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MILITARY READINESS ISSUES
House of Representatives,
Committee on National Security,
Military Readiness Subcommittee,
Washington, DC., Friday, March 6, 1998.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9 a.m., aboard the U.S.S. Constellation, San Diego, CA, Hon. Herbert Bateman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HERBERT H. BATEMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. BATEMAN. The subcommittee will come to order.
I would like to welcome everyone here today to the first of a series of field hearings the Subcommittee on Military Readiness will hold this year. It is a distinct pleasure for me to hold this hearing on the U.S.S. Constellation, which is one of the United States' most visible symbols of our military capabilities. Conducting a readiness hearing here on the ''Connie'' is significant in that readiness can be seen, heard, and felt firsthand. It is also significant that many of the military services' operational bases are nearby.
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I believe that it is important to get out in the field and hear from individuals at all levels who are charged with making readiness work. I also believe that it is important that all levels of military personnel have the opportunity to review the process by which the Congress and the House National Security Committee exercises its oversight responsibilities which are mandated by our Constitution. We are here today not so much to ask questions, but rather to listen to our witnesses give their personal perspectives on current readiness in their units.
There are several reasons why it is important for members of the committee to travel to the field to hear about readiness. As many will remember, 3 years ago, while the Pentagon leadership was claiming forces were more ready than they had ever been, the committee found a serious readiness problem that was emerging in the military services. At that time the committee determined the services were in the early stages of a long-term systemic readiness problem that was not confined to any one quarter of the fiscal year.
In an attempt to understand the reasons why we are faced with readiness problems today, it may be useful to look back a few years. The Army, which conducted 10 operational events outside of the normal training and alliance commitments during the 31-year period from 1960 to 1991, has conducted 26 operational events in the 7 years since 1991. The Marine Corps, which undertook some 15 contingency operations between 1982 to 1989, has conducted 62 since the fall of the Berlin Wall. For the first time the Air Force is experiencing long-term deployments.
All of these additional deployments and contingencies have come at a time when we have reduced from 18 to 10 Army divisions, nearly half the number of Navy ships, and from 24 to 19 Air Force fighter wings. Overall, the military personnel downsizing has taken us from approximately 2.2 million active duty service members to the budget request level for fiscal year 1999 of 1.4 million active duty soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. Just doing the math tells a good deal of the story.
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Some of the indicators that initially led us to an awareness of the readiness problem were that all of the F–15E and two-thirds of the F–15C air crews based in Europe needed waivers for training requirements; 2 of the 6 Army contingency corps units, the most ready in the force, reported significantly reduced readiness ratings; and 28 Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation squadrons had to ground more than half their aircraft during September 1994.
Although dismissed by the Pentagon as anecdotal, the committee believes these indicators were indeed warning signs that could not be ignored. In an attempt to measure the administration's success these past 2 years in addressing obvious readiness shortfalls, the committee staff conducted a comprehensive readiness review during the fall of 1996. In addition, I and many other Members of Congress have been meeting with many members of the military services and visiting several military installations during the past year.
The results of the study and the meetings indicate that readiness is not improving and may be in a decline. In this context it is essential that the readiness subcommittee continue to test the Pentagon claims that the U.S. military is as ready as we have ever been, and U.S. military forces remain the best equipped, best trained, and most capable of any in the world.
One of the possible reasons there is such a disparity in the reported readiness by our military leaders and a more accurate real-world assessment of readiness may be found in the way we currently measure readiness.
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The systems currently in place to measure readiness do not take into account many of the indicators that would give a more accurate real-world readiness picture. Some of these indicators may be the amount of time individuals are away from home, the stresses of working harder and longer and doing more with less, the quantity and quality of military training, and other measures that are not currently used to assess military readiness.
Because of these concerns, the National Defense Authorization Act of 1998 includes a provision that will improve the methods by which we measure real readiness. The subcommittee is in the process of reviewing those mandated changes and will further review these concerns in a hearing later this month.
Readiness is a perishable commodity. By the time we find it is broken, it may be already too late. I believe this hearing today could be one of the most important the subcommittee will have this year. It is important that members of the committee hear what is really going on from a cross-section of our military service members who are in the know on these issues. Our aim today is to hear from those that have to deal with the day-to-day challenges with keeping readiness at an acceptable level.
We are very fortunate to have three panels of witnesses representing the four military services at all levels of command and supervision. The first panel is composed of senior commanders from major operational commands to give us their views on the big picture point of view. The second panel will have commanders of individual operational units consisting of commanders that have just returned from deployment, commanders getting ready for deployment, and other commanders that have been supporting these same deployments. And our third panel will consist of senior noncommissioned officers from these units represented on the second panel.
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I am convinced that the views of the senior NCO's, which many consider the backbone of any operational unit, are essential to an accurate assessment of readiness at the working level. I look forward to their unique perspective on these important issues.
Mr. BATEMAN. Before we get into hearing from our panels, I would like to yield to the Honorable Solomon Ortiz from the great State of Texas, who is the Ranking Democratic Member of the subcommittee, for any statement he would care to make.
Mr. Ortiz.
STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Chairman, can you all hear us OK? I know I am having a problem hearing. Now I can hear myself.
Mr. Chairman, I join with Chairman Bateman in welcoming you to this Readiness Subcommittee hearing today. I am especially pleased to be a part of this effort on the part of my colleagues to observe firsthand what readiness is all about.
Looking at readiness from your perspective, where the rubber meets the road, it is very important as we seek to provide the best national security that we can for the dollars available. Your testimony, along with what we will hear on the remaining field hearings and what we will learn in the hearings back in Washington, will help us better to understand what we should be doing to assist you in achieving your readiness goals.
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Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt that readiness is a complex matter, and measuring it is very difficult. The first question that always surfaces is what do we want the force to be ready to do? In the hearings thus far we have heard from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant Commanders-in-Chief [CINC's] that the deployment forces are very ready indeed to accomplish the combat tasks, and that is comforting. But I am concerned about what one CINC recently described as the challenges of that readiness. For whatever reason, we do not have the robustness in our capability that has influenced our readiness in the past. That includes a day-to-day readiness of the follow-on forces needed to execute the military strategy.
I am also very much concerned about our long-term ability to maintain the equipment those forces must employ. Are we allocating the right level of funds that are needed for the repair of these parts? Is the infrastructure the right size to sustain the needed current maintenance requirements and any future surge requirement? Are we retaining enough people with the right skills?
We have heard concerns being expressed about those forces that do not deploy. They are the personnel who must pick up the tasks in base operations at the many installations that remain open and functioning while the deployers set sail to distant places.
You know, we are in this game together. We want you, the witnesses, to be candid with us. We want to help. But we must know what the problems are so that we can correct them. And if funding is one of those, and I agree, in my opinion we have caught too much, too soon, too fast and this worries me. And as I look at the testimony and I read the testimony, it concerns me very, very much.
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We want to help you. We want to know exactly what is going on so that we can. We have an outstanding chairman. He wants to do, along with the rest of the Members, what is right. And again I welcome these witnesses before us today, and I am happy to be in the San Diego area. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ortiz. We have a very unique hearing room. It is a magnificent one. But the acoustics do leave a little to be desired.
Before introducing the first panel of witnesses, let me call attention to and welcome as members of our committee, temporarily at least, my colleague and your neighbor, Congressman Duncan Hunter, who chairs the Military Procurement Subcommittee of the National Security Committee. And we are happy to have him join us today.
We are also happy to have your neighbor, Randy ''Duke'' Cunningham, who serves on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. He is our bill payer, and we have to be very respectful of him in that capacity.
And, also, I think it appropriate to call attention to the fact that this is truly a homecoming for Duke Cunningham. He flew from the decks of the Connie in shooting down MiG's during the Vietnam War, and he returned to the Connie after he had been shot down. So we are delighted to have Duke aboard today and thank him for participating in our hearing.
The first panel of witnesses consists of Adm. Archie Clemins, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet; Gen. David Bramlett, Commanding General, U.S. Forces Command; Gen. Richard B. Myers, Commander, Pacific Air Force; and Lt. Gen. Jefferson Howell, Commanding General, Marine Forces Pacific.
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Admiral Clemins, before I turn it over to you, I would like to thank you and Captain Bullard for having us aboard this morning, and thank all the personnel of the U.S.S. Constellation.
The subcommittee is honored and pleased to be here today and thanks the Captain and his crew and all of you who have taken the time out of your schedules to allow us to conduct this hearing. I believe this probably is a first for the Navy. I am sure it is the first for the committee.
And with that, Admiral Clemins, we would be happy to hear your testimony.
STATEMENT OF ADM. ARCHIE CLEMINS, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET, U.S. NAVY
Admiral CLEMINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just like to open with a few brief remarks here today. It is an honor to be here before this committee. The deployed forces that we deploy are ready and trained to do the work wherever they may be, whether it is in Bosnia or Southwest Asia.
1997 was a very successful year. People worked hard and they worked smart to maintain readiness and to get the job done. Our requirements were to fly 83 percent of our primary mission requirements. We actually flew 82 percent. We steamed ships at 28 underway days and deployed 51 days per quarter. We did all the mandatory ships' maintenance, and the PAC Fleet naval aviation safety record was the best in recent history and the second best ever.
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Trying to be good stewards, there were several initiatives started in 1997, some of which you have heard of, including the Pearl Harbor shipyard integration with intermediate maintenance facility. We call that the Pearl Harbor Pilot. The regional maintenance concepts we are implementing in Pearl Harbor, in San Diego, and in the Pacific Northwest. We have consolidated our bases and infrastructure and are continuing to work that. The most recent initiative in that area is the base operating support where we go to one claimant in an area, and San Diego is the model that is leading that effort.
We are also looking to the future in what we call Information Technology for the 21st Century, where we are moving toward a network-centric approach to warfare so we can capitalize, just like industry has, on the power that gives us the ability to function in both the tactical and the tactical support arena.
We have worked hard to reduce the housing deficit for our people. The quality of life plus-up that Congress gave us last year has been used very efficiently to do unprogrammed projects.
Now, that is the good news side of the story, obviously. There are several challenges ahead. We are losing flexibility to manage our money due to the congressional budget limitations, and we are now asset-limited versus requirement-driven. Every ship, every submarine, every airplane counts, and due to the reductions that have taken place, we can no longer have people that take longer than necessary to do maintenance, or they cannot fly. And so we have to manage all those assets much more carefully than we did before.
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There are some management shortfalls that are starting to show themselves. The nonrated personnel in the Navy, we were short of those people in 1997. We have started to correct that, and it is better now than it was in 1997. The technical ratings, there is a shortage of those personnel in both the aviation and the surface community. We do not have enough senior enlisted women to man all the ships that we would like to man with the women at sea. The retention from the first term enlisted in 1997 did not meet its goals, and we have both at the department—primarily at the department head level in the aviation and the surface and the submarine communities, we are not maintaining the number of junior officers that we need to.
As far as readiness trends go, and I am sure you will have many questions on these, but the deployers are doing exceptionally well. There are downtrends in the nondeployed personnel, ships, airplanes and submarines to make sure that our deployed ships are prepared to fight when they get there. We still have the finest safety in history, but it has become obvious that we cannot take readiness for granted, and like I told you earlier, there are many moving parts that have to be balanced now to keep that readiness.
In closing, I would like to thank this committee for their strong support, and we look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, Admiral Clemins.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Clemins can be found in the appendix on page 275.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Let me mention for the benefit of all the witnesses that we have your prepared written statements. I had the pleasure of being able to read through them on that flight from Washington last night. We will make them a part of the record of the committee's proceedings, and you may then proceed with whatever remarks you choose to make.
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The next witness is Gen. David Bramlett, Commander, U.S. Forces Command. General, we are pleased to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF GEN. DAVID A. BRAMLETT, COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY FORCES COMMAND, U.S. ARMY
General BRAMLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a very special honor for me to be here. It is always exciting for a soldier to be aboard a ship, particularly one that is not moving, which is the way I like it.
What I would like to do is briefly summarize some key points from my testimony, the written record that has been submitted, if I might. But first, by way of introduction, my responsibilities as U. S. Army Forces Command Commander is to represent, quite frankly, the 779,000 men and women who serve as the ready force prepared to deploy around the world to support our war-fighting CINCs or to assist our civil authorities should we provide military support.
In that number are 200,000 active men and women, 29,000 civilians, 185,000 members of the Army Reserve, and 365,000 men and women in the Army National Guard. So it is an extensive command, and I am very, very proud to represent those soldiers and their families here.
As a force provider, it is my responsibility to train, mobilize, deploy and sustain those forces; sustain in the sense that should we find forces in the Pacific or Europe, when it comes time to rotate them, it is my responsibility to send those who will replace them over there.
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Key points I would make about your Army today: First, we are ready; most obviously demonstrated recently at Fort Stewart, GA, where the 3d Infantry Division, a brigade of the 3d Infantry, deployed to Southwest Asia on short notice. Six thousand one hundred soldiers and 6,000 tons of materiel shipped in 7 days in cooperation with the Air Force. It took us over 30 days to do that in the gulf war. There is no more vivid demonstration of our Army's readiness today, I think, than that statistic.
We are a very busy Army. As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the rate of deployments are up dramatically, to say nothing of our own station training, our deployments at the combat training centers and a host of other activities we are involved in. So it is a busy time not only for the Army, but for all our sister services.
We are a total Army; 54 percent of this Army, as you may have picked up, are members of the Reserve components. We are very proud of that. Of the 22,000 soldiers and 305 units Forces Command has sent to Bosnia to support that mission since the signing of the Dayton Accords, fully three-quarters of the units and over 50 percent of the soldiers are either National Guardsmen and women or members of the Army Reserve, a statistic known by very few in this country and a tribute to our Reserve component and the integration of our Army.
We are also a married Army. That is very important. Two-thirds of our soldiers are married today. When myself and members of this panel were young lieutenants and ensigns, those were not the statistics. They were not the military that we have today. Our families are our great strength, not only to our soldiers, but also to the fabric of our Army, and also, quite frankly, affects the way we measure readiness.
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And we measure readiness three ways: First, the more traditional sense of training, or go-to-war readiness; the infrastructure, which are our bases and posts, our training areas, our marshaling areas, our rail heads and, quite frankly, the homes of the men and women who serve; and, thirdly, the quality of life with respect to the services we provide these great men and women who serve and their families.
Where are we in Forces Command in a nutshell? A year ago I would have told you personnel problems were the major reported issue. Today, I report to you that it is a lack of resources. Given the three ways we measure readiness, the priority in Forces Command is, as you would have it, our go-to-war readiness. We have told our commanders in the field to make sure our forces are ready when they are called upon, such as they were at Fort Stewart, and that is our priority.
As a result, our funding for infrastructure, that is to say our power projection, and also our quality of life programs, have become the bill payers for that priority. We know of no other way to do it other than to be prepared to respond to serve the Republic. But therein is the problem. We are accepting great risk in our quality of life and our infrastructure programs.
As I look at the readiness indicators, again as our chairman commented on, you look at the statistical data that comes in our unit status reports, or our source data, and it shows a very positive picture. Indeed, we have personnel problems that seem to be getting better. We have been short maintenance personnel, noncommissioned officers in the maintenance areas, captains and majors, but we are working through that as we look to the future.
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Today, though, we see the indication of a lack of funds to be the major shortcoming. We read of commanders transferring monies into our mission accounts so that we are prepared to do the things I discussed with you just a moment ago.
We also measure readiness by the performance of our units at our combat training centers and by the reports we get, by the analysis we make notwithstanding that our heavy forces enter the National Training Center at a relatively lower level than they did perhaps 8 to 10 years ago. Nonetheless, their ability to assimilate the lessons in that great learning environment and emerge as a, well, better trained organization and return to home station and maintain their readiness has been more than adequate, more than satisfactory. We feel very, very good about those indicators.
And of course the final indication is how do they perform on deployments, be it Bosnia, be it Southwest Asia, or the multinational force observers. Wherever our soldiers have gone, they have performed to the highest standards, which is finally the best testament of our readiness.
So my message in closing is that our challenge in the Army is to make do with the resources we have. As you know, we have invested for future readiness to make sure the men and women that follow my generation have the equipment and the knowledge to be prepared to sustain the world's greatest Army. And to do that in the near term, we have accepted the degree of risk as we balance scarce dollars in the current posture. The missions will continue, and we will continue to be ready.
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Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you General Bramlett.
[The prepared statement of General Bramlett can be found in the appendix on page 293.]
Mr. BATEMAN. And now we will hear from Gen. Richard B. Myers, Commander of the Pacific Air Force.
General Myers, pleased to have you.
STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, COMMANDER, PACIFIC AIR FORCES, U.S. AIR FORCE
General MYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. And first I would like to thank you for coming such a long way in the middle of the night from Washington, DC, to discuss readiness with the four of us. I think that says a lot about your interest in things that are of great interest to ourselves.
I would also like to thank you for the plus-ups that we have gotten in the 1998 bill, specifically, think of the quality of life enhancements and the additional funding that was put in there for biological and chemical defense that is having a positive impact as we speak in the Pacific Air Force; and we thank you very much for that.
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I am going to suspend with opening remarks. You have the written testimony. I would just like to say that the Pacific Air Force's 42,000 men and women that I represent sitting here at this table are ready to do their job today. The details are in the written testimony.
We certainly have some challenges, and I would be happy to discuss that with you. But we will just let the testimony stand, and I will wait for your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Myers can be found in the appendix on page 310.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, General. Now, we are ready to hear from Lt. Gen. Jefferson Howell, Commanding General, Marine Forces Pacific.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JEFFERSON D. HOWELL, JR., COMMANDER, MARINE FORCES PACIFIC, U.S. MARINE CORPS
General HOWELL. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, gentlemen. I am indeed honored to be here with you this morning. As I tell my Marines every day, it is great to be alive and in the Corps. And it is great to be in the Pacific with the Pacific Marines.
I am pleased to tell all of you that your Pacific Marines are ready for combat. I am concerned about our ability to sustain that readiness in the future, given our aging equipment and our inability to replace it as quickly as we should.
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You have my testimony, and I am waiting for your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Howell can be found in the appendix on page 322.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, General Howell. Thank you all.
General Bramlett, you mentioned that in the surge to southwest Asia in recent weeks and months, that you were able to deploy over 6,000 Army troops in a period of just 2 or 3 days. That is a remarkable accomplishment and one that I don't take at all lightly.
But I have some concern that if we look back to Desert Storm/Desert Shield where we had to deploy over 400,000 troops to Saudi Arabia or to the Persian Gulf area, I am not sure that we are ready or able to do that today or, if we could do it at all, that we could sustain it.
I am concerned that we wore out a lot of equipment in those deployments in the Persian Gulf war, equipment that has gotten older and older and more and more difficult to maintain since, and which we aren't replacing.
Throughout all the services, I am hearing complaints about the extreme difficulty and pressure to maintain wearing-out equipment, what it is doing in terms of budgets, what it is doing in terms of demand on personnel, what it is doing in terms of their ability to meet other challenges, because they are so stressed just in the context of maintaining their equipment.
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I don't want to make this a speech, but I am generally concerned that I hear about all of these complaints. But I am not seeing, as a Member of Congress, a proposed defense budget that lets you get about modernizing and replacing this equipment. It is generally a matter of concern.
I would like to hear your reaction, General Bramlett, or any other members of the panel.
General BRAMLETT. Mr. Chairman, if I could address first our ability to operate over a period of time to deploy the forces. You are correct; we deployed in a relatively short time our brigade task force, 6,000 soldiers. There was a second brigade task force to follow.
If we had to deploy larger forces—fortunately, since the gulf war, working with the services sitting here with me, we now have large medium-speed Roll-on-Roll-offships [RO–RO's], which are extraordinary ships. In fact, they were built right here at National Ship Building Co. [NASCO]. We also have 31 additional RO–RO's ships. We have the C–17. We have 36 of those and building toward 120. The capability of those three systems will allow us to close very, very quickly, working with the Navy and Air Force and also the Marine Corps.
The equipment we have been systematically modernizing with appropriate portions of our budget since the gulf war. We are now fielding the A2 tank. It is a follow-on to the M1A1, extraordinarily sophisticated and much more lethal than its predecessor.
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We have a follow-on Bradley, which is called Operation Desert Storm. It is a modification based on our experience in the desert. We have a new Howitzer, the A–6, which is the Paladin, which again is a level of sophistication up from its predecessor.
Now, on the other end, our trucks, which aren't very glamorous and obviously overlooked—and let me make a plug now. We do need the trucks to keep up with, quite frankly, the more renowned and recognizable pieces of our Army arsenal.
But, Mr. Chairman, I think we have been systemic in our approach over the years since the gulf war, and now we are investing in the future to make sure we continue that trend and prepare ourselves.
Mr. BATEMAN. Any other witnesses have comments?
If not, Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, one of the biggest problems that I have seen as we have these hearings and throughout the years, is a problem with maintenance work. And I know from testimony that I have heard in the past that there is a backlog, into the millions of dollars, in maintenance work.
Do you have any problem with spare parts or maintenance work and equipment that needs to be maintained, but because you don't have the money, you don't maintain it?
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Admiral CLEMINS. I would like to answer that first, Congressman. On the aviation side of the equation, we have measured our backlog, and we have changed how we have done that, and in the 1998, 1999 and the 2000 budget is we spend the money to buy readiness; because if you use the backlog metric on aviation, that assumes you bought the right number of airplanes to start with, then therefore the backlog is some such semblance.
So we are buying down the backlog that will actually buy us readiness in the squadrons, and we have made the first commitment on that in 1998. We are doing that in 1999. And we are doing that in 2000. That will have taken us, by the end of 2000, where every airplane squadron throughout their cycle will have 90 percent of their primary aircraft requirement. And then, within the last 6 months prior to deployment, they will be up to their primary aircraft assignment lists at that particular time.
That is a real change. Now, having said that, if you go—and I am sure you will hear this this afternoon, that we do have problems in the area of cannibalization in the nondeployed forces on the spare parts.
And I am sure when you speak to the chief and to the squadron commander from VFA–113, he will reemphasize that to you; that getting the right spare part at the right time and getting the number of spare parts is an issue in getting them fixed.
I would like to emphasize that every time we do have to cannibalize, that means somebody has to do the maintenance action at least twice, which makes the workload double what it should be on the petty officers and the senior enlisted that are actually doing that maintenance item.
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Mr. ORTIZ. Would anybody else like to address that? General.
General MYERS. Congressman Ortiz, I would like to discuss that as well. For the Air Force, it is much like, I think, the Navy experience. While our overall readiness is very good, and over 90 percent of our forces are either C–1 or C–2, according to the readiness reporting we go through, and I believe that is an accurate——
Mr. ORTIZ. Can you get the mike closer to you, General, please?
General MYERS. This is better. I was saying that, overall, our readiness is quite good right now. We report over 90 percent of our units are either C–1 or C–2 by reporting. And you all know what that means.
But below the surface it is like the duck on a pond. There is a lot going on under water you can't see. And you will hear that as well this afternoon, because we do have currently some spare shortages.
The Air Force has just recently taken a decision with the Air Force Materiel Command to try to fix that in the near term. And I think our 1999 budget that is before you goes a long way to properly funding spares, for the first time in a long time in the Air Force, up around the 95 percent level. And we hope the following year will go to the 100 percent level.
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The way this manifests itself on the ramp is that our readiness spare packages that go to war with us, our fill rates are quite low. And the mechanic on the line often doesn't have the spare parts to do his work, so he must take it off the good airplane and put it on the flyer, today's flyer; we call that cannibalization. That really creates double or sometimes triple work to do that.
So we are ready. But in a sense, we are doing that on the backs of our people, asking them to work harder. You will hear some of them, I am sure, this afternoon.
But I think the budget that is before you, the 1999 budget does a good job of balancing the readiness and modernization and quality-of-life issues. And I guess my forecast is that we will be a little bit better in the future than we are currently here today.
Mr. BATEMAN. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. ORTIZ. Yes. I yield to the Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. General, you have intrigued me more than a little in the reference to the 1999 budget submission. We are told that it includes an additional $1 billion for spare parts. And while we are told that, we don't have the budget documents that we customarily would get; we can't verify it.
And one of the things I find a little alarming is that in a hearing earlier this week, I was advised that the money, appropriated funds for commissaries which used to be an Office of Secretary of Defense expenditure is, in this budget submission, being treated as an O&M expenditure of each of the three military services. That totals 800-some-odd million dollars.
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And so this budgetary ledger demand, it looks like to me that $1 billion that you are looking for in extra money for spare parts may not be there. I hope you can help us find it because we recognize the need for it, and we are very encouraged when we heard it was there. We want it to be really there, not rhetorically there.
General MYERS. Mr. Chairman, I couldn't agree with you more. We want it to be there, too. I don't have the visibility either.
Mr. BATEMAN. You all whisper it to the folks in the Pentagon, because we really need the documentation on this. And it will alleviate my worries, and I am sure yours, too.
General MYERS. Mr. Chairman, we will holler at them.
General HOWELL. Sir, may a make a comment on Congressman Ortiz's question?
Mr. BATEMAN. Certainly.
General HOWELL. I am very proud of our logistics system, both on the ground side and aviation side. As Admiral Clemins said, we have come a long way in providing the types of parts and spares that we need to keep our equipment up. Where our big challenge is, our equipment is getting so low, it is taking twice as many parts as before. And on top of that, the prices of our spares and parts have gone up exponentially. And a lot of it was unpredicted.
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So we are finding some key parts to aircraft and ground equipment is doubled and tripled in price from a year ago. And so that cuts into your budget. You had to take money from other things to buy those things. And so you are robbing from other accounts. And that way you can't fix as many houses and do other things.
So we are going to make sure we are ready, but we are having to take money from other accounts to do that. And it is killing quality of life and those other types of issues. So that is our biggest challenge right now.
Mr. ORTIZ. Can you tell me why the prices have gone up? Any idea as to why?
General HOWELL. Sir, I cannot. We have identified—you know, we are into our second quarter this year. And we have been quite surprised and alarmed by the increased calls for aviation and parts for ground equipment that were unexpected. We are going to try to identify that, and we are going to the Supply and Logistics Command to find out what has happened, because this is really hitting us hard right now.
Mr. ORTIZ. Now, again, I am assuming that the retention rate for mechanics is horrible. Am I wrong? Am I right?
General MYERS. The——
Mr. ORTIZ. The retention rate for the mechanics who maintain the equipment. What is the retention, gentlemen?
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General MYERS. Let me take that on in terms of the Air Force. I think our experience has been that in certain disciplines, that is absolutely true. F–16 crew chiefs, helicopter mechanics, the second-term and the first-term retention has been low. And those are typically the disciplines and the skills that are deployed the most right now.
To fix that, the Air Force has reinstituted the enlistment bonus to target those peripherals. In fact, to target several peripherals, we went from 40-some bonuses to now I think it is 84, to target those specific skills where we are having retention problems. And the best we can tell, it is still early, but it looks like that is starting to turn that around. But that is generally true. The ones that deploy the most, at least in the Air Force, is the mechanics fields have the force retention.
Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Bramlett.
General BRAMLETT. Congressman, if I might also add my comments, the maintenance posture is a function, as you mentioned, parts and also the maintenance personnel. We are short maintenance personnel. I think the way for me to respond to retention is mention our No. 1 recruiting effort—for turret mechanics for our Bradley and our tank, which I think probably answers your question a different way.
What our commanders do on parts, there is a desired level of skill at both the unit level and the next unit up. The commanders make a decision on those they can afford to have on hand to make sure we are fully mission capable and then some. And they are making a selected decision based on the money they have. This is the balancing act that I think General Howell spoke about where money shifts around.
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And I think to reinforce the point that Admiral Clemins made, and I would like to add—that is, that when we move that flexibility, move that money around to balance the components and readiness, it really hurts our commanders in the field. And I think maintenance is one area where they make very fine decisions based on what they have.
Thank you.
Mr. ORTIZ. I am going to pass on to my colleagues. I think that the logic as to where they did that was because Members were concerned about the maintenance work. And they were afraid some of this money might be transferred elsewhere, and the maintenance was not getting done. But again, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't want to take all the time. If there is a second round, I will ask some other questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ortiz. Next I will ask if Congressman Hansen has any questions.
Mr. HANSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Following the 1992 election, the chairman of our committee was Les Aspin from Wisconsin. Les Aspin was made the Secretary of Defense and launched into something called the Bottom-Up Review. I am sure you remember that well. We poured over that review. And it said that the military should be in a position to take care of two conflicts at the same time.
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Could I have some comment on that? Do you, gentlemen, feel that the respected services that you represent here, that you could handle two relatively major conflicts at the same time?
Admiral CLEMINS. Congressman, I will answer that first. If you take the preparedness that we are currently in for southwest Asia, and as you know, if you take nearly two simultaneous conflicts, there is a time period in there which you assume that you are going to have to do that. Every day, we evaluate whether we can meet those time lines that we need to meet, whether we have the ordnance, whether we have the forces trained, and whether we can go through that process. For the Navy, that pertains primarily to carrier battle groups, and fitness ready groups with the Marine Corps.
And as we look at that, there is some risk and some categories on that second major theater of conflict that we would have to deal with, with certain segments of the forces, certain segments of ordnance, et cetera.
Mr. HANSEN. Admiral, while you are on that, in the event that we had a problem between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, like there was some flexing of muscles not too long ago, would the Navy be in a position to do anything about it right now? In other words, I would like to know, are there any carrier battle groups between the Hawaiian Islands and the Pacific rim at the present time?
Admiral CLEMINS. No. 1, I was a service fleet commander out in that portion of the world when that situation took place. And there is nobody that could respond today in 3 days like the U.S.S. Independence responded in 1996.
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Mr. HANSEN. The Independence now is in the Persian Gulf.
Admiral CLEMINS. Persian Gulf. Yes, sir.
Mr. HANSEN. Do you have any carrier battle groups between the Hawaiian Islands and the Pacific rim at the present time?
Admiral CLEMINS. No, sir, I do not. The closest battle group you have is the Abraham Lincoln, which is the current next supporter that is working up. That is on the west coast of the United States. And the next closest battle group you have to that is the Independence that is in the Persian Gulf at this time.
Mr. HANSEN. Isn't this the first time for many years that there hasn't been a carrier battle group somewhere in the Pacific?
Admiral CLEMINS. We have had occasions when that has occurred in the past. In fact, at one time we had deployed the Independence to the Persian Gulf. But with the force structure size the way it is now, when you have the presence that you have in the Persian Gulf, there is no secret that you have less presence both in the western Pacific and even in the Mediterranean.
Mr. HANSEN. And in my years on the Intelligence Committee, I always became nervous about some of the nations that were starting to gain more power and clout in various areas. And as I look at North Korea, as I look at the People's Republic of China, as you go over to the Mediterranean, Qadhafi, Rafsanjani, Saddam Hussein, it seems to me, and I am just giving you my opinion for what it is worth, I don't think that the results of the Bottom-Up Review is now accurate. I do not think that we have the military force in the various areas in the Pacific rim or in Europe or in the Mediterranean that we really could do it.
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And I know that doesn't amount to much here. But in my humble opinion, I don't think we are capable of taking care of those things. And, Mr. Chairman, I consider that a real problem as far as military readiness goes.
Thank you very much for your response. I do appreciate it.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hansen. Next I recognize the gentleman from Guam, Mr. Underwood.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very happy to hear the testimony. And just as a brief follow-up to what Mr. Hansen has mentioned, you were saying that if, for example, we had a crisis in the Taiwan Straits now, Admiral Clemins, what would be the sailing time that we could get a carrier battle group there?
Admiral CLEMINS. It would be at least 14 days.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. Fourteen days. Is that consistent with some of the assumptions that were put into the Bottom-Up Review that we could—14 days seems like a heck of a long time. Was the assumption that we could get there within 3 days, 5 days? Were there any assumptions built into that review?
Admiral CLEMINS. I am sitting here thinking about the assumptions. And I will have to get back to you on that answer.
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[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 485.]
Mr. UNDERWOOD. OK. Well then, I can assume from that that we really are a little bit wide of the mark on even the assumptions that we put into that process. And it is something, of course, that I think all members of the committee are very concerned with and certainly I am very concerned with. I am just trying to get a handle on the whole issue of—the issue of readiness. And there has been—you know, you would have to excuse that maybe I am kind of merging all of your testimonies together, because trying to read through 20 testimonies for today is a little bit complicated.
But there have been almost—the sense that I get from looking at your—reading your testimonies, hearing you today, I am very interested in the testimonies as well of the enlisted personnel that are going to come on later, because they had some very interesting comments that are driven by anecdotal evidence. The assumption that I am getting is that we are ready today, but this cannot be sustained over time, that the—even though the anecdotal evidence is not, does not jibe with the existing readiness indicators that we have today, they are perhaps indicators of some weaknesses in the whole structure, in the whole system of readiness. And there have been items offered out like logistical problems, spare parts, experience gap in the technical fields, particularly trading opportunities, and the demands on individuals and OPTEMPO and those levels.
So what I would like to get is that, since all of those are—and maybe there are many other factors that go into this, but those are the things that seem to come out in the testimonies that I read. Perhaps each one of you could characterize for me which of those four or perhaps some other elements are of the most serious concern, by service, for your readiness levels as they exist today.
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What are the problem areas that you are most concerned with in looking at those factors and perhaps other factors that I did not mention? Perhaps we could start with General Bramlett and just go down the line.
General BRAMLETT. Thank you, Congressman. As we look at the factors that you have outlined, as I mentioned, the priority we place on our scarce resources is going to our readiness. The bill payers are in our infrastructure and our quality of life.
To follow up on your theme, if the perception of our soldiers that serve so well, and their families, that the impacts are in the bases they live and the programs that support them are sufficiently severe, then we may see problems with soldiers leaving the service.
Our retention rates are currently over 100 percent for the first quarter of fiscal year 1998. We talk to our soldiers and families a lot and make them aware of the difficulties we are facing now. But I think that is the vulnerability that I worry about, that the price we are asking in our infrastructure and quality of life to make sure that we can do what we are required to do may come to haunt us in the outyears. And the commanders, we pay a lot of attention to that and, quite frankly, we are very concerned.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. Thank you very much.
Admiral.
Admiral CLEMINS. The 1999 budget is a very good budget, but it is only as good as the models that we use. And as we keep learning more, we find out that some things didn't incorporate into the model and then we have to solve those in execution. I think you all know that as well as we do.
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Right now with the size of the force we have, we have everything so integrated that as you make one decision, you affect three or four other items down the road. I was commenting at breakfast today that I can no longer afford to have a ship come out of maintenance late because he is on a train to get somewhere. Or I can't afford to have—to lose one ship or one airplane squadron or something like that for materiel problems.
Having said that, if you don't invest in your people, it is clear that there is nothing else we can do. And my top three areas of concern that I work on most of the time first is the manpower counts, like you heard, the qualified technicians. The second issue is the retention of junior officers. And the third issue is the Flying Arrow Program, and those that were mentioned by General Howell and the other issues.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. OK, could you repeat the third issue, please?
Admiral CLEMINS. The Flying Arrow Program.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. The Flying Arrow Program.
Admiral CLEMINS. Just to amplify that a little bit, the Flying Arrow Program consists of three things. It consists of fuel to fly the airplanes. It consists of spare parts at the intermediate-level maintenance activity used to repair those airplanes. And then it is aviation depot-level repairs that are beyond the capability of the intermediate level, and they have to go back to the depot level to be repaired.
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OK, so getting all that together, to get a flight hour right, so that you don't have to cannibalize parts, so you have the right spares, those are my three top issues.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. General.
General MYERS. Congressman, I think you have hit upon the essence of this. It is not just the spare parts issue which we have talked about. It is the other factors that my colleagues have brought up. I would just mention that infrastructure is very important to the Air Force, of course. And I would—whether it is Anderson Air Force Base, Guam, or we need some supplemental help for the national disaster typhoon or supertyphoon pocket that went through there, we need to get that infrastructure back up operational, so we can, you know, utilize Anderson Air Force Base. Or whether it is Korea, where we send most of our folks, over 90 percent of them over there 1 year, unaccompanied, away from their families, and the infrastructure there is just in very, very poor shape.
And there will be some items before you in this year's budget where we need help. That is as much as readiness, as a spare part for an F–15. It is a vital part of readiness.
The other thing that concerns me is retention. And of course in the Air Force, you know, it is well publicized that we have pilot retention issues. And we thank the committee for their support of the increase to our pilot bonus, so-called pilot bonus. And we think that is helping, but it is still fairly early to tell.
OSD has an effort now to look at overall aviation career incentive pay and will be coming to you with their proposals after they finish their study. And we would appreciate support in that realm as well. But that is one of the issues that worries me and one of the things that I try to work, personally, as I can.
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Another one is, of course, our first-term and career retention for our enlisted force is good. Our second-term retention is—has taken a turn below our goal. I think the reenlistment bonuses will help there. But we also need to make sure that we are properly manned in those career fields that are undermanned at this point. And I would specifically mention our security forces who are busier than ever and some of our mechanics.
Now, having said that, in the Pacific Air Forces, as in the European Air Forces, because we are forward deployed, we get priority on people and on parts. And so we are in better shape than General Howell. If he were to talk to you for the near combat command, his hat on, he will say his total mission-capable rate for his fighters is probably 7 percent below what ours is in the Pacific and the CANN rates and so forth that go along with that. We are in better shape in the Pacific. So I need to caveat what I say with that. We have a little better priority when we are forward deployed, particularly on the Korean peninsula.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. Thank you.
General.
General HOWELL. Sir, this hearing is so important to me and to the Marine Corps because, as you know, the whole ethos of the corps is to be ready for combat. We see ourselves as a ready force.
The 82d Congress mandated that we be most ready when the Nation is least ready. So we take this very, very seriously. So I am going to make sure that we are ready; which means that whatever we have to do, we will sacrifice to make sure that our forces are ready for whatever needs to be done.
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If we have old equipment, it takes more and more time to work on and to fix so it can go to the field and be used to train with, that deprives us of that opportunity to be ready. So how do we do that? Our maintenance personnel spend hours and hours under those vehicles or what have you to make sure they can go out in the field the next day and train with the Marines. And we take it out of our hide. And it is those young marines that have to give that sacrifice to make sure that we can do the things we need to do to be ready when our Nation wants us to be ready.
If we have older equipment, it just means much more and more maintenance time to turn it around so that we can be ready. We need to recapitalize. We need to procure more gear so that our marines don't have to spend so much time maintaining them, and they can use them out in the field and work with them. It is the least we can do for these fine Marines that we have.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. Well, thank you. It seems that there is—and this is something that has always been of interest to me, to try to understand what are the objective criteria that go into readiness measures versus what you hear from people who are experiencing their profession on a day-to-day level.
And when you read through these testimonies, you get the anecdotal evidence. And sitting from where you are at, it is very hard to try to combine the anecdotal evidence with your own existing readiness measures. And it is that disconnect.
But on the other hand, I take it from—even from your comments, General, that the Marines are ready to do whatever it is they are going to be asked to do. And I assume that, basically, that is true for all the services. But asking people to do more with less can only be sustained for a very short period of time. You end up getting less with less.
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And one of the—one of the written testimonies in there by an enlisted man said exactly that. When you ask people to do more with less, you are really fooling yourself. You are going to end up doing less with less.
But it is a perceptual problem, I think, that we are getting from the lower ranks and that has to somehow fit into the equation of how we measure readiness. It does appear that there may be a day of reckoning here where this all comes together in a very negative way. And I am hoping that by the kinds of testimonies we are going to hear today, that we will get some of that clarified in my own thinking.
General HOWELL. Sir, can I make just one more comment on the parts?
Mr. UNDERWOOD. Certainly.
General HOWELL. That day hasn't come yet. I want to assure all of you here that we are not a hollow force. We are ready, and you can be confident of that. However, you are right; the trends don't look good. And we are very concerned about the future if things keep going the way they are going.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. If the members of the subcommittee will indulge me, I would like now to recognize our colleague, Duncan Hunter.
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Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me? Good. In our shop, in procurement, we handle ammunition accounts. And last year, we made a request to the Army and to the Marine Corps to give us basic ammunition shortfalls for the two-MRC scenario that Mr. Hansen spoke so eloquently about, the ability to fight two wars nearly simultaneously.
General Howell, the Marine Corps came up with a list that said we are $300 million short on basic ammunition requirements. Do you agree with that?
General HOWELL. Yes, sir; I do.
Mr. HUNTER. Would you like to have that $300 million worth of ammunition?
General HOWELL. Yes, sir, I would. We have to balance that with the other things we need, too. But I think we are on track to get what we need but we are short, sir.
Mr. HUNTER. So my question to you is: Do you think it is fair for this country to put you, the Marines, in a position where you have to choose between M–16 bullets, and you were 93 million M–16 bullets short last year of basic ammo requirements, is it fair for us to make you balance and prioritize between having M–16 bullets or having quality of life for your troops?
General HOWELL. Sir, we need to be ready for combat, but we need to take care of our families, too.
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Mr. HUNTER. General Bramlett, the request we made of the Army, the Army said that they are $1.6 billion short of basic ammo requirements for the two major regional conflict [MRC] scenario. Are you aware of that letter that was sent out by the Army on that?
General BRAMLETT. Congressman, I have not seen that figure. That is not at all to say it is not accurate. I frankly, because of my role, I deal with the training ammunition detail so I would like to take that for the record if I might and confirm it with you.
Mr. HUNTER. OK. Gentlemen, what we can do basically is allocate money and spend money between the authorization committees, subcommittees and the Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense. We can spend money.
You have told us that you have—as I understand it, the problem with readiness here is not that you do not have that spare part in that aircraft right now, the problem is there are not many of those spare parts behind it on the shelf. Is that an accurate summary; that there is a lack of depth in terms of spare parts, not necessarily a lack of spare parts at the moment, if you take a snapshot?
General BRAMLETT. If I could answer first. From the Army's perspective, from forces command specifically, it is balancing the money we have to buy the spare parts. I am not aware that as we look to fill what the appropriate amount is that we are not able to purchase it based on the money we have. So I think I would qualify it in that sense.
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General MYERS. For the Air Force, I would mention that in some cases it is not having the parts and in other cases it is having the parts but not the parts to fix the parts. And we have taken steps internally to work that issue with Air Force Materiel Command. So it is a little bit of both, Congressman.
Mr. HUNTER. Admiral Clemins.
Admiral CLEMINS. I would add one more comment to that, because it is the parts to fix it and it is the spare parts. But it is one step more than that, because it is not just simply throwing money at it, although that certainly helps. The other issue is, if you are not getting the mean time between failures which the part was supposed to deliver, that has an impact on it, too. And there are parts, different parts this year than last year, that are not getting them the mean time between failures for what they were bought for. So it is all that, Congressman.
General HOWELL. Sir, I think overall the parts picture for us is very robust. We do have some individual items that are rare that we are hurting for but really what is hurting us more than anything is the cost more than just not having them.
Mr. HUNTER. That leads me to my last question. You, obviously, gentlemen, all of you, have had to figure out what you need not only in the immediate situation with respect to day-to-day readiness, but what you need behind that, what you need in the spare parts pipeline, if you will.
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Now, you have also all spoken of having to shift money from other accounts. I presume that is from the quality of life accounts, from modernization accounts. My budget went down from what the President offered us in his 5-year blueprint from $60 billion for modernization until, when we got to this year, of $48 billion. So we took $12 billion this year out of the modernization account somewhere along the line, and I presume a lot of that went to readiness.
So my question for each of you is this: Without robbing any other accounts, that is without any shifting, how much in dollar terms do you need in spare parts to have not only immediate readiness but sustained readiness over the next several years?
General Bramlett, have you made any estimates like that?
General BRAMLETT. Well, Congressman, not in that context. As I had mentioned, as we look at the requirements we face in fiscal year 1998 and 1999 and out years, we can estimate the amount. If you want a specific figure for robustness, I would have to take it for the record and run that specific cut.
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 485.]
Mr. HUNTER. General, I think that is the heart of the matter. I think you not only need to have readiness, and if we have to fight those two MRC's and those two MRC's go on longer than we suspected, longer than 6 months, longer than a year, you need to have not only a part on the shelf, you need a part behind that part on the shelf. Any corporation that is planning for over a 5-year or 10-year period figures out what it needs not only immediately in its vehicles and its machinery but in the pipeline.
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Certainly there has been an analysis to show what you need. And since what we need is not simply anecdotal evidence, not simply generalizations about looks like the trend is not good. All we can do is try to spend money, authorize money, appropriate money to give you what you need. So I want to repeat the question.
Without robbing any other accounts, that is without any shifting, how much in dollar terms are you short in spare parts not only for the immediate state of readiness but for sustainability over the next several years, sustained readiness?
General BRAMLETT. Congressman, I would like to take that for the record so that I can prepare the assumptions, because I think that would be very important given your description of what you see.
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 485.]
Mr. HUNTER. Don't you agree that that is the question we have to have answered?
General BRAMLETT. Yes, sir. I think it will be important to have the assumptions so we see the basis for the figures.
Mr. HUNTER. We need to give you what you need.
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General BRAMLETT. Yes, sir.
Mr. HUNTER. Admiral Clemins.
Admiral CLEMINS. I agree that is the right question, with a couple of modifications. The supplementals that were sent to Congress yesterday, because things do change, and when you look at the increased operations that has come about as a result of both the Southwest Asia and Bosnia, I can tell you how much I need as a result of just those evolutions, quite frankly, and I can tell you what I need in 1999 to do that, and I will also take it for the record and provide that information, Congressman.
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 485.]
Mr. HUNTER. If you can do that for the record. And don't presume the supplemental, just give us the facts and we will be able—if we have a $2 billion supplemental, we will be able to deduct that from the figure you give us; okay?
General Myers.
General MYERS. Congressman Hunter, I agree with Admiral Clemins that the contingency supplemental is very important to the Pacific Air Force. If we do not get that money, we will have to take that out of flyer hours or other quality of life or infrastructure projects that will have real detrimental effect.
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I would say on the overall issue of spare parts, that the 1999 budget, where the chairman says he does not have the documentation he would like to have, I believe it is our feeling in the Air Force that the 1999 program goes a long way toward achieving the ends that you say is required to get us the spare parts to take us into the future.
Of course, we need the 2000 budget as well as the 2001.
Mr. HUNTER. Let me hold you up on that one. I like the words ''goes a long way,'' but sometimes that means taking 10 percent of the problem and funding it. We had a $300 million shortfall in Marine ammo and the recommendation was that we get $20 million of that this year.
I need to have that question answered, as to what you think you need to have not only immediate readiness but sustained readiness over the next several years. That is the question we need answered. And we will try to figure out if we are taking off a big enough bite each year. But we need that answer from you. That is the only way we can really address this question.
General Howell.
General HOWELL. Sir, I know in the Marine Corps' dream dollar account we need $1.2 billion to procure the equipment we need to replace what we have. I know it has been about half that amount for the last 3 years.
The Commandant has testified to that before you, I believe, and so a figure for the replacement of just rolling stock in the capital year of $1.2 billion. As far as spares, I will have to take that for the record, sir. I cannot answer that specifically.
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[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 485.]
Mr. HUNTER. Rolling stock, though, you need an additional $1.2 billion?
General HOWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. HUNTER. And if you will get the last of that spare parts question, that will be great.
General HOWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hunter.
Admiral CLEMINS. Mr. Chairman, may I just make one more comment for Congressman Hunter?
If you look at it from this position of it is more than just what you ask, because I have to get all the ship maintenance done whether I have the dollars or not. I have to get all the ship maintenance done. I have to get all the flying done.
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Mr. HUNTER. Admiral, we understand that. That is why I ask you without robbing other accounts. Because what we want to do is be able to give you what you need.
I don't think it is fair for us to say we have this amount of money and you have to report to us that you are having to shift money around in accounts and you are having to balance M–16 bullets against having quality of life; balance spares against being able to steam to a contingency, as you have had to do in the last several years so often. So we need to know.
Now, if we make the political decision and the Clinton administration makes a political decision not to give you what you need and wants to take what you have called some degree of risk that you are not going to have what you need if you have to get into a sustained conflict, then that is our mistake as politicians. I don't think we should make that mistake frankly, but we have to have the answer from you so that we know what the options are, and if we do want to fund everything robustly, we can do it.
I think we ought to go in and say what do we need for quality of life, x billion dollars? Here it is. What do we need for ammunition reserves, x million dollars? Here it is. What do we need for spares, x million dollars? Here it is. And not ask you to rob Peter to pay Paul.
Don't you think that is a fair request to make of you?
Admiral CLEMINS. I would like that very much.
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Mr. HUNTER. I want to finish with one question, Mr. Chairman.
In your estimations, in your personal views, if you don't presume you can take from other accounts, do you think that your readiness funding for sustained readiness over the next several years is adequate or inadequate? General?
General BRAMLETT. I will take it first. Again, our readiness in our mission account, the ultimate dollars we get, we can forecast an ability to sustain our readiness. Our problem is at base operations and real property maintenance. It is our ability to do the infrastructure and quality of life. That is where the underfunding is.
Mr. HUNTER. You are underfunded in that area?
General BRAMLETT. Yes, sir. In the past, we have used money in our mission account, migrated to take care of quality of life because of underfunding in the latter areas. But it is the ability for us to balance those demands on all of us that we need that flexibility.
I realize you are concerned about the migration of dollars. But to answer your question in the literal sense, the mission dollars are adequate. It is the other things that are not being able to be helped that are hurting us.
Admiral CLEMINS. This goes back to Congressman Ortiz's question. Because we have taken the force to, what, 12 carriers, 12 Amphibious Readiness Groups (ARG's), 116 surface ships, 50 submarines, 4 command ships. That is the Navy; all right? Now, when you sit there and look at it, every one of those is integrated.
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So when you say for sustained readiness, I have to fund the bases, I have to fund the flying hours, I have to do the steaming, I have to do that. So when you say do I have sustained, I must sustain every one of those, and it is not a matter of picking this one or that one.
Mr. HUNTER. No, but we want to give you the adequate dollars, though, to be able to sustain the readiness with a high rate of mission capability over a sustained period of time. That is the question for you.
Assuming that you are going to look at that and say what is it going to take to do that without pulling money out of other accounts, and what is it going to take to have an adequate number of spares behind the spares that are on the shelf so that we can go for a sustained period of time and still be able not only to replace the part that is on the shelf right now but have a part behind it to your satisfaction. We want to know what that number is.
Admiral CLEMINS. I will take that for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 485.]
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you.
General MYERS. Congressman Hunter, the Air Force, of course, a major part of our mission is our flying hours, and we in the Pacific Air Force have flown 100-percent of the hours every year. In years past we have had to migrate out of other accounts to do that, but the Air Force is committed to fully funding our flying hours. So the budget you see should be 100 percent funding for our flying hours, which comes with the spares and all the things Admiral Clemins mentioned earlier.
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Then it goes to the balance of the budget, between people programs, readiness, and modernization. But I guarantee you your Air Force is ready and will be ready in the future as well.
Mr. HUNTER. We know that; thank you. I still need that figure, General.
General MYERS. Yes, sir.
General HOWELL. Our readiness accounts are right for what we need to do now, but it is because we have allocated the funds to make sure that we can have good readiness accounts. Now, the other accounts suffer because of that.
The flying hour program, though, I am short right now. This fiscal year I have a $35 million problem for my flying hour program. So that is a readiness account that I am short on right now.
Mr. HUNTER. You are short $35 million in terms of your flying program?
General HOWELL. For this fiscal year.
Mr. HUNTER. OK. Thank you.
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Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. McHale.
Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, good morning. I want to thank you for your appearance before the committee today, and I particularly want to thank the sailors and the marines, the men and women who have set up the hearing for us. This kind of thing doesn't happen automatically. A lot of hard work went into it and I would like you to know we deeply appreciate it.
My first question is for Admiral Clemins, and it is really a followup on the questioning presented to you previously by my friend Mr. Hansen.
Going back to the Bottom-Up Review and back to 1994, when the annual message of the Secretary of Defense was sent to the President and to the Congress, a chart that appeared in that publication indicated that by 1999, in order to sustain a two MRC strategy, we would need a U.S. Navy of 346 ships. In fact, we are going to have 315. That is a 31-ship deficiency, an 11 percent drop in just the period 1997 to 1999. Those are the global figures.
What I would like to do is take that issue and bring it down specifically to the Pacific area of operation. What has happened to the size of the Pacific Fleet in the past 5 years? What effect has that had on readiness? We are now building five to seven ships per year and, in your judgment, is that enough to meet future operational requirements?
I set that in the context in which it was reported that Admiral Pillig, for instance, has suggested that we build at least two more ships per year to meet the future requirement. Admiral, what is your judgment?
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Admiral CLEMINS. I don't have the exact number of ships just since 1994 that the Pacific fleet has come down, but there is absolutely no question that we have to build more ships than we are building right now, and we have to build more ships and more submarines to be able to stay at 50 submarines, stay at 116 surface combats, to be able to stay at 32 amphibious ships. The current building rate will not sustain that.
Mr. MCHALE. I wish that I could literally take a highlighter and emphasize the point that you just made. We are not meeting the requirement for ship construction when judged by the benchmark that we ourselves define. That is a clear deficiency. And if we fail politically and morally to meet that deficiency, sailors and marines will pay for that misjudgment in some future theater of operation.
Admiral, in your judgment, do we place our national security at unacceptable risk if we drop below 12 carrier battle groups and 12 ARG's?
Admiral CLEMINS. Yes, I think we do. I think you see it, if you go back to Congressman Hansen's question today, that just the Southwest Asia scenario and you look at the areas that have been left gapped, without any coverage just in this one scenario, is a vivid example of that.
Mr. MCHALE. General Howell, if you can comment on that same question, 12 carrier battle groups, 12 ARG's. Is that the right number, in your judgment?
General HOWELL. If we were as robust as we should be in those, I think, given today's world situation, we could handle that, Congressman. But when we look at our ARG's right now, they are getting smaller and smaller. We used to put out five ship ARG's, four ship, now we have three ship. You are leaving stuff behind. You are not as robust a combat unit when you go out and do that.
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So we need to have more ships, or at least when the yards MEWS go out, they have everything they need.
Mr. MCHALE. The reality is not only do you have smaller ARG's but you frequently split those ARG's to deal with separate contingencies; isn't that true?
General HOWELL. Yes, sir; and they train for that, but if you don't have enough ships, it is difficult to carry out those missions.
Mr. MCHALE. That new commander will often have his force split over thousands of miles of ocean, and that is a pretty tough matter to handle when you need to match those forces for a particular mission.
General HOWELL. It is a tough row to hoe.
Mr. MCHALE. Gentlemen, in August 1990, when the 7th Med and then later, one Marine Expeditionary Force [MEF] later, deployed into Southwest Asia, in my judgment the period of greatest vulnerability occurred during the early days of deployment, after the force went into theater before the gear was drawn off the Marine Preposition Force [MPF].
I spent most of yesterday with General Zinni. I don't believe that the crisis, the confrontation with Iraq, has necessarily faded into history. The balloon may go up one more time. If you have to deploy, let's say theoretically one MEF into theater during that early period of deployment, have we now established a system to provide sufficient defensive and deterrent capability available to that ground commander so that the force is not unreasonably exposed after they go into theater but before they get their tanks, their artillery pieces, their LAV's off the MPF?
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General HOWELL. Sir, I think that General Zinni has a very good plan for that type of protection. It is always risky. It all depends on the warning that you get and then how you can handle that.
If we get the predicted unambiguous warning we think we will get, I think because of the tactical air forces we have in theater, both Air Force and Navy, I think that we would be able to protect those forces coming in the way we are now. I think General Zinni has really done a fine job organizing for that type of a contingency.
If it was a no notice, we would have a lot of trouble.
Mr. MCHALE. Obviously, in my judgment, I would suspect in yours as well, we have to focus on that. If those forces go in and we have got to—frankly, I think this is a superb argument for enhanced naval gunfire of some type to be developed in the not too distant future. That is the period of greatest vulnerability.
One of the problems they had with one MEF was coordinating the air and ground forces during that early stage before a direct air support center [DASC] was set up. I suggest to you that that concern ought to be foremost in our mind.
General HOWELL. Sir, it is.
Mr. MCHALE. Good. General, is the MEF forward in Southwest Asia and do you plan to keep it there?
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General HOWELL. We have a MEF forward at headquarters there now. We don't have any large size forces deployed there at this time.
Central Command is looking at the long-term, what type of residual forces they want to leave in there to take on any contingencies, and the Marines will probably be a part of that.
Mr. MCHALE. My final question is for General Bramlett. General, throughout the cold war, and I think quite correctly, the U.S. Army was oriented principally toward Western Europe. The nations of Europe are now at peace, they are stable, and at least for the time being it would appear they are free from significant external threat. Shouldn't the Army now pay more attention to the Pacific? And if so, what can be done to enhance the Army's Pacific capabilities?
General BRAMLETT. Sir, first with respect to Europe, obviously Supreme Allied Commander, Europe [SACEUR] would be a key player as well as the joint staff. So I think that would be probably more appropriate for their consideration.
I think in the Pacific, as you know, we have two divisions in Europe, two divisions in the Pacific, parts thereof, and six are in the Continental United States [CONUS]. As we look at our national military strategy and the ability to shape, respond and prepare, I think, from my perspective, that is about the right balance. We have four deployed in the Pacific with the 25th and the 2d. Those two in Europe, as we have seen, they will deploy outside of pure NATO guidelines, and then with the six divisions we have here in the continental United States.
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I would like to follow on to your comments about Southwest Asia, because I think an important part of the equation over there, in addition to the MEF forward you spoke about, and the ability to bring the MPF's ashore, the Army also has prepared itself there, as you know. There is preposition equipments ashore as well as afloat. Two brigades worth, in fact.
