the exact date but I can find that for you.
Mr. PICKETT. We are looking about 12 months from now; is that right?
General PLUMMER. Right.
Mr. PICKETT. What do they say about that?
General PLUMMER. What they are saying is that readiness rates right now are holding fairly stable. We are seeing—starting to see some trending indicators downward in a couple of the services, based upon similar things that have been discussed here—PERSTEMPO, OPTEMPO, quality of life, those kinds of things—primarily in personnel and training, having to do with recruitment and having to do with the migration of funds from training to infrastructure support and base operating support and things like that.
Page 472 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
That is what we are seeing in the current report.
Mr. PICKETT. So where does that put us 12 months from now?
General PLUMMER. Well, what they are saying 12 months from now, is that they—their readiness, overall readiness capability to perform the mission 12 months from now will be very similar to where it is today. They are not predicting that the trends that they are seeing today are going to cause a great degradation in readiness such that they would not be able to perform their mission 12 months from now.
Mr. PICKETT. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Pickett.
Mr. Gibbons.
Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Finch, sitting where I do, it just seems to me that America has had the great fortune with the current status of its readiness, the fact that you have already indicated, that we have suffered a few cash-flow problems, especially with our contingency operations, in our military budget.
Page 473 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Also, to me, it seems unrealistic that we are identifying near-term readiness deficiencies that are today currently complicated by budget or cash-flow problems and unforeseen contingency operations for long-term readiness projections, which we are taking the short-term readiness, to project long-term readiness, but yet we have got these complicated factors that are falling in here.
Should we not reduce our expectations, perhaps our global expectation of our military forces based on those complexities?
Mr. FINCH. This is a good core question, and I think that it—there is a case to be made that we may right now be in an exceptional time in terms of, as you know, for example, the operations in Bosnia, which are particularly striking, and that, we may see at least some settling out of that.
And so clearly one of the things that we need to do and continuously do in terms of looking at, do we have the appropriate level of effort out there, given our general strategy and what it is we are trying to do in terms of affecting the shape of the world in the future, beyond that another aspect of it is that, the load on our people is not just derived from these contingency operations—the Bosnias and the Haitis and that kind of thing—but it is really kind of a whole collection of things.
For example, one of the areas that is prevalent and does cause some sorts of concern is the load imposed by simple exercises, training, that sort of thing. And, in fact, I know in your hearings down in Norfolk, Admiral Reason, in particular, raised the question of, perhaps we are spending too much time and effort on exercises.
Page 474 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Exercises are very important for training, but clearly, if the training you get comes at the expense of readiness and the training comes at the expense of the people, then you really need to rethink about whether or not that is the wise thing to do.
I can recall a couple of years ago talking to, at the time, the Vice Chairman, Admiral Owens, and I said, ''Admiral Owens, this PERSTEMPO problem is just bedeviling me because I can't quite figure out, is it a problem, is it not a problem, and what causes it?''
And I present to you the Owens' hypothesis, which is, the thing that was driving PERSTEMPO problems was not so much the contingency operations, but it was the question of exercises; and particularly that, CINC's are out there doing their job to prepare forces and whatnot, but they don't have any particular constraints on the demands that they place and so their tendency perhaps is to ask for lots and lots of commitment of forces for exercises without any particular breaks. And it may be that one of the things that we should carefully examine, problem contingency operations and our expectations or is it perhaps that, in conjunction with the training regime that we have out there?
Mr. GIBBONS. Well, Mr. Finch, the fiscal 1998 budget proposes some significant reductions in personnel and end strengths in the active and Reserve forces. In fact, for example, the Air Force budget projects, I think 381,100 personnel, which from your experience on the Bottom-Up Review, if I recall your testimony, seems to be the number or the minimum number that was required to support a two-Major Regional Conflicts [MRC] strategy. How can our forces continue to reduce end strength while supporting this two-MRC strategy and increase or endure an increasing OPTEMPO or personnel tempo for the numerous—for the numerous, now, peacekeeping missions that are out there?
Page 475 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. FINCH. I think it is important to distinguish between the overall end strength of the force and the force you need to support the host of operations that are out there. And clearly, we need to ensure that we don't overtax our people with respect to the operations. However, it is not that all of our people do these types of operations all of the time, and I wonder if I might cite an example.
One of the areas that, in addition to our readiness responsibilities that we are involved in, is looking at more efficient ways of doing schoolhouse training, if you will. And what we discovered is that there are techniques and technologies that allow us to train people at a certain level but do it in 30 percent less time. Well, if the students spend 30 percent less time in the school house, then at least potentially there are fewer people that we need in our force in order to be able to have them tied up in that part of our operations.
So I think that you will often see a case where there are some suggestions by the services and suggestions on our budget that we can prudently reduce end strength below the bottom-up review levels, but I believe it is, more than anything else, kind of a reflexion that we figure out ways, to do things more efficiently and smarter, particularly in our infrastructure areas, than we have—in terms of reducing people available to go out and do the day-to-day business, because clearly, as you know we are taxed in those areas and we certainly don't want to make the problem even worse.
Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, can I ask just one follow-up question on one of your earlier comments about the cannibalization?
Page 476 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Should funding be continued from Congress for Reserve component equipment purchases? Because as I look through, and my staff has looked through several budgets, we see very little evidence of recent equipment purchases by the active duty components for Reserve components. What will happen to these Reserve components, if we start talking about cannibalization here, to their readiness, their compatability, equipment interoperability with active forces, if we don't fund them adequately for their Reserve purchases?
Mr. FINCH. Clearly from a readiness standpoint, the Reserve components, right along with the active, they must be equipped appropriately to do the jobs that we ask them to do. You know it is often the case, however, that the job that we ask Reserve components to do will be one where they don't have to be ready instantly today, but they need to be ready sometime 30, 40, 60, 90 days out into the future. And so when you look at equipages in Reserve component units, it is really often a different standard than by active components.
With that said, I know that we have spent a lot of time—another aspect of it is that while equipping the Reserve components comes in part from new purchases, it also comes from equipment that is made available from the active force. And I know that one of the things that we spent a lot of time on over the last couple of years is to increase visibility and to ensure that the flow of equipment that is available from the active force gets into the Reserve components.
Now, in terms of the question of, given all of that, do we have enough equipment and should the active components, sponsor or ensure that there are purchases in our budget identified specifically for the Reserve components, as I am sure you are aware this is kind of, the question that has been kicked around for some time. I think it varies from service to service, and it is generally one that we haven't really totally come properly to grips with, but sort of a sense that if we put money—the dilemma is often that if we put money in our budget, that it—or I should say more properly that the Congress will add money back into our budget, whether or not we ask for it. And so there is kind of a tendency to say, well, if it is going to be put in, why should we put it in?
Page 477 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
I think one of the things we need to do is kind of come up with a stable agreement among ourselves as to what the right answer is, put it in our budget and have it supported up there. But, admittedly, we have not yet converged upon the right answer in that area.
Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gibbons. And we thank Secretary Finch and General Plummer for coming and appearing before us today.
If there are further questions that you would like to submit for the record, they will be collected by staff and relayed to our witnesses.
Thank you very much.
Mr. FINCH. Absolutely. Our pleasure. Thank you very much.
Mr. BATEMAN. Let me, while the next panel is coming up, advise the committee that I am told that we have to vacate this room at 1 p.m., and we will do the best we can. If we don't get all of our questions raised today, we will see that they are submitted for the record.
With that, we will ask Maj. Gen. David L. Grange, Director of Operations, Readiness and Mobilization, Department of the Army; Rear Adm. John Craine, Jr., Director of Assessments, Department of the Navy; Maj. Gen. Donald L. Peterson, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force; and Brig. Gen. Matthew E. Broderick, Director of Operations Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.
Page 478 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Gentlemen, thank you very much for coming and appearing before us. We look forward to your testimony, starting with Maj. Gen. David L. Grange.
General.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. DAVID L. GRANGE, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, READINESS AND MOBILIZATION, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
General GRANGE. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor for me to appear today to discuss Army readiness with you. The U.S. Army of today is performing four major missions: Deterring aggression and preventing conflict on a worldwide basis, providing support to our Nation, supporting our national strategy of peacetime engagement and enlargement, and remaining prepared to fight and win a major theater war. The Army has deterred aggression and prevented conflict by being the most combat-ready and capable army in the world.
Being the best is not cheap. However, to develop—deploying fully combat deterrent forces, such as intrinsic action in Kuwait, are far less expensive than conducting combat operations to force an aggressor back within his own national boundaries.
Providing support to the Nation is a mission the Army has had from its inception, a mission that is required by our Constitution. The Army has a responsibility to protect Americans both at home and abroad, to include natural disasters or terrorist attack within our national boundaries.
Page 479 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Requests for military support to civil authorities remains high as the Nation's expectations of what the Federal Government should provide in times of civil or natural emergencies continues. Examples of this mission area are the Army responses to requests for assistance in the case of hurricanes, floods—an example which we currently have over 3,000 soldiers supporting in the Ohio River basin—tornadoes, wildfires, winter storms, counterdrug operations and special events such as the Atlanta Olympics, the Presidential Inaugural and the recent requirement for preparations for Nunn-Lugar II, the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act.
The Army's third mission area is peacetime engagement. This is a steadily demanding mission, which supports a national security strategy of engagement and enlargement.
U.S. Army task forces deployed to trouble spots have consistently restored order, relieved suffering and terminated fighting. Our peacekeeping humanitarian assistance operations in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Haiti, as well as combined exercises throughout the world, are examples of successful peacetime engagement operations.
The fourth and principal mission of the U.S. Army is to remain ready to fight and win one or even two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. There is no substitute for victory.
Further, the American people will not tolerate large numbers of casualties. Readiness in this mission area means the ability to deploy quickly anytime and anywhere in the world we are asked to do so, and that means to operate in the jungle, the desert, urban terrain, desert environments throughout this spectrum of conflict.
Page 480 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Since the end of the cold war, the Army has provided the majority of the Department of Defense forces for operational missions. The missions have increased by approximately 300 percent, while the end strength of the Army has decreased by over 35 percent.
Today, the Army has over 100,000 forward-deployed soldiers with over 33,000 soldiers deployed today on operational and major training exercises in 64 countries around the world. These deployed numbers are the norm.
Additionally, the current environment with adversaries capable of terrorism, information warfare or weapons of mass destruction adds additional readiness requirements to our force to counter these asymmetrical threats.
Overall, Army readiness, as reported monthly in unit status reports, has remained relatively constant during this busy period since 1990. However, current PERSTEMPO, much of which is self-generated within our own service, is stretching the Army in certain areas, as indicated by the unit status report commander's comments. We are looking at measures to both reduce PERSTEMPO and improve the Army's readiness, a reporting system to better capture readiness requirements in today's environment.
As I alluded to earlier, the Army has experienced a steady increase of mission support in a national strategy of engagement and enlargement. These missions require properly manned, equipped, and trained units. The Army deploys units for these missions as fully prepared for success as possible. The associated resource demands have predictable impacts upon readiness.
Page 481 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
We will not send a soldier into harm's way who is not fully trained and equipped to conduct his mission. In many cases, unique packages of the force mix are required for these missions. This often requires a cross-leveling of personnel and equipment between deploying units and nondeploying units to meet deployment standards.
This, in turn, leaves nondeploying units and personnel equipment shortages, which naturally degrades their combat readiness somewhat.
Operations such as Joint Endeavor and, currently, Joint Guard consist of task-organized groupings, requiring Army personnel from both Europe and the United States of America to support. While our divisions in Europe provide the base upon which the deployed organizations are built, the total Army is required to field task forces, resourced and trained for success.
Of special note is the fact that over 11,000 Reservists and 1,500 individual active component augmentees from CONUS units have deployed and supported Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard to date.
The impact of contingency operations remains with units after they return to home station. Units need time to redeploy equipment, conduct maintenance, take personal leave and then conduct unit level combat mission training to regain proficiency in collective wartime tasks. The most broadly felt peacetime engagement readiness impact is the requirement to divert OPTEMPO funds to cover the cost of contingency operations.
Page 482 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Should these expenses not be reimbursed in a timely manner or not arrive until the end of the fiscal year, it can result in circumstances where the commanders have no choice but to cancel training. Lost training opportunities cannot be recouped. It is therefore absolutely critical that reimbursement for contingency operations be provided before the Army budget reprogramming is required.
In closing, sir, the threat in the world today is dangerous and real, as you know. The Army must maintain the readiness to deploy on short notice, to fight and win a major theater war, as well as perform peacetime engagement operations. The American people expect us to be ready and unequivocally successful.
Resources are keys to readiness. Further, resource reductions, especially in personnel, will dramatically increase the Army's challenge of accomplishing its missions.
We appreciate your continued support for the readiness of this irreplaceable national resource, America's Army.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, General Grange.
[The prepared statement of General Grange can be found in the appendix on page 520.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Now, Admiral Craine, we will be happy to hear from you.
Page 483 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. JOHN W. CRAINE, JR., DIRECTOR OF ASSESSMENTS, DEPARTMENT OF NAVY
Admiral CRAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank you for this opportunity to be here as well today to discuss the Navy's readiness and how we measure and assess the overall condition of our forces. This committee has been particularly helpful in protecting Navy readiness, and we are grateful for your support.
With your permission, sir, I have got a prepared statement I would like to submit for the record, and I would like to make a few brief remarks.
Mr. BATEMAN. It will be made a part of the record, without objection.
Admiral CRAINE. The Navy's readiness today is satisfactory. We are ready to meet all of our commitments throughout the full range of national military strategy. We continually monitor the readiness of our forces, deployed and nondeployed.
We have found that our rotational or cyclical posture is one that has been in place for more than 40 years; most efficiently employs our resources. And by this I mean our ships, our planes, people, as well as our dollars. A rotational readiness posture, which in effect is tiered across all of our forces, allows us to provide immediate response to any contingency worldwide and, I might add, one that is essentially bought and paid for in the sticker price of our assets.
Page 484 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
We put a high priority on our forward deployed and engaged forces, ensuring that they are maintained at peak readiness. We also pay very, very close attention to our nondeployed forces, where readiness shortfalls would first be observed. Providing this kind of visibility to the condition of our assets is the fundamental basis of our system of measuring, reporting and solving readiness shortfalls before they become major deficiencies.
Our primary measure of current readiness is the status of resources and training system, or SORTS. SORTS provides the wartime readiness capability of our forces, as well as insights into personnel, equipment, supply and training resources.
While this data is historical, we are able to draw some conclusions on what it takes to maintain a high state of readiness. In looking at this data, it shows that our forward deployed forces have been continually maintained at a very high state of readiness and that our nondeployed assets at a lower but still satisfactory and steady level.
Readiness data such as this and more detailed data dealing with recruiting, retention, materiel condition, our assets, personnel tempo is presented to the Chief of Naval Operations monthly and is supplemented by routine reports from the fleet commanders, delineating their current readiness issues and status.
Furthermore, trips to the field are conducted by senior Navy leaders to maintain a check on ground troops. In addition, we periodically report our readiness status, as we have heard, and any significant problems to the Joint Staff and to OSD through the joint monthly readiness review and the senior readiness oversight council.
Page 485 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
While SORTS and these other indicators have proven reliable, we are continuing to work on identifying additional indicators that can provide better visibility on our readiness issues and, more importantly, impending problems.
While it would be nice to clearly see what the future holds and to be able to predict future readiness, we can't currently do this today, but we are working on it. We are developing some predictive tools which are promising and are centered around aircraft mission capable rates and ships' operating time, free of serious casualty reports.
In another effort, our federally funded research and development center, the Center for Naval Analysis, is developing a tool to link readiness with the quality of our personnel, and we are beginning to see relationships between this personnel quality index and our achieved readiness. This research is particularly encouraging because it reinforces what we have always believed, that highly skilled, motivated sailors are key to our fleet's readiness, and that it indeed may be possible to project future readiness.
In summary, readiness is ultimately the foundation of maintaining the credibility of our forces as instruments of foreign policy and national resolve. Today, your Navy remains forward deployed, is relevant and ready to protect America's interests, both home and abroad. We believe that this readiness is well understood by potential adversaries and will give them pause, allowing us to accomplish our most important objectives, the deterrence of war and the preservation of peace and stability. We look forward to your continued support in helping us accomplish these objectives.
Page 486 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. Chairman, I thank you.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Admiral Craine.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Craine can be found in the appendix on page 530.]
Mr. BATEMAN. And now we turn to Maj. Gen. Donald L. Peterson.
I would ask you to address the Virginia delegation.
Welcome, Paul.
Mr. MCHALE. Good to be here, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Go ahead, General.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. DONALD L. PETERSON, ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. AIR FORCE
General PETERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, committee members. It is a pleasure to come before you this afternoon to discuss the readiness of the world's finest air and space force.
