Segment 5 Of 5 Previous Hearing Segment(4)
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QUARTERLY READINESS REPORTS
House of Representatives,
Committee on National Security,
Military Readiness Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 18, 1998.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:05 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Herbert H. Bateman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
STATEMENT OF HON. HERBERT H. BATEMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. BATEMAN [presiding]. The subcommittee will come to order.
I'd like to welcome everyone here today to this Readiness Subcommittee hearing. The subject of today's hearing is the adequacy of the quarterly readiness reports that are provided to Congress by the Department of Defense. These reports, mandated by Congress, are designed to give us an ongoing picture of the day-to-day readiness of our military forces.
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We're concerned with these reports because the subcommittee continues to be misdivided by the disparity between the reports we received from the Pentagon and the reports we received from personnel when we visit units in the field. Committee members have become increasingly aware of these apparent disconnects between the readiness picture presented by former readiness reports and from the testaments of the administration and leadership of the Pentagon and the reality that seems to exist in the military as determined by the many commentaries on readiness made to members and staff of the committee.
Yet we continue to hear of growing concerns over many of the issues affecting readiness, including operating tempo, increased volume, deployments, morale, the impact of peacekeeping operations, and the increasing use of training funds for other purposes. Ironically, none of these types of issues is measured in the services' readiness reporting system nor do they get addressed in the formal quarterly readiness report provided to the Congress.
Nearly 4 years ago, the General Accounting Office cited the need to develop a more comprehensive readiness system and provided the Department of Defense with specific indicators cited by military commanders as being critical to readiness assessments but not included in their readiness reports. The Department agreed that it needed a more comprehensive readiness system and contracted with the Logistics Management Institute [LMI] to assess GAO's recommended indicators to determine which of the 29 recommendations may have the greatest potential value for DOD decisionmakers charged with maintaining high readiness.
The LMI assessment completed in October 1994 concluded that 19 of the 29 indicators recommended by GAO offered a high or medium value for readiness assessments. That is, those 19 indicators would allow DOD to measure additional factors that caused changes in readiness, provide early notice of any adverse changes, provide the opportunity to improve readiness, and detect trends that may affect future readiness. LMI concluded that ''the GAO study and our analysis provide a starting point for identifying a more complete and useful set of readiness indicators.''
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Since the GAO recommendations and the assessment by LMI, the committee became increasingly concerned that DOD would not take steps to include any of the identified and validated indicators in their readiness measuring system. Due to the continued lack of progress on the part of DOD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate actions to improve the completeness and accuracy of readiness information provided by military units through the status of resources and training systems or [SORTS], the committee took action.
Last year as part of their fiscal year 1998 national defense authorization bill, this committee included a provision that would expand the quarterly readiness reports provided to Congress. This provision required the Department of Defense to develop a plan using the indicators identified by the GAO and validated by the LMI as having a high or medium value for readiness assessment that would expand the scope of the quarterly readiness reports. Specifically, the provision stipulates that ''each report shall also include information regarding each of the active components of the armed services and an evaluation of such information with respect to each of the 19 readiness indicators.''
The provision in law was necessary because Congress saw little effort by DOD to upgrade readiness assessments at the unit level. Although DOD has developed and submitted a plan on how they plan to enhance the quarterly readiness report to be submitted to Congress effective October 1998, I'm greatly concerned that the plan does not make more of an effort to effectively enhance the congressional oversight of military readiness. Such data, which have long been recognized as having significant limitations when evaluating the true readiness of a unit, continue to be the principal source of readiness report information.
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The proposed plan states that DOD will not provide data for 6 of the 19 indicators because either the data are already provided to Congress through other documents, or there is no reasonable or accepted measurement for those indicators. The plan seems to take the stand that no new readiness reporting requirements are necessary to enhance the quarterly readiness reports. I'm anxious to hear about the ongoing efforts of the Pentagon to do a better job in assessing readiness. Given that the readiness indicators to be included in the quarterly readiness reports were identified, validated by reputable sources, and mandated by Congress, I am particularly interested in hearing from our panel some explanations about why the plan to expand the quarterly readiness report seems to limit the use of the indicators in developing readiness data.
We're very fortunate to have two panels of people who will speak to the Pentagon's efforts to improve readiness assessment and reporting.
The first panel is made up of GAO representatives who will provide some background on the overall readiness reporting system and then give an assessment of the Pentagon's plan to enhance future quarterly readiness reports.
The second panel is made up of individuals who are responsible for the readiness report system and includes a representative from DOD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and from each of the military services.
Before we get into hearing from our panel, I would like to yield to the Honorable Solomon Ortiz from Texas and the ranking Democratic member of the subcommittee for any statement he would like to make. Mr. Ortiz.
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STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to take this time to welcome and add my thanks to our distinguished witnesses for their attendance here today. I also want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity we have had this session to better understand what military readiness is all about.
In the hearings thus far, the National Security Committee and the Readiness Subcommittee have received testimony from military personnel ranking from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to senior officers in the services responsible for training, to the commanders of senior enlisted personnel in the field on the state of readiness of the force. I keep hearing what appears to be a common assessment that our forces are at the tip of the spear already. But I also hear questions about how deep that readiness is and how long we can sustain it. But we're not focusing on the details of the readiness status here in this hearing today. How the readiness assessment is routinely reported to the chain of command and what is included in the report is of great interest still.
Mr. Chairman, there's no doubt that the readiness is a complex matter and measuring it is very, very difficult. But that does not mean it is an impossible task. I am concerned about our ability to exercise our oversight responsibility if we do not get the right information. The challenge appears to be in determining what information is needed and what level to permit the responsible officials to exercise the readiness oversight responsibilities. That includes us here in the Congress.
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I am also troubled by the potential implications of some of the statements and observations surfacing in the hearings. Some of these we are learning about for the first time. For example, we have been told that the force is ready as it always has been. That readiness has come at a high price; it's forestructure and modernization being the bill payer. There's some cautionary signs in our readiness trends that the services are watching carefully. The forces are being deployed more than ever before. The morale of the deployers is great, but for the stay-behind forces, it's another story.
In the case of the U.S. Navy, we have a programmed readiness force. But the readiness backstop is getting deeper and it is taking longer to get back to C–1. The budget is billed on assumptions about saving from efficiencies, outsourcing and privatization. Activities that have not materialized in the past. The budget is adequate or near-adequate. The nondeploying forces are frequently left behind without adequate resources to accomplish the missions assigned. The Department appears to be willing to adopt new concepts not based on a full understanding of their impact but of the potential for savings.
The maintenance backlog continues to get worse, even with the annual congressional adds for depot maintenance. The Department continues to draw down the civilian work force into public depots—based on an assigned end-strength target without regard to the workload requirement or the availability of dollars. The services are challenged with a need to maintain an aging fleet and weapons systems and are experiencing a shortfall in repair parts. The Army training base will be required to operate with less money in fiscal year 1999 that was available in fiscal year 1998. Maintenance of the training infrastructure is less than adequate and at some installations results in a condition where you have two standards for facilities—one for the deployers and a separate one for the training activities.
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There remains a shortfall in the Army assets needed for training—development training support—and deducting development. The use aboard military manpower is on the increase. The extreme fencing of operation and maintenance account [OMA] forces a devastating effect at the installation level. Morale, welfare, and recreation [MWR] activities at some training installations are deplorable and detract from training and retention. The Air Force is having difficulty retaining the skills needed for career personnel who form the backbone of the unit's maintenance capability. Filling the required needs is not an easy task and in some cases it is akin to mission impossible.
Additionally, Mr. Chairman, during the full committee hearings last week, the chairman of the House National Security Committee stated that there would be no money available until after the President's request this year. With all of the seemingly contradictory, and sometimes conflicting bits of information, it is not surprising that we sometimes have difficulty reconciling and understanding the implications of the official readiness reports submitted to the Congress, the data we receive from constituents and information we personally collect in our visits to the field; and what is the right contact to use to process information related to the total readiness of the force?
These observations remind me of the comments I heard about the Soviet Union when I first arrived in Congress. Mr. Chairman, that is why I am so troubled by the potential implications of the observations and all the information that accumulates when we have these hearings on readiness. How are we to design the ground troops for readiness? What reports do we use for our oversight responsibilities? What information does the Department use to determine the trade-offs needed for the delicate balance between the competing requirements for today's readiness and future readiness? How does the Department ensure a clear understanding of the readiness of the civilian maintenance work force and the military training infrastructure? How does the Department factor in the budget plans and the inherent budget risks and the impact of those risks so that we here in the Congress get the opportunity to be provided, informed, and exercise our oversight responsibilities?
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Mr. Chairman, when I think of readiness assessments, I am reminded of the onion. Like the onion, you know, readiness consists of many layers of activities. when one or more of these activities are at risk, the readiness of the force is at risk.
I hope that when this hearing is over today, we will have a better understanding of the ongoing DOD activities to improve the readiness analysis and reporting process. A clear understanding of current readiness, readiness trends, and objectives in the Department that results from peeling back the many layers of the readiness onion. It's essential for the Department and for the Congress as we work in concert to achieve the best readiness with the resources available.
Mr. Chairman, no matter how the reports on military readiness read, what is included or omitted from them, the American public should be grateful for the way our services' personnel and civilian employees conduct themselves and perform their missions. During my visit to our installations and activities, I've been very impressed with what I have seen and have heard.
Again, I want to thank our witnesses for coming and being at this hearing today. This is why I ask so many questions because I keep hearing different things from different hearings and I hope that at the end of these hearings, Mr. Chairman, that we can better understand as to how we can help.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ortiz.
The first panel consists of Mr. Mark Gebicke, the Director of Military Operations and Capabilities Issues for the U.S. General Accounting Office. He is accompanied by senior evaluators, Ms. Christine Frye and Mr. Thomas Gosling. Welcome and we look forward to hearing your testimony.
STATEMENT OF MARK GEBICKE, DIRECTOR OF MILITARY OPERATIONS AND CAPABILITIES ISSUES FOR THE U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Mr. GEBICKE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We're very pleased to be here this afternoon to talk about how readiness assessments are prepared by the Department of Defense.
You mentioned in your introductory remarks some concerns that you have about the validity and the thoroughness of the process and also those inconsistencies and disconnects that you sometimes hear when you go out to the field and people talk about the difficulties that they have in readiness. Mr. Ortiz, you mentioned that as well. But yet when the readiness reports come over, everything looks fine from a gross or an aggregate perspective.
What I'll try to do is to summarize maybe in 5 or 6 minutes my full statement for you.
Mr. BATEMAN. The full statement will be made a part of the record and you may proceed as you choose.
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Mr. GEBICKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We'll talk about three—focus my comments around three questions. Now what corrective actions has DOD taken recently in the readiness assessment area? Do the readiness assessment reports that the Congress receives provide the Congress with the ability to effectively oversee readiness? Then finally, if we think further improvements are needed, what types of improvements might we suggest to the process?
Let's talk first about corrective actions. The Department has a number of initiatives underway to improve the SORTS process and as we all know we've talked about SORTS before. That's the unit readiness report system and basically measures the readiness of a unit. How effectively can that unit carry out its mission. But it is only the effectiveness of the units, it doesn't look at the broad picture.
The improvements that the DOD is working on primarily focus on what I would call technical enhancements. They focus on making the system more user-friendly, eliminating inaccuracies in the system and other types of problems. Not to be belittled—I mean, these are significant problems that need to be taken care of, but they will not take care of the inherent limitations that we have in the SORT system. They're still going to be there and I just want to make sure that that point is clear.
The Department over the last several years, I believe, initiated in 1994 a new process called the joint monthly readiness report [JMRR]. We have a lot of positive things to say about that particular process. It's worked very effectively from our perspective and really complements the SORTS report to a great extent. Because it is looking at SORTS—it is looking at readiness more in the aggregate and, of course, the SORTS report would because they're unit-based.
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Some things that we think are very positive about that system is that you have all the major components playing into that system, so you have the combatant commands. You have the services as well as the combat service and combat support agencies. It's headed by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, so it has high visibility. It's scheduled on a routine basis. It is scenario-driven; that is, every quarter a different set of scenarios are provided to the players and they then become concerned about how ready they are to actually implement those particular scenarios. It might be two major theater wars for instance, or it might be a peace operation in a major theater war. It also actually uses the operation plans of the CINCS that would be involved in those sections of the world. So some very positive things to say about that particular system. It has been maturing over the last several years and we think it operates quite well.