The demonstration we had with the third IB flying in in less than 7 days, they drew the tanks and equipment in less than 10 hours from getting off the airplane to moving out to the desert.
So I think the ability of a force projection Army with six divisions here, working with the Air Force and the Navy to get forces quickly at any port in the world, seems to be the right balance for our strategy.
Mr. MCHALE. General, let me assure you, I have nothing but the highest regard for the extraordinary professionalism shown by the Army during the recent deployment of additional forces into Southwest Asia. You did a superb job and I think you have earned the highest praise for your performance of duty.
I would simply note in closing that I think we have to take a more original look at the deployment of Army forces around the globe. Because of the commitment of so many fine soldiers over so many decades, the freedom of Western Europe was preserved. I think it is difficult to argue that the threat environment in Western Europe today has not, as a result of those past sacrifices, dramatically improved.
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We have 100,000 forces in Western Europe, forward deployed, 100,000 forces deployed in the Pacific. My judgment is the Army needs to take a harder look at the Pacific, reflecting the evolving threat environment, and that we need to break the mold on the post-World War II configuration which, in my judgment, is still dominant.
I would welcome a comment from you, but mostly that is an observation that you might want to take home with you.
General BRAMLETT. Sir, I have it. As a data point, during the cold war we had about 57 percent of the Army here. We currently have about 75 percent.
Again, as we look for our requirements to execute the strategy, as we build a force projection Army, the balance appears from our standpoint, I should say from my standpoint, to be about right. But certainly your points are well made and well taken.
Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. McHale.
The gentleman from Nevada, Mr. Gibbons.
Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I first of all want to tell our distinguished panel here today how proud we are as a Nation of the great service you have given to this country, you and the men and women in each of your commands. I think we do owe you a great deal of thanks, our pride in the job you have done with the limited restrictions you have and that Congress has imposed upon you.
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As I sat here today and listened to many of the comments of my colleagues and the answers that were given by you I am reminded of that movie ''Trains, Planes and Automobiles,'' only now it has become ''Ships, Tanks and Airplanes.'' We are struggling to get from A to B with the limited resources we have, and I know that is a difficult, difficult situation as we move into a more expeditionary type service.
What I want to know maybe from each of you, as one brief question, Mr. Chairman, and then I will move on, because I know we are time sensitive and, hopefully, my philosophy here is that when you have ridden your horse to death there is only one thing left to do, and that is dismount.
On readiness, many, many times we hear from our war-fighting CINC's that as they deploy their units overseas, they cannibalize and they cross level from units that are left behind, and those units that are left behind are perhaps ineffective to follow on, to be deployed.
I want to know if that cannibalization and that cross leveling that took place in order to deploy the units you have sent over there recently has left units ineffective and is that your opinion as to some of those? Does that reflect your understanding of some of those units that are left behind?
I would just take a brief answer from each of you. General?
General HOWELL. Sir, we try our best to have all our units ready, even the ones who have just come back. It is impractical to believe they can be ready the minute they come back because we lose people, we disperse people and you are right, we have to cross deck some of the unique equipment to the ones that are going out. So that leaves them less at ready.
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We have worked very hard to get them back up to a combat ready status, maybe not at a peak status, but ready if they were called.
General HOWELL. In this day and time, we are finding out it is taking longer and longer to get back up to that standard because—mostly because the age of equipment is such it just takes that much longer to fix it and get it back up to go.
Mr. GIBBONS. General Myers.
General MYERS. Congressman Gibbons, you know the deployment business very well. But I think in terms of Pacific Air Forces that the forces that are left behind after deployment are still ready. And that is our current situation.
And as I mentioned earlier, I think the bigger impact might be with Air Combat Command. General Howell has already probably addressed that. But even there, I think his units are ready to go if called upon. We do exactly what you say. We do some CANNing of—from one squadron saved to another to get it ready to go. But then we backfill as soon as we can. And we keep our readiness somewhere between C–2 and C–1.
Mr. GIBBONS. So you are saying regardless of the deployment, the cross-leveling, and the cannibalization, that any unit left behind would still be either C–1 or C–2 immediately following that.
General MYERS. In the Pacific forces, that was true. Now, bear in mind, we are not deploying a lot. We are helping some of the southwest Asia deployments. But, currently, our backfill was when the Independence left the western Pacific, we backfilled with an F–15E squadron from Alaska. And there is only one of them there that nobody cross-filled from, so I don't think we see that specific problem that you are addressing.
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Mr. GIBBONS. Admiral Clemins.
Admiral CLEMINS. There are three parts that I would like to give you an answer. First of all, to get the people ready, the forward-deploy ready—I will take the Independence, for example, she had 18 days. She was notified on January 25. She went on January 23.
We had to send 94 people to that battle group that was not there to be able to deploy; 77 went to the carrier, and the other 21 went to the escort ships that went with her.
Now, where do you think those came from? Those came from the ships, the Lincoln battle group getting ready to go, the Vincent battle group after her. So that makes the two battle groups back here less toward go. And it is those same people that were short, that those were the ones we keep cross-touring. It is not the lawyers that we keep having to go to. It is these technicians. So these people that were back here are now short people, so they are not as ready as they were before, also.
Then, when people come back from deployment, it is the assets that you mentioned. It is the cannibalization of parts. As soon as the squadron comes back, that you will hear this afternoon, that all of a sudden they come back with 12 airplanes up. And the next thing you know, they only got six airplanes up, because parts were waiting to be cannibalized, to be put on other airplanes to go to get ready to train.
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The net effect of this is, like General Howell says, it means, in a sense, the assets and the people have to come together, that we are staying in our phase readiness level. We are staying in a lower readiness longer and ramping up at the end much faster in that last training period than we were before.
So those are the impacts that we are now seeing in the fleet. And I think you will hear those much more vividly when you hear from the enlisted people this afternoon.
Mr. GIBBONS. General Bramlett.
General BRAMLETT. Congressman, our most recent deployment when I spoke about the third ID, we, as a matter of course, asked this to be reported or how much cross-leveling or cross-necking we do so we can get a better assessment of what it is like at that level.
The 55 or 4,500 soldiers that were part of the brigade that went, they cross-leveled 78. The bulk of those, if there was a bulk, came from in the aviation community. The second brigade to go was ready to go right behind them, and that is our second brigade.
And we detected—I didn't ask specifically, but I don't think there was a problem with their readiness levels. And behind that was the 1st Cavalry Division of Fort Hood with three brigades that would have been the next that I would have moved to.
One of the things we have to do—to a question that came up earlier with our 10 divisions—is those here, the 6 in the United States that are involved with the two major theater wars (MTW's) have to maintain at all times a certain readiness level to meet their time lines if we have to take that worst-case scenario and do both of them. But it is something we watch very carefully for the reasons you know well.
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Mr. GIBBONS. Let me follow up with one very simple followup question. In your reporting systems, as you look at the readiness in those readiness reporting systems, is the cannibalization and cross-leveling accurately reported in those readiness reports so that there is no gaming of the system, so that you are getting the right information and that you are passing the right information along? Do you feel confident that that cannibalization is accurately—as well as the cross-leveling—accurately reported in those readiness status reports?
General HOWELL. Sir, in my experience, you know, source reporting or type of readiness reporting we do is a snapshot in time. And it depends on when you take that snapshot of what you are going to see on that. And that is the problem with that type of reporting.
I am convinced that we really, in the Marine forces, we don't really have a cannibalization problem for the exchange of our rotating forces as much as its people and some capital gear that has to be exchanged, because we only have onesies and twosies. But I really don't have a great concern at this time, sir, as far as the cannibalization for aircraft or that type of thing.
Mr. GIBBONS. General Myers.
General MYERS. Congressman, I would say that as you know, the source reporting, the key there is the unit commander, in our case the squadron commander. He is the one that we hope has the integrity to call it exactly as he sees it. My job is to make sure there is no pressure on him, that he is free to call it as he sees it, whose unit is ready to need it, its operational and wartime commitments. And we put a lot of——
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Mr. GIBBONS. In your opinion, do you think that they are always truthful and accurate in what they report to you?
General MYERS. I think, for the most part, they are. But I think we have a lot of folks that lean forward, you know, trying to make it look as good as they can sometimes and say, yeah, we are ready. And so, in fact, I have just recently tasked my staff to give me their opinion of that very issue, you know, what do they sense out there. And maybe it is time to go back out in the field and say, hey, men and women, those of you that are working this, you have got to call it as you see it and the chips are going to fall where they may.
I think that our cannibalization [CANN] rates really are a symptom of—the CANN rates specifically of spare part shortages and shortages in our readiness spares packages—and those are accurately reflected in sorts and very often bring our units down to lower than C ratings.
My general thought is that we do accurately report. But I think it is something you need to continue to emphasize to the young commanders so they will—they don't feel any undue pressure.
Admiral CLEMINS. We are getting a more accurate source information every day. We do not have good cannibalization data because, when you look at source, you will not find out that that is cannibalized. But the source data is getting better all the time. And we do not have good cannibalization data.
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General BRAMLETT. Sir, on the cross-leveling, we normally get that report upon deployment, but the source data comes in, it is empirical, as you well know. But each commander on the report that comes up through me to the department lays out, in commander's terms, what his problems are.
For example, he may say, statistically, I have 92 percent of the personnel I am supposed to have, but they are not sufficient, noncommissioned officers. Therefore, I have assessed my readiness to be at T, training level 2, because I don't have experienced leaders. So that is a great leveling paragraph or two that puts those—those stark numbers into the context of the commander's subjective assessment.
So from a standpoint of the senior commander, I read that paragraph in greater detail than I do, necessarily, the empirical data that I get. Certainly, that is valuable, but it is the commander's assessment that is most helpful.
Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gibbons. Now, I recognize the gentleman from California, Congressman Cunningham.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would like to start, not by commending the panel that we are looking at, but I would like to commend the committee. I think it is very important, because there are people in the audience, the press, that don't understand what actually goes on at one of these hearings. You can see that this panel, which I am very, very proud of on both sides of the aisle, it is very bipartisan, and I believe, with the bottom of my heart, they are trying to do everything they can to help you. I think that, if you look at that, and in retrospect, there are those in Washington where we come from that do not, and they have an opposing view.
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And unless you are able to read between the lines of the answers and/or the questions, if you are not knowledgeable about the way that these things work, you can come away with the wrong impression.
Let me give you a couple of examples. Now, I want to see if you agree with me. And you just—that is why it is going to be a cleanup hitter, that it is important that you look at a President's budget, the lowest since 1950. Can we make it? Yes. Absolutely.
I used to work for Vice Admiral Turner and Vice Admiral McDonald, Vicky Weisner, and I know the constraints that you have in your answers. I also testified myself and knew the trouble I would get in if I answered questions in a certain way. As a matter of fact, I did a couple times, and I had my rear end chewed out.
When you talk, for example, read between the lines, the President's budget is good. And the question I will have follow on is the supplemental; that if we can live just within that budget, fine. But when we look at Bosnia, when we look at the expansion of Iraq, and we are still paying for Somalia and Haiti, billions of dollars, which come out of our operation and maintenance funds, out of that already low 1950's budget, if that is taken out, everything we have said goes down the hill because we can't maintain—and I think that is why Congressman Hunter's question on sustained readiness is so important. Between the lines, yes, we can do it. But all of these other factors come into play. And it is very, very different. And you—and I'm proud of the panel, because, within the constraints, you are answering these questions very, very well. I just want those that are out there listening to understand between those lines.
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I also would say that if you take a look, that in the plus-ups every year, 7 years, 5 years on this committee, and then gone to appropriations, in the panel, it will say this is a great budget, this is a great budget. And then when we ask behind the scenes, and we do what this panel is doing, go out and talk to the troops, we talk to the people, we find out what your real requirements are, and we plus it up $7 billion each time to $5 billion.
And in that budget—you have said that the other budget was good, but I hear you say, Congressman, thank for you plusing up the budget, we really needed that. But yet in the hearings, they said the President's budget was OK. And we get the real meaning of what you do need.
And, again, I want to thank you because you made that very clear to us. I think it is important for the rest of them.
For example, when you list the requirements, yeah, we got a C–17, we got Ro-Ros, we got the F–18E/F, we have got the F–22 in the Air Force, we got the helicopters for the Marine Corps and the V–22, but yet the modernization budget is not there to pay for it. Sixty billion dollars—even Shalikashvili—but yet you say, yeah, I can shift money around, but the budget and the outline sustained is not there.
Mr. McHale, very good question and very good response. Five hundred forty-six ships down to less, if we procure 3 to 5 ships a year which is in the President's budget, puts us below 300 ships, which is not adequate. But yet that money is not in the budget. So there are additional requirements.
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And the problem is when we increase that, those with an opposing view come at us and say, look, the military never even asked this, and yet you are sticking it in there. And yet we know what your requirements are, and that is why we plus it up.
I am proud of the panel and I am proud of the witnesses here. But I would also look at a question that was asked that, 15 days to get to an area, it is not just the battle group, it is the logistics, it is stretching out the people, 300 percent increase in OPTEMPO.
And you talk about retention. You talk about not having enough maintenance people. But between the lines, why is that? Family separation is the No. 1 issue for retention, and we are losing our quality people in doing that.
And yet when we have another deployment away, you say can we do it? Yes. But in the budget is not—when you have Reserves, they are very cheap. But when you employ them, it is very costly. It is costly. That is not in the budget. And yet we are going have to do that. So if the readiness was there, it is not there.
My question: Is the supplemental critical to sustained readiness?
General BRAMLETT. Congressman, I will answer first. We absolutely have to have it. It is indispensable.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Yes.
Admiral CLEMINS. I second that. We are expending more money every day, but it is no secret that we are engaged in Southwest Asia at CINCPAC fleet up to $77 million and growing. And that is in the supplemental. And that is absolutely essential.
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General MYERS. On Pacific Air Force's part, it is absolutely essential.
General HOWELL. I concur with the other gentleman. We absolutely have to have that to do what we are doing.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Thank you. And I would finish—I would close, Mr. Chairman, by saying that one thing that we don't address, we haven't addressed, is what is the actual threat that we need these for.
And the saying is the cold war is over. But yet we saw Russia's response when we thought about going into Iraq. They are not our allies, in my opinion. Today they dropped out of St. Petersburg three nuclear Typhoon-class submarines. We are building one. And it is less than its equal.
They have a first strike nuclear site under the Ural Mountains that they are building today. And they already have one half its size to the northeast. And we look at the SU–35 and the SU–37 aircraft fleet—for my colleagues who don't know, our F–15 and F–14 aircraft don't have parity with those aircraft, they outperform them.
And they have an AA–10 and an AA–12 missile—the cold war is over—that is better than our advanced medium range air to air missile [AMRAAM]. And that is why it is critical that we have the F–22 and the FA–18E/F and the B–2 and the V–22 and the helicopters to meet those needs. But they are not in this budget.
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And I want to thank the panel, and I want to thank the Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, Congressman Cunningham.
That completes the round of questioning and I think brings us to the point where we must close out with this panel. But I want to repeat what Congressman Cunningham has reminded us of about the supplemental appropriation. Each of you have said it is absolutely essential, it is critical to your mission and ability to accomplish it.
I think we need to make it on the record, and if any one of you dissent from this, let me hear it loud and clear. You not only need the supplement, it must not be offset against other items in the defense budget, or it will break your back in terms of readiness and your capabilities. Does anyone dissent from that?
General BRAMLETT. No, sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. All agree that it should not be offset unless you are going to do very significant detriment to our defense capabilities?
General HOWELL. Absolutely.
General BRAMLETT. Absolutely.
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General MYERS. Absolutely.
Mr. BATEMAN. We may have additional questions that we may submit to you for the record. But with that, we thank you very, very much. We are grateful for your testimony. And we do, indeed, appreciate the caliber of the service that you perform for the country and the caliber of the people you lead. With that, thank you very much. And we will take a 5-minute recess while the second panel gets in place. Thank you again.
It looks like our panel is more ready than the Readiness Subcommittee, but I think we have to get our proceedings back on track. And it is my pleasure now to recognize the participants in the second panel of witnesses, who are Lt. Col. Ronald Buffkin, commander, 3d Squadron of the 6th Calvary Brigade in Korea; Comdr. Terry Kraft, commanding officer, Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 131; Lt. Col. Donald L. Hall, commander, 421st Fighter Squadron, Hill Air Force Base, UT; Lt. Col. John T. Boggs, commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division; Lt. Col. Kevin Wendel, commander, 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, 101st Airborne (air assault) Division; Comdr. John Hult, commanding officer, Strike Fighter Squadron 113; Lt. Col. Karen Torres, commander, 22d Airlift Squadron, Travis Air Force Base, CA; and Lt. Col. Kevin P. O'Keefe, commanding officer, 3d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division.
We are very pleased to have you this morning to come and present to us your views on the status of readiness of the units that you lead. And let me add only a concluding remark before we begin your testimony, that we are proud of you and we are proud of the men and women that you lead, and are genuinely concerned and interested in knowing what your status of readiness is and hopefully how we can best address improving it, correcting it in any way that it needs to be corrected.
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Your testimony is extremely valuable to us. We look forward to receiving it. We have received written statements from each of you. You may proceed as you choose, but your written statements will be made a part of the record. And you can summarize and then we look forward to having an opportunity to ask you questions and to hear your responses.
With that, I first call on Lt. Col. Robert Buffkin. Colonel Buffkin.
STATEMENT OF LT. COL. KEVIN R. WENDEL, COMMANDER, 1ST BATTALION, 327TH INFANTRY, 101ST AIRBORNE (AIR ASSAULT) DIVISION
Colonel WENDEL. Sir, I want to take the opportunity to go first, sir.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, my name is Col. Kevin R. Wendel, and I am the commander of 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, Air Assault Station, Fort Campbell, KY.
It is a privilege to appear before you today to discuss the issues of readiness in my unit. I have been in command for 19 months and have had the opportunity to execute a wide range of training missions and one 6-month peacekeeping operation deployment to the Sinai Peninsula, the Arab Republic of Egypt.
I took command in June 1996 and initially trained at the squad through battalion task force level, focusing on our air assault skills. This intensified training cycle culminated in a leader training program and task force rotation to the joint readiness training center at Fort Polk, LA, in January 1997.
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In October 1996, we were alerted for Rotation No. 33, multinational force and observers mission. Sir, let me say up front that the multinational force and observers mission comes with a high cost on warfighting readiness. Three to six months prior to deployment, the battalion ceases air assault infantry battalion mission essential task training, becomes nondeployble, and is removed from division ready force status.
Upon redeployment, the battalion reorganizes and conducts training on its mission essential tasks. This takes 3 to 6 months before the battalion is again combat ready on all its tasks. Retraining is resource intensive.
This mission puts a significant PERSTEMPO and OPTEMPO burden on the remaining battalions in the division to fill the operational void while we are deployed. A multinational force and observers [MFO] mission can cost up to 18 months of air assault infantry task force war fighting readiness at my battalion level.
Sir, we did learn some significant lessons as a result of this mission. One, nonstandard task organizations create excessive turbulence in units. As much as possible, the units should deploy as they are manned, trained, and equipped to fight.
Small unit leadership is the cornerstone of peacekeeping operations and is a solid foundation for larger, more complex missions. Noncommissioned officers, when empowered, can achieve excellent results.
Sir, OPTEMPO has remained high, but consistent. Since 1994, this battalion has participated in two deployments, three rotations to the JRTC, the U.N. Mission to Haiti, and numerous other on- and off-base training exercises. Soldiers have served in Bosnia and Honduras in my battalion, and most recently at Joint Readiness Training Center [JRTC] again in February 1998.
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Sir, our mission, our MFO mission is an extremely positive experience in all respects. Our soldiers perform exceptionally well. They safely drove over 700,000 kilometers, participated in over 30 squad platoon logfires, and accomplished every MFO mission.
While it was a long deployment, it was predictable, and soldiers and leaders understand they succeed on an important real world mission. My intent was to balance mission, training and personnel, and available time. This puts your men to stress on every element to exploit every resource and training opportunity.
Taking care of soldiers through tough realistic training has not changed. I can tell you that the ranks are full of soldiers, motivated and working hard, ready for our next mission.
Sir, I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today about our recent operational experience. I will be happy to answer any questions, sir, you may have. Thank you very much.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Colonel Wendel.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Wendel can be found in the appendix on page 322.]
Mr. BATEMAN. And now Lieutenant Colonel Buffkin.
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STATEMENT OF LT. COL. RONALD BUFFKIN, COMMANDER, 3D SQUADRON OF THE 6TH CAVALRY BRIGADE (APACHE), KOREA
Colonel BUFFKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished committee members. I have commanded the 3d Squadron of the 6th Cavalry for 15 months. The 3d Squadron is an AH–64 Apache attack helicopter outfit. I will tell you, right now my soldiers in Korea are living and working within range of North Korean Scud missiles. Our readiness is a 24-hour-a-day job for us. And I can report to you, without hesitation, that the 3d Squadron is ready, and it is because of the resources that you have made available to the forces in Korea.
I do believe we are adequately resourced to do the training and maintenance for our 11 mission essential tasks that we would have to conduct in wartime, if called upon. One reason we are ready is because of the great soldiers in the Army today. I have been in the Army for 23 years, and I will tell you, today the soldiers in the Army are the finest I have ever seen and served with. That gives us great readiness.
Also, the conditions in Korea give us a battle focus. Every soldier there lives under the real threat of war. That requires us to be ready and focused for combat at all times.
One thing I do want to emphasize is the quality of life. You know, you have heard about some quality-of-life issues so far, and I will tell you, my soldiers in Korea live in some of the poorest living conditions in the Army today.
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The barracks were mainly constructed either in the 1950's or 1960's. And if there is one message I could give to you, it is to look at the quality-of-life issues that we will address to you today. I will look forward to answering any questions.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Colonel Buffkin.
[The prepared statement of Lieutenant Colonel Buffkin can be found in the appendix on page 343.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Next, Comdr. Terry Kraft.
STATEMENT OF COMDR. TERRY KRAFT, COMMANDING OFFICER, TACTICAL ELECTRONIC WAREFARE SQUADRON 131 (VAQ–131)
Commander KRAFT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank the committee for allowing me to speak before you today. I represent both my squadron VAQ–131—I am the commanding officer—and my air wing, Carrier Air Wing Two.
I would like to take a quick look—we are one of the squadrons that recently returned from deployment—so I would like to take a look at kind of where we were then and where we are now.
We returned from our 6-month deployment on board this great ship on October 1, 1997. During that deployment, we spent 3 months in the Persian Gulf operating under Operation Southern Watch. During that time, we were fully funded, fully ready, fully trained, and ready to fight. My squadron was C–1 or C–2 in all areas. And we achieved 100 percent sortie completion rate along the gulf.
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This was not without significant challenges, which were mostly borne by my outstanding sailors in VAQ–131. For example, one aircraft was down for a seat part for almost 6 weeks. Another aircraft was down for not having an O-ring part for 3 weeks. Both those parts are what we call consumables, which mean they should be readily available. In this case, they were not. We managed to make do with a lot of innovation, but I was concerned about our abilities to ramp up to more challenging operations should they occur.
Coming back from Korea sort of changes a lot. The nature of Navy readiness is very cyclic, as we all know. My four-jet squadron, immediately upon my return, became a two-jet squadron. Two of the jets were given to other squadrons getting ready to deploy.
Of note, VAQ–131 was just returned on board the Nimitz from the gulf, came back with zero jets, as all our assets were kept in the gulf to augment other squadrons.
We are now—we have been back for 6 months and we still have one flyable jet, as the other one is in modification. My unit is C–4, but we will need to ramp up, and we will get more aircraft to prepare for a land-based deployment to Saudi Arabia, which we will accomplish this summer.
The cost here is kind of a hidden cost, but from what I see it is a personnel cost in my squadron as we go through these kind of larger and longer and deeper cycles as we come back and we prepare to deploy again. The toll is on my personnel.
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One thing offered in my statement, I will summarize, I have an outstanding E–7 and E–8 in my squadron. Both senior maintenance personnel nearing this point in their tour, they are about to become the maintenance control master chief, which means they will run the whole maintenance effort for my squadron.
These two outstanding sailors instead have chosen to get out. And it is a personnel cost on the churning as we break down to basically one asset and have to ramp back up in our people and our assets to get up to four.
My message is we need to take a careful look at what our commitments are and the number of assets we have and look at the costs on our people as we struggle to maintain in our community adequate parts and aircraft support as we rebuild for these deployments.
Thank you very much, sir, and I am standing by for your questions.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Commander Kraft.
[The prepared statement of Commander Kraft can be found in the appendix on page 351.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Commander Hult.
STATEMENT OF COMMANDER JOHN HULT, COMMANDING OFFICER, STRIKE FIGHTER SQUADRON 113 (VFA–113)
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Commander HULT. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, good morning. I am Cmdr. John Hult. I am the commanding officer of Strike Fighter Squadron 113. We are based at Naval Air Station [NAS] Lamoore near Fresno, CA.
I very much appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today regarding the readiness of my squadron as we prepare and we are the next to deploy aboard Abraham Lincoln.
I would like to make just a few brief remarks. First is my responsibility to provide fully combat-ready pilots and aircraft to my air wing commander and the chain of command so that we may engage the enemy and sustain combat operations at sea when called upon to do so.
Although readiness is sometimes a difficult thing to quantify, let me say that we Americans, and my squadron in particular, are the most well-trained and well-equipped forces in the world. And I can't imagine today any country on Earth that would be willing to face us in combat.
Having said that, however, we, at the squadron level, are faced with a number of significant challenges that impact our readiness. Our training requirements continue to increase, while at the same time our resources have dwindled.
My primary concern is low aircraft availability. And the primary reason for that is a lack of spare parts. Problems with readiness, morale, and retention can be traced either directly or indirectly to lack of funds in many areas.
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We have and will continue to get the job done through hard work, innovation, and leadership. But to do more with less and the traditional ''can do'' work ethic that we in the Navy subscribe to, leads to frustrations that manifest themselves in morale and retention problems, even though we keep our deployed readiness levels on an even keel.
The Navy is a great, honorable profession. And we will remain the best in the world. The men and women that I see every day working for me are the best and the brightest. And we will continue to respond when called upon to project the power that has been entrusted to us.
I look forward to answering all of your questions.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, Commander Hult.
[The prepared statement of Commander Hult can be found in the appendix on page 359.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Now, Lt. Col. Donald Hall. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF LT. COL. DONALD L. HALL, COMMANDER, 421ST FIGHTER SQUADRON, HILL AIR FORCE BASE, UT
Colonel HALL. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the current state of readiness in the 421st Fighter Squadron, the Black Widows. I am Lt. Col. Lee Hall, commander of the 421st. My squadron is one of three F–16 units comprising the 388th Fighter Wing at Hill Air Force Base, UT. Our mission in the 421st is to rapidly mobilize, deploy, then employ and support the war-fighting CINC's. We specialize in the delivery of precision laser-guided munitions, day or night, plus maintain proficiency in a variety of other missions including offensive/defensive counterair and close-air support. The Black Widows are made up of approximately 275 dedicated men and women who fly and maintain our 20 F–16's.
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Since World War II, the Black Widows have proven to be ready, willing, and able whenever the Nation has called, and we remain so today. August 1997 marked the start of the squadron's latest trip to Southwest Asia in support of Operation Southern Watch. We successfully deployed 18 F–16's, 270 people and 78,000 pounds of equipment from Hill to Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia. During our stay, coalition forces faced the largest and most sustained challenge to United Nations control in the no-fly zone since the end of the gulf war. The Black Widows played a major role in forcing Saddam back into his box.
In mid-November 1997, just 3 weeks after returning from the Persian Gulf region, the squadron took part in a 388th Fighter Wing operational readiness exercise. During this week-long exercise, the Black Widows were rated excellent in our ability to generate sorties and strike targets. Both of these successes confirm my belief that the Black Widows remain a strong and viable fighting force.
Morale is good, and by and large, my people love what they do. However, negative trends, especially in the areas of operations tempo, personnel manning, and supply, continue to hamper my ability to maintain our current high levels of readiness. As in the past, the 421st Fighter Squadron remains ready, willing, and able to answer the call to arms where needed anywhere in the world. However, in my opinion, unless action is taken soon to reverse these negative trends, we will soon find ourselves unprepared when we are once again asked to defend freedom.
Thank you for this opportunity and your attention. I will be glad to answer any of your questions.
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Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, Colonel Hall.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Hall can be found in the appendix on page 365.]
Mr. BATEMAN. And now Lt. Col. Karen Torres. Colonel.
STATEMENT OF LT. COL. KAREN TORRES, COMMANDER, 22D AIRLIFT SQUADRON, TRAVIS AIR FORCE BASE, CA
Colonel TORRES. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It is an honor to be here today, and I would like to thank you for this opportunity to discuss the readiness of my unit and the challenges of our airlift mission.
I have commanded the 230 members of the 22d Airlift Squadron for over 20 months, and the squadron is one of two active-duty C–5 squadrons stationed at Travis in northern California. The units are extremely capable and prove daily that they are ready to answer the Nation's call for rapid response outside the strategic airlift.
Travis' C–5's provide roughly 30 percent of America's heavy lift, and the crews never fail to meet the challenges of their global airlift mission. In 1997 alone, they responded to humanitarian crises, natural disasters and peacekeeping operations, as well as contingencies that brought us to the brink of hostilities. They also supported Presidential airlift requirements, exercised taskings, Drug Enforcement Agency movements, NASA deliveries and standard cargo requests.
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This list is far from inclusive, but it does demonstrate the varieties of our assignments and the breadth of experience necessary for our airmen to respond effectively in all cases.
There are a few other indicators besides experience that I look at to determine the readiness of my unit. They fall into two general categories: personnel and logistics.
To briefly synopsize my personnel indicators, the Double Deuce is currently ready and able to perform its worldwide airlift mission. My manning numbers in all crew positions are very near 100 percent, with mission-ready rates slightly lower. The crews are well-trained, and their experience levels are good, but this experience is decreasing gradually due to low pilot retention figures and senior noncommissioned officer retirements and midlevel separations in the enlisted corps. We need to continue to pursue initiatives to retain and professionally develop our crew force in all positions.
I have never flown with a group of folks who worked harder or were more dedicated. They operate airlift missions into a variety of global threat scenarios. They do it safely and reliably, over and over again. We must remember that our airmen go above and beyond the call of their civilian counterparts. They are servicemen and women who may be called to give their lives for their country. They are our Nation's go-to-war capability. We have spent millions of dollars to train these professionals, and we need to be willing to reconsider old paradigms to stem the ongoing flood of talent.
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In addition to personnel indicators, I also consider several logistical gauges to measure unit readiness: financial resources and equipment availability and reliability. In short, financial resources in my unit are sufficient, and personnel equipment levels are good. The reliability of the C–5 aircraft, however, is the second major indicator that I feel is indicating negative trends for the readiness of my unit. It has less mission-capable jets and fewer on-time departures and deliveries. This is due to many factors which point toward the long-term need for airframe modernization. In the short term, more skilled maintainers and wing-level spare parts would have a noticeable positive impact.
Overall the 22d Airlift Squadron is ready and able to perform its wartime mission. There are two areas, however, that need continued attention to preclude an unrecoverable loss of capability, air crew retention and C–5 modernization.
Thank you for allowing me to address the committee. I look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, Colonel Torres.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Torres can be found in the appendix on page 376.]
Mr. BATEMAN. And now Lt. Col. John T. Boggs. Colonel Boggs.
STATEMENT OF LT. COL. JOHN T. BOGGS, COMMANDING OFFICER, 1ST BATTALION, 5TH MARINE REGIMENT, 1ST MARINE DIVISION
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Colonel BOGGS. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, you have my bio. You have read my statement. All I can tell you is the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine, 1/5, is well-trained. The OPTEMPO is high, but manageable. We could stake our life on our equipment. Our men are OK, our families are fine, but I have to tell you that we are at our limit.
I am going to tell you that it took every bit of willpower, imagination, and faith in God to maintain the level of readiness that we have enjoyed.
Gentlemen, I look forward to answering any of your questions.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Colonel Boggs.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Boggs can be found in the appendix on page 386.]
Mr. BATEMAN. And now Lt. Col. Kevin O'Keefe.
STATEMENT OF LT. COL. KEVIN P. O'KEEFE, COMMANDING OFFICER, 3RD BATTALION, 5TH MARINE REGIMENT, 1ST MARINE DIVISION
Colonel O'KEEFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. I seem to always find myself in this position, being a marine and relatively far down the alphabet, that I end up being the anchorman. I am sure on this panel that is quite an honor, and I take it that way.
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As commanding officer of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, sir, you have my statement. I just want to add that I am extremely proud and humbled to have this opportunity to talk about your marines and your sailors in the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, and I stand ready to answer any and all of your questions.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Colonel O'Keefe.
[The prepared statement of Colonel O'Keefe can be found in the appendix on page 398.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank all of you for the statements you have made.
Colonel Wendel, you address in your statement something that I hear increasingly, and that is the phenomena that peacekeeping missions and responsibilities actually lead to a deterioration in war-fighting ability. You mentioned that in the context of your assignment or mission in the Sinai. Is that also a phenomenon that our troops in Bosnia would experience?
Colonel WENDEL. Sir, my experience in the MFO, and that was a very well-defined tasked mission with very strict rules of engagement and operational measures, that did significantly impact on our air assault of the war-fighting task, that is correct, sir. We left behind all of our tactical equipment virtually, except for small arms weapons. We didn't deploy with any of our vehicles or any of our other weapons systems. So for us, sir, that is true.
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Those units, and I don't have that much experience with the Bosnia mission, but I know they do deploy with their organic tactical equipment in most cases and are generally performing a lot of those missions that they normally perform in war-fighting as well.
Mr. BATEMAN. A number of you point to shortfalls in spare parts, especially the aviation units, as being a detraction from the status of your readiness. How much of this problem is not having anywhere the spare part or in the distribution system of spare parts that may be on the shelf or in a warehouse somewhere but don't get to where you need them? Is it the lack of the part or the lack of the availability of a part that may, in fact, be in the inventory, or is it some of both?
Colonel BUFFKIN. Mr. Bateman, for my unit, very specific, an Apache Squadron in Korea, we do not have a problem of spare parts availability. The system works. How they get there and where they come from, I am not sure, but we do not have a problem with spare parts availability in Korea for my squadron.
Mr. BATEMAN. For those of you who do have the problem, is it inventory, or is it management or the logistics of getting it where it is needed?
Commander KRAFT. I think in our community we have good visibility on where our parts are. The simple fact is there are just not enough of them, due to the fact that we ramp down to—we ramped down our Improved Capability II [ICAP] version of our aircraft to move on to another version that was subsequently canceled. Therefore, the spare parts track down, and now they are having to track back up again so we have sufficient parts, and that is where we are right now.
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Mr. BATEMAN. Anyone else have any comments on spare parts?
Commander HULT. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. And I am not sure at the squadron level. We need a part, and the part is not there, I don't know for sure if it is not enough parts in the system or just not where I need it.
Mr. BATEMAN. Either way it has the same effect.
Commander HULT. Yes, sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. Colonel Hall.
Colonel HALL. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. It is an issue of time. We need to get the airplane blacked on the schedule to train the pilots. So it is more effective for us to take that off another aircraft, which, of course, triples the workload, because my technician has to pull the part off, install it on the airplane, take the broken part off and put it on the cannibalized aircraft. So it is a matter of being expeditious in getting the aircraft back in the air.
Mr. BATEMAN. I am glad you brought up the fact that it is not just the inefficiency of taking a part off and putting it in. You have the problem of that which you took it from, you have to put it back into in some manner or form.
Anyone else?
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Colonel TORRES. Mr. Chairman, I was going to add one thing on the issue of spares. C–5's, the mission that we have, is very flexible. When contingency pops up, we get tasked with a lot more lifts than we anticipated, and we use the spare parts that are available, which then depletes our spares' bins. They were underfunded to start with. We use them at a higher rate than anticipated, and then we end up at the end of the fiscal year always in a tremendous spares' hole waiting for some supplemental funding to get the spares back in the bins.
So that is not only our unit, but we see a significant impact there.
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask Lieutenant Colonel Buffkin a question.
You are in a very unique situation because you are right in the front lines: Korea. What about spare parts for those that are not deployable, those Apaches that they use for training? What about their spare contingents for them? Are they the same as you, they always get their spare parts? Do they have them? Could you maybe elaborate a little bit on that?
Colonel BUFFKIN. Mr. Ortiz, if I understand your question, you are asking for the follow-on Apache units that would deploy to Korea in time of war.
I don't have any visibility on that, sir. I would have to take that as a question for the record. I just don't know the answer to that.
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Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. And one of the reasons that I asked, because whether it is testimony that we receive here or in Washington, it comes down to the same thing: spare parts. And one of the things that the Army has been pushing very hard is the prime vendor support. Are you familiar with that?
Colonel BUFFKIN. Yes, sir, I have heard about that.
Mr. ORTIZ. This is where the manufacturer will take care of the aircraft. But in my opinion, there is not going to be any competition whatsoever, because they make it, they maintain it, and no competition whatsoever.
Something else that I appreciate what you are saying. We are fully ready, we are fully trained, we are fully equipped and ready to fight. But for how long? With the downsizing, the spare parts, retanking problems, for how long can we continue to have this status? How long can we be like that? Any of you like to tackle that question?
Colonel BUFFKIN. I would like to say that that is a good question, Mr. Ortiz, but as an example, our mission-capable rate in Korea, and again Korea is very specific, very focused, soldiers work very hard all day, all night to get those kind of readiness rates, but we experience a mission-capable rate on the average of about 90 percent. We sustain that day after day.
Last year, as an example, we flew over 4,400 hours, and that was sustained over the year. So I believe the capability to sustain is there in the system.
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Mr. ORTIZ. Anybody else?
Commander KRAFT. Sir, from my perspective, I think we will always be able to maintain that readiness on the leading edge. It is the fact—how much harder are we working back here in the rotation to maintain that leading edge unit. And I think for me that is where the challenge is: How hard are we working our people to maintain that leading edge. And that is one thing I worry about, sir.
Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you.
Yes, sir?
Commander KRAFT. The admiral mentioned that in particular the F/A–18 units, when we returned from deployment, you will fly off 12 airplanes, and the next day you have less than 6, because the wing has taken your airplanes and stripped them down for the parts necessary to go to the airplanes that are next to deploy.
We are the ready carrier Abraham Lincoln and TAC 14, and my squadron is committed to be able to get under way in 96 hours. And we can do that, but not with the assets that are currently in my command.
I have commitments from the air wing commander at Lemoore Naval Air Station, CA, that if we are required to get under way in 96 hours, we will be able to, but those parts will again come from the rest of the squadrons and the air wing there at Lemoore.
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Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you.
Anybody else?
Colonel O'KEEFE. Sir, if I might, one comment from the Marine side, Mr. Ortiz, sir. An infantry battalion is not a very complex beast, particularly a light infantry battalion like the Marines are. Our principal concerns are relatively noncomplex weapon systems and primarily a very small amount of motor transport, rolling stock.
My experience in the last 14 months in command have been, very simply, that spare parts really have not been a problem. We have had the funding, but it is coming down to the issue of the ''thing,'' the item that you are repairing is getting old. I can hang entirely 100 percent new parts on a HMMWV, but that HMMWV chassis, the basic engine block, in fact, I did a little research before I came here, and the nearly 50 HMMWV's that I have, well over half of them have a manufacture date of 1986. That is when we introduced the HMMWV.
So I have the spare parts, I have sufficient funding now to maintain the readiness, but in the longer term this vehicle, and some of my other weapon systems, in fact, we can hang as many new parts as we want on them, but at a certain point in time we need, I think, to make the investment in the infrastructure there in the ''thing'' itself and replace those.
Because just to echo the comments of my counterparts here, the resource here we never talk about really is the most important resource to our marines and sailors, and that is their time: time for working on this, time for family, time for whatever. Marines join the Marine Corps to do things like that. They want to work hard. They want to deploy. OPTEMPO, at least in my battalion, I don't think is an issue, but at a certain point in time you will run out of time. There will not be time enough there.
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Mr. ORTIZ. Who does your maintenance work?
Colonel O'KEEFE. Majority of the maintenance work is done by the marines in the battalion. We have first and second echelon, which is the——
Mr. ORTIZ. In-house?
Colonel O'KEEFE. Yes, sir, in-house. The major items, pulling an engine, changing engine blocks, major repairs on ordnance, when we talk about bore-siting weapons, that is done at a higher echelon. But most of the work, in fact, is accomplished by marines.
Mr. ORTIZ. I think that is one of the reasons why you don't have the problems the others have. You do it in-house.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't want to take all the time. I yield to whoever is next.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ortiz.
Congressman Hansen.
Mr. HANSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am given a lot of confidence by the competence and enthusiasm of this panel. It seems to be that they can handle it. I am glad to see that.
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I guess for those of us who are war history buffs, we go back and read what happened in the Second World War, and, apparently, Hitler did not understand the importance of the industrial complex of America and what they were able to come up with. He did not anticipate that they could build as many B–51's and DC–3's and all of those things of war that they were able to do.
Complex is getting a little tougher all the time. Knocking out three airplanes a day is not heard of anymore, things such as that. It takes a long time before something goes from the stage of thinking about it until it actually flies or sails or whatever.
I guess we all remember back in English lit, and I will probably get this all wrong, about for the want of a horseshoe, we lost a war. Remember that one; where the shoe was lost, the horse was lost, the war was lost type of thing. This committee is about the horseshoe. The horseshoe is there, it is on the horse, and it is willing to go.
And so as I look at what you folks go through in trying to keep it together, I think Colonel Boggs' willpower, imagination, and faith in God goes a long way. Many times it is the person who can scrounge it all up.
Seems like many, many years ago, when I was in San Diego here as a boot during the Korean war, I still remember all the old chiefs saying, the officers saying, a good sailor will get it done. Mr. Chairman, I guess we are looking at a lot of good sailors who are able to, with imagination and willpower, get a lot of things done, which I personally appreciate very much. I do think, however, there comes a point of realism in this thing when we go back to the horseshoe.
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Colonel Hall, I am a little disturbed. I know where you come from, and I know what you do, and I appreciate it, but it always bothers me when we do have to cannibalize. I was recently in Langley with General Hawley, Air Combat Command. He was talking about the B–1's that had to be cannibalized, the F–16's that had to be cannibalized. This is really not back to the idea of who is firstest with the mostest, as they used to say, can do it.
I still remember the admirals and the generals in the Carl Vincent room of 2118 of the Rayburn Building from the old Soviet Union, now that we are all supposedly good buddies and good friends, saying we could not run with you. We didn't have the industrial complex. We didn't have the butter and the guns to do it.
So I would just hope, and I am speaking in generalities here, but I would certainly hope that the American Congress and the military realizes that there is never going to be a time that we do not have a war in front of us. And we do have to subscribe to George Washington, who said the best way to keep the peace is to be prepared for war. I hardly think we are prepared if we do not have the adequate facilities to do it. Back to the horseshoe and nail.
So I really have no questions, but I am just kind of concerned in a way. I really appreciate the enthusiasm and confidence, Mr. Chairman. A great group of folks here that are going to do the very best.
The other side of the coin, I think there is some responsibility on the administration, on this Congress, to make sure if we are going to put you in harm's way that we give you adequate things to work with. And frankly, in my opinion, and I guess I take this not so much due to my years on the Armed Services, but my service on the Intelligence Committee, and I have to agree with Jim Woolsey, the past Director of the CIA and, in my mind, one of the smartest, most intelligent men I have ever met, who made the statement that the old Soviet Union was a dragon in the jungle; and it broke apart, and now we have 50 poisonous snakes. I think it is really harder to handle the poisonous snakes than the dragon.
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I don't have any questions for this group, I just support and sustain them and hope we can come up with the horseshoe. Thank you.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Congressman Hansen.
Congressman Underwood.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I certainly appreciate getting a ground-level view from this panel. I will spare them any questions on spare parts since those questions come up all the time.
The issue that I am trying to understand, and I read your testimonies, is trying to understand what is the major concern in terms of readiness. And sometimes the issue, obviously, is guided by what kind of work you are doing. If you are in charge of an electronic warfare unit, you are going to be more concerned about those issues than if you are in charge of an infantry unit where you will be more concerned about personnel issues.
So it is very interesting to read your testimonies because they run the gamut from discussing issues about family support groups, telecommunications with families, which obviously implies that they are on the front line somewhere and that maintains an issue. I was very interested in the description of the experience gap; the issues that mean that we are having problems retaining people and providing them the opportunity to—and, obviously, they may lack the desire to—stay in.
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In view of all those issues—and also for the first time I saw in Lieutenant Colonel Hall's description a frustration with the mission. And that takes us to kind of a different point of view of analyzing what are contributing to the problems with readiness.
I go back to my earlier point. I think a lot of this has to do with morale and retention and perception. And so I wanted to get a sense maybe from each branch, as opposed to each one of the eight panelists. Maybe they can give me a sense as to which is the most important consideration in terms of readiness from your experience. And from that I mean the sum total of your experience rather than simply your current assignments.
Colonel BUFFKIN. Mr. Underwood, I can give you just my own opinion there. The Army today, and you heard it earlier, is a married Army. Most soldiers have families.
Most soldiers are concerned about care and concerned for those families. Even in Korea, where most soldiers cannot take their families over there, they don't do it. The big issue I hear with soldiers is that their families are taken care of. And a soldier will suffer hardship. We expect life as a soldier to be tough, but we also expect our families to be provided for. So my spin on that readiness is that we have got an obligation as leaders to provide for the Army families.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. So, in your experience, you would say that that is a greater debilitating—has a greater debilitating effect or readiness than, perhaps, some of the other resource or technical issues that have been discussed?
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Colonel BUFFKIN. No, sir. I didn't say that. I think, of all the dimensions of readiness, that family readiness, family support, which falls under quality of life, has a footing almost as high as the other matters.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. Very good. Someone from the Navy.
Commander KRAFT. That is a very interesting question, sir. Although I talk a lot about how we are asset limited right now for our readiness, I think in the long term it is a personnel issue.
We have got to keep good-quality trained personnel on our units. A person that stays in means you don't have to retrain someone else. And that experience base is going to continue to grow.
So, to me, the important thing is to maintain our good people. As the colonel said, we need to treat them right, and we need to give them the parts and the tools to fix the jets that we have to maintain.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. So are these people not staying in because they don't have the tools to do the job, or is it the OPTEMPO, or is it a combination of all those things? Or how would you rank those?
Commander KRAFT. Sir, in the Navy, we have always had the OPTEMPO. And the main factor that my people tell me is the frustration at having to maintain a lot of different jets—as we cycle through, we give some away, we get some—and not having enough tools and parts to keep those jets properly fixed and flying. But the OPTEMPO is something we do in the Navy. We deploy. And that is always going to be like that when we go to sea.
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Mr. UNDERWOOD. All right. Thank you.
Colonel TORRES. Mr. Underwood, I would like to second the Navy's opinion that it is the retention of our skilled people that is a significant readiness impact, both air crew and maintainers. From my perspective in the C–5 squadron, I have no maintainers assigned to me.
So I can talk to the air crew perspective. Of 17 eligibles, I have only had 4 takers on the pilot aviation incentive pay. That is about a 24 percent take rate. I think that is higher than Air Mobility Command [AMC] overall, lower than what the Air Force expected or had hoped for.
They are walking out the door. I lose 34 percent of my top line every year because they are on a 3-year rotation cycle. And it is not experience that is easily regained. It is a function of increased tempo. Our TDY days for all pilots at Travis are in excess of 100. The pilots are about 105; the copilots, because they are a little bit lower manned right now, about 124 days a year; the engineers are at 100. The loadmasters are about 88.
The OPTEMPO, the families, not so much that they fly a lot, I never hear anyone complain that they are flying too much. That is what they signed up to do. That is what they love to do. But the turbulence of the scheduling, the no-notice deployments, the Phoenix Scorpions that come up where we have a meeting on Monday, they say, ''Okay, max C-5 push, go.''
That type of uncertainty wears on your families. Ultimately, when they need to make a choice when it is time to either reenlist or take the bonus for pilots, they are choosing an other-than-military lifestyle. I think that it would be reflected the same in the maintainer ranks, because I have talked to my maintenance squadron commanders as well, and they are experiencing the same types of indicators for similar reasons.
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Mr. UNDERWOOD. So as they are walking out the door, these are the kinds of comments they are making to you as opposed to dealing with issues of logistical problems, which are also——
Colonel TORRES. Right. I have an interview, outgoing interview with everyone who is leaving my squadron for whatever reason. And we don't—they don't often cite the logistical problems. Like I said, I don't have maintainers assigned to my unit.
It is an irritant if you go out to an aircraft, and it is not ready to fly, you have to go to the spare. Sometimes you have to go to the second spare before you get airborne. But that is not one of the main detractors that is raised to me.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. Thank you. The Marines.
Colonel BOGGS. Sir, this is kind of a—everything is connected. I need new equipment. I don't—I don't need more parts. I need to stop spending so much time repairing. I need new equipment. I need to get rid of that 12-year-old HMMWV.
You see everything is connected. I can't roll the HMMWV. That means I have got to start curtailing back my training. I curtail back my training. I am balancing now. This is a balancing act of training, maintenance. The more I am spending on one, the less I am spending on the other.
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It affects families. How does it affect families? It affects families because the best quality of life I can do for a family, any family, is to make sure that their husband comes home, that dad is always in one piece.
How do I do that? He has got to bet his life on that equipment, every piece of it. Everything in an infantry battalion, as Lieutenant Colonel O'Keefe has pointed out, we are rather simple, it is not as complicated as the wing, but our stuff has got to work.
I have got to stop cutting my training schedules back so I can do nothing but maintenance for weeks on end. I have got to look out for my families. They love them. They love them to death. They want the time with them.
My training time can't go on and on and on. I can't train through the weekends. I can't push things back because I couldn't do this today because I am fixing that vehicle; Bravo company can't go to that training area because it needs x amount of support; those vehicles can't roll today. That has got to stop.
I have got mechanics, and I can repair in-house. I have only got five mechanics in an infantry battalion. They can only hang so many parts in an hour, in a day. H&S company, we start talking— 1/5 is an unusual battalion in respect that our retention rate was over 40 percent, 100 percent sailors. Our Navy were 100 percent 2 years in a row. Why? Because they were doing the things that they wanted to do. That is why they came in. This is exciting. You can see it in their eyes.
But it is incumbent upon me as a steward of that battalion to make sure that they are capable of doing what they have to do when they have to do it. So I have got to stop repairing and get some stuff in so I can move on to other things. Everything is related. You can't divorce maintenance issues from family issues, from training issues. It is all related. Thank you.
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Mr. UNDERWOOD. Well, thank you very much for that impassioned statement. I certainly appreciate the service of all of you. And I am interested, very interested in your comments about readiness. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Congressman Hunter.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Colonel Buffkin, you said that your units in Korea are basically 90 percent ready at this point, have a high scale of readiness. We all know that war and conflict degrades readiness. On the first day you may have 90 percent. On the second day you have 80 percent, and on down.
So your sustainability is key; that is, the idea that you not only have that spare part right now, but that there are two spare parts on the shelf behind it. So in the second month of the war and the third month of the war when you need that equipment, you have got the sustainability that is necessary to continue to prosecute your mission.
Have you made an analysis as to what your readiness rate will be and what your spare part supply is and what your ammunition supply after 3 months of conflict in Korea?
Colonel BUFFKIN. After 3 months—after 3 months of conflict, no, sir. At squadron level, we have not made a detailed analysis of that. But I will tell you that our current squadron load list of spare parts, I believe, it would support a heavy OPTEMPO of flying.
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Right now, sir, every night, we are flying very, very heavy. And my current spares, my maintenance capability is they will support that. And I believe it would—it would be able to sustain itself for an extended period of time.
Mr. HUNTER. How about your ammunition requirements?
Colonel BUFFKIN. Our ammunition requirements, our current basic load that we have is based on three—that I know that I have my hands on right now—it is based on three battalion terms of combat; in other words, if we loaded every single Apache up to its maximum. What I have on hand, I could do that three times. That would be a very heavy combat load. Beyond that, I am assuming the ammo would come from mid-theater, but that is somebody else's job outside of my squadron.
Mr. HUNTER. OK. Obviously, you all have an idea of what you need right now to operate. I just ask you all to comment and maybe comment briefly, because I know our time is short here, on whether or not you—you send a request up your chain of command as to what you need in the inventory in terms of spare parts and logistics. Now, do you all send that up on a regular basis? Is there anybody who doesn't send it up? Colonel Hall, do you send it up?
Colonel HALL. Well, we have a logistics support squadron in our wings that does the supply. It is not an internal squadron function, so I don't have—I have some spares. Obviously, I have a small spares section in my squadron, but much of it comes from the depot.
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Mr. HUNTER. OK. Do you know whether or not you have got what it takes to sustain yourself for a conflict for a fairly substantial period of time? Have you made an analysis and said, ''This is my standard, and, yes, I think I have enough of A parts, B parts, and C parts, not only on the planes now, but on the shelf to sustain our operation''? Do you do that type of analysis?
Colonel HALL. Yes, sir.
Mr. HUNTER. You do?
Colonel HALL. Yes, sir.
Mr. HUNTER. Currently, do you have a shortfall or do you have what you need?
Colonel HALL. Well, sir, if I may answer that, when we went to Prince Sultan Air Base back in Saudi Arabia, back in August 1997, we were required to cannibalize four of the remaining Hill F–16's in order to get our ATF–16's plus a war-ready spares kit which contains all those spare parts to Prince Sultan.
When you combine those four aircraft with the three aircraft we always have in depot undergoing major modifications, that is seven aircraft that are not available for the guys back home to fly and train with. So my sister squadrons who remain behind are the ones who are really hurt.
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We on the front lines are well taken care of.
Mr. HUNTER. You are taken care of unless you lose a plane through attrition, and then when you go to get the reserve planes, if they have been cannibalized, they can't operate; right?
Colonel HALL. That is right.
Mr. HUNTER. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think, Mr. Chairman, one of our—I think we need to pursue in depth this question with the—especially with the first panel and the answers that would be forthcoming from them with respect to sustainability, because I think that this hearing is starting to focus that that is a major problem.
Just one last question, ladies and gentlemen. We have talked now—we have established that we are all cannibalizing aircraft to some degree. I have got the Navy cannibalization rates here in front of me. They have—Mr. Gibbons, an expert pilot himself, noted they actually have an acronym now in the Air Force called the CANN rate, the cannibalization rate.
Do any of you think that we should have to cannibalize any aircraft, that that should be a method of getting spare parts? Because you have explained to me it takes even more effort to cannibalize. You have got to go pull the part, take the time to pull the part off the cannibalized airplane, put it on the airplane that is being readied. And then, ultimately, you have got to go back and reinstall the part on the cannibalized plane to restore it to its pre-cannibalization state of readiness. That looks to me like an enormous waste of energy and maintenance time.
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Do any of you think that we need to have—that we should have any rate, any degree of cannibalization going on in the Armed Forces? Should that be a standard operation or a standard modus operandi?
Commander HULT. No, sir, I believe it should not be. And there was comment made earlier that there are times, especially on the flight deck, when launch time, which is a very small window, when the catapults are actually firing before the next recovery comes aboard to get airplanes airborne.
And it is at times more efficient, and it may mean the difference between getting the sortie off or not, if we go to the airplane that is right next to the one that is having the problem, pull that part off, put it in. It is an expeditious rob, cannibalization, that is required to get that airplane off the deck. And that is not part related necessarily.
The cannibalization that I think should not be done is the cannibalization due to lack of parts. When there is no part, we go to the shelf and it is bare, we have to go to an airplane and pull one off. And I don't think that should be done.
And what that does, it is—it cascades into, not only doubling or tripling the workload, but that equates to working harder. It takes time away from training our maintainers, longer workdays, less time at home. And it is one of those things that is a significant contributor to frustrations that lead to morale problems and then manifest themselves in retention problems.
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Mr. HUNTER. OK. Just one last thing I would like to ask you. No more questions, but I would like to request that you submit to our National Security Committee and this subcommittee your own unit's shortfall in, No. 1, components; and No. 2, munitions as of today, as to where it is right now if you have a shortfall. OK. And I appreciate so much your candid testimony today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hunter. And now Congressman McHale.
Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, ladies and gentleman. I thank all of you for the very fine overview that you provided in the last few minutes. I am going to focus in, I am sure to the surprise of my colleagues in the Congress, on the Marine Corps. And Colonel O'Keefe, as you smile down there at the end, I am going to focus in specifically on you.
Colonel O'KEEFE. I am the anchorman, sir.
Mr. MCHALE. Say again.
Colonel O'KEEFE. I am the anchorman, sir.
Mr. MCHALE. Colonel Boggs, you are now in the T–3 shop; is that correct?
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Colonel BOGGS. That is correct.
Mr. MCHALE. When did you give up command of the battalion?
Colonel BOGGS. I gave up command of the battalion on the 29th of January of this year.
Mr. MCHALE. All right. Well, I will turn to Colonel O'Keefe, but if some of the questions are still within your purview and recent experience as a battalion commander, don't hesitate to jump in and provide additional information. Let me also say, Colonel O'Keefe, I realize full well it is a whole lot easier for me to sit up here asking the questions than it is for you down there to answer them.
So as we go through these, I am asking for specific information. You may require a moment to just think about dates and training activities. Don't hesitate to do that, because these are not necessarily easy questions to answer in the specificity with which I am presenting them.
My first question is: When was the last time that 3/5 conducted a field operation in measure of personnel protection gear?