Page 487 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
The Nation's Air Force, and that includes active, Reserve and Guard, and its dedicated men and women, are ready and fully capable of carrying out a national strategy and their performance every day proves that. I will briefly cover how we measure our readiness and how we assess it and what we are doing to improve that process.
The SORTS is one of our primary tools as well, as mentioned before. It measures a unit's current resource levels against those required to accomplish the wartime tasking. Today, there are about 2,400 Air Force units that report against SORTS, against combat plans. Currently, approximately 90 percent of those units are combat ready and possess the resources and training to accomplish their wartime mission. These percentages have remained relatively stable, this level over the past 5 years.
These readiness levels are validated through operations such as the global attack mission during Desert Strike, when our B–52's flew a 16,000-mile round trip sortie to launch cruise missiles against Iraqi aggressors. Again, numerous rapid global mobility deployments from our airlift mobility forces in support of humanitarian and deploying force missions, as well as rapid deployments of air expeditionary forces, tend to prove the capability of our forces.
A key part of our system process is the commander's judgment of his unit's readiness, and as was discussed earlier, we consider this to be a strength of sorts. In fact, for example, a recent unit returned from Southwest Asia, from a deployment there. The commander, when the unit returned, assessed the unit and felt that some of the pilots needed improved training, or increased training, or some that they were unable to accomplish during the deployment, and the time that they were deployed they attrited their skills, and he subjectively downgraded his unit's readiness level until they had time to come back up to speed. That unit is now fully capable.
Page 488 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
SORTS is a valuable measurement tool, but we are working to make it better. With that in mind, we are looking to improve the reporting in our aircraft units, our bombers and our tactical fighters, for example, with a program that will more directly link aircrew training with our core competencies in the tasks that they have and to give us a better picture of our ability to carry out the Air Force's and the CINC's missions.
We are encouraged by the preliminary results of this task that we are doing, and we continue to work toward implementing the program. SORTS is an important part of that picture; it provides us a macro level view of readiness, but it doesn't tell us the whole story, obviously. That has been discussed today. That is why we have focused our efforts in the past few years to find ways to improve readiness measurement.
You have heard the previous witnesses discuss issues that have worked, that we have all worked together on, such as the monthly readiness review and briefings to the senior readiness oversight council. These reviews provide the services the opportunity to report important trend information for the key components of unit readiness—people, equipment and training—as well as evaluate our capabilities against realistic scenarios.
We also use many other indicators to assess the readiness of our forces. Not all of these indicators approach readiness from the same perspective, but together they provide a good representation of our overall readiness.
I will address some of the other indicators we watch. Operating tempo, or OPTEMPO, is one of the key indicators. Air Force OPTEMPO is high. Right now more than 14,500 Air Force men and women and over 350 aircraft are deployed around the world in contingencies, plus approximately 75,000 are permanently stationed overseas.
Page 489 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
The global mobility force policy, GMFP, was developed with the Joint Staff to help manage the OPTEMPO of our low density/high demand assets. The Air Force operates 14 of these 22 systems covered in the GMFP. Its program sets limits on the number of aircraft and crews that can be committed to operations so that sufficient resources remain available to conduct training and sustain operations. The Joint Staff works with the CINC's and the services to prioritize or request these assessments. In this way, we help balance the needs of the CINC's and the services.
PERSTEMPO is, of course, another important indicator. We quantify PERSTEMPO as the number of days an individual is TDY away from his home. Our aggressive management of TDY rates to through global sourcing, that is using all of our resources around the globe, increase in use of the Guard and Reserve, and force structure adjustments, has reduced the number of units exceeding the Air Force's 120 day TDY threshold from 13 in 1994 to 4 in 1996. However, I must say at the same time, the number of units exceeding the 100 days has risen from 17 to 24 as we level this tasking.
One recent improvement in tracking tempo was the linking of the personnel and finance databases so that we can now track TDY's for every person in the Air Force. We expect this to be our sole PERSTEMPO tracking system by next year. The Air Force is doing better at leveling the workload, but the workload remains high.
Our Reserve components are an invaluable part of these efforts. In fact, last year Guard and Reserve personnel participated in exercises and deployments at a rate approaching that of Desert Shield mobilization, and nearly all of it was voluntary.
Page 490 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Our people are critical to readiness. It is only through our disciplined, professional and dedicated people that we are able to maintain our current readiness levels. Our ability to recruit and retain quality people is an important indicator of future readiness. We are meeting our recruiting goals, and our recruits quality is still the highest in DOD; but it is getting harder and harder to maintain those standards. While we are still meeting our retention goals, the drawdown of the last few years has left us with a shortage of experience in critical middle management NCO's, the heart of our enlisted force. A forecast 40 percent increase in airline hiring is also starting to impact on pilot retention, which was down 9 percent from 1995 to 1996. The pilot bonus take rate deceased 18 percent over the same period, and early signs from this year show it going even lower. Our separation for pilots numbered 586 through January, compared to 417 this time last year. Retention of navigators has also slipped.
In an effort to improve the quality of life of our people, we initiated a quality of life program, the seven priorities as ranked by our people:
First, fair and equitable compensation; safe and affordable housing; quality health care; managing our OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO concerns; increased community programs; preservation of retirement systems and benefits; and continued support to the educational programs.
We know that if we take care of our people, they will take care of readiness. We also monitor many leading logistics indicators such as mission capable rates, depot backlogs, and spares funding for trend information.
Page 491 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Another important indication is inspector general inspections. Every unit in the Air Force is inspected and graded on their ability to perform their wartime mission using realistic scenarios. We have seen improvement in our inspections in the last few years.
A critical indicator on how ready we are is aircraft mishap rates. For the last 3 years, our mishap rates have declined while workload has increased. In fact, last year's rate was the second lowest in the Air Force's history while the ground mishap-fatality rate was the lowest ever; and that is a testimony to the men and women who operate and maintain those machines.
Finally, we depend on regular commanders' reports which address readiness, capabilities and resource issues.
In closing, despite the downward trend of some of our indicators, your Air Force is still the best in the world and ready to answer the Nation's call. While the level of effort required to maintain that readiness is increasing every year, it is our smart and dedicated people who make this possible. We must keep faith with these superb people by ensuring their quality of life remains commensurate with their value as volunteers in service to this great Nation. We, too, would agree with the Army that timely contingency funding reimbursement is essential if we are to maintain our level of readiness.
I thank you for allowing me to come here today to represent the splendid men and women of the Air Force, and greatly appreciate the support of this committee. I am ready now to answer your questions.
Page 492 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, General Peterson.
[The prepared statement of General Peterson can be found in the appendix on page 537.]
Mr. BATEMAN. And now we ask General Broderick if he would make his presentation.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. MATTHEW E. BRODERICK, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS DIVISION, PLANS, POLICY AND OPERATIONS DIVISION, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
General BRODERICK. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, good afternoon. Sir, I would like to submit my prepared statement for the record, and in the brevity—in the interest of time, I will be glad to summarize.
Mr. BATEMAN. It will be made a part of the record, General.
General BRODERICK. Yes. DEPTEMPO is as high in the Marine Corps now as it has been in its history, as is OPTEMPO. We, in 1996, conducted 286 exercises of joint service and combined throughout the world. We have on LANT, as our LANT commander told you, 177 average of marines deployed within a year. He may not have told you that the combat service support ones are about 183 days a year. On the west coast it is 159-day average per year.
The OPTEMPO is driving marines to not getting a break during the weekends, during the evenings, during the holidays. The wives used to realize that marines were ready to deploy, and there wasn't much complaint on that. We are now starting to get complaints from wives because when they do return from deployment, they are spending an inordinate amount of time having to maintenance gear at night and on weekends and they are not getting that standdown time.
Page 493 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
We have found that on the LANT side, maintenance is going up and that is the problem that is driving this OPTEMPO in many cases; $4.1 million in 2 years, from $2.1 to $4.1 million.
We have also realized that we have to maintain our manpower, our readiness and our quality of life, and that is where we are putting our money. It is at the expense of modernization and infrastructure. Quality of life means different things to different services. In some cases, quality of life to us and to the Commandant means making sure that the individual fighting man will have modern equipment and clothing to survive on the battlefield and to us that is a quality of life.
We are doing this at the expense of modernization and infrastructure. And General Wilhelm, when he talked to you, I think summarized it very well when he said, today's modernization problems may become tomorrow's readiness problems.
We want to be more predictive. We want to be proactive vice reactive. We need more fidelity and more refinement on our readiness indicators, and we are taking different strides to do that. We are working with OSD and the Joint Staff in a formula for how to do this better.
On the Marine Corps side, I would like to start by explaining, as I think you know, we are in a cyclic program where basically one-third of our forces are forward deployed, one-third getting ready to deploy and one-third are coming back in a standdown status. That has put us consistently for the last 10 years at about two-thirds of our forces in a C–1 and a C–2 status; and then one-third, because they are standing down, are going to be in a C–3, and in some cases a C–4 status, and we try to manage that C–4 status.
Page 494 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
We use SORTS in the micro view. In the macro view—excuse me. In the macro view. In the macro view, SORTS will give us an indicator and then we can go and use other tools to go down and look at what may be happening. One of the ways we can do that is the MARES report. The Marine Corps automated readiness evaluation system, [MARES], is a readiness report system. It allows us to get out to a specific unit and find out what the status is on its supplies and equipment. We can look at it across the Marine Corps or right down to an individual squadron or battalion.
Another system that is coming on line is called ATLASS, and that lets us track logistics supply systems, and it will give us a better indicator of scheduled maintenance and preventive maintenance and is now tracking unscheduled maintenance.
A new system that was come on line to give us DEPTEMPO is called MCTEEP, the Marine Corps Training and Exercise Employment Program. MCTEEP is now taking historical data and it is aggregating it with projected data. We track costs for exercises. We track the number of people that are involved in exercises and deployments, and we track the number of equipment and supplies that are used in exercises and deployments.
In using that, we think we can use this as one form of predictive tool to tell us, first of all, how much a unit is expending in exercise on equipment and manpower and, in the future, what its deployment status is getting. If he is getting too high, maybe we have to make corrections and either take him off a cycle of exercise or take him off a cycle of training.
In accuracy and timeliness, GAO found that SORTS was missing in several of these areas. We have come up with a new system that is coming on line called GOMESS. It is the global on-line marine edit and support system.
Page 495 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. SISISKY. What is that again?
General BRODERICK. With GOMESS, now we can allow squadron and battalion commanders within 3 days to report right into the National Military Command Center and it does not go through a higher headquarters. So we should get timely, accurate reports from commanders as their status changes.
We have also commissioned the Center for Naval Analysis to do a study, which is due this summer, to give us more predictive indicators of how we may get out in front and be proactive in the future.
Sir, that is a summary of where the Marine Corps is right now. We agree with you that probably in 18 to 24 months we will need to meet a crossroads in readiness, and that is because we are putting a lot of money into readiness and taking out of infrastructure and modernization. But we stand ready today to be a 911 force.
[The prepared statement of General Broderick can be found in the appendix on page 548.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, General Broderick.
Thank you all.
General Grange, someone mentioned in the earlier testimony that there was a delay in the Army on relaying its SORTS data to the JROC or the SROC. What is the period of that delay, and what is the reason for the delay in the Army that isn't the case with the other services?
Page 496 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General GRANGE. Yes, sir. It is about 28 days, and the reason being, the Army does not have the automation, first of all, to report with all 4,808 units to the Joint Staff as the other services. We are taking that initiative on. It is a requirement; we understand that. It is going to cost some money, and we are going to do that.
When the reports come in from a separate company battalion up through the different levels of chain of command and they get to the MACOM, the major command, actually the Defense Information Systems Agency gets the information at the same time we do down in DESOPS and Department of the Army. It is just below the MACOM level where we have the problem with the automation.
So there is no changing of reports, it is just a matter of how it comes through, and the Army tries to fix any problems at those levels. We are going to do it.
Mr. BATEMAN. So there is no nefarious scheme that you want to get it in order to filter it or anything of that kind?
General GRANGE. No, sir, they are not allowed to do that.
Mr. BATEMAN. OK. Mr. Sisisky mentioned newspaper accounts of high rates of AWOL being reported among Army personnel. I assume these are probably basic trainees and other fallouts from basic training of those recruits that came in. We frequently ask and get voluntary information about recruitment and retention, but no one in the Army, no one in the Defense Department has mentioned this business of the fallout that we are experiencing. Is it higher than it has previously been? Is there a problem here? And if there is, what is the basis for it?
Page 497 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General GRANGE. Yes, sir. I will have to get back with you on the AWOL numbers. I have not seen any unusual amount of AWOL's in any of the status reports that we receive.
But in regards to retention recruiting, as you know, Chief of Staff of the Army and the Army leadership has several initiatives ongoing to—we may have a recruiting shortfall, and so we are making efforts to make sure——
Mr. BATEMAN. They have commented on those. We are aware of the problem, and the Army and all the services are seeking to address it. But it would be helpful if you would get back to us for the record on this AWOL as well as the other fallout from people who are recruited into the Army but then could not pass the physical fitness test and whatever other categories or explanations for why we are getting substantial reductions from those that come in as recruits and those who get through basic training.
General GRANGE. Yes, sir, I will do that.
Mr. PICKETT. Mr. Chairman, could we get those from all of the services?
Mr. BATEMAN. Yes, I would happy to have it from all the services.
Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, I might add that the reason I raised the question, it either came out of Time or Newsweek magazine, the newspaper accounts as gospel, but they do raise questions, and therefore we would like to have the data.
Page 498 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix on page 555.]
Mr. BATEMAN. One other question. What does it take in resources by way of personnel, equipment, and supplies for the Army to meet the requirements necessary to be prepared for war?
General GRANGE. Well, again, it depends, of course, where you are going to fight. You know our peacetime commitment right now—you are aware of that, sir—on the numbers of personnel we have doing peacetime engagement to support the Nation, et cetera. The number of units and the number of people, of course, are classified; and we can lay that out for you at any time for any fear of war either way.
What it takes, though, really is, one, regardless of the quality of soldier, we would have severe problems right now if we had the same Army we had in the seventies. We have confident, competent leaders, and we have good soldiers. We ask them to do a lot, and they are able to do it. That is our bedrock, and that is where some of the questions came earlier on. For instance, what about training base? We see readiness reports for units. What about training readiness reports?
We, in fact, have just incorporated training readiness reports because that is where we develop these soldiers, where we keep the quality of junior NCO's and junior officers trained and ready to go to war. But it takes that. Just like Matt Broderick brought up earlier, you need the people, you need to have them trained, but you also have to have the quality of life and some of the structure available to have that force progression platform and a mobilization base, and you can't break them apart. If you have a problem with BASOPS or quality of life, it is going to affect training, and vice versa, they come together. So we are taking new measures, as the General Accounting Office reviewed with you, to capture those readiness indicators more clearly.
Page 499 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
I hope I answered your question, sir, on the unclassified matter.
Mr. BATEMAN. I understand. With that, I will ask Mr. Sisisky to——
Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, I have a series of questions that I am going to let you write because we are running out of time.
General Grange, I might add one further thing that hurt the Army probably more than anything. I raised the question last year. They did it for budgetary reasons, but they froze promotions of NCO's. Do you remember?
General GRANGE. Yes, sir.
Mr. SISISKY. They got out, I mean, a good many of them. I knew it because the NCO Academy and the Army was just drying up, which is—but that is another thing.
I will ask one question, however. You heard General Broderick comment that readiness was deteriorating unless some changes are made, I think—I don't want to paraphrase your words—between 18 months and 2 years.
General BRODERICK. We meet a crossroads in 18 to 24 months; yes, sir.
Page 500 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. SISISKY. Do you gentlemen believe that will happen in your service also?
General GRANGE. Sir, if we do not do some things in the Army, internally in the Army, regardless of what Department of Defense does—internally in the Army, if we don't take certain actions, we will have a problem in 18 months. And we are doing that.
Mr. BATEMAN. Suppose we do not take certain actions, like providing you with the funds to fix things?
General GRANGE. Yes, sir. My answer was just what we have to do internally in the Army, that we know we have some problems and that does not require more funding. There are funding issues as well, but internally in the Army we have to do some reorganization and we have to do some changes.
Mr. BATEMAN. Could you give us for the record an inventory of what those corrective actions are that have been identified by the Army?
General GRANGE. Yes, sir, I can do that.
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix on page 555.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Admiral Craine.
Page 501 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Admiral CRAINE. Sir, readiness within the Navy is a delicate balance between personnel, supply, equipment, the various assets that we have.
Based on projections from what is in the budget today and what is projected to be in future budgets, we think that our readiness is going to be OK in the future. That is not to say that we are not concerned. Pilot retention is an area that we are looking at as the airlines are beginning to hire again. But overall, we are projecting readiness is going to be OK in the future.