Now you also asked us to take a look at the quarterly readiness reports that the Congress has been receiving over the last few years from the DOD and to mention any items that we had where improvements could be taken. As you said in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, it is required—these reports are required by law. They come to you on a quarterly basis. Let me just highlight so—a clear understanding as to what's required by the law.
Each readiness problem and deficiency is to be highlighted in that report, the planned remedial actions and then finally any key indicators that are tied to the remedial actions that are going to be taken. Now what we found and what we did is we took several of those quarterly readiness reports and we traced them back through the Department. What we found is the reports that are provided to you and other Members of the Congress actually come from the Senior Readiness Oversight Council. The Senior Readiness Oversight Council [SROC] is basically, if you will, the civilian counterpart to the jammer [JMRR]. Although obviously, the military plays a part, as well in the SROC.
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What we found is we found a high degree of consistency between what was reported to you and what was discussed in the Department in terms of the readiness concerns. We found that the briefings provided to the Congress in forms of the briefing charts were virtually identical to the briefing charts that were discussed at the senior level at the Pentagon. What we need to keep in mind that this is—what we found in your reports, we also found true in the Senior Council—that this is a highly aggregated discussion of readiness issues within the Department.
We didn't think, quite frankly, that it was fully responsive to the legislation because it was so aggregated that it identified problem areas very vaguely. Quite frankly, without additional information, it would be hard to determine what the problem was, the extent of the problem, or the extent of the remedial action that needed to be taken to fix the problem. So we think in that regard that the reports that you're receiving come up a little bit short. Now I will say that you don't have the benefit, of course, of participating in the discussions that take place at the Pentagon; and of course, they do. So I think some supplemental information in those reports would be very helpful to someone who didn't participate in the discussions at the Pentagon.
Let me turn now to the new requirement which you have in the law for 19 additional indicators that will be coming up here in October of this year. We have looked at the implementation plan that was submitted to you as to how that is going to be accomplished. While we think the plan is a good first step, we think that with some enhancements even better information could be provided to you in October. Along those lines, what we had in mind is that as of right now, the Department is not planning to provide all 19 indicators that you requested so we think obviously a good place to start would to be provide all of the information that you did request in law. We also think that the report should pretty much stand alone. Right now, I think the plan says that the—many of the indicators are provided to the Congress and various other and sundry reports and the plan would suggest that that information not be sent to you once again, but just be cross-referenced to other reports.
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We would think for somebody who really wants to look at readiness and wants to look at the 19 areas that you're interested in, that having a stand-alone document and having all the material in one place might be a better approach. We also think that the indicators—to the extent possible—should look outside of SORTS' database for some of the reasons that you mentioned in your opening remarks. We would think that in some cases that information might be available. When we did our work, which proceeded the LMI study, and then we basically went to the field and asked the commanders in the field what other information they maintained to help them determine readiness, the information that we put in our report was what we heard, not what we thought up. So we know other indicators are out there and other information is available.
The other thing that's pretty consistent with my earlier point on the quarterly readiness reports and that is some indication of the analysis that's going to be provided with the indicators so that you can put the information in the proper perspective. Because I'm a little concerned that you might get reams and reams of paper and not really be able to clearly digest what it is that you have. We would suggest that the plan is a good first step. We would suggest that there continue to be a dialog between the DOD and the Congress and possibly that the plan be—maybe updated or improved. The conversations that we've had with senior officials at DOD would indicate that they're agreeable to doing that with you.
We just feel that if those steps were taken place that when that first report arrives in October, it might be a little bit—a better report than would otherwise be presented.
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Mr. Chairman, that's a quick summary of my remarks. We'd be glad to respond to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gebicke can be found in the appendix on page 1077.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much. You mentioned that the implementation plan that we have asked for does not include 6 of what—19 indicators?
Mr. GEBICKE. There's 19 broad categories of indicators, but in effect you'll get a lot more specific information in the 19—but I think your reference was to some indicators that would not be provided to you.
Mr. BATEMAN. Yes. What I wanted to have you respond to, if you're able to do it, is what are the indicators that are not going to be included?
Mr. GEBICKE. Let me ask Ms. Frye to go ahead and respond to that.
Mr. BATEMAN. Be happy to hear from Ms. Frye.
Ms. FRYE. The seven are deployed equipment, condition of nonpacing items
Mr. BATEMAN. What was that second one?
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Ms. FRYE. Condition of nonpacing items. I'm sorry. Personnel strength, historical trends, borrowed manpower, personnel morale, operation tempo, and training funding. These are the seven for which they said either the information was provided elsewhere or for which they did not have an easy way to measure it right now and they would not provide the data.
Mr. BATEMAN. I'd certainly take your point that even if we have been furnished information on those subject matters in other materials that might come over here from the Pentagon, it would be much more desirable; we could exercise our responsibilities more clearly if it were all in one document. Do you do anything—or have you done anything to sort of go behind the SORTS reports by going out and actually doing some inquiries and investigations in a specific unit on which you have the unit SORTS report?
Mr. GEBICKE. We haven't on this particular assignment, Mr. Chairman, but we have done something similar to that on prior work.
Mr. BATEMAN. What did you determine when you did that?
Mr. GEBICKE. Well, you know, you'll find inconsistencies like you'd find and I've seen in the paper when you go out to the field. The problem I think is—there's a number of problems with the SORTS. One is even at the unit level, you have some gross indicators of problems and situations.
Let me explain. For instance, in the case of equipment. Now what SORTS measures in equipment, one of the measures is equipment on-hand. So it's what you have on-hand percentagewise relative to what you're authorized to have. If you have 90 percent or more of what you're supposed to have, you are E–1—top ranking. If you have 80–89 percent, you're E–2 and et cetera. So you could have a unit that is 89 percent and a different unit that's 80 percent and they're both reporting E–2. Simple. The simple, more specific fix would be to report E–85, I mean, so you know exactly where it is. Then the unit could struggle along at 80 or 81 percent and be E–2 and then they drop down to 79 percent and then right away they're E–3.
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The other situation you have, as you know, two major elements of SORTS are subjective in nature—they're not quantified. One is the rating by the commander on training and how quickly he or she can get troops trained and ready to go. The other is the overall C-rating. We find that prior work in a number of cases and I'm going to throw out about 10 percent—because I don't recall exactly—commanders will upgrade the rating which would otherwise be indicated by the quantifiable section of the SORTS report. By that I mean that maybe all the numbers would indicate that the rating should be C–2, but the commander could at the bottom say, you know overall I think it's probably a C–1. Now in our assessment of commander's comments, we find the trend to be increasing or improving the rating as opposed to decreasing the rating and we have some examples that we're developing in other work where I think most people if they looked at the information in front of them would really question how the commander could upgrade the rating.
But it's the—and that's not necessarily a weakness in SORTS, but I think that we have to recognize—that subjectivity and the commander's comments are very important and he or she should really know best what the condition of that unit is. But, you know, one last comment, I don't know how many people have ever gotten promoted because they have downgraded the readiness of their unit—if you follow my comment.
Mr. BATEMAN. Yes.
Mr. GEBICKE. I mean, I think the expectation is that we're ready. It's a can-do, positive attitude.
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Mr. BATEMAN. Well, it's a part of the culture.
Mr. GEBICKE. Exactly.
Mr. BATEMAN. I think you almost have to predict it, do you not? In what ways does the information that's captured in the DOD status of resources in training systems or SORTS differ from what the Department includes in the quarterly readiness report to the Congress? Are there disparities between the two?
Mr. GEBICKE. Well you're—in the SORTS as we're talking about you're looking at very unit-specific information. You have an excess of 9,000 units that are reporting that information on a monthly basis. That information is used in a number of different ways. It is used by the jammer process because when they look at the individual units and how they're going to respond to those scenarios that I talked about earlier, they want to know what the readiness of those particular units would be. The information that you're receiving in your quarterly readiness reports is highly aggregated. Between the jammer process and the Senior Readiness Oversight Council, a lot of the details kind of fall by the wayside. The Senior Readiness Oversight Council is more of a regular meeting that takes place where readiness problems are discussed which come from the jammer or could come from other sources, as well—things that maybe have popped up recently. It's your report—the quarterly readiness report—then that flows from the Senior Readiness Oversight Council. So at every level it's becoming abbreviated and more aggregated, if you will, until by the time you get it—it's as I mentioned in my opening remarks—it's highly aggregated.
Mr. BATEMAN. Well, one of the things that's troubled me and I don't know how we can completely solve the problem is that we get expressions that overall our readiness—or 90 percent of our units are at C–1 or C–2—only x percent are below it. But that's sort of dealing with things in gross—it doesn't tell you where the deficiencies are. It only gives you an overall statistic. There may be any number of units and maybe they're critically important units where you're not getting an accurate picture or a detailed picture of all the data that would be necessary. Is that a problem?
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Mr. GEBICKE. Absolutely. In fact, in one of the quarterly readiness reports that was submitted to you that we reviewed, one of the problems had to do with personnel shortages in the Army. It didn't give you any indication as to which units were affected, how many of those units were affected, and didn't indicate what the remedial action was going to be or how long it was going to take to fix the problem. So that's the vagueness and the highly aggregated level of the information that you're receiving that we'd like to see fixed.
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. ORTIZ. Since I had a lengthy statement, I would like to yield to my colleagues in the form that they arrived, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. That would be who, Mr. Pickett? Mr. Pickett.
Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gebicke, are we trying to sort of push a noodle down the road here in the fact that there's no way to simply establish a numerical system that can accurately reflect what readiness is in our military because of the complexity and variety of things the military does? In some units, the number of people would be very central to what they're going to do. In other units, it may be a certain piece of equipment that's very essential to what they're going to do. If that one piece of equipment is down, then for all practical purposes they're down.
I just think that there's no way that you can get an accurate, concise, simple report that will tell the Congress what's going on as far as readiness is concerned in our military. I'm convinced today, based on what I had seen and heard in the past couple of months that the readiness of our military has reached an unacceptably low level. I will continue to believe that, irrespective of what I hear. This is not questioning the integrity or credibility of people—it's just perhaps we have a different threshold of deciding when things have gotten beyond where they should be.
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Well just a moment ago, I went through these 19 items on my own and I struck off almost half of them that in my mind are clearly inadequate as far as the military is concerned, which confirms my own conviction that we are—have reached an unacceptably low level in readiness. Are we at a point where if—let's take an example—that we were going to try and get a fix on where the Department was financially, we'd send in some outside auditors—or auditors that have an independent streak in them to review and assess the records. Are we at the point where the Congress needs some independent-minded agency, body, commission, committee, or something to make these reviews in an independent, detached fashion? Because as you observed earlier, the commanding officers are not about to say they have failed and have been unable to maintain their units in a ready state when they know that they will be graded on that when promotion time comes. That's just human nature. As you said, it's a can-do attitude and I understand that.
These are people that are committed and I know that they're very sincere about what they're doing. At the same time, the Congress must have an accurate and consistent evaluation of where we are in the process. It's our responsibility to provide the resources to do what needs to be done in the way of maintaining readiness and maybe we are not providing enough, but we need to be told that and told that in a clear, unequivocally understandable way that we can convey the message to the public and perhaps be able to get the political support that's required to get the additional resources. I just sense that we're never going to quite get there if we try to use the same records to inform Congress that we are—that the military uses for its own purposes.
Mr. GEBICKE. I appreciate your concern and I share that with you. I don't think you could ever have a system that is totally based on numbers and quantifiable information. You're just never going to get there. The point that we're trying to make is there probably are some other things that could be done to enhance it a little bit. But I would concur with you. I mean, in the end, it is going to be subjective. It is going to be judgmental. Your observation of maybe a group from outside of the Department might have some credibility. It might make some sense because if somebody detached from the Pentagon could make that assessment, it certainly should be an objective assessment. But that would be a very difficult assessment to make for an outside group.
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I was just thinking as you were talking, clearly you'd want some people that were very familiar with the military, obviously, to do that. You'd probably want to rely on—to some extent—some retired individuals which—who have been there and understand how the military operates. Then you have to ask yourself whether or not they could be totally objective in their assessment, as well, since they were part of the community. But I think it has some merit.
Mr. PICKETT. That's all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Pickett. Let me add a footnote to that. We focused on the fact that the unit commander is almost predictably going to have a bias toward reporting perhaps a some degree higher state of readiness than may actually exist. I think there's another phenomenon I'd like to have you comment on.