Colonel O'KEEFE. Sir, the last time we conducted a field operation in nuclear-biological-chemical environment was in November of this year, the entire battalion, where we had our combat readiness evaluation. Subsequent to that, the individual companies have, in fact, conducted NBC training. We went to 29 Palms CA, Marine Corps Air/Ground Combat Center, and at the company level conducted that training as well.
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Mr. MCHALE. Was that a combined arms mechanized training exercise [CATS]?
Colonel O'KEEFE. No, sir, that was not. That was Exercise Steel Night, which was I think this year the largest combined arms mechanized exercise in the Marine Corps. I think something in excess of 15,000 Marines participated in that 2-week exercise.
Mr. MCHALE. During that last field exercise at the battalion level, did your combat operations center [COC] operate for a forseen period in MOPP gear.
Colonel O'KEEFE. Yes, sir, they did.
Mr. MCHALE. That is great. What's the condition of your MOPP gear?
Colonel O'KEEFE. Sir, actually, our condition of MOPP gear is pretty good. We have gotten in the new Saratoga suits. I have enough NBC equipment right now to outfit every marine and sailor in the battalion with complete sets. We are in the process right now of doing some minor modifications in our masks, some small little defects. But right now, I have full and total confidence in my NBC ensemble for my marines.
Mr. MCHALE. Colonel Boggs, what is the state of the division's MOPP gear?
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Colonel BOGGS. Sir, I couldn't speak to the state of the division's MOPP gear. We have, as Lieutenant Colonel O'Keefe pointed out, had a problem with the gas mask, which I think is throughout DOD. Those are being repaired. 1/5 also conducted a battalion level MOPP exercise in March 1997 as well as in February 1997 at CATS and also operated in sustained environment with the gear on and everything mopped up to level 4.
Mr. MCHALE. Colonel O'Keefe, what is the rank of your S–3?
Colonel O'KEEFE. Sir, my S–3 right now is a major. And that is by table of organization.
Mr. MCHALE. Colonel Boggs, throughout the division, do you typically have major S–3's or do you have a lot of captains serving that billet?
Colonel BOGGS. Sir, it is usually majors out there.
Mr. MCHALE. There was a problem a couple years ago in that many of the S–3's were, in fact, captains even though the table of organization [TO] would call for a major. Based on what you have related to me so far, has that discrepancy been generally corrected?
Colonel BOGGS. Sir, I would say that it has. In 1/5, my S–3 initially was a major-select. He pinned on major within 30 days.
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Mr. MCHALE. All right. So, typically, you have got an amphibious warfare school [AWS] major who is filling that billet.
Colonel BOGGS. Most generally, sir, an AWS or an Army school.
Mr. MCHALE. Colonel O'Keefe, how many marines do you have today in 3/5?
Colonel BOGGS. Sir, on the rolls right now, I have about 900 marines and about 50 sailors assigned to 3/5. Total strength today is 955.
Mr. MCHALE. That was going to be my next question. So you are pretty close to TO.
Colonel BOGGS. Yes, sir, we are.
Mr. MCHALE. How many corpsmen do you have in the battalion? Are you pretty well up to speed?
Colonel BOGGS. Sir, we have—our staffing goal right now, I think—I don't have the exact number, I think it is about 30. That is not a wartime TO, but that is what they refer to as our staffing goal. I am sure you are familiar with that. And so as far as being up to what I am going to deploy with, that is—I have those corpsmen already aboard.
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Mr. MCHALE. How many sets of night vision goggles [NVG's] in the battalion?
Colonel BOGGS. Sir, I will have to get back to you on that. It is in excess of 500.
Mr. MCHALE. In excess of.
Colonel BOGGS. In excess of 500.
Mr. MCHALE. That is very encouraging. Globial positioning system [GPS] units.
Colonel BOGGS. Sir, I will have to get back to you with numbers on that.
Mr. MCHALE. Just rhetorically, how close to being up to speed?
Colonel BOGGS. I believe each company has between 3 and 5, so it would give me about 15 and 20 in the battalion.
Mr. MCHALE. A platoon commander would typically have a GPS unit.
Colonel BOGGS. He would have access to it; yes, sir. In fact, we just completed an exercise at 2200 last night. We were in the field the last 11 days, and we were utilizing those pieces of gear with combined arms exercise.
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Mr. MCHALE. A couple of years ago, this committee, under the leadership of Patrick Kennedy and some others who are before you, provided the funding for a complete issue of Gortex gear for every marine. Do your Marines all have that gear now?
Colonel BOGGS. Yes, sir, they do. And, in fact, we are in anticipation of getting our second generation Gortex. And if I could just make a side comment, it doesn't take much to make an infantryman smile, but I will tell you the Gortex, the new boots, and probably the new sleeping bag system, beyond a doubt, you have got some pretty happy infantrymen. An infantryman's life is pretty miserable most of the time. But those little, small creature comforts go a long way down at the cutting edge for the morale. So I thank you very much for that.
Mr. MCHALE. If General Zenni calls you to Southwest Asia, are you guys good to go?
Colonel BOGGS. Sir, we are prepared to deploy in the end of April. All I need to know is what direction to go and what uniform to wear.
Mr. MCHALE. Hurrah. Commander Hult, one final question. Others have indirectly answered this question at various times during previous testimony. I met yesterday with Admiral Oliver. He and I discussed this issue in some detail, but I would be interested in hearing your perspective. Why are so many fine young pilots choosing to leave the Navy?
Commander HULT. There are a number of reasons. I think they want the same thing that we have always wanted, and that is flight time, time in their logbooks. There are, however, other dissatisfiers, OPTEMPO. And the flight time isn't necessarily fuel money. It goes right back to low aircraft availability with the spare parts and everything else that we have talked about all day today.
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And pay and benefits. It is just—with the airlines hiring, we can't pay them enough to stay in the military and fly with the flight time that they are getting or, more appropriately, not getting here in the military.
Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you. Mr. Gibbons.
Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much. Thank you. I just have one area that I want to get into for you ladies and gentlemen today, and that is the area of interoperability and readiness. There is a problem that I see generating itself out there when each of you, in your own units, have a different type of equipment than your compatible sister unit, and the flag goes up and the wartime CINC says, I want only those aircraft equipped with lantern, for example. How does that interoperability or lack thereof affect your readiness to do your job in the overall picture of the readiness of our military forces to answer the call?
Commander KRAFT. I think I am probably a good one to answer your question, sir. In the Prowler right now, as you may know, the A6–V has replaced the Air Force EF–111 as the world's tactical electronic warfare [EW] asset. So four of our squadrons are tabbed; we call them expeditionary squadrons, they deploy with the Air Force to places like Prince Sulton Air Base [PSAB] and Incirlik and work with them.
And I can report that our interoperability with the Air Force, as far as the Navy goes, is very good. We have managed—we can do simple things now like talk to each other all the time and all the other things that have been problems in the past. We have worked very hard on it. It is—it is not difficult for a Navy squadron to integrate with an Air Force air wing, given the proper time and training. It is something we are doing right now.
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Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is all I have.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gibbons. Congressman Cunningham.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have got several questions. I will try and be brief. I have seen the ''can do'' attitude, and I know why it exists and the importance of it, and I commend you. But I think it was expressed just a couple days ago in a hearing. I asked a special forces and a SEAL team guy that had been deployed 200 days for the year. And he stated that he had to have his CO tell his wife that he had to go, that he found it difficult to go home and tell his wife and his children that he had to go again. And he was willing to do that. But yet that shows a tremendous amount of stress on our individuals and the families themselves.
If you disagree with any of these things, just say. But as long as I can remember, family separation has been the No. 1, if not close to, the reason for lack of retention. You take them away from the families, you don't take care of the families, then that retention really goes down.
Do you pretty well agree with that?
I think that where you have a 300 percent increase in OPTEMPO, that affects those families. And we have to attend to that and we have got to do something about that.
Colonel Boggs, I think you have summed it up very, very well in saying all these things are interrelated and how that you have got a balance of these things to keep it going. And taking care of the family is important. Would you say that the education of your children is just as important as in the civilian sector?
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Commander KRAFT. Yes.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I think absolutely, yes. But yet in the President's budget, education impact aid is cut out. And where you shift from one place to another, whether it is because of BRAC or something, and I know the chairman has got a direct interest in that as well, that we need to put that back in there. And it is not in the budget. And I think we plan on doing that because it takes care of your families and the impact of education on those kids.
I know it is not something we talk about in readiness, but like Colonel Boggs said, it is all interrelated from the families or not.
I was glad to hear you talk about the Army in Korea because of the maintenance and conditions. I knew I was going to ask you a question, but I know that is true. I spent time there myself. The U.S. Air Force I would say with the F–16—you rascals—that looking at the current threat, SU–35/37, and even though you have got AMRAAM on the airplane, do you think it is absolutely critical for the F–22 to come about to the Air Force in future threats?
Colonel HALL. Congressman Cunningham, we have provided air superiority. There have not been bombs dropped on our troops for years and years and years. And I think that in all the services but one, air superiority. To maintain air superiority with a threat like the MiG–29, the SU–27, the AA–10 Charlie, we need to continue to increase capability of our fighter aircraft.
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Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Thank you. I knew that, but I wanted to hear it from you. And I will say for my Navy guys out there, the FATDF, with a reduction in numbers, the unit cost goes up. But can you explain the value for the panel here of coming back, say, for example, on the Sea of Japan off of Korea, where you have only got one pass at the deck, and you have got icy waters out there, and the performance pluses over the CD that are important, and why we need that airplane?
Commander HULT. Yes, sir. Anything—any advantage that we can get in bringing back—or ''max trap'' is what we call it, means an additional look at the flight deck. The EF, it provides significantly improved range and endurance, which means—and additional weapons stations, which means that we can bring back more weapons and/or fuel to the carrier. So we have more than one look—which we currently have usually, depending on the ordnance that we have in the CV—look at the deck. If we only get one and there is no divert, then we go in the water. And it can be a life-and-death capability.
With regard to the threats out there, I think that any advantage that we can get, in particular with the new threats, the longer-range capability, the more sophisticated weapons of the Soviet-built machines, any increase in stealth or sensor capability that we can manage out of newer airplanes like the F–18 ENF, will gain at least parity and/or maintain our superiority over those particular threats. Currently, we have to rely on tactics which we will continue to improve versus those threats.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Would you, in your professional estimation, think that the increase in cost is worth the increase in capability to the F–18 EDF?
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Commander HULT. Over the CV?
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Yes.
Commander HULT. Yes, sir.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Thank you. One of the things that I would like to ask also, when you say the airlines, and there is not enough money to pay these pilots, would you agree for the aviators, though, that if we decrease the other factors, the OPTEMPO for the families, if you have better living conditions for the service members, if they are not required to be away from the families, if their children can take care of education and even a bonus, that retention would increase?
Commander HULT. Yes, sir. I think it would increase for my pilots. However, if you increase any one significantly, retention would increase. If our OPTEMPO doesn't change, and we significantly improve flight hours, retention would also increase. Yes, sir.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Colonel Torres, how about in the Airlift Command? Is that pretty much the same? Do you think your retention would increase if we could better all these interrelated things like Mr. Boggs had talked about?
Colonel TORRES. I think it is a little bit, maybe not more complicated, but my guys transfer pretty easily to the airlines because they have got thousands of hours of heavy time. And we have a robust economy, and airlines are hiring as they are through, I think, 2003. It is a very lucrative offer that they get. And a lot of my people are the single breadwinners. They have small children. And I think, unfortunately, that even if we fixed all those other indicators, if the civil draw is out there and the pay scale is significantly larger, as it is over the long-term, that when they look at how they are going to provide for the future of their families, college educations and that, sometimes it becomes more just an economic question. And I hesitate to say it, but I think that that is true.
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Mr. CUNNINGHAM. And I don't disagree with you. I know myself there was a period when I was a lieutenant commander, I thought about getting out and going to the airlines. But then I looked at the package of retirement, I looked at the medical benefits, I looked at I love the flying, and those things outweighed getting out.
And I think a lot of our kids are dedicated. They support this country. And I personally feel that if we could ease some of the problems of these other interrelated things, retention would go up. And a bonus. I think we are going to have to provide that for kids, realizing the sacrifices that they have to make, and their families.
I would just close by—when you talk about the full mission capable of your aircraft, I remember we used to report 90 percent also in the squadron. But when we went off the front end of the boat, probably only 2 of the 10 birds we had up the radars would work because of the old parts and those kind of things.
We report 90 percent FM, full mission capable. But in actual reality, when we actually got airborne, we would be blind. I know there is a lot of difference between an F–18 and old-smoke-and-thunder hog. But I also know that the reality of things, that your FMC there is some invalidation of those requirements. And I want to thank each and every one of you. God bless for you what you are doing. Thank you.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Congressman Cunningham.
We are pleased that another of your neighbors here in San Diego has been able to join us, and I will now recognize Congressman Brian Bilbray for any questions or comments he may wish to make.
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Mr. BILBRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, let me, not only as the Congressman for this area, but as an individual that was born here at North Island Naval Air Station, welcome you to San Diego. Though I try to remind my colleagues again and again that this is a military complex second to none anywhere in the world, we not only are the host of military facilities, we are a military family in San Diego.
The fact is I want to welcome not only the Members of Congress, but all the members who are representing the Armed Services here today and those who are listening to the testimony.
I also would like to thank the crew of the ''Connie'' for hosting us today. And I have to say there is this interesting feeling of deja vu that only happens in America. The last time I was employed on the ''Connie,'' I was looking at her from a different direction. I was the diver cleaning the bottom of this ship. And it definitely shows you what America is all about, and you never know where you will end up. I never thought I was going to be on the top side ever for very long.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to echo the concerns of my colleague Mr. Cunningham. I just came from a high school here in Coronado, and I apologize for being late. I think there was a very important issue there, but the naval facilities that are in our community not only serve the military needs of America, but they also are neighbors to the neighborhoods in which they are sited.
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One of the things that have consistently reminded the neighborhoods that serve the families of the Navy and Marine Corps here in San Diego County is that, yes, the children and the families impact the community, but that the Federal Government recognizes that impact and addresses that impact with impact aid and shows that the military not only is a benefit to national defense, it is a benefit to the entire community at large.
The President cutting military impact aid, the impact aid issue, is a slap in the face not only to the readiness and the morale of the military personnel, it is a slap in the face to those communities that have opened their arms and welcomed the military into our family and want to maintain that relationship.
I, frankly, have to say in an age where everybody is talking about how important education is and the education of our children, it is interesting to see that this is a proposal coming out of the administration at this time. I am not one that takes a shot at the administration, and many of my colleagues resent my not taking more shots, but I think this is one that is deserved. And I say it only so that the administration sees how wrong this action is and corrects it before we are finished with the process. And I think that is what the process is for.
I again would congratulate everybody here today. Welcome to San Diego. Enjoy yourself. And, ''Connie,'' congratulations. Obviously you are getting a much deserved face lift.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
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Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Congressman Bilbray.
We have focused in a lot of our questions on matters of spare parts, and we have talked about retention, but we have not talked much this morning about the quality of the troops or of personnel who are coming into our military services.
All the evidence I have seen from personal observation, all the testimony that we hear, is that the forces you lead are superior to any the United States has ever been able to field. But we need to get a feel from you as to whether or not that person who has come in as a recruit, gone through basic and then through a tech school, and then gets assigned to your unit, do you observe any degradation in the quality of the personnel that are now coming into the force relative to what you experienced 5 or 10 years ago?
Colonel WENDEL. Sir, I would say not in the infantry ranks. The soldiers I get today are good as any I have seen, and we are now getting them in sufficient numbers that I can man three rifle squads in each infantry platoon. Those soldiers are ready to soldier, and there is no perceivable difference in the quality.
Mr. BATEMAN. I am glad to hear that.
Anyone else?
Colonel BOGGS. Sir, the marines and sailors that I have the pleasure of working with in 1/5 are absolutely superb. Not only are they smarter than we were when we were young, they are confident, and they are excited about what they are doing. And there is a sense of ''I am doing something important.'' You see it in them, and it is wonderful to be around them.
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Colonel HALL. Mr. Chairman, I would just say one thing. The new recruits are very good, they are very well-trained, but they are just too much of a good thing. I am manned at 160 percent of my authorized entry-level technicians and about 60 percent of my more experienced journeymen. And even though they are very well-trained and they are very good, it is just too much of a good thing.
Commander KRAFT. I think we are getting outstanding people now, sir. I think we have to remember also they are a product of where they came from. We are seeing greater acceptance possibly where they might have seen in high school of drug use and those types of things, and we have to continue to stay on top of that. But we are getting great people in the Navy right now, and I am very happy with that.
Mr. BATEMAN. Anyone else have an observation? If not, we have gotten to the point where I think we need to close this testimony, give people an opportunity for lunch and for us to get back in time to hear the third panel.
I cannot close, though, without expressing again our appreciation to you for being here, for your testimony, and for the things that you do for your country and the splendid way in which you are leading the people your country is furnishing you to guard our national security.
We thank you, we are indebted to you, and we genuinely appreciate your testimony and your presence here today.
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Mr. BATEMAN. The subcommittee will come to order, and we will proceed to hear the witnesses on our third panel. And we are very anxiously awaiting that testimony because the people on this panel are one of the very special reasons we wanted to come to San Diego where we would have the opportunity to get your perspective.
It is certainly my belief, and I think it is shared by all my colleagues, that you are the people in the military services who make it work. And if you have problems, we want to know about it. If you don't have problems, we will be delighted at that. But the main thing is we need your frank, candid views as to the status of the forces that you lead and whose responsibility is so largely in your hands.
With that, it is my pleasure to introduce the members of the panel. Hopefully, your sequence is going to follow what I have here.
First, Sfc. Richard Elder, 1st sergeant of Alpha Troop, 3rd Battalion of the 6th Cavalry Brigade; then S. Sgt. David Spencer, platoon sergeant, 1st Battalion 327th Infantry, 101st Airborne, Air Assault Division; AME1 John Borella, Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 131; ATC Todd Grever, Strike Fighter Squadron 113; M. Sgt. David Rodriguez, sortie generation superintendent, Hill Air Force Base, UT; and M. Sgt. Eugene D. Mehaffy, C–5 flight engineer/1st sergeant, Travis Air Force Base, CA; and then we have S. Sgt. Ben A. Grainger, platoon sergeant, Heavy-Machine-Gun Platoon, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division; and last, but certainly not least, G. Sgt. Don W. Gallagher, company gunnery sergeant, Lima Company, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here, and we can proceed with Sergeant Elder.
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STATEMENT OF SFC. RICHARD ELDER, 1ST SERGEANT OF ALPHA TROOP, 3RD BATTALION OF THE 6TH CAVALRY BRIGADE, U.S. ARMY
Sergeant. ELDER. Mr. Chairman, distinguished committee members, my name is Sfc. Richard L. Elder. I am the 1st sergeant for Alpha Troop, 3d Squadron, 6th United States Cavalry, the ''heavy cav.''
My cavalry squadron is stationed in the Republic of Korea. I have been assigned to that unit for the last 9 months. I am very proud to tell you that the 3rd Squadron has the highest operational readiness rate for any Apache helicopter battalion in the U.S. Army. That fact is the result of extremely long hours and hard work, professionalism, and dedication of the soldiers, noncommissioned officers and the officers with whom I serve.
I would like to say that the soldiers with whom I serve, America's sons and daughters, are the finest that I have had the opportunity and the privilege to serve with in my 15 years in the military. If I could ask of this committee for help on any one issue, it would be for better living conditions for my soldiers. The barracks in which my soldiers live are woefully substandard. They are in dire need of repair, remodernization or to be completely rebuilt.
I want to thank you for this opportunity that you have given me to share my thoughts with you. It has been an honor and my pleasure to speak to this committee. Thank you.
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Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, Sergeant Elder.
[The prepared statement of Sergeant Elder can be found in the appendix on page 412.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Sgt. David Spencer.
STATEMENT OF S. SGT. DAVID G. SPENCER, PLATOON SERGEANT, 1ST BATTALION, 327TH INFRANTRY, 101ST AIR-BORNE (AIR ASSAULT) DIVISION, U.S. ARMY
Sergeant SPENCER. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, my name is S. Sgt. David G. Spencer. I am currently the 2d Platoon, Platoon Sergeant of Delta Company, 1st 327th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, Air Assault, Fort Campbell, KY.
I have recently returned from a peacekeeping mission with the multinational forces and observers in the Sinai, Egypt, where I performed duties as a rifle squad leader and a remote observation post commander. I have gained some insight in the planning, preparation for and execution of this mission both personally and at the unit level.
My first objective was to take a squad of antiarmament instruments and successfully transform them into a strong, cohesive small-unit tactical force. Second, I wanted to allow my soldiers the opportunity to take advantage of all the deployment had to offer: realistic and intensive real-world training, college courses, and the many cultural experiences, such as visiting the pyramids and the Holy Land tours. Finally, I wanted my squad to return safely with every soldier, build on the skills that we acquired while in the Sinai, and get reintegrated into our antiarmor role as part of a rapid deployment air assault infantry battalion.
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This mission affected our combat readiness, command structure, personnel and equivalent requirements. We shifted from warfighting to peacekeeping. We typically fight mounted with tube launched optically tracked wire guided missiles [TOW] missiles, the MK–19 automatic grenade launcher, and the 50-caliber heavy machine gun. All these weapons were prohibited in accordance with the agreements and procedures defined by the multi-force observers [MFO]. We went from a 5-platoon, 87-man company to a 63-man unit.
However, the deployment provided us noncommissioned officers total mission focus on individual tasks and many of the basic infantry collective tasks. Overall, the deployment allowed me to train with minimum distractions, and I can honestly report we excelled. Our squads became firmly cohesive and highly skilled in all individual and collective tasks. The deployment was totally safe and free of any type of incident.
Separated from our families, especially during the holiday season, was tough, but all soldiers persevered, and I am glad to report they are happy to be back with their loved ones. However, soldiers and their families are realizing that an increasing number of training and operational deployments are a part of Army life. The family support group is a key part of mission success.
Our challenge now is to regain our combat readiness and our warfighting mission's central task. We are now fully reorganized and about 1 month into an extensive training period. I feel we need at least 1 more month to be fully combat ready. Time allotted for me to train my platoon is critical.
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Peacekeeping significantly impacted on our valuable resource of time, executing the collective air assault antiarmor skills of my platoon. My platoon is now challenged to master many skills. We are doing that competently and professionally. The quality of soldiers in my squadron during the deployment and now in my platoon is the best I have ever seen in my years in the Army. Also, I am seeing fellow noncommissioned officers at all levels rise to the occasion everyday.
In conclusion, our recent MFO deployment provided my soldiers with tremendous personal and professional opportunities that they would not otherwise be afforded. Our soldiers did an outstanding job meeting every challenge during this real-world mission. I feel confident disciplined soldiers make the difference.
I appreciate the opportunity to address the committee today, and I will be glad to answer any questions you have for me.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, Sergeant Spencer.
[The prepared statement of Sergeant Spencer can be found in the appendix on page 417.]
Mr. BATEMAN. AME1 John Borella.
STATEMENT OF AME1 [AW] JOHN R. BORELLA , TACTICAL ELECTRONIC WARFARE SQUADRON 131, U.S. NAVY
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AME1 BORELLA. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity that you have afforded me.
Looking through the other two panels, a lot of this is going to be just beating a dead horse. However, I am going to say a little bit about each one.
The problems I see with readiness, as far as the EA–6B training unit, would be lack of aircraft, massive cannibalization, shortage of parts, the transferring and receiving of several different aircraft, and then morale as well, which would coincide. It is just like the Marines were saying before, it all ties together.
Probably the lack of aircraft is also in the training. You have to fly that aircraft, say, for us, we have 18 aircrew members, and that is the only way that they can get trained is to fly it. Well, a lot of your enlisted men came in the Navy to work on aircraft. And what happens, when that airplane has to be fixed, when it becomes inoperable and has to be fixed, it has to be fixed quick, meaning that the senior maintainers are the ones going to be fixing it. So the junior personnel are just doing the mundane tasks, which in turn the senior members leave, and now the junior men are there without the training that they need.
Cannibalization and shortage of parts, that has been going on and on for years, but it has gotten to the point where not only can you not get your repairable items that you change infrequently, now the ones that come due all the time, whether it be from a nut and a bolt all the way up to an internal navigation system or whatever.
For morale, I would just put for the junior personnel what you have is job dissatisfaction. To me, it is not the separation from family, it is not the deployments, it is the men not being able to do a quality job as well as not being able to do the job at all. I believe that that is our retention problem, and that is our readiness problem.
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Thank you.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of AME1 Borella can be found in the appendix on page 425.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Now, ATC Todd Grever.
STATEMENT OF ATC [AW] TODD GREVER, STRIKE FIGHTER SQUADRON 113, U.S. NAVY
ATC GREVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I am honored to be here today.
As far as readiness goes, the key maintenance factors limiting our operational readiness today are shortage of the spare parts, personnel, and skills.
Due to the shortage of spare parts, we end up cannibalizing more frequently than desired to keep our airplane as fully mission-capable as possible. The double work that this causes not only affects our parts requirements there, but it also extends to partial mission-capable. If we have a discrepancy, as Representative Cunningham said, going off the end without a radar, not having a radar is not a down gripe for an airplane, but it is a decision we have to make of whether or not to down the airplane to fix that radar if there is no part to replace it. So not only do we need those spares that keep the engines running and keep all that stuff going, we also need the parts to keep the systems fully tweaked out.
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Personnel skill shortages are equally damaging to readiness. The shorthanded work center is hard-pressed to keep up with the workload, often extending work hours in the process. The underskilled work center is caught in a training deficit, which slows down the production and the troubleshooting effort. Corporate knowledge is an invaluable training tool. Skilled personnel must be on hand in order to train the younger personnel.
Operations tempo has a tremendous impact on our sailors. Family separation is the leading reason why our E–6's and below are choosing to leave the Navy. For example, I was away from home four times for a total of 91 days out of 153 from August 1, 1997, until January 1, 1998. Three days ago I came back from a 2-week detachment aboard the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, and in less than 2 weeks I will be going back out for another month; and 2 months after that I will be going out for my 6-month deployment. So operations tempo is at a high.
Quality of life issues of long working hours, living conditions at sea, and amount of pay are all substantial concerns for enlisted members. Our lowest-paid members can actually lose money when they go to sea. Many early and midcareer sailors have decided it is not worth the net retirement benefits and the other aspects to stick around and make it a career.
On the plus side, the Navy has made improvements with sailors flown to sea, e-mail availability, and better quality of food aboard the ship. The lack of morale, welfare and recreation [MWR] funds, though, back at the base camps is still having an impact on our command's ability to provide those recreational opportunities for their spare time.
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The bottom line is this: We will be ready to conduct a prompt and sustained combat mission at sea, but that readiness will come at the expense of our personnel. Personnel will work longer hours, perform the double work of cannibalization, and they are going to get less pay and less retirement benefits in the process.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, Chief Grever.
[The prepared statement of ATC Grever can be found in the appendix on page 431.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Senior Master Sergeant David Rodriguez.
STATEMENT OF SENIOR M. SGT. DAVID RODRIGUEZ, SORTIE GENERATION SUPERINTENDENT, HILL AIR FORCE BASE, UT, U.S. AIR FORCE
Sergeant RODRIGUEZ. Good afternoon, sir, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. Thank you for this opportunity to discuss the current state of readiness in the 421st Fighter Squadron. I am Senior M. Sgt. David Rodriquez, sortie generation superintendent of the 421st Fighter Squadron at Hill Air Force Base, UT. I am responsible to the squadron maintenance officer for the management, supervision, and training of 214 assigned maintenance personnel. I allocate personnel and resources to the production effort in order to meet the mission of the 388th Fighter Wing. I have been part of the 388th since its last activation at Hill Air Force in February 1976, and I personally have been a member of the 421st since September 1982.
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I have seen the wing, squadron, and maintenance sections struggle through downsizing, but have always seen successes with challenges we faced. As time went on, downsizing continued, and we ran out of new ideas on how to manage this slimmer Air Force. We seem to have hit the wall. Now, pressing issues, such as levels of experience, chronic manpower shortages and parts shortages, limit our ability to generate aircraft needed to support our flying schedule and training requirements.
Once again, I thank you for having me here, and I will entertain any questions you have at the end, sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, Master Sergeant Rodriguez.
[The prepared statement of Master Sergeant Rodriguez can be found in the appendix on page 437.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Now, M. Sgt. Eugene D. Mehaffy.
STATEMENT OF M. SGT. EUGENE D. MEHAFFY, C–5 FLIGHT ENGINEER/1ST SERGEANT, TRAVIS AIR FORCE BASE, CA, U.S. AIR FORCE
Sergeant MEHAFFY. Sir, good afternoon. I am M. Sgt. Gene Mehaffy from Burlington, IA, and I enlisted in the Air Force 18 years ago. I am a C–5 flight engineer and first sergeant of the 22d Airlift Squadron at Travis Air Force Base. Thank you for allowing me to address this committee. I would like to present several points concerning readiness.
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To begin with, I feel our readiness is high, but not sustainable. Retention, operations tempo, and compensation are key issues. The early retirement system created the upper end of the growing experience gap in my unit. The experience gap in the enlisted flying force is caused by excessive midterm, midcareer departures. The retirement offered young airmen and junior NCO's is creating the lower end of the gap.
Our very best are being skimmed off the top by an ever-improving civilian job market we cannot compete with. Not only are we losing the people we have, but it is getting harder to find experienced trainees in the flying positions.
Maintenance is having the same problem we are. They cannot afford to let their experienced people crosstrain into flying jobs. The result is a constant flow of young, inexperienced airmen who leave the Air Force relatively soon after completing their nearly 2-year flight engineer upgrade training program.
When we do find a high-quality airman who is willing to trust his future to us, we have another hurdle: OPTEMPO. If you have ever been on a C–5 flight deck, you know why they call it a Cadillac. But if you have ever been on that flight deck for back-to-back 24-hour duty days, the term ''Cadillac'' would not come to mind.
The 24-hour flying day is not intended to be used on a continual basis. It is for contingencies. But when every other mission we fly is a contingency, the 24-hour duty day becomes a norm.
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When I read a promotion fitness examination study guide, I don't think they are talking about me on those pages. They are talking about NCO's who volunteer in community activities, support their subordinates and occasionally get home for a birthday. That is not the strategic air mobility flying world. When we are home, we train. We don't have time to take care of ourselves or our people the way we should.
OPTEMPO goes hand in hand with the ability of the en route global strategic airlift system to move missions. Poor C–5 en route reliability is an operations tempo multiplier. Significant initiatives have been implemented Air Force-wide to reduce OPTEMPO, but enlisted flyer compensation has seen little improvement since the end of the Vietnam war.
In the Air Force, promotions and, therefore, compensation is limited by leadership requirements. You cannot promote everyone just because you want to increase pay. Pilots are paid a monthly flight pay more than three times as large as the enlisted flight pay and a $22,000 bonus in return for service commitment, because they, like enlisted flyers, cannot promote to increase pay. Professional pay for enlisted flyers warrants serious consideration. High OPTEMPO and compensation disparity make retaining highly skilled enlisted flyers difficult.
In closing, I would like to emphasize the urgent need to find ways to stop the growth of the experience gap. Experience and degradation alone will reduce readiness more than all other issues combined, and if left unchecked will have devastating effects in the not too distant future.
Thank you, sir, and I will be glad to answer any questions.
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Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Master Sergeant Mehaffy.
[The prepared statement of Master Sergeant Mehaffy can be found in the appendix on page 452.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Now, Staff Sergeant Ben A. Grainger.
STATEMENT OF S. SGT. BEN A. GRAINGER, PLATOON SERGEANT, HEAVY-MACHINE GUN PLATOON, 1ST BATTALION, 5TH MARINE REGIMENT, 1ST MARINE DIVISION, U.S. MARINE CORPS
Sergeant GRAINGER. Mr. Chairman, congressional members of the subcommittee, I think it an honor and a privilege to be here today. I would like to personally thank you as an infantryman for the gortex in the boots. It has made life a lot better out there for me and my marines.
If you have read my statement, I am ready for any statements you may have at this time.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, Sergeant.
[The prepared statement of Staff Sergeant Grainger cam be found in the appendix on page 465.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Gunnery Sergeant Don Gallagher.
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STATEMENT OF GUNNERY SGT. DON W. GALLAGHER, COMPANY GUNNERY SERGEANT, LIMA COMPANY, 3RD BATTALION, 5TH MARINE REGIMENT, 1ST MARINE DIVISION, U.S. MARINE CORPS
Sergeant GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, Congressmen of the subcommittee, it is a great honor and privilege to be here today. I am the company gunnery sergeant for Lima Company 3/5. We are a group of consummate professionals, and our motto is, ''Get some.''
And with that in mind, I am ready for your questions, gentlemen.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Sergeant Gallagher can be found in the appendix on page 478.]
Mr. BATEMAN. In the last panel I made reference to the fact that we have had some identifiable problems with retention, but then I asked about the quality of the people coming into the force who have just been through their basic training and maybe one tech school and then come to your units.
Do you observe any degradation or deterioration in the caliber of the personnel who are now coming in?
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Sgt. ELDER. Mr. Bateman, sir, as I stated in my opening statement, the soldiers that I serve with today are the finest I have ever seen. There has not always been a time that I could say that. But without remorse, I definitely say that now. The soldiers that I serve with are the finest there is.
Mr. BATEMAN. Any other view to the contrary?
Sergeant GRAINGER. Mr. Chairman, the young men that come in today are the finest quality. I think the issue is to make a better individual, you would have to have good leaders in place, and keeping those good leaders in place to guide those young marines as they come in and other soldiers is one of the key issues also.
Mr. BATEMAN. Several of you have made reference to problems with being able to maintain equipment, and I have some concern based upon some of the things I have heard today and earlier that as a part of the drawdown, we have lost a higher percentage or degree of senior experienced noncommissioned officers in technical skills, and we have not, to this date, been able to fill the gaps as much as we should or need to from the more junior noncommissioned officers. Is that a valid observation?
Sergeant MEHAFFY. Sir, in the flying squadron we have lost a tremendous amount of experience as far as senior NCO's are concerned. The retirements, they are practically running out the door. The early retirement program also hurt us in that regard.
With us, you can make more master sergeants and senior master sergeants from techs and staffs, but what matters is experience in the airplane. The grade is not the significant thing, it is actually experience that we are losing. The number of flying hours across the board, if you add up the total number of flying hours from our enlisted crews, has dropped significantly.
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Sergeant RODRIGUEZ. Sir, as far as getting replacements, we have to grow those people. The younger airmen coming in, we have to grow them and mold them into the leaders of the future.
The problem that we are having is those people, when they come in and start seeing the high OPTEMPO, the coming back from Korea after a 1-year remote tour and within 6 months having to go to another 45-day or 90-day TDY, time separated from their family, the incentive is not there for them to stay in and continue to be our replacements.
So we are starting to see the master sergeants, the senior master sergeants, retiring, and then there is very few of the staff sergeants or tech sergeants, or what we call our 7 levels, with the experience. They are not there. They move up and replace us, but, again, there is no young airmen coming in to fill in the shoes of that staff or tech sergeants. They are just bailing out.
Mr. BATEMAN. You cannot grow them overnight.
Sergeant RODRIGUEZ. Right.
Mr. BATEMAN. Back in Washington, when I ask this question of the Navy leadership, I am told that the Navy's policy is fixed and immutable; that you will not be away from home port more than 180 days in a given year, and that the Navy doesn't deviate from that policy. And I am necessarily addressing this to people in the Navy. Many people in the Navy tell me that they are deployed away from their home port or stationed more than 180 days a year.
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Now, I guess this really is a way of saying that the ship may not be deployed more than 180 days away from its home port or home station, but people on ships sometimes get deployed more than 180 days.
Is that really the phenomenon, that the ship may not be deployed; contrary to the rule, the people on ships sometimes are?
ATC GREVER. Yes, it is, Chairman.
That is correct. And many components of the Navy are not shipborne 100 percent of the time like myself. We are home-based in California. And we make training detachments to many locations throughout the western United States as well as on board the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln.
Mr. BATEMAN. And some of those deployments are for more than 180 days a year away from home station?
ATC GREVER. If you are going to make a major WESTPAC, odds are that year you will be gone more than 180 days, yes, sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. OK. Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Chairman, I think that I asked a lot of questions at lunch with some of the chiefs that I met with. And I am just grateful that we have this young man serving our country. I'm proud of your dedication and your commitment.
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And, yes, there is a lot of young men. When I served, we had the draft. Now, we have an all-volunteer service system. And some of the young ones coming in are not going to take what you have taken. I mean, we talk about, from housing, we talk about young men who, at least one of them who, in 5 years, was deployed out at sea for 3 1/2 years out of the 5 years, Mr. Chairman. The family suffers. And sometimes we wonder why we have discipline problems with our young ones. It is because we don't spend enough time with them.
But you know one of the problems that we have, we, Members of Congress, is that a lot of Members don't travel. And they don't travel because they get criticized because they say, when we travel, these are junkets. But this is the only way when we can find out the problems that we have in the military. This is when we find out problems, not only with the military, with pay, with retention problems. And if we don't come out and talk to you, we won't know how to fix these problems.
And going back to the problem that we have with parts, this is nothing new, believe me. I have heard this for the past 5, 6 years. Now, when you get these parts, are they reliable? Can you depend on these parts? Or do you get one, and it doesn't work, and you have to get another one? Can anybody answer that? I mean, once you get the parts, I know it takes a long time to get them, but once you get them, are they reliable parts? Can you count on them working?
Sergeant RODRIGUEZ. Yes, sir. For the most part, you can rely on the parts that you get. Every once in a while, we do have a—for example, several years ago, we had some problems with some wheel-speed sensors on the F–16 aircraft where we get them from supply, we put them in the aircraft, and they do not work properly, and we still have a problem. But we identified that problem, and the manufacturers or the depot that repairs them has already taken steps in order to make them more reliable. But for the most part, I would say they are reliable, but they are hard to get at times.
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Mr. ORTIZ. One of the things that I'm just going to suggest, Mr. Chairman, is that for those Members that don't travel, I would like for you to write to us and tell us about your problems. I was very moved by what you told me about the family problems, the housing problems, the pay, some of your colleagues who are on food stamps. It moved me. But in order for me to let the other members of the committee know what I was able to hear today, write to me. And I would like to make copies and pass them to the rest of the Members who don't travel. And they don't travel because they're criticized. Write to us and tell us. Be candid with us. We want to help you. But if the rest of the Members don't get the story, it would be very hard for us to straighten out these problems.
And this is my statement, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your work. Thank you for the dedication and thank you for what you are doing for this great country. Thank you.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ortiz. Congressman Hansen.
Mr. HANSEN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. This group has been very candid. I appreciate their candor. I have to say that the questions of retention and equipment are two that have been real concerns to many of us on this committee. And I think that is some of the things that we'll have to look at.
Very frankly, Mr. Chairman, I think I'll just pour over these written statements, and maybe in our next meeting, you will give us all an opportunity to vent our emotions on how these things ought to be handled. I really just thank this panel. I think they are very good, and I really have no questions.
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Mr. BATEMAN. Congressman Underwood.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. Thank you very much. Thank you very much for the opportunity to hear your testimony and read your testimony. And like the other members here of the committee, I was certainly very touched by listening to the chiefs during the luncheon that we just had.
It is true that many of the, particularly the OPTEMPO, when we started to hear stories of people being deployed for some 10 months in the immediate preceding year, it certainly does not speak well of some of the statements that we sometimes hear in Washington, like the chairman has pointed out, that ships aren't deployed by more than 180 days. And then we come to find out that individuals may be deployed by much more than that. And sometimes people don't hardly ever see their families. They don't—in some instances, we heard of people having, out of 5 years, have not seen their children for more than a year and a half out of that experience.
I was also struck by the testimony on the parts situation and the assumption that somehow or other, cannibalization and the chronic shortage of parts are a natural fact of life. And in fact, so much so that there are many people, some of the junior members in the services now assume that parts are supposed to come from hangars as opposed to coming from a well-founded system of the supply of parts. And I think that is a very serious concern.
I just wanted you to know that, despite all those problems and the kinds of problems that we hear about, retention and the kinds of problems and strains that are put upon all of you and the people under you and the men and women under you in terms of their own family lives, yet, at the same time, it was been reported to me that, for example, on the most recent crews of the ''Connie'' that they had no serious problems, no serious problems. No one attempted to commit suicide; none of the problems that ordinarily may occur in the course of a deployment. And I think that stands as testimony to the quality, not only of the people coming in, but I think the quality of the senior NCO's that we have in dealing with these personnel problems in a very direct way.
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I, like the other Members, am very concerned about the issues pertaining to personnel matters and family matters, trying to find ways to provide better family support services and trying to make sure that you all do your job well. And I just wanted to pass along my own personal gratitude and congratulations for the service that you are providing this country.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Congressman Underwood. Congressman Duncan Hunter.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Chairman, I am taken with the candor that has been displayed by this panel. I really applaud all of you gentlemen. And I—and the leadership of our services can be proud that you have—you have told us more, at least this Member more in terms of readiness than literally days of hearings in Washington, DC, and you have been very, very forthcoming with us. If we don't act as a result of what you have told us, then we are deficient. And I think you have said it about as clearly as you can say it.
Master Sergeant Mehaffy, you talked, you said one thing that I think was a little bit of a new area here. Incidentally, I really applaud what you all have said about the cannibalization rates and the personnel shortages that we have on our horizon if we don't act. But you talked—I thought you mentioned something about the fact that we should look at enlisted pilots. Did you mention that?
Sergeant MEHAFFY. No, sir, not enlisted pilots. I mentioned—if I can just clarify that. The feeling is, among the enlisted pilots anyway, that the Department of Defense and the Air Force, looks at pilots as the only people on the plane. And we also need flight engineers and we need load masters that fly that same airplane.
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The monetary bonuses offered to pilots, it stops there. And we are getting out for the same reason they are. Well, we have cargo carriers. They are hiring flight engineers and load masters at good pay. And we can't keep those people unless we offer them something comparable.
Mr. HUNTER. OK. So you would recommend a bonus program for those personnel, as well?
Sergeant MEHAFFY. Yes, sir.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I think it might be wise for us to get a readout, if we could, from the Air Force on any—because I know they have given us a lot on the pilot shortages, but on pending shortages in these other areas.
What you are saying is, it takes a lot of folks to fly an airplane, and we are going to see deficiencies in these other capabilities if we don't act. Is that your feeling?
Sergeant MEHAFFY. Yes, sir. In fact, our latest issue of Phoenix Scorpian, we had problems, both manning crews with pilots, engineers, and loads, just trying to assemble crews. So it is not just a pilot issue to fly an airplane.
Mr. HUNTER. OK. Thank you very much. Gentlemen, once again, thank you for your testimony. I think you have given us a great deal of value in what you have had to say today.
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Congressman Hunter.
Congressman McHale.
Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all of you for appearing. Earlier this morning we got, I think, a very good perspective, an officer's viewpoint on first-fifth battalion Marines and third battalion fifth Marines. At least in the initial part of my question this afternoon, I want to get an enlisted perspective.
Gentlemen, what is the word on the street with regard to the crucible? Has it significantly improved the quality of the new Marines reporting into your battalions?
Sergeant GALLAGHER. Yes, sir. I believe that the Marines coming in, going through the crucible, it is giving a better sense of direction, teamwork. Not that the Marine Corps hasn't already emphasized that at boot camp, but the Marines, I feel, are getting better prepared to come out to the fleet when they hit the infantry.
And in the infantry, you have to come out there and you have to be ready to hit the ground running. And more time that they are adapted to the teamwork and philosophy of the crucible is paying off in the end for us.
Personally, I have got a 180-man company. We are starting to see a big influx of these recruits coming in now, and I believe the standards are definitely rising in the Marine Corps.
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Mr. MCHALE. Staff Sergeant Grainger.
Staff Sergent GRAINGER. Sir, in the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, we haven't got our first wave yet of the crucible Marines. We are supposed to be getting them this June. So I can't really comment at this time.
Mr. MCHALE. When was the last time each one of your battalions went to the rifle range?
Sergeant GALLAGHER. I'm kind of in a unique situation, sir. I did the last at 1–5. And a month after we returned, I cross-stacked them out with 3–5. So I went through the whole work-up with 1–5, went through the rifle range and pistol range, all the training with them. And due to the OPTEMPO in 3–5, it has been scattered, spread apart due to operation commitments. But we are almost at 100 percent before we head overseas, which the battalion will deploy in just less than 2 months now.
Staff Sergeant GRAINGER. 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, we reached 100 percent for September. And we are starting the rifle range for this fiscal year at this time.
Mr. MCHALE. Staff Sergeant Grainger, my understanding is that not long ago, you did a pump to Okinawa; is that correct?
Staff Sergeant GRAINGER. Yes, sir.
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Mr. MCHALE. I want to get a sense of the status of the consolidated memorandum receipt [CMR] account on Okinawa. For the benefit of the other Members, as I understand it, what happens is, your battalion and others periodically went to Okinawa. You left your gear here when you went to Okinawa and picked up prestaged equipment permanently retained on Okinawa on what we call the CMR account and then utilized that equipment for training on Okinawa while you were there; is that correct?
Staff Sergeant GRAINGER. Yes, sir.
Mr. MCHALE. Give me a word picture. What kind of condition is that gear in, particularly the HMV's, but just an overall view of the kind of equipment, the quality of equipment, its age and condition when you pick it up on Okinawa.
Staff Sergeant GRAINGER. As far as the HMV, sir, I personally had 18 HMV's in Okinawa. At least 1 week per month, I have to stop training and basically, sir, try to recondition these vehicles. These vehicles are pretty old.
Mr. MCHALE. How old?
Staff Sergeant GRAINGER. I would probably say 12 to 15 years for the most part, sir.
Mr. MCHALE. Are they rusted?
Staff Sergeant GRAINGER. Yes, sir. We have holes in these vehicles. We have vehicles where the frames are rusted through. We are trying to get service on them.
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We have holes. You can stick your arms through some of them, sir, the rust condition is so bad. Once a month, or week, we sit down and try to break the rust off of these. And usually the entire month prior to deploying, we try to get this equipment up in some kind of state of readiness for the battalion that is going to take it over that will replace us.
Mr. MCHALE. My understanding is, staff sergeant, that you have got heavy machine guns, 50-caliber machineguns.
Staff Sergeant GRAINGER. That is correct, sir.
Mr. MCHALE. How old are they?
Staff Sergeant GRAINGER. I have some 50 calibers, sir, that date back to the 1940's.
Mr. MCHALE. Some of those machineguns are almost 50 years old; isn't that correct?
Staff Sergeant GRAINGER. That is correct, sir.
Mr. MCHALE. What kind of shape are they in?
Staff Sergeant GRAINGER. Sir, we try to get as much life as we can out of these weapons. If we send a weapon to OMC—the Marine Corps is trying to replace all the old weapons as fast as we can. There is just not enough money to do that all at once, sir.
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If I send a weapon down to OMC, it is because I can get no more use out of the weapon at all, sir. The tolerances will not allow the weapon to fire properly anymore.
At the rate it is going now, it may take me a year to year-and-a-half to get a replacement weapon to my Marines to operate. The last two I sent down, I finally received them back after 1 1/2 year, just 2 weeks prior to me deploying.
Mr. MCHALE. For the benefit of the Members, can you slow down a little bit there. The last time you sent out those machineguns, some of which may be 50 years old, your unit had to wait 1 1/2 year for those weapons to come back?
Staff Sergeant GRAINGER. That is correct, sir. That is for a replacement of an entirely new machinegun, sir.
Mr. MCHALE. Let me shift gears a little bit and talk about housing, junior enlisted housing for married marines up at Camp Pendleton. If a lance corporal who is married reports in for duty, and he and his wife want housing aboard base, how long are they going to have to wait?
Staff Sergeant GRAINGER. Sir, I would like to state that the housing being built is nice housing, but there is just not enough of it.
Mr. MCHALE. Again, forgive the poor acoustics, but I want to make sure we get the message you are communicating. It is good housing, but there just isn't enough of it; is that correct?
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Staff Sergeant GRAINGER. Right, sir. My average E–3 employee lance corporal and below lance corporal is waiting approximately a year to get the base for his family, sir.
Mr. MCHALE. All right. So you have got a lance corporal who reports in, with a wife, and they are going to have to wait out in Oceanside or in some surrounding area waiting a year before they can get housing aboard base?
Staff Sergeant GRAINGER. That is correct, sir.
Mr. MCHALE. All right. What happens if he goes on deployment during that period of time? His wife and his child living on a lance corporal's pay around Oceanside, he goes on a float, what happens to his pay at that point?
Staff Sergeant GRAINGER. Well, sir, the lance corporal or below—actually it is the entire enlisted rate structure that goes on float, but it applies more to a lance corporal or below because he is hit the hardest. His pay is cut. When an enlisted man leaves the Camp Pendleton area to go overseas, his pay is cut.
Mr. MCHALE. When you say an enlisted man, you mean E–3 and below?
Staff Sergeant GRAINGER. No, sir.
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Mr. MCHALE. Any enlisted man?
Staff Sergeant GRAINGER. Any enlisted man.
Mr. MCHALE. Is the officer's pay cut?
Staff Sergeant GRAINGER. No, sir.
Mr. MCHALE. All right.
Staff Sergeant GRAINGER. Not that I am aware of, sir.
Mr. MCHALE. And for the E–3 and below, he not only experiences a pay cut, tell me about sea pay. What happens to him?
Staff Sergeant GRAINGER. All the enlisted marines' pay is cut when you go overseas. When they get on the ship, the senior enlisted marines from the rank of E–4 and up receive sea pay, which is approximately based on how much sea time you have.
Mr. MCHALE. What happens to the E–3 and below?
Staff Sergeant GRAINGER. The E–3 below, sir, is given nothing, basically. He will take more pay cuts as he gets on ship, which—that puts more of a burden on his family basically, sir.
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Mr. MCHALE. So to put all of that together, if you have got a lance corporal who is married, shows up at Pendleton, there is no base housing for him, he is going to have to live with his family out in Oceanside or one of the surrounding areas; and then if he does a pump during that period of time, his pay will be further cut while his family remains behind, living in the expensive civilian community, but at lower pay. Is that correct?
Staff Sergeant GRAINGER. That is correct, sir.
Mr. MCHALE. How long has it been since your battalions each had a forced march in excess of 20 miles?
Staff Sergeant GRAINGER. Our last one, sir, was last year, right before our deployment, sir. It has been approximately 1 year.
Mr. MCHALE. Gunny.
Gunnery Sergeant GALLAGHER. Third Battalion, 5th Marines, did one in November, sir.
Mr. MCHALE. I am sorry, I couldn't hear that.
Gunnery Sgt. GALLAGHER. Third Battalion, 5th Marines did Macree standards, which is 25 miles. They did that in November, sir.
Mr. MCHALE. Mr. Chairman, if I may, one final question. I'll turn to the Navy at this point. It is really a followup to Congressman Underwood and some of the questions that he asked.
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When I speak to junior enlisted sailors, I am repeatedly told that there are systemic pay and promotion problems, that those problems are quite common. That concerns me. More importantly, the sense that I get is that many of these junior enlisted sailors don't believe that their individual pay and promotion problems matter to their senior officers.
Let me invite the two representatives here from the Navy to comment on that. Are there a lot of pay problems? And more broadly, when an individual sailor has that kind of problem, do you have a sense—and I am not talking about your immediate commanders now; I am asking you to make a judgment based on your many years of experience. Not reflecting on the officers under whom you currently serve, but does the Navy leadership nurture and provide the kind of response to an individual problem that those sailors deserve to receive?
ATC GREVER. I would have to say yes. We have a system in place. Not only that, I keep up with my command's financial specialist, so I see a lot of these financial problems on a daily basis. Not only do we have the family service centers and all the financial specialists over there, every command has a financial specialist as well as many within the command at a divisional level as well as the chiefs and the center's supervisors and division officers, that sort of thing.
Some of the individual pay things, as the marines were saying earlier, an E–3 who goes on a ship loses money. It is a fact of life. But there is really nothing that our operational commanders can do about it. Pay is mandated at a——
Mr. MCHALE. There is something we can do about it. That is why I ask the question.
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ATC GREVER. They have a tremendous amount of concern for it. They try to do everything they can to encourage and promote the advancement and selection for other personal opportunities for the troops.
AME1 BORELLA. Sir, I don't think any men won't take any more money if that is what you were asking. The——
Mr. MCHALE. I am really getting to two points. There are systemic pay problems and, more importantly, when a sailor has a problem and goes to his officer, is that officer going to feel the kind of immediate sense of responsibility that the sailor deserves? And I ask that because I have now heard on many occasions—maybe this is unfair, and I guess I am giving you an opportunity to rebut it; far too often I hear from a junior enlisted sailor a sense that his pay problem doesn't matter to those who are up the chain of command.
AME1 BORELLA. Well, I believe most of the commands now, we started doing the financial specialist, and I believe maybe that was one of the reasons—not only that, but for credit counseling, things of that nature. I have never really looked at it as far as to know if the senior or the junior, you know, enlisted were wondering about the senior officers.
As far as the pay, that is—I mean, the cut in pay for the sea, you know, that is something that we do need to look into; and that has been that way for a long time. Other than that, I think we give them all the affordability that we can, you know, with their pay, base pay, as far as that is concerned.
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Mr. MCHALE. All right.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. Gibbons.
Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, let me say that each of you here deserves the great accolades of a grateful nation for all you have done. Thank you for being here today and your willingness to testify.
I guess my question is sort of a parallel to Congressman McHale's last question; that is, for each of you in your units, do you find that you are faced with skill imbalances; in other words, too many E–1's, E–2's, and E–3's versus E–4's; and E–5 and E–6 versus E–7 and E–8's? How is the balance right now among your units? Is that having an impact on your readiness? And is that also a criterion for many of the junior members and the new enlistees in terms of their retention?
It is a three-part question. If I could just maybe get a response from each one of the services, I would appreciate it.
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Sergeant First Class ELDER. Mr. Gibbons, sir, I have no skill imbalances. All of my soldiers are the same MOS. And they are—and they are the appropriate skill level by table of organization and equipment.
As far as retention goes, I have just recently had about 40 percent of my troop reenlist. And two of those—two of those were first-term soldiers. And one was a second-term soldier.
ATC GREVER. Mr. Congressman, we do have some problems in that area. But ours is a very unique operation that we have many different skills, 10 different production work centers for the maintenance department alone; and then within that work center, you have a supervisor, crew leaders, and then crew members. There isn't a very large disparity between the rates, the E–6, E–5, E–4.
Where we have a problem is with the training level of those people in those positions. We have people coming from different weapons systems into our organization and taking over as supervisor when they have no F–18 experience. That creates a very large skill deficit that we have to—they have to take it on board and train themselves. And when we get down to the lower levels, we have a—we may have plenty of warm bodies, but they are not all knowledgeable on what they have to do to fix the airplanes.
Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you.
Senior Master Sergeant RODRIGUEZ. Sir, we do have some imbalances in the 421st. We have—a vast majority of our folks are three levels. And the three levels take a while to get experience. When we find—for example, let's say an aircraft lands and lands code 3, which means it can't fly its very next sortie, we're relying heavily on a small population of several levels that we have in order to go out there and fix that airplane so that we can meet the next available sortie for the next go for pilot training.
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So you drag around a three level or attempt to try and show them what you can; but you can't do that step-by-step training that is so vital for the guy to get the experience, the knowledge, the know-how from beginning to end. Usually it is A–OK, let's get in there very quickly, fix this aircraft, get it airborne for the next sortie; and then try and talk the three level over, OK, here's what I did, and here's why I did it.
So, yes, we are heavy on our three levels; seven levels are scrambling trying to get them trained as quickly as we can and get them up to speed.
Master Sergeant MEHAFFY. Yes, sir. We have a slight problem in the—within the load-master career field. Last year, the Air Force went out into overage career fields and moved tech sergeants, which are E–6's, and master sergeants, E–7's, into the load-master career field, cross-trained them into that career field from overage career fields rather than promoting the load-masters who were staff sergeants waiting.
So what we have now is a large group of inexperienced tech sergeants and master sergeants who are essentially being trained and evaluated by senior airmen and staff sergeants. So we have kind of a flip-flop.
Staff Sergeant GRAINGER. Sir, some of the problems that we are facing, first of all, a lot of E–3's and below come in now, there are more and more married. So we are trying to—some of our focus is having to be turned away from our main focus, which is the infantry. It is more a counselor, because as we said, the pay fluctuates, sir.
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For a lance corporal and below, his wife has a crisis; that marine needs something done right then and not the following months. So you find a lot of times you have to stop for those kind of scenarios.
With a marine being overseas, it is even harder for him to concentrate on what has got to be done when he is worried about his family 2,000 miles away.
Another problem we are facing is, with all the cuts that have come in the Armed Forces, with the civilian personnel working on the bases, somebody has got to pull that slack. It has been my marines.
Right now, I have given up five marines, which are my leaders, to do all kinds of other jobs. I have one for next year is going to be environmental police sergeant on the base. I have got one to teach motorcycle safety for a year. These leaders are being pulled out because the vacancies have got to be filled.
There has got to be a way for the base to operate, but there is no way to do it. We are having to give up marines to help the battalion in 3 shops, the 1 shops and stuff like that, because those numbers aren't taken into account, but those shops have to run. There is no MOS on the enlisted side or there is not enough of those people to do that.
So the attrition in the grub battalions is being cut quite a bit to try and maintain all the things that make the Marine Corps run. And that has had a big impact on me trying to accomplish my mission.
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Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Congressman Gibbons.
And now Congressman Cunningham.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me tell you, I was looking forward to all the panels, but you, this one. Let me tell you why. I was on the House floor, and I got a call back in the cloakroom. It was from my old command master chief. And the same day I got a call from my old drill instructor.