General PETERSON. Sir, today I think we have a balance—we are trying to achieve the right balance on modernization of readiness, but, as we said before, we are very highly tasked, our people are working very hard in a high OPSTEMPO, and we do have concerns about recruiting and retention, especially in the robust economy that we have today, and offer alternatives.
Mr. SISISKY. The Marine Corps seemed to be very honest when they talked about equipment. The truth of the matter is, there is a degradation of Air Force equipment; 1 percent a year, as I understand it. The Navy is getting new ships and actually better ships, but the problem is going to be, it ain't getting many ships. And the oceans have not shrunk, and looking at what is going to happen with 4 ships a year, with a budget of 5, you are talking about a 200-ship Navy, and that, to me, looks like it is going to be a problem. We can fix the ships because they are easy to fix now, but I can see in the future the problem.
And of course the Army has the problem with trucks and other things. We are not building any more tanks. We are upgrading tanks. And they are going to have the same problem in the future, which raises the amount of the cost.
Page 502 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Pickett.
Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Grange, I notice from the remarks from the Marine Corps that they have just recently put together this defense—this global on-line reporting system. Do you think there is any possibility you all might be working with the Marine Corps to maybe use their system as a place to start to put yours together?
General GRANGE. We will definitely look at that if we have not already done that, sir. But we know what it is going to cost to do it to meet the DOD requirements, so we will look at anything.
Mr. PICKETT. We have heard a great deal about the operations—well, the PERSTEMPO and the impact of that, and we also have heard a fair amount about this issue of overhead, about maybe the military departments have not adjusted their top administrative structure, staff structure, as rapidly as they have come down in size and maybe some more needs to be done in adjusting this overhead piece.
My question is this—well, there are two parts to it. The Army has demonstrated very graphically here what your people are doing in all these exercises around the world and some 33,000 soldiers in 64 countries. So my question to each of you is, is there some possibility that we are overdoing this exercise a bit, we need to rein in that activity some?
Page 503 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
And second, could we lower the stress on some of our people if we diminished the size of the overhead, the infrastructure that is not actually out there on the line doing these deployments?
General GRANGE. For the Army, we have already taken actions, one to reduce overhead in the Department of the Army, as you may be aware of. I know, for instance, in my shop, in DA, it is a 30 percent reduction in personnel.
We are going to have to look at that some more because we have to fill up some spaces within the operating units, so we are going to have to do that internally in the Army, and we are doing that now, looking at it. I think by this summer we will have our study done.
To reduce PERSTEMPO, the chief of staff has an action to do that. He thinks it may be somewhere between 120, 150 days, a right mark for PERSTEMPO. Europe last year averaged, for junior enlisted, 158 days a year away from their bunk; senior NCO's and officers, up to 190 days—or 180 days, excuse me, 180 days a year.
TRADOC study is very much in line with that. Fort Hood is around 140 days. Research, Development & Acquisition [RDA], study is around 144 days for junior enlisted and about 190 for senior NCO's and officers. So we have to do something on a PERSTEMPO, and we have taken that on.
Of course, we can't speak for the peacetime engagement operations. We have been told to do those obviously, and they obviously have had an effect in the world today. But for internal Army exercise and training, we are looking at that.
Page 504 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. PICKETT. Admiral Craine, can you look at the Navy, the issue of the overhead, whether you have restructured your management structure to accommodate a smaller force and what impact that would have on PERSTEMPO along with lowering the number of exercises?
Admiral CRAINE. Yes, sir. We have, as you all know, come down in the number of sizes of our ships, various classes. We have also come down correspondingly on the infrastructure side. We still have a ways to go.
With PERSTEMPO, though, we are seeing that that is actually tending downward over the past several years through efficiencies in our training—turnaround training cycle and through recent realignment in the fleet.
As you are aware, we created Western Hemisphere Group, shortened the number of steaming day units, or units that would have to steam to get to where they needed to go to operate, and this has correspondingly resulted in more time at home for other sailors.
Mr. PICKETT. General.
General PETERSON. Sir, we have reduced our overhead staffs both at headquarters and numbered Air Forces. We also took another reduction in our number of fighter pilot staffs to prioritize those to the field and leave those staff vacancies.
As far as PERSTEMPO, I mentioned the help we have had there. We have had great participation from our Guard and reserve units in distributing the PERSTEMPO load, and we have been looking at that with our overseas units and counter space units.
Page 505 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. PICKETT. Thank you.
General.
General BRODERICK. Sir, we have already done two of our study structures and have reduced our headquarters. I think you will find that the Marine Corps probably has the largest officer-enlisted ratio now, and I don't think we could reduce much more than where we are at.
We do, with this new MCTEEP system that I talked about, want to start looking at OPTEMPO and deployment tempo in the area of exercises. We can now be predictive in that, and we think that, yes, we are maybe committing too many exercises. Some of them are a problem because you are committed to them because the CINC's request them and you have to sign up to those first, and it becomes a little cyclic in that, if you want to prepare for that exercise or you want to prepare your force, you have to go out and do your own internal service exercises that require you to get up to a certain state of readiness. So which ones do you cut? You are not allowed to cut the CINC ones. And if you cut your service ones, you won't be in this high state of readiness.
So this fine pruning is involved in what you can drop out of, and that is the commitment, that is one of the problems we run into.
Mr. BATEMAN. We will be submitting for the record questions to have the Department respond to the number of exercises, number of people involved in the exercises, and the cost of the exercises.
Page 506 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, one witness stated CINC's have never seen an exercise they didn't like.
Mr. BATEMAN. I hate to do this, but if we are going to finish, I must turn to Mr. McHale for any questions he may have.
Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, let me first of all say that I am delighted to be the forward element of the Army of Northern Virginia. This is the Virginia subcommittee, I assume, of the National Security Committee. I am pleased that you allowed one Pennsylvanian to participate.
Mr. BATEMAN. A sister Commonwealth.
Mr. MCHALE. That is correct.
As someone who has prepared SORTS reports, let me tell you that I am very skeptical when we try to reduce combat capabilities to an arithmetic formula. I believe the readiness, like war itself, is more of an art than a science. When I look back, for instance, to the Vietnam war, I think that the daily body counts that were incurred during that conflict ultimately measured everything except those factors that were decisive in the outcome. That doesn't mean to say that I reject the SORTS report or it isn't a useful tool. It clearly is. But I would emphasize my belief that, at best, the SORTS report provides a static, limited view of the unit's true combat capabilities.
Page 507 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
With that somewhat skeptical premise to my question, let me present a few of those questions to each of you.
General Broderick, I am trying to remember where I read about you. I have read about you. I don't know if it was in the book ''Sense of Values.'' Is that where it was? I thought it was. You were a MUTE commander; is that correct?
General BRODERICK. Yes, sir.
Mr. MCHALE. Which MUTE did you command?
General BRODERICK. 24th MUTE.
Mr. MCHALE. How many CH46's did you have?
General BRODERICK. I had 12, sir.
Mr. MCHALE. How old were they?
General BRODERICK. At that time they were—I don't know specifically, but I would guess they were probably 28 or 29 years old.
Mr. MCHALE. How old are they now? How long ago was that that you commanded the MUTE?
Page 508 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General BRODERICK. They were 26 years old then. I would say probably 29 now.
Mr. MCHALE. So three decades in age, clearly reaching the end of their military capability. That is not to say a lot of maintenance does not go into them to keep them flying and flying safely. But these aircraft, some of them, I suspect, literally flew in Vietnam; is that correct?
General BRODERICK. Yes, sir. The aircraft is probably older than the crews that are maintaining them.
Mr. MCHALE. In your opinion, would a SORTS report adequately reflect that age of the aircraft in terms of the inevitable diminution in combat capability?
General BRODERICK. It would give you a fairly reliable report on the number of aircraft that were available to that unit; and, from there, you would have to go down to what we call an aircraft materiel readiness report and actually find out the real status, and that is what we would do. It would just be an indicator that would drive us to a final detail.
Mr. MCHALE. The point that I am making is, you couldn't just look at the SORTS report and get a sense that the aircraft being evaluated originally came into use almost 30 years earlier.
General BRODERICK. That is correct, sir.
Page 509 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. MCHALE. My point being, it is a partially helpful but ultimately somewhat inaccurate impression of the equipment essential to the combat capability of that unit; all right.
Now, General Grange, similarly, let me first of all ask this. If I recall correctly, the SORTS evaluation, the rating, of an individual unit is classified information; is that correct?
General GRANGE. That is correct, sir.
Mr. MCHALE. All right. So I do not want to get into the current rating of an individual unit, but let me raise a similar matter. I talked about equipment with General Broderick. In your case, let me talk about the combat capability of the enhanced readiness brigades within the National Guard.
Our 2–MRC strategy is heavily dependent on the ability to potentially deploy those 15 enhanced readiness brigades into combat within 90 days of activation in the event that we face a second MRC. That I don't believe is classified information. I think what I have stated is correct.
General GRANGE. The goal is 4 of those 15.
Mr. MCHALE. All right.
Page 510 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Clearly, some of those 15 would have to face that kind of 90-day window of preparation in order to be prepared potentially for introduction in the theatre in the event of a second MRC. The point I am getting to is this: My understanding is that only 1 of those 15 brigades has in recent years, if ever, been cycled through the NTC; is that correct?
General GRANGE. Sir, I cannot answer how many. I thought there was more than one that had gone through in the time period you indicated. It is more than one, but it is not many.
Mr. MCHALE. All right. If it is more than one, the second one went through quite recently, because up until a few months ago it was 1 brigade out of 15.
Similarly, virtually none of those 15 brigades have gone to the field as a maneuver element in recent years, and yet, despite that fact, which I believe to be accurate, we are counting on at least 4 of those 15 brigades being available for combat within 90 days of activation. I don't think that is possible.
If a unit does not go to the field and train as a maneuver element, how can we realistically expect that within 90 days they will be combat ready? And does the SORTS report adequately reflect the true combat capability of such a unit?
General GRANGE. Not in the context you are referring to, sir. It will show you a pre-mode capability, which is at the platoon level of the standard. It will show you the post-mode capability that they, for instance, for those elements obtain a go-to-war capability in 90 days or 180 days for some more of those units. But maneuvering as a brigade, very difficult, as you know.
Page 511 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. MCHALE. But that is precisely what we expect of them in the Bottom-Up Review.
General GRANGE. They have to maneuver as a brigade prior to going to combat. What they have done is trained their staffs in an about command training but not boots on the ground as a brigade.
Mr. MCHALE. How can we realistically expect, regardless of what a SORTS report might say, that a unit could be an effective maneuver element in war within 90 days of activation when the first time that they assemble as such a maneuver element is during that 90-day period? I mean, are we fooling ourselves? I think we are.
My belief is, if we want a unit to be combat ready, we need to take that unit to the field frequently, preferably firing live rounds downrange. And I don't care what a report says, if we don't assemble that unit in the field periodically, that unit cannot on a modern battlefield be combat ready within 90 days of activation.
So my statement is—and I invite a response if I am inaccurate—any arithmetic evaluation of that unit which fails to take into consideration its lack of field training is not a complete picture of its combat capability.
General GRANGE. If your point, sir, is, is the SORTS reflecting that, it cannot. That comes from a commander's comments and a higher command's evaluation of, can that unit do what you say it can.
Page 512 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. MCHALE. And I agree with that completely. So we on this committee need to understand that when we look at a SORTS evaluation, it is helpful but limited in its impact.
Mr. Chairman, I realize that I have gone on at some length. One final question, if I may, to the admiral and to General Peterson.
Last week I asked your service chiefs whether or not we had sufficient strategic lift, both sealift and airlift, to support a 2–MRC strategy were that strategy to be implemented, and both gentlemen began their responses with ''yes, but.''
I frankly believe the more accurate answer would be a ''no, but,'' explaining how we could achieve that capability with certain changes in the strategic lift now available, certain enhancements.
When you are evaluating sealift or airlift, does the SORTS report adequately compare the capability of the unit when contrasted with its strategic requirement? In other words, when you look at the training and equipment of a unit, is that unit also evaluated in terms of its overall sufficiency for the mission requirement in the event that we go to war, or do we just look at the current status of a ship, the current status of an aircraft, the current status of the crew, while failing to measure whether in the aggregate that lift capability can sustain the strategic requirement?
General PETERSON. In the case of the Air Force and with SORTS, we do measure readiness of a unit capability, total capability, as part of assessing war plan capability.
Page 513 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. MCHALE. So we do not measure whether we have enough units, we measure whether the unit itself is combat ready.
General PETERSON. In SORTS, yes, sir.
Mr. MCHALE. But we don't measure whether we have enough such units to, for instance, provide the airlift needed to support a second MRC.
General PETERSON. But we do in our combat planning do that, but not in SORTS.
Mr. MCHALE. Admiral.
Admiral CRAINE. Same for the Navy on the maritime side, look at the capability of the unit, not what it will carry. We get that from other sources; other measurements tell us that.
Mr. MCHALE. Again making my point that SORTS is helpful but incomplete in the picture that it provides. I frankly believe that we are very deficient both in sealift and airlift in order to realistically support a second MRC and that that deficiency would not be readily apparent, indeed would not appear at all, in the SORTS reports at all.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you.
Page 514 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. McHale, and we thank the witnesses. You have been very helpful.
With that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:04 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
"The Official Committee record contains additional material here."
"The Official Committee record contains additional material here."
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 11, 1997
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BATEMAN
Mr. BATEMAN. Army units submit monthly readiness reports through their chain of command rather than directly to JCS. How much of a time delay is there before JCS receives the data, and what happens to the units' report during this time?
Page 515 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. GEBICKE. Army regulation 220–1 prescribes the procedures for Unit Status Report development, submission, and review. Reporting units are required to submit Status of Resources and Training (SORTS) documents through their chain of command. When they reach the installation or division level they are converted into electronic message text format and forwarded to the units' major Army Command (MACOM), United States Army Reserve Command, or the State Adjutant General. The reports are then transmitted by these commands to Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) which, in turn, transmits them to the JCS.
HQDA normally receives unit SORTS data about 10–14 days after the 15th of each month,which is the ''as of'' date for all monthly reports. During this period the reports are reviewed at each higher level in the chain of command. Commanders above the reporting unit level are instructed not to change the reported levels of supporting units, but commanders at the installation/division level and below can add additional information to the reports as appended remarks. Higher level composite reports, however, can report a higher or lower readiness level to reflect a higher level perspective. For example, a division could report a higher readiness level than the battalions within the division. Commanders above the installation or division level who wish to submit comments on the readiness status of reporting units must send them through the chain of command by separate communication.
Mr. BATEMAN. What recommendations has the GAO made to improve the comprehensiveness of the Status of Resources System (SORTS), and what is the implementation status of each?
Mr. GEBICKE. In October, 1994 GAO recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for personnel and readiness develop a more comprehensive readiness measurement system to be used DOD-wide. We recommended that as part of this effort, the Under Secretary: review the indicators we have identified as being critical to predicting readiness and select the specific indicators most relevant to a more comprehensive readiness assessment, develop criteria to evaluate the selected indicators and prescribe how often the indicators should be reported to supplement SORTS data, and ensure that comparable data is maintained by all services to allow the development of trends in the selected indicators.
Page 516 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
DOD entered into a contract with the Logistics Management Institute (LMI) to review our indicators and identify those which offered the greatest promise of enhancing SORTS. LMI provided DOD with their recommendations and, according to DOD officials. LMI's indicator list was used as the starting point for developing its Readiness Baseline. But most were eliminated from inclusion because sufficient data bases did not exist to use them. Aside from the use of our indicator list, DOD, to our knowledge, has not used the data to develop a more comprehensive readiness assessment system. Similarly, DOD has not developed criteria for or required the services to begin collecting additional data to facilitate more comprehensive readiness assessments. In short, GAO's recommendations have not been implemented by the DOD.
Mr. BATEMAN. I would like to give you the opportunity to expand on your affirmative answer to the question posed by Representative Jim Gibbons at the conclusion of the testimony by the first panel of General Accounting Office witnesses: ''Could we (the United States) do another Desert Storm today?''
Mr. GEBICKE. A short answer to this question is yes, I'm optimistic that we could handle another Desert Storm today. Of course, in using Desert Storm as a frame of reference, I'm assuming you mean the circumstances now would be similar to then, that is—the U.S. has a period of time before the onset of ground combat to address any unit level shortcomings, such as the need to cross-level personnel to offset personnel shortfalls in units slated for deployment; there are opportunities for U.S. units to train up either at home prior to deployment, or in theater after deployment to enhance their warfighting capabilities and unit cohesion; there are no other major regional contingencies competing of U.S. forces; and the war is not fought in a chemical or biologically contaminated environment.