I think it's almost the uniform view of the people on this committee that we have been dealing for the past several years with a Defense budget that has been driven more by the OMB and a numbers game of this is a number that will not be exceeded than one which is truly reflective of all the needs that need to be addressed. But our reports and our testimony comes to us from people who have signed off on those budgets and who, therefore, may be ill-prepared to say: Gee, they really are inadequate and our readiness is suffering because we aren't providing sufficient resources.
It leaves us oftentimes with having to read between the lines of people who come before the committee and say that their base operation and support funding is 60 or 70 percent of the quantifiable needs, and yet that's what the budget is. Is it adequate? Well, we can get by. But 60 or 70 percent of a quantifiable need is not something you ought to have to get by on. So it seems to me that we may have some, not deliberate, but psychologically unavoidable errors at both the unit lowerlevel, as well as at the microlevel. Do you share any of that concern, as well?
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Mr. GEBICKE. I haven't really thought that much about that. But I mean what you said, you know, I think it rings true. I did read your transcript from the hearing you had in San Diego and I sense that you had a difficult time eliciting what the problems were and where they could be fixed with some additional funding. There seemed to be some reluctance there on the part of the various panels that testified before the subcommittee.
The Department has a—they have a tough problem. I mean, they have a budget that they're trying to operate within and there are a lot of competing demands obviously within that budget. To give you an—well, I could go on, but I——
Mr. BATEMAN. No, go ahead.
Mr. GEBICKE. OK. One thing that I had happened to testify on yesterday is an area where we have done a lot of work and it was of concern to this subcommittee, as well—it's in chemical/biological defense preparedness. That's an area where clearly more needs to be done. Yet, it's an area, where quite frankly, when everything is said and done, it just doesn't get the attention that it may deserve. I'm sure there are other areas that have to be compromised because of the funding restrictions that are in place.
Mr. BATEMAN. And that brings us to whom? Mr. Evans has departed, so Mr. Sisisky. Oh, he's departed also. Mr. Underwood.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. I'm still here, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.]
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I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm interested in the discussion and the relative weight of objective and subjective criteria in terms of readiness and the implication that people are somehow motivated. Well that's human frailty—motivated by some sense of self-interest either in overestimating your readiness capacity. There also—it could also conceivably be argued that in appearances before committees like this they underestimate because there's always the possibility of getting rewarded with more resources. So there's always the tendency to talk about that, but what is the relative weight given to objective and subjective criteria in readiness assessment? What is the relative weight?
Mr. GEBICKE. There are in the individual unit readiness reports, there are four individual factors and the first three are quantifiable. Personnel—how many people do we have onboard relative to what we're authorized to have? Then there are two on equipment. One deals with on-hand equipment and the other deals with the serviceability of that equipment. How well you can support it—all quantifiable.
The fourth item is training. That is totally subjective. I mean, it can only be—how long is it going to take to get my people ready to go? How much training do they really need? Then most importantly, the overall rating which takes into consideration all four—the overall C rating is also subjective.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. So that comes out to——
Mr. GEBICKE. See, the ratings that you hear, when you hear C–1, C–2, C–3, that is a subjective application of the commander's overall assessment of his or her unit to perform—and that is subjective.
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Mr. UNDERWOOD. And that is subjective.
Mr. GEBICKE. Yes.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. And, of course, we are relying and I have full confidence that this is in fact the case of a professional cadre of people to make that subjective assessment.
The question I have then is in terms of the criteria, do you see any changes necessary in that criteria, the relative weight between objective and subjective criteria?
Mr. GEBICKE. No, I don't, not in SORTS per se as it's now designed, primarily because I can't think of how you could apply more quantifiable measures to the training initiative, or the training segment. There possibly could be some other components or some other indicators that are not currently measured.
If you think of the personnel, for instance, to give you an example, we talked earlier about personnel and how that's calculated quantifiably. You know, with 10 percentile, 90 to 100 percent of your personnel on board, you are going to be P1 for personnel; 80 to 89, you are going to be P2.
Well, that for instance, is just an aggregate number. So it doesn't take into consideration the manpower as a commander that I might have loaned out. It doesn't take into consideration the people that I might have deployed in Bosnia or Haiti or somewhere else. It doesn't take into consideration that I might have some people filling some MOS's for which they are not qualified. So there are a lot of things—it's just an aggregate calculation.
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And one of the things that we had suggested in our work about 4 or 5 years ago is there are probably some other indicators within the aggregate personnel line that maybe would be helpful in getting a truer accounting of the personnel readiness of the unit from a personnel perspective.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. Now the system is designed to give us a rendering of whether they are ready at this moment in time.
Mr. GEBICKE. Exactly.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. And I gather from the sense of the hearings that this committee has conducted that there is the widespread feeling that the units are ready at this time, but this level of readiness cannot be sustained over time; that there is going to be a day of reckoning some time ahead if we don't get some relief in terms of resources.
And so that being the case, is it possible to conceptualize a readiness system, a readiness rating system, which will give you an indicator that things are weak, as opposed to just giving you a kind of a snapshot picture at this moment in time. And is that the kind of data which would kind of fill out the picture?
Because I don't want to wake up one day—at least, the sense I get, and maybe I'm not paying enough attention—but one day we are going to wake up and say, well, we found out that nobody's ready, that the forces have been completely gutted out. And the day of reckoning is here. There must be some process or maybe some attention paid to the process of ratings for readiness which would give some warning about weaknesses so that people have advanced notice. Is that——
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Mr. GEBICKE. Yes. I was going to suggest that although this does not occur in SORTS, as you mentioned, in the unit readiness report, because that is, you are exactly right, a snapshot at a particular point in time and that snapshot takes place every month.
But in the joint monthly readiness report and in the meeting that takes place there, there is somewhat of a near-term readiness concern and focus. Now it doesn't go down to the unit level, but it is scenario-driven and the OP plans are brought out so it brings the units into the fray that would have to respond to the particular scenarios that are played out in the JMRR.
So it does look out at least out to 12 months, doesn't look beyond that. But that will not tell you that a particular unit or a particular group is going to not be able to perform in a longer period of time out in the future. And the unit readiness reports will not do that for you either.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Underwood. Mr. McHale and then Mrs. Fowler.
Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome and thank you for appearing before the committee.
As I was listening to the testimony, it occurred to me that I have never heard a Member of Congress say, I am going to lose the next election. And I have never met a captain who has said, I can't take that hill. What he's really saying is I'm going to take that hill or I'm going to die trying. It's not careerism, and it's not an unwillingness to face difficult truths; it is an ethos. I wouldn't characterize it as the culture of the military; it is a moral obligation to complete the mission regardless of what it takes.
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And so I'm not surprised to hear your subjective evaluation nor do I disagree with it. That realistically we are not going to expect junior officers in particular to have the degree of objectivity where they recognize that maybe they're not going to take that hill.
Back in an earlier life, I used to be an operations officer, and I used to do the SORTS report for our unit. And I can tell you that I filled out that report with absolute honesty. I tried to exercise the very best judgment that I could, but my marines were going to be ready. And if we had ever gotten close to the point that I thought that I'd have to fill out a derogatory SORTS report, long before we got to that stage, we would have been out in the field raising the level of readiness to a point that I could honestly fill out that report and indicate that I am going to achieve the mission.
What I'd like to do is get a sense of your evaluation of readiness standards as they apply to our Reserve and Guard components. How long have we had the SORTS report? How long has that been in existence?
Mr. GEBICKE. We don't know exactly. Many years; at least 10 years, and I think there was a predecessor report before SORTS.
Mr. MCHALE. And, at least from my experience, because the reference I made earlier was to the Marine Corps Reserve, the SORTS report did apply to our Reserve component. Does it apply to all Reserve components, including the Guard?
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Mr. GEBICKE. Yes, it does.
Mr. MCHALE. All right. Has anyone done a case study on the 48th Brigade of Georgia back in 1990, 1991 when there was the considerable controversy—and I am not going to address the merits here—but the 48th Brigade of Georgia, the Guard, was brought to active duty and then, depending upon whose version you want to believe, the unit was either combat ready or not combat ready. And ultimately, as a matter of fact, did not deploy to the Persian Gulf.
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 1155.]
Has anybody gone back to look at the SORTS report on that unit prior to activation?
Mr. GEBICKE. The General Accounting Office did a review on that particular—that's the same unit that went to the National Training Center [NTC] and basically was there for an extended period of time, and by the time they were released——
Mr. MCHALE. Yes, yes. And if you talk to members of the Guard, they will tell you that the unit was in need of some work upon activation, but fully combat ready within a reasonable period of time. If you talk to others, particularly with the Active Forces, they will argue that the unit was not prepared for combined arms warfare.
What I'm wondering is, regardless of who's right in that analysis, and I frankly don't know even today, I'm wondering what did the report say prior to activation. Because clearly, I would assume from what you have told me, we have a track record of reports. Then we have a no-fooling, real world situation where the unit was brought to active duty and then the judgment was made not to deploy it into theater.
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Do we have a case study to determine the accuracy of those reports as established by subsequent activation?
Mr. GEBICKE. We haven't done that, to my knowledge. We do have a data base where we retain SORT statistics on a monthly basis. I don't think we go back that far.
Mr. MCHALE. I think it would be instructive as a case study in SORTS, not a case study of the 48th Brigade, but a case study of the efficacy of SORTS. To go back, let's say, for a 2-year period of time prior to that activation to determine whether or not the alleged deficiencies brought to light upon activation were reflected in any way in the history of SORTS reports preceding activation. It might bring to our attention some of the deficiencies manifested within the SORTS reporting process.
Take that, if you would, as a formal request. I'll fill out the appropriate paperwork, but that's a GAO study that I am now asking you to do, if I may.
Mr. GEBICKE. I understand.
Mr. MCHALE. One final question. Again, this reflects my horrendously parochial background, but in the Marine Corps, there's a system called Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation system [MCCRS]. Whether you're active or reserve, those standards are applied uniformly in terms of combat readiness across all the components of the Marine Corps, active and reserve.
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I am told that the Army does not have a similar system, that there is not a uniform standard of readiness applied to essentially similar units active, Guard and Reserve. Is that the case?
Mr. GEBICKE. I don't think we have the answer to that. I'd be glad to provide that.
Mr. MCHALE. All right. I think the general probably does and we'll have a very competent, well-informed witness in a few minutes. But I thought perhaps you knew that.
In the services generally, do we have standards of readiness that cross intraservice boundaries. In other words, within the Navy Reserve, do we measure readiness within the Navy Reserve by the same objective standards that we do the active duty Navy? Again, I know of only one service, just my own limited background. That is what is done in the Marine Corps.
I am curious to know if we do that in the other services, and I will turn to the general in a few minutes and find out what the situation is in the Army. Do you know what the answer is?
Mr. GEBICKE. The Navy, I do not know.
Mr. MCHALE. As somebody has a particular interest in the Reserve, I'd be interested in knowing the answer to that question. And if we don't have such a standard, following your evaluation, could you recommend whether or not the individual services adopt such a standard.
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Mr. GEBICKE. OK.
Mr. MCHALE. OK. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. McHale. Now Mrs. Fowler.
Mrs. FOWLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for being here. I read your testimony but I missed part of it, so I hope I'm not repeating. But I just have really one issue that I'd like to raise.
These quarterly readiness reports that we put in last year's bill that we are going to be receiving, one of the things we asked for in those as a result of some of our discussions with GAO was a report on logistics equipment maintenance. And this would be the backlog, like for the Navy, airframes and engines. And I was concerned recently when I looked at the Navy's fiscal year 1999 budget that I saw it projected 630 active duty engines, 130 reserve backlog in the system for next year.
Admiral Hancock has called me in and we are going to have a meeting next week, so I'm looking forward to talking with him about it and I appreciate his doing that. But I just wondered is the GAO familiar with the Navy's new methodology of determining the relevance of this backlog to the readiness of the fleet?
Mr. GEBICKE. I'm not familiar with that, Mrs. Fowler. We may have some people within the General Accounting Office that are. I would be glad to inquire when I get back to the office this afternoon.
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Mrs. FOWLER. Thank you, I appreciate it. That's all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mrs. Fowler.
You mentioned, as a part of the SORTS report, that the unit commander, in effect, sort of inventories the equipment as to whether or not he has all of the equipment that he is supposed to have.
Does that include, or maybe he's got a piece of equipment or 10 pieces of equipment he's supposed to have, but only 5 of it is operable at any given time because of the maintenance problems and the fact that the equipment is wearing out? Do you get any measure of that?