And my drill instructor, he didn't say, Congressman, he said, Cunningham. He used to hold his hand like this. He says, when you were in boot camp—and the master chief told me the same thing. He says, I trained you better than that, skipper. Get a haircut.
I want to promise you I am going to get a haircut today.
And I knew, Gunny, I saw you and the staff sergeant, and I saw the chiefs looking, and I want to make that perfectly clear, I am going to get one today.
But, no, I do thank you.
And let me tell you what else has been important. We have heard a resounding message. And I would say for the panel, let me, by meeting with some of the enlisted and the senior enlisted, let's take this ship right here, for example; the U.S.S. Constellation came back after a long deployment. They have been here a short time. But yet in April, May, June, July, and August, they are going to have to go to Bremerton.
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Their families are here, and this is shore duty. They are here on shore duty, but yet they are going to have to deploy and have this ship repaired, 4 to 5 months away from their families. And this is when they are supposed to be with their families.
After that they have two 40-day workup periods in which they have to bust hump just to get the airplanes back up because their parts have been robbed, they have been cannibalized; they are going overseas and they have to get their equipment up now and spend additional time away from their families at a high tempo rate.
I know in the Army, the Navy, the Marines, the Air Force, it is the same thing. The C–5's, I have talked to some of the lift guys, you have to wait months, or not months but maybe 30 days to fill a pallet and get it over. But those are the kinds of things that this committee is learning, the extraordinary OPTEMPO and the problems that you have.
Let me tell you something from this member, and I think I speak for every member of the committee up here, we are going to try and limit the OPTEMPO that you have to suffer through, especially when we don't take care of the parts and all the things that you are talking about. We are going to provide you with a supplemental to pay for it so you don't have additional money coming out of O&M, which is your operation, your maintenance, and your parts that you are talking about. We are going to fight tooth, hook, and nail for that to help your families. I know the chairman mentioned impact education aid for your families.
In the modernization, most of you are talking equipment from the 1970's. I didn't know you had a machinegun that was 50 years old, Gunny. But I want to tell you something; the modernization account, which is not funded in this particular budget, we are going to try to increase it and we are going to work tooth, hook, and nail, based on a lot of the things that you are giving us.
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I would ask you, like one of the other members did, to write us letters. I promise you I will not use your name. Give me what you need, and the other members, or even the chairman. Let him know what your needs are. This kind of a hearing, we pretty well know what your requirements are before we are here. I want to tell you that. People say why do you have a panel like this? We pretty well know what those requirements are. It sure helps back up what we know, and I have learned a few new things here as well. But I would say also that we need the public to know that, so that when we go to the House floor to carry through these promises, that we are able to help you.
I want to thank each and every one of you. I know who ran my squadron; it was my command master chief, my sergeants and my enlisted. Without them, we couldn't do it. God bless you and thank you for coming.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Congressman Cunningham.
Let me say thanks again to all the members of the panel and to tell you that I think it has been a very valuable experience for us. I, for one, come away from this meeting particularly shocked to learn that there are people in the Navy and the Marine Corps who are deployed and aboard ship who lose pay and allowances that they were receiving when they were at home station. That doesn't make any sense, and we will certainly be talking to our colleagues on the personnel subcommittee to see if we can't address that problem.
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There are many more problems that you have brought to our attention. I have not even asked you, but I am going to do it now, to raise your hands if you have people serving under you whose families or whose wives may be on food stamps or children. Any of you? None of you have anyone in your units who are on food stamps or receiving social service benefits?
I am certainly glad to hear that answer, but that is not the answer that I have been getting from a number of other commanders. Oh, yes. Yes, Sergeant.
Sergeant GRAINGER. None of the ones that work directly for me, sir, but we have some in our battalion who are on the WIC program.
Mr. BATEMAN. You, also.
Certainly I think we have done a disservice to the people who serve our country and to our country's national security if we do not take better care of those who serve in it that they would have to have wives or children in a WIC program or some other form of social service benefits.
This is another formalistic type of way you could communicate with us your concerns, whatever they might be. This is not the end of that process. Our addresses are very easy to obtain, we are very easy to communicate with and we look forward not to this being the conclusion of any communication between you and the members of the House National Security Committee but the beginning of communication. So we would welcome any observations, any comments, any recommendations that you choose to send us.
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Congressman Duncan Hunter has asked if he might be recognized, and I am certainly more than pleased to do that and to thank him for the courtesies extended to me and to the committee while we have been here in San Diego.
Mr. HUNTER. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss, and Duke and I live here, and Brian lives here, so we are back in our districts in good old San Diego, but you have come a long way. For everybody here, the chairman is a Virginian. He carries on that great tradition of caring about the men and women of our armed services, and we want to thank you. You flew 8 hours the other night. All our members did, and our great staff.
Mr. McHale is from points north of you and he wanted to come out and find out about his Marine Corps. Mr. Underwood lives a short distance away, in Guam, although he may be able to keep on going and visit his district here at the same time.
Mr. Hansen, from Utah; Mr. Gibbons, from Nevada; and Mr. Ortiz, from Texas. I just want to say I am proud of our members of this panel and, Mr. Chairman, Herb Bateman, we are proud of you. I think you have done a great job in mustering this attendance and we are going to work hard. We want to let you know we are going to work hard for you and try to see to it that you have the support that you need so that you can support the folks that are sitting at the table.
Thank you very much for being with us.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Congressman Hunter. And again my appreciation to all the members who participated in this last panel. To those who are in the audience from the second and the first panel, our appreciation to you as well.
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I want to thank the captain, the crew of the Constellation, everyone who has made possible this meeting, for all the care and effort that went into making it possible. We are indebted to you and certainly deeply appreciative. Thank you and please let us hear from you. We more than welcome any communication that you might send us.
With that, unless someone has further business, the hearing will be adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
the official Committee record contains additional material here.
UNIT CHALLENGES TO MEET READINESS REQUIREMENTS
Mr. BATEMAN. What is the biggest challenge you face in trying to maintain a level of readiness that is required to meet your ''go to war'' mission?
Colonel BUFFKIN. My biggest challenge is turnover of people. As I wrote in my official statement before the committee, this turnover is managed in the Korean Theater by a robust training program. The one-year clock every soldier starts the moment he or she steps off the plane in Korea means that we as leaders must quickly receive and integrate the newcomers to conduct our Mission Essential Tasks.
Colonel WENDEL. Sustaining a trained level of readiness on our five Air Assault Infantry Battalion Mission Essential Tasks. Our tasks are: Deploy the Task Force; Conduct Air Assault; Protect the Force; Conduct Raid, and Defend. Due to the Multinational Force and Observers mission we have had excessive personnel turnover and turbulence, extensive re-training of soldiers and leaders on warfighting tasks, and significant demands on time and resources. Recovery and retraining will last 90 to 180 days. Resourcing and maintaining trained leaders and soldiers to perform all of our warfighting Mission Essential Tasks remains our biggest ''go-to-war'' challenge.
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Commander KRAFT. The biggest challenge we currently face in VAQ–131 is the scarcity of aircraft available in our aviation community right now. Due to the number of aircraft awaiting rework and modification at our facility in St. Augustine, Florida, we have around 80 aircraft for a community Primary Aircraft Allowance (PAA) of 104. The result is that instead of deploying with five EA–6B's, which is optimum, we deploy with four. When we returned from our deployment in Oct 97, we were reduced to one aircraft.
We are now back up to two, and able to get our readiness level up to T3. The ''swapping'' of assets creates challenges in maintaining them, due to the fact that squadrons may not have their aircraft for an extended period of time if not deployed. Our squadron is a good example, we will fly and maintain 8–10 different aircraft this year.
Colonel HALL. The biggest challenge I face in keeping my squadron ready for war, is directly related to the current high operations tempo. My squadron's last 45 day deployment to Saudi Arabia ended in October 97, we are preparing to go again now in April 98, and if things stay true to course, we will return later this year, around Thanksgiving. High operations tempo, as I mentioned in my written testimony, is the number one reason cited by squadron members when they chose to leave the Air Force. Every time an experienced pilot or maintenance technician walks out the door and is replaced by a pilot or technician fresh out of training, my ability to ''go to war'' is reduced.
Colonel TORRES. My wartime mission is to generate a set number of basic air-refueling C–5 crews to fly missions in support of worldwide aircraft requirements. My biggest readiness challenge while preparing to meet that mission is the retention of skilled aircrew members. I don't generate airframes or own the maintainers. I supervise the people who fly them, engineer them, and load them. Since the economy is robust and the airlines (passenger and freight) are hiring, many aircrew members are tempted by opportunities in the civilian world, and it appears that regardless of the incentives the AF offers (ex: double bonus for pilots)—the outflow of experienced crew members remains difficult to stop. In further attempts to mitigate the situation, Air Mobility Command has implemented initiatives to alleviate many irritants identified by aircrew members and has others on the books yet to be tried. But the interim results at my level are not much changed—most of my separation eligible pilots are doing so, many of my retirement eligible senior non-commissioned officers are departing, and first term re-enlistments are not increasing.
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Although I have roughly 100% manning in each crew position, mission ready rates are slightly lower because flyers who are still in student status are not counted as fully qualified. This may seem like a high manning and mission ready rate compared to other units, but many other units can draw from similar aircraft type wings for assets when they forward deploy. The units that go forward are full up, but those who remain behind are often lacking readiness indicators. My unit doesn't forward deploy periodically; we forward deploy every day as individual crews on single airframes. There is only one other line C–5 wing in the nation, and there aren't enough assets to backfill for each other during high ops tempo periods. When the US wants to position support for a show of force or respond to a natural disaster we get called to airlift whatever's required—often with only 12–24 hours notice before launch. I cannot afford lower manning numbers due to decreasing retention figures—and continue to meet my wartime mission.
General HOWELL. The biggest challenge we face in trying to maintain a level of readiness for our ''go to war'' mission is aging equipment. As equipment continues to age it requires more maintenance and increased costs to maintain and repair and greater personnel demands in order to keep it in an acceptable state of readiness. Additionally, FY98's incremented contingency costs and southern California ''El Nino'' storm damage costs, if not reimbursed, will impact our Operations and Maintenance budgets. This will cut into our unit training, our base maintenance and ability to maintain all equipment to our normal standard. The best solution for this aging equipment is modernization. Retooling spare parts assembly lines is too slow and too expensive, and only serves to treat the symptoms of the aging equipment problem. By improving force modernization abilities, we can potentially save millions of dollars by decreasing maintenance use of spare parts, and preserve our greatest asset—our Marines, by reducing their maintenance manhours required and returning these hours to quality of life and dollars to training needs.
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Equipment and Spare Parts Assessment
Mr. BATEMAN. How do you characterize the readiness status of the military equipment and spare parts available to your unit? What are the hardest items to get? How long does it take?
Colonel BUFFKIN. We have excellent availability of spare parts and equipment in my unit at this time. The hardest items to get are typically those replacement parts that are not in high demand. This is a rare occurrence for our squadron. Our Operational Readiness (OR) rate for both ground and air has exceeded Department of the Army standards for almost every reporting period.
The repair parts system is designed to provide the common use and frequently demanded items to meet the needs of the unit. There is not a common part that can be pinpointed on a recurring basis that leads to supply delays. However, low density or uncommon requisitions lead to delays in excess of three weeks.
On the air side, some priority 12 requisitions have been on order for six months. An example is Apache tail rotor bushings. We use 8 of these for every Apache phase.
Colonel WENDEL. The readiness of our tactical equipment is satisfactory. Our wheel vehicle fleet, tactical radio equipment, and weapons remain above 90% operational ready. Spare parts are generally received within the required delivery dates consistent with requisition coding. Prescribed Load Lists (PLL) are maintained at above the 95% rate; however, we maintain 50% less lines of stockage as previously authorized at the battalion level. This is satisfactory while garrison-based, but not during actual deployment. The most difficult repair parts to attain are the items that seldom break. This again is based on a demand history. Some examples are as follows: frame parts, steering columns, and support equipment parts, such as sling sets. These items can take in excess of six months before they come in. This requires the unit to spend extra money in locally fabricating the required items.
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Commander KRAFT. Our equipment is maintained in excellent condition and most parts are readily available. There are challenges in certain areas, such as ejection seat parts and counting acceleometer units, that we must watch closely. When we need a part, we have usually been able to get it and install it in our aircraft within 24 hours. Since returning from deployment, we have not had a jet down for more than 48 hours awaiting a specific part, which is a testament to the support we are currently receiving from our wing and Aircraft Intermediate Support Department.
Colonel HALL. Over the last five years, my squadron's percentage of fully mission capable aircraft has dropped from 92 to 75 percent. This drop is directly related to lack of spare parts. In 1992, only about 4% of the squadron's aircraft were non-mission capable due to lack of parts. At the end of 1997, this figure had more than tripled to nearly 15%. As a result of this spares shortage, my flight line maintenance troops have been forced to resort to increased cannibalizations (CANNs). In the last five years, the aging of my F–16 fleet combined with the lack of available spare parts, has caused my CANN rate to quadruple. Additionally, whenever a part is CANNed, my maintenance troops do triple the work (take it out of one aircraft and install it in another, then reinstall the new part when it is issued, back into the original aircraft).
My hardest items to get are avionics parts, such as the Dual Mode Transmitter for the radar. Parts like this can take two weeks or more to arrive once ordered.
Colonel TORRES. The military equipment that I have in my unit is mostly aircrew individual equipment issue—flight gear, chemical ensembles, cold weather gear, etc * * *. Members usually have all the equipment items they need to perform their mission. Periodically, supply backlogs will delay the issuing of new flight suits, headsets, or other flying gear; but these delays have not been extreme or had any negative mission impact. I do not act as the controlling agent for any large equipment items.
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The C–5 airframe is the largest piece of equipment that impacts the readiness status of my unit. The C–5 is in its third decade of service and is experiencing decreased mission-ready and home-station departure reliability rates. This is due in part to a lack of weapon system spares at the depot to support wing requirements. According to my logistics counterparts, the most difficult items to get over the last six months and the average time to ship them from the depot to the field are as follows: altitude indicators (3 days), landing gear conduit assemblies (8 days), flight control actuating cylinders (55 days), fire suppression seals (7 days), and maintenance detection computer processors (10 days). These top five items are mission essential parts and have been rank ordered based on their frequency of repair.
General HOWELL. Overall, Marine Corps ground equipment readiness has been a stable 90% for more than the past 12 years. We are seeing an increase in maintenance and spare parts costs due to the advanced age of our equipment. Our parts problems are extremely varied and change daily by commodity.
For example, the overall readiness status of ground equipment (motor transport, ordnance, communications) in our infantry battalions averages above 90%. Ordnance and communications are generally in that range consistently. Motor transport fluctuates much more so, based on our optempo/training cycle, ranging on average between 80–93%. The key issue is the number of hours of maintenance required per hour of operation. In motor transport, dealing with vehicles over half of which are 12 years old, the ratio is about 4 hours of maintenance per hour of operation. Additionally, more and more of our operating budget is being consumed by our maintenance costs. The end result is that we have less time and fewer dollars to place directly against field training.
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As far as spare parts are concerned, some examples of turn around times for critical items include:
Motor transport: springs (Helix) for HMMWVs take on average more than 42 days to receive.
Communications: Antenna bases, especially for the PRC–117 SINCGARS are not durable given the type of field operations which an infantry battalion conducts, and break frequently at a cost of $128 per base. Cable assemblies are difficult to obtain, taking an average of 25 days to receive.
Ordnance: Reticles and magazines are also slow parts to receive, averaging 20–25 days.
Measure of the Effect of Simulation
Mr. BATEMAN. What, if any, simulation is available to you and your unit? Is it as effective as the actual training? What are its limitations?
Colonel BUFFKIN. Any pilot will tell you that actual flying and shooting from an attack helicopter is always better than simulation. Simulation, however, does offer some advantages that we cannot get in an actual Apache. Emergency procedures training, techniques of fire distribution, gunnery training, and some instrument tasks, all can be accomplished well in our Combat Mission Simulator (CMS) at Camp Humphreys. The limitation of the CMS is that it stops at the crew level of training. The CMS cannot replicate a team, platoon, or troop of Apaches flying and fighting in concert with each other on a tactical mission. The Army has fielded a collective Apache trainer, but we do not have it in Korea.
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Colonel WENDEL. A variety of simulations are available to the battalion. The Division has a fully resourced Battlefield Simulation Center which is used for a wide range of battalion and brigade command post exercises. The Field Artillery and Air Defense units also have simulation trainers which we use. Through Training and Doctrine Command sources, CD–ROM based individual learning programs are used. The Joint Readiness Training Center and the National Training Center conduct extensive simulation training. All of these simulations are excellent training tools for soldier, leader, and train-the-trainer skills prior to field training. They are not as effective as force-on-force or live fire training. Simulations cannot replicate battlefield stress or severe environmental effects of high intensity training on soldiers and their equipment. They are, however, an integral part of our training strategy. We have used or will use each of these tools in the next 90–180 days.
Commander KRAFT. We have two front seat and two back seat simulators for our aircraft. They are the 2F119, 2F143 and 15E22C. They can simulate most things in the Prowler, from coming aboard the carrier to flying over Iraq. We could use another front seat simulator at Whidbey Island. Typically, we are only able to get just two-three simulator periods a week, due to the fact that the simulators are shared between an average of six fleet squadrons in addition to the fleet replacement squadron.
Colonel HALL. Here at Hill AFB, we are currently transitioning from our older simulator, the Weapons System Trainer (WST) to a new system called the Unit Training Device (UTD). The WST was primarily used for emergency procedures training and in that limited role, was very useful. Our UTD system is not yet fully functional, so I cannot personally comment on its utility. However, several of my pilots' initial impression of the UTD is somewhat negative, due to a step back in fidelity.
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Colonel TORRES. At Travis there are two full-motion air-refueling C–5 simulators and an air-refueling part-task trainer. There are also partial training devices in the Field Training Detachment for all crew members to use which simulate the nose and main landing gears, thrust reversers, the fuel/environmental/air-refueling systems, flight controls, and the visor/cargo door assemblies.
The full-motion simulators are very effective for checklist training, en route procedures, instrument flying and approach/landing training. The most effective use of the device is the simulation of emergency procedures. Aircrew members can be task saturated and given compound emergency scenarios for practice that they are not allowed to simulate in the actual aircraft. They also practice checklist and crew coordination skills. Their performance can be taped for later discussion and critique.
The air-refueling part-task trainer is a no-motion cockpit mock-up with the visual of a tanker model (KC–135 or KC–10) in front of the aircraft at approximately 150 feet. In my opinion, this trainer is the best simulation of refueling in the close and contact positions. The simulator is also designed to refuel, but I believe the 3–D model on the ARPTT is a more effective training device compared to the existing simulator software. The simulator is better for rendezvous procedures and checklists, but it can't beat the part-task trainer up close.
The field Training Detachment training aids are basically partial trainers with cut-away views to observe the inner workings of the systems described. The training they offer is valuable because most of what you see is covered on the airplane—unless you are observing the frame during one of its maintenance inspections at a repair facility.
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General HOWELL. The Marine Corps Systems Command has a Program Manager for Training Systems who provides management oversight regarding the design, manufacture, fielding and sustainment of real-time simulators. The following simulator systems are available within the Fleet Marine Forces and supporting establishment:
Precision Gunnery Training System (PGTS)
Light Armored Vehicle Full-Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer (LAV–FIST)
Indoor/simulated Marksmanship Trainer (ISMT)
Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES 2000)
Tank Weapon Gunnery Simulation System (TWGSS)/Precision Gunnery System (PGS)
MAGTF Tactical Warfare Simulation (MTWS)
Mr. BATEMAN. Is it as effective as the actual training?
General HOWELL. No. The development of basic individual skills, combined with challenging individual and collective sustainment training, is essential, particularly during peacetime. Simulations offer the only means to train Marines in operational tasks in a simulated combat environment. The realistic training systems listed above are used to enhance combat readiness. The Marine Corps is continuing to explore and field a number of new systems and simulators that will contribute significantly to training effectiveness while reducing overall training costs.
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Mr. BATEMAN. What are its limitations?
General HOWELL. On the surface, there are few limitations to using simulators for training. For example, simulators cannot replicate the effects of field conditions, physical fatigue, weather or other environmental conditions on an individual. However, simulators are now capable of training a Marine rifleman to engage a target while introducing uncertainty and other performance standards into the training regimen. At the other end of the scale, commanders now have the capability to conduct complex Joint Task Force level exercises which help validate actual contingency plans and mission rehearsals.
Readiness Implications of Infrastructure
Mr. BATEMAN. How would you assess the condition of your installation and/or your unit's infrastructure: Housing for your personnel? Training facilities? Maintenance areas?
Colonel BUFFKIN. As I stated in my written testimony and again at the hearing, our soldiers deserve better facilities. These are the worst permanent facilities I have seen in my 23 years of Army service, outside of field conditions.
Let me give you a few examples again. My wife and son live in a 1950s-vintage Quonset hut. We have no bathtub, the roof leaks, and the heating and cooling is poor. I am lucky; most officers live in worse quarters. There are no family quarters available on Camp Humphreys. I choose to live in these for reasons of readiness and family support. Living conditions off post are poor and expensive. Force protection of our families residing off post is a big concern with me. We need to build adequate family quarters on Camp Humphreys. Bachelor Housing for Apache pilots on Camp Humphreys is poor. I've had officer pilots live in a cheap hotel for weeks awaiting a small, shared cubicle room on post.
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The worst facilities are our soldiers' barracks. They are crowded, old, and well-below the expectation of what most Americans believe are available. I've had parents visit soldiers here, and I've been professionally embarrassed when showing them where their sons and daughters live. Work orders have gone for months without action. The installation and chain-of-command are responsive to these concerns, but it appears to me that a lack of resources for quality of life issues is the problem.
Soldier support facilities on Camp Humphreys are poor. Let me give you two examples. The library is in need of upgrade. Army libraries provide a respite from boredom, encourage mental readiness, and are a valuable outlet for soldiers. Camp Humphreys' Library has a high utilization rate but does not have enough space, resources, or computers to support the number of soldiers here. The other example is the post gym. This also has a high utilization rate, but is in need of upgrade.
Colonel WENDEL. Housing for single soldiers is marginally adequate. The barracks need complete renovation and remodeling. Most rooms do not meet the authorized square foot allocation for each soldier, or have too many occupants. The Brigade's barracks are under a renovation contract, but they are many months behind schedule. Housing for married soldiers is somewhat better; many housing areas have undergone complete renovation, and many others are being renovated. However, the majority of our married soldiers live off-post in the Clarksville, Oak Grove, and Hopkinsville communities. Most soldiers would like to live on post, but the waiting list is exceptionally long. Generally speaking, waiting periods for junior enlisted on-post housing is 15–17 months. For senior enlisted it is between seven and 18 months depending on how many bedrooms one requires. Bottom line is that Fort Campbell requires an increase in quantity and quality of on post housing for all ranks of soldiers.
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The support infrastructure of the post is in serious need of upgrade. Services such as water, sewer, electric and road repair are under or not funded, and serious problems will begin to surface as these services begin to fail. Other environmental services, such as air conditioning are being curtailed to reduce costs.
Training facilities are also falling into disrepair. Our Military Operations in Urban Terrain facility is in serious disrepair and is virtually unusable due to lack of maintenance. This is a key part of our training. Other training ranges and facilities, to include our live fire complexes, need repairing and upgrades, but, for now, are sufficient to maintain readiness.
Our motorpool is adequate, however, it lacks proper storage space for unit equipment. We have used unit funds to upgrade our maintenance facilities and tools. Constant improvements are being made on a daily basis by our own soldiers. Some examples of self-improvements include fixing our air compressor lines for our tools, and purchasing our own tools which decreases time to complete maintenance job orders and, making our maintenance effort more efficient.
Commander KRAFT. We have the very best naval air station in the Navy as our home base, NAS Whidbey Island, Washington. Housing at Whidbey is a bit short now, but with current construction will meet our needs in the next two years. Our barracks (single sailors) is newly refurbished and is the best I've seen. Our galley is currently under renovation and should be a great facility when complete. One phenomenon I'd like to note is that the Pacific Northwest is a rapidly growing military region. As such, long commutes are becoming common between our bases such as Bremerton, Everett and Whidbey Island. In the future, we may need to address the cost of commuting via ferry between the Olympic Peninsula (Bremerton and Bangor), Whidbey Island and Everett. Military members are currently not reimbursed for these costs, which can exceed eight dollars each way.
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Colonel HALL. I would characterize my facilities as adequate. My biggest concern is being physically separated from my maintenance organization. With two different buildings, one for Operations and another for Maintenance, communication and supervision becomes more difficult.
I would also describe housing as adequate. The rapid growth of the Salt Lake City metro area and corresponding increase in housing costs, has made it somewhat difficult for my young married enlisted troops to find affordable housing. With a year or more wait to get an on base home, many of them are financially challenged while waiting their turn.
Colonel TORRES. I assess the condition of Travis AFB facilities as significantly improved over the last six years. Due to Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) bringing the KC–10's to Travis, we built three squadron operations/aircraft maintenance unit (AMU) buildings, a maintenance hangar, and are building 361 new family housing unit. We also have an aggressive dormitory program, building and renovating 11 facilities for our enlisted force. Our training facilities are generally adequate with a new KC–10 flight simulator facility recently added to our inventory. Our new collocated club and base exchange mini-mall were provided with non-appropriated funds.
Although recent investment in Travis AFB facilities has improved our quality of life, both at home and at work, we still have some critical shortfalls. Primarily, our aircraft control tower needs immediate replacement, the radar approach control and the civil engineering maintenance facilities require replacement, we need a central deployment facility, and our base water, electric, and pavements need upgrading. Additionally, our facility project requirements exceed $300M over the FYDP. Our family housing includes over 1300 units that are below Air Force standards and in need of replacement or major renovation. We are concerned the lack of Real Property Maintenance by Contract (RPMC) funding will not permit us to address these requirements. Our facilities will continue to deteriorate and become increasingly expensive to maintain and repair without a continued investment.
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General HOWELL. In FY97, the Marine Corps began an annual assessment of the capability of our facilities to support the mission. In doing these assessments, facilities are broken into mission categories. The following information is based on the condition assessments for the mission areas reported. In housing of personnel, based on FY97 survey, 58% of the mission areas are capable of performing the mission adequately, 38% can perform the mission with moderate degree of problems, and 4% of the mission categories show severely degraded conditions. In training facilities, 43% of the mission areas are performing adequately, 36% have moderate problems, and 21% are severely degraded. In maintenance facilities, 80% of the mission areas are performing adequately, 17% have moderate problems, and 3% are severely degraded.
FY97 is the first year the Marine Corps has collected this data. We have found some problems with the data that we have addressed through system improvements and will be implemented in collecting FY98 data. While the information above is not perfect it can be used as an order of magnitude to evaluate Marine Corps facilities.
NON-DEPLOYABLE PERSONNEL
Mr. BATEMAN. What percentage of the personnel in your units are non-deployable? What are the reasons they are non-deployable? Do the unit's status reports (SORTS Data) reflect the impact of these personnel not being available to go to war with the unit?
Colonel BUFFKIN. In Korea, we are all deployed already. The measures of deployability such as dental readiness, pregnancy, weapons qualification, etc., we closely monitor. We consider every soldier in the squadron as a go-to-war individual.
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Colonel WENDEL. Less than one percent of our personnel are non-deployable. Five of the six non-deployable soldiers are pending a medical evaluation board in the next three to nine months to assess their physical profiles (their ailment or injury). The sixth non-deployable soldier is absent without leave (AWOL). All six of these soldiers are properly reported on the unit status report.
Commander KRAFT. My unit is 100% deployable. SORTS data does not reflect personnel not deployable, but we immediately transfer personnel found to be not deployable. Since I have been in VAQ–131, we have transferred two such personnel. One is now out of the military.
Colonel HALL. This is not a big issue for my squadron. I currently have 271 personnel assigned to my unit. Of those, 247 are deployable (91%). The reasons for the 24 non-deployable troops, range from medical problems to pending retirements. This limitation is not currently reflected in SORTS, and has not been an issue due to cross balancing of personnel between squadrons. When I have someone who can't deploy, I swap troops with another squadron for the duration of the deployment.
Colonel TORRES. The only person in my squadron who is not deployable according to their position is my civilian secretary. This is a miniscule percentage in a unit of over 200 people. The rest of my people are either flyers or administrative support personnel and they are all eligible to deploy. However, on a daily basis there will always be a small percentage of people who are not worldwide deployable due to illness, leave, or temporary duty for training. The only figures subtracted from my deployable SORTS total are those who are medically limited. The assumption is that I can recall those on leave or in training to deploy if necessary.
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General HOWELL. For FY97, on average, approximately 5.1% of a unit's personnel were categorized as non-deployable.
Mr. BATEMAN. What are the reasons they are non-deployable?
General HOWELL. There are five primary reasons Marines are reported as non-deployable once they have obtained MOS proficiency and are assigned to a deployable unit of the operating force. These and some examples of each are:
a. Medical; spans temporary to permanent conditions up to physical evaluation boards (PEB).
b. Administrative; home awaiting orders/discharge from PEB, administrative separation, in unauthorized absence or deserter status.
c. Legal; confined pending or after military trial, in hands of civil authorities.
d. Humanitarian; pending transfer or temporary additional duty or applying for hardship discharge.
e. Commander's Call; covers several areas to include in hands of civilian authorities, and on probation to under investigation by military or civil authorities.
Mr. BATEMAN. Do the unit's status reports (SORTS data) reflect the impact of these personnel not being available to go to war with the unit?
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General HOWELL. Yes, Marine Corps operating force SORTS reports reflect the impact of these personnel not being available to go to war with the unit. The personnel C-rating of SORTS reports reflect only those Marines in the unit that are deployable.
BORROWED MILITARY MANPOWER (BMM)
Mr. BATEMAN. Military often take military personnel from their assigned units to perform work unrelated to their assigned duty. The personnel may be driving a bus, working in the gym, working on a staff, etc. This practice creates holes in a unit's manning roster. The BMM individual is not available for training; however, he/she remains assigned to the unit and is counted as available for training for readiness reporting purposes. What is the number of BMM personnel in your unit?
Colonel BUFFKIN. I have always fought against MTOE combat arms units being tasked for BMM. Currently, we have no BMM tasking. I am tasked each summer to provide a lifeguard for the camp pool which falls into the category of BMM. Occasionally, other taskings are received in this same category.
Colonel WENDEL. Of the 629 soldiers in our battalion, we presently have 22 personnel who are Borrowed Military Manpower. We have ten soldiers who are on special duty serving in the following positions: Range Control, Post Office, Brigade Gym (two), Air Assault school, Troop Medical Clinic (two), Brigade Driver, Division Wash Rack, and Division Judge Advocate. Two personnel recently returned from duty in Bosnia and Honduras. Another ten soldiers are short-term Retirement, Permanent Change of Station, End of Term of Service, or Medical hold soldiers not performing line duty. They perform additional duties for the battalion/brigade such as Master Driver, Staff Duty and special projects.
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Commander KRAFT. The practice referred to in this question is what we refer to as ''Temporary Additional Duty'' (TAD). It can be a drain on a squadron when deployed on a carrier. Some personnel will always be working outside the squadron though assigned to it. They include corpsmen, mess specialists, and pay clerks. In addition to those personnel, however, we must provide 25 more to our ship to assist them in their services. From a squadron of about 140 enlisted, it can be a strain. We try to rotate them through these jobs at a rate of not more than 90 days assigned away from the squadron, but it often ends up closer to 180. These jobs are typically food service, laundry or supply. One solution might be to provide more services personnel to the carriers, thus easing the burden on fleet squadrons.
Colonel HALL. We don't typically assign personnel to duties outside the unit. However, we do place individuals into positions inside the unit that are outside their specialty. In my squadron I have seven Non-Commissioned Officers currently working outside their career field. One is in charge of small computer maintenance, another is my resource advisor, two run my mobility section . . . etc. Bottom line, all these individuals are fully employed in jobs critical to the success of the unit, but we are not authorized personnel to fill these positions. Whenever we take people ''out of hide'' to fill these requirements, we short-change ourselves elsewhere.
Colonel TORRES. I am not familiar with the BMM terminology. My people are rarely tasked for these types of additional duties in order to remain available to fly their primary airlift mission. However, we do contribute in a few ways to similar programs. We provide one of our non-flying support personnel to perform duties as a Security Forces augmentee. We also provide periodic rotating manpower for the base self-help store and base clean-up details.
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Aside from these duties, I also maintain the currency of people attached to my squadron for flying purposes. These attached individuals are actually assigned to other units—normally wing or group staffs and the Operations Support Squadron. I currently have 8 people attached. I also have 12 people on-loan to the same locations. These people perform their daily duties outside my squadron, but still belong to my unit for deployment purposes. Basically, attached flyers' primary duties are their office jobs and they can decline mission taskings from my scheduler. On-loan personnel are supposed to fly when I need them to—regardless of their office duty schedule. Unlike the BMM personnel described, both attached and on-loan flyers are required to maintain their flying training to stay proficient and deployable.
In addition to the duties already described, members of my unit also fill short-notice TDY taskers from 90–120 days. The majority of these assignments are as airlift planners to Italy, Panama, Korea, and the Middle East. During this time, their training lapses, they stay assigned to the unit for documentation purposes, and they are not available to me as a flying crew member. This scenario—more than any—depletes my ability to put crews in the air.
General HOWELL. The Marine Corps does not utilize a Borrowed Military Manpower program. However, any Marine assigned to a unit without a structured billet, will be considered BMM in keeping with the intent of this question. For example, there are numerous administration specialty enlisted Marines assigned to headquarters that are filling temporary billets. We categorize our personnel that perform the above duties in the following categories:
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(1) Fleet Assistance Program (FAP): There are approximately 5,700–6,000 FAP billets in the FMF. The actual structure spaces are part of the bases and stations' tables or organization (T/O). The actual personnel are pulled from the FMF unit who use the facilities located on those stations. These personnel filling FAP billets are still deployable for SORTS reporting. This is based on the fact that the Marine Corps reports against T/O, a wartime requirement. When in need, those Marines will join their units.
(2) PMOS 8412: Career Recruiter. There are approximately 260 vacancies in the 8412 filed. These vacancies are filled by taking from the FMF and the Corps in general.
IDENTIFYING THE RIGHT READINESS INDICATORS
Mr. BATEMAN. There are hundreds of readiness indicators and only a small number are used to report a unit's official readiness and establish the ''C'' readiness level for a unit. Do you have some additional indicators of readiness you use to assess your unit's readiness?
Colonel BUFFKIN. I am always gauging the readiness of our squadron to conduct its wartime mission in Korea. Probably the best indicator that I have always used is my boss (commander) and his assessment of the unit. A good headquarters is always conducting measurements of its subordinate elements. I have been fortunate to work for officers who believe in accurate reporting. If my boss says a certain area in the squadron needs attention, then I look at it. This ''higher commander's assessment,'' is both a subjective art and objective science based on years experience in the profession of arms. This assessment cannot be quantified on a Unit Status Report. This is the reason I have welcomed outside looks, within reason, at the squadron to seek the reality of readiness.
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The second indicator I used is the squadron battle drill. We schedule one squadron battle drill per month. This is an excellent indicator of readiness. The battle drill requires all pieces of the squadron to come together to plan, conduct, and after-action-review one of our mission essential tasks. We use Readiness Level 1, an Apache pilot training measurement, as the entry ticket into the squadron battle drill. We try to integrate as many elements of the squadron as possible into these drills. If the 3rd squadron can plan and safely conduct a night, multi-ship, squadron attack with 15–20 crews, then we are ready. This ''squadron collective event'' measurement is not on the USR either, but is an excellent tool to measure readiness.
The third indicator we use, although infrequently, is live fire gunnery. A lot of training and readiness comes together when a crew in an Apache can shoot, hit, and cause the required damage on a target. This skill requires adequate ranges, realistic targets, and live ammo.
Colonel WENDEL. We use a number of elements to assess readiness in the battalion. These include: Mission Essential Task proficiency as assessed against task, conditions, and standards; Personnel turbulence within the unit; Individual and collective training such as special skills certification, advanced marksmanship, and collective live fire proficiency; Air Assault proficiency and qualification rates, physical fitness, and qualifications and experience of key leaders. We also assess readiness during formally evaluated tactical exercises at squad, platoon, company and battalion level. Systems performance is assessed through command and compliance inspections for all commodity areas. Using all of our readiness indicators, we are maintaining the Army and unit standards, except for company and battalion level Mission Essential Task proficiency.
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Commander KRAFT. Our monthly Training and Readiness Report is a fair indicator of our readiness. It is a snapshot of where we were during the previous month. As I stated in my testimony, my readiness indicator as a CO is more complex than a simple report. I take a look at what we have coming up, such as carrier qualification or a training detachment, and assess how prepared we are to safely execute the tasks we will be assigned. I do this by flying on a daily basis and looking at such indicators as field carrier landing practice performance and aircrew proficiency on our various training ranges. The wide range of activities my squadron may be tasked to perform makes any specific training ''yardstick'' difficult to use. The end result is that I'm the one that needs to be able to tell my superiors that VAQ–131 is ready to go.
Colonel HALL. Not really. Under our current Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS), I personally think we have an accurate means of measuring and reporting our ''C'' status. Additionally, as commander, I am given the latitude to ''commander assess'' my squadron's overall ''C'' status up or down based on my personal judgement. To this point in my command, I have not felt the need to ''commander assess'' a different ''C'' status than that required by SORTS.
Colonel TORRES. I also consider the experience levels and training upgrade progress (i.e. crew qualifications) of my flyers. Additionally, I take into account the professional development of my airmen and the impact poor retention is having on the rank structure (i.e. leadership to follower) ratio within the unit.
General HOWELL. SORTS best represents an aggregate picture from which to gauge unit readiness. For the Marine Corps, SORTS is the vehicle from which ''checks'' are made against other reporting systems utilized. Some of the other systems and indicators of readiness include:
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(1) Unit Activity and DepTempo: Marine Corps Training Exercise Employment Plan (MCTEEP). MCTEEP is a software program which provides data on unit deployment training and exercises activities entered by battalion/ squadron level units. The data contained in MCTEEP details deployment and exercise dates times, numbers of participating personnel and costs. Deployment Tempo (DEPTEMPO), the Marine Corps' standard method for tracking unit time away from home station is also calculated. Training remains the most subjective area of readiness reporting, particularly with respect to ground units.
(2) Manpower: Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS) Data from the MCTFS, which spans active and reserve pay and personnel records, is used to establish a measure of ''health'' of both units and MOSs. By ''health'', we mean a unit's strength or the assignable strength of a particular MOS.
(3) Aircraft readiness is portrayed in weekly Aircraft Material Readiness Reports (AMMRs) which provides aircraft status; numbers of mission capable aircraft, maintenance status, aircraft location and parts required to complete repairs. When tracked over time and looked at in relation to their deployment status, they portray an excellent readiness cross check to SORTS data.
(4) Log/Equip: Marine Corps Ground Equipment Readiness Report (MCGERR), a command information system which provides equipment status by unit, location or roll-up throughout the Marine Corps. MCGERR is a subsystem of the Marine Corps Asset Tracking Logistics and Supply System and Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance Management System (ATLASS/MIMMS). ATLASS/MIMMS integrates supply and maintenance information to provide asset status and visibility for ground equipment. MCGERR retrieves, integrates, and processes the unit provided data to:
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Reflect the current status of selected ground equipment authorized and possessed by reporting units.
Provide the identification of MCGERR tracked equipment excesses and deficiencies within the reporting unit.
Provide data for the determination of equipment/supplies on-hand ''S'' rating and the equipment's operational status ''R'' rating for use in SORTS reporting. Additionally, MCGERR provides an overall assessment of a unit's equipment capability ''E'' rating for internal tracking within the Marine Corps.
Greatest Contributor to Readiness of Your Unit
Mr. BATEMAN. What is currently the primary contributing factor that drives your unit's readiness rating? Personnel? Equipment? Training proficiency? What?
Colonel BUFFKIN. Peopole are the primary contributing factor that drives readiness ratings for the 3rd squadron. If we get the right people, in the correct specialties, and in the required amount, we'll train them for our mission here.
Colonel WENDEL. The primary driving overall readiness is training proficiency. Because of our MFO deployment we are not currently trained and ready on our five battalion Mission Essential Tasks. The components of training proficiency are: qualified leaders, focused training time without external missions or support requirements, availability of training resources, and trained soldiers. Key to this issue is regaining proficiency within the Training Cycle system of the Brigade and Division. However, our current glidepath will have us proficient on our Mission Essential Tasks in July 1998.
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Commander KRAFT. Within a doubt, it is equipment. We should have four aircraft but we currently have two. Our USQ–113 jammer is only provided just prior to deployment.
Colonel HALL. The biggest factor for us is the lack of targeting pods for our aircraft. There are three LANTIRN equipped F–16 squadrons here at Hill. The 34th Fighter Squadron is designated as ''A'' squadron, the 4th Fighter Squadron is the ''B'' squadron and my squadron, the 421st is the ''C'' squadron. Even though we have three squadrons, there are only enough targeting pods for two.
Colonel TORRES. Personnel is the only SORTS category reported directly by my unit. Training data is submitted from the Group level to include my unit and the other C–5 squadron at Travis. The other indicators are submitted variously by 14 additional squadrons and incorporated into a wing report.
Lieutenant General HOWELL. Personnel has been the most common contributing factor which impacts the SORTS rating. Overall staffing and critical Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) fills are the most influential factors which degrade these personnel ratings.
Constrained at 172,000, the Marine Corps carefully apportions personnel to ensure we cover all requirements placed upon us, both internal and external. The primary contributing factor that drives Marine Corps unit readiness ratings is personnel. Personnel manning is measured in terms of unit Task Organizations (T/O's), which state wartime personnel requirements. Available manning is apportioned to meet T/O requirements through our construct of cyclical readiness to meet the forward presence demands of the National Military Strategy. The Marine Corps continues to sustain a personnel balance in order to fulfill our forward deployed forces support to CINC and National Command Authority taskings.
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PERSONNEL FROM THE TRAINING BASE
Mr. BATEMAN. Are the individuals you are receiving from the training base as well trained and prepared for their jobs as they were in the past?
Colonel BUFFKIN. This is a topic my sergeant major and I discuss frequently. Most people in the Army believe that they had it tougher, were trained harder ''back in the day.'' I grew up in the Army then, and I will tell you it isn't so. The soldiers we get today are smarter, tougher, and more willing to be trained than ever. Even with our huge turnover, every time I think we just lost an irreplaceable soldier who rotates back to CONUS, another soldier, just as ready replaces him or her.
Colonel WENDEL. Yes. There is no quantitative or qualitative difference in the quality of the individual soldiers being received from the training base. They meet basic Army qualification standards. The challenge is training them to be Air Assault soldiers and meeting the standards set forth by our Corps, Division, and Brigade.
Colonel KRAFT. Yes, we are currently enjoying well trained personnel coming to us from boot camp and our various advanced schools. I have noticed no quality dropoff through the downsizing.
Colonel HALL. Yes, but we are getting too much of a good thing. My squadron currently has 130% of our authorized 3-level (semi-skilled apprentices) avionics technicians, but only 67% of our authorized 5-level avionics technicians and 7-level avionics craftsmen. This over-manning in semi-skilled 3 levels puts a heavy strain on our 5 and 7-levels, as they must add an increased training and supervisory requirement to their already heavy work load. By asking our seasoned maintenance professionals to do more and more, we increase their frustration level. As this increased frustration is combined with our high ops tempo, I find more and more of my 5 and 7-levels are electing to leave the service or asking to be transferred to a less stressful position away from the flight line. As they leave, more young troops are sent to take their place, and the cycle continues.
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Colonel TORRES. Today's C–5 aircrew members are trained initially by civilian contracted instructor-based, computer-based, and simulator training. Flying training is conducted at the schoolhouse by active-duty military instructors, and local mission qualification training is supervised by active-duty military instructors at homebase. Do I see a difference between today's recruits and those trained when I checked out in 1985 in the C–5? Yes. The general knowledge level for pilots concerning aircraft systems knowledge has decreased. This emphasis shift was an intentional move by the AF when it contracted the training to teach pilots what they need to know to fly the jets—not to build them. But this difference does not keep today's crews from professionally and expertly moving the mission in today's worldwide environment. Converse to yesterday's training, today's training puts more of an emphasis on international flight procedures, secure communications, and technological planning advances to assist today's pilots. Would I say today's recruits are as well trained as in the past? I'd say they're different trained for a different flying environment.
Colonel O'KEEFE. The young Marines and sailors that this battalion has received over the course of the last nine months from entry-level training courses has been uniformly superb. The Unit Cohesion concept, coupled with revamping of our School of Infantry (SOI) for our infantry Marines and Marine Combat Training (MCT) for Marines in non-infantry specialities, is producing a Marine who is competent in the employment of his weapon and confident in the combat skills with which he has been provided. Our challenge at the infantry battalion remains, as it always has been, to take this basic-trained Marine, build on the foundation provided by boot camp and SOI/MCT, and teach him the more advanced individual and team skills he will need to be successful on the battlefield as part of a larger team.
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Sergeant GRANGER. The Marines we receive are able to perform with no problem, but some additional training is needed to conduct the jobs that are required of them by the Battalion and Marine Corps. The young Marines we receive today are brighter and catch on faster today.
Problems I see in this area in Marines having to do multiple jobs due to the shortage of Marines in the unit when other Marines are sent out to support Fleet Assistance Program (FAP) and Camp Assistance Program (CAP) billets around the base. Someone has to pull these tasks. It can only get worse if we get any more cuts in man power. We are accomplishing all of these tasks, and getting them done as Marines always do. The strive for responsibility and ''doing it better'' is always a Marine goal. But a Marine can only be responsible for so much and do so much. I don't think we can continue to meet our goals, set them higher, or continue with our current rate of success if troops are downsized any more.
PERSONNEL SHORTAGES
Mr. BATEMAN. Are you experiencing any significant shortages of personnel in key support positions? Please describe the status of personnel overall and by combat, combat support, and service support within your units and the impact of any personnel shortages on readiness.
Colonel BUFFKIN. We are not filled to strength at this time. Currently, the squadron is going through a high period of turnover. As an example, I am short two lieutenants; one in Operations, one in the Support Platoon. My S–2, normally a captain, is a 2nd Lieutenant. I am currently short three Instructor Pilots in the squadron. All of these shortages impact readiness.
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Colonel WENDEL. The battalion is operating at near 100% strength (629/630 soldiers). However, this percentage is misleading because we are overstrength in the Light Infantryman (11B10) and Heavy Antiarmor Infantryman (11H10) junior enlisted military occupational specialties and understrength in many of the senior enlisted military occupational specialties across the battalion. Below is a breakdown of significant (90% or less strength) shortages of key personnel positions in the battalion. These figures were compiled from the personnel daily status and the officer's slate maintained by this battalion. Combat Light Infantry Platoon Sergeants are at 75% strength, Infantry First Sergeants are at 83%, and Heavy Anti-Armor Section Leaders are at 60% strength; Combat Support/Service Support Signal Support Systems Sergeants are at 60% strength, Personnel Administrative Specialists are at 80%, Medical Sergeants are at 83% strength, Food Service Sergeants are at 50% strength, and Unit Supply Sergeants are at 60% strength. Officers in the grade of Captain are at 66% strength ( 8/12 Captains), and Infantry Platoon Leaders (Second and First Lieutenants) are at 78% strength ( 11/14 Platoon Leaders). The overall impact is that we have less experienced personnel in many leadership positions. This increases overall leader training time, a requirement to train more frequently, and resources required to achieve and sustain a trained status on all Mission Essential Tasks.
Commander KRAFT. We have a significant personnel shortage looming in VAQ–131. It involves senior enlisted. Our basic allowance from the Navy is 11. I will probably be down to seven by next spring. Two critical billets are Maintenance Control Master Chief and Aviation Armament Chief. These billets (E–9 and E–7) are currently unfilled and remain that way for the rest of this year. This creates significant challenges for my other senior enlisted and my maintenance department in general. This is typical of the senior enlisted shortages currently occurring in my community. We are working with our wing and the personnel command to remedy this problem.
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Colonel HALL. My problem is not overall manning; I actually have ten more people in my squadron than authorized. However as mentioned above, my concern is the low experience level in my maintenance organization. For the enlisted grades of senior airman through technical sergeant, I am only manned at 74% authorized, while I have 128% of my authorized airman.
Unlike the Army, my people are not categorized as either combat, combat support, or service support. My pilots are the only actual ''trigger pullers'' in my squadron, and are currently manned at 100%. I expect to be fully manned with pilots throughout CY 1998. Though my overall numbers are good, my pilot experience level is projected to drop dramatically over the next six months from its current level of 65% fully experienced pilots to 40%. Lack of experience equals reduced combat readiness.
Colonel TORRES. My squadron is not experiencing any significant shortage of service support personnel. I am down two bodies of six authorized in my Ops Support Section; and typically, one of my three authorized admin/personnel specialists is deployed worldwide at any given time. My support processes continue to function in this configuration, but the folks who are here end up working harder and longer to get the job done. Any additional leave, temporary duty, or absence due to illness is acutely felt. All my flyers are classified as combat support personnel because of our airlift mission. I discussed the status of aircrew manning and its effect on readiness in my answer to question #13, paragraph 2.
General HOWELL. Shortfalls exist across the force in personnel assigned versus personnel authorized. However, general observations must be made with caution. Manning shortfall data represents a snapshot valid only at the time of measurement. Over the last nine months, ending in March 1998, the majority of reported personnel shortfalls existed in combat support and combat service support MOS's. This phenomena is likely attributable to longer training pipelines and smaller MOS densities. While any personnel shortfall has an adverse impact on the unit in question, overall readiness is not detrimentally affected.
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AIRLIFT WING PERSONNEL SHORTAGES
Mr. BATEMAN. Please describe for us the availability of critical personnel within your wing, and if shortages exist, how readiness is being impacted. Do you have other personnel shortages? If so, how is readiness being impacted?
Colonel TORRES. The SORTS report worksheet identifies career fields which are critical to be manned. In my unit, all pilot, engineer, and loadmaster billets are identified as critical. Any change in SORTS status or the actual ratings are classified. Although my unit is fully mission capable now, a lesser manning level would decrease my ability to put enough crews together to meet my wartime mission specifications. This negative readiness issue would drop our C-rating and have a significant impact on the ability of Air Mobility Command to provide global heavy airlift. The C–5s at Travis provide roughly 30% of America's heavy lift capability, and are crucial to the rapid response deployments which are becoming a DOD hallmark.
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS
Mr. BATEMAN. Please describe the status of personnel authorized vs. assigned and the number available for deployment. Is there a big difference when looking at combat, combat support, and combat service support military occupational specialties? Please describe the impact of any personnel shortages on readiness.
Lieutenant Colonel BUFFKIN. Authorized versus assigned does not impact the squadron in terms of soldiers available for ''deployment.'' All soldiers here are deployable. On the authorized versus assigned aspect, the squadron experiences its highest turnover in the May, June and July months. We go from about a four percent turnover to around 60 percent per month. Our assigned strength then stabilizes prior to the fall exercise window. This supports a readiness and training cycle for the theater. Our USR accurately reflects our authorized versus assigned balance. The difference between combat, combat support, and combat service support specialties in minimal.
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Lieutenant Colonel WENDEL. The status of personnel authorized versus assigned and number available for deployment are within one to two percent difference as reflected on the Unit Status Report. The shortages of leaders and low density technical skills soldiers significantly impacts on training readiness. As stated above in response to the question on personnel shortages, when positions are undermanned or filled with a lesser experienced soldier or leader, readiness is affected.
Commander KRAFT. The number of personnel assigned to a squadron is dependent on several factors. Each squadron's manpower requirement reflects the wartime employment of the command. This number is called the M+1 manpower requirement. From this wartime requirement, Navy resources the squadron for peace time activities at a slightly smaller percentage. Recently, 90% of the wartime employment factor (M+1) has been funded. This gives the unit sufficient personnel resources to deploy and complete their assigned mission.
The number of personnel actually reporting on board the squadron fluctuates depending on where we are in the deployment and work up cycle. As we get closer to deployment our priority for filling vacancies increases and we are given the necessary resources to ensure we can deploy in a high state of personnel readiness.
Additionally, in isolated instances, due to the subspecialty required of the position, the inventory of some enlisted ratings may be insufficient to fill all the available positions. In these cases, the specific squadron will be given a fair share of available personnel which hold the subspecialty. Once the subspecialty inventory increases, personnel will be transferred to the units with the greatest need and who are closest to deployment.
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In the case of my squadron we get a fair share of all available personnel in the specific rates/pay grades in which there are not enough people available Navy wide to provide 100 percent of our allowance.
The Navy does not utilize the military occupational specialties (MOS) categorization, so in deployable Navy Units (sea duty commands) everyone assigned to the sea duty unit identification code (UIC) are deployable unless they have a medical legal or other situation that could prevent them from deploying. Currently my unit is 100% deployable.
Personnel shortages can impact readiness. In our case, we will be able to maintain our readiness with our impending senior enlisted shortage, but we will do so by working harder and not having senior leaders as involved with issues like ordnance safety.
Colonel TORRES. At Travis there are 133 C–5 pilot slots authorized and 132 assigned (99%). There are 125 C–5 flight engineer slots authorized and 135 assigned (108%). There are 153 C–5 loadmaster slots authorized and 156 assigned (102%). The mission-ready deployable numbers are slightly lower in each case due to student upgrades. Deployable numbers are as follows: pilots (98%), engineers (102%), and loadmasters (94%). As discussed earlier, the vast majority of my personnel are combat support assests. I discussed the negative impact of an aircrew shortage in question #13, paragraph 2, and question #23, paragraph 1.
TRENDS IN YOUR READINESS
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Mr. BATEMAN. Would each of you outline for me what you consider to be the strong and weak points in readiness for your respective commands and tell me to what extent that situation has or is changing over time (past and future)?
General BRAMLETT. Our Army's strong point is our soldiers' proven go-to-war readiness, as is evident by how well they have performed on operational contingencies, as well as during training at their home stations and the Combat Training Centers. As a result of our priority on training (go-to-war) readiness, our biggest challenge today is the lack of resources to maintain infrastructure and quality of life. Adequate funding of base operations, real property maintenance, and military construction is essential if units are to deploy rapidly when called. Quality of life for our soldiers and their families is a key factor in sustaining readiness. It is becoming increasingly difficult to balance the requirements of go-to-war readiness, infrastructure, and quality of life at current and anticipated levels of funding.
Admrial CLEMINS. There are many strong points in our readiness. In general, our deployed carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups are as ready as they've ever been to conduct the full spectrum of operations, and our submarine force has been maintaining its readiness at historic levels. There are also definite indications of an improvement in surface ship material readiness as evidenced by a steady decline in the number and median age of serious equipment casualty reports (CASREPS) since January 1996, and a decline in the size of shipboard maintenance packages over the past year. Last, but not least, is the quality of our people. Studies have shown that one of the key factors in readiness is the quality of people, and the quality of our Officers and Sailors is better now than it's ever been.
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In spite of the encouraging signs above, we do have a number of readiness concerns. Overall we have seen a decline of about 8% in non-deployed readiness in our Status of Resources and Training (SORTS) system over the past two years, which means that we are keeping our deployed forces ready at the expense of the forces back home. Because of scarce resources it is getting harder to ''ramp up'' the readiness of units before they deploy. Currently our top concern is non-deployed aviation readiness, where we are seeing a number of inter-related problems including spare parts shortages, increased cannibalization rates, lower mission capable, (MC/FMC) rates, fewer flight hours for pilot training, and a depot maintenance backlog. We are also experiencing personnel shortfalls. In the Pacific Fleet we are currently short over 1900 sailors in key enlisted technical ratings (specialties), part of a Navy-wide shortage that has tripled in the past four years although we are seeing some encouraging signs of improvement since February 1998. We also have shortfalls in at sea manning of non-designated E1–E3 personnel (general details or ''GENDETS'') in both the aviation and surface ship communities. GENDETS in the Pacific Fleet are currently manned at about 82%, a dramatic improvement from 73% only six months ago. We expect to solve the GENDET problem within the next year to eighteen months.
General MYERS. Our number one strength is our people. PACAF forces remain ready to conduct any assigned mission with nearly all of PACAF's units at the highest levels of combat readiness. That level of preparedness is a direct result of the professional men and women who serve PACAF. Additionally, we generally enjoy good training. We train daily with our sister services and we have a robust exercise program that interacts with 23 different countries in the region annually. COPE THUNDER in Alaska is our gemstone for both training and engagement. The COPE THUNDER airspace and facilities are among the finest in the Pacific and make a significant difference to our readiness by giving us the opportunity not only to hone our warfighting skills but also to train with our allies.
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Our Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directed exercise program is also a key part of our readiness. In PACAF, the JCS directed exercise program does not have a significant impact on tempo. Indeed, at a time when our allies in the region are looking for increased US support to conduct exercises, we must continue our focus on these exercises and keep our engagement and interoperability with our Asia-Pacific partners at their highest levels.
PACAF's war reserve munitions (WRM) program offers significant benefits to readiness by enhancing our ability to beddown aircraft and personnel at the main operating bases and at collocated operating bases where there is limited infrastructure. To beddown aircraft, the command has pre-positioned WRM commodities which include aerospace ground equipment (AGE), fuel tanks, racks, adapters, pylons, and fuels mobility support equipment which are critical to ''turn-key'' flying operations. PACAF also maintains pre-positioned material handling equipment and AGE to ensure responsive cargo off-load and operations of AMC strategic airlift. However, we do need more covered storage space to preserve our pre-positioned WRM. PACAF's pre-positioning strategy is both an airlift saver and helps to ready the battlefield for air employment.