Page 517 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
I would also assume that Iraqi forces are much less capable today than they were in 1991.
I should also mention, that data available to us indicates that the situation of disconnects between readiness data and other available information is not unique to today; it also existed at the time of Desert Storm. To what extent those disconnects are more serious today than they were then is not totally clear to me. What we do know, is that U.S. forces had time to address any shortcoming they had before engaging in conflict, and we had only one major contingency to deal with at that time.
Mr. BATEMAN. The committee has been told that JCS level exercises are planned up to five years in advance. Please provide for this subcommittee a list of JCS generated exercises for 1989, 1996, 1998, and 1999. The list should include: a short statement of the purpose of the exercise, name of exercise, date, number of units (by service) participating, total cost (spent in prior years or projected for 98/99).
Major General PLUMMMER: Data is not readily available for fiscal year 1989 and would not be useful for comparison purposes as it is dated. The earliest relative data available is from Fiscal year 1995 and is offered instead of 1989. Please see attached spreadsheets. For some entries, the inclusion of dates classifies the entry. For this reason, the data is provided in two separate attachments, Unclassified and Secret. The cost data provided includes CJCS strategic transportation costs only, which must be consolidated with Service costs to determine the total cost of each exercise. The number of units (by Service) participating is information that is not available at the Joint Staff level. This information should be available from Service inputs.
Page 518 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. Often there is reference to number of days ''deployed''? Is there a standard definition across the services of what is considered deployed? If there is no standard definition, what should the definition be?
Mr. FINCH. The ''DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms'' describes deployment as the following:
(DOD) ''1. In naval usage, the change from a cruising approach or contact disposition to a disposition for battle. 2. The movement of forces within areas of operation. 3. The positioning of forces into a formation for battle. 4. The relocation of forces and materiel to desired areas of operations. Deployment encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental United States, inter-theater, and intra-theater movement legs, staging, and holding areas. See also deployment order; deployment planning; deployment preparation order.''
As you may note in definition 4 above, the nature of how forces deploy varies across the Services.
In the context of our broader discussions, deployments are relevant in that they constitute an important component—but not the only component—of PERSTEMPO. For example, personnel that leave their home station for training are not necessarily deployed, but this action does affect their PERSTEMPO. To address the PERSTEMPO question, we do have a common definition across Services. It is ''one day away for operational/unit training purposes of station equals one day away.''
Page 519 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. The subcommittee understands that your Joint Monthly Readiness Review Process involves briefings from warfighting CINCs on readiness issues. As they prepare and exercise their War Plans, to what extent have any of these CINCs raised serious questions about manning shortfalls for both combat and combat support personnel? If so, what actions have been taken?
Major General PLUMMER. The CINCs have primarily identified personnel shortfalls for both component and joint headquarters staff billets. Shortfalls for a few specific specialties have also been identified. The Joint Staff coordinates with the Services to address these shortfalls. Service actions have included reallocating personnel spaces where appropriate in order to increase authorized peacetime billets in certain key staffs, and improving recruiting, retention, and training initiatives for certain specialties.
Mr. BATEMAN. In his testimony before the full House National Security Committee on February 12, 1997, General Shalikashvili stated that several processes and tracking mechanisms are being put into place in order to monitor the pulse of PERSTEMPO and attempt to alleviate hardships. Please describe for us what those processes and tracking mechanisms entail and when you expect to have them fully operations.
Major General PLUMMER. As General Shalikashvili indicated, there are many efforts at all levels to track PERSTEMPO. Following Desert Storm, many people viewed the increased humanitarian, peacekeeping, evacuations, peacemaking, and other such deployments and missions as aberrations. For the most part, our Services' personnel management and tracking systems have been in place for years and were built to support and track permanently assigned personnel at their home duty station. Temporary duty and time away from home remained relatively constant and was primarily a function of a couple of things: training which required a member to be away from his or her home ''bunk;'' exercises which were normally scheduled and planned well in advance; or ship deployments to cover on-going forward presence requirements. Finally recognizing that the post-cold war security environment was driving significantly higher time away from home (or PERSTEMPO), OSD Readiness, the Joint Staff, and the Services began to assess these changes and what might be needed to address possible impacts. This study highlighted the need for the Services to develop, track, and archive information on ''time away from home'' in support of the increased taskings.
Page 520 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
The Army has been working for the past year to develop a tracking system and is well on their way to accounting for and archiving total days away from home for their military members. Their initial focus has been on capturing the increased operational deployments.
The Air Force started implementing their new system over a year ago and is now able to track members total time away. They closely monitor this information and brief CSAF each month on areas that appear to be approaching higher than desired levels.
The Navy has been collecting PERSTEMPO data via their PERSTEMPO model since 1985. For those assigned to sea duty, this model tracks members time away from home via the ships' time away from pier. They have established goals that are closely monitored and the CNO is provided quarterly updates and other information as required.
The Marine Corps is developing a new system that will hopefully be up and running in the next few months. However, even without a tracking system, the Marine Corps manages ''time away'' through advance planning and use of rotation schedules to support recurring missions.
The Marine Corps deploys primarily as units, and as such does not measure PERSTEMPO, preferring to use deployment tempo (DEPTEMPO). The recently fielded version of the Marine Corps Training, Exercise, and Employment Plan (MCTEEP) application assists in management of DEPTEMPO. Through the combination of actual events and planned or projected events, MCTEEP can calculate past, present or future DEPTEMPO for units. Adjustments to rotation plans are made accordingly to equalize DEPTEMPO among like units.
Page 521 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
As you can see, each Service has developed or is developing a system to monitor PERSTEMPO or DEPTEMPO and help make force employment decisions. Eventually this data will provide a tool for the Services to use in operational management.
There are two other programs within the purview of the Joint Staff which have already come on line to help monitor the ''pulse'' of tasked units and assist all of the Services, the CINCs, and OSD in finding solutions to any overtasked personnel problems. First, the Global Military Force Policy (GMFP) started last year to provide a mechanism for a continual review by the senior leadership of those scarce resources which are in high demand units. The GMFP established general mission priorities for allocating these resources and developed metrics to measure usage levels. Second, the Joint Monthly Readiness Review provides the Services with a venue within the joint community, to include the CINCs who task the assets, to address concerns with units and personnel who may be overly tasked.
Mr. BATEMAN. What are the efforts being taken to capture or measure the value added by new simulation and simulator capabilities, both at the individual and small unit levels, as well as at the higher levels of staff training? When will you be able to tell to what extent these capabilities can reduce the traditional funding associated with tank miles, flying hours, and steaming days?
Mr. FINCH. In April of 1995, the Department provided the House committee on National Security and Senate Armed Services Committee a report entitled, ''Use of Simulation in DoD Training.'' This document described in detail the capabilities and limitations of simulators and simulations for individual, unit, and joint training, including tradeoffs that have already been made. The substance of this report provides a more complete response to this particular question and is therefore recommended for your review. The conclusion of this report offers a succinct answer to this question. It reads:
Page 522 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
''The Department of Defense has extensive experience with simulation, spanning involvement by all the Services and in many different areas of training. There is ample evidence the simulation has been cost-effective for a wide variety of applications. The demonstrated benefits of such uses of simulation are: (1) increased skill proficiency, (2) increased readiness, (3) decreased accidents, (4) decreased combat casualties, (5) reductions in training time, (6) reductions in the costs of ammunition, and (7) reduced wear and tear on actual equipment.
''The Department has a number of studies planned and under way to test the cost effectiveness of emerging simulation technology. Of these, the Close Combat Tactical Trainer is the first advanced simulation training program which will systemically quantify OPTEMPO tradeoffs during it's acquisition testing cycle. Applications of advanced simulation in the other Services should follow a similar approach. However, the Department's goal is not just to find lower-cost substitutes for field training exercises; the goal is to determine the best mix of simulation and operational activities based on valid cost-effectiveness.''
Since last April, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has initiated the development of guidelines for cost-effectiveness assessment of large-scale simulations. We expect the first draft of these guidelines to be completed by September of this year, and upon their release, OSD will direct the Components to assess the cost-effectiveness of large-scale simulations systemically. Our longer-range plans are to incorporate measures of performance into simulators and simulations in order to systemically assess both individual and collective performance as a more objective means of determining military readiness for a wide variety of potential missions. Such measures will be implemented through the Joint Training System being developed by the Joint Staff.
Page 523 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN.The Army and Marines are taking steps to enhance readiness assessment by identifying additional readiness indicators and putting into place a process to better assess readiness in their respective services. What is DoD/JCS doing to capitalize on the Army and Marine Corps' efforts to improve readiness assessments? What effort is being made to standardize ''good ideas'' across all Services?
Mr. FINCH. The Readiness Working Group is currently reviewing DoD readiness assessment processes, which coincides with efforts by all Services to reevaluate how readiness can be better reported and more succinctly evaluated. We intend to capitalize on Service specific efforts. There are several forums in place that are intended to prevent duplication of effort. We intend to enhance the visibility of ''best of breed'' approaches in a manner mutually acceptable to OSD, JCS and the Services.
Mr. BATEMAN. An extensive review of readiness indicators was done by GAO and reviewed by a DoD contractor in 1994. It was determined that there were many indicators that had the potential for monitoring a critical aspect of current readiness and could, ultimately, help shale the Future Years Defense Plan. Your office stated at the time that, after an assessment of the indicators, you would tell the Services which indicators to monitor and that you expected to begin developing trend lines based on selected indicators sometime during the summer of 1995. Which of the indicators did you select to begin monitoring? What are the trend lines indicating?
Mr. FINCH. DUSD (Readiness) initiated the Readiness Baseline project in 1995 in response to concerns on the visibility of readiness indicators in DoD. Since that time, DUSD (Readiness) has analyzed metrics supplied by Services and a DoD contractor, established data sources and points of contact, determined a hierarchy of essential metrics, and archived a portion of this database at Defense Manpower and Data Center, Monterey, California.
Page 524 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
The indicators selected have been grouped into four major categories: personnel, equipment, joint, and training. DUSD(Readiness) intends to use this information to monitor current readiness, better analyze readiness programming in a historical context, and better articulate current readiness concerns as expressed by the Chain of Command and Congress.
Work continues to formalize the data collection process by reaching agreement on access by the Services and other appropriate agencies.
Readiness Rating Factors
Mr. BATEMAN. What is currently the primary contributing factor that drives the readiness rating provided by the unit commander? Personnel? Equipment? Training proficiency? Supply?
General GRANGE. The primary resource area that is driving our readiness ratings is Personnel. The current force structure, following the recent conclusion of the drawdown, establishes a personnel strength requirement of 518,000. With the Army's end-strength capped at 495,000 (95.6% of the requirement), the level of fill in units across the force is correspondingly affected. Currently, this situation is exacerbated by (1) an assession/retention shortfall, (2) a grade and skill imbalance (residual effect of the drawdown), and (3) the Trainees, Transients, Holdees and Students (TTHS), personnel account exceeding goal. This strength imbalance is a matter of personal interest to the Chief of Staff of the Army, and we have recently formed a standing task force to identify and assess all contributing factors and possible corrective actions. Additionally, the staffing of a Force Structure Realignment Plan has been initiated to reduce the personnel strength requirement by 10,000 to 508,000.
Page 525 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Readiness Funding Levels
Mr. BATEMAN. If Readiness funding is at record levels, why are we seeing negative readiness indicators?
General GRANGE. Readiness indicators in today's Army are a reflection of the changes in strategy and emphasis directed to the Army's mission since the end of the cold war. The strategy of engagement and enlargement together with the complex and changing global scene has created an all time high of operational pace and personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO). In addition to preparing for regional contingencies, the Army is deploying more often to meet the Nation's security interests around the world for a wide variety of activities. Characterizing readiness funding at record levels is not completely meaningful. For the past several years, Army posture statements have assessed Army near term readiness funding as adequate, given the Army's overall affordability problem and the need to maintain balance and stability across all Army requirements and functions. The good work of Congress and Office of the Secretary of Defense in supplying reimbursement for contingency operations has maintained our Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) at a level which prevented significant degradation in major combat unit readiness. Although prompt and full reimbursement for unforeseen contingency operations is essential in maintaining readiness, individual units do experience changes in readiness depending on how their deployment status changes their training cycle.
Per Capita Operations and Maintenance Funding
Mr. BATEMAN. What factors go into the formula to determine the per capita Operations and Maintenance funding spent per individual service member?
Page 526 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General GRANGE. Per capita Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding per individual soldier is an indirect cost component of Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO). OPTEMPO is the term used by the Army to describe the tempo (miles and hours) of MTO&E (''Go-to-War'') unit training and the cost in dollars of that training. OPTEMPO has two parts: (1.) Direct—costs which are equipment-driven; and (2.) Indirect—costs that vary in proportion to military end strength for the MTO&E Army only (indirect costs are also influenced by civilian workyears and certain operating costs that support unit training).
The indirect per capita cost includes training costs such as organizational clothing and individual equipment, NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) supplies and equipment, medical supplies and equipment, and rail transportation.
Peace Operations
Mr. BATEMAN. The Army's Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) headquartered at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, published a special study in February 1996 entitled ''The Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness.'' The report recommended that the Department of the Army consider having units report ''C–5'' on their unit status report for a period of four months after return from the peace operation. It went on to say that this would more accurately reflect the true status of the unit. What action has the Army taken in response to this recommendation?
General GRANGE. The Army has looked at this option. We do not want to lose track of the readiness of units during the post-contingency operations recovery period. Our current war and peacetime requirements demand that the Army continually assess the immediate availability of all units. Having units report ''C–5'' for 4 months after return from a peace operation would obscure significant available unit capabilities which could be critical in an emergency response or crisis situation.
Page 527 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Personnel
Mr. BATEMAN. What percentage of the personnel (on average) in your units are non-deployable? What is the total number in each service? What are the reasons they are non-deployable? Do the units' status reports (Status of Resources and Training (SORTS) data) reflect the impact or these personnel not being available to go to war with the unit? At what point are these personnel backed out of the numbers of military personnel ready to go to war?
General GRANGE. The latest SORTS Data (15 FEB 97) lists 3.9% of the soldiers in Active Component units as not immediately available for deployment, of which less than 1% are permanently non-deployable. The latest SORTS Data (15 FEB 97) lists 14,917 soldiers in Active Component units as not immediately available for deployment. Some of these soldiers are deployed in support of exercises and contingency operations and are not immediately available to their parent unit. The Army reports these soldiers in 12 categories ranging from absent without leave to pregnancy. Most soldiers are not immediately available for deployment due to ongoing legal processing, pregnancy, or unresolved medical issues. The impact of these soldiers on unit readiness is reflected in personnel (P-ratings) ratings, which consider available warfighting strength in addition to assigned strength.
Mr. BATEMAN. What is the total number of ''borrowed military manpower'' personnel in your service? How do these show up in your SORTS data?
General GRANGE. All Active Army units report special duty personnel statistics in their Unit Status Report (USR). There are two types of special duty. Borrowed Military Manpower (BMM) soldiers are those which have been temporarily assigned duties in support of Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) activities; the BMM position having been specifically approved by the reporting unit's Major Army Command (MACOM). The second type is Troop Diversion (TD). TD are all soldiers tasked to perform duties outside of their units of assignment (reporting units) in support of a higher headquarters, other Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTO&E) units, installation activities, or TDA organizations; the assignments have not been specifically approved by a MACOM. Although we do not have the numbers for the Total Army, the 24 major combat units (combat divisions and brigades) reported 2,331 soldiers in a special duty status in their 15 JAN 97 USRs. Of the 2,331 soldiers, 767 are BMM and 1,564 are Troop Diversions.
Page 528 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Deployed Unit Readiness
Mr. BATEMAN. How do you track the readiness of your most frequently deployed units? Do you identify and track additional readiness indicators for these units? Do these units receive any sort of consideration when deciding on who will be the next unit to be deployed for a mission? Are there any plans to manage these units, or the individuals in them, differently so as to give some relief from the constant demands on the unit to be away from home and station?
General GRANGE. Currently the Major Army Commands (MACOMs) track unit deployments, and use this information in determining unit mission assignments. The Army is currently developing a methodology to track this information using the automated Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS) and Unit Status Reports. Individual soldier deployment information is currently recorded using SIDPERS transactions. There are currently no special reporting requirements for frequently deployed units. The Army continues to pay special attention to personnel actions that affect soldiers assigned to those units.
Reserve Component Redesign
Mr. BATEMAN. How haw the efforts to redesign the reserve component forces affected their readiness?