Mr. GEBICKE. Yes, there is a measure for that, the fully mission capable rate. So there is a quantifiable factor.
Mr. BATEMAN. Okay. Anyone else have any questions of this panel. Thank you very much. We appreciate your being here and your testimony.
Mr. GEBICKE. Thank you.
Mr. BATEMAN. I think we are now ready to welcome our second panel, and I will share with you the aside to my colleagues that I have detected a degree of unreadiness on the part of our staff, for which I am sorry. [Laughter.]
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The second panel consists of Mr. Louis Finch, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness; accompanied by Gen. John J. Maher of the U.S. Army, Vice Director for Operations on the Joint Staff. We are also pleased to have Lt. Gen. Thomas N. Burnette, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans and Army Operations for the Department of the Army; Vice Adm. James O. Ellis, Jr., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations; Lt. Gen. Patrick K. Gamble, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations in the Department of the Air Force; and Lt. Gen. Martin R. Steele, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations, the U.S. Marine Corps.
Welcome to all of you. Mr. Secretary, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF LOUIS J. FINCH, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR READINESS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Secretary FINCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I am sure I can speak for our whole panel here today. Thank you for bringing us together to discuss what is our No. 1 priority in the Department, the readiness of our military forces. And with your permission, Mr. Chairman, we all have good, formal written statements, but if it would be all right, we would prefer to offer those for the record and perhaps give you some brief summary remarks by way of introduction and then leave some extra time for our dialog.
Mr. BATEMAN. The statements of all of the panel members will be made a part of the record and you may proceed to summarize as you see fit.
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Secretary FINCH. Very good. Well, our topic for discussion for today, which is fundamentally how it is that we in the Department are providing readiness information to you here in the Congress, is important and the timing is propitious.
It happens that we in the Department have been working very hard on a couple of important initiatives to be able to improve the communication between ourselves, you and this committee, and the Congress as a whole. And if you would permit me, what I would like to do is report on these two initiatives, hit the highlights of it, and I'm sure my colleagues here will be able to fill in many of the details.
The first of these initiatives is one that involves four times a year providing to you here in this committee a great deal of new quantitative information on readiness. You, of course, know quite a bit about this initiative, because it really has its roots from some language, a provision in the Fiscal Year 1998 Defense Authorization Act that you were the sponsors of.
And as you know, this provision directed that we provide a very large set of readiness information to you on a periodic quarterly basis. And we are moving forward to doing exactly that. In mid-February we provided for you on the committee a report on how our plans are to carry this thing out, and you may note under this report that the package of information that we have is going to be very substantial. That we will begin to provide to you some 250-plus indicators of various aspects of readiness that will cover various dimensions of personnel, materiel, and training. And our first report will be up to beginning October 1.
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And I would anticipate that with this new information that you will find this to be a very forthcoming step in terms of our openness and willingness to provide as much information as you desire in terms of various aspects of readiness.
With that in mind, I wanted to offer a couple of cautions with respect to this information. First off, we are providing a great deal of it, but in terms of deciding what information to make available, one of the basic fundamental guidelines that we set was that we would not create any new additional burden on the troops in the field in terms of additional readiness reporting.
I think we are all aware that perhaps one of the biggest readiness challenges we face is the TEMPO of operations and the workloads that are on our troops. And certainly one thing that I believe we would totally agree with is that we don't want to increase the burden by providing additional readiness reports unless there is some compelling reason to the contrary.
So while there may be a desire on some—I know that in looking at the GAO report, there was some interest in providing additional information. What we concluded was that there would be marginal return for additional information compared with the additional burden that it would put on the troops in the field in terms of reporting. It simply wasn't worth it.
I would also offer perhaps a thought or two on expectation management. We will provide a massive amount of data, but at least based on my experience over 4 years in office in looking at indicators of readiness that have been provided by my friends here on the panel and their staffs, I will say that 99 percent of the time you will see information that simply isn't very interesting. You will show a very steady state stream of readiness throughout the force.
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And there may be an expectation on the part of some that there will some great revelation of some new insights into readiness. We will provide the information; we will be forthcoming. But at least in terms of what new insights that you will get over and above other reporting that we do, I at least caution that there may be less there than some would expect.
In terms of our second initiative, this is one that I think will directly address some of the concerns and issues that I know are on your mind. It involves a new thematic way that we are dealing with readiness issues in senior level assessment of them in the Department.
As you know, the Department's senior level body that deals with readiness issues is the Senior Readiness Oversight Council, known in our jargon as the SROC. And this body meets every month to consider high-level readiness issues. It's chaired by the Deputy Secretary, includes membership of the Vice Chairman, the Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretaries both from OSD and the military departments, and virtually everybody, at least in the Pentagon, that has some principal stake in readiness.
In the past, the meetings of the SROC have dealt with very good reports that were broad executive-level overviews of readiness. And while they dealt with issues, they tended to be very broad and more abstract. Something that we, and particularly both the Deputy Secretary and the Vice Chairman, concluded several months ago is that we really needed to put a bit more focused proactive issue-oriented spin on the discussions in the SROC.
And so what we have been doing over these last several months is to look in some depth at particular readiness issues that have come up on the screen, both from our former readiness reporting, from anecdotes in the field, from discussions that we have had with you all.
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And to just give you a flavor of this approach that we are taking, I wondered if I might go through a checklist of several of the issues that we've dealt with over the past several months. I will just list problems and actions that we have taken for each of these.
The first problem that we've addressed is PERSTEMPO. As we know, big issue in terms of the load that's on the troops. And the actions we've taken are a whole host of initiatives to include new service TEMPO management systems that have been in place to get a better visibility into these questions and help manage them better.
Another problem is biological/chemical warfare threats. And out of that consideration came our new program for anthrax vaccinations and a whole host of other initiatives to address that class of problems.
The third area is pilot retention. And from that, we have service initiatives to better manage the TEMPO of our aircrews, to offer bonuses, increased pilot production, better aircrew readiness reporting.
A fourth is recruiting and retention shortfalls. And the actions there included initiatives on the part of the services to increase incentives where needed and to very closely monitor what's going on in that area.
Another problem is declining aircraft mission capable rates. And there we have several initiatives, including service moves to put more money in spares funding, to include long-term programs for improving engine reliability and what-not.
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Another problem we addressed is the sufficiency of operations and maintenance funding in fiscal year 1998. And the actions there include, among other things, putting forth the emergency supplemental request to cover contingency costs in Bosnia and Southwest Asia, plus a number of service initiatives that will cover the potential O&M shortfalls that we might need.
Back in my office I have a checklist of all of the various readiness issues that seem to be up on the screen, and recently went through an audit of my checklist versus the list of things we've covered. And I think that by and large we've at least had some addressing of all of the major issues, except for one that I know is out there and one that I know is a concern to this committee, and that is situations where we may not have the right number and type of people filling out our units. And in that respect, while we haven't had an SROC focused on that question yet, I anticipate in the next month or two that we will have one.
It's not to suggest that in addressing these issues that we've solved all the problems. Clearly, these are tough, difficult problems. In many cases, it takes months or years for the solutions to finally take effect. But I can assure you that these are the issues that we're addressing that are the most critical for readiness. These are the issues that we hear about most often from anecdotes, reports in the field, and in your hearings. And they are the issues that are now getting focused, senior-level attention in the SROC.
And of course this is most relevant to this committee because, as you know, after having a meeting of this body, then we package the results and bring them before you in our quarterly reports. So I think that in the next quarterly report, subsequent quarterly reports, you will see a lot more focused, issue-oriented—you know, find-problems-and-fix-problems approach that will be coming up.
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Now given the improvements that we are making through our system, there is kind of a fundamental question: What is it telling us about the readiness of our force? If I could, I'd like to borrow from the words of our Chairman, General Sheldon, in his testimony before you in this committee on February 5.
At that time he said, ''It's my assessment that as Chairman that we are within the acceptable band of both readiness and risk.'' And in this context of the national military strategy of two major theater wars, we are ready to execute that strategy.
So in sum, I think that we are overall still in good shape with respect to the strategy, but I think that certainly with the evidence of this committee and our own discussions, we see areas of concern. And our approach is to take those areas and come forth and solve them.
Certainly based on all of my experience, both working with you and for you on this committee, I have come to understand over the years that issues like readiness are best dealt with as a collaborative measure between the executive and legislative. There's a long history of cooperation with this committee, and I would anticipate that for all of these various areas where we need solutions, we'll certainly need your help with them.
Moreover, there are two particular areas that are up on the screen that we would ask your special help and need your collaboration. First and foremost is the early and timely consideration of the emergency supplemental that we have up to provide funds to support our operations in the gulf and in Bosnia.
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And while it wish it perhaps were otherwise, clearly this committee alone is not in a position to deliver the Congress in total, but if we could ask you to work with your colleagues to move this along, it would be very important because any delays of any significance at all will really deeply eat into the readiness of the force.
And I would say that as we get into the fourth quarter, if we don't have the funds that we need, that you will see unprecedented drops in readiness. And my friends on the panel here I'm sure can give you some of the details of what an ugly scene that might look like.
The second area has to do with consideration of additional rounds of BRAC. I know this is a difficult issue for you all to consider, but in the long term, it's very important. I can recall after leaving the committee—you may recall that I went off and worked for the Rand Corp. and actually did some work for the Army studying what happened to the Army after Vietnam and what were the causes of some of its readiness problems.
And I recall a few years ago writing an essay based on that work which was entitled ''How the Army's Tail Ate Its Teeth After Vietnam.'' Now I think you can probably substitute the Navy, the Air Force, or the Marine Corps, but basically what happened, if you look at the numbers, is the Army's budget went down modestly, but because they did not have the tools of BRAC to divest their infrastructure, the infrastructure did not go down. That means the funding just completely collapsed in terms of the dollars out there to the units. And that was one of the principal causes.
And I think to this point in the draw-down, we've collaborated quite well and we've pretty much avoided that, but you know, the end is not here and if we don't do that over the long term, I think we may end up in a situation that we totally wish not to repeat in terms of the late 70s.
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So in closing, let me thank you and the work of the committee. As a member of your staff, I have come to appreciate the power of our collaboration together and its importance in making great progress in public policy issues.
I think we can all agree that readiness of the force is one of the top priorities in public policymaking. And I would anticipate that we will continue to work together closely in order to be able to keep our forces ready to fight and ready to win.
And with that, with the permission of the Chair, I'd like to next yield the floor to my friend and colleague from the Joint Staff, General Maher.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Finch can be found in the appendix on page 1092.]
Mr. BATEMAN. We'd be happy to hear from General Maher.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. JOHN J. MAHER, VICE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
General MAHER. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, it's indeed my pleasure and distinct honor to appear before you today. I want to thank the committee for your continuing support and for this opportunity to discuss the readiness of our Armed Forces. Let me begin firstly by echoing Mr. Finch's comment regarding General Shelton's current readiness assessment: Our Armed Forces remain capable, within an acceptable level of risk, of meeting the demands of our strategy.
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As you know, ensuring the current and future readiness of the Armed Forces is General Shelton's first priority. The process we use to assess our current readiness, my focus of today's testimony, is the joint monthly readiness review, or JMRR. And the JMRR process is the central component of the Chairman's readiness system and provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a current and broad assessment of the military's readiness to execute the full range of the national military strategy. It provides our senior military leadership a clear picture of current risk and highlights warfighting concerns.
This review incorporates inputs from the services, from the CINC's, and from the combat support agencies. The JMRR expands upon unit readiness assessments to also include a joint readiness perspective. This warfighter-oriented perspective focuses on the ability of the CINC's to integrate units into an effective force ready to execute assigned missions.
In the JMRR process, unit readiness is reported by the services, in accordance with their Title X responsibilities. Joint readiness is assessed and reported through the unified commanders. Depth is added through assessments from the combat support agencies. Although based on objective measures, these readiness assessments are by design subjective. Metrics alone do not define readiness. They are indicators and assessment tools used by commanders who are responsible for assessing and maintaining current readiness.
JMRR reports are based on three criteria: a current assessment, a 12-month projection, and a warfighting scenario. The scenario is specified to ensure a robust assessment of the most demanding missions. As the process has evolved over the past 3 years, we have varied the JMRR scenarios to cover the full range of the national military strategy from two nearly simultaneous major theater wars to lesser contingencies on the scale of Bosnia peacekeeping operations. Recently, our scenarios have adapted to include terrorist threats as well as weapons of mass destruction.