Our toughest challenges lie in equipment maintenance, chemical & biological force protection, and infrastructure. Readiness Spare Packages (RSP) are an air transportable package of repairable assets designed to support a unit's wartime tasking for 30 days. RSP fill rates have a direct impact on supply support. Presently, rates are below adequate levels. FY98 funding was increased to provide for repair of current year requirements. However, fill rates have not yet improved. For example, the current F–15C/D RSP fill rate averages 64% and our A–10 fill rate averages 70%. Additionally, our aging aircraft are increasing the demands on our logistics system. Depot funding needs to be increased to allow the depots to attack the backlog of parts required to fill our depleted RSP kits. Despite these numbers, PACAF's Mission Capable rates for aircraft are above those of CONUS based units. That's due to two factors: first, a conscious effort to give priority to forward based units; and second, the superb efforts of our men and women on the maintenance line. However, maintaining the current kit fill rates results in fewer parts and higher cannibalization rates. Our people must work twice as hard for each repair. Quality of life suffers and retention become a bigger issue. We believe our FY99 budget addresses many of these concerns, but we must continue our focus on this critical area.
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PACAF forces must be prepared to sustain our mission in a chemically/biologically contaminated environment for extended periods of time. This requires a balance between mission sustainability and personnel survivability. PACAF forces are well trained and have always been prepared for the possibility of chemical and biological attacks, but with current and projected requirements for forces in Korea and Japan, shortages of individual protective gear exist. In addition to working our individual protection issues, we are also in the process of providing collective protection for aircraft sortie generators using fixed and transportable systems. PACAF has initiated several actions to repair fixed systems and procure transportable systems. Congress' support with additional funding in FY98 made a significant difference and projected funding will allow us to continue our efforts.
A strong point is PACAF's work to strengthen its chemical and biological agent detection capability. This summer, Osan and Kunsan will become the first Air Force bases to receive biological detection systems as part of a field test by the Joint Program Office for Biological Defense. We appreciate your continued support of PACAF's nuclear, biological, and chemical defense program.
And finally, our infrastructure requires keen attention. Although well maintained within limited funding, our infrastructure has serious problems that directly impact mission readiness. The average age of PACAF's infrastructure is over 40 years, with 65% of our systems having exceeded their design life expectancy. These systems include water, sewer, electrical distribution, heating and cooling plants and distribution systems, airfield pavements, airfield lighting and fuel delivery and storage systems. In addition, we need special assistance in Korea. Even with host nation support, utility distribution systems are among the worst in Air Force and DOD. Continued investment in infrastructure at core military bases is essential to our strategic presence at those bases in the future.
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Our ability to support continuous air operations may be seriously impacted by our inability to re-supply jet fuels in theater. Host nation fuels infrastructure is very limited and may not meet our needs. At Andersen AFB, re-supply is impaired due to deteriorating fuel receipt infrastructure. Replacement of a 45 year old pipeline is programmed for FY98. Additionally, 15% of Andersen's hydrants are out of service. Five maintenance and repair projects have been submitted and MILCON to construct 36 new hydrant outlets at Andersen is currently at the top of the DLA MILCON priority list. Alaska bases also suffer from old infrastructure with hydrant construction currently on-going, construction of JP–8 tankage programmed for FY98, and major hydrant replacement scheduled for FY99. Thank you for your continued support as we work this critical readiness issue.
We all know the technological advances being reached in communications and computing. Additionally, information is a critical asset and medium of warfare. As new technologies increase our capabilities, we are finding it more and more difficult to keep up with the foundation necessary to support these new capabilities. Many PACAF bases simply do not have sufficient communications infrastructure to support new information systems that provide critical command and control and combat support information to the war fighter. Over 100 programs fielding new systems during the next several years have been identified. These systems will require communications infrastructure and equipment that PACAF bases will have problems supporting. We are striving to work the issue Air force wide through the Combat Information Transport System, a program designed to provide information connectivity for C–4 systems.
IMPACT OF HIGH OPTEMPO & PERSTEMPO
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Mr. BATEMAN. Would each of you tell me to what extent your readiness is impacted by high operating tempo, PERSTEMPO, and personnel turnovers (turbulence)? To what extent does this effect unit cohesion and your ability to train to standard not only at the individual and small unit level, but also at higher echelons?
General BRAMLETT. Higher operating tempo challenges our ability to maintain readiness, but we continue to maintain high rates of overall readiness by using resources more efficiently. However, readiness can be affected if we have to borrow from our operations and maintenance accounts to initially fund contingency operations. When we fund contingencies that way, readiness declines because scheduled training has to be cancelled. With regard to PERSTEMPO, frequent deployments can stress soldiers and families. In FY97 FORSCOM soldiers spent on average about 140 days away from their bunk, when both deployments and home station training are considered. Good leadership, community solidarity, and adequate QOL mitigate this stress. Personnel turnover has averaged less then eight percent per month for the 13 major active component reporting units in Forces Command for the period January through March 1998. This is predictable and manageable; readiness has not been affected. Generally, unit cohesion remains high. We are still able to train to standard. However, our heavy units are increasingly finding it difficult to resource training at the battalion task force level.
Admiral CLEMINS. Overall, OPTEMPO is about right to meet our commitments and train our forces and we have been staying within PERSTEMPO guidelines with a few exceptions. But because of asset limitations and increasing requirements, our forces are being stretched and we can no longer absorb new missions without tradeoffs in PERSTEMPO, OPTEMPO, maintenance schedules, training, or gapped presence. Some air squadrons, such as EA–6Bs (Tactical Electronic Warfare), are operating at surge tempo. Also, demand for P–3s (Maritime Patrol), E–2Cs (Airborne Early Warning), and RP–3s/EP–3s (Special Project Unit) aircraft is outpacing available resources as we struggle to meet commitments to forward presence, theater war plans, counter-drug operations, and intelligence-collecting missions. There may be some long-term readiness impact from wearing out air frames sooner than planned but the main impact so far has been to quality of life. In 1997, for instance, eight of twelve active duty EA–6B squadrons were involved in six-month deployments. Personnel have been away from their homeport of Whidbey Island, Washington, half of each year. Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 138 has been deployed to Korea and the Persian Gulf over the past three Christmases.
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Personnel turnover is a separate issue. Ships, submarines, and aircraft squadrons prepare for deployment by undergoing an inter-deployment training cycle (IDTC), which is designed to enable a unit to reach a peak of readiness just prior to deployment. While ideally you would like to have the same team intact throughout the IDTC and the six-month deployment, personnel turnovers are a fact of life for several valid and unchangeable reasons (professional development, sea-shore rotation, unplanned losses for medical reasons). But it is certainly true that a higher than normal turnover rate would make it more challenging for commanders to train their crews to work together as a finely-tuned team. While we can do little about rotations that are part of a Sailor or Officer's career path, we are paying increasing attention to the areas where we can have an impact such as the retention rate and first-term attrition rate.
General MYERS. Continuing contingency deployments have had an impact on personnel and unit readiness. Rotations to SWA limit unit flying training opportunities and the added deployments have reduced our participation in training exercises. As a result of contingency operations, COPE THUNDER 98–1, a major training event for four of our wings, had to be completely canceled. Furthermore, the 35 FW at Misawa AB, Japan, canceled their participation in an additional COPE THUNDER as well as two other primary training events. The 18 WG at Kadena AB, Japan is unable to participate in two large scale exercises and the 8 FW at Kunsan AB, Republic of Korea, reduced their participation in another. In addition, units that deploy often end up with a split squadron operations, with one group deployed and one at home. This does not optimize their training at either location. Finally, with the contingency deployments, the unit has fewer people at home station, but 100% of the home requirements must be performed. In some career fields experiencing manning problems, like Security Forces, helicopter mechanics, and engine maintenance personnel, deployments can reduce available manpower by 20 percent. While these numbers may not seem staggering, when applied to a four or six man shop, the impact is significant. Contingency support requirements are having an effect, but nearly all of our units are still rated at C–2 or better. We are, however, continually watching for warning signs and adverse trends.
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General HOWELL. The Marine Corps uses DEPTEMPO (unit deployments in excess of 10 days) as the preferred method for tracking the impact of time away from home station. Supporting the exercise and operational requirements of three CINC's does result in heavy deployment and TAD schedules. Manning shortfalls do impact operational tempo, unit cohesion and training efficiency. In general, low density MOS's experience higher tempo. Additionally, higher level staff (division, wing, FSSG, MEF and Force) tempo is aggravated by any manning shortfall, MANNING SHORTFALLS, however, are only one factor in the complex array of the elements of readiness. In the long term, recent CMC initiatives, such as the cohesion program, and table of organization realignments based on the active duty force structure review, have dramatic potential to diminish existent, and to preclude future personnel imbalances and shortages across the force. In the interim, despite the challenges of manning shortfalls, MARFORPAC has adequate personnel readiness to accomplish assigned missions.
Training Center Deployments
Mr. BATEMAN. Would each of you tell me how often do units deploy to regional training centers such as the Army's National Training Center, the Marine Corps training center at Twenty-Nine Palms, Nellis AFB, and Fallon Naval Air Station? Are you sending the same number of units now as in the past? (If not, why not?) How do units going to these training centers compare today with units going there in prior years in terms of how prepared they are at the time they begin their rotations at these training centers, and at the time they complete their rotations? How much cross leveling is required for a unit prior to its departure? How often do units deploy to regional training centers?
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General BRAMLETT. Active Component brigade combat teams deploy to the training centers on average once every two years. Army National Guard enhanced separate brigades have a scheduled opportunity for the National Training Center every eight years and for the Joint Readiness Training Center every seven years?
Mr. BATEMAN. Are you sending the same number of units now as in the past?
General BRAMLETT. Active component units deploy to the combat training centers at approximately the same frequency as in years past; however, there are currently fewer AC units and therefore fewer AC rotations each year. The opportunity for ARNG enhanced separate brigades to attend one rotation each year to the NTC began in FY96 and to the JRTC in FY95.
Mr. BATEMAN. How do units going to these training centers compare today with units going there in prior years in terms of how prepared they are at the time they begin their rotations and at the time they complete their rotations?
General BRAMLETT. Comparisons are difficult due to the varying training objectives of each rotation and the continuing maturing of the training centers into increasingly challenging training experiences. Generally, however, heavy units are arriving at the National Training Center at a lower level of proficiency than in previous years. During the rotation, however, although they experience a steeper learning curve, they finish at a level comparable to those of units in the past. Light units are coming to the Joint Readiness Training Center better prepared than in the past.
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Mr. BATEMAN. How much cross leveling is required for a unit prior to its departure.
General BRAMLETT. There is little cross leveling of personnel or equipment. If minor personnel cross leveling does occur, it is normally for sound training reasons, such as key leader development or capitalizing on a collective training experience.
Admiral CLEMINS. There has been no change in the number of units deploying to regional training centers (in our case NAS Fallon); each aircraft squadron deploys once during the inter-deployment training cycle (IDTC) as part of the workup for deployment. The main difference in the past year has been spare parts shortages. The impact on training readiness is felt primarily in the early stages of the IDTC. Squadrons that have recently returned from deployment have a lower priority for parts support than deployed units or those nearing deployment. In many cases they are required to give up parts for deployed or deploying squadrons. Therefore their aircraft availability will suffer, causing some degradation in readiness training. In many cases, squadrons need to accomplish aircrew qualifications with unit level training during this phase of the IDTC. In later phases, sorties at NAS Fallon are flown at the air wing level and individual qualifications are more difficult to achieve. Current repair part shortages have caused some delays in achieving required aircraft availability to support unit level training, thus causing steeper ramp-up of qualification levels as units transition from the Basic to Intermediate Phase of the IDTC.
General MYERS. As a result of the vast distances and expense involved for PACAF forces to utilize CONUS based training, we minimize our participation and rely heavily upon our outstanding training areas within Alaska to provide effective joint and combined training. We scheduled each of our flying units to participate in one or more of our four COPE THUNDER exercises held each year. Overall we are highly successful in getting our units to this exercise; however, this year we had no choice but to cancel the first COPE THUNDER because of the increased force levels and tempo in SWA and our need to maintain presence on the Korean peninsula. As a result, at least one of our fighter units will not participate in a COPE THUNDER exercise this year. Annual participation is consistent with prior years and our future plans.
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We remain particularly sensitive to our last remaining forward-deployed units in Korea. For these units, the need to participate in COPE THUNDER cannot be overstated. Force requirements within the Korea Theater preclude units stationed on the peninsula from being able to participate in exercises in CONUS without providing a replacement unit to meet the war time tasking. For these units, deployments to Alaska are currently their only regional training option for joint and combined training away from their home station.
With regard to the readiness of our units to participate in these regional exercises, our continued emphasis on at least annual participation along with the daily mission focus of our PACAF units means that our men and women arrive ready to exercise with very little ''run up'' required.
General HOWELL. Units deploy to the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) at 29 Palms, Ca on a rotational basis at the Division, Wing, or Group level of command. Units scheduled for a major deployment (Marine Expeditionary Unit) (Special Operations Capable) (MEU/SOC) or Unit Deployment Program (UDP)) within the next six months are given top priority for Combined Arms Exercise (CAX) participation. Unit assignment to CAX is a flexible process driven by future deployments, unit availability and unit readiness.
Marine Forces Pacific, Atlantic, and Reserves (MarForPac, MarForLant, and MarForRes, respectively) are tasked to assign their units to CAX. Traditionally, MarForPac and MarForLant assign units to four CAXs apiece, and MarForRes assigns units to two CAXs each year. This ten CAX per year schedule is standard and has not changed for the last several years.
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Given the flexible CAX assignment process, no prescribed/mandated amount of time exists for a unit to spend preparing for CAX. The Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commanders for each CAX (who are normally infantry regimental commanders) are responsible for their units' home station pre-CAX training. Infantry units normally focus on the fundamentals of fire support coordination (FSC), using a combination of classroom exercises and practical field application, usually within 30 days prior to deployment to CAX. Aviation units focus on individual pilot and FSC training sorties. These training events have been the foundation of pre-CAX training, and also have not changed throughout the years.
The CAX program does not, and should not, feature any sort of formal report card on participating units. The CAX program, unlike the Army's culminating unit readiness rotation at the National Training Center (NTC), is a training evolution and nothing more. Therefore, any evaluation of participating unit readiness is based solely on subjective observation, not objective definitive data. Formal unit evaluation is done by the divisions, wings, and groups in the form of Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluations (MCCREs) administered at their home stations. The bottom line observation is that CAX training increases small unit and MAGTF cohesion and combat readiness. Individual Marines and units from all elements of the MAGTF leave MCAGCC far more combat capable than they were before they came to CAX.
INFRASTRUCTURE UPGRADE INITIATIVES
Mr. BATEMAN. What trends do each of you see in the maintenance and repair of facilities and how that might affect readiness?
(Note: We are interested in family housing and barracks issues, but you may want to go broader than that to include other types of infrastructure facilities such as rail yards, hard stands, wash racks, etc.)
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General BRAMLETT. Declining resources for base operations, real property maintenance, and military construction are of great concern to me. Over the past five years, resources available to repair and maintain infrastructure have declined significantly. If allowed to continue for too long, it could diminish our ability to train and sustain forces, project combat power, and retain quality soldiers.
Admiral CLEMINS. Surveys indicate that sailors consider barracks and housing among the top four Quality of Life issues, and therefore key to readiness in the fleet. The Navy has made a significant commitment to improve Bachelor Housing and has a goal to eliminate the critical maintenance backlog of existing units by FY04 based on current funding, and by 2013 when we fully implement 1+1 criteria. Congressional plus-ups, such as the QOL Enhancement last year have been very helpful in accelerating the refurbishment of old barracks to acceptable standards.
Family Housing trends in maintenance and repair are on track to complete revitalization of existing units throughout the Navy by FY05 and about 40% of the Pacific Fleets inventory remains to be upgraded including 75% of the Family Housing in Hawaii. As you know, the DON is proposing Public-Private Ventures (PPV) in major fleet concentration areas to leverage the department's resources and reduce deficits more quickly than through traditional MILCON. The department realizes that a PPV, depending on how it is structured, may result in out-of-pocket costs to our families, which is an expense not previously incurred in quarters. To ensure that this does not become a QOL dissatisfier we need to ensure we build to quality standards and limit out-of-pocket expenses to our families. Maintaining a robust family housing account to complete upgrades to our inventory will be a significant challenge through the FYDP.
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General MYERS. Facility maintenance and repair trends, and their impacts on readiness, fall into three categories: adequate family housing and dorms, reliable base infrastructure, and quality mission facilities.
PACAF dormitory improvements have made great progress thanks to CSAF MILCON emphasis on eliminating central latrine dormitories, and host nation burden sharing in Korea and Japan. PACAF will eliminate our last central latrine dormitories with the FY99 MILCON and CY99 Korean construction programs. Congressional dormitory operation and maintenance (O&M) ''Plus-Ups'' have visibly helped reduce dormitory deficiencies. We appreciate Congress's recognition of the impact of dormitory conditions on the quality of life of our airmen, which in turn affects readiness. Our next challenge is to address our 4,300 dormitory room deficit, the largest enlisted dormitory deficit in the Air Force. Eliminating that dormitory deficit is especially critical for overseas bases, where off-base housing is largely inadequate and poses potential force protection risks. Osan AB, for example, not only has the largest dormitory deficit in the Air Force (1485 units), which exceeds the next highest base's deficit by over 600 rooms, but is in closer proximity to a potential hot spot than any other Air Force base where force protection is of paramount concern.
Our PACAF family housing encompasses over 20,000 units on nine bases in five countries (17% of the Air Force's family housing inventory). Housing in PACAF, both on and off base, is generally smaller, older and more expensive than in CONUS. Over half the family housing in PACAF does not currently meet Air Force standards, with the best being in Japan, thanks to major host nation construction. Our family housing in the worst condition is at Hickman AFB (over 81% do not meet standards). Our largest deficit is at Elmendorf AFB, where we are pursing a private sector financed initiative to address the shortage. Our goal is to reduce family housing deficiencies by 10% annually. The quality of where our people live carries over into how they feel about their job and the Air Force, and in turn how they perform to ensure our readiness.
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PACAF base support infrastructure is also a real concern due to the poor condition of our utility systems. PACAF bases are now 40–50 years old with major electrical power, water, sewer, heating and cooling, pavements and POL systems that have outlived reliable life. These systems, although diligently maintained by our personnel, urgently require major maintenance and repairs and complete systems replacements. Electrical power outages, water breaks and inefficient heating and cooling systems are all to common and not only impact readiness but also seriously degrade the quality of life of our personnel and stretch our already thin work force.
Our airfields and other mission facilities are the 30–40 year-old vintage, with resultant associated challenges for continued maintenance and repair. Examples include runways that have cracked and displaced slabs, taxiway and parking pavements that cannot be used because of severe spall failure, inoperative hangar/aircraft shelter doors, deteriorated revetments that will soon collapse, airfield lighting systems that are corroded and approaching failure. Our current backlog of primary mission airfield deficiencies requiring MILCON, host nation, and O&M investment is over $220M. These conditions clearly have a tangible impact on readiness that will continue to be reflected in eroded sortie generation rates and readiness if not addressed on our watch.
General HOWELL. Every year our facilities get older. In addition, we do not adequately fund repairs to maintain them in their current condition and we do not replace them within an expected life span. Based on these trends, the condition of our facilities will continue to worsen. This will eventually have an impact on readiness, but in the short run we mitigate this impact by ensuring our mission facilities and quality of life facilities are adequately maintained. This is done at the expense of the support facilities. Eventually the support facilities like admin buildings and roads will degrade to the point where they demand the resources being used on the mission critical facilities. At that point we will have serious problems because we will have to make choices like which is more important: a passable road to get personnel to the airfield or an adequate runway to land. The absence of either would cause problems, but we are not there yet.
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TRAINING DETRACTORS
Mr. BATEMAN. What are the biggest training detractors that each of you experience in your commands?
General BRAMLETT. FORSCOM's major training detractor is the unpredictable funding stream that results from having to use training and maintenance dollars to initially fund contingency operations. This, coupled with lower overall funding, creates significant training management challenges.
Admiral CLEMINS. The biggest training detractor for us has been lowered aircraft availability caused by spare parts shortages in non-deployed aviation. The impact of supply shortages on training readiness is felt primarily in the early stages of the inter-deployment training cycle (IDTC). Squadrons that have recently returned from deployment have a lower priority for parts support than deployed units or those nearing deployment. In many cases they are required to give up parts for deployed or deploying squadrons. Therefore their aircraft availability will suffer, causing some degradation in readiness training. In many cases, squadrons need to accomplish aircrew qualifications with unit level training during this phase of the IDTC. In later phases, sorties at NAS Fallon are flown at the air wing level and individual qualifications are more difficult to achieve. Current repair part shortages have caused some delays in achieving required aircraft availability to support unit level training, thus causing steeper ramp-up of qualification levels as units transition from the Basic to Intermediate Phase of the IDTC.
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General MYERS. Our biggest training detractor is the competition for time and money between real world requirements, training needs, and managing OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO. The increased demand for specialized training classes, retention issues in critical specialties, and scheduling difficulties when units deploy, leave home station personnel understaffed during the deployment. The end result is that both deployed and home station personnel are unable to attend training opportunities which have already been reduced by limited exercise and school funding. Our Security Forces are a good example. They have a regional air base training center located at Osan Air Base, ROK. Due to current OPTEMPO and manning, requirements for non-ROK based units to deploy and train has been reduced from annually to every two years. Though the issue is highlighted in a few key areas, it is spread throughout the force from chemical/biological training to healthcare providers.
General HOWELL. While we remain the force of choice for contingency response operations and continue to train for this requirement, it is not without cost/detractors. The biggest detractor is unreimbursed expenditures associated with unfunded deployments as a result of operational contingencies and other incurred costs like natural disasters such as the ''El Nino'' storm damage in Southern California. Funds expended as a result of unfunded contingency operations and natural disasters, if not reimbursed, reduce funding available to conduct routine training. Additionally, our aging equipment requires increased maintenance and upkeep to ensure its readiness. The Marine Corps maintains current readiness funding first, even to the detriment of other areas, such as modernization, training and maintenance of real property. If proper training is to be conducted, the Marine Corps must ensure current readiness costs are fully paid.
MOST NEEDED RESOURCE
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Mr. BATEMAN. If you had the opportunity to acquire any resource you needed, what resource(s) would you acquire first? Personnel? Equipment? $$ for training or infrastructure?
General BRAMLETT. Although we are concerned with noncommissioned officer shortages, our greatest resource need right now is increased funding. Readiness is a function of training, infrastructure and quality of life. Our number one priority of those three is training (go-to-war) readiness, and we have applied our available funding to that priority. Training is adequately funded, but just barely; quality of life and infrastructure are not. We are and will continue to maintain our training readiness, while we are not able to fund quality of life and infrastructure at desired levels at the expense of quality of life and infrastructure maintenance. (delete) As we look to fiscal year 99, if we receive additional funding, we will apply it to base operations and quality of life requirements; Real Property Maintenance; Active Component Support to Reserve Component training, restoral of Authorized Stockage List/Prescribed Load List levels; acquisition of full unit Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) authorizations (unit readiness related items such as camouflage nets, tool set kits, and reserve parachutes/air items); and chemical defense equipment.
Admiral CLEMINS. If forced to choose one I would fund people first. Not only are people our most valuable resource, but underfunding the manpower accounts over several years led directly to our current manning distribution problems. It has also been a major detractor from quality of life because of delays in permanent change of station (PCS) moves. Further, a shortage of temporary duty under instruction (TEMDUINS) funds has detracted from professional development of our people by preventing many Sailors from getting the training they need to advance in their careers and get the job done aboard ship. Although funded in O&M,N, TEMDUINS is executed in conjunction with, and is inextricably liked to, PCS funding. After the personnel account and TEMDUINS I would use extra money to fill shortfalls in the ship maintenance, air operations, and real property maintenance accounts in that order.
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General MYERS. PACAF would acquire funds to repair and maintain our infrastructure. Our infrastructure has serious problems that directly impact mission readiness. The average age of PACAF's infrastructure is over 40 years, with 65% of our systems having exceeded their design life expectancy. In Korea, utility distribution systems are among the worst in Air Force and DOD. Continued investment in infrastructure at core military bases is essential to our strategic presence at those bases in the future. In addition, we are convinced that no other facility program influences the performance and commitment of our forces and contributes as much to their quality of life as quality housing. Our master plan includes funding for six PACAF dormitories over the next five years. Existing dormitory infrastructure, particularly in Korea, continues to age and deteriorate at excessively high rates. Unusable dormitories and airmen living in leased space off base in Korea are not only quality of life issues but raise serious force protection concerns.
The FY99 focus on readiness will help our equipment maintenance issues but it is not a single year fix. As we look to FY00 and beyond we must continue to balance our sustainment, quality of life, and modernization efforts. I must also reiterate that people are our most valuable resource. We must continue our efforts to recruit, train, and keep the best in uniform. Your support of our pilot retention initiatives and our efforts to keep personnel in critical enlisted specialities is greatly appreciated.
General HOWELL. The Marine Corps priority of needs fall into several areas which support our near and long term readiness. Our first priority always has been and always will be near term readiness. Quality recruits are the key to our continued readiness and the recruiting environment is becoming increasingly challenging—the propensity to enlist is declining, and competition among the Services for quality recruits is steadily increasing. I am concerned about these trends. In order to continue our successful recruiting efforts, we have been forced to place increased emphasis on advertising. This requirement for increased levels of advertising is exacerbated by the fact that advertising costs have risen at an average of 12 percent per year. While we continue to address this challenge as we develop future budgets, my number one shortfall for FY 1999 is $12 million for advertising.
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My next highest priority is equipment to support our ground forces and modernization in the area of aviation. Over the last several years, topline constraints have forced us to make tough decisions in striking a balance between readiness, quality of life, and force modernization. For some time now, financing near-term readiness has come at the expense of future modernization. There is an urgent and immediate need to modernize equipment for our ground forces.
Although the FY 1999 request for procurement of ground equipment and ammunition is approximately fifty percent above the level appropriated for FY 1998, allowing for the start of recapitalization of critical Fleet Marine Force equipment that is approaching the end of its useful life, as well as replacement of aging equipment with new, more capable equipment, the FY 1999 level is still approximately $500 million below our historical average of $1.2 billion. Assuming no change in our topline, we begin to approach that level in the outyears; however, it is essential to note that it will take a long time to recover from the cumulative effects of low procurement levels necessitated during the budget deficit recovery years. We simply must increase ground equipment procurement funding if we are to sustain a ready, capable Corps in the next century. If we do not, today's modernization concerns will become tomorrow's readiness dilemmas.
The situation is much the same for modernization in the area of aviation. Our CH–46E Sea Knight was first introduced to the fleet in the mid-1960's, and has an average age of over 30 years. Our CH–53D, which is also approaching 30 years of age, has exceeded it original projected life by seven to ten years, and our fleet of KC–130Fs is approaching 40 years of age, almost twice the original projected life. The V–22, replacement for our CH–53Ds and CH–46Es, was accelerated by the QDR, allowing us to procure 11 more within the FYDP than originally planned, however, we need to ramp up to the maximum economical rate of production as soon as possible after completion of the test phase. This budget allows for the necessary research and development to upgrade our UH1Ns and AH1Ws, however, actual procurement of this critical upgrade program does not begin until FY 2002.
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While the Marine Corps remains committed to fully financing our operating forces, we are concerned about trends in maintenance of our equipment which can impact readiness and quality of life. High operational tempo and aging equipment have caused dramatic increases in the cost to maintain our equipment, both in terms of parts and manhours. The more time and money we spend on repairing equipment, the less we have to train Marines. The solution to this problem is replacement of our aging equipment. Until this happens, we could use an additional $16 million in FY 1999 for equipment maintenance.
Another area where we could use additional funds is initial issue. An additional $35 million would allow the Marine Corps to accelerate the pace of procurement of this equipment which directly impacts the effectiveness of our active and reserve operating forces.
In terms of infrastructure, the Marine Corps remains concerned about the maintenance of our bases and stations and about the continued underfunding of our military construction and family housing accounts. Funding in each of these areas remains austere, and under existing topline constraints, does no more than minimize the deterioration of our facilities. In spite of efforts to contain it, our backlog of maintenance and repair grows by approximately $60 million each year and exceeds $1 billion by FY 2003, far exceeding the Marine Corps goal of $100 million by FY 2010. An additional $72 million for maintenance of real property in FY 1999 would allow the Marine Corps to fund the first year of a plan to arrest the growth in and eventually decrease, in a phased approach, the backlog of maintenance of real property.
In the area of military construction, our goal is to replace physical plant every 100 years by investing one percent of plant value in new construction. This goal requires approximately $300 million per year. The Marine Corps budget is currently structured, provides for replacement of physical plant well in excess of every 150 years.
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Additionally, the Marine Corps has a family housing deficit of approximately 10,000 units. At projected funding levels, using traditional military construction methods, we will make little, if any progress toward elimination of this deficit. We are, however, using our limited resources to revitalize existing housing units and we are pursuing Public/Private Ventures (PPV) where feasible. If proposed PPV initiatives are successful, the 10,000 unit deficit should be eliminated by FY 2034.
The Marine Corps has used many approaches to mitigate the impact of these shortfalls. We have aggressively pursued improved business practices, bought used items like recapped tires instead of new ones, and remanufactured major aviation end items such as the AV–8B and the AH1W/UH1N. We are pursuing the most cost effective options to replacing our aging fleet of ground equipment including the five ton truck, the HMMWV, and the howitzer, and we have supported the QDR recommendation for reductions in our active and reserve force structure in order to free up funds for needed modernization. We believe that the Marine Corps has a cogent, common-sense approach to obtain a 21st century Marine Corps that will be effective. efficient, and affordable but we cannot execute that plan without additional funds.
Please allow me to make two points. It is critical to the Marine Corps and to the Department of Defense that the supplemental request be funded ''above the line.'' Additionally, we have worked hard to intricately balance our request within the constraints of the President's budget, and unless funds are available in addition to the present topline, we feel there is no better allocation of funds within Marine Corps accounts than that reflected in our budget request.
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NUMBER OF TRAINING EXERCISES
Mr. BATEMAN. You all are commanders of major commands within your respective services. How many training exercises do you participate in during any calendar year that require your service members to be away from their homes? How many are service directed vs. JCS directed? Has that number increased in recent years? Do you expect the number to continue to increase? Who generates these training exercises? Does anyone monitor the number and the cost? How many training exercises do you participate in during any calendar year that require service members to be away from their homes?
General BRAMLETT. In FY97 FORSCOM units participated in 75 exercises.
Mr. BATEMAN. How many are service directed versus Joint Chiefs of Staff directed?
General BRAMLETT. In FY97 FORSCOM units were involved in 50 exercises with CINCs and 25 Combat Training Center exercises directed by the Army. These figures do not include home station training exercises directed by the unit commanders.
Mr. BATEMAN. Has that number increased in recent years?
General BRAMLETT. The number of CINC directed exercises has increased from 31 in FY96 to 50 scheduled in FY98 (the same number as was scheduled in FY97).
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Mr. BATEMAN. Do you expect the number to continue to increase?
General BRAMLETT. No. Due to funding constraints imposed on the CINCs and operational requirements, these exercises are not increasing.
Mr. BATEMAN. Who generates these training exercises?
General BRAMLETT. The CINCs generate their training requirements based on operational missions as outlined in the Defense Planning Guidance and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The Combat Training Center rotations are generated by Army training guidance (Army Regulation 350–50).
Mr. BATEMAN. Does anyone monitor the number and the cost?
General BRAMLETT. Yes. The Joint Staff, J7, monitors the number and the cost of CINC exercises. Also, FORSCOM's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations closely monitors the Forces Command unit participation and cost of Combat Training Center rotations.
Admiral CLEMINS. The number of exercises we conduct has not increased for the past ten years. Additionally, we are continuously looking for opportunities to consolidate exercises to increase efficiencies where it makes sense. An example of this approach is the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise series, where a number of exercises with the ASEAN nations have been consolidated into a single deployment. We monitor the number of exercises conducted annually at Pacific Fleet headquarters. The operations and maintenance costs for almost all exercises are absorbed into routine operations, as the majority of exercises are supported by forces deployed in support of the Global Naval Force Presence Policy or by forward deployed naval forces (FDNF) in Japan. Because of this, there is almost no impact on PERSTEMPO caused by our participation in exercises.
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In addition to exercises conducted to meet Title 10 training requirements (i.e., JTF–EX, KERNEL BLITZ, etc.), Pacific Fleet forces participated in 14 CJCS-sponsored joint exercises in fiscal year 1997. Participation ranged from small naval force cells for command post exercises (TEMPO BRAVE, POSITIVE FORCE), to large-scale, fleet-level exercises (TANDEM THRUST). Additionally, our forces participated in 100 service-directed joint and combined exercises, ranging from unit level explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) exercises to carrier battle group and amphibious ready group passing exercises (PASS-EXes).
General MYERS. PACAF forces participate in approximately 53 exercises per year that require service members to be away from their homes. The number varies slightly since some exercises occur only on a biennial or triennial basis. Of the 53 total, 21 exercises are PACAF directed and 32 are JCS directed exercises. That number has not increased in recent years and we expect to see a decline in exercise participation. The current Asian economic crisis adversely impacts the ability of our regional friends and allies to participate in exercises. The Congressionally mandated exercise funding reductions will also decrease the total number of exercises. Furthermore, short notice contingency taskings significantly reduce the number of planned exercises because they divert units and airlift assets to other theaters.
Exercises are generated to fulfill a number of requirements, to include: (1) sustain joint and combined warfighting readiness; (2) test, evaluate, and analyze doctrine, war plans, and the ability to conduct contingency operations; (3) support theater treaties and alliances; (4) demonstrate U.S. resolve and capability to support our friends and allies; (5) provide JTF-focused training; and (6) support USCINCPAC's Peacetime Engagement Strategy. My staff is responsible for the command's exercise program and they closely monitor the number of exercises, the cost for each exercise, and the overall OPTEMPO of participating units.
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General HOWELL. The term ''training exercise'' must be defined before answering this question. There are several different levels of training exercises. JCS/CINC sponsored exercises are at the highest level followed by service sponsored exercises and then unit level training exercises which are at the lowest level. All levels of training exercises could require service members to be away from their homes.
JCS/CINC sponsored exercises accomplish joint training and/or regional engagement objectives. Service sponsored exercises increase proficiency of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Unit level training increases the proficiency of individual elements of the MAGTF (Command Element, Ground Combat Element, Aviation Combat Element, and Combat Service Support Element).
JCS/CINC sponsored exercises and service sponsored exercises have greater visibility and are conducted less frequently than unit level home station training. On average, units from Marine Forces Pacific participate in 16 JCS/CINC sponsored exercises in the PACOM and CENTCOM AORs and 18 Service/Force sponsored exercises annually. Accurate data for unit level training is maintained only at the unit level.
Mr. BATEMAN. How many are service directed versus JCS directed?
General HOWELL. On average, units from Marine Forces Pacific participate in 16 JCS/CINC sponsored exercises in the PACOM and CETCOM AORs, and 18 Service and Force sponsored exercises annually. However, there is a greater frequency of training exercises at the unit level. Proficiency at the unit level is a prerequisite to participating in CINC/JCS sponsored and service sponsored exercises.
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Mr. BATEMAN. Has that number increased in recent years?
General HOWELL. The number of exercises at all levels has remained relatively constant.
Mr. BATEMAN. Do you expect the number to continue to increase?
General HOWELL. The number of exercises will most likely remain the same.
Mr. BATEMAN. Who generates these training exercises?
General HOWELL. Training exercises are generated by commanders at all levels based on an analysis of Mission Essential Tasks (METs). The goal of all MARFORPAC training is to incorporate its METs efficiently and effectively as training objectives into every training opportunity. To the greatest extent practicable all exercises relate to those missions and associated battle space functions.
Mr. BATEMAN. Does anyone monitor the number and the cost?
General HOWELL. Yes. Exercises are planned and monitored as part of a training cycle. The cycle consists of four phases: identification of joint training requirements, developing the training plan, executing the training plan, and assessing the effectiveness of training.
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1. Requirements. This phase translates the missions assigned to MARFORPAC into a theater strategy. Each mission is analyzed and essential tasks that must be performed in order to accomplish this mission are identified. These tasks along with conditions and standards form the MARFORPAC Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL).
2. Plans. This phase takes the identified requirements and assigns tools and resources to be used in meeting these requirements. This phase results in establishment of the Exercise Campaign Plan.
3. Execution. This phase implements the Exercise Campaign Plan; conducting the exercise/training event. Commanders evaluate how well JMETs were accomplished against the prescribed standards.
4. Assessments. This phase combines all evaluations over a one-year period into an aggregated set of results. These results are the commander's assessment of the forces demonstrated ability to accomplish the JMETs required for missions assigned.
The results of one cycle influence exercise objectives and design of the next cycle. This training cycle is followed at each level of command with the difference being the level of training objectives. At the higher levels of command, training objectives are focused at the strategic and operational levels. At the lower levels of command the focus is on tactical level objectives.
READINESS INDICATORS
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Mr. BATEMAN. Status of Resources Training System (SORTS) data has been characterized as providing valuable information. However, the information has been characterized as being limited, not always objective, and lacking the capability to give the kind of comprehensive assessment of readiness that is required today. What other information do you use to track unit readiness?
General BRAMLETT. The Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) tracks and measures resource fill and training aspects of unit readiness. We also use other readiness measurement tools. Within the SORTS framework, each commander provides his/her qualitative assessment of the unit's overall readiness, relying on professional judgment in weighing the empirical data to provide a holistic view of the unit's status. Additionally, both personnel and equipment managers have extensive automated systems which use a variety of statistical tools to rack these resource areas. FORSCOM hosts a quarterly review with the leadership of the National Training Center (NTC) and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) to examine current and continuing trends in training readiness manifest in the performance of participating units. Reserve Component training is also independently monitored using the Training Assessment Model. We also gauge the readiness of the various installations using the Installation Status Report. Another comprehensive method of assessing readiness is the Joint Monthly Readiness Review. Though a more subjective assessment in nature, it addresses force readiness concerns, which is more than just the sum of individual unit readiness indicators. Ultimately, of course, there is no substitute for a commander on the ground observing unit performance in training and operations.
Admiral CLEMINS. SORTS is the primary method used to monitor readiness on a day-to-day basis. We also use it to help spot long-term trends. But we supplement SORTS with numerous other metrics to give us the granularity we need to get a full picture. Some examples of other indicators include OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO trends, retention rates, aircraft mission capable rates (MC/FMC), equipment casualty report (CASREP) trends, ship maintenance package size trends, ordnance inventories, and numbers of off-ship requisitions. There are many others.
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We have an ongoing effort underway to improve our indicators so that we will be able to better monitor current readiness, forecast future readiness, and tie readiness to funding. We have to know how much readiness in a given area we can buy per dollar so that when we have shortfalls in say, the flying hour program, we will know what the impact on near- and long-term readiness will be. This is a very tough problem because there is not always a one-to-one relationship and there is usually a lag time before declining readiness starts to show up. We are taking advantage of new technologies, such as the Type Commander Readiness Monitoring System (TRMS), an automated readiness database, which will ultimately make it much easier to get good and timely readiness data directly from fleet units. Information Technology for the 21st Century (IT–21) will also facilitate readiness reporting and monitoring by tying all units together into a common, personal computer-drive network.
General MYERS. SORTS remains our primary indicator of readiness and is an effective tool that provides a ''roll up'' assessment of the four major areas of supplies, equipment, personnel, and training. Coupled with the commander's assessment, SORTS provides a realistic method of determining ''go to war'' readiness of our units. Because a large number of inputs contribute to each evaluation area, an increased number of individual evaluations by subordinate commanders and supervisors are required. Any shortfall that affects a unit's ability to perform the mission is highlighted individually and enables command-level attention to fix or alleviate the problem before the shortfall results in a mission failure. Some have advanced that inspections conducted by a variety of organizations also indicate the readiness of our units. While Inspector General (IG) inspections provide a snapshot assessment of a unit's mission capability, these inspections serve primarily to validate the capability expressed in SORTS. IG inspections can and do highlight particular problems that require attention, but the war readiness of a particular unit is more accurately reflected in the continuing SORTS reporting.
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Besides SORTS reporting, logistics indicators are tracked to evaluate unit readiness. Supply and maintenance utilize a combination of indicators such as weapon system stockage effectiveness, issue effectiveness, readiness spares package fill rates, as well as total not mission capable supply rates, cannibalization rates, and mission capable rates to help measure the degree of readiness by weapon system. These indicators are briefed to wing commanders and myself monthly to keep me informed of the health of the force.
Other information we use to track unit readiness is the quarterly PACAF Limiting Factors (LIMFAC) reports and the semi-annual wing Executive Review Board (ERB). Combining the SORTS, LIMFAC reports, and wing ERBs provide an overall assessment of the WRM program. This type of information is also included in formal reports such as the Logistics Sustainability Assessment, the USCINCPAC Quarterly Readiness Report, and the Joint Monthly Readiness Report.
General HOWELL. SORTS best represents an aggregate picture from which to gauge unit readiness. For the Marine Corps, SORTS is the vehicle from which ''checks'' are made against other reporting systems utilized. For example,
(1) Unit Activity and DepTempo: Marine Corps Training Exercise Employment Plan (MCTEEP). MCTEEP is a software program which provides data on unit deployment training and exercises activities entered by battalion/squadron level units. The data contained in MCTEEP details deployment and exercise dates, numbers of participating personnel and costs. Deployment Tempo (DEPTEMPO), the Marine Corps' standard method for tracking unit time away from home station is also calculated. Training remains the most subjected area of readiness reporting, particularly with respect to ground units.
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(2) Manpower: Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS). Data from the MCTFS, which spans active and reserve pay and personnel records, is used to establish a measure of ''health'' of both units and MOSs. By ''health'', we mean a unit's strength or the assignable strength of a particular MOS.
(3) Aircraft readiness is portrayed in weekly Aircraft Material Readiness Reports (AMMRs) which provides aircraft status; numbers of mission capable aircraft, maintenance status, aircraft location and parts required to complete repairs. When tracked over time and looked at in relation to their deployment status, they portray an excellent readiness cross check to SORTS data.
(4) Log/Equip: Marine Corps Ground Equipment Readiness Report (MCGERR), a command information system which provides equipment status by unit, location or roll-up throughout the Marine Corps. MCGERR is a subsystem of the Marine Corps Asset Tracking Logistics and Supply System and Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance Management System (ATLASS/MIMMS). ATLASS/MIMMS integrates supply and maintenance information to provide asset status and visibility for ground equipment. MCGERR retrieves, integrates, and processes the unit provided data to:
Reflect the current status of selected ground equipment authorized and possessed by reporting units.
Provide the identification of MCGERR tracked equipment excesses and deficiencies within the reporting unit.
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Provide data for the determination of equipment/supplies on-hand ''S'' rating and the equipment's operational status ''R'' rating for use in SORTS reporting. Additionally, MCGERR provides an overall assessment of a unit's equipment capability ''E'' rating for internal tracking within the Marine Corps.
PERSONNEL SHORTAGES
Mr. BATEMAN. At what rank or grade do you find the greatest personnel shortages in your respective commands? Field Grade Officers? Non-Commissioned Officers? Enlisted?
General BRAMLETT. The commissioned officer grades currently experiencing the greatest personnel shortages in Forces Command are majors (O–4) and captains (O–3). As of April 7, 1998, majors are filled at 69 percent and captains at 79 percent of their authorizations. Throughout our noncommissioned officer and enlisted ranks, sergeant (SGT/E–5) is reported with the greatest shortages at 89–91 percent of authorized levels.
Admiral CLEMINS. Our greatest personnel shortages are currently in the mid-grade petty officer (E4–E6) technical ratings (specialties). We also have a shortage in non-designated E1–E3 (general details or ''GENDETS''), although this problem is improving steadily. Further, we expect to have some shortfalls soon at the department head level (O–3/O–4) in the surface ship, submarine, and aviation communities because we are not retaining enough people.
General MYERS. Our personnel shortages are a mirror image of Air Force personnel shortfalls. We don't have enough company grade pilots, navigators, and air battle managers. We are making up for those shortfalls by reducing staff and returning more field grade officers to flying duties. The situation is revered for support officers where we don't have enough field grade officers and we're making up these shortfalls with company grade officers. Across the board, our personnel shortages in the enlisted ranks are in the second term airmen ranks. Those are our technically-skilled E–4s and E–5s at the six-to-ten year point their career.
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Lieutenant General HOWELL. Manning shortfalls exist across the enlisted and officer grade structure spectrum.
FREQUENTLY DEPLOYED UNITS
Mr. BATEMAN. Each service has some specialty personnel and units which are more frequently called upon to perform missions to support operations and training exercises around the world. Do you make any effort to tract the personnel tempo and the readiness of your most frequently deployed units? Are any special efforts made to identify and track additional readiness indicators for these units? Do these units receive any sort of consideration when deciding on who will be the next unit to be deployed for a mission? Are there any plans to manage these units, or the individuals in them, differently so as to give some relief from the constant demands on the unit to be away from home and station? Do you make any effort to tract the personnel tempo and readiness of your most frequently deployed units?
General BRAMLETT. Yes, we do that through our monthly readiness reporting process.
Mr. BATEMAN. Are any special efforts made to identify and track additional readiness indicators for these units?
General BRAMLETT. Our readiness reporting process tracks personnel, equipment, training, and supply readiness indicators, to include the unit commander's assessment; therefore, no further special efforts are required.
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Mr. BATEMAN. Do these units receive any sort of consideration when deciding on who will be the next unit to be deployed for a mission?
General BRAMLETT. Yes, during the selection process FORSCOM takes into account the personnel tempo history and readiness of all units.
Mr. BATEMAN. Are there any plans to manage these units, or the individuals in them, differently so as to give some relief from the constant demands on the units to be away from home and station.
General BRAMLETT. DA guidance regarding deployments to Operation JOINT GUARD stress that soldiers serving one or more overseas temporary duty or temporary change of station (TDY/TCS) tours will not be selected for subsequent duty in Bosnia. Soldiers may voluntarily waive this deployment restriction. Our deployment policy is to deploy units and individuals for no more than 179 days. For specific missions (e.g., INTRINSIC ACTION in Southwest Asia), we limit the rotations to 120 days to minimize OPTEMPO. We also work to balance assignment of missions between the Active and Reserve components in order to reduce the tempo on units and individuals. In addition, we are prohibited by law from redeploying RC soldiers to Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR once they have been called to active duty and performed a tour in that operation under the current Presidential Selective Reserve Callup.
Admiral CLEMINS. We monitor the personnel tempo and readiness of all operational units although some units require a greater degree of management attention. We are especially watching certain aircraft, such as EA–6B Tactical Electronic Warfare squadrons, because they are operating at surge tempo due to asset limitations. We always take into account the impact on sailors and their families of any operational decision but the reality is that we no longer have the luxury of absorbing new missions without negative impacts on people. Because of limited assets and increasing requirements, all of our forces are being stretched and we are constantly forced to make tradeoffs to PERSTEMPO, OPTEMPO, maintenance schedules, training, or gapped presence. So far we have managed to stay within our PERSTEMPO guidelines with few exceptions although we will begin to go beyond the guidelines later this year if the 2.0 carrier presence in the Arabian Gulf continues. We are also concerned about a shortfall in enlisted technical ratings (specialties); in order to keep deploying battle groups fully manned we are sometimes forced to ''crossdeck'' Sailors in key ratings to deploying ships. We are paying increasing attention to these problems but there are no easy fixes.
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General MYERS. For some time now the AF and PACAF have focused on the tempo of our units. Air Force wide, we track the tempo of all units to help senior commanders make the tough calls on sending an increasingly tired force back on deployment. Within PACAF, we are particularly sensitive to the unaccompanied locations in Korea and do not routinely deploy these units away for any great lengths of time. High-demand low-density units, such as our HARM capable F–16's at Misawa AB, AWACS in Alaska and Okinawa, rescue helicopters and certain critically manned career fields such as air refueling tanker co-pilots are managed service-wide. A delicate balance between the critical needs of the Korean theater and the worldwide demands for aerospace power has put inordinate demands on our forces stationed both within and outside the US. We have found that a continual threat assessment is required before deployment of any PACAF unit elsewhere in the world.
The Air Force has established a 120-day metric as a standard to gauge the tempo of our units. That is any unit spending more than 120 days away from home station requires special attention. Within PACAF, we use a 90-day metric. This is primarily because of the forward-deployed nature of our force structure. In most cases, when a PACAF unit deploys outside of theater, it deploys from a forward-deployed posture. This often compounds the difficulty in keeping morale high, can contribute to supply difficulties, and contributes to increased family stress as the member leaves his or her family in a foreign country.
Lieutenant General HOWELL. The Marine Corps' rotational unit deployment schedule has been successful in keeping Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) at manageable levels by using scheduling to ensure minimal impact on personnel. The PERSTEMPO of all Marines is therefore spread equally throughout our deploying forces. The Marine Corps does not specifically track PERSTEMPO, it tracks unit Deployment Tempo (DEPTEMPO), because Marines train, deploy and fight as units, not as individuals. The Marine Corps does, however, track every Marine's accumulated deployed time (ADT) and overseas control date (OCD) within our manpower assignment process. These measures enable manpower planners to establish a queuing process for future dependents-restricted overseas assignment tours.
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By controlling unit DEPTEMPO through effective scheduling, the tempo of individual Marines will also be controlled. The Marine Corps depends upon our local unit commanders to assign Marines to deploying detachments in an equitable manner in order to ensure that individuals are not over-deployed. The Marine Corps tracks and displays its DEPTEMPO data as part of the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) process, which is also displayed in the Quarter Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC). Eight frequently deployed unit types are tracked and displayed in these forums; Infantry and Artillery Battalions, F/A–18 squadrons in Unit Deployment Program (UDP) and F/A–18 squadrons assigned to Navy Carrier Air Wings, EA–6B Electronic Warfare Squadrons, and the different types of helicopter squadrons. If contingencies increase DEPTEMPO significantly to the detriment of a unit, we adjust the deployment schedules to ensure relief to those units affected.
Marine Corps Manning Levels
Mr. BATEMAN. How would you describe the personnel manning levels for your units; do you have personnel shortages and specialty imbalances? If so, to what extent? What is the impact on readiness? What are the causes of these shortages and what actions have been initiated to improve the situation?
Lieutenant General HOWELL. Manning shortfalls exist across the force. During March 1998 major subordinate commands (MSC's) identified shortfalls in 70 specific occupational specialties. Substantial or long term shortfalls exist in the following occupational categories: 02XX Intelligence, 04XX Logistics, 23XX Ammunition and Explosive Ordnance disposal, 25XX Operational communications, 26XX Signals intelligence/ground electronic warfare, 28XX Data/communications maintenance, 65XX Aircraft ordnance, 72XX Air control/air support/antiair warfare. Measuring the level and impact of MOS shortfalls is imprecise. Impact on readiness varies with the density of affected MOS's and the operational level and perspective of affected units. The impact is most acute in low density MOS's and at the lower end of the operational spectrum. Manning levels fluctuate in response to myriad interrelated manpower accession, training, and assignment policies that are best effected above the force level, i.e., at the service headquarters (CMC) level. Across the force, in spite of the challenges of manning shortfalls and robust operational schedules, MARFORPAC units retain adequate readiness and remain capable of meeting assigned missions.
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Air Operations Tempo
Mr. BATEMAN. In recent years, the number of contingency operations and operations other than war have increased the OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO for Air Force units and personnel. What impact have these increases had on overall personnel retention, pilot retention, and unit readiness?
General MYERS. The impact of increases in Air Force OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO on pilot retention, personnel retention and unit readiness is complex and not easily measured. Since 1987, the Air force is 36% smaller, we have 66% less forward basing, and yet we have four times as many people deployed. 52,058 Air Force personnel deployed for Southwest Asia, Bosnia, and Northern Watch/Provide Comfort from 1 Oct 97 through 31 Dec 97. 8,700 more Air Force personnel are assigned to Korea. Pilots are leaving the Air Force at high and increasing rates regardless of the number of days they've recently spent TDY. Increased OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO is listed as the number one reason in exit surveys, but it is only one of a number of factors including quality of life issues, airline hiring, career requirements, etc., in the decision process. In PACAF, we also share worldwide shortages among our F–16 and HH–60 mechanics but these issues are not restricted to our flying operations only. Support personnel, in particular our security forces, are being tasked at levels never before experienced. Coupled with declining experience levels, as manning shortages continue, demands will increase and create additional retention issues. High OPTEMPO has not led to decreased unit readiness yet, but we are watching for the warning signs.
Challenges to Maintaining Readiness
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Mr. BATEMAN. What is your biggest challenge in maintaining the readiness of your personnel and units, and what impact has this challenge had on readiness so far this year?
General BRAMLETT. Our biggest challenge in FORSCOM today is balancing the requirements of go-to-war readiness with the resources needed to maintain infrastructure and quality of life. This is most difficult when we are faced with unprogrammed costs for contingency operations. Go-to-war readiness remains our top priority. Currently we are not able to find quality of life and infrastructure at levels which will sustain them adequately.
Admiral CLEMINS. The biggest challenge in the Pacific Fleet is operations and maintenance funding shortfalls. The impact is that we have to do more with less and take the shortfalls out of hide.
We will begin to feel a serious impact at the beginning of the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1998 unless the supplemental appropriation is approved soon. Without the supplemental we will have to defer all ship maintenance availabilities until the start of the new fiscal year; and furlough people at Pearl Harbor Naval Ship Yard and Puget Sound Naval Ship Yard. If we decide the impact to the ship maintenance program is too great, the other option would be to spread the costs across the other programs such as air operations, ship operations, and combat support but could only do so with Congressional approval due to the restrictions currently in place. Other Navy impacts will include delaying permanent change of station (PCS) moves until the new fiscal year and possibly delaying officer and enlisted promotions. While the measurement of readiness impacts is not exact, the bottomline is that there will be detrimental readiness impacts if the FY98 Supplemental is not approved without offsets being required.
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General MYERS. Our biggest challenge to readiness is the maintenance of our people and equipment. There is a cost associated with readiness and that cost is providing quality training to good people with well maintained equipment. Our continuing support for contingency operations worldwide, with their demand for people, equipment, and parts, is starting to wear on our forces both at home and deployed. We are keeping our forces trained and ready, but this year, we've already canceled or reduced participation in seven major exercises and training events. We keep our aircraft flying, but only through the resilience and determination of our maintainers as they cannibalize parts and simply make things happen. Our Security Forces protect us but only through repeated twelve hour shifts. We are doing all we can to manage OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO and provide our people with quality time and training they need at home station—our SORTS ratings show that we are succeeding. We are also making strides toward solving our spare parts problems with the FY99 budget. But with all our efforts, we simply are not currently structured for open ended contingency operations.
I must also mention our nuclear, biological, and chemical defense challenges. In order to be successful, we must be prepared to continue our mission in a contaminated environment for extended periods of time. This requires a balance between mission continuation and force survivability. New weapon systems have extended the threat area beyond the Korean peninsula, increasing the requirement for NBC defense equipment. This only serves to exacerbate an existing equipment shortage. All the services rely heavily on our ability to airlift critical forces and supplies onto the Korean peninsula. We have concerns about cargo movement in a chemical-biological environment and some real challenges exist for planners to develop standards and adequate procedures for large frame aircraft decontamination.
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Finally, if we are to maintain the advantage over potential adversaries in the future, we must modernize our weapon systems and our infrastructure. To meet these challenges, we need your continued support.
Lieutenant General HOWELL. The Marine Corps' biggest readiness challenge today is ensuring the appropriate amount of funding is maintained for current readiness, while ensuring the already programmed funding for modernization—future readiness—is also maintained. The Marine Corps funds current readiness first, even to the detriment of other areas such as quality of life, maintenance of real property and modernization. Marine Corps Operations and Maintenance (O&M) accounts are the bill-payers for maintaining current readiness. Our aging equipment requires increased maintenance time and expense and the price of replacement parts are also increasing greatly. The ''El Nino'' storm damage to Marine bases in Southern California will cost the Marine Corps a great deal of money to repair this year. Our O&M funding must cover these costs, or our readiness to answer the National Command Authority taskings will decrease quickly. Unless reimbursed by the emergency supplemental funding, these necessary expenditures will further erode our fiscal resources, forcing the Marine Corps to reprogram training dollars, base maintenance dollars and modernization funding to cover the current readiness costs. The Marine Corps needs Congressional assistance in paying for these contingencies and disaster relief costs if it is to stay on the path to maintaining current readiness without sacrificing modernization, quality of life, and pushing our base maintenance costs even further back.
Army Personnel Shortages
Mr. BATEMAN. As our contingency element, the XVIII Airborne Corps receives priority for personnel fill. Yet we have heard there may be some shortages of personnel in key support positions. Please describe the status of personnel fill overall. Is there a difference in the fill level of the combat, combat support, and combat service support within your brigades, and what is the impact of any personnel shortages on readiness?
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General BRAMLETT. As of 7 April 98, commissioned and warrant officers in XVIII Airborne Corps units are filled at or above 100% of authorizations overall. There are indeed shortages in the grade of captain. The branches most acutely affected are infantry (87 percent of authorized), artillery (87 percent of authorized), and transportation (92 percent of authorized). The shortage of infantry captains is spread evenly across the Corps; however, Fort Bragg experiences the greatest share of the field artillery and transportation captain shortages in the Corps. The overall enlisted strength for XVIII Airborne Corps major unit installations is 99 percent. Generally, combat arms military occupational specialties (MOS) are filled at a higher level than combat support and combat service support MOSs.