General GRANGE. The Army National Guard Redesign Study has not yet impacted Army National Guard unit readiness. The Secretary of the Army approved the concept plan to convert limited Army National Guard combat structure to required support forces on 23 May 1996. The Army Staff, in close cooperation with the Reserve Components, have been developing a detailed cost analysis refining the total cost of conversions for Total Army Analysis 2003 and the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study. The cost analysis will be presented to the Senior Army leadership for decision in April 1997. An implementation plan will be developed to accomplish the objectives, while minimizing to the extent possible, the impact on unit readiness.
Page 529 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. How long will the redesign effect the readiness of the units involved?
General GRANGE. The conversion timelines have not been approved by the Senior Army Leadership. We are in the process of analyzing resourcing requirements for inclusion in the Program Objective Memorandum Fiscal Years (FY 99–03). These requirements will be among the determinants of the time required to implement the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study concept. The conversions would not begin until FY 99.
Mr. BATEMAN. Is there a marked difference in the reported readiness of the various types of units?
General GRANGE. The Army National Guard Division Redesign has not been implemented yet. Therefore, it has no impact on the Army National Guard unit readiness. However, the projected outcome is that it will make the Army National Guard more relevant to the warfight.
Retention
Mr. BATEMAN. Are the units that are frequently deployed from their homes able to recruit and retain quality personnel? Do you perceive that there will be problems of retention in the future?
General GRANGE. Deployed commands have had reenlistment rates at slightly higher than overall Army averages. The 10th Mountain Division, which was deployed for most of fiscal years 1994 and 1995 had mid-career soldiers reenlisting at a rate slightly ahead of the Army average. Initial term soldiers in the 10th Mountain Division reenlisted at the same rate as the overall Army rate. For the 1st Armored Division which was deployed to Bosnia during fiscal year 1996, rates for initial and mid-career soldiers were again above Army average. Overseas soldiers generally reenlist at a higher rate than soldiers based in the United States. Retention problems may develop in the future as the novelty of some exercises and deployments wear off. Field commanders have expressed concerns that continued frequent deployments combined with high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) may take its toll on retention in the future. However, at this time, concerns about eroding pay and benefits, reductions in bonuses and civilian opportunities have a greater impact on a soldier's decision to reenlist than time away from home.
Page 530 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Readiness Posture
Mr. BATEMAN. During the hearing it was generally agreed that we currently enjoy a great readiness posture right now but that we are approaching a readiness crunch or crossroads in 18 to 24 months. Do you agree?
General GRANGE. As briefed by the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) in the most recent Senior Readiness Oversight Council, three out of four of the Army's future readiness trends are predicted to go down. Internally, the biggest issue we have is the force structure/manning imbalance combined with current recruiting challenges. Our recruiting goal increased from Fiscal Year (FY) 96 to FY97 by 16,300 soldiers due to the leveling off of our personnel downsizing initiatives. If this goal is not achieved, this will contribute to increased turbulence and have a serious impact on future readiness across the Army. Steps we have taken to help correct the problem include increasing the number of recruiters in the field, lowering minimum high school diploma (HSD) graduate rates from 95% to 90% (the additional 5% of non-HSD enlistees must still achieve Test Score Category I–IIIA. The maximum Category IV assession remains at 2%), increasing the number of prior service enlistees to 8,000, increasing enlistment bonuses and college fund programs, and shortening minimum enlistment periods to two years for 10% of accessions. For the force structure/manning imbalance, we are internally deleting approximately 10,000 spaces out of our force structure to bring the total Army structure down from 518,000 to 508,000. Externally, the biggest challenge facing the Army is maintaining readiness when faced with possible failure to receive full and timely reimbursement for Contingency Operations (CONOPS). The current Army funding shortfall due to CONOPS is approximately 900 million dollars, most of which is programmed for the 4th Quarter (QTR). The CSA has told Commanders in the field to continue to train and to not hold back funds for the 4th QTR training. Failure to receive the reimbursement will cause training, maintenance, and perhaps even base operations (BASOPS) activities, to be canceled or downgraded.
Page 531 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. What are you doing internally in your service to avoid the crisis?
General GRANGE. In the personnel area, we are intensively managing the accession and growing of soldiers. We are allocating additional resources to the recruiting mission. We are increasing our attention to the retention of qualified soldiers. We lowered the minimum high school diploma graduate rates from 95% to 90% while maintaining the quality of the force as measured by mental test scores and requiring alternative credentials such as the general equivalency diploma (GED), increased the allowable number of prior service enlistees from 4,000 to 8,000, increased enlistment bonuses for selected military occupational specialities and college fund programs, and shortened minimum enlistment periods to two years for 10% of accessions. In the category of training, the Army is capitalizing on the use of sophisticated simulation devices. By balancing the use of simulations and time spend in the field, we are experiencing great strides in training readiness. All major Army commands are working on reengineering and redesign initiatives, such as streamlining operations, adopting suitable commercial practices, that result in more cost-effective and efficient organizations. An example is III Corps (Fort Hood) using contract maintenance to conduct scheduled services and maintenance on equipment left behind by deployed units.
Mr. BATEMAN. During the hearing it was generally agreed that we currently enjoy a great readiness posture right now but that we are approaching a readiness crunch or crossroads in 18 to 24 months. What can Congress do to help you avoid the crisis?
General GRANGE. We have maintained our force posture by protecting readiness as our number one priority. However, the challenges of meeting missions in a changing, complex global environment create significant demands on an Army that is stretched. First, we need prompt and full reimbursement for unforeseen contingency operations. This reimbursement will prevent the reallocation of scare resources programmed and budgeted for daily readiness requirements. Second, we need your support for an Army end-strength sufficient to meet the dynamic requirements of the National Security Strategy. The most important asset to the Army is the soldier. A properly sized force will be able to achieve the objectives directed by the National Command Authority without placing excessive strain on units, soldiers or their families.
Page 532 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. During the hearing it was generally agreed that we currently enjoy a great readiness posture right now but that we are approaching a readiness crunch or crossroads in 18 to 24 months. Where do you need additional Operation and Maintenance funding to help continue your current readiness posture?
General GRANGE. We need prompt and full reimbursement for unforeseen contingency operations. This reimbursement will prevent the reallocation of scare resources programmed and budgeted for daily readiness requirements. We also need sufficient, stable, and balanced resources with flexibility for the commander to manage daily operating activities. We ask Congress to continue to support our budget requests.
Mr. BATEMAN. There is an unconfirmed report that there is an absent without leave problem in the Army. Is this true?
General GRANGE. Over the last three years there has been a slight increase in the number of soldiers reported as either absent without leave or deserter. The rate per thousand of soldiers reported absent without leave or deserter, has varied over time. In 1994 the rate was 1.38 per thousand, in 1995 the rate was 1.15 per thousand, and in 1996 the rate was 1.88 per thousand. This rate, while not ideal, has not had an effect on readiness. Typically, an absent without leave soldier is a junior enlisted soldier or trainee. Their population percentage, coupled with their not occupying critical positions, further negate the impact.
Mr. BATEMAN. What is causing the increase?
Page 533 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General GRANGE. While there appears to be an increase in the rate, it is statistically insignificant and may be an anomaly.
Mr. BATEMAN. The readiness report is due as of the 15th of the month. The Army is the only service which has a delay of several weeks in providing the data to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Why the delay in providing data to the Joint Chiefs of Staff? What happens to the data during the delay? When will this delay be eliminated?
General GRANGE. The Army has 4,694 reporting units (Active Component/Reserve Component [AC/RC] Modified Table of Organization and Equipment [MTO&E] units that submit Status of Resources and Training System [SORTS] data). Army units submit Unit Status Reports (USR) through the chain-of-command, to the Major Army Commands (MACOMs), then to Headquarters Department of the Army within nine working days for active units and 21 calendar days for reserve units. This allows for thorough review of reports for accuracy and encourages immediate remedial actions at the lowest possible level. We are continuing to report through the chain-of-command as we evaluate alternative reporting options. However, whatever alternative reporting that the Army adopts will include dramatically shortened report transmission times.
Migration of Operating Tempo Dollars
Mr. BATEMAN. How much of a problem is the reported migration of Operating Tempo dollars to Base Operations funding, and why does it occur?
General GRANGE. Traditionally, the Army has used Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO) as a resourcing tool for readiness. The Army has always recognized that resourcing readiness depends on more than just the training OPTEMPO piece. Operational Readiness (OPRED) is the most current methodology that the Army has developed to reflect the total cost of preparing a unit to go to war. OPRED includes OPTEMPO (ground and air) and all costs necessary to be prepared (ranges, land, training aids and simulators, maintenance, power projection facilities, etc.). The OPRED concept encompasses the resourcing of readiness programs, a review of modernized training strategies, and the revised readiness evaluation and reporting mechanisms being developed for future unit and installation readiness reporting.
Page 534 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
The selected migration of funding is not a problem and should be supported. As the local situation dictates, a commander in the field needs to be able to adjust his resources among the programs that contribute to readiness. For example, maintaining operational tank gunnery and maneuver ranges is necessary to support the OPTEMPO ground miles of the units using them.
The Army recognizes the importance of this issue and the concern over migration, and is taking steps to better identify the movement of resources. Currently, our accounting systems do not allow us to track dollar for dollar during migration. Starting in FY98, the Army will use a new Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA), Budget Activity 1 structure that will provide increased visibility on the readiness accounts and enable us to better track OPTEMPO dollars and associated migration. Additionally, the Army has increased funding in Base Operations in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for the outyears. This should reduce the need for migration.
Readiness Reporting
Mr. BATEMAN. How do we obtain a more accurate, objective readiness report?
General GRANGE. Accuracy does not appear to be a lingering problem in readiness reporting. The use of automation has enhanced this greatly. The challenge is to expand the current reporting system with more quantitative inputs so that the report is more objective. To this end, the Army is incorporating a concept called Operational Readiness (OPRED) into Unit Status Reporting (USR). This concept is designed to more effectively capture the total cost of preparing a unit to go to war. The new USR will expand the number of resource areas measured and capture the impact of funds, personnel, equipment, ammunition and time shortages on training. It will also factor such diverse areas as leader qualification, availability of training areas, simulations, and status and through-put of power projection platforms. Although, the subjective commander's assessment remains the hallmark of Army readiness reporting, linking resources to readiness will allow him to take an objective look at training.
Page 535 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Promotions
Mr. BATEMAN. Is the Army still enforcing any type of Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) promotion freeze?
General GRANGE. The Army does not have a promotion freeze. Noncommissioned officer promotions are at their highest level since the beginning of the drawdown. Some slowdown in promotions will occur in FY98 as the Army's initiative to change the noncommissioned officer structure takes effect.
Readiness Assessment
Mr. BATEMAN. Provide a list of major exercises generated by your service for years 1989, 1996, and 1999. Provide statement of purpose for the exercise, number of units, and approximate total cost to the service. Is their a correlated negative impact on Quality of life?
General GRANGE. The major Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises with Army participation for years 1989, 1996, 1998 and 1999 are listed below. The purpose of each exercise, major units and approximate cost is included. These exercises are sponsored by one of the Unified Commands and are scheduled 3–5 years out. Since these exercises are scheduled well in advance and normally are only 2–3 weeks in duration, any impact on the quality of life is insignificant. However when exercises are considered in conjunction with all other operational/contingency requirements, there is a negative impact on the quality of life.
Page 536 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
PERSTEMPO
Mr. BATEMAN. How do you measure Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO)? How do you define ''deployed?'' Is deployed considered the same as a day away from home? what is the current rate of PERSTEMPO?
General GRANGE. PERSTEMPO is the overall rate of deployment for Army elements expressed as a percentage of the force and average days deployed. It is composed of two elements: Skill Tempo (SKILTEMPO) and Deployment Tempo (DEPTEMPO). SKILTEMPO is a measurement of the percent of Military Occupational speciality (MOS) deployed from home station for operational deployments as a percent of the overall MOS population. DEPTEMPO is a measurement of the number of days that soldiers in units are deployed as measured against total number of days available.
''Deployed'' is defined as one day away from home station for a training or operational mission. Deployed is not the same as ''away from home.'' Soldiers are away from home for more reasons than just deployments. An example is soldiers attending professional development schooling.
The Army is developing ways to better track PERSTEMPO data. A process action team should be operational mid-April to refine current tracking systems. Future Unit Status Reports will include DEPTEMPO data. At present the army has approximately 6.2% of the force deployed away from home station. This does not include PCS moves.
Page 537 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Current Readiness
Mr. BATEMAN. We are as ready as we have ever been.'' Is your service ready to execute another Desert Storm?
d20
General GRANGE. Today the Army is ready to fight and win a conflict similar in size to Desert Storm as an integral part of the joint team. Detailed analysis of possible future major regional conflicts suggest that five Active Component Armored Cavalry Regiment, seven National Guard enhanced Separate Bigrades, special operations forces and requisite echelon above division/corps combat support and combat service support units will be adequate, under most conditions, to successfully fight and win a single major regional conflict. However, circumstances could lead a U.S. commander to request substantially more divisions, particularly if initial allied defensive efforts fail to quickly halt the invader.
Therefore, the current total army combat force of 10 Active Component divisions, two Active Component Armored Calvary Regiments, and 15 Army National Guard Enhanced Separate Brigades are capable and ready to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. It is always important to note that the Reserve Component are an essential elements of the Total Army force. They provide critical combat support/combat service support capabilities by incorporating units into the force Support Packages and Time Phased forces and Deployment Lists. They also provide additional capabilities for use against an adverse major regional conflict, especially in the two nearly simultaneous major regional conflict scenario.
Page 538 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. Other than dollars, what are your greatest needs?
General GRANGE. We have maintained our force posture by protecting readiness as our number one priority. However, the challenges of meeting missions in a changing, complex global environment create significant demands on an Army that is stretched. First, we need prompt and full reimbursement for unforeseen contingency operations. This reimbursement will prevent the reallocation of scarce resources programmed and budgeted for daily readiness requirements. Second, we need your support for an Army end strength sufficient to meet the dynamic requirements of the National Security Strategy. The most important, and smartest, weapon in the Army's arsenal is the soldier. A poorly sized force will achieve the objectives directed by the National Command Authority without placing excessive strain on units, soldiers or their families.
Predictive analysis
Mr. BATEMAN. What readiness ''predictive analysis'' does your service perform? How is your analysis performed?
General GRANGE. The Army uses information from various personnel, equipment and training databases in conjunction with current and historical unit readiness reports to project unit readiness. The Army Readiness Management System (ARMS) is an automated information management system which integrates Army wide resourcing information with current and historical unit resourcing for major combat units. ARMS projections take into consideration resourcing trends, Army wide resource availability, and planned force structure/requirement changes.
Page 539 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Training Center Rotations
Mr. BATEMAN. What is the cost (Milpers, Operations & Maintenance, Ammunition, total) of a National Training Center (NTC) or a Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation?
Gemeral GRANGE. Defining the cost of an NTC or JRTC training rotation is complex. There are many factors that make up the total cost of a rotation. Some of these are, the size of the unit and scope of training required at the center, the scenario designed to train the unit, distance between the center and the unit which affect transportation costs, and fixed costs contracted on a yearly basis for mission support of the center. Keeping all this in mind, the average cost of a rotation (Mil Pers, Operations & Maintenance, and Ammunition costs) for the NTC in Fiscal Year (FY) 97 is $38.48 million, for the JRTC in FY 97 it is $18.332 million.
Mr. BATEMAN. What is the current standard with regard to the number of rotations a commander can expect during his command?
General GRANGE. A maneuver (Armor, Infantry, and Special Forces) battalion commander can expect to participate in a CTC rotation at least once during his command tour. As stated in Army Regulation 350–50 (Combat Training Center Program), ''The Army's goal is for all commanders of active component combat maneuver (Armor, Infantry) and Special Forces Battalions to receive at least one opportunity to train at NTC, JRTC, or CMTC during a command tour.'' A command tour at the battalion level is normally two years in duration.
Page 540 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. Is this standard different from FY 89/90?
General GRANGE. This standard has remained constant since 1989.
Mr. BATEMAN. If readiness funding is at record levels, why are we seeing negative readiness indicators? What factors go into the formula to determine the per capita Operations and Maintenance funding spent per individual service member?
Admiral CRAINE. In determining our current state of readiness, Navy analyzes readiness indicators applicable to deployed and non-deployed forces. In examining the data, deployed readiness indicators, over the past two years, have displayed consistently high levels of readiness for our deployed forces. Non-deployed readiness indicators, depict lower but consistently satisfactory levels of readiness. The difference between the deployed and non-deployed levels of readiness is consistent with the Navy's cyclical, or tiered, readiness posture.