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The JMRR process runs on a 3-month cycle. Full reports are received from the services, CINC's, and combat support agencies the first month of each quarter. Issues raised in these reports are analyzed during the second month. During the third month, the services and Joint Staff functional experts provide feedback on actions to address these deficiencies.
It is important to note that the process focuses on the current readiness issues, working near-term fixes or work-arounds or accepting risk. Many of these problems cannot be resolved in the near term and can only be addressed through programmatic actions. These deficiencies are referred to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council or JROC. A JROC supported by the joint warfighting capabilities assessments process is the principal senior military forum for addressing joint requirements.
A summary of the JMRR is briefed to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council, SROC, the Department of Defense's principal readiness forum. The SROC, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, brings together both senior civilian and military leadership for a review and assessment of significant readiness topics. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Chiefs are the principal members. The quarterly readiness report to Congress is based upon information presented and discussed in the SROC.
Major pluses of the JMRR process are the internal readiness assessments conducted by the unified commands, services, and agencies necessary for their JMRR submission. These internal assessments add focus to readiness issues and provide important building blocks to the overall JMRR assessment and assure we get the warfighter's readiness perspective.
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Periodically we ask the Unified Command Service and combat support agencies to provide us feedback of the effectiveness of the JMRR. The results of a recent survey show great support of the JMRR process. The JMRR is recognized as an invaluable tool to bring the most significant readiness issues to the forefront. We continuously reassess the process and make adjustments as necessary to ensure that the JMRR remains an effective assessment tool.
One of the tools we use to support the JMRR process is the global status of resources and training system, commonly known as GSORTS. GSORTS is the single automated reporting system within the Department of Defense that functions as a central registry for all operational units.
A focus of GSORTS is to assist in determining the ability of units to perform the missions for which they were designed. As a unit readiness reporting tool, GSORTS provides information required by the unified commanders and Chiefs to perform crisis and deliberate response planning. GSORTS also provides management-level information required by the services.
Although GSORTS is a valuable tool, it is not designed to be the single source for readiness information. There is a wide variety of metrics and systems we use to assess our ability to execute the full range of the national military strategy.
We are working to improve GSORTS to better meet warfighter needs. Technical fixes and improved oversight have dramatically improved the accuracy of information. We also have rewritten GSORTS reporting policy to address timeliness concerns. Last, we have started development of improved assessment tools to better meet user needs.
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We are working with OSD and the services to provide expanded readiness information to Congress in compliance with section 322 of the Fiscal Year 1998 Defense Authorization Act. We on the Joint Staff are working to facilitate the process of providing comprehensive data from the services without adding more workload to our already fully tasked unit commanders. I would refer your questions pertaining to specific indicators to Mr. Finch or to the services.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the support of this distinguished committee, and I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before you and state my views on these important issues. I'll be happy to answer any questions you may have and I will be followed by the representatives from the services.
[The prepared statement of General Maher can be found in the appendix on page 1104.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, General Maher. Now we would be pleased to hear from General Burnette.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. THOMAS N. BURNETTE, JR., DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS AND ARMY OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
General BURNETTE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I too appreciate the opportunity to appear today and report on how the Army basically manages readiness in our reporting system.
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I believe, based on my experience as a battalion, brigade, and division commander most recently, that the Army has effective systems in place that allow it to measure, assess, and predict readiness in our forces. We have systems that let us do that.
I would tell you also that no readiness system is perfect, and SORTS certainly isn't. But I would tell you that it does give us the ability to measure the personnel status of our units, and quite frankly, I was surprised to hear my GAO friend tell you that we do not report every month by unit on percent of MOS qualified. We do. We also report on the percent of leaders in the unit, and we also report on the turnover in the unit. There are a number of things that go into GSORTS, and I was surprised that he wasn't informed on that, frankly.
But I would tell you, as you get it at each level of the chain of command, that it gives you an accurate reflection really of the combat status of that unit, the readiness status of that unit.
The interesting thing about it is its a bottom-up system; and it starts really with battalion commanders, not preparing the report, but signing the report. And in it, it's both a combination of measurable things like percent of soldiers assigned, or the equipment readiness in your unit, the mission-capable rate of your equipment.
But I would also tell you that it relies on commanders' judgment. Those of us that have been in this business for a long time appreciate that you entrust us with the lives of your sons and daughters. I would also hope that you trust us to report accurately and correctly and honestly to you, because I believe we do.
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I would also say that in this reporting process, in addition to personnel, equipment on hand, training, and equipment readiness, the commanders also report the status of certain other resources that they have, like their training ammunition, their funds, and things of that nature. And it gives them an opportunity monthly to report that up the chain of command as they see fit.
And then finally it gives them an opportunity in this report to report anything else they want to say to the Army's leadership. And as an example, as a division commander, I read every status report from my battalion commanders. And I will tell you that today, General Reimer, our Chief of Staff, reads every one from his major combat units, divisions and special forces groups that comes in. And we do that.
I was also a little taken aback by the testimony of my GAO friend saying that there was a benefit to inflating your reports. I would tell you nothing could be further from the truth. As the 10th Mountain Division commander, for about a year I downgraded the readiness report of my division to reflect the fact that even though the numbers added all up, in my personal professional opinion, that unit was more accurately reflective of a C–2 status than a C–1 status.
And I think the rest of our commanders do that, too, because they understand that in the command climate we deal in that that status report is also in many respects a request for resources. So if you're short people, it doesn't do you any good to say you're not. If you're having problems getting training funds, it doesn't do you any advantage to say you're not.
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So I would say that there are differing opinions on that, and I think most commanders believe that it is an accurate reflection. So I would say that it does give us an accurate thing. Now, the unit status report [USR], as we fill it out in the Army, is an input into the DOD system, so that information has full visibility by everyone, but, more importantly, it's the basis for the whole chain of command, for a division and our Army Chief of Staff to get the information on those units and actually manage their readiness.
On a monthly basis, the Chief of Staff sits with the Deputy Chiefs of Staff in the Army Operations Center, and we go over the readiness status of our major units one by one, and we go through the commander's comments that they write to there, and we use that process to determine what the problems are and what fix we're going to put into place. And as I mentioned, this process also takes place by our division commanders, installation commanders, and others worldwide, so they use it not just to report it but to use it as a way to fix problems that people bring up.
I would also say, SORTS is not the only source of data that you use to manage readiness, far from it. There are many, many other things that you use—and I guess Mr. Finch talked about the numbers of different indicators—some are more important than others. So, I think there's a good process within the Army. As to the JMRR and the SROC, we participate in that, and I feel and the Army feels that it is a useful process. It gives us an opportunity to bring forth issues that we have to the joint arena and also to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for resolution.
As to the expanded quarterly readiness report, in October, you will receive your first one; and although we will provide at your request a great deal of raw data, large volumes of it, frankly, I predict that this will not necessarily give you a better understanding of the readiness of units out there, but I do think the things that we will provide you in the QRR as far as major problems and remedies, we'll do that for you.
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But looking at just data doesn't really do it. For instance, if you're looking at the status of all C3 units in a quarter, that doesn't tell you much, because in my personal experience, the status of an individual battalion's problem is kind of transitory; it will go away in a month or two—you might be short a few people here; later on, they come back in. But I would say that we in the Army are willing to work with the committee to try to provide you information that's useful to you in order to assess the readiness of the armed forces and give you the opportunity to help us remedy those problems.
So, the bottom line, I would tell you, is that the Army's leadership from the Chief of Staff on down is actively involved every day, every month in managing readiness in the Army, and I think we do a fairly good job of that within the resources that we have.
In closing, I'd like to thank the members for your support in ensuring Army readiness, and I stand ready to answer any questions that I might be able to. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Burnette can be found in the appendix on page 1111.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, General Burnette, and, now, Admiral Ellis.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. JAMES O. ELLIS, JR., DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR PLANS, POLICY AND OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
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Admiral ELLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I, too, want to echo the sentiments of my colleagues and express our appreciation for the opportunity to appear before you here today and for the opportunity to continue the review of this vitally important issue.
As has already been stated by the members and then some of my colleagues, the review of readiness is inherently a very complex process. It's been ongoing for as long as we have had a military in this Nation, and it's been properly exercised on both the civilian and the military side. The complexity of it has only increased with time, and the metrics and the methods and the techniques by which we measure have changed as well.
If I might answer the question from the previous panel, we have had a SORT system or its predecessor for 34 years beginning in 1964; our first formal reports in 1968, so it's now the 30th birthday. It is not the SORTS now that it was then. We have continued to tailor and refine and update that system at every turn to ensure that it meets the needs that we have to fulfill so critically, and that's ensuring that we take advantage of every metric that's available to assess the readiness of the fleets.
Mr. Pickett has, I think, quite accurately pointed out that there is no way that you can totally quantify the readiness of any armed force. There's too many other ephemeral issues that are wrapped up in that; that must be considered, but—and SORTS is by no means the only method that we use, but it has evolved with time, and, indeed, there are changes afoot now within the Navy SORT system to ensure that we continue to capture those critical nuances that are so essential to this balancing that we're about now as we work toward sustaining our current readiness while ensuring our future readiness.
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The leadership oversight is another critical issue, and Mr. McHale has touched on that far better than I. We have a tier approach in that as do all of the armed services. We have a chain of command responsibility that's actively involved in that oversight. I know that you in your field hearings and I know that Mr. Taylor in some of the correspondence that he's had made available to him, if there's any doubt of the willingness of our leadership out there in the field to articulate the needs, the legitimate concerns, and the shortfalls, I hope that your experience and your discussions there would dispel that; because the final point I want to make is that it is those fleet inputs, it is the considered judgment of the fleet commanders and their subordinate battle group commanders and the airwing commanders and the squadron commanders below them, that brings together the input that then flows into the JMRR and SROC process that you've already heard described.
I want to make sure that—I know you understand, but some may, perhaps, not—that where we get that readiness data is from the fleet. The fleet commanders, themselves, input it into that JMRR and SROC process. It comes up by two parallel processes, one directly to the service for our inclusion in the JMRR process and the other up through their Joint component avenue so it comes in from the unified CINC who also has a chance to review and edit and consider it as he brings his input into this new process. So, not only does it come from the bottom up, as Tom has alluded to with regard to the Army, it comes in by two different paths to ensure that no single individual or process of flaw in this system can preclude it from the appropriate level of consideration.
So, in summary, I would say the aggregation that we've talked about here at the level of oversight, that we in the military leadership and you in the civilian leadership are exercising, is not necessarily a bad thing, but it gets parsed out as it works its way down through the process to the fleet commanders and those that are properly charged to effectively ensure the combat readiness of those forces to accomplish that mission. It's the mechanism by which we allocate our resources, the Chief of Naval Operations every month just as the Chief of Staff of the Army gets a personal briefing using all of this data that's available on the current status of the forces in terms of readiness. We have shared that with staff members from your committee, and it's an open dialog that we welcome.
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So, I guess my point would be that, as Tom has alluded to, the process is not perfect, and as Mr. Pickett has noted, no deliberate, methodical, analytical process is ever going to fully capture all of the elements of readiness, but we have continued to refine it. We are far, far better now as a result of the focus since 1994; we've reorganized to ensure that we have single elements of our organization that focus almost exclusively on readiness and its assimilation that continue to explore new avenues in which we can get better data and make that available to those that make the critical resource decisions.
In conclusion, in my statement before you last Wednesday, I led in with a status of the forces around the globe. I'd like to conclude with that now. We still have three carriers in the Arabian Gulf or in the Sumkamaua. They're doing magnificent things for us. We now have two amphibious readiness groups and Marine expeditionary units special operations capable in the Mediterranean. One of them on its way over and one of them homeward bound for a well deserved respite as they once again begin that cycle of readiness that characterizes the Navy and the Marine Corps.
It is those sailors and marines, those men and women, that are the focus of all of the efforts, our collective efforts, to ensure that we keep faith with them in terms of giving them what I view as the most significant quality of life issue, and that's the ability to fight and preserve their life in combat if ever called upon to do so; and readiness is the critical element of that. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Ellis can be found in the appendix on page 1124.]
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Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Admiral. General Gamble, we're pleased to hear from you now.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. PATRICK K. GAMBLE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
General GAMBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to get back in dialog with you on this again as a continuation, I think, of the discussion we started last week, because it's flowing right along; and I think this entire discussion is really painting a clearer picture, and it is an expression of the stock and trade we all have in this business called readiness, and it paints, I think, a better picture of how complex this is.