In general, at this time last year, personnel shortages were an area of some concern to us in certain grades and skills. However, the Army has been implementing solutions and we are beginning to see improvement.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER
Mr. HUNTER. General Bramlett, the request we made of the Army, the Army said that they are $1.6 billion short of basic ammo requirements for the two major regional conflict scenario. Are you aware of that letter that was sent to the Army on that?
General BRAMLETT. Congressman, I have not seen that figure. That is not at all to say it is not accurate. Because of my role, I deal with the training ammunition detail so I would like to take that for the record if I might and confirm it with you.
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The Army estimates approximately a $7.5 billion shortfall in war reserve and training ammunition. Very important, however, is the fact that only $957 million is required after considering substitutes. The Army's FY99 capacity to reduce the shortfall is between $55 million and $256 million depending upon production rates. The Army's FY99 ammunition program is a well-balanced approach to maintaining our combat readiness and warfighting sustainability. This program is consistent with Army priorities and available resources.
Mr. HUNTER. So my question for each of you is this: Without robbing any other accounts, that is without any shifting, how much in dollar terms do you need in spare parts to have not only immediate readiness but sustained readiness over the next several years?
General BRAMLETT. The cost of spare parts required to ensure immediate readiness (FY99) is $1,703.5M. Of that, $1,051.8M is the spare parts requirement for ground equipment, and $651.7M for aviation equipment. The cost of spare parts required to ensure sustained readiness (through FY2002) is $5,457.5M. Of that, $3,252.4M is for ground equipment and $2,205.1M for aviation equipment. The costs by fiscal year are:
These figures coincide with the President's Budget for FY99, as well as with the POM requirements for FY00 through FY02.
Admiral CLEMINS. Due to shortfalls in the flying hour program in recent years, we have built up a backlog of unfilled requisitions for aircraft spare parts and aviation depot level repairables (AVDLR). The affect of not re-ordering spare parts has drawn down our inventory, which would normally be replenished. Assuming the fiscal year 1998 supplemental appropriation is approved, we expect this ''bow wave'' of aviation spare parts requirements in the Pacific Fleet to be approximately $108 million at the start of next fiscal year. It is projected that an additional $108 million in the Pacific Fleet Flying Hour Program will fix the problem in fiscal year 1999 and for the foreseeable future as long as unforeseen requirements are not incurred.
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It is important to remember that as Pacific Fleet Commander I am addressing fiscal shortfalls in the Pacific theater only. To get the full picture on the Navy-wide situation, it will be necessary to ask the Chief of Naval Operations and the Atlantic Fleet Commander this same question.
Mr. HUNTER. No, but we want to give you the adequate dollars, though, to be able to sustain the readiness with a high rate of mission capability over a sustained period of time. That is the question for you.
Assuming that you are going to look at that and say what is it going to take me to do that without pulling money out of other accounts, and what is it going to take to have an adequate number of spares behind the spares that are on the shelf so that we can go for a sustained period of time and still be able not to replace the part that is on the shelf right now but have a part behind it to your satisfaction. We want to know what that number is.
Admiral CLEMINS. Funding in fiscal year 1998 is adequate to maintain readiness if the supplemental appropriation is approved soon. Without the supplemental we will have to defer all fourth quarter ship maintenance availabilities until the start of the new fiscal year and furlough people at Pearl Harbor Naval Ship Yard and Puget Sound Naval Ship Yard. If we decide the impact to the ship maintenance program is too great, the other option would be to spread the costs across the other programs such as air operations, ship operations, and combat support, but we could only do so with Congressional approval due to the re-programming restrictions currently in place. Other Navy impacts will include delaying permanent change of station (PCS) moves until the new fiscal year and possibly delaying officer and enlisted promotions. While the measurement of readiness impacts is not exact, the bottom line is that it will hurt readiness if the supplemental is not approved with no offsets required.
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Although the fiscal year 1999 President's Budget is executable and strikes the right balance between near-term readiness and modernization, in the Pacific Fleet we expect to have shortfalls in key readiness accounts. My biggest concerns are the following estimated shortfalls: ship maintenance ($118.9 million), flying hours ($30 million), base operations and real property maintenance ($53 million), and combat support ($21.6 million). We also have a backlog of unfilled requisitions for aircraft spare parts and aviation depot level repairables (AVDLR) that is expected to reach $108 million by the beginning of fiscal year 1999.
It is important to remember that as Pacific Fleet Commander I am addressing fiscal shortfalls in the Pacific theater only. To get the full picture on the Navy-wide situation, it will be necessary to ask the Chief of Naval Operations and the Atlantic Fleet Commander this same question.
Mr. HUNTER. Just one last thing I would like to ask you. No more questions, but I would like to request that you submit to our National Security Committee and this subcommittee your own unit's shortfall in one, components; and number two, munitions as of today, as to where it is right now if you have a shortfall.
Colonel HALL. I do not own components or munitions in my squadron. Those resources are stocked and provided by other organizations within this wing. Additionally, those resources are shared among all fighter squadrons.
Colonel TORRES. As commander of a C–5 flying unit, I am responsible for the generation of mission-ready aircrews. I am manned at roughly 100 percent in all crew positions and do not generate the airframes—accordingly, I do not have any component shortages in my unit. We do not maintain the flare-equipped C–5s (Dover AFB does); and my crews do not have any difficulties obtaining holsters, sidearms, or ammunition from the Security Forces unit here for our deployments. We do not have a munitions shortfall.
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MISSION CAPABILITY RATES
House of Representatives,
Committee on National Security,
Military Readiness Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 11, 1998.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m. in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, the Hon. Herbert Bateman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HERBERT H. BATEMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. BATEMAN. The subcommittee will come to order. I would like to welcome everyone here today to this Readiness Subcommittee hearing. This hearing is part of our on-going effort to get a handle on the true status of the readiness of our military forces.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Guide to the Chairman's Readiness System states that ''Readiness is a fundamental characteristic of an effective armed force.'' Today we are focussed on a part of the readiness equation that leaves little doubt as to its importance in determining the true status of our armed focus.
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This hearing is focussed on the mission capable rates of aircraft and other major combat systems within our military. We need not point out that mission capability rates are a vital readiness indicator of a combat unit.
I must tell you that the current mission capability rates and trends that are being reported are truly troubling. For a military unit that has one or more of these systems, the equipment operational rate is critical to the overall performance of the unit in performing its assigned combat role.
We continue to read reports such as found in the January 6, 1998 Defense Daily. The report pointed out that a ''lack of critical parts for the F–16 aircraft has forced two fighter squadrons to cannibalize grounded aircraft to ensure that they could continue to conduct Operation Deliberate Guard, the NATO peace enforcement mission over Bosnia.''
It causes me to wonder that if such a high priority mission is lacking critical parts, what is the current state of the rest of the force?
Today we will hear from witnesses who will attempt to explain why we are continuing to see the drop in mission capable rates of aircraft such as the F–16 and other major combat systems within the military. Of particular concern to this committee is the continuing decline of Air Force and Navy aircraft mission capability rates. The Air Force has experienced a steady decline since 1991 and there doesn't seem to be any end to the decline in sight.
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I have great concerns that the decline in mission capability rates across the board continues. At the same time, we continue to receive reports from the leadership of the Pentagon that the state of readiness is as high as ever and that we are ready to go to war.
I would remind everyone that nearly 4 years ago this committee found indications of serious readiness problems within the military. At that time the committee determined that the services were, in fact, in the early stages of readiness decline. Although at the time, the information was largely dismissed by the Pentagon as anecdotal, the committee pressed the administration to increase their emphasis on readiness to avoid the problems of the 1970's when the military became a hollow force.
The Clinton administration has made the claim that readiness is a top priority in formulating defense budgets, including the fiscal year 1999 budget currently being considered before this committee. However, the budget submitted to Congress continues to be inadequate and readiness problems persist. From reports received during member and staff visits to the field and from numerous reports in the press, there are strong indications that there are still serious readiness problems in our military.
The Air Force has reported to the subcommittee that the long-term mission capable rate trends have steadily declined since 1991. In the aggregate for all aircraft, the overall mission capable rates have declined 9 percent to a current level of 74 percent. Since 1991, the Air Force fighter aircraft mission capable rates have declined by 10 percent to a current low of 74 percent. The bomber fleet has declined 2.3 percent to a current low of 64 percent and the strategic airlift has declined 6.2 percent to a current 70 percent.
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It must be noted that it is only with extraordinary maintenance efforts that these rates have been attained, and these are not fully mission capable rates.
To overcome the operational challenges caused by the smaller number of flyable aircraft, maintenance personnel are working harder and longer hours. The longer hours are often spent on the increased use of a cannibalization process of taking parts from a nonflyable aircraft and using them to fix another aircraft.
Cannibalization of nonflyable aircraft often creates more problems because of the number of items broken in the process of removing perfectly good parts from an aircraft. Also, it increases the amount of work required of an already overworked enlisted maintenance force.
The Navy has reported similar problems with aircraft mission capability rates. From 1994 to 1997 for aircraft aboard Navy carriers, the Pacific Fleet has experienced a 12 percent drop in aircraft fully mission capable rates to its recent low of 54 percent. Nondeployed aircraft mission capable rates dropped 8 percent to 61.4 percent and aircraft fully mission capable rates from nondeployed units dropped 10.6 percent to 48.9 percent during the same period. These operational rates strike at the very heart of what this committee has been saying about the readiness of the military.
The public readiness reports provided by the Pentagon do not reflect the actual readiness of the force. It will serve this committee well to have a clear and complete understanding of the problems the services are facing in getting the necessary parts and performing the maintenance on rapidly aging aircraft and combat equipment. Unfortunately, the implications of continually limited budget do not bode well for the future readiness of these units.
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We are very fortunate to have two panels of individuals who will speak to the operational and logistics support of major combat systems. The first panel is made up of the chief operations officer in each of the services. The second panel is made up of the chief logistics officer from each service.
Before we get into hearing from our panels I would like to yield to the Honorable Solomon Ortiz from the great State of Texas and ranking Democrat on the subcommittee for any statement he would care to make.
STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to take this time to welcome and add my thanks to our distinguished witnesses for their attendance here today.
In the hearings thus far this session, the National Security Committee and the Readiness Subcommittee have received testimony from the Chairman of the Joint Staff, the combatant Commanders in Chief [CINCs] and commanders and senior enlisted personnel in the field on the state of readiness of the force. I am comforted by what appears to be a common assessment that our forces are at the tip of the spear and are indeed very, very ready.
Your prepared statements and the testimony that we have already heard lead me to believe that while we are ready with our first-to-fight forces, there is a lot of uncertainty about how deep that readiness is and how long we can sustain it. One combatant CINC recently described it as the shallowness of our readiness.
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The focus of this hearing today, improving mission capability rates, seems to me to be the right issue at this time. Prior to this session, we were informed about the shortage of repair parts and the lack of skilled personnel to maintain the equipment. It is a money problem? Are the right policies in place? Are we training and retaining the right people in the numbers required? Are workloads properly allocated to get the best utilization of the infrastructure and the dollars available?
Is the infrastructure right-sized to sustain the needed current maintenance and any surge requirement? Have we eliminated the organizational barriers that inhibit our ability to improve our maintenance productivity? Why does the maintenance backlog continue to grow when we here on this subcommittee have added money to the budget each year?
In light of the uncertainties about the demands and duration of any future conflict situation, it appears prudent that we explore these and other factors that impact directly on our ability to achieve the best mission capability rates possible with the resources available. Our military forces deserve nothing less.
Mr. Chairman, I hope that when this hearing is over today we will have a better understanding of the on-going DOD initiatives to improve mission capability rates and what we here in the Congress can do to help.
Now today, Mr. Chairman, I have a very special person with us today and that is Sheila McCready. She is now working for the Army. I guess my loss was the Army's gain and Sheila, we are happy to have you with us.
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Again we thank the witnesses for being with us and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ortiz.
For our first panel of witnesses we have Lt. Gen. Thomas Burnette, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans of the Department of the Army; Vice Adm. James O. Ellis, Jr., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Plans, Policy and Operations; Lt. Gen. Patrick A. Gamble, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, Department of the Air Force; and Lt. Gen. Martin R. Steele, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations, the U.S. Marine Corps; and also Lt. Gen. Terrence R. Dake, Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation of the U.S. Marine Corps.
Gentlemen, we are happy to have all of you and look forward to hearing your testimony. I would say that we have copies of your written statements and you may proceed as you wish, General Burnette, and all of your written statements will be made a part of the record without objection.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. THOMAS N. BURNETTE, JR., DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS, U.S. ARMY
General BURNETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the readiness of the Army.
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Overall, the Army's first-to-fight units continue to sustain high levels of readiness while the readiness of our later deploying units remains within acceptable norms. All of our major combat and our key support forces are ready today to execute the Nation's military strategy. With respect to mission capable rates, I would like to share a few things for you.
Focussing on our active component units, during the most recent reporting period, and we report monthly, all 16 of our major combat systems met their Department of the Army readiness goals. In the last 12 months the fleet-wide average rates, fully mission capable rates for these 16 systems, also met their readiness goals.
For most of our Army systems, non-air, the readiness rate goal is 90 percent. For our aviation items, like our Apache helicopters, our readiness goal is 75 percent, for our Blackhawks about 80 percent.
I would just like to say that during the last 12 months, those aircraft in particular have done fairly well, and I would like to mention a few.
For our Apaches, the readiness rate goal is 75 percent. During the last year we have achieved a readiness rate of 84 percent with those aircraft across the fleet. For our 58 Deltas, our armed Kiowa scout helicopter, our readiness goal is 75 percent across the fleet. We have maintained a readiness rate of over 86 percent.
For all of our UH–60 fleet, the rate is 80 percent goal. We have achieved 81 percent. For our CH–46 Delta aircraft, which is our large medium transport helicopter, our readiness rate goal is 75 percent and we have achieved 75 percent.
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We have one aircraft, the UH–1, that we have not achieved readiness rates on. This is caused primarily by a failure of a specific part in the engine of that helicopter, in the T–53 engine. We are working very hard to correct that problem now.
So while we have readiness challenges in many other areas, our material readiness status, our equipment on hand and our equipment maintenance rates remain in pretty good shape.
I would like to share one thing, though. As we look at readiness, we really look at it as a three-legged stool. The first leg of that is the readiness of Army forces to be able to go forth and perform their shaping function worldwide, like they do in Bosnia today.
The second leg of that stool is the ability of Army forces to go and respond to other things, like major theater wars, and other major contingencies, like we are doing in Kuwait today.
The third leg of that readiness stool is our ability to modernize our force so we can be ready tomorrow. The issue that the Army has had for some years is that we have had a challenge keeping those three things in balance. And frankly, we have been able to maintain these sorts of readiness rates by paying out of our modernization accounts. We have literally had to short our modernization accounts to maintain those kinds of readiness rates.
If you ask the Army right now, they will tell you, the soldiers in the field and the commanders will tell you that funding is the number one readiness issue for the Army today. The Army's operations and training accounts are barely adequate. However, our base operations accounts, currently funded at 80 percent of our requirements, our Real Property Maintenance [RPM] accounts, currently funded at 62 percent of our requirements, are not adequate, and cause critical shortages. And those shortages at installation level cause the commanders to migrate funds from their training and maintenance accounts to their base accounts in order to maintain their bases and in order to keep their family quality of life adequate on their installation.
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That is the strain that you see as you go to hearings and talk to our soldiers and commanders. And the overall impact of that has been, frankly, that in many of our units you find that the only place that we now are able to conduct battalion- and brigade-level training is at our National Training Center, our Joint Readiness Training Center [JRTC]. So there have been very real stresses on the Army in those accounts.
The other major trend that we have seen in the Army is that the numbers and types of deployments have increased over the years. During this last year, in addition to the 122,000 soldiers that we have deployed overseas or stationed overseas every day, on the average day we had another 30,000 of our soldiers actually deployed on an operation somewhere worldwide. Frankly, that is over a third of the active Army that is either forward-deployed or in some operation overseas.
Now, when we do contingency operations such as you see now today in southwest Asia or in Bosnia, many times we have to pay for those operations in the early stages from our operations and maintenance funds until such time as the Congress provides the supplemental funding. And this year is no different than many of the rest.
Right now, for this year, fiscal year FY98, contingency operations, including those in Bosnia and those in southwest Asia, such as Kuwait, we face a $1.13 billion shortfall and the President has submitted that in the form of supplemental. We ask your support in providing those supplemental funds in a non-offset way so that we can continue to do those operations worldwide and we can continue to maintain the Army at a ready rate.
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We were asked not too long ago what would be the impact of not receiving this sort of supplemental funding early in the year. If we have assurance from the Congress that we would receive supplemental funding by the first of April, then we could continue to function probably until about the first of June. After the first of June, if we don't have supplemental funding by that time, readiness will rapidly decline, with the predictable result being Army divisions, our major combat elements, going C3 for readiness and other attendant problems in the force. So we ask for your assistance in providing that supplemental funding.
There is also a request forwarded for funding for fiscal year 1999, additional funding for Bosnia that the administration has provided. That was not originally in the fiscal year 1999 President's budget because at that time the decision had not been made to continue operations in Bosnia. We also request and appreciate your help and support for funding in Bosnia operations next year.
I would say, in summary, the readiness of our first-to-fight forces is in pretty good shape. The readiness of those forces behind them are at acceptable levels for those timelines that we expect them to meet. And we expect that we can meet our commitments to national security strategy with some risk involved.
So I would say we are continuing in the Army to put emphasis on readiness. We are continuing to stay trained and ready to the extent that we can. As I mentioned, the pressures on our training funds are basically caused by the pressures of having to migrate money to run our bases and to do our RPM.
In closing, I want to thank the members of this committee for your support to the Army and to those great soldiers out in the field. I thank you for the opportunity to appear here today and look forward to your questions.
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[The prepared statement of General Burnette can be found in the appendix on page 565.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, General Burnette.
Admiral Ellis.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. JAMES O. ELLIS, JR., DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (PLANS, POLICY AND OPERTIONS), U.S. NAVY
Admiral ELLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Members of the committee, again I want to add my thanks for this opportunity to be with you here today to discuss the mission capable and fully mission capable rates of naval aviation. This committee has always been particularly helpful in addressing Navy concerns and we remain grateful for your support.
As you have heard directly from fleet commanders, commanding officers and the enlisted sailors who really represent the heart of our service, and as we have all seen demonstrated repeatedly in recent weeks, the forward-deployed aviation units of the Navy and Marine Corps, collectively naval aviation, remain ready to fully support the needs of the Nation.
The mission capable rates and the fully mission capable rates we will discuss here today are for the sailors and marines who fix and fly those aircraft, not antiseptic statistics, but really the real measure of the combat power that we hope will deter but that we know will defeat any potential adversary.
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As you may be aware, today we once again have three aircraft carriers in the Arabian gulf. A snapshot of those mission capable figures for those airwings that are embarked on those aircraft carriers stand at 91, 82 and 88 percent respectively for U.S.S. George Washington, U.S.S. Independence, and U.S.S. John C. Stennis, newly arrived. Representing a snapshot average of 87 percent, they are matched as well by full mission capable rates that are just a few points lower.
The mission of naval aviation, both blue and green, Navy and Marine Corps, is to deploy combat capable forces forward fully responsive to the needs of the Nation. And I am proud to say that as demonstrated by those figures, we are accomplishing that mission not just today in the Arabian gulf but around the world.
As we know from discussions with our sailors, from our readiness monitoring systems and, as you know, from your recent visits to the fleet and as the chairman has already articulated, a sustained high forward-deployed aviation readiness has had an impact on the readiness of the nondeployed forces.
The Navy leadership continues to move aggressively to correct the effects of a combination of factors that contributed to degraded readiness and widened the gap in 1997 between the readiness of our forward-deployed forces and the readiness of those nondeployed forces of which you spoke earlier, Mr. Chairman.
We fully understand the impact of these material challenges on our sailors and are equally mindful of the training, readiness and quality of life degradation that can result from long-term inattention to this critical issue.
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Our dramatically improved focus on assessing and monitoring readiness has been essential to identifying a number of force-wide aviation issues. Data clearly indicate that carrier airwing squadron readiness, which normally declines immediately following deployment in the early phases of the inner deployment training cycle with which you are so familiar, last year fell to a lower level and recovery to full combat readiness was steeper and occurred later in the cycle, as you know.
Admiral Johnson calls this the bathtub effect and notes that the deeper tub and steeper sides pose increased readiness challenges to our people, our training and ultimately to our overall readiness.
The Navy has moved quickly to solve the readiness decline noted in 1997. With your support we were able to realign $332 million in the flying hour program. Over 75 percent of that money, as you know, goes to directly fund the depot-level repairables or consumable parts required to maintain those aircraft.
After a brief lag, we have seen positive trends in the Fully Mission Capable rates [FMC] and the Mission Capable rates [MC] data, confirming both that our indicators and tracking systems work to inform us of a problem and that we know where to most effectively put those precious resources to most effectively correct it.
We are encouraged to report that our most recent aviation maintenance material management data indicates that all of our metrics are very close to meeting or already exceed CNO goals. In fact, of the deployed, nondeployed, MC, FMC, only one fails to meet standard, that being nondeployed MC rates, mission capable rates, which are four-tenths of 1 percent below the Chief of Naval Operations [CNO] goal. We are pleased with the trend but not satisfied with the improvement, sir.
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We are confident that the $332 million realignment I spoke of in the O&M account provided by you in fiscal year 1998 has been largely responsible for improving those MC and FMC rates and I would like to take this opportunity to again thank you for those funds.
Additionally, the budget before you includes yearly increases for the Navy in excess of $400 million to improve the material condition of our aircraft and I believe that these funds, more than anything else, demonstrate our commitment toward both improving and sustaining aircraft material condition and thereby improving the lives of those sailors and marines who work so hard to make it happen. We appreciate your support of these budgetary levels and your continued interest in naval aviation readiness.
In conclusion, the Department of the Navy is committed to maintaining the proper MC and FMC rates for both our deployed and nondeployed forces and as a result, are fully funding those aviation accounts. And in so doing, we intend to maintain that delicate balance between current and future readiness.
All of us in the Navy's officer and enlisted leadership will continue to monitor these trends closely, not just in written reports but by standing, as you did, in the hangers and on the flight decks of the fleet. Most of us are not far removed from the operating forces of the Navy and the Nation. We well remember the names and the faces of those who today work both on the ground and in the air so that we can continue to capably meet our Nation's commitments in the future.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you and I would be happy to entertain any questions.
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[The prepared statement of Admiral Ellis can be found in the appendix on page 580.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Admiral Ellis.
General Gamble.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. PATRICK K. GAMBLE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
General GAMBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think it is greatly appreciated on the part of the Air Force, not only here in the headquarters area but down in the field where the word gets out, that you are having hearings like this. It is greatly appreciated that you are trying to get to the bottom of what we see as a problem that we would like to manage from the front this time instead of show up with a hollow force, like we did in the 1970's, and try to work the damage control.
The good news is I think we are well on the way to trying to find out what the potential for a hollow force is this time instead of having to work a damage control problem. MC rates is certainly a piece of that and I think in the 1970's MC rates and cannibalization [CANN] rates were the metrics that were most commonly used to describe a problem that was 1970's-oriented.
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The Air Force story today, though, is, as we look at readiness, that while this is an important component and indicator of readiness, mission capable rates, there may be some other things at hand here that are getting at readiness problems because it is a 1990's problem this time for the Air Force.
Congressman Ortiz listed a number of questions that he had that were readiness-associated that went beyond mission capable rates and I was gratified to hear those because I think therein lies some of the areas that the dialogue needs to further explore, and I will be very happy to do that with you.
Let me just summarize by saying again what my colleagues have said to a large degree also stands true for the Air Force. In terms of the numbers and dollars and supplements and the reasons for those kinds of things, we have the written statement that we have prepared that is very similar. But again, the appreciation is heartfelt that we can actually have a dialogue to see if we can't put our finger on some of the more acute elements of the problem, and that is what I am glad to be here today to hopefully do. I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Gen. Gamble can be found in the appendix on page 587.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, General Gamble.
General Steele.
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STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. MARTIN R. STEELE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PLANS, POLICIES AND OPERATIONS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
General STEELE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, for the opportunity to be able to speak to you today on the subject of readiness in general, on the mission capability rates for both our ground and aviation equipment in particular.
We, too, in the Marine Corps thank you for the support not only of all of Congress but particularly the members of this committee have given to the U.S. Marine Corps to ensure its readiness for our Nation. Being a part of the Nation's by law expeditionary force in readiness, no single issue commands more attention from marines than the subject of readiness.
My detailed statement for the record outlines the reasons for our institutional emphasis on readiness, how our core competencies reflect and support a commitment to being ready to go at a moment's notice, as well as one fundamental precept of the corps, our cyclical approach to maintenance and readiness. I hope that the statement will be helpful in putting our responses to your questions in the proper context.
Before answering your questions, we would like to quickly emphasize three key points. First, the Marine Corps is as ready to respond to today's challenges to our national security interests as at any time in its history, as Mr. Ortiz indicated in his comments a moment ago, and our mission capability rates reflect that fact. Today ground equipment readiness rates stand at 93 percent and our combined rotary and fixed wing mission capability rates reach nearly 70 percent.
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However, as you indicated, Mr. Chairman, this readiness is coming at an increasing cost. Although our equipment is properly maintained, is well cared for and is ready, increasing equipment age is putting strains on our operations and maintenance, our operations and maintenance budgets, our ability to train and on the backs of our marines.
Our field commanders report it is increasingly apparent we cannot continue to rely on better business practices and the self-sacrifices of our marines to compensate for increasingly strained O&M budgets.
Finally, we believe that modernization is truly the long-term and only solution to our aging equipment and the threat it poses to our future readiness.
While we are encouraged that our procurement budget is going up, much because of your support, we believe it is not increasing fast enough to compensate for years of underfunding in our investment accounts. We therefore have introduced a number of coping mechanisms that I highlighted in my formal statement to help us bridge the gap between today's Marine Corps and the potentially revolutionary Corps that we intend to build for this Nation in the 21st century.
We will continue to be ready and we thank you for your support and I look forward to your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Steele can be found in the appendix on page 593.]
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Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, General Steele.
General Dake.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. TERRENCE R. DAKE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR AVIATION, U.S. MARINE CORPS
General DAKE. Mr. Chairman, I want to join my colleagues in thanking you, sir, for letting me appear before this Subcommittee on Readiness. It certainly seems appropriate that we would be here to talk about that.
I want to acknowledge the support that the Congress and this committee especially have given to the operating forces in this fiscal year. Even as we speak here today, the marines and sailors are the beneficiaries of the increases that you have made in our flying hour programs and funding as well as depot-level maintenance.
In this time, as we look at the readiness of our forces, and as you have even in the hands of the committee the fiscal year 1999 President's budget, you will see a commitment to increases in those same readiness accounts which you have seen fit to increase in this year. It is most appreciated and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, General Dake.
Well, thank you all very much for being here and for your statements. I am going to make a few comments. Certainly I don't intend them to be directed negatively to you gentlemen on the panel, but there is definitely a disconnect between the fiscal resources that we are giving to our military and your needs if we are going to protect readiness and, of course, if we are going to have modernization, which is the key to tomorrow's readiness, and the lack of it already a drag on today's readiness. The budgets have been inadequate.
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Yes, we have done some things in this committee and in the full committee to upgrade that which the commander-in-chief has requested in terms of fiscal support for the armed services, but I don't think there is anyone on this committee who believes that it has been adequate. And it is almost impossible for us to make it adequate unless we have support from people in the military. We cannot, as a political reality, be increasing defense budgets, subjected to the political charges that we are forcing things down the throat of the Pentagon that they don't want and don't need because they haven't been asked for.
I am told, and I hope it is the case, by one source in the upper levels of the Pentagon, that there is $1 billion in the fiscal year 1999 budget request for spare parts. I am told there is a $1 billion increase in O&M accounts in order to enhance readiness. I hope we aren't talking about the same billion dollars.
I also am mindful that we do not have the back-up budget books from the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force, and therefore, our staff is in a difficult position to really be able to take apart the budget the way we normally analyze it to see what really is there and isn't there.
I must tell you that sitting in this room last week when I was told that commissary costs of $800 million, which were normally an item in the Office of Secretary of Defense, have been moved to the O&M accounts of the three military departments, it bothers me because it sounds like we may have already spent some $800 million and some of that $1 billion plus-up. I want to find out if these things are for real. And if they are not for real, what is the best thing we can do about it?
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I don't want to dwell on this unduly but to get to a question, you have given us, and I in my opening statement gave too many statistics but do you keep any records on the incidence of cannibalization of equipment, especially in aviation?
General BURNETTE. Yes, sir, we do. The Army defines cannibalization a little bit different than the other services do. A piece of equipment becomes cannibalized when it goes to basically be reutilized for some other purpose. We absolutely do that.
Mr. BATEMAN. And you do maintain records of it?
General BURNETTE. Yes, sir, we do.
Mr. BATEMAN. And the Navy, Air Force, Marines?
Admiral ELLIS. Yes, sir. The Navy certainly does. We cannibalize for only three reasons. One is direction from higher authority; the second would be a long-term materiel short-fall; and the final reason would be for trouble-shooting techniques in the aircraft business. But all of that is entered in our maintenance documentation, sir. As you know well, it is all computerized now. We have codes that indicate the purpose of the maintenance action and cannibalization is certainly one of those. That is how we have been able to provide you the trend since 1980 of Navy aircraft cannibalization rates.
Mr. BATEMAN. I hear a great deal of anecdotal evidence about cannibalization, especially with aviation resources. If we haven't asked for your cannibalization figures, I would like for each of the services to provide us with what you have so that we can either confirm or deny the degree of cannibalization which allegedly is taking place.
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Admiral ELLIS. Yes, sir, we would be happy to provide that.
[The prepared statement of General Dake can be found in the appendix on page 593.]
Mr. BATEMAN. When we were at our field hearings in San Diego last Friday I was amazed to hear of squadrons returning from deployment who had only half of their aircraft operational because they had had to give up their planes to other units which were forward-deployed. Some squadrons were down to one plane that was operational. That doesn't seem to jive with the kinds of figures that I am hearing today.
Do you have any comment on that, Admiral?
Admiral ELLIS. Yes, sir. I would be glad to. As you know, that initial 6-month period following the return from deployment frequently is the time that is allocated for modifications and upgrades to aircraft.
So some of those aircraft may have been dedicated for those slots into depot-level overhaul repairs or for modifications. There are other requirements, however—you are exactly right, sir—that need to be met—to be met in terms of satisfying the deploying squadrons, those that are about to leave and go out there and do the things that are being done so capably in the Arabian gulf.
The squadron at that time is at the downward slope in its training cycle. All of this is predicated on attaining certain milestones through the work-up process that return them to C1 or C2 prior to deployment.
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You are exactly right, though. As Admiral Johnson has noted and as you are very much aware, the speed of that decline, the depth of that bathtub, even though we ultimately get to the right point at the end, the tub is deeper and the sides are steeper than they have been heretofore.
And that varies dramatically, as you know, by the type of aircraft. There are certain type model series in which we have more severe shortages than others.
Mr. BATEMAN. Time permitting, I may ask some more questions but for now, Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think that we had a very good hearing last week in San Diego and at that field hearing Friday. You know, senior sailors and soldiers and airmen told us that quality of life issues are the number one retention factor for themselves personally. They told us that they could put up with a lot in the way of high OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO. They were confident that the military were taking care of other issues, such as adequate affordable housing near the workplace, sufficient health care for them and their families and college funding for advanced graduate degree work for senior NCOs.
Now, what are the services doing to ensure retention of these highly skilled, experienced members of the armed services? As we all know, we have had hearings, whether it is hearings or field hearings, and we seem to understand that retention has become a serious problem.
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Apache helicopter pilots, airplane pilots, jet fighter pilots—these are the problems that they talk about. ''We don't mind as long as we know that our families are being taking care of.''
What is being done? Maybe you all can enlighten me a little bit, any of you gentlemen.
General BURNETTE. I would like to start and then pass it to my colleagues.
I think first of all, the support that the Members are giving us in the four areas that you talked about, Congressman Ortiz, is very important because when you talk to soldiers, frankly, it is pay, it is housing, it is medical, it is retirement. And the support that you give us to provide those things, we appreciate.
The second thing I think that we are all trying to do to improve the quality of life of our soldiers is to reduce the number of days they are deployed away from home. And frankly, the Army has had some difficulty with that because of the Bosnia deployments and some of the others. And to help with that, we are going to spread the mission for that operation across the total Army—the units that are in the continental United States, in addition to the ones in Europe—in order to reduce the personal tempo. So I would say that would be the second thing, which is to help to reduce the personnel tempo, the days away from home deployments.
I would say third is to ensure that we are funding our base operations accounts, which is really where soldiers and their families live, to make sure that we have a full quality of life. Our folks are trying very hard to do that.
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With respect to other things, such as Apache pilot retention, which is really the only area we have, and our pilot retention shortage is not near the same problem that the other services have because they are different kinds of aircraft, different kinds of skills; we are looking at doing some restationing—items of restationing some Apache forces back into the continental United States where they are not deployed all the time.
So I think by stationing, by working on the number of units that go to the different kinds of deployments, we want to do that. It is like somebody told me a long time ago, if you are on a good football team, you don't get to choose your schedule. And we certainly don't get to choose our schedule, which teams we are going to play and when we are going to play them. So that is a given.
So the Chief of Staff and the rest of the commanders are attempting to control those things that they can control. For instance, the Chief of Staff of the Army looks specifically at each unit that is going to be deployed for more than 180 days and makes a personal decision on it.
We have a policy now that we are not going to send units to back-to-back rotations, and I will be pleased to talk about that a little bit later on but I would like to pass the answer back over to my colleagues.
Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, General.
Anybody else?
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Admiral ELLIS. Thank you, Tom.
We, too, Mr. Ortiz, are very concerned about the things that are important to our people—the pay, the medical, the retirement. We monitor all of that carefully, your continued support. It is important that all of those programs keep pace with inflation so that there is no degradation and it is reflective of the true costs that it takes to live and maintain a family in a wholesome environment, which is as important to them as it is to anyone else in this country. And certainly we owe them that and as always, that is our top priority.
There are many other things with which you are well aware that you may have seen in San Diego that we are doing—the distance learning, the things that are available on board ships, the college courses, the family services center, the regionalization of those, the improvements that we are making in housing and those types of initiatives.
In the final analysis, though, this isn't a business for them. As Tom has said, these folks want to be on a winning team and that is an important element of it, is to show them that level of commitment and that level of concern.
We do that by carefully monitoring the PERSTEMPO. As you know, the Navy has a program that we watch very carefully. The CNO approves personally every single exception to that. There were only three such exceptions last year. Two of those were related to maintenance problems—the 6-month deployment, the 2-to-1 turnaround ratio and the no more than 50 percent time deployed.
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All of those things are inviolate. You have seen that recently in our decision to bring aircraft carriers like NIMITZ home from the Arabian Gulf to ensure that we don't exceed those things. We have to maintain that commitment. We have to maintain that trust.
We are working to shape the force appropriately and I think we are doing that. The technological challenges we face in the years ahead I think are the most demanding for us. As we become increasingly a high-tech force, the demands generated by, fortunately, a robust economy here in our own country make these people even more desirable for the private sector and we have to make ourselves competitive—not equal because, in the final analysis, those that stay, those that are committed to this profession are here for a different reason. It is not the money, but that is a factor and certainly when it comes to caring for their family it is an important factor. We thank you for your support in that area.
Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Admiral.
General GAMBLE. I think a couple of things come to mind when I reflect on your question and listen to my colleagues in terms of quality of life, and I have tried to break it down into a couple of components.
One is the family security retirement component. That certainly is an important element of quality of life and there have been a number of programs that you are well aware of and that we have talked about that are under way in terms of trying to provide better family security. And retirement is a very, very important issue and, of course, any time that comes, it is a very sensitive issue. So family and retirement are a component of quality of life.
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Another component that you can probably put together is the component of pay and compensation. And one way we can compensate is time off. So in terms of compensation, for what they do, people look at dollars and they look at the ability to take time off and contribute to that family quality of life, for example.
We can affect time off and so, in our rotation policy coming back from deployments, we have some management actions that we have taken in the Air Force to give people a standdown time. Unfortunately, it is not as long as we would like compared to some of the deployments because the aviation units in the Air Force who are tasked with supporting war plans have to be very ready because they go very early on when that plan is executed.
So even when they come back or even those units left in the rear area, they have to maintain a high state of readiness. So we can't let them linger too long standing down. But we can do some and we are taking some of those management actions. And the troops apparently seem to appreciate that very much.
Pay is a sensitive issue and I just mentioned that every time you talk pay, you really get people's attention. That is a quality of life issue.
The third set or group, I think, that comes to mind is what I would call more in the area of professional satisfaction for doing the job that they have been asked to do. They came aboard because they wanted to do the Nation's work, and I like the comment my colleague made about they wanted to join a winning team and they want to be the best.
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Four months ago I was in the field myself listening to the same thing that you all listened to on the West Coast. The anecdotal evidence is overwhelming. When it comes to this idea of professional satisfaction, what you hear is, ''I signed up to be on a winning team; you gave me the best training; you gave me the best equipment; and I want to be the best.''
And from the Air Force perspective, we saw ourselves in 1991 going to war in Iraq and basically vindicating all the theories of the 1980's about the importance of readiness and training, and it worked. And they remember that.
And now they are comparing today, 7 years later, with then, and they are saying, ''I have the opportunity here but I am not being fulfilled because I go out and there are just too many obstacles to being as good as I was a few years ago.'' And that professional frustration is what is growing and building.
That is not a quality of life issue, but the reason they joined is beginning to erode out from under them. And when that happens, that professional satisfaction turns to frustration and eventually it turns to career decisions. They take that home at night with them and their family reinforces the fact that maybe things aren't going the way they thought they were going to go or the way they went a few years ago. And after a while, they make a family decision. Whether they realize it or not, it is a consensus in the family and that tips the scales on that one particular day when the frustration is high. That tips the scales and they make a career decision at that point.
So retention, then, I think you put your finger on it. It is a big driver right now. And I would say that some of the things we are trying to do in quality of life won't balance out on that scale with some of those retention decisions that are being made. That is the problem I think we are beginning to see today.
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Mr. ORTIZ. One of the things that surprised me, Mr. Chairman, at this hearing is that when we talked to some of the sailors there, I was surprised how many of them have second jobs. It puts a burden on the more senior enlisted people, personnel, because they say, ''I am sorry; I am on food stamps, my wife just had a little baby and I have to have a second job.'' And that is scary. It really is. And I hope that we can work this out somehow, to alleviate that.
General.
General DAKE. I just wanted to make some comments on the part of the Marine Corps. We, too, look at retention. We have concerns about that. Essentially it surfaced in 1996 when we realized that the numbers of pilots that were leaving, particularly our tach air pilots, had essentially gone from a 10-year average of about 34 to over 90. Then, in 1997, it increased to over 100. To this year, we are on a pace that will put us back to about the 1990's where we were in 1996.
So we think that we are at least flattening the curve through some of the initiatives that have been taken. Some of that is compensation. Some of that is the ability to control, in their own training environment, at least, the OPTEMPO that we generate. We try to train at home bases, as opposed to deploying for training now, as much as possible.
We have worked for quality of life. And I think that is true. The quality of life for the families back home remains important to those Marines that are forward-deployed. Marines are used to austere conditions. That is when they are away from home in an expeditionary environment. That is what they do. In fact, their morale when they are deployed like that is, in fact, higher.
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But they want to know that people back home are well taken care of. They want to know that their bases are supporting their families. And I think they worry about the future more now than perhaps they did when people of my vintage were coming through. They are aware that compensation and retirement has altered from the same retirement plan that I am on to the one that they are on.
So I think those are some of the things that, in fact, are making our pilots face decisions. And there is a myriad of reasons why they would cite that they choose to go to a different place.
And I think that if we were to comment, moving from the pilots to our enlisted Marines, we actually have increased the percentage of manning in our squadrons on the enlisted side, so our enlistments are up. We are able to sustain in the technical MOS's more so than we were 2 years ago. In some of my helicopter squadrons we have actually increased the manning from 76 percent to over 86 percent in that 2-year span strictly because we have concentrated on MOS's and specialties that fall into that category.
I think we have to continue that support, however, across the board. I think it is one of those readiness issues and your support in doing those things, sir, is what has enabled us to flatten that curve.
General STEELE. Sir, I would just like to make an overarching comment in regards to the total Marine Corps, to complement General Dake's aviation side.
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Understanding exactly what you have said and asked, the reality is that we are the youngest of all the services agewise and the lion's share of our people are in the lower three grade enlisted ranks and we do not have, at this particular moment, a retention problem of those marines. In fact, our retention goals are being exceeded every month, very fortunately for us, because we only retain a small portion of that lower grade enlisted rank.
But as the youngest of the services, we also place the greatest demands, because of their deployments. Those young marines know, upon entry into our Corps, that they will be gone somewhere around 50 percent of the time in their first enlistment, the first 4 years of their tenure as marines.
So as General Dake indicated and my colleagues have indicated, the words that they express to us as leaders when we visit them in the field is not so much for their own being because they are selfless servants. They want to make sure, those that are married, that we are, in fact, trying to improve the quality of life for their wives and their families at home. And we are going to continue to work that.
It is our major concern but, of course, because of the mission, our expeditionary nature, the fact of the matter is we are very reliant on them to do the job and they have been performing magnificently and our retention goals remain up.
Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Mr. BATEMAN. Next in the order in which they arrived, Mr. Underwood.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Just to reiterate some of the points that were made in the course of the hearing in San Diego which, for me personally, I think, was a great eye-opener, there was a contrast in trying to understand the factors involved in readiness. Many of them surfaced around issues pertaining to spare parts and the cannibalization of equipment, aircraft. And then there was a great deal of attention and it seemed that the closer we got to people, the stronger the concern was about quality of life issues. The lower we got, so to speak, in the chain of command, the more attention was given to those issues.
Now, given the fact that we could try to work on all issues at the same time and certainly it is incumbent upon this committee in particular because this committee has a unique responsibility for that, to try to work on all of these issues at the same time, I am trying to get a sense of where—and correct me if I am wrong but my impression is that the issues of recruitment and retention, some of that—now, Lieutenant General Burnette, you put in there that you are meeting your retention objective, but in terms of the retention objectives, there was a great deal of attention by Air Force representatives about the so-called experience gap, that people aren't moving through the pipeline as quickly and they are getting out of the service, so there is an experience gap that affects readiness.
Given all of those issues related to dealing with issues pertaining to equipment and having the opportunity to use equipment and having the opportunity to adequately train versus the issues pertaining more to personal well-being, concern about families, concern about pay, concern about benefits, how would you characterize the mixture in terms of level of effort that you would give to this committee or to other members? How would you categorize that? Would it be a 50/50 effort?
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General BURNETTE. I would say it would be impossible for me to tell you what percentage, sir, to put into what different things. But I would say from the Army perspective, you are exactly right. We did last year and we are this year exceeding our retention objectives. Much of this is due to the fact that soldiers, like our Marine counterparts, enjoy going on operations abroad. The enlistment rates, for instance, of units coming back out of Bosnia are at record heights. So I would say that yes, we are meeting the retention goals.
For us it is a balance and that balance is to make sure that the soldiers have the right kind of equipment, and I think we are doing a pretty good job with that; that our soldiers have adequate funds to train so that they feel good, that they are part of a winning team; and that our installation commanders have got adequate funding on those bases to make sure the place where those soldiers live is a place that has a high quality of life, so that the families want to stay.
Are we out of balance right now in the Army? We are out of balance. The area we are most out of balance is in our base operations. In order to keep those units trained to where they have to go, we have to put in adequate money and we are not able to put as much money as we would like into our base operations to sustain quality of life. And that is basically where we would have a balance problem.
We are, in fact, recruiting also this year, we are exceeding our recruiting objective, so I would say that is where our balance issue is.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. Admiral.
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Admiral ELLIS. Yes, sir. I think that is the key word, balance, Mr. Underwood. We certainly need to maintain that perspective. We are working against some recruiting and retention challenges. We are not doing as well as we would like, on the enlisted side and on the officer side. We have some great visibility into that. We are addressing it in terms of additional resources flowing to the recruiting force and to those that are capable of influencing this and we are optimistic about the outcome.
We did end last year with some successes in the technical ratings, which are really crucial to our future. The nuclear fields and the electronic technicians—for a time, we were deficient. We were successful last year. We are facing those challenges on a continual basis.
We need to give our people a vision of the future, sir. We need to have them understand what it is their operation, their organization is about, and we have done that. They need to see themselves in that role. They need to have an understanding of career progression opportunities and that there is a future in this for them.
As we have drawn down, I think by the nature of a drawdown, by definition, you get out of balance. You are accessing fewer than you might normally as you draw down in the forces and now we are coming out from under that. The Navy has done a very, very good job of that drawdown.
Now we are managing our transition back to the status quo, the steady state, if you will, where once those advancement opportunities return to stabilized rates, they can see a future for themselves in this organization that contributes so much to the welfare of the Nation. That is our challenge, to restore that balance now.
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Mr. UNDERWOOD. Of the things that are in balance, and some of these things obviously are not going to be well coordinated, but would you say that of the things that are in balance, most of them pertain to personnel issues, quality of life issues?
Admiral ELLIS. I think there is some element of that. Clearly there are some infrastructure pieces of that. Certainly we are speaking of Full Mission/Fully Mission Capable [FM/FMC] rates here, but there is a lot of concern about the bases. You have heard that articulated by most of the people that have spoken here.
Some of that is due to the size of the infrastructure that we have relative to the force size and how we reshape that and how we find the efficiencies or draw down the size of that in the future is going to be an element of restoring that balance, certainly.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. General.
General GAMBLE. I agree it is balance. I think that when we are in balance, when the general sense of contentment is rather high, there is predictability about one's job, one has a professional satisfaction that you can go to work and do the work that is expected of you on a regular schedule, if there are things that are not necessarily to your liking, your satisfaction with your way of life tends to cover that up while you are being patient while they are being worked.
On the other hand, if things aren't going well on the job, if the hours are longer, if there is a frustration level, if there is a high tempo that you meet yourself coming and going, especially if there is unpredictability, which is a human factor that drives people crazy—we want a scheduled, orderly life and when it is disorderly, that really bothers us—then what happens is those things that are out of balance then become the lightening rods for our frustration on the quality of life side.
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So if the housing is a little bit rundown, there is a promise that we are going to get it fixed here in the next couple of years, but that is not good enough. It is rundown today.
If there is a rumor in the ''Air Force Times'' that the commissary system is up for grabs again, that becomes more reality than rumor because you are in an environment where you are tensed up.
People make the decision under those conditions to leave, especially those who have been through this now for one or two enlistments. They have rotated to the desert four or five times. They pulled that year remote in Korea when they came back from their last desert tour. Now they are back again and they finally make the decision to leave. And with that person goes a wealth of experience. That is the experience gap you are talking about.
The accessions that are coming in, we are meeting our recruiting goals but the schoolhouse is pumping them out as fast as they can get them through. They stick them in that unit, which still has to rotate again, but now you don't have a five or seven-level. You have a three-level doing the job that the five- or seven did before because you have an overabundance of these younger troops, because your mid-level experience has made its decision to leave.
Now, that directly affects your mission capable rate. That directly affects your ability to do a CANN without breaking the part that you are CANNing.
So incrementally over time, you will begin to see that dynamic take effect, and it impacts directly on mission capable rates.
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Mr. UNDERWOOD. Now, you characterize a lot of this as professional satisfaction. In the hearing in San Diego I read in the statements of one of the people who testified a comment that I thought was impolitic at first and it expressed dissatisfaction with the mission, the actual mission. That was a source of concern about readiness. I guess it is one of the things that sometimes, as we look at objective criteria and so on, doesn't get reflected into this mix but a lot of it had to do with the deployments in Saudi Arabia, where they were expressing that the frustration was really being fed more by the nature of the mission than the actual——
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Underwood, you have given them right much to chew on. Let's let them finish their answers so we can get to some of the others, if you don't mind.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. Certainly.
General GAMBLE. I think the point they make is right on. We hear the same thing. I will give you an example.
I had a young crew chief on an AC–130 in my office just a few weeks ago. He is off his seventh rotation into Bosnia, doing that mission.
Now, he flies directly over his targets and he looks at those targets through a scope every night. He is that close to the need to pull the trigger if the time ever comes. He is as motivated an individual as I ever met in my life. He is thrilled with his job because that is what he trained to do and that is what he is ready to do.
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By contrast, there are some in other rotations, and in the desert a classic one, of course, that you have probably heard about is the fighter pilot who goes up and orbits someplace or in Bosnia orbits someplace and then comes back and lands and doesn't maintain the skills that the day-in, day-out training afforded him or her back at the base at home would normally give them, going through exercises and red flags.
And they build up a professional frustration and they come back to their home unit having lost qualification in many of the skills that it took them a long time to gain when they were back at the home base. There is where our professional frustration is. So there is a contrast.
General STEELE. Going back to your opening question, sir, we have been blessed and fortunate that retention rates are at 100 percent or exceed 100 percent; the same way with our assessments, and our goals have been exceeded for the last 32 months. We have been blessed with good fortune with bringing in the young men and women in this country to be able to serve in the Corps at the numbers that we need to be able to do that.
In regard to the balance piece, our priority will remain on readiness and maintaining the force in a ready condition, particularly those, as Mr. Ortiz said in his opening, at the tip of the spear, which gets to our condition of cyclical readiness and our greatest concern regarding our Marines are those—we have those that are deployed, those that are getting ready to deploy and those that have just returned from deployment.
Our focus, if you will, from a leadership perspective now is on those returning from deployment. The term has been used, bathtubs, troughs. Because of the aging equipment condition and the lack of spare parts, we are finding that the challenge we face is having our Marines having to spend additional time upon return from deployment repairing their equipment or keeping it in a state of readiness because of its age and the availability of parts.
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That is the biggest concern that we have in regard to the balance portion of your statement, but our focus of energy is still going to be on those that are forward-deployed.
Through your help, we have been able to apply dollars and resources to those people who have just returned from deployment. We are not there yet but we have been able to do that, to expedite the repair cycle maintenance time, particularly on the ground side, to be able to get this aging equipment up and operational.
Unfortunately, the trough is probably deeper than it has been in the past and the slope of the curve is steeper on the way out, but we do see that because of the attention we have paid to it and the Herculean efforts of all of our Marines, that we are able to continue to maintain cycle readiness in the way that we desire to.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. Thank you.
Mr. BATEMAN. Mrs. Fowler, and we will have to proceed now under the 5-minute rule as we have a second panel of full witnesses.
Mrs. FOWLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a couple of comments and then some questions for Admiral Ellis.
General Burnette, your comment on not doing back-to-back rotations for units in and out of Bosnia, I just spent 2 days there talking to enlisted guys and what you are doing now, they come back from Bosnia and they are transferred to another unit. Then that unit goes back, so it is a matter of semantics. The same unit is not doing back-to-back but the same guys are doing it or women are doing it.
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And that is the problem, and you have to stop that because I sat right there Sunday listening to people tell me what is happening to them. So you need to check into that and make sure it is not just semantics; it is real people that aren't doing it back to back.
For the Air Force, General Gamble, I was just reading an article in one of the defense publications about your retention rate problems and we, of course, all know about the pilots but I was very surprised and concerned to see that first term retention rates across the board, and I am talking about crew chiefs, maintenance personnel, et cetera, are primarily under 50 percent, and that is not good.
I was reading about one air logistics group that, by this June, will have 34 planes out of that one air logistics group that will not be able to fly by June of 1998 because they haven't been maintained; they don't have the parts. So I am deeply concerned about what is happening here.
And Admiral Ellis, I will follow up with that because I am really troubled about the decline in mission capable and fully mission capable rates for the Navy. I was pleased to see that in the President's 1998–1999 budget that he increased the money for the flying hours program, but I am really concerned about the figures I have seen on depot maintenance.
According to the data I have received, funding for Navy aircraft depot-level maintenance will decline from current levels by roughly $33.5 million under the fiscal year 1999 request. Now, as I understand it, the figures I have been given, this translates into a depot-maintenance backlog for fiscal year 1999 of 109 airframes and 780-engines.
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Now certainly with regard to engines, this is an all-time record high, I think. I didn't hear any reference to this in your testimony. So do these numbers not affect the Navy's mission capable rates?
And second, can you tell us why there is such a great disparity between the projected backlogs of airframe work and engine work? It seems to me that a 780-engine backlog translates into far more than a 109-aircraft backlog. So unless the Navy has hundreds of spare engines sitting around somewhere, what factors are at work here?
Then finally, given all considerations, could the United States today maintain a sustained carrier battle group and naval aviation presence in the Persian Gulf of the size that we deployed during Desert Shield/Desert Storm? So if you could answer those.
Admiral ELLIS. Great questions, Mrs. Fowler, as always.
One, the depot maintenance side, I am not familiar with the number of degradations you talk about. I am familiar with the backlogs. We have a logistics panel that follows me and they may be able to shed more light on that. If not, I certainly will take that for the record for you.
As you know, the depots historically have operated at an airframes backlog in the vicinity of 100. We peaked much higher than that in years past and we have now appropriately prioritized; and prior to your question, I thought, adequately funded a reduction to about that 100 level, which we think is about the right steady state level for the long term.
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The engine number you quote is much higher than anything I have seen and you are right; that is of concern and I will answer that question for the record if the gentleman that follows me, Bill Hancock, can't respond to that.
In terms of the carrier battle group piece, the answer is yes, we can. In terms of the 2–O presence, if that was the question, we can sustain——
Mrs. FOWLER. No, the same size, the same number of carriers that we had in the gulf during Desert Storm, could you do that today?
Admiral ELLIS. Yes, ma'am, we can do that. In fact, we game it out each month, under the guidance of the Joint Staff, with the monthly readiness report, where we create scenarios of exactly that—major region conflicts [MRC's] that flow 11 carrier battle groups and we have examined in agonizing detail all the readiness metrics that would be required to make all that happen.
Mrs. FOWLER. How many carriers did we have there during the gulf war?
Admiral ELLIS. We had five.
Mrs. FOWLER. And we could have five there today?
Admiral ELLIS. Yes, ma'am.
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Mrs. FOWLER. It will be interesting to see.
Admiral ELLIS. I am not saying they could be there tomorrow.
Mrs. FOWLER. You are putting that on the record.
Mr. SISISKY. Write that down.
Mrs. FOWLER. That is going to be real interesting, for you all to show how you can do it. Thank you.
Mr. BATEMAN. Admiral, you will never have five there if you are going to maintain any carrier presence anywhere else.
Admiral ELLIS. That is right, sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. And it is all in the ports of Norfolk and San Diego.
Mr. SISISKY. And the Nimitz will be in Newport News for 3 years.
Mr. BATEMAN. No piling on, now.
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The next to ask questions, Mr. McHale.
Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, good afternoon.
General Burnette, when I took over as cochair of the Guard and Reserve Caucus, I was initially surprised and disappointed to discover the tremendous barriers between the various component parts of the Army as those barriers existed at that time. Believe it or not, there is a compliment coming here, because things have gotten a lot better.
About a year ago there was a very hostile environment between the active duty Army, the Guard and, to a lesser degree, the Reserve. Let me begin by commending you, General Reimer and the Department of the Army for what I think is an extraordinary effort to heal those wounds and to move in a dramatic and effective way toward a true total force Army. I think the situation this year is far better than it was last year, with increasing respect and interoperability between the various components of that total force Army.
I think a major reflection of that is on page 6 of your testimony where you talk about the new active Reserve integrated divisions. I think that is exceptional. In a couple of weeks I and others from this committee will be going out to Fort Riley to get a full briefing on the integrated division and I want to take this moment to give you an ''attaboy'' for moving toward the total force Army, I think in a very effective way.
I also note on page 6 of your testimony that 55 percent of Army combat units are located within the National Guard, and that is commendable. It is also true that the majority of those soldiers are within Guard divisions not currently assigned to any op plan. Most of those soldiers, most of those units, all eight of the Guard divisions, have no wartime mission. Isn't it time to get the Guard into the war fight?
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General BURNETTE. I would like to answer that for you, sir. I would say that as we look at it, we consider having the Army National Guard divisions in the Nation's Strategic Reserve as being in the war fight. They are, as any unit that is in reserve, is considered part of the total team.
Currently assigned to the war plans, such as to Southwest Asia or to Korea, there are certain numbers of divisions that are stacked up and ready to go.
In the event that something goes bad, and I wouldn't say badly awry but in case there is a situation where you lose large numbers of soldiers due to weapons of mass destruction in the new world or due to something else, we need the National Guard divisions in the Strategic Reserve to be able to reconstitute those forces.
I would also point out that we have 15 National Guard enhanced readiness brigades that we do assign to the different parts——
Mr. MCHALE. I understand. And those 15 enhanced readiness brigades have extremely important wartime assignments. Without belaboring the point, I think the analysis you have just given is not adequate. It is no longer satisfactory to simply assign a strategic reserve mission to those eight Guard divisions because inevitably, that gives rise to the perception that these aren't real war fighters. We give them real equipment. They are fine officers, fine NCO's, fine soldiers, and then we don't give them a wartime contingency.
I think history is going to overtake that position and I think in the not too distant future if we are truly to have a total force Army, it is going to be necessary for all of those component parts to have a role to play when the balloon goes up.