With regard to Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding, the Navy does not fund its O&M programs on a per capita basis. O&M programs are funded according to requirements. An example of this can best be depicted within the Navy's Flying Hour Program. The active aircraft flying hour program provides the funds necessary to achieve the Navy's goal of 85% Primary Mission readiness (PMR) to train and maintain qualified aircrews in the primary mission of their assigned aircraft. To achieve this goal, Navy will determine the requisite flying hours necessary. Based on the flying hours, Navy can project the O&M funding necessary to procure fuel, spare parts and consumables for each type of aircraft.
Page 541 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. What percentage of the personnel (on average) in your units are non deployable? What is the total number in each service? What are the reasons they are non deployable? Do the unit's status reports (SORTS Data) reflect the impact of these personnel not being available to go to war with the unit. At what point are these personnel backed out of the numbers of military personnel ready to go to war?
Admiral CRAINE. There are no personnel in any of our deployable units that are non-deployable. Although there may be a small percentage of personnel that were originally assigned to deployable units but then transferred to non-deployed units, on a temporary basis, until able to return to deployable status. Reasons for temporary reassignment include but are not limited to medical, hardship, and disciplinary purposes.
SORTS only would reflect an unanticipated loss if a critical rating was impacted. However, this would only be temporary since a replacement would have to be immediately identified and detailed to fill the emergent requirement.
Mr. BATEMAN. What is the total number of ''borrowed military manpower'' personnel in your service? How do these show up in your SORTS data?
Admiral CRAINE. Military manpower borrowed for purpose of providing temporary support in excess of endstrength is not tracked. The Navy routinely details Sailors for Ship/Base Operating Support (mess specialist, security augmentation, etc.) during a Sailor's initial tour. When a clear imbalance between an existing billet and requirement occurs, the Navy performs an efficiency review at the claimant level to rebalance the manpower need.
Page 542 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Occasionally, personnel must be detailed for emergent requirements. Some emergent requirements are operational, such as standing up a Joint Task Force (JTF). But others such as support to the Olympics, Presidential Inauguration, and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) are not. Often when Sailors are detailed to emergent requirements, their original job falls to others in the unit.
Short of mobilization of Reserves, the Navy does not specifically program endstrength for these additional taskings. Although Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW) funds are used to augment units when they have additional tasking, it is programmed endstrength and is not used to bypass authorized endstrength.
It should be noted that SORTS reflects only those personnel permanently assigned to a unit, thereby providing the most accurate picture of a units readiness in the Personnel resource area.
Mr. BATEMAN. What is currently the primary contributing factor that drives the readiness ratings provided by the unit commanders? Personnel? Equipment? Training proficiency? Supply?
d16
Admiral CRAINE. Personnel, Equipment, Training, and Supply are all equally weighted resources areas that comprise a units overall readiness rating within SORTS. However, each resource area may become the primary contributing factor dependent upon where the unit is in the Inter-Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC). For example: When a ship returns from deployment it remains in a Ready Force status for approximately 30 days. Following this period, Personnel and Training readiness may begin falling as experienced personnel transfer to new duty stations and the ship enters a period of reduced operational activity to support maintenance availabilities. Additionally, prior to a major repair period, a ship must offload all ammunition and reduce onboard fuel percentages. This drives down the Supply resource area rating. The Equipment resource area rating will also decline as equipment is overhauled, taken out of service or placed into reduced operational status.
Page 543 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Conversely, as newly trained personnel report aboard, the Personnel resource area will begin to improve as the ship approaches the next deployment. Once the ship has completed the majority of its maintenance requirements, it will begin participating in training exercises and the Training resource area will continue to improve until the ship reaches its highest level of readiness at the beginning of its deployment.
Mr. BATEMAN. How do you track the readiness of your most frequently deployed units? Do you identify and track additional readiness indicators for these units. Do these units receive any sort of consideration when deciding on who will be next unit to be deployed for a mission? Are there any plans to manage these units, or the individuals in them, differently so as to give some relief from the constant demands on the unit to be away from home and station?
Admiral CRAINE. Readiness for deployed Navy units is monitored primarily through the Status of Resources and Training system or SORTS. Sorts provides the wartime readiness capability of our forces, as well as, insights into personnel, equipment, supply and training resources. Readiness indicators dealing with recruiting, retention, material condition, casualty repairs, and PERSTEMPO are also monitored and reported to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) monthly and is supplemented by routine reports from all Fleet Commanders delineating their current readiness issues and status. Furthermore, trips to the field, by senior leadership are conducted to ensure we maintain a check on ground truth.
With regards to our deployment cycle and managing the time away from home and station of our units and Sailors, these issues are all covered under the Navy's PERSTEMPO program. The program consists of three established guidelines: A maximum deployment of six months (portal to portal): a minimum Turn Around Ratio (TAR) of 2:1 between deployments (the ratio between the number of months a unit spends between deployments and the length of the last deployment, e.g., a nominal 12 months non-deployed following a 6 month deployment. The turnaround ratios for all elements. The turnaround ratios for all elements of Naval forces have been well above this 2:1 figure, given the funded levels of non-deployed OPTEMPO, and the requirement to maintain PERSTEMPO at or above 50%); and a minimum of 50% time a unit spends in homeport over a five-year period (three years back/two years forward)
Page 544 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
The Navy sets 50% time in homeport as the goal for our units. However, these units periodically make cyclical forward deployments for up to six months. During the preparation and deployment period, they are not able to achieve the desired goal of 50% time at home. This is why we use the five year average. Units which have recently completed a deployment typically spend a greater percentage of their time at home, which balances the time spent away during deployment, and allows them to meet the 50% goal over the five year period. Because the average assignment for our sailors is three to five years, all who complete their entire tours should receive the benefits of the program.
It should be noted that scheduling conferences take place to coordinate the order of what units will deploy next. Additionally, deployment decisions regarding high demand/low density units such as EA–6B, work and family is a quality of life issue that warrants EP–3, special forces (SEALs) are determined by Global Military Force Policy (GMFP).
The time our people spend away from home is of great concern. Maintaining the proper balance between our utmost attention. Navy believe the PERSTEMPO program achieves that balance and intends to continue using this proven program.
Recruiting and Retention
Mr. BATEMAN. Are the units that are frequently deployed from their homes able to recruit and retain quality personnel? Do you perceive that there will be problems of retention in the future?
Page 545 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Admiral CRAINE. Navy units typically deploy for six out of every 18 months. More frequent deployments are very rare and require the specific approval of the Chief of Naval Operations. Recruiting personnel to fill deploying Navy units is not an issue. Each unit's manning status is continuously monitored at several echelons of the chain of command. The Bureau of Naval Personnel orders personnel to each unit based on need.
Retention of quality personnel is a constant concern. The top three reasons given in FY 96 for leaving the Navy or thinking of leaving the Navy were, in order of importance: family separation, promotion and advancement opportunity, and basic pay. These have been the top three reasons in each year since FY 93, although the exact order changes from year to year.
To the extent that we can adequately address a relatively small number of factors, which are clearly interrelated, we will continue to enjoy success in the future. The most significant include adequate and ''comparable'' compensation, service member and their family quality of life, family separation, and expectations for future advancement.
Recent trends for enlisted retention have been mostly positive. As of February 1997, first-term retention (the crucial decision for enlisted personnel) had nearly returned to pre-drawdown levels. However, some quality personnel with specific technical, critical skills continue to have low retention rates and will require an increasing investment in reenlistment incentives as the high experience levels produced by the drawdown begin to decline.
Second-term retention is somewhat lower than pre-drawdown levels but has risen steadily over the past few years. As drawdown conditions wane, we also expect this rate to continue to increase.
Page 546 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
On the other hand, retention rates in the third-term and beyond remain significantly below long-term levels. A combination of factors aggravate retention. First, due to the drawdown, there are a significant number of personnel reaching the retirement decision point. The proportion of the force in the 19th and 20th years of service is almost twice as large (2.4% to 1.3%) as it was prior to the drawdown. Given our current high rate of loss at the retirement point, this would partially explain the low retention rate.
Secondly, the increasing influence of the REDUX retirement system is unknown. Cohorts entering the military in FY86 are now reaching crucial career decision points and, given the much-reduced value of the retirement, may be opting to leave. This, in addition to the reduced opportunity for advancement to senior pay grades, has greatly affected the perceived value of retirement.
Mr. BATEMAN. During the hearing it was generally agreed that we currently enjoy a great readiness posture right now but that we are approaching a readiness crunch or crossroads in 18 to 24 months? Do you agree? What are you doing internally in your service to avoid the crisis? What can the congress do to help you avoid the crisis? Where do you need additional O&M funding to help continue your readiness posture?
Admiral CRAINE. The Navy funding contained within the fiscal year 1998 budget and that in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) contains what we believe to be the right choices to modernize our forces while ensuring readiness is maintained. However, although all budgetary shortfalls attributed to contingency operations have been identified and forwarded, unfinanced contingency operations and other emergent demands for resources in the future will necessitate reallocation on non-deployed operating, training and maintenance funds (the only place from which to draw current year dollars in the absence of rapid processing of supplemental appropriations). Although Navy has worked hard to rebalance plans for subsequent budget years to accommodate and alleviate the impact on readiness, in the future the requirement for additional or extended contingency operations could impact readiness dependent upon the timeliness and likelihood of supplemental appropriations.
Page 547 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
With regard to additional funding, if additional FY98 funds were to be provided, they would be applied to accelerating the procurement of certain aircraft, ship, and weapons programs; ship and aviation depot maintenance; and increasing our RDT&E accounts.
OPTEMPO
Mr. BATEMAN. How much of a problem is the reported migrations of OPTEMPO dollars to BASEOPS funding, and why does it occur?
d16
Mr. CRAINE. The Navy has not experienced any noticeable migration of funds from the OPTEMPO accounts (Flying Hours and Steaming Days) to base operations in recent years. OPTEMPO programs have remained at their budgeted levels during execution and are typically or in fact been increased due to additional requirements associated with ongoing contingency operations. Critical base operations requirements above budget are usually accommodated by deferring planned maintenance of equipment or real property.
Mr. BATEMAN. How do we obtain a more accurate, objective report?
Admiral CRAINE. While SORTS and other readiness indicators have proven reliable, we are working towards identifying additional indicators which are more objective and provide better visibility of readiness issues and impending problems.
Page 548 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
We are developing some predictive tools which are promising and are centered on aircraft mission capable rates and ship's operating time free of serious casualty reports. In another effort, our federally funded research and development center, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), is developing a tool to link readiness to the quality of our personnel. We are beginning to see relationships between this personnel quality index and our achieved readiness, as measured by SORTS. This research is particularly encouraging because it reinforces what we believe—that highly skilled, motivated Sailors are key to our fleet's readiness—and that it indeed may be possible to project future readiness.
Mr. BATEMAN. Provide a list of all major exercises generated by your service for years 1989, 1996, 1998, and 1999. Provide statement of purpose for the exercise, number of units, and approximate total cost to the service. Is there a correlated negative impact on quality of life?
Admiral CRAINE. It is the goal of the Navy to satisfy the CINC's exercise commitments with forces that are already forward deployed. This serves two purposes. First, since we are already forward deployed, the incremental costs associated with participating in these exercises are relatively small. Secondly, for the same reason and as a result of our PERSTEMPO program, we can minimize the adverse effect these exercises may have on the quality of life of our Sailors.
Unfortunately, the Navy does not maintain lists of exercises as far back as 1989. A list can be provided detailing the 1996 exercises. Navy does not track the incremental cost of these exercises so a list may not be useful for the purposes you intend. If this is not the case, I would be happy to provide a list, if still required.
Page 549 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
We are still planning 1998 and 1999 exercises and therefore cannot provide them at this time. However, once they are complete we can provide them if still required.
Mr. BATEMAN. How do you measure PERSTEMPO? How do you define ''deployed''? Is ''deployed'' considered the same as a day away from home? What is your current rate of PERSTEMPO?
Admiral CRAINE. As previously stated, the PERSTEMPO program is measured using the following three guidelines: A maximum deployment of six months (portal to portal); a minimum Turn Around Ratio (TAR) of 2:1 between deployments (the ratio between the number of months a unit spends between deployments and the length of the last deployment; and a minimum of 50% time a unit spends in homeport over a five-year period (three years back/two years forward)
Deployed is defined as any unit away from homeport more than eight consecutive weeks (56 days) and is therefore not the same as a day away from home.
The current rate of PERSTEMPO is totally dependent upon a unit's five year schedule (three years back/two years forward) and is therefore ever changing. From a corporate perspective, Navy finds it is more practical to monitor and assess the PERSTEMPO program by tracking the number of exceptions approved by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).
To date, only one exception has been approved by the CNO in 1997. To provide an order of magnitude, in 1996 the CNO approved five exceptions.
Page 550 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. ''We are as ready as we have ever been''. Is your service ready to execute another Desert Storm? Other than dollars, what are your greatest need?
Admiral CRAINE. Under our current National Military Strategy, which includes a two MRC (Major Regional Conflict) scenario, Navy is properly sized and shaped to meet all commitments. The two MRC strategy shapes capabilities adequate to fight and win a conflict similar to Operation Desert Storm.
Mr. BATEMAN. What readiness ''predictive analysis'' does your service perform? How is your analysis performed?
Admiral CRAINE. As previously indicated, Navy is conducting ''predictive analysis'' centered on aircraft mission capable rates and ship's operating time free of serious casualty reports. By establishing the relationships between the aforementioned areas and readiness, it may be possible to project future readiness.
Readiness Trends
Mr. BATEMAN. If readiness funding is at record levels, why are we seeing negative readiness indicators? What factors go into the formula to determine the per capital Operations and Maintenance funding spent per individual service member?
General PETERSON. Readiness levels as measured through the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS), one of our primary assessment tools, indicates approximately 90 percent of our units are combat ready and possess the resources and training to accomplish their war-time missions. This percentage has remained fairly stable over the last five years. In contrast, readiness funding, when adjusted for price changes and functional program transfers, has declined each of these years. Reduced funding, the drawdown, and the pace of current operations have placed a great deal of stress on our people and equipment. We continue to closely monitor retention rates and remain concerned over personnel TDY rates. While some leading indicators such as mission capable rates for our aircraft show a slight decrease, we anticipate the rates will remain stable with the improved spares funding contained in the FY 98 President's Budget.
Page 551 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
The Air Force does not use a ''per capita'' formula to develop budget inputs. Instead, financial requirements in the O&M appropriation request are primarily based on factors for programmed force structure and operating activity levels such as flying hours, space launches, deployments, workyears, weapon systems maintenance, training requirements, square footage, facility maintenance and other workload indicators. The summation of the detailed program estimates form the budget requirement.
Mr. BATEMAN. What percentage of the personnel (on average) in your units are non-deployable? What is the total number in each service? What are the reasons they are non-deployable? Do the unit's status report (SORTS Data) reflect the impact of these personnel not being available to go to war with the unit? At what point are these personnel backed out of the numbers of military personnel ready to go to war?
General PETERSON. Air Force has 36,220 people (9.3% of the active duty force) that are non-deployable for reasons such as: confinement, material witness, pregnancy, hospitalization, airmen with less than 12 weeks total active federal military service, projected separations, students in courses more than 20 weeks, etc.. More than half these conditions are waiverable by the unit commander based on mission needs and individual circumstances, 92.8% of the 36K are temporary conditions and will return to deployable status, or be processed out, and a very few (<2%) will result in a permanent restriction. Yes, the unit's status report (SORTS Data) does reflect the impact of these personnel not being able to go to war with the unit. They are subtracted from the total personnel available (and if critical personnel, from the critical personnel available) in calculating the personnel measured area P-level for the unit SORTS report. They are deleted from the numbers of military personnel ready to go to war, when they are determined to have a personnel availability code of ''not available.''
Page 552 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. What is the total number of ''borrowed military manpower'' personnel in your service? How do these show up in your SORTS data?
General PETERSON. ''Borrowed military manpower'' is not a common practice in the Air Force. We are currently manned at 99.5%. Today, more than 90% of our units are combat ready and possess the resources and training to accomplish their war-time missions. Air Force personnel are counted once and only once for SORTS reporting. If a unit, on mission need, would lend personnel to another unit, only one unit can count them as available. As long as individuals can be deployed (or when deployed, redeployed) within their designed response times, they would be considered available for the unit personnel measured area P-level calculation.
Measuring Readiness
Mr. BATEMAN. What is currently the primary contributing factor that drives the readiness rating provided by the unit commander? Personnel? Equipment? Training proficiency? Supply?
General PETERSON. All of the areas you mention are reported under SORTS. Personnel, Training, Supply, and Equipment ratings are derived by objective measurement, while the overall SORTS rating is determined by commander's assessment of these and other factors against the assigned missions. Of units reporting degradation in category levels, the largest number do so for equipment and supplies on hand.