The bottom line is we want your role in the oversight of this business we call readiness to be clearer to you; and so, therefore, we're entirely supporting whatever endeavors we can undertake to make that process work better. And that's our bottom line in being here and what we want to convey to the committee, because we appreciate the importance of doing that.
Having said that, though, we offer—in addition to what my colleagues have already said—a couple of thoughts—and you have my prepared statement; but these are in addition based on the discussion that has already taken place. One of them is, we're spending an awful lot of time discussing the process, and, actually, I think it was Congressman Ortiz at the beginning who was the only one so far who's talked about the product. Are we ready? How do you know that, bottom line, this process that we're endlessly dialoging on works?
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And there is, in fact, a balance between the examination of the process and all the indicators as complex, objective, or subjective as they may be, and the product which is the expression of the readiness of the force when it goes out and does what it's supposed to be able to do. And, so I think if you take that balance across the board and take a look at it, it starts with the subjective assessment of the commander; and I think some great words have been said about what drives that commander, that young lady or that young man, who are out there in front of the troops. And I agree that while there's been discussion about careerism and some of those kinds of things, I can happily state before you today that that is not the driver. The driver that's been expressed is the fact that—and it is an ethos—you want to win when the chips are down; that's No. 1, because the country expects that, and you want to do it with the fewest number of casualties. And, so, therefore, the accountability and responsibility for that is, exclusively and by law, given to that commander, and that commander then when he or she reports is trying to do their best to be able to tell it like it is, and I think that's the bottom line that we should take to the bank and not forget, and if there are cases where that's not true, then let's pursue and eliminate any tendency for that to be in their future. But I think in the vast majority of all those 9,000 units, that's not the case.
In fact, what is the case in the Air Force as I look across what has been demonstrated, is a compilation of several things. If I look at the exercises, recently, that we've undertaken and look at the after action reports and see the critiques and the hot washes and the demonstration of the units to arrive and conduct those exercises and then go home safely and meet the tasks and the objectives that were in those exercises, I'm encouraged; we're doing pretty good. If I look at the training that goes on at Ref Flag and I look at the hot washes and the compilations of results that are racked up by the units that go out and train and watch their learning curve go up just like we expect it to do—not stay flat or go down, but go up—I'm encouraged because that training is working for us, and when we rotate those units through, we're giving them quality training, and that is the kind of training we're still getting today. When I look at the results of the inspections that the units are getting when it comes time to show cause formally to an inspection team from the service or from a DOD or an agency inspection, I'm encouraged because right now those ratings still remain pretty high. And, then, finally, in the real world, if I look at the deployments to Bosnia; the operations recently in Bosnia, Operation Northern Watch, Southern Watch, the recent augmentation—did they get there when the CINC wanted them there on the day he wanted them? And were they ready to go to work when they got there? The answer is a solid yes. So, if I look at that balance between the process and the product, right now I would say that is the basis upon which we say we're ready to accomplish the mission.
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Now, we stood before you last week and we stand before you again this week saying, ''But we have concerns.'' And what we're trying to do is express this greater fullness of what readiness is all about and get out in front of the problem rather than report the problem after it's already occurred; and, again, I'm happy to say I think that's where we are right now. We're in front of the problem.
Let me just use mission capable rates as a small example. Our mission capable rates that we strive for are a goal that is placed in the Air Force, but it is not the wartime mission capable rate for which the wartime plans would call us to be accountable for. This goal is higher than those mission capable rates by a significant amount, and it's higher because that ethos that you mentioned, we co-op that, and we capitalize on that, and we take the efficiency and the motivation of our leaders and our troops and their productivity and we channel that and we say we can do better than the minimum. We can reach a goal up here that gets us to the top end of the readiness bar rather than meet the minimum standard; and so, in fact, we raise that bar higher, and so the degradation that you're seeing in the Air Force is a degradation from that top end. It is not a degradation from our wartime minimum; it's a degradation from our maximum goal that we set out for different aircraft types. And it does concern us that we're off meeting that goal, but we're a long way from being unable to meet our wartime tasks. We're trying to work the problem before we get to that lower end.
Let me address another item that came up about a common system across the Guard and Reserve as well as the active duty forces. I can also report that that is the case in the Air Force. You know we're pretty integrated in terms of the Guard and Reserve and the active duty in the Air Force. We've been working on that for a long time. If an air lifter or a bomber or a fighter pilot go out and exercise taking inspection or do the real thing, it's the same standard for all of them. In fact, the readiness ratings are the same for all the units, and as regards those readiness ratings, they cover flying units as well as ground units such as security police and engineers.
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About 8 to 10 percent of our SORTS units that report have a commander who changes that report from the objective grade to a subjective grade overall based on the commander assessment. About 8 to 10 percent of our overall reports are changed by the commander. Two-thirds of those assessments go up; one-third of those assessments go down on the average. To me, that's kind of healthy. Let me give you an example of where a commander might raise a grade—this is a hypothetical example, but one in which in my previous experience I've seen. If a security police commander has a 44-man squad which has to meet a certain firearm training schedule by a certain date and if they don't they lose status and go down; if that individual for some reason doesn't meet that schedule and all 44 of those people go unqualified on that date, that may very well result in him having, because of SORTS, to downgrade the report; to go from, let's say, a C2 to a C3. But that difference of 1 day, objectively, is subjectively overruled by that commander because the commander knows that that unit, if you take SORTS, that snapshot in time on that day, that unit, if mobilized that day and sent, can still shoot, can still fight, can still as a team go out and do the job that that 44-man team is supposed to do in that greater scale; but, yet, the SORTS would say, ''You are required to downgrade that unit because they missed their training, and they have to make it up and catch up.'' And if they do it 2 days later, if you took the snapshot again, their SORTS rating would jump right back up. So here's the dilemma that a commander has sometimes, and this is the reason why we give them the latitude to be able to be subjective and that balance, once again, comes into play.
And, finally, I think the last thing I would comment on is we really do want to improve this process. We have improved it; we're not satisfied with it; we think we're getting smarter about it, and, in the Air Force, we have gone out with a integrated process team to get those anecdotal field comments firsthand. And we like the take on that, and we think we want to do that some more and see if we can't sort of roll this into the normal way we do business because we found those to be quite valuable. As I said in my written comment, sometimes they're a little emotional, sometimes they're a little gun barrel focused, because that's the view of the world from the individual you're talking to; but, boy, they sure put the emotion in there, and there's always a negative truth in there someplace. And if you accumulate those, you may very well uncover something that didn't come out in the SORTS; and you can get right to the heart of it, and in the chain of command we take all of that very, very seriously.
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So, in sum, I think, once again, I don't envy the GAO folks when they have to go out and work a problem like this, because it is precisely that complexity and the enormity of the whole thing that makes it very, very difficult, argues against an outsider doing it, because the inside group, those of us who do it for a living and do it in great numbers, we have a lot more at stake, and I'm satisfied that our commanders do it to the best of their ability and give us a pretty fair shake when they report up the chain. Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Gamble can be found in the appendix on page 1131.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, General Gamble. Now, General Steele, we're pleased to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. MARTIN R. STEELE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PLANS, POLICIES AND OPERATIONS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
General STEELE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I, too, am honored, like my colleagues, to be back with you today talking about the preparedness of the Marine Corps to fight and the quarterly readiness report to Congress.
I do not intend to repeat what my colleagues have said. There are a couple of points that I would like to make in the opening. The Marine Corps currently reports on 132 of its major units. Those are our ground, aviation, and combat service support units. We intend to continue to refine the process to give them the tools to allow them to provide more insightful information about the readiness.
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As I've mentioned to this committee on two previous occasions and our Commandant, General Krulak, has also talked to you, the Marine Corps approaches readiness in a cyclical manner; that is in three phases: those units that are at the tip of the sphere, as Mr. Ortiz said earlier today, that are the highest state of readiness; those that are just returning; and those that are preparing to deploy. We're going to continue to do that because we believe it's the most effective way for us to establish and maintain current and ready units and also ensure focus of effort with our resources available to us.
At the same time, we also intend to ensure that the products, that the tools that we provide our commanders to allow them to more accurately report and reflect the readiness of those units will be improved upon in an iterative way. We intend to work with the Joint Staff and OSD and our sister services to ensure that we can refine this process day in and day out; and, like my colleagues who've said we do believe that in its 30-plus years, it's going to continue to need to be refined into the future to ensure that we do this more accurately.
Finally, I'd like to thank you for your support and your continued support to ensure you that through this methodology, through this EQRR, this enhanced quarterly readiness report to the Congress, that we will be able to provide you with more viable information for your oversight functions. It's an honor to be with you today, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Steele can be found in the appendix on page 1137.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, General Steele. I thank all of you. Your testimony has been very, very helpful, and I can assure you it has had some genuine impact.
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Let me express at least my view that our interest in readiness and in the way you quantify our readiness is more than just our oversight responsibility. I guess it proceeds from the oversight responsibility, but our involvement in this is as much or more to improve the system that you operate under and the processes that you utilize as the people who are really in charge and who day in and day out have the direct responsibility for the capability of our forces. So, while we're interested in it, and there is a legitimate concern from an oversight point of view, the driving principle factor, at least in my mind, is we want you better prepared to measure your readiness in order that you can report to us where there are deficiencies.
Now, in the implementation plan that addresses the provisions in the 1998 authorization bill, as I understand it, according to the GAO, the implementation plan contemplates that 7 of 19 indicators you did not contemplate reporting on; some, because we already have that information in another form, others, because you didn't feel like the game was worth playing, that the data—the effort to obtain the data was disproportionate to the value that the data would have if you received it.
What I'd like—and I don't know that anyone prepared to do it ad hoc today—I think we need an answer that tells us of the seven indicators that you don't contemplate including in your report to the Congress, which ones are in the category of ''You already have that information in other forms,'' and which ones are you saying, ''It's not useful enough to go through the pain of collecting the data''?
Yes, Mr. Finch.
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Mr. FINCH. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I might at least give a preliminary response to that. In going through the 19 different indicators, I'll give you at least my arithmetic which may vary a little bit from that of the GAO. We are—and I think they would agree—providing precisely what you all have asked for in 13 areas. Of the remainder, there are three that we are providing but in different format. For example, there are—there's data on historical personnel status that is provided routinely under the defense manpower requirements report. There is operations tempo data, flying our planes and that sort of thing, which is provided as part of our normal budget documentation. There's training funding that, likewise, is provided under budget documentation. So, with those three areas, the information is available. We will cross-reference in our reports to you; but rather than creating more paperwork, more staff time to take data from one report and shift it into the other, we thought that the most effective and efficient way would be to just continue on in reporting to you in the Congress in the way that we have historically in those three areas.
There is one indicator which is entitled ''Deployed Equipment,'' and in looking through the details of both the GAO assessment and—in fact, the GAO may have mentioned that one of the bases for their comments is a study that was done sometime ago by the Logistic Management Institute [LMI], and this is sort of their baseline for which they make their judgments. In looking at the original study, the intention of LMI was to provide reporting on pre-positioned equipment, and we are covering that as pre-positioned equipment, so at least in that indicator that's one that we are totally complying with.
There are two areas where, for a variety of reasons, we thought we found ourselves in a position of not being able to provide useful information. One of these is the condition of nonpacing equipment items and the other is personnel morale. In the case of nonpacing items, this is a very, very complicated question. In the first instance, the majority of the services do not report and do not have data or any basis for reporting; and even where it is, it is exceptionally complex. I can recall—just as a personal story—a year or two ago digging into some data in various equipment in units and looking at ones that were deficient in the nonpacing item area, and I discovered that in one of the Army units they were deficient of d-flat clarinets. Now, I used to play the clarinet. I used to be a musician. I love Army bands, but it shows you the level of detail that if you get into that. I assure you, you do not want massive reporting in this area.
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In the case of morale, the reality is to fall, I think, legitimately, to commanders. One of the most important functions that they do is to keep their pulse on the morale of the troops under their command. We could find no good valid way of measuring it in terms of the statistics that we had out there; and, so rather than throwing numbers at you that we thought were not a particularly meaningful measure, we decided that despite our efforts of a good healthy search throughout the Department, that we were just simply unable to report anything in that area.