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Let me turn to Admiral Ellis, if I may. Admiral, let me cut to the bottom line. We are not building enough ships. I look at the 1994 annual report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress; and in that report we indicated that by 1999, to sustain the two MRC strategy that was at the heart of the Bottom-Up Review, we would need 346 ships.
In fact, in 1999, we are going to have 315 ships, down 31 ships and at a construction rate of between 5 and 7 per year, we are moving in the wrong direction.
How can we be 31 ships down when measured by our own benchmark and have that not affect readiness?
Admiral ELLIS. As you know, sir, the 315 that we will have will be much more capable than those levels that we had at 346.
Mr. MCHALE. That is absolutely true but we anticipated that in 1994.
Admiral ELLIS. And the two MRC strategy is certainly our benchmark, the two MTW strategy. As you know, we have made adjustments, as we always do, to tailoring the battle groups reflective of the increased capabilities that these new units bring that allow us to decrement to some degree.
We have strategy; as you know, the Navy with its three-hub strategy, relies on flowing those forces from one theater to another and using the scheduling piece to accomplish that, but the bottom line is the tempo on those forces, if we deploy at the same level with smaller numbers, it's basic math.
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Mr. MCHALE. I don't see how you can avoid reaching that conclusion. We are 31 ships down from where we said we should be by 1999. And even though those ships are remarkably capable and even though the Navy is doing the very best it can to draw from those resources the maximum capability, the fact is we have 31 fewer platforms than we said we would need. And at a construction rate of five to seven per year, a construction rate that I think is inadequate, we are moving in the wrong direction, increasing the size of that gap.
I think that is the fundamental challenge facing the Navy. You can't have a U.S. Navy without ships and you have to define how many ships you need. Then you have to have the political will to build them. And we, I am afraid, in recent years have not pressed that point as firmly as we might.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. McHale.
Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Next, Mr. Chambliss.
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for having to go back and forth to another hearing. I am sure whatever questions I might ask have probably already been asked, so I am going to pass.
Mr. BATEMAN. Next is Mr. Taylor.
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Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank the panel for bringing a number of very troubling things to our attention. I wish you had brought some suggestions along with it as to how to fix it.
I want to read a statement that someone managed to get to me. This is from the commanding officer of the U.S.S. Carl Vinson. I will cut to the quick. It is a note back to the Pacific Fleet headquarters.
He is saying, ''Like our predecessors, we have responded to temporary additional duty [TEMADD] requests in order to get ships at sea at the required readiness levels. Command and control authority has done everything possible to my knowledge to alleviate the pain that comes with sending one of many of your own to another deploying ship for six months only to receive the sailor back midterm in your own work-up cycle. This, of course, results not only in erosion of morale for the sailor and his family but also those around him who wonder if they are next.
''To be honest, it erodes the credibility of the commanding officer and all senior leadership, as we encourage team-building and organizational unit then, from the perspective of the sailor, to yank them out of the aforementioned TEMADD requirements.
''The Carl Vinson snapshot at the nine-month mark prior to deployment, we have completed all the requisite personnel reporting requirements, such as the initial Marine Corps Personnel [PERSMAR] and EMERS required. Projected through September '98 the ship's NMP,'' which I am told is the Naval Manning Plan, ''will have been reduced by 171 personnel to 2,730. Current on board manning is 182 people below NMP and 391 below billets authorized [BA],'' which, for us civilians, is the basic allowance.
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''Data in the EDVR''—that is enlisted distribution network—'' and PERSMAR response indicate a continuing decline to 2,355, 391 people short of NMP, 609 people from BA. We view our BA numbers as the appropriate baseline because every month our NMP decreases, making the system appear as if everything is okay.
''This is an untenable situation to be in four months prior to deployment, with all of the undergraduate training already completed and only RIMPAC (a Pacific Fleet exercise) and Information Technology Fleet Exercise [ITFEX] remaining with which to synergize our team of warriors.
''We are further concerned that the projected on board [POB5] manning data is not optimistic, considering that there are three carriers in front of the Carl Vinson yet to be manned at C2 levels or above.
''Carl Vinson is having difficulty obtaining required personnel with appropriate NECs,'' which is the naval enlisted classification, ''to man and operate the number of special equipments on board,'' and it goes on.
What really troubles me is I think you gentlemen have been forthright in showing the decline in the capability, mission capability of the equipment. We hear about a very high OPTEMPO. We hear about people getting out because of that high OPTEMPO. But I really don't see anyone in uniform putting their foot down and saying, this can't stand. We are walking into a box and somebody is going to pay for it and a lot of people are going to pay for it.
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What is particularly troubling as a Member of Congress is there must be a dozen organizations out there that any time this committee or any other committee puts something into the budget that we know is right but isn't asked for by the administration, then it is immediately labeled pork. They don't know what they are talking about. They think they know what they are talking about but they are wrong.
So my question to you gentlemen is at what point is someone wearing your uniform going to step forward and say, this won't do; something has to change?
I realize it is your job to take orders, but you also have a higher responsibility. That higher responsibility is to the people you represent in each of your various branches of the service. And it is going to start there because if it starts here, no one is going to believe it. It is only going to be believable if it comes from someone in uniform.
Mr. BATEMAN. Any comment, gentlemen?
Admiral ELLIS. If I may, sir, since that one was a Navy issue, I had a personal discussion with the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet 2 days ago on exactly those types of priorities. Admiral Clemins talks to me daily, as you might expect. He has made very clear statements with regard to the status of personnel manning within the Pacific Fleet and has highlighted some of the issues in aggregate that you describe, sir, in your description of the commanding officer of Carl Vinson's concerns.
So I assure you that it is on the screen and those issues are on the scope and are getting every bit of the attention that they deserve.
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Now, as you said in your opening statement, sir, the challenge is not necessarily in the recognition of the issue, though that, too, can sometimes become a challenge; it is in how you solve it, and that is where we are turning to and devoting the resources.
Mr. TAYLOR. So, Admiral Ellis, are you telling me that the Navy will not be coming to us this session asking for fewer people? Because obviously if you are robbing Peter to pay Paul to man your ships right now, how on earth are you going to do it with fewer people? If you are cannibalizing one plane to get another one flying, I may not be much but I am a pretty decent mechanic and I know about the amount of time you are wasting, how many parts you are breaking from what is left of that first one in order to get the second one to fly.
None of these things make sense. They are all short-term fixes with huge long-term prices to pay. Who is going to come forward and say it? You guys have come the closest of any panel I have seen in 5 years, but even you have been extremely modest in your request. And you are not really asking for a fix; you are outlining a problem.
But if you don't ask for a fix, if you don't outline a solution, I can assure you the guy who needs to be in that chair right now is John Kasich. The guy who needs to be in that chair right now is Bob Livingston, the Speaker of the House, the President of the Senate. Those are the ones who are going to put the budget numbers together. And I am not so sure they are getting the message.
It is too late for the President's budget. It is already written. It didn't do you justice. But there is another chance legislatively. But my question is are you making the right request and are you making it to the right people, because this committee can only spend what the Budget Committee gives us.
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[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 659.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Very good points made.
Mr. TAYLOR. There is a question. I would hope somebody would respond. I don't want anybody to lose their job.
General STEELE. I would just like to say, sir, from the last hearing that I had the opportunity to speak to you on this issue, we talked about the consistent theme that in the case of the Marine Corps, and particularly this commandant, General Krulak, has come over to express time and again the fact that we are underfunded, particularly in our procurement accounts, and that we are going to ensure that we are funded in readiness at the expense of those other accounts and that we have solicited your support and you have graciously afforded us that support over the years. But that theme will be consistent from the Marine Corps.
I would like to make one point that I just touched on the last time we had an opportunity to talk in regards to the effort. I can't speak to the Carl Vinson and the Navy but from the Marine Corps' perspective regarding manning and the manning of our organizations and what we are doing about it on the front end, with the infantry battalion, wherein we have 24 active infantry battalions as the base organization, we have established a program within the last 15 months called unit cohesion wherein, at the entry level, we bring young men into the Corps and assign them into squad-sized units, normally about 12 marines at the entry level, and then put them into an organization wherein they will stay for their entire first enlistment.
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They will make the deployment as we project them to. They will have the same leadership and there will be stability in the organization. Now, we are 50 percent of the way through the implementation of the infantry battalions and we just started with our tank and our artillery units on the ground side.
We have made a commitment to this, an institutional commitment to get to the point that you said, sir, and we are confident that it is going to help us. It will always be cyclical, though, when they come back at the end of their enlistment before we can build them up for the next deployment, and it is a challenge that we will have and that we will continue to face.
But the concerted effort we have put into manning the organization at a minimum, within your guidance, of 90 percent and the DOD's guidance, we believe that we are well on the way to working that so we are not climbing on the backs of our Marines, particularly those that are forward-deployed.
Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, if I may, must one last question.
Mr. BATEMAN. If you do it very quickly because we have another panel and some people haven't had any chance for questions.
Mr. TAYLOR. My question is has the commandant made a specific request for x number of dollars to do this much?
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General STEELE. To my knowledge he has, sir, but I will have to take it for the record.
Mr. TAYLOR. Would you, please?
General STEELE. Yes, sir.
Mr. TAYLOR. And any of you other gentlemen. I am just saying I would love to see the written replies, since we are short for time, to my questions.
[The information can be found in the Appendix at page 659.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Next, Mr. Hunter, who was here at the outset.
Mr. HUNTER. No, I am fine.
Mr. BATEMAN. He passes. Then Mr. Sisisky.
Mr. SISISKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So you don't get the wrong idea, we had the Deputy Secretary of Defense in front of the full committee this morning and basically it was the same type of thing. We are not going against you. We know what happens in the military. But there are terms which reappear throughout today's testimony and I am going to tack onto him, for each service, which are adequate or barely adequate. And those terms really concern me.
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Although all the witnesses resist referring to today's military as hollow, I think there does appear to be a consensus building that we may be moving in that direction.
And General Gamble, and that may be the perfect name to go with the risk this may involve, said it best when he said they will never let you down, no matter what. However, he continues, ''But I suspect that in a private moment many of our airmen would tell you they are becoming frustrated over the poor prognosis.''
General, I think that is a masterful way to get your point across and you may be looking for a political career because that sounds like a term that politicians would use.
But frankly, none of you have convinced me that we are not taking a big gamble by letting things go where they are today. I will admit—I have been around almost the world since December visiting our people, our airmen, soldiers and Navy people from as far as Yokosuka to Bosnia, and the morale is extremely well.
But General Burnette, let me tell you, you said that the units are not getting the back-to-back rotations. I was having lunch with a soldier who happened to be from Virginia and I said, ''How long have you been in the Army?'' He said, ''Ten years.'' I said, ''How many of those times have you been deployed?'' He said, ''Seven years.'' ''Now, where are you from?'' He said, ''I'm from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 18th Army and I'm proud of it.''
He wasn't complaining. I said, ''Do you have a family?'' He said, ''Yes, I have one child.'' He said, ''But that's what I'm there for.'' He has been in Bosnia now for 10 months. He doesn't know when he is going to go home.
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Now, what we have done, as I understand it, is taken people who are skilled in certain things and brought them to Bosnia, and they may have been there two and three and four times. And I understand the Navy does the same thing. They will cross-deck. Somebody will get in and then, ''We need you. Somebody is out. We don't have that skill.'' And there is where you are going to have the deterioration.
And we are not criticizing you; believe me. I am sure you would like to get up and cheer for your people because we want to do what is right. The problem we have is that we get the same answer: it is adequate or nearly adequate. And I don't think that is good enough, really, for the people.
I will tell you, every time I make a speech I say one thing that is consistent. We don't know how lucky we are in this country to have the quality of young men and women serving in the service today. The people of the United States really do not know, I don't believe, but we are fortunate as the devil to have this. Thank you very much.
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Riley.
Mr. RILEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to keep this brief because I do know you have another panel.
General Burnette, when I read your testimony there was one statement that you made, and especially after the conversation we have had here today, about our state of readiness today. You made the statement that the Army's first-to-fight units continue to sustain high levels of readiness, but the Army made tough decisions to mortgage future readiness in order to maintain current readiness.
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I guess my question for each of you, if we have this type of problem today, what does this say about where we are going to be next year, 2 years from now, 5 years from now?
Mr. BATEMAN. Before you answer, Mr. Riley, would you mind assuming the chair while you get your answers? I have to go and make a vote in another committee. Sorry to have to leave. I will return as soon as I can.
General BURNETTE. Over the last several years, Congressman Riley, the Army has, because of the funding levels that we have had, we have consciously gone short in our modernization accounts in order to fund future readiness, and that is clear from our budgets and it is clear from the testimony that our chief and our secretary have made on the subject. And consequently, we have built up what we would call a modernization backlog in order to do that.
Now we are at the point, starting with present budget fiscal year 1999, of attempting to put more money into our modernization accounts in order to try to reconcile that problem. The only way you can do that with the total obligation authority that we have is to take it from somewhere else within that total obligational authority.
So in the past, where we were taking risks in our modernization area, I would say now that this budget takes more risks in the near-term readiness area in order to attempt to modernize for the future. As I mentioned earlier, it is a difficult issue of doing the shaping operations like you have out there today, the responding operations and, at the same time, actually modernizing for the future.
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I will give you a personal view. That is that you have to ask yourself the question: Is 3 percent of the Gross Domestic Product [GDP] enough to ensure national security? And my personal view is that it is not. I would just leave it at that and pass it to my comrades.
Admiral ELLIS. Yes, sir. I think Tom has done a good job of summarizing the challenges you folks know far better than we do that have confronted us for some time, and how do you balance the modernization needs which, as I said in my statement, is really the future readiness account, to buy that capability, to buy that maintainability, so that the folks that are maintaining now are junior folks that are going to be the career contributors to the force and their sons and daughters that follow them have what they need to maintain the readiness in the future. How do you balance that with current readiness concerns?
That was the focus of last year's effort, the Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR], to avoid migration that I think all of the services had pursued over the years from the operating and maintenance accounts or out of the procurement accounts into operation and maintenance. We, too, believe that we have struck a balance here.
We have described to you far more than perhaps you want the bathtub situation that is probably as good an analogy as any. It is a balancing act. It is a very delicate process. It is one that requires careful scrutiny. I use the analogy that the Navy right now is an engine and we are operating at a lot higher RPM than we have in years past and we all know what comes with that. You have to have a lot closer tolerances. You have to have a lot more fine-tuning to make it work and you probably need to up the periodicity of the maintenance appropriately.
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That is where we find ourselves as we try and deal with the real-term legitimate needs of the Nation that are being met so well at the same time as we honor the requirements that are also equally legitimate for the future of the force and those, most importantly, that served in it.
General GAMBLE. Sir, I think that is a fundamental dilemma type of question for the Air Force, too. No doubt about that. One half of my job title is air and one half is space. As I look at revolution in military affairs and look at the future capability that we are supposed to be balancing between readiness and modernization, a lot of that modernization has to do with what is the smart thing to do, to migrate mission to space, to make it more effective or smarter or faster or safer or whatever.
And, as you know, space programs are very expensive and that is going to take up a lot of our future modernization to get the mission done better.
But as I look on my air side, I see, and I put that in my statement that in 4 years, 4,700 of our 6,000 airplanes are going to be over 20 years old and every year those dollars you pointed out earlier in the opening statements that are being plussed up are going just to pay for the aging of the airplanes, just to keep them where we want them.
When I joined, the idea of flying a 20-year-old airplane would shock me, when I was a lieutenant. Today 20 ain't bad, and it'll be that way for a long time to come.
So while it is a balance and we are trying our best, it is very, very difficult.
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General STEELE. Yes, sir. Near-term readiness is going to remain the priority, sir. It does have long-range implications. We have talked about them throughout this hearing today. For us, modernization is the key; that is, to replace our aging equipment. We continue to fund the readiness account today.
You have helped us improve on our modernization or procurement account. It is not enough yet. Our infrastructure is still underfunded. We need the money to be able to do that. We are going to continue to focus, though, on near-term readiness for the foreseeable future to ensure that we have that.
General DAKE. I would like to mention, as we look to the future and the price we pay today and the balance between those, as we look at the future for the Marine Corps aviation side, we look at V–22, Joint Strike Fighter programs that we today, as we hold onto our legacy equipment to get to those new systems, the aging aircraft take more direct man-hours in order to maintain them.
We talked about the increase in cannibalization that we have seen. In some cases that is because we have components that are no longer made and you have to wait until a contractor can spool up and build that component and then it is a considerable amount of time. You cannot wait that time so you cannibalize for your readiness aspect.
The way to overcome much of that, the best way, would be to speed the arrival of things like the V–22, so that the aging air frames, the CH–46's in this case, which are well beyond 20 years and will be 30 years before they are replaced, I think is where we have to strike the balance.
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So, in the near term, we are paying a price for legacy equipment. Fortunately our manning is getting better in the Marine Corps aviation side and enlisted, and it is on the backs of those marines that we are riding to the future.
Mr. RILEY [presiding]. Thank you, gentlemen. I hope that each one of you, if I have an opportunity to speak to you again, can give us some indication about how far down the road are we going to be before we hit critical mass, before we really get into a problem that we can't reverse, and we won't have time to do that this afternoon.
Mr. Pickett.
Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I listened carefully. I think we are all talking very close to the same thing. We, as a group, are sitting here, you at the table looking up and talking to us and we, up here looking and talking to you, and all of us are in a state of denial. What we are denying is the fact that the readiness of our military has reached unacceptably low levels.
And Mr. Taylor was trying to get you to say that and you don't want to say it. We take the position that we are perhaps not qualified to say it, so it doesn't get said, except I am going to say it. I think we are there.
If you look at these tabulations that have been provided here about the decline in the percentages that have occurred since 1990, if the unemployment rate had gone up 10 percentage points or if the index of economic activity had gone down 10 percentage points, we would be walking around wringing our hands and wondering what is going to happen next, and that is what we need to be doing as far as the readiness of our military is concerned.
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I think it is the responsibility of Congress to remedy the situation. It is our job to fix it. You are the ones that execute the program but you don't appropriate the money or authorize the money and I think the people here, sitting at this table, would understand that readiness is at an unacceptably low level and it is our job to fix it.
That is all I have to say, Mr. Chairman. That is not a question.
Mr. RILEY. Thank you, Mr. Pickett.
Mr. Evans.
Mr. EVANS. No questions.
Mr. RILEY. Gentlemen, thank you so much for your testimony. We appreciate it. We know we kept you a little late but thank you so much for your service to the country and for your candidness today.
General BURNETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral ELLIS. Thank you.
Mr. RILEY. Gentlemen, if you would, I would ask each one of you to take your seats. Gentlemen, let me welcome you here today. Thank you so much for coming. Chairman Bateman had a vote he had to make. So did some of the other members. But we will go ahead and get started. We are running somewhat late.
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So our second panel of witnesses today is Lt. Gen. John Coburn, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Department of the Army; Lt. Gen. William P. Hallin, Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics, Department of the Air Force; Vice Adm. William J. Hancock, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy; Maj. Gen. Joseph D. Stewart, Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics, U.S. Marine Corps; Brig. Gen. Bruce B. Byrum, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation, U.S. Marine Corps.
Lieutenant General Coburn, if you would like to start.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JOHN G. COBURN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS, U.S. ARMY
General COBURN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members. I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss Army readiness with you.
My message today is that readiness is your Army's top priority, that mission capable rates are good and that your Army is trained and ready. However, readiness is a complex equation. It involves weapon system status, unit status, personnel readiness and power projection capability. To be ready, all of these areas have to be in balance.
Let me share with you what I believe about Army readiness. I believe that readiness is a total Army effort and that active component/reserve component integration in everything we do is absolutely critical for tomorrow's success. I believe that a revolution in military logistics is under way that is substantially changing the way we support our forces. I believe that logistics modernization is critical to sustaining our forces.
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I strongly believe that we must recapitalize and modernize to get rid of old equipment that requires more maintenance and parts than more modern, reliable systems.
I believe in partnering with industry and I believe that a weak industry equals a weak Army.
I believe that lack of adequate funding is our number one readiness issue, followed closely by OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO.
Finally, I believe that the quality of life areas that our soldiers deem most important are the true underpinning of all of our readiness efforts.
Let me conclude by saying how you can help us. Continue to support Army modernization but not at the expense of other Army programs. Support supplemental funding without offset for Bosnia and southwest Asia. Don't forget that logistics modernization, although not as glamorous as high-dollar combat systems, is a vital component of the Army's modernization strategy. Such items as tents that don't leak, sturdy boots and quality rations, while not high-dollar items, make a decided difference to the soldier in the foxhole.
And finally, continue to recognize that our soldiers are the best in the world and they need your continued support.
Again thanks for all that you have done for our Army. Thanks for the opportunity to appear before you and I look forward to your questions.
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[The prepared statement of General Coburn can be found in the appendix on page 616.]
Mr. RILEY. Thank you, General Coburn.
Admiral Hancock.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. WILLIAM J. HANCOCK, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY
Admiral HANCOCK. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I also appreciate the opportunity to share with you the Navy's perspectives on readiness. I have a written statement that I have submitted for the record but I would like to make a few points, if I may, at this time.
First, as a former Department of the Navy budget officer, I was delighted to learn that the budget justification books for the Navy and the Marine Corps have been submitted. I know this has been a particularly sore point when I was a budget officer. I am glad that my successor has solved that potentially insurmountable problem.
Next, achieving the appropriate level of operational readiness is, as in the Army, it is the Navy's top priority. And an important contributor to overall readiness is the aircraft materiel condition. And I believe that the current materiel condition of the Navy's aircraft supports operational requirements.
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As we have executed the post-cold-war drawdown and worked hard to live within the constrained budgets, we have pursued a number of initiatives to reduce the cost of supporting our forces. I do not believe that any of these logistics streamlining initiatives have resulted in significant readiness risk.
Second, we learned from fiscal year 1997 the importance of properly pricing our flying hour program. Thanks to the support of the Congress, I believe the Navy's flying hour program is appropriately funded for 1998 and I am confident that we will, therefore, be able to sustain operational readiness.
I appreciate the leadership you and the members of this subcommittee have shown on the important issues of military readiness. And, as a final point, I believe there would be no worse driver of negative readiness than a supplemental that requires offsets. I think the emergency supplemental is a very, very important contributor to the ability of each of the military departments to keep the resources focused on driving readiness conditions in our forces.
Thank you very much, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Hancock can be found in the appendix on page 627.]
Mr. RILEY. Thank you, Admiral.
General Hallin.
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STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. WILLIAM P. HALLIN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS, U.S. AIR FORCE
General HALLIN. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today and discuss Air Force mission capable rates with you. Let me just make clear from an Air Force perspective, the priorities are very straightforward: people, readiness and modernization. That is the way we built the 1999 budget.
As already discussed, mission capable rates address really just one aspect of a multi-faceted readiness issue. A ready force, as we have discussed here previously, must possess the necessary people, training, equipment, spare parts and supporting structure to perform the mission.
Our people unquestionably represent our readiness bedrock. Today they are performing superbly, as you have seen in terms of your visit to the field, to meet higher levels of operational tempos and deployment requirements. And we are committed to ensuring that they have the training, tools, equipment and the parts to do their job.
Significant effort is being focused on turning around the decline in mission capable rates. While mission capable rates today meet our operational requirements, we have over the last several years experienced higher operational tempos and turbulence from the nearly 40 percent drawdown in the force.
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In addition, as has been previously discussed, the aircraft fleet age now averages almost 20 years, resulting in higher than forecast failure rates, unpredictable parts obsolescence and more frequent engine and airframe structural inspections.
We have taken several actions to begin to stabilize rates and first of all, I want to start out by thanking you for the plus-up Congress gave us in the 1998 budget of $300 million, which we applied against the spares problem. And we continued that increase in the 1999 budget and added $350 million to plus-up the spares account in 1999, as we did into the out-years.
We are working on not only improving spare parts funding but also implementing an aircraft engine life management program to better assess some of the technical surprises we have been confronted with in dealing with aircraft engines and streamlining our supply chain management.
Now, while we expect mission capable rates to stabilize and begin some modest recovery this year, the aging aircraft fleet will continue to pose some logistics support challenges for us.
I guess from a bottom line standpoint, it is essential that we ensure all aspects of the readiness equation, as we have discussed here this afternoon, from mission capable rates to our most vital resources, our people, as we try to balance the requirements and the resources to meet not only today's mission but prepare for tomorrow, as well.
Thank you for the opportunity to address you and I look forward to your questions.
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[The prepared statement of General Hallin can be found in the Appendix on page 635.]
Mr. RILEY. Thank you, General.
General Stewart.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. JOSEPH D. STEWART, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
General STEWART. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am honored to be here today. I thank you for your support over the years. It has meant a lot to the Marine Corps.
I would tell you that the readiness challenges that we are facing today would be a lot tougher without the generous assistance of this committee. I can also tell you that readiness is our No. 1 priority. The O&M dollars that we use to sustain it, we consider to be the lifeblood of the Corps.
I can report to you that readiness in the Marine Corps is acceptable but it is not going up and it is not nearly as high as it used to be. It is also a lot tougher to maintain. Our gear is older but we have not modernized. Much of it has exceeded or will exceed its life expectancy.
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I would tell you that the deploying units, those at the tip of the spear, so to speak, do have extremely high readiness, but the burden for keeping those deploying units ready has fallen on the shoulders of the units who remain behind. That is those units that remain behind get less people, get less equipment, and they get less money.
Also, our sustainment equipment, the gear that we hold at our logistics bases—this is the equipment that we use to replace our combat attrition, the gear that we use to be able to run a viable depot maintenance program—that has also been a bill-payer to keep our deploying units up to speed.
I would also, and this would be the last point that I would make, is that it costs more to maintain readiness today than it did in the past. For example, in the Fleet Marine Force, an equipment repair order, which is similar to what you do when you take your car in for maintenance, in 1996 the average equipment repair order in the Fleet Marine Force cost $85. Now, we don't pay for the labor. That is just the parts that go into that maintenance action. In 1996, $85. Last year it was over $160. So it is almost twice as high.
Similarly, at the depot level, the amphibious assault vehicle, the workhorse of the Marine Corps, our main piece of equipment, in 1990, to do an overhaul of that piece of gear at the depot level cost about $108,000. Last year to do that same overhaul was $227,000.
So that is where we stand. Again I would thank you for your support. It has been important to the Marine Corps and I am prepared to answer your questions.
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[The prepared statement of General Stewart can be found in the Appendix on page 645.]
Mr. BATEMAN [presiding]. Thank you, General Stewart.
General Byrum.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. BRUCE B. BYRUM, ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR AVIATION, U.S. MARINE CORPS
General BYRUM. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for having us here today to talk to you on readiness.
With regard to aviation readiness within the Marine Corps, you have heard our predecessors. Readiness remains our No. 1 priority. However, as you begin to fund the readiness and look at modernization, there is a tenuous balance and modernization for the Marine Corps and the MV–22 and the joint strike fighter, which we are trying to neck down our force, from multiple-type model series to lesser-type model series so we can sustain that force in the out-years, that bow wave for the cost of modernization is being put out.
To answer Mr. Taylor's question or the question with regard to what year, when we look at 2005 and 2007, we begin to see an increase within naval aviation of almost $1.4 billion required to begin modernization of those type model series that we have in the force today.
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To sustain the readiness we have today, we appreciate the support we have had from this panel and from Congress in plussing-up the fiscal year 1998 flight hour funding. It is properly sourced at this time and we have seen improvements across the force, and that is why we are able to sustain the readiness as it is.
Also within the fiscal year 1999 budget you will see that same commitment to depot level maintenance, to spare parts, to sustaining the readiness of our legacy equipment. You will see a decline, however, in maintaining the combat capability of that equipment. Some of those systems that we would like to procure for our aging force—F–18's and AV–8's are hard to fund when we have to look at our modernization bill in the out-years, and that is going to have an effect in 2005 and 2006, and I am here to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Byrum is found in the appendix on page 645.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, General Byrum. General Hallin, I am not sure that you are the appropriate person in the Air Force to address this question but it relates to maintenance of your aircraft.
Some 2 or more years ago I got into the budget a sum of $6 or $8 million to be used for a demonstration of the technology involved in robotic inspection of airframes. This was in the context of information that there is a technology that is ready to be demonstrated and that technology, if applied throughout military aviation, had a potential of saving hundreds of millions of dollars a year because instead of stripping paint off and going through all of that process, you would robotically inspect the plane with radiography, thermography, and other techniques that are, I'm told by NASA, who developed the capability, ready to be demonstrated.
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My latest information is that of that sum of money, $3 million was used to fund a contract between Wright Patterson and the University of Dayton to explore new and different and other technologies instead of demonstrating a technology that is there and for which the appropriation was intended.
Are you familiar with any of this? And if you are not, would you get familiar with it?
General HALLIN. I will take that one for the record but I certainly agree with you in terms of the capability that we need, from the standpoint of being able to go in without removing the coating from the surface of the aircraft and detect corrosion. As you can imagine, as our fleet continues to age, corrosion is a significant problem for us. I will have to take that for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 659.]
Mr. BATEMAN. I would like very much to hear the specifics of this and what the Air Force's plans are. I have been given several assurances from people who then went away and retired or whatever happened to them or on to other assignments. I want to see something done on this because I think we can save hundreds of millions of dollars, and the more we delay, the more of the savings we are losing.
Since I wasn't here to hear the statements, for which I apologize, I am going to next turn to Mr. McHale, who is our carryover from the first session, and see if he has any questions.
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Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Stewart, could you give us a brief summary of the status of the mobile offshore basing concept? How is that going in the Marine Corps?
General STEWART. Sir, I don't really know a whole lot about that. We are looking at the concept.
Right now our focus is on what we call MPF enhancement, which is really the next step from where we are with our maritime prepositioning force program, and those three ships are coming on line. We are still looking at 2010 and beyond and are examining that concept but we have not really——
Mr. MCHALE. I don't mean, with my question, particularly not providing any introduction for the question itself, I don't mean to put you on the dime and I certainly understand that you might not have that information readily available to you.
We in this subcommittee have dealt with the MPF enhancement and are warmly supportive of that. The mobile offshore basing concept is one that I was reading about last week—I think it was in the Navy Times or one of the other trade publications—and it relates to the challenges we face when introducing an expeditionary force into a theater of operation where, for whatever reason—political opposition or physical constraints—we don't have access to airfields and port facilities ashore.
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I am very interested in that concept because we can't always count on a Port of Jabil being available when we need to go into theater and although I am not endorsing that concept—I don't know enough about it—I would welcome any supplemental information that you might have.
When we were out in San Diego the other day we heard testimony from Staff Sergeant Grainger on the subject of the CMR account on Okinawa. That caught my attention. Through no fault of the Marine Corps, simply the aging of the equipment, for instance, Humvees that are now 12 years old, much of the equipment in the Consolidated Memorandum Receipt [CMR] account is not as serviceable as we would like it to be. Staff Sergeant Grainger, with the kind of deportment that you expect of a staff NCO, described pretty vividly what it was like to deal with rusted Humvees where the holes were so big he could stick his arm through the hole and where he soaked the deteriorating body part to prevent further damage. But there is only so much you can do when the gear is that old.
I have kind of taken that under my wing. I would very much, in this cycle of the authorization bill, like to address the need for additional funding to bring that CMR account up to speed on Okinawa and I would welcome from you and from the LLA any information subsequently that you might have to make that a reality.
We can't send these Marines out on a Marine Corps expeditionary unit [MEU] over to Okinawa and have them pick up gear that is simply not serviceable for the mission requirements that they have.
And finally, General Byrum, if I may, I was going to ask General Dake this but didn't have an opportunity when he was testifying earlier. The Navy has made a conscious choice to go with the F/A–18E and F as a predecessor to the Joint Strike Fighter and when asked what their rationale is, the Navy typically says, ''We're concerned that there might be a delay in the Joint Strike Fighter and that without the benefit of the F/A–18E and F, should the Joint Strike Fighter be delayed, we could find ourselves with a gap in terms of capabilities.''
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The Marine Corps has made a different judgment. The Marine Corps has made the decision to stay with the F/A–18C's and F–18C's and D's and move directly to the Joint Strike Fighter.
I guess what I am asking of you is give me a drop dead date. When do you have to have the Advanced Short Takeoff Vertical Landing [ASTOVL] variant of the Joint Strike Fighter in the Fleet Marine Force [FMF] so that you don't have the gap in capabilities that the Navy is concerned about?
General BYRUM. I would like to take that specifically for the record but I will give you my assessment at this point.
As we begin to look at our naval inventory of the F–18C's and D's, and look at what our program is to go to the Joint Strike Fighter, we begin to go into inventory, particularly within the D's and some of the A's and begin to equate to squadrons at around 2012.
So if we have not started to procure and started to replace AV–8's, F/A–18's by that time, we will begin to see squadrons without aircraft because of the fatigue life.
Mr. MCHALE. Let me suggest to you—my light just turned red and we have a vote that is rolling but let me suggest to you that if that is the appropriate date, terrific. We need to hear that loudly, clearly, and consistently so that we in the Congress, as we examine the issue of funding for the design and ultimately acquisition of the ASTOVL variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, so not push it off into the future beyond a timeframe that is acceptable to the Marine Corps.
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I want to make sure that whatever decision the Navy has made on this subject, and I respect their judgment, that the ASTOVL variant not be pushed so far out into the future for financial reasons that we produce a tactical environment that is unacceptable.
We need to know from the Marine Corps, no fooling, when do you need the Joint Strike Fighter, so that when some argue for a date further down the road, we have competent information to rebut those arguments.
General BYRUM. Yes, sir.
Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Next we will entertain questions from Mrs. Fowler under the 5-minute rule and then we will have to recess for a vote and we will get back as quickly as we can.
Mrs. FOWLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be brief and some of these, if they can't get answered now, if you could just do them for the record, I would appreciate it.
For Admiral Hancock, I just asked Admiral Ellis some questions that he suggested I ask you and I was going to ask them anyway, so I'll do that quickly. I am really troubled by the decline in mission capable and fully mission capable rates for the Navy and I am deeply concerned about the figures I have on depot maintenance.
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According to my data, and my data comes from the Navy's fiscal 1999 budget, funding for Navy aircraft depot level maintenance will decline from current levels by roughly $33.5 million under the fiscal 1999 budget request. As I understand it, this translates into a depot maintenance backlog for fiscal 1999 of 109 airframes and 780 engines. Certainly with regard to engines, this is an all-time high.
Now, I didn't see any reference to this in your testimony and do these numbers not affect the Navy's mission capable rate? Can you also tell us why there is such a great disparity between the projected backlog of airframe work and engine work? It seems to me that a 780-engine backlog translates into far more than 109 airframes. Does the Navy have hundreds of spare engines sitting around? What factors are at work here?
Then my questions for all of you would be twofold. At what percent of requirements are you funding airframe depot maintenance, engine depot maintenance and depot-level replacement? So I need to know what percent of requirements that each service is doing that.
Then the other question is in your opinion, and this is for each of you to answer, would the divestiture of organic depot functions from your service have positive or negative consequences on readiness? Since we have an official in DOD who has said that we are moving toward socialism with our industrial base and the Department of Defense, I would be interested in your views on that.
Admiral HANCOCK. Very quickly, Admiral Ellis and I were both surprised about the 780 engine's number. I will research that number.
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Mrs. FOWLER. That includes reserves; 680 active and the rest were reserves.
Admiral HANCOCK. Yes, ma'am. But that is a number that is surprisingly high to me, since I was under the impression when we built the budget that we had funded to historical requirements. So I will——
Mrs. FOWLER. I thought we gave you $100 million to do that.
Admiral HANCOCK. Yes, ma'am. I am aware of 150 bare firewalls in the operating fleet, about half of those in the F–18 fleet. As you know, we have some difficulties with the F–404 engine, which we are overcoming slowly but surely, and that air firewall number is coming down in a very positive way from last year where, in the F–18's alone, it was 170.
We have made a conscious effort to properly finance the aircraft maintenance program with plus-ups across the FYDP in every single fiscal year.
I am a big believer in developing a balance of investment because every dollar I put into operation and maintenance is unavailable for the recapitalization of MV–22, F–18E, F and other items. We try and strike that balance but, at the same time, produce the readiness that we require.
Admiral Ellis, I think, described pretty well the readiness of the three aircraft carriers in the gulf and that is typical of the readiness we see of those airwings that are operating forward. And I will provide the other information for the record.
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Mrs. FOWLER. Thank you. And the basic question on divestiture of organic depot capability. Would that affect your readiness?
Admiral HANCOCK. I am a big fan of organic depots. As you know very well, we have divested ourselves of half of our aircraft depot capacity in the last several years and several BRAC rounds.
Today the depots have been single-sited for product lines so we have no duplication in the Navy of component or airframe product line.
Mrs. FOWLER. General Coburn.
General COBURN. Let me try to answer your first question, if I might, first, ma'am. On engines, we are fully funded. We don't have a 1998 or a 1999 backlog.
Mrs. FOWLER. This is the Navy's figures I was using on that.
General COBURN. All right. As to the question on depots, I, too, am a very strong supporter of depots. I have watched our depot personnel around the world. I watched them in Vietnam; I watched them in the desert; I watched them in Bosnia. They provide an immediate response capability that might not otherwise be available in industry. I think that they provide a vital component of long-term readiness and they also serve as a cost factor. In other words, they serve to drive costs down where you don't have competition in the private sector or perhaps little competition. So I think they are absolutely vital to long-term readiness.
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[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on Page 659.]
General STEWART. Can I answer that question, Mrs. Fowler?
Mr. BATEMAN. If you all can do it very quickly because we are running out of time.
General STEWART. The first question you asked was on what percentage of the requirement was funded. In the Marine Corps we have a $132 million requirement; $78 million is funded. So about $53 million is unfunded.
Mrs. FOWLER. What I would like is a breakdown on airframe depot maintenance, engine depot maintenance and depot level repairables. I know each of you will probably have to get that for the record.
General STEWART. That was overall.
The other thing I would say about organic depot maintenance is we are a strong believer in doing it organically. As you probably know, we do about 95 percent of it in-house by contract. We need it for our short response times and we hope we can continue doing it that way.
General HALLIN. I can address the question very quickly here. In terms of our requirements on depot purchase equipment maintenance for fiscal year 1999, we had 83 percent of the requirement funded, about a $1.9 billion requirement, had a backlog of $323 million but of that backlog, there are 25 aircraft in that backlog and 106 engines.
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With respect to the depot level repairables, in fiscal year 1999 we funded 100 percent of the validated requirement.
With respect to organic depots, I am a strong believer in their contribution to readiness.
Mrs. FOWLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. I think we had best recess now and catch the vote. We have a few minutes left on the first vote and then there is at least one other vote but we will be back as soon as we can.
[Recess.]
Mr. BATEMAN. The Chair is pleased to recognize, as soon as he is seated and comfortable, Mr. Riley.
Mr. RILEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Coburn, on behalf of the committee I am pleased to say that test of the AIM–21 program has apparently been quite successful. Furthermore, I am very grateful that the Army's leadership views the AIM–21 program as the cornerstone of sustainment readiness for the Heavy Empire force in the 21st century.
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This program not only aggressively addresses the required readiness needs of the armored forces but also focusses on an aspect of the defense industrial base which has proven to be a winner for all—a partnership between private industry and organic capabilities at the Anniston Army Depot.
General, I now have a few questions for you relating to the AIM–21 program. First, what is the current status of the AIM–21 for fleet sustainment? When does the Army look to initiate the program?
General COBURN. Mr. Riley, we have about $35 million in the program for 1998. The program is indeed a good program, has proved successful and, as you know, what we are trying to do is reduce our operation and support costs, which are about 60 to 70 percent of the life cycle cost of any weapon system.
We will go ahead and do about 50, somewhere around that number, this year. We are looking for dollars in 1999 and 2000. But overall, the program is, I think, on track. It is healthy. It is a good program and it is one the Army needs.
Mr. RILEY. And General, how is the partnering arrangement working at Anniston?
General COBURN. Working very, very well. Anniston has a number of partnering arrangements with industry but this particular one is with General Dynamics, works very well. Basically what happens is the folks down at Anniston, at depot, take the tank apart, redo the engine, redo the systems, redo the components. They ship that up to Lima, OH, where General Dynamics puts it all back together, puts the turret back on it. And it really is a good example of partnering with industry. There are other examples down there, as well. Anniston has about 12 partnerships, as a matter of fact, with industry, but that is a particularly good one.
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Mr. RILEY. Going back to what Mrs. Fowler said a moment ago, and I appreciate what you said about how you viewed the organic depots, in light of that, what do you see in the near future for these partnering arrangements at other organic depots?
General COBURN. Well, I think the solution, quite honestly, Mr. Riley, to our depot system is one, we have to size our depots to the requirement, to whatever the workload requirement is, and then we make them as efficient as we can. And there is just not enough workload for both industry and our depot system.
So we size our depots to the workload requirement and then we try to make them as efficient as we can by those partnering arrangements that you have just referred to; in other words, reduce excess capacity in any way we can, and that is what we have to do to get our rates down.
Mr. RILEY. Based on that, General, today you have five Army depots. Over the next 5 years, 10 years, how many do you propose to have 5 years down the road?
General COBURN. In 1995, during the BRAC process, during the station strategy discussion, we decided that we needed three depots. We need one depot for combat equipment—i.e., tanks, track vehicles. We need another depot for aviation. We need another depot for communications electronics.
So we need three, but that is about the minimum that we need. We don't need any less than that because any less than that, then you really start to get into a dilution of your organic capability and your core requirements.
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Mr. RILEY. Mr. Chairman, that is all I have.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Riley.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for being with us today and for your testimony. With this, I think we can excuse you and we will ask that you be available to respond to questions that we may submit for the record, in view of the inability of some of the members to get back. We thank you very much and appreciate your testimony.
[Whereupon, at 4:42 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
The official Committee record contains additional material here.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BATEMAN
MISSION CAPABLE RATES
Mr. BATEMAN. What are the primary reasons for the 8.0 percent decline in aircraft mission capable rates that occurred between fiscal years 1990 and 1997?
General GAMBLE. The decline in aircraft mission capable rates since FY91 has been driven by both maintenance problems and spare parts shortages. The Total Not Mission Capable Supply (TNMCS) rate has increased 5.5% since FY91 (8.6%) to first quarter FY98 (14.1%) as a result of increased parts shortages. The Not Mission Capable Maintenance (NMCM) rate has also increased 3.3% since FY91 (8.0%) to first quarter FY98 (11.3%) as a result of increased maintenance requirements.
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Spare parts shortages are driven by fleet age, contractor delinquencies, repair constraints, technical surprises, and excessive component repair part lead times. FY97 82% spare part funding compounded supply problems—especially in FY97/4. Maintenance requirements are driven primarily because of engine problems and aging aircraft. These include increasing aircraft structural inspection requirements, fuel leaks, landing gear system maintenance, structural corrosion, and engine risk mitigation inspections.
We expect MC rates to stabilize in FY98 and begin recovery based on improved FY98/99 spare part funding, Engine Life Management Planning, and streamlined supply chain management. The F–16 service life improvement program and increased KC–135 depot maintenance will correct known major structural and corrosion problems. Aging aircraft issues will continue to pose tough logistics challenges.
Mr. BATEMAN. What are the primary reasons for the 2.2 percent decline in aircraft mission capable rates that occurred during the first quarter of fiscal year 1998?
General GAMBLE. The decline in Mission Capable (MC) rates was caused by maintenance and supply problems. The Not Mission Capable for Maintenance (NMCM) rate increased from 10.8% to 11.3% while the Total Not Mission Capable for Supply (TNMCS) rate increased from 12.6% to 14.1%. Maintenance increases were driven by engine and aging aircraft problems such as increased risk mitigation inspections, fuel leaks and landing gear maintenance. Spare parts shortages were driven by contractor delinquencies, repair constraints, excessive component repair part lead times, technical surprises, and aircraft aging problems.
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While the overall first quarter fiscal year 1998 MC rate of 74.6% was lower than the overall fiscal year 1997 rate of 76.6%, the decrease was primarily driven by the October 1997 MC of 73.9%. Since October the overall MC rate has begun to stabilize at 74.6%. Improved Fiscal Year 1998 and 1999 spare part funding, streamlined supply chain management, and implementation of total engine life cycle management should continue to stabilize MC rates and begin recovery. Aging aircraft will continue to pose tough logistics support challenges.
The official Committee record contains additional material here.
Mr. BATEMAN. Has the reported substantial decline in aircraft mission capable rates been reflected in the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) reports that DOD uses to gauge the combat readiness of units? Specifically, has the number of Air Force flying units rated either marginally combat ready or not combat ready because of material readiness and supply problems increased since fiscal year 1990. If no, why not?
General GAMBLE. The Air Force has experienced a decline in overall mission capable (MC) rates in recent years. Present levels are still above our minimum operational requirements.
Mr. BATEMAN. Does the Air Force have similar problems with its spare aircraft engines and non-aircraft equipment? If so, please provide a brief overview of what these problems are and more detailed information for the record on the problems, their causes and the corrective action being taken.
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General GAMBLE. Over the past 15 months, the Air Force has experienced erosion to the overall engine non-mission capable for supply (ENMCS) rates and ware readiness engine (WRE) availability. (WRE is the computed requirement of spare engines to support the wartime flying hour program). Currently, 10 engines are rated unsatisfactory for ENMCS and/or WRE.
Improvements to forecasting, shop floor material control, ordering discipline, and training are underway. The allocation of Working Capital Fund cost authority based on sales will help improve current readiness levels.
Full recovery will require longer term improvements. These include implementation of Engine Life Management Plans (ELMPs), transferring best commercial practices to depot spare parts management, and moving from an on-condition maintenance (OCM) to a reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) philosophy that will restore a given level of reliability during each shop visit of an engine.
Mr. BATEMAN. Does the Air Force have procedures to ensure that key aircraft, such as these, are given priority over older and less capable aircraft and, if so, what are these procedures and why haven't they resulted in higher-than-average mission capable rates for these aircraft?
General GAMBLE. Air Force procedures ensure that priority is given to weapon systems based on operational requirements regardless of age. Some of our older aircraft fleets such as the C–5, F–15, and KC–135 fill critical operational requirements that cannot all be met by newer aircraft. It takes both the C–5 and the newer C–17 aircraft fleets to meet all of our airlift requirements. While the KC–135 fleet is over 35 years of age, we will continue to depend on these aircraft to meet our air refueling requirements. Even the F–15 air superiority fighter fleet is over 15 years old. While the F–22 is programmed to come in the active inventory as an air superiority fighter, the F–15 will still be required to meet all of our air superiority requirements well into the next century.
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Force Activity Designator (FAD) codes are used to establish spare parts requisition priorities based on operational requirements. The relative importance of a particular unit or program determines the FAD code assigned. To identify the importance of an individual requisition within a FAD code, an Urgency of Need Designator (UND) is used. For specific critical operations that warrant priority above all other units and programs, a Joint Chiefs of Staff project code may be assigned. Forces that are engaged in operations such as SOUTHERN WATCH or are forward based, such as USAFE and PACAF, usually do have higher-than-average Mission Capable (MC) rates. MC rates for all overseas based fighters averaged 83.3% for the first quarter of FY98 while fighters stationed in the United States averaged 76.2% during this same period. Overall, deployed MC rates are usually higher than United States based forces. Mission Capable rates for Air Combat command (ACC) F–16s, deployed to OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH, average 79.5% in the first quarter of FY98 against the ACC total F–16 average of 73.7% during the same period.
Mr. BATEMAN. What caused the large improvement in the B–1B's mission capable rate in fiscal year 1994 and large decline during the first quarter of fiscal year 1998?
General GAMBLE. The mission capable (MC) rate improvement in FY94 was caused by more parts being available and less downtime for maintenance. In fact, there were five years of almost steady increases (FY91 to FY96), with the B–1 fleet experiencing its highest MC rate in FY96 (68.6%). The MC rates for the B–1 decreased during FY97, dropping 6.1% from the FY96 level. Maintenance workload accounted for the majority of the MC rate decrease. The maintenance factors that contributed to the MC rate decline included an increase in equipment break rate (more failures), and manpower and resources were stretched thin to maintain an attrition reserve (AR) fleet (27 AR aircraft in FY97; currently only have 17 AR aircraft).
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The AF has a plan to stabilize the B–1 MC rates and begin recovery. The MC rate for the second quarter of FY98 was 57% (up 5.7% from the first quarter of FY98). The recovery plan includes programming for personnel and equipment to support the entire B–1 fleet (attrition reserve buyback).
Initial spares funding increased from $26.1M in FY97 to $104.1M in FY98. Long term weapon system reliability is projected to improve with engine modifications and the Conventional Mission Upgrade Program (CMUP), including the Defensive Systems Upgrade Program (DSUP).
Summary: The B–1 MC rate had steadily improved since 1991. However, this trend reversed in FY97 as a result of increased maintenance work and spare parts shortages. The recovery plan is based on a programmed increase of personnel and support equipment, increased spares funding, and improved aircraft systems reliability as modifications are completed on the engines and CMUP.
Mr. BATEMAN. Would these mission capable levels adversely affect your ability to accomplish any of your contingency missions and, if so, is this fact reflected in your Status of Resources and Training System reports? If not, why not?
General GAMBLE. No, current Mission Capable rates, while below where we would like them to be, are still sufficient for the Air Force to meet its operational requirements. This is reflected in our SORTS ratings.
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Mr. BATEMAN. What are the primary reasons for this steady increase in Total Not Mission Capable Supply Rates?
General HALLIN. Parts shortages have been driven by a variety of reasons to include fleet age, water intrusion (corrosion of flight control surfaces) results in longer than expected depot repair times. Additionally, AF Materiel Command has trouble finding vendors who still make the components for older systems such as the B–52 Electronic Counter Measure System.
Contractor delinquencies (failure to meet specifications or to deliver on time) caused 3 of the top 10 items driving F–16 spare part shortages (Feb 97–Aug 97).
Technical surprises, especially high performance engine reliability problems, drive spare engine shortfalls and the B–1, F–16, and F–15E fleets have experienced engine ''holes'' that have driven some engine cannibalizations.
Excessive component repair part lead times have resulted in depot repair line bottlenecks and caused 2 of the top 10 items driving C–130 spare parts shortages (Feb 97–Oct 97).
Finally, fiscal year 1997 82% spare parts funding compounded supply problems, especially in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1997.
We expect improved fiscal year 1998 and 1999 spare parts funding, implementation of Engine Life Management Planning, and streamlined supply chain management to stop the TNMCS rate increase and begin a recovery. However, aging aircraft will continue to pose tough logistics support challenges.
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Mr. BATEMAN. Do you have policies and procedures to ensure that usable parts are stripped off of aircraft that are no longer needed? If so, why hasn't the downsizing that has occurred since the end of the Cold War led to both reduced requirements for the increased availability of spare parts, and why haven't these two factors, in turn, led to improved supply support?
General HALLIN. The Air Force places a high priority on using available aircraft in supporting spare parts requirements of the remaining operational forces. This guidance was recently reinforced by a HQ USAF Integrated Process Team for Reclamation. Existing policies and procedures provide guidance for removing usable parts from aircraft that have been taken out of active service. Spare parts ''save'' lists are developed for each aircraft type for which there is an existing parts buy requirement. The ''save'' lists are then used by the Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center (AMARC) (the aircraft storage site at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona) to determine which parts to remove from the aircraft. Parts are only removed from aircraft that have been determined to be excess; however, to fill non-programmed urgent mission requirements, parts are also removed from those aircraft being held for possible recall to active service. Most aircraft stored at AMARC are held for spare parts removal, with the remainder being held for possible recall to active service or for support of security assistance programs.
Migration plans for the movement of aircraft through the reclamation process are developed by each system program manager and coordinated through the Air Staff on an annual basis. Funding for spare parts buys have been adjusted based on projected spares reclamation from approved migration plans—savings from reclamation for FY97 & 98 totaled $28 million. These savings were used to reduce major command spares costs.
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Some near-term improvements to supply support have been gained for specific weapon systems, such as the B–52 an C–141, through the use of AMARC parts. However, factors such as modifications, obsolescence, and unserviceability affect the usability of these parts. In addition, the population of available spare parts is limited.
Mr. BATEMAN. What action is the Air Force taking to improve supply support?
General HALLIN. Air Force spare parts shortages have largely been driven by fleet age, contractor delinquencies, repair constraints, technical surprises, and excessive component repair part lead times. Plus, prior year underfunding (FY97 funding was at 82% of requirements) and high OPSTEMPO further compounded supply problems. In short, the Air Force fleet is getting older and is being used more—failures are increasing particularly in engines. To improve supply support, the Air Force has implemented a comprehensive Engine Life Management Planning program to ensure the best maintainability and supportability practices are used to control costs and improve the health of engines. In addition, initiatives are also underway to streamlined supply chain management. These efforts together with funding levels which have been increased to 96% and 100% of requirements in FY 98/99 respectively will also contribute to improve supply support. While aging aircraft issues and high OPTEMPO will continue to pose tough logistics challenges, the Air Force is committed to putting the parts on the shelf so Major Command customers have the spares available to execute their flying hour programs.
Mr. BATEMAN. What was SMAG's total fiscal year 1997 funding shortfall for the buy and repair of spare parts?
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General HALLIN. In FY97 the Air Force Supply Management Activity Group (SMAG) funded the spares buy and repair requirement at 82 percent. Specifically, spares were funded at $2476M of a $3009M requirement for a difference of $533 million.
Mr. BATEMAN. What was SMAG's total total fiscal year 1998 funding shortfall for the buy and repair of spare parts?
General HALLIN. The Air Force Supply Management Activity Group's (SMAG) total fiscal year 1998 funding shortfall for the buy and repair of spare parts is $115 million, or 4% of the computed requirement. Conversely stated, the SMAG is 96% funded in FY98, a much better position than the FY97 funding of 82%. Based on the currently computed FY99 buy and repair requirement, FY99 pricing will provide enough obligation authority to make up the FY98 shortfall. Providing that the FY99 budget request is not reduced in any way, or the current requirement does not increase, the Air Force requested enough obligation authority in FY99 to fully meet the FY99 requirement plus unfunded carryover from FY98.
Mr. BATEMAN. Is this a typical situation? To what extent have requirements to buy and repair been fully funded over the past five years?
General HALLIN. Every effort is made to fully fund buy and repair requirements. However, requirements change twice a year, every time the requirements computation model is rerun with updated flying hour programs, failure rates and asset position. Requirements growth caused by increased failures, aging weapon systems or poor forecasting, results in the budgeted requirement being underfunded.
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FY94 was 93% funded; FY95 was 100% funded; FY96 was 90% funded; FY97 was 82% funded; FY98 is currently 96% funded.
Mr. BATEMAN. If SMAG's prices are based on the expected cost of providing goods to its customers, why doesn't SMAG have sufficient funds to fully finance its buy and repair requirements?
General HALLIN. SMAG prices are built budget lead-time away or two years ahead of the year of execution. Buy and repair requirements change twice a year or every time the requirements computation model is rerun with the updated flying hour program, failure rates, and asset position. At the time SMAG prices were built, the buy and repair requirement was fully financed. Since then, buy and repair requirements have increased due to a combination of factors such as aging weapon systems, increased failures, poor forecasting, and continued growth in scheduled and unscheduled engine removals. This increase in effect results in underfinancing of the buy and repair requirement, because pricing was built to cover a much lower buy and repair requirement.
Mr. BATEMAN. How does SMAG's inability to fully finance its buy and repair requirements affect its customers?
General HALLIN. While certainly underfunding of the prior year buy and repair requirement contributed to spares shortfalls, underfunding was only one of a combination of factors contributing to shortages. Other factors included the aging of the Air Force fleet, contractor delinquencies, organic repair constraints, technical surprises, excessive component repair part lead times and continued high OPSTEMPO. These factors taken together translate to fewer spare parts available for the Major Command (MAJCOM) customers to buy and use in the execution of the flying hour program. To improve MAJCOM support the Air Force is attacking the problems mentioned above in a variety of ways. First, funding levels have been increased to 96% and 100% of requirements in FY98/99 respectively. Next, initiatives to streamline supply chain management will help to alleviate depot production process problems. While aging aircraft issues and high OPSTETMPO will continue to drive increased consumption and pose tough logistics challenges, the Air Force is committed to putting parts ''on the shelf'' to improve spares availability.
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Mr. BATEMAN. Do SMAG customers have sufficient funds to buy the items they need? If not, why not?
General HALLIN. With the addition of the $300M received from Congress in the fiscal year 1998 Appropriations bill and the $209M requested in our Omnibus reprogramming request SMAG customers should have sufficient funding to buy the items they need to execute the flying hour program and help stabilize our Total Not Mission Capable Supply rates. As for FY99 flying hour costs they have increased beyond our projections. Increases were due principally to continuing growth in scheduled and unscheduled engine removals, increased sub-system failures, Time Change Technical Order weapon systems enhanced and parts coming out of warranty. At this time we are currently in the process of revalidating and plan to address any FY99 shortfall in our FY99 allocations after receipt of the FY99 budget.
Mr. BATEMAN. What action has been taken to ensure that the fiscal year 1999 budget will provide sufficient funds for both SMAG and its customers?
General HALLIN. Supply Management Activity Group (SMAG) FY99 funding is currently established at 100% of the anticipated requirement. For SMAG customers we are now in the process of revalidating FY99 flying hour costs and have found that costs have increased beyond our projections. These increases are due principally to continuing growth in scheduled and unscheduled engine removals, increased sub-system failures, Time Change Technical Order weapon system enhancements and parts coming out of warranty. At this time we are currently in the process of revalidating our plan and will address any FY 99 shortfall in our FY 99 allocations after receipt of the FY 99 budget.