Page 553 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
As you know, unit commanders are selected based on demonstrated performance and broad experience. The positions are few and highly competitive. We rely heavily on commander judgment, experience, and opportunity for direct observation of unit personnel to ensure the SORTS reports makes sense. Unit commanders are in the best position to know the true measure of a unit's capability to meet its wartime commitments. We expect a commander to change the overall C-level, up or down, from the measured value if in his or her judgment the metrics do not reflect accurately that unit's capability. When they elect to do so, they are required to comment in the report.
The leadership of the Air Force has great confidence in the credibility of commanders' assessments in SORTS and sees no evidence of attempts to mask readiness shortfalls.
Mr. BATEMAN. How do you track the readiness of your most frequently deployed units? Do you identify and track additional readiness indicators for these units? Do these units receive any sort of consideration when deciding on who will be the next unit to be deployed for a mission? Are there any plans to manage these units, or the individuals in them, differently so as to give them some relief from the constant demands on the unit to be away from home and station?
General PETERSON. We track all units the same way, through SORTS and other personnel and logistics indicators. In addition, the major commands and unit commanders work closely together to schedule all unit activities including deployments, exercises, and inspections. The Air Force continues to pursue all viable avenues to prevent degradation in readiness or adverse impacts on our people caused by long periods of high PERSTEMPO. Examples are:
Page 554 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Global Sourcing. ACC sponsors an annual Combat Air Forces scheduling conference with the goal of spreading the deployment tasking for contingency operations throughout the entire force. As a result we have stabilized PERSTEMPO for the majority of the CAF.
Increased Use of the Air Reserve Component (ARC). The Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard continue to support contingency taskings and have increased participation in CJCS exercises. Consequently, we have eased taskings on active HH–60, C–130, and F–16 units.
Relief From Tasking. We provided limited relief for U–2 assets in FY96. ACC will cut A/OA–10 participation in CJCS exercises by 30 percent; AFSOC is also reviewing cuts in exercise play.
We have taken actions to reduce PERSTEMPO for low density/high demand (LC/HD) units:
Global Military Force Policy (GMFP). This is a SecDef policy for prioritizing the allocation of LD/HD assets for crises, contingencies, and long-term JTF operations. It balances the CINC's immediate needs with the long-term need to sustain healthy weapon systems. Of the 22 weapons systems covered under GMFP, the Air Force owns 14: HC–130, RC–135RJ, U–2, Compass Call, EF–111, A/OA–10, AC–130H, AWACS, ABCCC, HH–60, MC–130P, MH–53, MH–60, and Ground Theater Air Control System (GTACS).
Of the weapons systems measured, four exceeded the USAF goal of 120 days TDY during FY96: RC–135RJ (151 days), U–2 (149 days), HC–130 (144 days), and A/OA–10 (133 days). Also, some career fields were significantly stressed such as Special Ops, Airlift Support, and Linguists.
Page 555 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Enhanced Force Structure. In FY96, we activated an AFRES Associate AWACS Squadron with 8 crews and increased the number of U–2 crews from 48 to 54. In FY97, we have increased crew ratios for active duty HC–130s from 1.75 to 2.0 and funded two additional RC–135 Rivet Joint aircraft.
Mr. BATEMAN. Are the units that are frequently deployed from their homes able to recruit and retain quality personnel? Do you perceive that there will be problems of retention in the future?
General PETERSON. Recruiting and classification of new personnel is accomplished at the Air Force level—units don't recruit. We met 100% of our FY96 recruiting goal of 30,700, and are on target to meet our FY97 goal of 30,200. Retention is also good. FY96 first term, second term, and career reenlistment rates were all at or above goals. Reenlistment rates for people with high PERSTEMPO were also good. Even with these positive trends, our caution lights are on concerning recruiting quality and rated retention. For instance, 83% of the FY96 accessions scored in the top half of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), but only 79% scored in the top half of the AFQT so far in FY97. Pilot 6–11 year retention rate down from 86% in FY95 to 77% in FY96. FY96 navigator 6–11 year retention rate down 11% from FY95 (86% to 75%). Aviation Continuation Pay take rates also down from FY95 to FY96 (77% to 59%), and we expect an FY97 rate of 43%. Approved pilot separations through Feb 97 up 51% over the same time last year (497 versus 329). However, PERSTEMPO is not the only factor impacting future pilot retention. Airline hiring is also projected to increase 40% in FY97 (2,100 in FY96; 3,000 in FY97).
Page 556 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. During the hearing it was generally agreed that we currently enjoy a great readiness posture right now, but that we are approaching a readiness crunch or crossroads in 18 to 24 months. Do you agree? What are you doing internally in your service to avoid the crisis? What can the Congress do to help you avoid the crisis? Where do you need additional O&M funding to help continue your current readiness posture?
General PETERSON. I cannot put a specific time limit on it, but we do have concerns for the future, as I mentioned in my testimony. Like the other services, we are experiencing a high level of OPTEMPO which places a significant amount of stress on our personnel and equipment. However, we believe we are receiving adequate O&M funding support from Congress to meet our most critical needs. Our present concerns stem from a few negative trends which are beginning to take shape in some of our readiness indicators.
People are critical to readiness. Our ability to recruit and retain quality people is an important indicator of future readiness. We are meeting our recruiting goals, and our recruits, quality is still the highest in DoD, but it is getting harder and harder to maintain those standards. The drawdown of the last few years has left us with a shortage of experience in critical middle management NCOs, the heart of our enlisted force.
A forecast 40% increase in airline hiring is also starting to impact on pilot retention which was down 9% from FY95 to FY96. The pilot bonus take rate decreased 18% over the same period, and early signs from this year show it is going even lower. Our separations for pilots numbered 586 through Jan 97 compared to 417 this time last year. Retention of navigators has also slipped.
Page 557 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
d16
In response to these concerns, we initiated a quality of life program with seven priorities:
1. Fair and equitable compensation;
2. Safe, affordable housing;
3. Quality health care;
4. Managing OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO concerns;
5. Increased community programs;
6. Preservation of retirement systems and benefits;
7. Continued support to educational programs.
We know that if we take care of our people, they will take care of readiness. We must ensure that their pay and benefits remain commensurate with their value to the nation. Timely funding of unprogrammed contingency costs is the other area where Congress can help.
Funds Migration
Page 558 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN How much of a problem is the reported migrations of OPTEMPO dollars to BASEOPS funding, and why does it occur?
General PETERSON. Funds migration within the Air Force is not a problem. We have empowered our commanders to accomplish the mission within the limited resources that are available. Despite the stress and strains of high levels of OPTEMPO, funding constraints, and retention concerns, the Air Force remains ready because commanders are meeting their training objectives and supporting quality of life for their people. Emerging day-to-day requirements often dictate that commanders migrate funds to ensure the highest priority requirements are funded. By allowing commanders the flexibility to internally reprogram dollars, the Air Force affords commanders the best environment in which to achieve their mission and maintain readiness.
Measuring Readiness
Mr. BATEMAN. How do we obtain a more accurate, objective readiness report?
General PETERSON. The Air Force is presently accomplishing research into improving the ''fidelity'' of our readiness metrics, with the goal of providing more comprehensive indicators of a unit's health and readiness to the commander and senior leadership alike. Part of this research will investigate appropriate means of linking readiness at the unit level, to the capabilities defined by the Air Force Task List (AFTL), and those required to support the CINCs' Joint Mission Essential Task Lists (JMETL).
Page 559 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
USAF Major Exercises
Mr. BATEMAN. Provide a list of major exercises generated by your service for years 1989, 1996, 1998, and 1999. Provide a statement of purpose for the exercise, number of units, and approximate total cost to the service. Is there a correlated negative impact on quality of life?
General PETERSON. United States Air Force (USAF) major exercises (1989, 1996, 1998, 1999):
Air Combat Command FLAG exercises:
Red flag is designed to conduct combat aircrew training in air and surface tactics against various threat forces using preplanned scenarios. USAF (a total of approximately 30 active USAF aircraft—fighters, bombers, command and control, tankers, transport—from 10 to 15 different units) participate along with reserve, guard, other services and foreign nations (Nellis Ranges).
Green flag designed to provide aircrew training in joint suppression of enemy air defenses, electronic support measures, electronic combat counter-countermeasures, and command, control, and communications countermeasures in a simulated combat environment (Nellis Ranges). USAF (approximately 70 aircraft) participate along with reserve, guard and other services. Foreign nations participate in a reserved coalition period.
Maple flag provides realistic simulated combat training to aircrews over terrain similar to Eastern Europe environment and provides joint and coalition training with emphasis on planning and executing sorties conducted from Canadian Forces Base Cold Lake, Canada. Approximately 50 aircraft from 10 units participate with allied participants. Approximately total cost of live flying exercises (Red, Green, Maple Flags per year $15–20M, four exercises total/year). Foreign nations pay their costs to participate.
Page 560 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Blue flag is a computer aided exercise that supports Numbered Air Force/Air Component Commanders and their Air Operations Staff training in command, control, communications and intelligence process of air tasking order production and trains Air Operations Center staff in Joint Forces Air Component Commander operations in specific areas of responsibility. The exercise is run by the USAF Battle Staff Training School at Hurlburt Field, FL. The exercise is conducted at the school or at the lead Numbered Air Force location. Approximately 570 personnel from numerous units (majority of personnel (360) from lead Numbered Air Force) together with other services and foreign nations participate, up to 2,000 personnel. Approximate total cost per year $4.5M, three exercises.
Air Combat Command's Flag exercise program provides the world's premier realistic simulated combat aircrew training. It prepares each aircrew with the required tools and experience to meet the challenges of combat. The Flag program is the core building block for training an Air Force combat aircrew to fight in a joint/combined environment. Red flag, Green flag, and Maple flag validate aircrew combat training, techniques, and procedures under different environments and scenarios. Blue flag prepares the Air Operations Center staff.
Pacific Air Forces:
Cope Thunder provides realistic training for US Pacific Command aircrews, operations/logistics personnel, and selected command and control operations in a simulated combat environment (Eielson AFB and Elmendorf AFB AK). Approximately 65 USAF aircraft participate from approximately 10 units together with other services and allied foreign participants. Approximate total cost per year $4M, four exercises. The Pacific region aircrews are limited by budgetary constraints from readily deploying to Nellis Ranges. As a result they conduct combat training in Alaska.
Page 561 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Other Cope operational training exercises which allow PACAF squadrons opportunities to practice large force deployments, individual force deployments and mixed force deployments: Cope west to Indonesia (once a year, every other year off year location can move, $500K), Cope jade in Korea (2×year, $800K total for both), Cope north in Japan (2×year $1.15M total for both), Cope south—location varies (once per year, have done it in Bangladesh $400K), Cope taufan to Malaysia annually $750K.
Air Force Exercises are vital for the training of Air Force people and by themselves have no appreciable negative impact. It is the combined effect of contingency operations, presence missions, overseas rotations, Joint/CINC/Service exercises, inspections, and day-to-day operations that put tremendous stress on our people.
Mr. BATEMAN. How do you measure PERSTEMPO? How do you define ''deployed''? Is deployed considered the same as a day away from home? What is your current rate of PERSTEMPO?
General PETERSON. Air Force defines PERSTEMPO as days per year an individual is TDY away from home station. It includes all TDY reasons, lengths, locations; ''A day away is a day away.'' The Air Force desired maximum PERSTEMPO level is 120 days TDY per individual, per year. As of mid Feb 97, 7,451 Air Force people accumulated more than 120 days TDY in the last 12 months. The other Services count unaccompanied (PCS) short tour personnel as part of their PERSTEMPO statistics. The Air Force counts them as a separate category in addition to, not as part of PERSTEMPO data. ''Deployed'' status is included in our PERSTEMPO data and is defined as TDY to a contingency, a military operation other than war, a JCS exercise and/or an Air Force major command exercise. As of mid Feb 97, 13,977 Air Force people were ''deployed'' (TDY) around the world.
Page 562 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Measuring Readiness
Mr. BATEMAN. ''We are as ready as we have ever been''. Is your service ready to execute another Desert Storm? Other than dollars, what are your greatest needs?
General PETERSON. Yes. We are more ready today than we were at the onset of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, from an operations and logistics perspective. We have operated continuously now for nearly seven years in that environment. We have learned valuable lessons as a result of those on-going missions which have improved our operations, logistics and tactics. We have successfully conducted three AEF operations in Southwest Asia and a fourth is presently underway. In addition, we have gained unequivocal insight into the operations and capabilities of Iraq's forces.
Our aircraft and equipment are six years older than during Desert Storm and we have maintained a higher OPTEMPO when compared to before Desert Storm. It is critical that our time-phased modernization plan stay on track.
Mr. BATEMAN. What readiness ''predictive analysis'' does your service perform? How is your analysis performed?
d16
General PETERSON. The Air Force has limited capability to forecast readiness. In SORTS, we ask commanders to make short-term forecasts (3, 6, and 12 months) of overall unit C-levels based on their knowledge of factors under their control. In logistics, we have the capability to make short-term forecasts of mission capable rates based on historical capability and programmed spare parts funding. In personnel, we have the capability to make short-term forecasts using historical data combined with data like future separations and bonus take rates. Due to the number of variables involved, their complex relationships, and the ever changing nature of budgets and policy, accurate long-term readiness forecasting is not within our current capability.
Page 563 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Sisisky mentioned newspaper accounts of high rates of AWOL being reported among army personnel. I assume these are probably basic trainees and other fallouts from basic training of those recruits that came in. We frequently ask and get voluntary information about recruitment and retention, but no one in the Army, no one in the Defense Department has mentioned this business of the fallout that we are experiencing. Is it higher than it has previously been? Is there a problem here? And if there is, what is the basis for it? It would be helpful if you would get back to us on this AWOL as well as the other fallout from people who are recruited, but then could not pass the physical fitness test and whatever other categories or explanations for why we are getting substantial reductions from those who get through basic training.
General PETERSON. We do not have an increased AWOL problem in Basic Military Training. Over the last four years we accessed over 120,000 recruits and only 18 went AWOL. Additionally, AWOL rates across the Air Force have remained constant at less than one per thousand per year. Basic Military Training (BMT) attrition steadily increased from 7% in FY92 to 11% in FY95, but since we implemented programs to help us reverse that trend, our BMT attrition through Mar 97 is down to 9%. Beginning in FY96, we reduced medical losses by implementing a break-in period for combat boots and establishment of a ''rehab flight'' for recruits with minor muscular/skeletal problems. We've also introduced a stress management course designed to help trainees overcome initial adjustments to military training, and instituted a ''motivational flight'' (more intense military training) designed to decrease performance or misconduct losses.
Mr. BATEMAN. All Services: If Readiness funding is at record levels, why are we seeing negative readiness indicators? What factors go into the formula to determine the per capita Operations and Maintenance funding spent per individual service member?
Page 564 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General BRODERICK. Readiness funding is at record levels; however, this increase is a result of aging equipment making greater demands on parts and repairs. The more equipment is used, the more maintenance and repair parts are required to keep it at high readiness levels. As equipment ages beyond its planned service life repair parts and maintenance hours increase, even as operational tempo remains constant.
Our 28 year-old CH–46E and 17 year-old 5-ton trucks are two prime examples of aging equipment requiring increased money and increased maintenance man hours. The longer equipment continues in use, the more parts are required, MARFORLANT documented an increase in ground parts spending from $2.1 million two years ago, to $4.1 million last year.
O&M funding is not programmed on a selected individual service member basis. The level of O&M funding represents the amount required in order to fund readiness. This includes essential logistic functions which allow us to maintain the readiness and sustainability of weapons and equipment used by our forces; replenishment, modernization and replacement of equipment during the Maritime Prepositioning ships (MPS) maintenance cycle; transportation of materiel to and from Marine corps logistics bases; Fleet Marine Force support costs (housing, training ranges/areas, and other essential facilities and services to support operational and training requirements); training, education, recruiting activities, and quality of life programs for our Marines and their families.
Mr. BATEMAN. What percentage of the personnel (on average) in your units are nondeployable? What is the total number in each service? What are the reasons they are nondeployable? Do the unit's status reports (SORTS Data) reflect the impact of these personnel not being available to go to war with the unit. At what point are these personnel backed out of the numbers of military personnel ready to go to war?
Page 565 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General BRODERICK. On average 15 to 18 percent of the active duty Marine Corps is nondeployable at any point in time. The total number of nondeployables for the Marine Corps is approximately 27,000. Reasons are as follows:
Mr. BATEMAN. All Services: What is the total number of ''borrowed military manpower'' personnel in your service? How do these show up in your SORTS data.
General BRODERICK. The Marine Corps maintains approximately 4000 personnel (slightly over 4%) on the Fleet Assistance Program (FAP), which provides additional support to critically needed bases, stations and facilities. Many of these are in quality of life areas.