So, that's basically our audit. As I mentioned, we're going to provide 250-plus different types of readiness indicators that's going to be—you know, it's going to be a mountain of data, I think, when you see it, and those are the areas, just those two areas are the ones where we will not be able to be forthcoming.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Finch. A suggestion was made that we might refine the metrics of the SORTS report by simply going beyond just saying C1 or a grading, but also expressing the actual percentage figure. To be C1, you are 90 to 100 percent; to be C2, you're, I assume, 80 to 89 percent. Wouldn't there be some merit in everyone being able to look at it and immediately see whether a given unit is at 91 or whether it's at 89 or whether it's at 80? General?
General BURNETTE. If I may, in the Army we do report in SORTS an additional measure called mission accomplishment estimate [MAE] which is a specific number, and it's a percent, and that's the percent of the unit's wartime mission that commander feels he can do if he had 72 hours to prepare. If he was told today that 72 hours from now he would have to go to war, what's the percent? And that's reported monthly, and that's called a mission accomplishment estimate; and that's his overall view of his unit, the morale of the unit, the leadership of the unit, the sustainability, the training, and that is reported, and we look at that routinely each month. But the problem is when you start aggregating that and you add it all up for all the times, it doesn't really tell you anything. It's really only specific to the unit that you're dealing with. So, to try to aggregate that to say what is the MAE of the Army would be a meaningless piece of information to you; but it is a key component of what we do, and I think most other commanders of other services report very similar to that. I don't know how you would use that data in the aggregate, though. We look at it unit by unit, one at a time in addition to the C rating that we have.
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Mr. BATEMAN. Well, it would seem to me that if you're taking the personal equation and you're evaluating it and you conclude that it is an 81, not an 89, that if you're dealing with unit-by-unit measurements, it wouldn't be any more difficult but it might be a little bit more meaningful if, as to each category that enters into it, you just gave the rating, not just something within 10 point blocks.
General BURNETTE. Mr. Chairman, our units do report that way by specific percent of personnel filled, personnel available, MOS-qualified, and the numbers and the percent of senior grade on hand. That information is reported. I'm not sure where we've given the impression that it's not part of the source data.
Secretary FINCH. I wondered if I might, Mr. Chairman, address kind of the general principle that you bring before us, and this is really kind of at the heart of something that's a real challenge and a genuine dilemma in readiness reporting.
If the senior level both in the Department as well as up here we brought before you the actual percentage of each unit, again, it would be a stack of paper this size; nobody could make sense of it. It is essential when you get to look at the force as a whole to aggregate in some way, to pull the pieces together in some sort of meaningful way. And, as you suggest, the way that SORTS does it is it talks about bands. There's the C1 which is the top band and C2 that's pretty good but not quite there and C3 and what not. And so while there is surely at the unit level when whoever it is that fills out the form that says what percentage of the people—you know, at that level, there is a real number that is actually down to the actual percent. But that type of reporting brought up through the chain and brought to us and to you at your level, it would not be meaningful, so what we choose to do is to say, ''Well, let's aggregate into bands and use that as a means of giving us a bit of the picture of the forest as opposed to all of the trees.'' I think it's—I mean, we could have a fair debate to say between 80—that the swing between 90 and 100 percent is too big and maybe we would want to occasionally reexamine whether we've got the bands right; but the reality is that somehow we need to have some means of aggregation and probably put units in groups in some fashion, and at least the way that we do it now seems to be reasonably satisfactory.
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Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. It's nice to have you all back again, and we appreciate the fine work that you do. One of my concerns, again, you know, has been the spare parts. We've had hearings in San Diego; we've had hearings here; and my question is where does availability of spare parts fit into the quarterly readiness report process? At what point would it appear as a critical readiness factor? How do you measure that?
Secretary FINCH. If I might just talk a bit generally and then draw upon the expertise of my colleagues here for some specifics. But spare parts, in the first instance, has an effect on mission capable rates of our equipment which is in turn reported through SORTS and other means. And so through the quarterly readiness reports and through the general information that we will be providing to you that if we have concerns and problems in that area that they will ultimately manifest themselves in the current reliability and mission capable rates; and I think that certainly in the services we have something where we have run into a few problems here and there, but that is ultimately the manifestation of it in terms of our reporting.
As I mentioned, in particular, mission capable rates and the cause for the fall off in some areas of mission capable rates due to spare parts has been the matter of focused attention recently before the Senior Readiness Oversight's Council; and in terms of our quarterly reports to you, I would anticipate in the next report, which I believe is due at the end of April, that we'll give you our take on the problem as we see it and the several measures that we're taking to be able to deal with it. But, with that, I'd like to yield to my colleagues to give more specific comments on reporting on the effects of spare parts shortages in readiness.
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Mr. ORTIZ. Are there other comments?
Admiral ELLIS. Yes, sir. As Mr. Finch has pointed out, the ultimate arbiter, the adequacy of spare parts, I guess, is no doubt about it, your readiness levels; but, clearly, there are many other mechanisms by which we measure that the range and depth of our aviation consumables allowance on board aircraft carriers and shore stations gives us a sense for both how wide the parts base is and the depth of that. That's routinely tracked as a metric, as I said, for both embarked afloat and support stations ashore. Clearly, the important element, though, with parts in addition to the aggregate number, is are the parts the right parts? And are they in the right location which is another essential element that we also track? We've realized some efficiencies by drawing down and colocating parts in regional hubs that increase the efficiency and responsiveness and aggregate some savings as well. So, we continue to monitor that issue, Mr. Ortiz, with the logisticians and the supply folks that make their living doing line-by-line assessments and after-action reports of recent deployment effectiveness and the like, so that we consistently tailor not just the numbers of parts but the specific types of parts and their location to ensure that we contribute optimally to sustaining readiness.
Mr. ORTIZ. Anybody—and the reason I ask, we had a civilian gentleman with us the other day, and he stated to the committee that there was a way of saving money; and he said the way we can do it is by reducing the stock that we have, the parts that we have; but to begin with, we don't have parts. What are you going to reduce? How are we going to save money when we don't have the parts?
Secretary FINCH. I think as a general——
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Mr. ORTIZ. And this worries me, you know, because either we have a replacement or we don't; and at what point is it really a high risk for our troops?
Secretary FINCH. Mr. Ortiz, if I might address this directly?
Mr. ORTIZ. Yes, sure.
Secretary FINCH. I think one of the—every day in a drawdown you learn something new about the effects of a drawdown. Just when you think you've come to understand that, there's something new again, it comes up. I think particularly in the spare parts area, clearly, there was a time as the force structure drew down and we were buying parts for a larger force structure, we had a pretty good inventory of spare parts; and so in many of the planning processes in terms of how many new spare parts we would buy and that sort of thing, we planned it based on our recent experience, and our recent experience often was we didn't need to buy anything because we had the surplus. By and large, I think that the surplus is gone. By and large, we are no longer in a position where we can live off of the procurement that we did in the mid and late eighties.
One of the lessons now is that have to, now, readjust and get back in the business of buying spares at a rate that's adequate. And I think that, for example, as you know, a lot of spares, particularly, in repairable areas is determined by industrial funding and that sort of thing; and one of the things that we need to make some adjustments on is to get the industrial funding and the pricing structure caught up to the fact that we no longer have these excess inventories. We need to start buying things anew. I know that in a couple of cases in the last year or so, one of the reasons we got a bit behind the eight ball in spare parts is because we didn't get the pricing mechanism right; and the reason we didn't get the pricing mechanism right was because we were assuming that there was an excess inventory that simply wasn't there. But I would anticipate now that we understand this problem that we're going to get ahead of it, and we're going to be a lot better on pricing, and we're going to have a better supply of spares that are out there.
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General GAMBLE. Mr. Ortiz, in the Air Force side of the spare parts story, let me unequivocally say that this is one area where there isn't a lot of ambiguity. The direct input of a dollar for spare parts feeds—and we've got a computer program that's really good at this now—feeds directly to a mission capable rate. That's one of the areas where we can connect the two pretty straight. So, under funding spares, we'll, in fact, drop MC rates predictably, and we can come within a percent or two of figuring out, depending on what the funding is, what the impact is going to be on MC rates. That story is in our quarterly ratings report that we just submitted to you; and it's combined along with, as we reported before, the aging of the aircraft fleet so you can see where that drives the dollar figures up, and, in fact, those dollars have been asked for to the tune, I think, of upward of about $1 billion because of the aging aircraft fleet. Over time, we've been increasing the request for spares.
So, not only that, but in the SROC part of the readiness reporting system, I had to stand before the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman and specifically talk about spare parts issues and spares with regards to engines, airplane by airplane. So, we got into that in very great detail in the SROC process, and it does not go unnoticed; that gets a lot of attention, sir.
Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you very much.
General STEELE. I would just like to add one point, sir, in going back to your question and just a complementary answer to what you've heard. Where you would see this was how I understood your question in our processing system in spinning off what General Gamble said. In our case, you would see it dramatically on—in those units that had returned from deployment whose priority for spare parts provisioning went down. They would be C3 and C4 almost immediately, because they no longer had the high priority as the tip of the sphere units; and they would report it immediately in their readiness report under ''R'' in the code; and it would be their rationale reason for why they were C3 or C4. And until they started to go back into the preparation for deployment cycle and their priorities went up again, they would remain at that way because of the condition of our equipment in that it's old—older. There's a minimization of spare parts, and they're not available to those units that are just returning from deployment.
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In one aviation case, it would be where we have a specific problem, for example, in our AV–8 engines that we've talked to you about and the challenge we're facing with the identification of a readiness condition within the AV–8 engines. That's going to be reflected—again, we've been able to ensure that the readiness of the forward deployed units, our AV–8 squadrons is up, but the minimal availability of the part that we need to repair the engines is reflected back on the units that are in the rear.
Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ortiz. Mrs. Fowler.
Mrs. FOWLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you gentlemen for being here. I know it's getting late, so I won't take but a few minutes. I have read your testimony and I just really have one question–and Admiral Ellis, I know, knows what I'm going to bring up; and I am looking forward to meeting with Admiral Hancock next week—but whenever I bring it up people don't seem to know about the figure or facts. I've got here the pages from the DOD overview, and it's coming straight out of their figures as well as the Navy's budget about the backlog that's going to be in the system that's projected for fiscal year 1999 for airplane engines.
And in looking at this overview that I just saw this afternoon, I'm concerned because it has in here, ''however, Navy reports that the airplane backlog goal of hundred units will be mandant and the engine backlog goal of 250 units will be achieved in Fiscal Year 2001 as planned.'' Well, last year, there was a backlog of about 500—this year, rather—next year, there's going to be a backlog of over 700. I'm not sure that's the direction we need to be going to get to 250 by 2001. So, I'm a little concerned about how this math is working out and more than half of the total of backlog that's going to be in the whole depot system is for the Navy, and I'm really worried. I look at these figures here and the financial backlog estimates of aircraft for the Navy is at $315 million and that's up from $246 million last year.
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So, it's not going in the right direction, and I'm looking forward to talking to Admiral Hancock, because I think this impacts directly on readiness; because what I hear out there is that we have carriers going out without their full complement of planes. We have planes coming in that are being cannibalized so the next ones can take off. I had pilots calling me saying, ''We're afraid to go fly this plane, because it's not being maintained properly; it's not being kept within the manner it should be.''
How many other planes are not able to fly because of that? I do look forward—I don't know if you have any comments on that or not, but I'm meeting with Admiral Hancock next week.
Admiral ELLIS. Thank you, Ms. Fowler. As always, you're cutting right to the point on some critical issues.
I've now read the OP–25 and see where the data are to which you refer. Clearly, we're concerned about the backlogs, as you mentioned. We are working toward a goal of 100 engines—or excuse me—100 airframes and 250 engines. As you note, after the spike predicted by the model, next year we do resume the curve, as you say, that by 2001 puts us on that very manageable goal of 250. We have plused-up, as you are also aware, I know, over the future year defense plan, about $340 million toward the backlog to which you refer.
The model is composed of a number of elements. It's not as precise as we would like. For example, you say we're at, as you note, around 100 engines—or excuse me, 100 airframes. We were predicted to be last year about 170. So we're actually doing better than the model predicted. We have continued to ramp-up the commitment. I think, as you know, by 2001, we're well up above the current funding level. So I think Admiral Hancock will be able to present to you the analysis that shows the confidence we have in getting to those goals, why we think those goals are appropriate, and we also share your concerns. We've got to get to management levels, because that is a precursor of readiness.