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Mr. BATEMAN. The Air Force has indicated that funding shortfalls are contributing to the spares shortage problems. Does the Air Force SMAG need funding authority to (1) buy more parts and/or (2) finance the repair of serviceable items that are already in the inventory?
General HALLIN. Prior year funding shortfalls were one of several factors contributing to spares shortage problems. At this time, we do not anticipate needing additional Congressional funding to address flying hour shortfalls. In FY98, we did fund our flying hour cost estimates as well as in the FY99–03 program. And, at the direction of the Air Force Chief of Staff, all Major Commands (MAJCOMs) were tasked and did revalidate their FY98 and FY99 flying hour requirements to ensure that they were adequate to meet minimum readiness levels. If any funding is needed in FY98, it will be reflected in our FY98 Omnibus reprogramming submission. If additional funding is needed in FY99, the shortfall will be addressed in the execution year.
Mr. BATEMEN. How, when, and by whom were the savings and pipeline reduction goals developed (i.e., what was the basis for assuming that pipeline requirements could be reduced by about $950 million in just three years)?
General HALLIN. Lean Logistics (now known as Agile Logistics) process improvements are applied to reparable and consumable items managed in the Supply Management Activity Group (SMAG) of the Working Capital Fund (WCF) in order to reduce pipeline times. Spare parts inventory is required to support each day of pipeline it takes to return an asset to the user. Shorter pipeline days established by Agile Logistics process improvements result in a one-time reduction in inventory requirements. Reparable item dollar savings are based on depot repair cycle time (including Order and Ship Time) reduction from a baseline of 66 days in FY94 to 37 days in FY99, phased in over three years, FY97–99. Consumable item dollar savings are based on Order and Ship Time (O&ST) reductions from 43 days in FY94 to 11 days, phased in over the same three years. Dollar reductions were developed from requirements model runs and analysis provided to the Air Force by the Logistics Management Institute (LMI) for reparable items and the Air Force Logistics Management Agency (AFLMA) for consumable items. LMI simulated the Recoverable Item Requirements Computation (D041 system) model, with input of shorter transportation times, lower depot repair cycle days, and lower O&ST days, computing a new lower buy and repair requirement. AFLMA simulated reduced demands (one-time) generated by inventory made available due to reduced O&ST days. These inventory requirement reductions translate into lower costs to the WCF over the three year phase-in period.
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Mr. BATEMEN. Were the savings and pipeline reduction goals achieved during fiscal year 1997, and are you on track for achieving your fiscal year 1998 goals? If not, why not?
General HALLIN. Air Force analysis of achieved pipeline times between December 1995 and August 1997 on over 16,000 items and 2.4 million transactions shows that we are achieving a reparable intransit time of 8.2 days against a goal of 12 days. In addition, we are achieving an average Order and Ship Time (O&ST) of 9.5 days against a standard of 11 days. Simulation of the Recoverable Item Requirements Computation (D041 system) comparing the pipeline days used in the current computation with the baseline year (FY94) pipeline times yields an estimate of actual savings in FY97 of $423 million compared with our original estimate of $336 million.
More recent analysis of achieved pipeline times in FY98 shows a slight increase in O&ST. The percent of items achieving the O&ST standards has decreased from 68% to 65%. However, we are seeing an increase from 79% to 90% in the percent of items that are achieving the reparable intransit standards. Even though we are on track for reparable intransit times, we are investigating the cause for the slippage of O&ST and will continue to monitor achieved pipeline times throughout the year.
Mr. BATEMAN. What is the effect if the savings and/or pipeline reduction goals are not achieved?
General HALLIN. Spare parts inventory is required to support each day of pipeline. Savings were taken based on a conservative reduction in pipeline time using commercial fast transportation and improved maintenance processes to achieve the reduction. For most items, the actual pipeline times meet the Lean Logistics (now known as Agile Logistics) goals. If pipeline reduction goals are not achieved, the Air Force is not budgeted to buy or repair spare parts to support the longer pipeline, causing spares shortfalls at the unit level. Mission capability rates would decline and aircraft availability would decline based on these spares shortages.
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Mr. BATEMAN. Do you have detailed plans, down to the activity level, that show (1) what each activity's pipeline goal is and (2) what action each activity is taking or will take to achieve its goal—and are you monitoring each activity's progress in achieving its goal? If not, why not?
General HALLIN. (1) Yes, pipeline goals have been established, the Major Commands have been apprised, and they are taking appropriate actions to meet the goals. The goals are established for the complete Air Force logistics pipeline.
(2) Best business practices are analyzed and implemented wherever applicable. The Air Force is analyzing each pipeline segment to determine where improvements can be made. The Air Force has pipeline tracking systems in place which allow analysis of each pipeline segment.
Mr. BATEMAN. At any given time during normal peacetime operations, about one-third of the Marine Corps forces are forward deployed on operations, one-third of the force will have just returned and one-third will be preparing to go on deployment. The units who have just returned from deployment often see readiness ratings go down to C–3 or even C–4 because people are allowed to go to school, are transferred or they take leave.
During the period immediately after returning from deployment, there are very few people in the unit and therefore, few available to perform maintenance on the unit's equipment. Are the pieces of equipment that go unattended because of lack of people to maintain them subject to more wear and tear than if they were able to be maintained at a constant state?
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Generals DAKE/STEELE/STEWART. Although the Marine Corps overall trend remains high in our forward deployed, first-to-fight units, the readiness trough is getting wider and deeper for those units that have just returned from deployment. The units typically lose many personnel to schools, enlistment's expiring, and reassignment, and do not receive immediate replacement for all of their losses. Equipment returning from deployment is typically in poor readiness state due to usage rate during exercises/operations and the inability to conduct maintenance/corrosion checks while shipboard. Once the personnel are completely replaced (3–6 months prior to deployment), readiness will return to higher levels. Because there are fewer personnel in the units immediately following deployment, their equipment is subject to less wear and tear.
Mr. BATEMAN. Your statement points out the very high ground equipment readiness rates reported by the operational forces. It also points out that the equipment is old and requires a great deal of maintenance to maintain the high percent available for training. This additional maintenance eats into the funding for training and time available to the unit to train.
How much longer can the Corps continue to maintain the old equipment before the maintenance requires so much time and resources to make it cost ineffective?
Generals DAKE/STEELE/STEWART. MCO 4710.8G defines an economical repair as ''. . . one which is estimated to cost less than 65 percent of the current standard unit price/replacement cost of the item. Therefore, the Marine Corps will continue to repair items as long as the cost is less than 65 percent of the current standard unit price/replacement cost.
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Mr. BATEMAN. When a unit deploys to the field for 30 days of training, how many of those days will be devoted to maintenance of equipment?
Generals DAKE/STEELE/STEWART. The number of days devoted to maintenance depends on the unit itself and its mission. For example, a maintenance battalion would be conducting maintenance on organic or supported unit's equipment all day long, every day; whereas, an infantry battalion may conduct overall maintenance daily but to a much lesser degree. Also, operator maintenance is continuous, regardless of unit. This includes care, cleaning, and servicing of all end items.
Mr. BATEMAN. Which pieces of equipment are the hardest to maintain?
Generals DAKE/STEELE/STEWART. Typically, the more technically advanced weapon systems present a greater burden for maintenance.
Mr. BATEMAN. Has the number of systems awaiting depot level repair increased or decreased?
Generals DAKE/STEELE/STEWART. Systems awaiting depot-level repair is identified as our unfunded requirements. Per the budget submission, backlog is $117 million, $38 million, and $53 million in FY97, FY98 and FY99 respectively.
Mr. BATEMAN. What types of maintenance problems have the longest depot turn around time?
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Generals DAKE/STEELE/STEWART. Typically, parts availability and technical support cause the longest depot turn around time on weapon systems. This problem occurs on older weapon systems (e.g., Assault Amphibian Vehicles and M88 Tank Retriever).
Mr. BATEMAN. How long can you sustain the 12 to 16 hour days, 6 to 7 days a week effort required to maintain the old equipment before retention and other indicators of morale begin to slip?
Generals DAKE/STEELE/STEWART. It is uncertain as to how long Marines can sustain 12 to 16 hour days, 6 to 7 days a week before retention and other indicators of morale begin to slip, although current experience indicates that it has already caused morale to slip. These increased demands certainly influence those undecided on remaining in our Corps to be less inclined to do so.
Mr. BATEMAN. What is meant when I read that the Army is a Force Projection Army, how confident are you in the Army's force projection capability? How confident are you that you will be able to sustain support of your primary combat systems during buildup and execution of combat operations?
General BURNETTE. America's Army today is a force projection Army capable of responding rapidly to threats against the national interest anywhere in the world. Our force projection Army provides national leaders the option of responding to crises with tailored infantry, armored, airborne, air assault, and special operations forces. In partnership with the Air Force and Navy, the Army, based largely in the United States, can strategically project a ground combat force capable of operating across the full spectrum of conflict.
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I am extremely confident in the Army's force projection capability. Since Operation Desert Storm, the Department of Defense has invested in force projected platforms and enablers that make this capability a reality. For example, the U.S. Navy has currently delivered five of the 19 planned Large Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ships, each capable of carrying close to a heavy brigade combat team, and continues to deliver a new construction LMSR about every three months. Department of Defense (DOD) also has in its possession eight Fast Sealift Ships and 31 smaller Roll-on/Roll-off ships capable of rapidly deploying Army ground combat power.
The DOD airlift program is well underway as a result of the November 1995 decision to procure 120 C–17 Globemaster III aircraft. Thirty-eight new C–17s have been delivered. As you know, this acquisition program is destined to replace the aging C–141 fleet as the core airlifter in the 21st Century. The C–17 supports a broad spectrum of military requirements ranging from major theater wars (MTWs) to smaller scale contingencies (SSCs) as well as peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance operations. The C–17 was specifically designed to provide strategic direct delivery of key Army warfighting weapon systems and cargo. In September 1997, 500 paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne Division, airdropped into Kazakhstan which was almost 8,000 miles from their base at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In Central Asia, these soldiers joined 40 members of the Central Asian Battalion, made up of forces from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, to begin a six-day training exercise to prepare for future peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. This was the longest airborne expedition in history.
Another critical piece to support rapid force projection is the Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) program, formally known as the Army War Reserve (AWR) program. These prepositioned sets and sustainment stocks enable Army forces to quickly deploy by air and to fall-in on combat capable equipment. Under this program, the Army has unit prepositioned sets of equipment and sustainment stocks in locations around the world. Our prepositioned equipment sets also contribute substantively to forward engagement with our allies in vital regions of the world. By this traditional role of forward engagement, the Army demonstrates U.S. commitment to its allies and maintains peace with its forces, ready on 18 hours notification, to begin the deployment of heavy or light brigade forces.
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Since Operation Desert Storm the Army has placed close to a million square feet of unit equipment and sustainment stocks afloat. The Army's current APS–3 afloat set of equipment consists of a 2×2 brigade set (two armored battalions and two mechanized battalions) comprised of 123 M1 Abrams tanks and 116 M2 Bradley fighting vehicles; Corps and Theater base sets of combat service support equipment; a port opening set of equipment loaded on a Heavy Lift Prepositioned ship and a T–Class Auxiliary Crane ship; 30 days of essential sustainment stocks on two container ships, and three combat loads of ammunition for a Corps-sized unit located on three ''Lighter Aboard Ship'' (LASH) ships.
The Army has invested in other enablers for Force Projection to include rail cars, unit deployment containers, and Continental United States (CONUS) infrastructure enhancements. The goal is to have world-class power projection platforms from which to project forces and to meet established deployment closure timelines. To date, the Army has procured and positioned 911 (84%) of the 68 and 89-foot rail cars to meet heavy lift unit deployment requirements. The remaining rail cars will be procured by Fiscal Year 2000 (FY00). The Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) has acquired over 2,500 intermodal and unique containers to support early entry units maintaining a ''combat configured/combat ready'' status. Container buys for early Division Ready Brigades (DRB) and their supporting units will continue through FY03. Essential to the Army's ability to project forces rapidly and in an efficient manner are the enhancements at key installations, airfields, seaports, and ammunition depots/plants. Infrastructure improvements have been ongoing since FY94. To date, all projects at Fort Stewart and Port Hadlock (one of two West Coast containerized ammunition ports), have been completed. Other major projects are in progress.
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Sea Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises (SEDREs), real-world deployments such as INTRINSIC ACTION, and other Combat Training Center (CTC) deployment training are ongoing and ensure that the Army's Contingency Force Package units remain fully capable to sustain force projection capabilities and meet deployment standards. Annual SEDREs rotate between three Divisions, lst Cavalry Division, 3d Infantry Division, and the 101st Air Assault Division; and prepositioned equipment exercises enhance the units' ability to execute their Mission Essential Tasks. Additionally, the Military Traffic Management Command has established Deployment Support Brigade teams to provide hands-on training with units to ensure timely and efficient throughput capability at the sea ports of embarkation. Between FY94 and FY97, the U.S. Transportation School trained over 7,000 Unit Movement Officers and deployment planning personnel, resulting in a cadre of personnel trained to support the ''train the trainer'' program.
The Army has invested in deployment automation to assist the Army's command and control of unit equipment moving from the fort, through the ports of embarkation, and into the tactical assembly areas. In view of this, the Army continues to field automation systems to support efficient movement control and in-transit visibility from the ''fort through the port to the foxhole.'' These systems are designed to feed transportation movement data into the Global Transportation Network (GTN) providing real time visibility to commanders on units and equipment. Automation enhancements provide the theater commander end-to-end command and control, thus improving asset visibility as well as facilitating rapid loading for aircraft and ships.
With regard to sustainment support, The Army's APS–3 afloat set provides the necessary sustainment support for our primary combat systems during the buildup phase of combat operations for a Major Theater War. In southwest Asia, the sustainment support aboard the APS–3 ships can be delivered into the theater within a matter of days. With the additional delivery of combat support and combat service support equipment using a combination of C–17 and C–5 aircraft Fast Sealift Ships, LMSRs, commercial, and Roll-on/Roll-off (RO/RO) ships; I am confident that adequate sustainment support will be available to support a Major Theater War for the execution of decisive combat operations.
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Mr. BATEMAN. What is the Army's out sourcing strategy? What is your method of determining if the strategy is being successful? Have you identified, as a result of your outsourcing strategy, any recognizable improvements in your ability to provide maintenance and/or parts for the support of Army systems?
General COBURN. Generally speaking, success of competitive sourcing strategies is measured in terms of savings and is captured and reported in accordance with the OMB Circular A–76 process. The overall purpose of competitive sourcing is to make the Army's commercial activities as efficient as possible. Cost-competition analyses essentially make the ''Most Competitive Provider'' the benchmark for efficiency. This can be either a private provider or a government activity designed as a ''Most Efficient Organization'' during the cost competition process. We are currently considering several competitive sourcing strategies that may over time improve maintenance or parts support of Army weapon systems.
Mr. BATEMAN. Desert Storm was a huge success but it, like Viet Nam, created an iron mountain of parts that never made it to the people who ordered them. How do you plan to avoid that problem in the future?
General COBURN. We remain committed to doing what is best for the Army and are striving to adopt best business practices where feasible. Two of the major factors leading to the iron mountain were the user's lack of faith in the supply system and the log jam at the ports. The Army is tackling this head on. In 1995, in conjunction with RAND Corporation, we began an initiative, Velocity Management, which is reshaping our logistics processes. We have developed methods to streamline our order-ship time and have cut it in half. In conjunction with the Defense Logistics Agency we have provided visibility of intransit items to users through the use of radio frequency (RF) tags and automated manifest system (AMS) cards. Army Total Asset Visibility (ATAV) allows the customer to see exactly where his part is in the pipeline, which will cut down on the practice of requisitioning another one ''just in case the first one got lost.'' Logisticians—supply and maintenance personnel and Army, Navy and Air Force transporters—will use the RF tags and AMS cards to prioritize and route cargo. This will greatly speed up the process and allow for near real-time visibility and rapid movement of critical weapons systems' parts to the user through all nodes of the supply and transportation pipeline.
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Mr. BATEMAN. The Army has undertaken initiatives to reduce the cost of spares. How much of the problem stems from improper diagnosis of mechanical problems so that the right part can be replaced. What is the Army doing to provide modern diagnostic equipment for the troops?
General COBURN. The Army is pursuing initiatives to both reduce the cost of spare parts and to modernize diagnostic capabilities. The U.S. Army Materiel Command is currently investing in the redesign of 44 selected high-cost spares to reduce life cycle operating costs. These initiatives are designed to reduce manufacturing or repair costs, increase reliability, and optimize the financial benefit of repair versus replace decisions. In addition, Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE), such as the Soldier's Portable On-System Repair Tool (SPORT), and the Base Shop Test Facility are already fully funded under the Integrated Family of Test Equipment (IFTE) program. The Electronic Repair Shelter is also fully funded minus its Test Program Set (TPS) which is carried as an unfunded requirement. This initiative and others like it will enable soldiers to properly isolate faults and diagnose the problem. As a result, soldiers will be better equipped to order the correct part the first time around. The Army continues to identify opportunities to leverage emerging technology and transition to on-board diagnostics and prognostics. These endeavors are being addressed as part of the ongoing budget process.
NAVY'S CANNIBALIZATION POLICY
Mr. BATEMAN. We recently learned that the amount of cannibalizing by units has been on the increase. While aboard a carrier we were told that some aircraft become the ''parts bin'' for maintenance and that it is not uncommon to have 40 to 60 parts taken off an aircraft to fix other aircraft before it is finally fixed again so that the aircraft can fly.
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What is the Navy policy on cannibalization of parts from an aircraft to fix another?
Admiral ELLIS/HANCOCK. The Navy's policy is that cannibalization is an acceptable alternative management tool for maintenance managers to utilize in the maintenance/repair of aircraft.
Mr. BATEMAN. Is there any control put on limiting this practice?
Admiral ELLIS/HANCOCK. Strong emphasis is placed on controlling cannibalization at all levels of maintenance and the use of the cannibalization alternative must be applied sparingly considering the long-term impacts over the short term gains of cannibalizing one aircraft to fix another.
Mr. BATEMAN. How is it decided when an aircraft has been down long enough and you begin to fix all the problems that this policy of cannibalizing creates?
Admiral HANCOCK/ELLIS. To the maximum extent possible, we make every effort to ensure that no aircraft are down for more than 30 days.
Mr. BATEMAN. Does the Navy keep track of the extra man-hours required by the process of cannibalizing?
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Admiral HANCOCK/ELLIS. The man-hours are collected and tracked for each cannibalization action.
Mr. BATEMAN. Does the Navy have any statistics on how many parts are broken in the process of cannibalizing aircraft?
Admiral HANCOCK/ELLIS. Statistics are not collected on maintenance-induced failures based just on cannibalization actions.
Mr. BATEMAN. What is the policy about carriers deploying with regard to their ''C'' rating status? Has the policy changed?
Admiral HANCOCK/ELLIS. The Navy policy regarding ''C'' ratings for deployed forces is contained in the classified Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) Document. If necessary, this information can be provided separately via classified correspondence.
While deploying forces typically achieve combat readiness status prior to deployment, on rare occasions some units deploy at a lower state of readiness. When this occurs, these units are provided the necessary resources and time to achieve the Navy's policy of being combat ready, in all resources and training areas, prior to their arrival in theater.
Mr. BATEMAN. If you accept a rating of C–2 (this means that 20% of the aircraft could be non operational) in your aircraft when you deploy, what is the possibility of getting fixed and ready to fly while enroute to their mission area?
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Admiral HANCOCK/ELLIS. The material condition of our aircraft is an important indicator of near-term readiness and that is why we pay close attention to aircraft mission capable (MC) rates. The Department's goal for deployed MC is 78% and anytime it is not attained, it warrants our attention. The goal is 78% because our aircraft must undergo various maintenance and inspections to ensure optimum performance and safety is maintained. While it may be possible to have 22% of a Carrier Airwing's aircraft non operational upon commencing deployment, it is extremely unlikely. Deploying aircraft in the best possible material condition is a fundamental element of ensuring deployed readiness remains at a high level.
Although the probability of repairing non operational aircraft prior to arriving in a mission area would be dependent entirely upon the extent of the repairs, a Carrier's repair capability is very extensive and repair time is generally of short duration. Therefore, as long the repairs were routine by nature, I would be optimistic that the probability of greeting aircraft fixed and ready to fly while enroute to their mission area is high.
Mr. BATEMAN. How can the pilots maintain proficiency if the aircraft are non-mission capable?
Admiral HANCOCK/ELLIS. By maintaining a deployed mission capable (MC) rate of 78% or greater, we are able to ensure sufficient quantities of aircraft are available to perform the necessary training required to maintain pilot proficiency.
Mr. BATEMAN. We spend a great deal of money to buy expensive aircraft and yet the CNO's deployed mission capable rates and full mission capable rates are only 78% and 61% respectively. The Navy (CNO's) goals for MC and FMC while non-deployed are 68% and 51% respectively. Navy MC and FMC rates have shown a steady decline since the early nineties. Will this trend continue? When will it turn around? What is required to get the MC and FMC rates trend up rather then the continued down turn recent years.
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Admiral HANCOCK/ELLIS. The material condition of our aircraft is an important indicator of near-term readiness and that is why we pay close attention to aircraft mission capable (MC) rates. The Department's MC and FMC goals were established to ensure sufficient quantities of aircraft are available to meet training and operational commitments. The goals are set at levels which allow our aircraft to undergo required maintenance and safety inspections.
With the plus-up received from Congress in addition to the funds we have added to our readiness accounts for FY99–03, our maintainers will have the necessary funds to order parts and perform the maintenance required to help improve the material condition of our aircraft. We have already observed improvement in aircraft Mission Capable (MC) and Full Mission Capable (FMC) rates and we are optimistic these trends will continue.
ARMY MISSION CAPABILITY RATES
Mr. BATEMAN. The Army seems to be able to maintain MC rates of their aircraft above the 90 percentile (see Army MC chart attached to Army questions). Have you discussed with them how they do their maintenance, their depot work, their parts distribution?
Admiral HANCOCK/ELLIS. We regularly discuss these, and other depot maintenance issues, with the Army.
Mr. BATEMAN. Do you think it would be useful to share ideas?
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Admiral HANCOCK/ELLIS. The sharing of ideas is very useful and we do so regularly, including at our Air Logistics Board, which is a sub-component of the Joint Aeronautical Commanders Group.
REPAIR PARTS
Mr. BATEMAN. It has been reported to the committee that the supply personnel can see parts that are available in the system but are not able to order the part because of lack of funds. This requires the maintenance personnel to cannibalize parts or carry the aircraft down. This is especially prominent in the latter parts of the year. Do you have sufficient funds to buy parts?
Admiral HANCOCK/ELLIS. In FY 1997 and Navy and Marine Corps experienced a much publicized shortfall in the flying hour program. One of the impacts of this problem was the lack of funding to purchase sufficient aviation parts and material to perform required maintenance. In response to this emergent problem, the Congress added $322 million to the Department's Flying Hour budget request in FY 1998. This increase was applied to finance the higher flying hour costs recently experienced and was incorporated into the FY 1999 and out budget estimates. Based upon execution feedback from the Fleets so far this year, there is sufficient funding to support aviation parts requirements. This assumes that the higher pace of contingency operations being conducted in Southwest Asia is financed via the Supplemental Budget request. If forced to absorb these costs from their existing resources the Fleets would again be likely to defer some parts purchases.
Mr. BATEMAN. How do you set priorities for parts purchase and distribution?
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Admiral HANCOCK/ELLIS. Priorities for material purchase typically fall into the following categories, from highest to lowest priority:
Critical maintenance related backorders * * * Not Mission Capable Supply (NMCS), Partially Mission Capable Supply (PMCS), Casualty Report (CASREP), industrial work stoppages.
Less critical maintenance related backorders.
Stock replenishment of high volume/critical material to preclude a backorder.
Routine stock replenishment.
The reference to distribution priority in the Committee's question is interpreted as how the supply system determines the priority used to release material to more than one customer. Priorities for the distribution of assets are outlined in DOD 4000.25M and generally consider two factors. The first factor is urgency of need, which follows the same general scheme used to prioritize purchases. The primary levels of urgency of need are described below and ranked from highest to lowest priority:
Required for immediate use and without which the force is unable to perform its assigned operational mission.
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Required for immediate use and without which the capability of the force its assigned operational mission is impaired.
Routine stock replenishment or in support of scheduled repair.
The second factor in determining distribution priority considers the relative importance of the requisitioning activity's mission. For example, if two different forces (Deployed and non-deployed) have a part requirement with the same urgency of need, a requirement to fix the deployed aircraft will take precedence over the non-deployed aircraft. The combination of urgency of need and activity mission is identified to a priority designator that is part of the information provided to the supply system as part of the requisition.
Mr. BATEMAN. Is there ever a time when you would decide not to buy a part to fix a broken aircraft?
Admiral HANCOCK/ELLIS. Yes, there are a variety of circumstances when a part would not be bought to fix a broken aircraft:
Broken part can be fixed locally (Organizational repair or intermediate repair capability-level).
Sufficient parts in locally held inventory.
The exigency of the mission were such that the broken aircraft was needed immediately, and the most expedient solution was to take the part from another aircraft that was hard-down (cannibalization action authorized).
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An aircraft is damaged beyond repair and permission is granted to get as many parts from the broken plane to satisfy other requirement * * * cost effective reutilization.
An aircraft is taken out of the inventory and does not need to be restored to Fully Mission Capable status before inactivation * * * inactivated with parts broken.
Cannibalization or repair when no parts are immediately available in the supply system or commercially.
CANNIBALIZATION
Mr. BATEMAN. I hear a great deal of anecdotal evidence about cannibalization, especially with aviation resources. If we haven't asked for your cannibalization figures, I would like for each of the services to provide us with what you have so that we can either confirm or deny the degree of cannibalization which allegedly is taking place.
General BURNETTE. The Army makes a distinction between equipment cannibalization and controlled exchange. Cannibalization is the removal of serviceable components from equipment chosen for disposal. Controlled exchange is the removal of serviceable components from unserviceable but economically repairable equipment. The controlled exchange action must restore the gaining piece of equipment to a mission capable condition, and must not degrade the donor piece of equipment condition beyond established expenditure limits. Cannibalization and controlled exchange supplement supply operations. Army policy authorizes controlled exchange when a non-mission capable for supply condition exists and the supply system cannot respond and there is an operational readiness requirement. Army policy does not authorize controlled exchange solely to enhance reported readiness rates. Cannibalization is documented when equipment is processed for disposal. The Army recorded 8272 cannibalization actions from calendar year 1995 to the present. Aviation controlled exchange activity is recorded in the Commander comments on the reverse side of the unit's monthly Army Aircraft Inventory, Status, and Flying Time Report. Controlled exchange actions are extracted manually from the report by the Army Material Command. The number of aviation controlled exchange activities during 1994 through 1996 for the following four aviation systems:
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Admiral ELLIS. A review of cannibalization data from 1980 through November 1997 indicates cannibalizations are declining overall per 100 flight hours (FH). However, in FY97 the cannibalizations rate increased from 8.4 Canns/100 FH in FY96 to 9.1 Canns/100 FH in FY97. This increase was attributed to the Navy's underpricing of the Flying Hour Program.
By underestimating the cost and demand of aviation depot repairables (AVDLRS), our Sailors were not provided sufficient Operations and Maintenance, Navy (OM,N) to order the necessary parts required to conduct all their maintenance. In an attempt to optimize aircraft material condition within this fiscally constrained environment, our maintainers performed more cannibalizations/100 FH in FY97 than they had in recent years.
The FY98 Congressional plus-up, in addition to the funds we have added to our readiness accounts for FY99–03, will provide our maintainers the necessary funds to order parts, limit cannibalizations, and help improve the material condition of our aircraft.
Mr. BATEMAN. I hear a great deal of anecdotal evidence about cannibalization, especially with aviation resources. If we haven't asked for your cannibalization figures, I would like for each of the services to provide us with what you have so that we can either confirm or deny the degree of cannibalization which allegedly is taking place.
General GAMBLE. Yes, sir, we would be happy to provide that.
The official Committee record contains additional material here.
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ORGANIC DEPOT FUNCTIONS
Mr. BATEMAN. ''At what percent of requirements are you funding air frame depot maintenance, engine depot maintenance and depot level replacement?''
General HALLIN. ''Active Air Force Depot Purchased Equipment Maintenance (DPEM) for FY99 in the FY99 PB is funded at 83% of total requirement. Within the total DPEM program, aircraft depot maintenance is funded at 90% of total requirement and engines are funded at 79% of total requirement. Depot Level Repairables (DLRs) are funded at 100% of total requirement.''
Mr. BATEMAN. ''Then the other question is in your opinion, and this is for each of you to answer, would the divestiture of organic depot functions from your service have positive or negative consequences on readiness? Since we have an official in DOD who has said that we are moving towards socialism with our industrial base and the Department of Defense, I would be interested in your views on that.''
General HALLIN. ''I believe the total divestiture of organic depots would have an adverse impact on readiness. The organic depots provide a capability to respond quickly to the service's materiel needs. The organic facilities provide each service insight into the systemic problems of the hardware/software supported and allow better understanding of future engineering needs. The depots provide a form of competition that serves as a check and balance for cost control. As the Air Force fleet ages, the depots often serve as a last source of repair. However, in the long term our organic depots must be efficient and provide a service to the war fighting commands. Therefore, we must make sound business decisions on this valuable infrastructure. We should divest excess capacity either by partnering with industry for selected workloads, leasing facilities where possible, or taking appropriate actions to reduce the overhead costs associated with the organic depots. In my view, it's not a cut and dried issue of retain or divest, but one of supporting the needs of the war fighters by optimizing the use of both organic facilities and the defense industrial base.''
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Mr. BATEMAN. Gen. Hallin, I am not sure that you are the appropriate person in the Air Force to address this question, but it relates to maintenance of your aircraft.
Some two or more years ago, I got into the budget a sum of $6 or 8 million to be used for a demonstration of the technology involved in robotic inspection of air frames. This was in the context of information that there is a technology, if applied throughout military aviation, had a potential of saving hundreds of millions of dollars a year because instead of stripping paint off and going through all of that process, you would robotically inspect the plane with radiography, thermography and other techniques that are, I'm told by NASA who developed the capability, ready to be demonstrated.
My latest information is that of that sum of money, $3 million was used to fund a contract between Wright Patterson and the University of Dayton to explore new and different and other technologies instead of demonstrating a technology that is there and for which the appropriation was intended.
Are you familiar with any of this? And if you are not, would you get familiar with it?
General HALLIN. I will take that one for the record but I certainly agree with you in terms of the capability that we need, * * *
The FY96 Defense Authorization Conference Report included language for a competitive program to demonstrate the feasibility of non-contact robotic aircraft inspection for the detection of hidden corrosion and metal fatigue. However no funding was appropriated for this demonstration. To comply with the intent of the conference report, in March 1997, the Air Force initiated an effort using $3 million in existing Science & Technology funding to conduct technology experiments for a non-contact Robotic Aircraft Inspection System program.
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The Air Force is optimizing existing, state-of-the-art technologies that survived a rigorous initial evaluation by the prime contractor, the University of Dayton Research Institute. To date, no existing corrosion detection technologies have been validated to reliably and quantitatively detect hidden corrosion in complex aircraft structures without excessive false readings. Selected technologies must be validated prior to major expenditures on unique robotic systems that may be affected by the methods eventually chosen. This validation process requires that actual representative or corrosion-suspect aircraft structure be assessed and then carefully disassembled for detailed measurements of the actual corrosion present. The Air Force sponsored program currently underway will be assisting NASA Langley Research Center extensively in developing this crucial information.
In parallel with the detection technology assessment, the Air Force's prime contractor has been evaluating potential candidates for eventual automation of the process. In addition, the prime contractor will be evaluating the use of the Air Force's large aircraft robotic system which is in final acceptance stages at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center. We are not ready for a significant capital expenditure on robotics technology demonstration until there is validation of the technologies to be demonstrated. In addition, no automation cost estimates can be made until reliable detection methods are validated.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ
MISSION CAPABLE RATES
Mr. ORTIZ. Last week one of the Combatant CINCs testified that while we are ready with our first-to-fight forces, there is a lot of uncertainty about how deep that readiness is and how long we can sustain it. How deep is our readiness and how long can we sustain it?
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General GAMBLE. The Air Force is ready to carry out the missions assigned to it by the National Command Authorities. Whether that mission is a No Fly Zone, disaster relief, the evacuation of American citizens from a troubled region or fighting 2 MTWs; we can sustain that effort. However, there is some risk. The Air Force is operating with very little margin for the unexpected. As has been noted with Mission Capable Rates, and unexpected development could have a significant impact.
Admiral HANCOCK/ELLIS. Our first-to-fight (deployed) force readiness is high, but because of our cyclical readiness posture, we expect non-deployed readiness to be at a lower level of readiness. This is a direct result of units entering the Inter Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC), where ships and aircraft undergo maintenance and warfighting skills and proficiencies migrate to a basic level due to crew turnover and a lack of opportunity to train while in maintenance periods.
Recently, we have observed that the readiness of our non-deployed units, during the IDTC, has fallen to a lower level and that the recovery to a full combat readiness state is steeper and occurs later in the cycle. We are watching this closely. With the support of Congress, have added nearly $3B to our readiness accounts for the period FY98–03.
Additionally, as part of the Chairman's joint readiness review system, we routinely assess our ability to surge our forces in support of a dual Major Theater War (MTW) and although some challenges will need to be overcome, the Navy has sufficient depth to meet and sustain our forces that would deploy if asked by National Command Authorities in a crisis.
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General BURNETTE. The Army maintains its major combat units at the highest levels of readiness, and the rest if its units at levels commensurate with their assigned warfighting priorities. During a period of diminishing resources, the Army must constantly adjust training, equipment and personnel strengths to ensure that units maintain the proper state of readiness.
Thus, some units within the Total Army are resourced at higher levels than others. This is also dictated by strategic transportation limitations, which allows the immediate deployment of only a portion of the Total Army. This limitation gives the Army leadership time to augment the less resourced units with additional personnel and equipment, conduct additional training, and in general upgrade readiness while awaiting deployment. This allows for the most efficient use of taxpayer dollars.
Additionally, there is a readiness bill associated with all smaller scale contingency deployments. When we deploy an Army unit to a potentially hostile environment where its performance could dramatically affect national policy and prestige, that unit is provided all of the training, personnel, and equipment resources needed to maximize its chances of success. It is brought to the highest standard of readiness which time and resources allow. The bill payers are the non-deploying units. This readiness bill is the price we pay for accomplishing our nation's policy of shaping the international security environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests. Individual augmentation of other operations by key leaders and unique Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) does impact on unit readiness. When leaders are not there, unit focus suffers.
However, funding is extremely tight. Contingency Operations shortfalls in Operation, Maintenance Army (OMA) will be paid from Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Readiness accounts if supplemental funding is not provided. The use of these funds degrades readiness because resources budgeted for training and maintenance are diverted to pay Contingency Operations (CONOPS) bills. The Military Pay Account (MPA) shortfall will require reprogramming from another appropriation, most likely Research, Development and Acquisition (RDA) if a supplemental is not received. We have submitted these requirements to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and are counting on them to pay this CONOPS bill.
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Lastly, we are still being required to pay for infrastructure that is excess to our needs. Closing or realigning those excess facilities would free up funds for readiness and modernization.
Generals STEELE/STEWART. If properly resourced, and barring major contingencies which cannot be met by our normal forward deployed first-to-fight forces, the Marine Corps can continue to maintain the current minimum level of acceptable readiness for the foreseeable future.
Generally, Marine Corps readiness is high in our forward deployed forces, while those just returned from deployment are resourced at lower levels. This is normal and expected for Marine units in our time-tested rotational unit deployment cycles. After units return from deployment, personnel transfer and enlistments begin to expire. Maintenance resource and repair priorities are given to those units preparing to deploy. As a unit gets to within three to six months of a deployment its across the board priorities are raised, new personnel arrive and equipment maintenance and repair priorities are increases. This ensures that units will train and then deploy with fully trained personnel and combat-ready equipment status.
However, to sustain our forward deployed, ''first-to-fight'' units at high readiness, units at home base who have just returned from deployment are experiencing longer, and in some cases deeper, troughs of degraded readiness. Aging equipment is our primary readiness concern. Aging equipment means increased maintenance time, effort, and expenses. Spare parts costs are continuing to increase. This growth impacts our operations and maintenance (O&M) funding by slowly eating into the funds which sustain and train forces. While the Marine Corps maintains current readiness first, even to the detriment of quality of life, maintenance of real property, and modernization, we endanger our long term readiness by taking from these accounts.
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Mr. ORTIZ. How have the services' Fiscal Year 1998 plans for training, real property maintenance, purchase of spare parts, base operations, and quality-of-life programs been changed or reduced because funds were diverted to contingency operations such as Bosnia and Iraq?
General GAMBLE. The current ongoing deployments to Bosnia and the Persian Gulf have not inhibited our overall ability to support the National Military Strategy of the United States. Those units remaining stateside are still capable of successfully performing their assigned missions. However, without timely passage of the Supplemental request, these units will experience impacts in a wide range of areas, including required proficiency training and base support activities. Funding to support direct readiness requirements, including spare parts, remains a top priority at all levels of the Air Force. If the Supplemental request is not approved in a timely fashion, the Air Force will be required to offset it internally, with resultant impacts on non-deployed units. Specifically, we will be forced to defer programmed depot maintenance, terminate non-contingency aircrew training, postpone quality of life initiatives, terminate various real property maintenance contracts, and begin civilian furlough actions. The impacts of such actions would include grounding of aircraft through the end of the fiscal year, deferral of programmed aircraft modifications, a rapid decline in proficiency and readiness, loss of special combat capabilities, increased risks to health and safety, and a reduction in quality of life across the board.
Admiral HANCOCK/ELLIS. To date the Navy has not changed its planned execution of training, real property maintenance, spare parts, base operations, or quality-of-life programs to finance ongoing operations in Bosnia and Southwest Asia. These costs have been covered from funds provided from the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund and from air and ship operations funds planned for the fourth quarter. The latter must be reimbursed by the Emergency Supplemental request or the Navy will likely have to reprogram funds from ship depot maintenance in order to continue fleet operations through the end of the fiscal year.
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General BURNETTE. In executing the National Military Strategy, the ''shaping'' and ''preparing'' pillars are funded in the President's budget, but actual operations, such as Bosnia and Southwest Asia are not funded in advance. The Army must cover unprogrammed Contingency Operations (CONOPS) costs using currently appropriated funds. If the contingency occurs early in the fiscal year, funds are ''borrowed'' from the 4th quarter (and if necessary, the 3rd quarter) to fund the operation. The Army ''bets'' that supplemental funding sources will provide the additional necessary funds to cover the shortfall. Earlier this year the Army received funds from the Overseas Contingency Transfer Fund. As a result of these transfer funds the impacts have been minor to this point. We will exhaust those transfer funds in April. If the Army is denied supplemental funding now under consideration or is required to provide offsets, that would mean the Army would absorb costs of CONOPs for the remainder of the fiscal year from Operations and Maintenance accounts. This places Army readiness at unacceptable risk. The consequences include slippage of our warfighting divisions to T–3 Readiness levels, maintenance of combat vehicles at less than Fully Mission Capable status, and elimination of all collective training above platoon level to include possible cancellation/reduction of Combat Training Center rotations. It additionally means the draw-down of Authorized Stockage Levels (ASL) and Prescribed Load List (PLL) repair parts (not replacing repair parts used), limiting facility maintenance to emergency only efforts, and limiting depot maintenance repair to fixing only high priority combat systems.
Generals STEELE/STEWART. If the contingency and storm damage amounts requested by the emergency supplemental bill are not restored, the following represent some of the projected impacts on the Marine Corps as the $42.7M cost is absorbed:
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Delays in equipment maintenance and refurbishment.
Cancellation of 2 of 10 of this fiscal year's Combined Arms Exercises (CAXs), the major training evolution within the Marine Corps.
A 23% reduction in MEU(SOC) training.
Cancellation of F/A–18 hangar repairs at Miramar Marine Air Station in California due to ''El Nino'' storm damage.
Cessation of bridge repairs at Camp Pendleton, California due to ''El Nino'' storm damage.
4 storm damaged messhalls at Camp Pendleton will remain closed due to ''El Nino'' storm damage.
Mr. ORTIZ. Where in the service's budgets is the billion dollars in spares that was added this year? How much did each of you get? What budget line is it in?
General BURNETTE. The Army did not receive an FY98 plus up for spares.
General GAMBLE. The FY99 budget submission continues to focus on near-term readiness by increasing funding for spares by $309M. Funding for spares is contained within the Air Operating Forces portion of the budget. Specific line items include Primary Combat Forces, Aircraft Operations, Air Operations Training and Combat Communications.
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Admiral HANCOCK/ELLIS. The Navy received an additional $322 million in the Flying Hour program to cover increased costs for Aviation Depot Level Repairable spares. These funds were added to Mission and Other Flight Operations ($207.9 million in subactivity group 1A1A) and Fleet Air Training ($114.1 million in subactivity group 1A2A).
Generals STEELE/STEWART. The Marine Corps did not add funding for spares in FY99. We did, however, realign a net increase to O&M of $42.6M in the following areas. Examples of the various programs under each category are included.
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ARMY DEPOT MAINTENANCE
Mr. ORTIZ. Why do you need an organic depot capability?
General COBURN. Organic depots are needed to support pre-deployment, deployment, and reconstitution of the weapons systems and equipment used by the Army in conjunction with a force projection capability. Although private-sector wartime support of some mission essential weapons systems and components can be accomplished with acceptable risk, some capabilities are so critical to national security that they must be preserved under direct DOD control at DOD facilities. The Army's organic depot capability, for the foreseeable future, will consist of five maintenance depots: Corpus Christi, Tobyhanna, Anniston, Letterkenny, and Red River Army Depots. The depot maintenance missions at Letterkenny and Red River are currently being realigned in accordance with BRAC 95.
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Mr. ORTIZ. Does the Army have a strategic plan for its depots? If not, how can you predict future workload? How can you prevent depot maintenance funds from being used as billpayers?
General COBURN. Yes, the Army has developed and is implementing a comprehensive strategic plan for depots. The plan outlines a strategy to maintain organic capability that supports the warfighter by shaping the depot infrastructure to ensure readiness, while minimizing cost, and maximizing efficiency. Specific objectives and milestones address how we will workload, fund, and support the depot infrastructure.
Mr. ORTIZ. What step is the Army taking to stabilize maintenance workload, size the workforce to workload, achieve productivity enhancements and recruit younger employees trained on new weapon systems?
General COBURN. The Army has recently updated this year's depot maintenance strategy, to include specific objectives and milestones to help stabilize workload, size workforce to workload, enhance productivity, and reengineer business practices. We have identified core requirements and determined required personnel levels to meet workloads at each depot. However, the U.S. Army Materiel Command's (USAMC) efforts to size the workforce to workload at depots, other than Red River and Letterkenny Army Depots, has been placed on hold due to Section 364 of the FY98 Defense Authorization Act. This provision prohibits the Army from initiating a reduction in force of civilian employees until the SECARMY certifies to Congress that the Army Workload and Performance System (AWPS) is fully operational. Certification of three of the main modules of AWPS is anticipated by third quarter FY98 with full certification by fourth quarter FY99. Ongoing depot modernization and productivity enhancement initiatives include, but are not limited to, a capital investment program to replace worn out or obsolete equipment with state-of-the-art equipment and processes, information technology enhancements, and numerous process improve efforts.
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Mr. ORTIZ. What assessment is being made of the impact on total Army costs of the development of depot-like infrastructure at active-duty installations and National Guard facilities? Fort Hood has a $60 million tank repair facility, Fort Campbell has acquired $10 million and $15 million pieces of equipment, and the National Guard AVCRAD at Groton, Conn., has doubled in size.
General COBURN. The 1998 Authorization Act provided for the reimbursement of the National Guard for work performed by the Active Army. Before authorizing any depot-level work outside the depot system, an assessment is made by the U.S. Army Materiel Command to determine the impact upon the overall depot program and value to the Army. Approval is granted only when it is determined such action is in the interest of the total Army.
Mr. ORTIZ. If depot-maintenance funds were not used as a bill payer for the Army, what difference would it make in how the Army workloads and operates its depots? What could you do that you can't do now?
General COBURN. An integrated requirement review and funding process drives the workloading plan for Army depots. If at some point we have to use the depot maintenance program as a bill payer we will rebalance the program in order to honor workloading commitments while preserving Army maintenance priorities. Unfortunately, using depot maintenance as a bill payer makes it difficult to preserve efficient business practices in the Army Working Capital Fund or to adhere to Army maintenance priorities particularly during the year of execution. Therefore, not using depot maintenance as a bill payer for other Army programs would avoid working capital fund inefficiencies and losses, place depots in a stronger financial posture, and preclude the growth in future year labor rates.
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ARMY OUTSOURCING STRATEGY
Mr. ORTIZ. What is the Army's outsourcing strategy?
General COBURN. The Army's competitive sourcing strategy is based on two key factors, war fighting capability and best value. We believe competitive sourcing initiatives must not adversely impact the Army's capability to support contingency operations. Regardless of cost, Army core capabilities must be retained during peacetime to support soldiers in combat. Once core competencies are satisfied, and depots and efficiently workloaded, additional support requirements will be competed in accordance with law and DOD policy. Ongoing Army competitive sourcing initiatives are being implemented at the base operations support level using procedures specified under OMB Circular A–76. These initiatives are managed under the purview of the Army Competitive Sourcing Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM). The Army is also currently reviewing several major weapon system and component outsourcing and privatization pilot programs. Since law limits flexibility to outsource depot-level maintenance work, we are carefully approaching this area within limits of legislative compliance.
DCSLOG'S QDR ROLE
Mr. ORTIZ. What is the DCSLOG's role in the Army's QDR reductions?
General COBURN. OSD formed a QDR infrastructure analysis panel. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics (DUSD(L)) chaired the Logistics sub-panel of the infrastructure panel. ODCSLOG participated in the Logistics sub-panel discussions, evaluated DUSD(L) proposals, and provided input of the final Infrastructure report.
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APACHE PRIME VENDOR SUPPORT
Mr. ORTIZ. At last Friday's field hearing we heard over and over again about the problem with spare parts. The Army has proposed Apache Prime Vendor Support as a way of overcoming the spare parts problem for the Apache helicopter. But I believe Apache PVS has far more serious implications for logistics management than just spare parts. General Coburn, what are your concerns about the Apache PVS proposal? Are you willing to turn over logistics management of a front-line weapon system to a private contractor?
General COBURN. We remain committed to doing what is best for the Army. Apache PVS promises to improve repair parts availability for the Apache helicopter. Because it does have serious implications for overall logistics management, we are proceeding with caution. Army logisticians have been participating in the PVS Integrated Process Teams from the beginning and are constantly assessing the impact of PVS on the total Army. One of our primary concerns is how PVS impacts the Army Working Capital Fund (AWCF) and how we recoup the surcharge revenues needed to sustain the infrastructure. We are also concerned about the possible increase in the number of contractors on the battlefield and what impact that might have on Army warfighting. Apache PVS is a very attractive proposal in many regards, but we are not going to break the Army to have Apache PVS. We continue to review all aspects of the proposal very carefully. The Army is not going to turn over total management of a front-line weapon system to a contractor. Assuming we proceed with PVS, the Army will continue to perform the inherently governmental functions for life cycle management, airworthiness, and stewardship for resources for the Apache helicopter.
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Mr. ORTIZ. How effectively are you integrating the Reserve Components into logistics?
General COBURN. Logistics is the most fully integrated portion of the Total Army. While the two Reserve Components make up 54 percent of the Army, they compose 72 percent of the combat service support force structure. All three components are required to provide the logistics support for a contingency or a Major Theater War. In our quest for seamless logistics, from the fort to the foxhole and back, we are moving toward even greater reliance on the Reserve Components. For example, by FY05 we are projecting that the percentage of all Quartermaster soldiers in the Active Component will fall from today's 39 percent to only 19 percent. In FY 05 26 percent of all Quartermaster soldiers will be in the Army National Guard and 55 percent will be in the U.S. Army Reserve. In addition, we are increasingly integrating the Reserve Components into day-to-day logistics operations. They are full partners in the Integrated Sustainment Maintenance program. They also link their training with Active Component training events and frequently augment Active Component support during rotations at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA. Not only are we integrating functions, but we are also integrating units by building multi-component units. Such large logistics units as Theater Army Area Commands, Materiel Management Centers, and Medical Commands have been multi-component for some time. Also, the logistics community is moving forward with the rest of the Army to create multi-component units at company level in order to more fully integrate the three components. Finally, the Army's largest logistics command, the U.S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC), provides responsive support in equipping and sustaining our Total Force while continuing to look for opportunities to involve the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve where it makes sense. For example, we are investigating using Reserve Component assets, under the auspices of USAMC, to perform new equipment fielding, operational testing and wheel vehicle repair.
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. EVANS
ARMY DEPOTS
Mr. EVANS. Why does the Army need an organic depot and arsenal capability?
General COBURN. Organic depots and arsenals are needed to support pre-deployment, deployment, and reconstitution of the weapons systems and equipment used by the Army in conjunction with force projection capability. Although private sector wartime support of some types of mission essential weapons systems and components can be accomplished with acceptable risk, some capabilities are so critical they must be preserved under direct DOD control at DOD facilities.
ARMY WAR RESERVE SUPPORT COMMAND
Mr. EVANS. As you know, the Army has a specific War Reserve Support Command to assist in managing logistical support for mobilizations. Can you tell the subcommittee what it does and why it was formed? Also, do you have concerns about plans to outsource some or all of the function and if so, could you outline them in detail?
General COBURN. The Army War Reserve Support Command was officially established in November 1996. Its mission is to provide the command and control for two Combat Equipment Groups (Combat Equipment Group-Europe and Combat Equipment Group-Asia). The Combat Equipment Groups execute the core functions of the Army War Reserve mission which is to receive, store, account for, maintain, issue, and reconstitute War Reserve equipment.
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The Army War Reserve equipment authorizations consist of seven pre-positioned combat brigade (six land-based and one afloat) sets with efforts underway to add an eighth set. The magnitude of the Army War Reserve Program exceeds $15 billion in major and secondary items, encompasses hundreds of millions of dollars in facility assets worldwide and employs over 2000 contractor personnel. In addition, the afloat mission is expanding to a 15-ship fleet, able to store equipment in over two million square feet. The bottom line is that the War Reserve Support Command is responsible for managing over a Corps equivalent of assets. The Army War Reserve Support Command plays a vital role in the Army's War Reserve Program.
Though outsourcing is an integral part of the Army War Reserve Program, it will not eliminate the need for the Army War Reserve Support Command. The principal contractors and their involvement are as follows: Lear Siegler Services Inc. performs the brigade set afloat (APS–3) maintenance mission in Charleston, SC, and the Qatar (APS–5) mission; and ITT maintains and supports the Kuwait set (APS–5), although this currently is managed by Army Central Command. Automation support is contracted to Stanley Associates. A number of the ships are leased and all crews are civilian U.S. merchant mariners provided by contracted U.S. shipping companies such as Bay Ship, Central Gulf, Osprey-Acomarit, and Maersk, In Europe, we hire directly or indirectly local nationals, or contract with the government of the Netherlands, based on country agreements. The companies are performing well in conjunction with the Army War Reserve Support Command.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR
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Mr. TAYLOR. It is too late for the President's budget. It is already written. It didn't do you justice. But there is another chance legislatively. But my question is, are you making the right request and are you making it to the right people, because this committee can only spend what the Budget Committee gives us.
General GAMBLE. Aging weapon systems have driven spare parts shortages and higher cannibalization rates, placing pressure on mission capable rates. Efforts to improve spare parts availability have yielded positive results and current data indicates a recovery trend over the next year or two. The FY99 Air Force budget carefully balanced the key priorities of modernization and readiness, while ensuring full support to our people. The budget request submitted to Congress included sufficient funds to fly the planned program based on the best estimates at the time of submission. A wide range of factors affect actual execution of the flying program during the year and costs will always vary from the original estimates.
Mr. TAYLOR. My question is, has the Commandant made a specific request for X number of dollars to do this much?
General STEELE. To my knowledge he has, sir, but I will have to take it for the record.
The Commandant has consistently stated that he has a shortfall in the FY 1999 account for the procurement of ground equipment of approximately $500 million. This shortfall is, very simply, a matter of topline constraints. This year, as well as over the last several years, topline constraints have forced us to make tough decisions in striking a balance between readiness, quality of life, and force modernization. And again, this year, we have been forced to fund near-term readiness at the expense of future modernization. There is now an urgent and immediate need to modernize equipment as we are approaching block obsolescence of aviation and ground equipment.
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The FY 1999 request for procurement of ground equipment allows for the start of recapitalization of critical Fleet Marine Force equipment that is approaching the end of its useful life, as well as replacement of aging equipment with new, more capable equipment such as:
Lightweight 155mm Howitzer, the replacement for our almost 20-year-old, well worn M–198 Howitzer;
Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR ), a lightweight truck fleet upgrade for our almost 20-year-old 5-ton trucks;
Light Tactical Vehicle Replacement (LTVR), a lightweight truck fleet upgrade for our aging HMMWV;
Javelin, our medium range, man-portable antitank weapon;
procurement of our short range anti-armor weapon, Predator; and,
upgrades to our C4I systems to provide better, more reliable, more secure, and more joint compatible C4 capability.
While this budget initiates a reversal of the past years' historically low levels of ground equipment modernization funding, the FY 1999 level is still approximately $500 million below our historical average of $1.2 billion. Assuming no change in topline, we begin to approach that level in the outyears. It is essential to note, however, that it will take a long time to recover from the cumulative effects of low procurement levels necessitated during the budget deficit recovery years, and that while the projected levels in the outyears will allow for acceleration of procurement of some of our ground equipment, it will not fully satisfy Marine Corps requirements. We have aggressively pursued improved business practices, bought used items like recapped tires instead of new ones, and remanufactured major aviation end items such as the AV–8B and the AH1W/UH1N. We are pursuing the most cost effective options to replacing our aging fleet of ground equipment including the five ton truck, the HMMWV, and the howitzer. The Commandant has supported the QDR recommendation for reductions in force structure in order to free up funds for needed modernization. We believe we have a cogent, common-sense approach to obtain a 21st century Marine Corps that will be effective, efficient, and affordable, but we cannot execute that plan without additional funds.
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Marine Corps equipment is aging and in many cases has exceeded its useful life. Maintenance costs are increasing and our Marines are working longer and longer hours to maintain aging equipment. The more time and money we spend on repairing equipment, the less we have to train Marines. We simply must maintain the increased levels of modernization funding we begin to see in the outyears if we are to sustain a ready, capable Corps in the next century. If we do not, today's modernization concerns will become tomorrow's readiness dilemmas.
The situation is much the same for modernization in the area of aviation. Our CH–46E Sea Knight was first introduced to the fleet in the mid 1960's, and has an average age of over 30 years. Our CH–53D, which is also approaching 30 years of age, has exceeded its original projected life by seven to ten years, and our fleet of KC–130Fs is approaching 40 years of age, almost twice the original projected life. The V–22, replacement for our CH–53Ds and CH–46Es, was accelerated by the QDR, allowing us to procure 11 more aircraft within the FYDP than originally planned, however, we need to ramp up to the maximum economical rate of production as soon as possible after completion of the test phase. This budget allows for the necessary research and development to upgrade our UH1ns and AH1Ws, however, actual procurement does not begin until FY 2002.
The Marine Corps has used many approaches to mitigate the impact of these shortfalls.
ADDITIONAL FUNDING
Mr. TAYLOR. My question is, has the commandant made a specific request for X number of dollars to do this much?
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General BURNETTE. The Army expects to send a list of Fiscal Year 1999 (FY99) unfunded priorities to Congress by the end of this month. The list will provide the Army's prioritized uses for increased funding should it be made available. In order to develop this list we are making some up front assumptions. First, the FY99 Budget Amendment must include new funding to pay for $1.39 billion in on-going contingency operations in Bosnia. Emerging FY99 requirements in Southwest Asia will also need to be funded. Secondly, it is essential that the Army's FY99 budget be funded in the categories we requested in the President's Budget. As tightly as we crafted our budget, well-intentioned rearragements could have unintended readiness and programmatic consequences. In addition, the Army built its FY99 budget on the assumption that Congress would authorize and appropriate funding for the requested Army endstrength of 480,000. If Congress does not, we will incur an additional unprogramed bill of up to $341 million, as a result of funding at 480,000 while manning the force at 495,000 personnel. You can be assured that any additional resources provided the Army will be spent carefully and wisely.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. FOWLER
DIVESTITURE OF ORGANIC DEPOT CAPABILITY
Mrs. FOWLER. And the basic question on divestiture of organic depot capability. Would that affect your readiness?
Admiral HANCOCK. As of the Fiscal Year 1999 President's budget submission, the Fiscal Year 1999 airframe depot maintenance program was funded at 83 percent of requirements. The Fiscal Year 1999 engine depot maintenance program was funded at 52.8 percent of requirements.
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As of the Fiscal Year 1999 President's budget submission, the engine backlog number was 650 for fleet and 130 for reserves, for a combined backlog of 780 engine units. The dollar value of the 780 engine backlog units equates to $167.7 million. The backlog total of 780 includes 90 FT–30 engines, which are planned for drawdown. These 90 engines are valued at $31.9 million. Once the 90 TF–30 engines are removed, the resulting backlog will equate to 690 engine units for $135.7 million.
General COBURN. Thank you for the opportunity to review my testimony. I concur with my responses provided to you during my testimony and have nothing further to add.
Next Hearing Segment(4)