Marines assigned to FAP are not reflected as deductions from unit strength in the SORTS reporting. When the unit deploys, FAP Marines rejoin their parent unit. We purposely keep their FAP periods short so as not to degrade ''individual readiness.'' Marines will also rejoin their unit for unscheduled contingency deployments. The Marine Corps accurately reports these Marines as deployable members of their parent unit.
Mr. BATEMAN. What is currently the primary contributing factor that drives the readiness rating provided by the unit commander? Personnel? Equipment? Training proficiency? Supply?
General BRODERICK. Currently, personnel is the primary contributing factor that determines the SORTS rating provided by unit commanders. Overall staffing and critical Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) fills are the most influential factors which degrade personnel ratings. Constrained at 174,000, the Marine Corps carefully apportions personnel to ensure we cover all requirements placed upon us, both internal and external.
Page 566 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. How do you track the readiness of your most frequently deployed units? Do you identify and track additional readiness indicators for these units? Do these units receive any sort of consideration when deciding on who will be the next unit to be deployed for a mission? Are there any plans to manage these units, or the individuals in them, differently so as to give some relief from the constant demands on the unit to be away from home and station?
General BRODERICK. Our most frequently deployed units, and all units assigned to the operating forces, are tracked via the Joint Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) report. This report provides a macro-overview of a unit's personnel manning, equipment and supply fill, equipment readiness and training as assessed by the unit commander. Additionally, deployed units are also monitored using periodic situation reports, maintenance reports and the Marine Corps Training and Exercise Employment Plan (MCTEEP).
The Marine Corps possesses one High Demand/Low Density (HD/LD) asset, the EA–6B electronic warfare aircraft. Our 4 active squadrons are national assets, and as such, their deployments and movements are scrutinized closely. Their readiness must be kept at its highest possible state.
The Marine Corps publishes a deployment schedule yearly. This schedule promulgates deployments 3 years in advance. Units deploy every 12 to 18 months. Contingencies can accelerate or change deployment cycles.
Deployment rotations are managed to ensure equality. Currently deployed units are at high readiness, being the lead for assignment to an immediate contingency in their area of operations. The next unit scheduled to deploy will be given priority in staffing and training to attain high mission readiness. Returning units retain a higher readiness status for 45–60 days. then historically move to a lower readiness status while personnel are rotated and equipment is refurbished.
Page 567 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Marines are deployers and, when assigned to an operational unit, will participate in 2 scheduled overseas deployments during a routine typical 3-year assignment.
Mr. BATEMAN. Are the units that are frequently deployed from their homes able to recruit and retain quality personnel? Do you perceive that there will be problems of retention in the future?
General BRODERICK. Frequently deployed units are able to retain quality personnel. In the aggregate, the Marine Corps continues to make total numbers of reenlistments according to the First Term Alignment Plan (FTAP). We continue to have overages and shortages within MOSs; however, we use reenlistment bonuses and lateral moves to target MOSs which fall short of goal. MOSs with high tech skills are the most difficult to retain, even with good bonuses.
OPTEMPO has increased across the entire Marine Corps, yet to date we have been able to meet retention goals. At this time, we have no quantifiable evidence to indicate that OPTEMPO will prohibit the achieving of future retention goals.
Mr. BATEMAN. During the hearing it was generally agreed that we currently enjoy a great readiness posture right now but that we are approaching a readiness crunch or crossroads in 18 to 24 months? Do you agree? What are you doing internally in your service to avoid the crisis? What can the Congress do to help you avoid the crisis? Where do you need additional O&M funding to help continue your current readiness posture?
Page 568 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
General BRODERICK. Yes, we agree that we are approaching a readiness crunch. Our analysis indicates that, overall, the readiness of deployable units is high relative to historical data. We are approaching a readiness crunch in 18–24 months. The relatively flat O&M budget of the past several years, combined with the advanced age of our tactical mobility assets, yield higher maintenance costs. Older equipment breaks more often and costs more to maintain. This impacts other aspects of future readiness as every dollar spent on maintenance is a dollar less to fund modernization, infrastructure and, in some cases, training. We have to be good stewards and take care of what we have and do our best to extend the life of our equipment, both ground and aviation.
We have several ground equipment programs ongoing in the operating forces that will assist in maintaining and preserving the equipment. First, throughout the Marine Corps we are keenly aware of the benefits of good corrosion control programs. Units are now beginning to fully institutionalize systematic corrosion programs especially to equipment that routinely deploys aboard ship. Second, the Combat Readiness Storage Program (CRSP) extends the life of our equipment. In this program 15% of serviceable engineer, motor transport, selected communication equipment and ordnance assets are placed in ready storage for a two year cycle. This percentage balances garrison demands and wartime, or contingency needs. Besides protecting equipment, it preserves man-hours normally required for routine and preventive maintenance. This is important as average equipment repair order costs in our operating force units have increased by 53% over the past two years.
Third, the operating forces are also scheduling and conducting periodic maintenance standdowns. This ensures that unit maintenance times do not impact upon maintenance training or training schedules. Fourth, we are continuing to increase the use of simulation. Simulation not only augments ''live training'', but it saves wear and tear on equipment.
Page 569 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
As indicated by recently completed and ongoing operations in Albania, Aviano, Bosnia and the Congo, Marine Aviation is ready for its forward presence and warfighting missions. To maintain our aviation readiness, we instituted a Campaign Plan to address potential readiness threats. This integrated plan of 10 Points is a progressive program to maintain our historical levels of readiness within resource constraints. It addresses manning, both enlisted and aviator, the time it takes to train our fledging aviators, and the retention of our more experienced pilots, the flying hour program for training, increased use of simulators, improved material condition of our airframes and greater efficiency in our training programs.
We are committed to this program throughout Marine Aviation. Its product will be a better trained and maintained aviation force of choice for the CinC and Nation. However, the program relies upon the integrity of all parts of the plan for success. The continued guarantee of resources devoted to operations and maintenance of our squadrons are necessary for training and deployment of our squadrons and the improved condition of our airframes. Without continued, appropriate intermediate maintenance and depot funding, airframe availability required to train and deploy our aviators will be inadequate. Preservation of sustained adequate operation and maintenance funding, for both flying hours and depot maintenance, is necessary to ensure our continued readiness.
Each of these steps is a critical element in our program to extend the useful life of our operating forces' equipment until modernization occurs. Despite these efforts, O&M costs have continued to increase at a rate that soon may begin to negatively impact training and ultimately, readiness.
Page 570 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. How much of a problem is the reported migrations of OPTEMPO dollars to BASEOPS funding, and why does it occur?
General BRODERICK. For the Marine Corps, such migration is not a problem. The constraints of the ''internal reprogramming'' threshold from Operating Forces impose restraint on moving funds from operating forces, even in the face of serious deficiencies in other areas of O&M funding such as base operations or maintenance of real property.
Mr. BATEMAN. All Services: How do we obtain a more accurate, objective readiness report?
General BRODERICK. We are currently working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and other services examining additional categories of objective readiness indicators for inclusion within SORTS. Concurrently, we have contracted a study from the Center for Naval Analysis, due in May, aimed at helping us identify other valid indicators for Marine Corps use in assessing and analyzing data.
The Marine Corps has made a marked improvement in reporting accuracy with the fielding of the Global On-line Marine Edit and Report System (GOMERS) to create and format SORTS reports. This computer application ensures accurate data entry to the report, eliminates higher headquarters layering and increases timeliness of reports by allowing battalions and squadrons to report directly to the SORTS database via defense message.
The Marine Corps has made an effort to define objective criteria for SORTS ratings and other readiness factors, some of which are intangible. Additional objective measurements will provide greater information about a unit, but it is the commander's subjective assessment which fully completes the readiness picture. Those indicators which may be considered for SORTS inclusion must enhance the commander's assessment.
Page 571 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. Provide a list of major exercises generated by your service for years 1989, 1996, 1998, and 1999. Provide statement of purpose for the exercise, number of units, and approximate total cost to the service. Is there a correlated negative impact on Quality of life?
General BRODERICK. The specific data requested for each year is not readily available. However, as a Service, the Marine Corps sponsors one major exercise, the Combined Arms Exercise (CAX) program conducted at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, 29 Palms, California. The size, breadth, scope, and intent of the CAX program has been constant since 1989 and is projected to remain so.
The purpose of a CAX is to train ground and aviation units in fire support coordination. This is done utilizing live munitions.
CAXs are conducted 10 times per year; 8 in support of the active component and 2 in support of the reserve component. Three thousand Marines train in the CAX environment over a 22 day period, concluding with a three day integrated live fire exercise. In 1996, CAXs conducted cost a total of $35 million.
Quality of life (QOL) is potentially affected each time a Marine deploys for these rigorous training events, and during training time preparing for the exercise itself. Part of being a Marine, or participating in any military service requires some form of deployment. CAXs are the cornerstones of our training and do not have a correlated negative impact on QOL.
Page 572 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. How do you measure PERSTEMPO? How do you define ''deployed''? Is ''deployed'' considered the same as a day away from home? What is your current rate of PERSTEMPO?
General BRODERICK. The Marine Corps does not track PERSTEMPO. DEPTEMPO is used to track the time a unit spends away from home base or station.
Deployed time calculations for the purposes of tracking DEPTEMPO is defined as follows: ''The percentage of time in a given annual period that a unit, or element of a unit, supports operations or training away from its home base or station for a period of 10 consecutive days or greater.'' Thus, deployed time is counted only if it is ''for a period of 10 consecutive days or greater'' away from home or base station.
The Marine Corps tracks DEPTEMPO and uses the deployment of an infantry battalion for 10 days or more away from home base as the bellwether. The infantry battalion FY96 DEPTEMPO was 34%. DEPTEMPO surged to 43% during a peak period for operations and training in FY96. If infantry line companies are used to track the average FY96 DEPTEMPO, the new figure would increase to 44%. Marine fixed wing aviation DEPTEMPO ranged from 38% to 58%. Rotary wing DEPTEMPO ranged from 38% to 41%.
Mr. BATEMAN. ''We are as ready as we have ever been''. Is your service ready to execute another Desert Storm? Other than dollars, what are your greatest needs?
General BRODERICK. Since Desert Storm, our Corps has taken significant reductions in force structure, from 194,000 down to 174,000. Major reductions have been in our tank, artillery, and fixed wing aviation units. If our modernization and procurement plans stay on track, our smaller Corps will be more combat effective. The planned improvements in our ability to move a Marine Landing Force ashore from over-the-horizon provide a new framework for flexible and responsive Naval Forces. Given the above, we can execute another Desert Storm, however, today it would be more challenging than it was in 1990.
Page 573 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. What readiness ''predictive analysis'' does your service perform? How is your analysis performed?
General BRODERICK. Since SORTS data is only a snapshot in time of a unit's current posture, readiness predictive analysis must be drawn from the experience of functional area experts and coupled with other available historical data. Marine Corps readiness is cyclical at the unit level and based on planned deployment cycles. Thus, readiness levels rise and fall dependent upon a unit's schedule. Nominally, deployable Marine units spend 2/3 of their time at C–1/C–2 readiness levels, either deployed or preparing to deploy. The other 1/3 time is spent in C–3 after having just returned from an overseas deployment.
Examination of SORTS data provides the macro overview and clues to spikes in readiness levels based on known sets of circumstances. SORTS data is evaluated along with other sources. Using the Marine Corps Automated Readiness Evaluation System (MARES) we analyze logistics data and ascertain equipment readiness problems at the unit level.
Marine Corps Automated Tracking Logistics and Supply System (ATLASS) will replace MARES and provide even greater detail. Our newly instituted Marine Corps Training and Exercise Employment Plan (MCTEEP) captures unit schedules, exercise data, deployment information, costs incurred, and DEPTEMPO percentages of units away from home for more than 10 days.
Readiness levels may be predicted for units based on forecasted deployment schedules, but no set of circumstances remains exactly the same. Predictive analysis is being evaluated by a Center of Naval Analysis study for Marine Corps Readiness. Additionally, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Undersecretary for Readiness has an ongoing analysis for ways in which to gain additional data and improve our predictive analysis capability.
Page 574 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Corrective Actions
Mr. BATEMAN. Could you give us for the record an inventory of what those corrective actions are that have been identified by the Army?
General GRANGE. Internally, the biggest readiness issue we have is the force structure/manning imbalance combined with current recruiting challenges. Our enlisted accession requirement goal increased from fiscal year (FY) 96 to FY97 by 16,000 soldiers due to the leveling off of our personnel downsizing initiatives. If not achieved, this will contribute to increased turbulence and have a serious impact on future readiness across the Army. Steps we have taken to meet the challenge include increasing the number of recruiters in the field, lowering minimum high school diploma graduate rates from 95% to 90% while maintaining the quality of the force as measured by mental test scores and requiring alternate credentials such as the general equivalency diploma (GED), increasing the number of prior service enlistees to 8,000, increasing enlistment bonuses and college fund programs, and shortening minimum enlistment periods to two years for 10% of accessions. For the force structure/manning imbalance, we are internally deleting approximately 10,000 spaces out of our force structure to bring the total Army structure down from 518,000 to 508,000. Externally, the biggest readiness issue is maintaining readiness while faced with the possibility of not receiving full and timely supplemental funding for Contingency Operations (CONOPS). The current Army funding shortfall due to CONOPS is approximately $900 million. Commanders in the field are continuing to train and are not holding back funds to pay for contingency operations. However, failure to receive supplemental funding will cause training, maintenance, and perhaps even base operations (BASOPS) functions to be canceled or downgraded.
Page 575 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Sisisky mentioned newspaper accounts of high rates of AWOL being reported among Army personnel. I assume these are probably basic trainees and other fallouts from basic training of those recruits that came in.
We frequently ask and get voluntary information about recruitment and retention, but no one in the Army, nor Defense Department has mentioned this business of the fallout that we are experiencing. Is it higher than it has been? Is there a problem here? And if there is, what is the basis for it?
General BRODERICK. The Marine Corps has experienced a decrease in the ''fallout'' (desertion and AWOL or unauthorized absence, UA) during the past three years. Based on current trends we do not perceive problems.
Desertion and unauthorized absence leads to, or represents a portion of personnel losses, referred to as non-EAS attrition. Non-EAS attrition, those members who do not complete their initial obligation, has remained fairly stable since 1984, despite increases in the quality of accessions (High School graduates and mental category groups).
d16
Desertions and unauthorized absences from the Recruiting Training Depots are almost non existent (less than 1/100 percent). The supervision provided and location of the depots does not afford the member the opportunity to leave the installation.
Page 576 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
The Marine Corps has initiated a major change to address non-EAS attrition, which in turn will reduce the desertion and AWOL numbers. Transformation, a four phased approach to reduce attrition, will prepare the member for continued service. Starting in the delayed entry pool (DEP), it emphasizes our Marine Corps, core values and commitment. It continues with an additional week, to include the ''Crucible'' at recruit training. Unit cohesion, the third phase, is designed to keep most Marines together from recruit training through their first enlistment. Transformation then follows every Marine through their remaining service, by sustaining the core values and commitment until they retire or leave active service.
The Marine Corps is committed to reducing attrition and continues to explore any avenue to reduce it.
The number of Sailors deserting the Navy in fiscal year 1996 was 1878 (less than half of one percent of Navy's endstrength). Of this figure, only seven were Sailors who deserted from basic training at the Navy's Recruit Training Center (RTC). In comparing monthly averages of deserters from fiscal year 1996 to fiscal year 1997 (through February 1997), the trend depicts a slight decrease in the desertion rate from 156.5 in FY96 to 141.2 in FY97. The total number of deserters at large as of 18 February 1997 was 1551. The following table provides more detailed information regarding RTC attrition since fiscal year 1991:
It should be noted that in fiscal year 1996, only one Sailor attrited from boot camp as a result of an inability to pass the physical fitness test.
Recruitment Fallout
Page 577 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 3 Of 5
Aproximately 15% of all soldiers that begin basic training/advanced individual training/one station unit training (BCT/AIT/OSUT) fail to complete it. The 15% attrition rate in accessions is attributed primarily to physical fitness failures, discipline problems, and medical drops (due to injuries and previously undetected illnesses/ailments). The number of soldiers who fail to complete BCT/AIT/OSUT because of desertion or being absent without leave (AWOL) is quite small. The Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) lists the percentage of AWOLs and desertions in all Training Commands, less Guard and Reserve, as .08% in FY96. That is 807 AWOL/desertions out of 95,836 recruits that started training. In the Army since 1994, there has been a slight increase in the number of soldiers reported as being either AWOL or categorized as deserters. The typical soldier who goes AWOL or deserts is a junior enlistee or trainee. The Army's AWOL/desertion rate was 1.38 per thousand in 1994, 1.15 per thousand in 1995, and 1.88 per thousand in 1996.
Next Hearing Segment(4)