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Mrs. FOWLER. Well, that's why I think it is a direct relation to readiness, and I am concerned about it and want to see these numbers. I've arranged them—you can tell I'm a hack—these dollars that are projected to bring this down by 2001, how many of those are projected to come out of the savings in outsourcing and privatization? Because you're not going to get what they're projecting. I know that's part of the future years defense program [FYDP], is, oh, you're going to have all this money being saved, and this, therefore, we can spend. I'm a little worried that you're not going to have it, and then we're going to continue to see. So I'll be interested in where those dollars are really coming from.
Admiral ELLIS. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. FOWLER. Thank you, Admiral Ellis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mrs. Fowler.
Mr. McHale.
Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony. I regret that there are so few members of the committee here to listen.
I would recommend to you that you not think of this as a light turnout, but rather think of we three as the most powerful Members of Congress. [Laughter.]
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I would like to come back, if I may, to the point that I raised to the first panel; and General Burnette, I'm glad that you were in the room at the time that I raised some of those issues.
Preliminarily, let me repeat what I said the other day when General Reimer appeared before our committee. I credited him personally, and the senior leadership of the Army, with enormous improvements over the past year in terms of the integration of Guard and Reserve forces into the Total Force Army.
The Army, I think, has achieved a great deal in that regard, very substantial improvements and I think that is the reflection of the will of the leadership of the Army, to make sure that all components of the Army are fully integrated into the war fight.
And my question really comes back to that ongoing and successful effort and that is the degree to which the Army measures combat capabilities across intraservice boundaries utilizing objective standards. I truly don't know what you do in that regard. I mentioned earlier that I am familiar with what the Marine Corps does. The Marine Corps has a MCCRS standard that applies whether you are active or Reserve. It's an object standard of combat capability. Does the Army have a similar standard?
General BURNETTE. Yes, we do. The reporting system, the readiness reporting system, for our Reserve components is identical to the active component for everything: Personnel, equipment readiness, training readiness, commander's assessments. The only difference is that we require them to report quarterly, every 3 months, rather than monthly because, frankly, the data don't change that much, month to month.
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But they are identical.
Mr. MCHALE. But in terms of combat proficiency, the standard remains the same?
General BURNETTE. They are the same measures, that is correct.
Mr. MCHALE. Has the Army, and I don't mean to come at you out of left field on this, has the Army taken a look at the SORTS reports for the 48th Brigade of the Georgia National Guard immediately preceding their activation during the gulf war to determine whether or not those SORTS reports accurately reflected the combat capability of that unit?
General BURNETTE. I am certain that we have, and let me provide that to you. I am sure we have some studies on that. I was not in that area during the time that it went on. I was in 10th Mountain region.
Mr. MCHALE. I understand and I understand completely that you are not able to answer that off the top of your head, but I think that examination might be instructive. Not so much in terms of the combat readiness of the 48th Brigade, but the revelation of any deficiencies, that might be seen in the reporting prior to that period, because clearly when the unit was brought to active duty, a command judgment was made that the unit was not ready for an actual combat assignment and if we have a discrepancy between the reports that were prepared in advance and the judgment that was made upon activation, I think an analysis may well lead to some helpful conclusions.
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General BURNETTE. I'd like to provide that to you and I will bring that over, whatever studies we have and bring that to you at soon as I can.
Mr.MCHALE. OK. The final question, and again, I was in the Active Marine Corps Reserve as an operations officer until just before I came to Congress, but in recent years, I've been a little bit out of the loop, so let me just double check with General Steele.
Do Reserve units still have the mobilization operations readiness deployment test [MORDT] procedure, where a unit is MORDTed?
General STEELE. Yes, sir. They do. I don't think we're doing MORDT and GOs though because of the cost associated with MORDT and GO, but the commander of Marine Forces Reserve is continuously out, checking on their ability to be able to respond and put their gear out.
Mr. MCHALE. I was actually going to ask about the MORDT and GOs and I'm glad you raised that, as we used to say in the law, ''sui sponte''; I'm glad that you raised that issue.
What that is, is, and I'm going to ask all of you from the various components to let me know what you do, so we're going to kind of move down the line here. It will be the end of my questioning.
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When a unit, a Reserve unit, was MORDTed, in order to provide an objective evaluation of that unit's combat capability, above and beyond and the most recent SORTS report that would have been filed for that unit, a team of inspectors without warning would show up at that Reserve unit on a given weekend and would objectively measure the performance of that unit, across a range of capabilities, including training and logistical support.
Does the Army have something like, where out of the blue a team of people, outside the unit, who do this on a full-time basis, will show up and put that unit through its paces in order to have a benchmark against which to measure the more subjective standard reported in the SORTS process.
General BURNETTE. We do not have such a procedure. We do, however, do an evaluation of those units during their annual training, rather than do it out of the blue on weekends.
Mr. MCHALE. As someone who has had a knot in his stomach when that MORDT team arrived, let me suggest to you, that's not a bad idea. It does not take a great deal of manpower to achieve it; this is a team that reflects a variety of professional and MOS experiences so it is a well-balanced team of objective professionals who show up unannounced on the doorstep of that Reserve unit to take a hard look at their gear and training to make sure they are ready.
I think that is a very worthwhile concept. As I said, I've been on the receiving end of it, and not only is it effective when the team shows up, the prospect of the team showing up at any time, provides, I think of H.L. Mencken's words that ''Conscience is that little inner voice that tells you someone may be looking,'' and so you're never quite sure when your conscience is going to show up on your doorstep and when they are going to take a hard look at your proficiency. I think it's a very, very fine and very effective concept.
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Admiral, if you could tell me briefly about the Navy. Do you have a uniform standard across the components of the Naval service and do you have any kind of process that resembles the MORDT procedure?
Admiral ELLIS. First off, with regard to uniformity of standards, we certainly do, Mr. McHale. As you know our Reserve forces are not quite aligned in the same manner as the Marine Corps and the Army are. We have some that are involved principally in contributory support and then we do have the units that are ships, aircraft squadrons, and the like.
Those that are ships and aircraft squadrons are fully employed. They are fully integrated into our daily operations. They are making UNITAS cruises around South America, they are doing marvelous things in active involvement. Same thing with our EA–6B Reserve squadrons that deploy in the normal rotation to those places where they are in such high demand those days. So——
Mr. MCHALE. And so your Reserve squadrons and your active duty squadrons are measured by exactly the same professional benchmarks?
Admiral ELLIS. Yes, sir, they are. Now some of the tactical air squadrons that don't routinely deploy, they'll do their 2 weeks active duty, those types of operations. But as far as the surface ships go, they're out there steaming every day in support of fleet operations and legitimate forward presence requirements; so they're not, we don't have to have somebody knock on the door. The guy's aboard and evaluating him just as we do all of our other units as they prepare for those types of iterations, sir, so we're very pleased by that.
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Mr. MCHALE. General Steele, obviously you do have the MORDT procedure and MORDT and GO, General, as I recall it, that you referred to it; occasionally a unit would not only be MORDTed, and that is this team would not only show up and inspect the unit, but they would instruct the unit to pack all of their gear, that unit would then deploy physically from that Reserve center to some predesignated destination.
That was called a MORDT and GO. It's very expensive but it also is an extraordinary task of rapid readiness, something that goes beyond the checklist of a SORTS procedure.
Admiral ELLIS. If I might add one amplification, Mr. McHale. We also have a number of units, as you know that are specialized, the mobile and shore undersea warfare units, some of the mine countermeasure helicopters, all of those are so involved in the annual exercises in Korea and other places, that they get their annual test either for real-world contingencies as the military intelligence electronic warfare [MIEW] folks just did in terms of the gulf response, or the major exercises on the peninsula, so that is the true metric by which we measure them. We send them out to the theater.
Mr. MCHALE. General Steele, I guess really the only question you have to answer or confirm is the standard of readiness used in the Marine Corps does not deviate whether you are talking about an Active duty unit or Reserve unit. Is that correct?
General STEELE. That's correct, sir.
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Mr. MCHALE. Same standard right across the board?
General STEELE. That's correct.
Mr. MCHALE. A marine is a marine.
General STEELE. A marine is a marine.
Mr. MCHALE. General Gamble.
General GAMBLE. As I said before, sir, same exact standards. If a pilot is taking a check ride in a bomber in the National Guard unit or an active unit, it's the same checkride. It's the same operational readiness instruction [ORI] when they are tested.
Now, where the difference comes in is the no-notice part of it. If you're pulling air defense alert in a National Guard fighter unit, it's no-notice when the horn goes off.
If you're pulling in a block 30 F–16 with a mobility commitment to join a time phased force deployment [TPFDD] that goes to Korea, for example, or to Southwest Asia, what they'll do is they'll gin you up with intelligence messages much like the real world would build you up prior to your mobilizing and deploying. So they don't no-notice them, they actually treat them like they would in a real world and bring them up to speed, so they recall their personnel and bring them down and so on.
And then, of course, the Reserve associate program you're familiar with with our airlift where the units are integrated and the Reserve flies just like the active duty crews, flies the same airplanes off the same piece of flight line.
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And then, finally, I think the most no-notice I can think of off the top of my head would be our rescue and recovery forces who do sit active duty alert and they get no notice for real and go out and perform some really hair-raising rescues and if you look at some of the ones done up in Alaska, this is real-world stuff where the parachute jumpers [PJ's] are jumping in at night at 20 below zero and rescuing people who are downed and injured and I guess that truly is the no-notice aspect of readiness up there.
Mr. MCHALE. As we move toward a true total force concept, and particularly as the Army shows dramatic and praiseworthy improvement in that regard, obviously when the unit's brought back in active duty and gets plugged into a mission, the standard is going to be the same, regardless of the origin of that unit.
I think it is absolutely essential that in a peacetime training environment we apply the same principles so that across the board, I would prefer with unannounced inspections, the standards be applied uniformly to active, Reserve, and Guard units because that not only guarantees readiness, the meeting of that standard is what breeds professional respect across the intraservice boundaries.
When everybody had to meet the same standard, the respect upon achieving that standard is likewise uniform.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. McHale. I have one further question and then I think we can let this good panel go about other things. The Army has at the National Training Center a very sophisticated observer-evaluator group who discharge that function for the various units who come there on exercises and the Air Force has its Red Flag and I'm sure there is also a very sophisticated evaluation done there.
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Does anyone take a look at the evaluations that are done at the training centers versus what the SORTS report on the units just before they came to the training centers?
Does anyone look at that?
General BURNETTE. From the Army's perspective, because we want the combat training center rotations to be a training experience rather than a test, we consciously do not compare units. We do, however, look at trends of different things that need more training. But we do not, as a conscious decision, in order not to put a chilling effect upon the unit commanders that their career's on the line when they go there, we make a conscious effort that we do not do that.
General GAMBLE. No, sir, I can't think of a direct link. That's an interesting idea. I don't think, if we do it, it's probably done by a commander at a particular unit who has thought of it much like you have, but it is not a policy.
Mr. BATEMAN. Well, we thank y'all very much. We do appreciate your testimony and taking the time to come and appear before us today.
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 1155.]
[Whereupon, at 5:22 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]
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The official Committee record contains additional material here.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BATEMAN
Mr. BATEMAN. We have been led to believe that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has identified some potential improvements to SORTS that, on the surface, seem to provide better detail and a better indication of a unit's readiness. For example: OSD suggested that units could report the actual percentage of required resources for SORTS ratings. OSD suggested that SORTS could be modified to permit units to report their readiness linked to specific missions, such as a major theater of war or a peace operation. OSD suggested that units could identify assets key to warfighting, such as combat crews and pilots, and report on the readiness of such assets individually.
The Joint Staff's plan for improving readiness assessment did not include these OSD proposals. Can you comment on each of these potential improvements and discuss your current plans, if any, to amend SORTS accordingly?
Secretary FINCH. Let me assure you that the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and each of the Services are working closely to ensure that the readiness reporting system provides the senior military and civilian leadership with timely and accurate information. Important to note, however, is that SORTS is only one measure used to monitor the readiness of the Services. The Department's readiness assessment is based upon a wide range of sources, to include the CINCs' integrated priority list (IPL); the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR); and the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC), which meets monthly with the senior leadership from the Services, the Joint Staff, and OSD.
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OSD, the Services, and the Joint Staff have all suggested improvements to SORTS. We continue to work collaboratively on the best way to pursue necessary enhancements to the system. Some of the improvements, primarily in technical upgrades, are already being implemented. The Department will continue to work toward ways of ensuring that the readiness reporting system meets the needs of the senior leadership.
We are also actively pursuing with the Joint Staff the automation of the reporting system and are enjoined in the Services' efforts to update their readiness reporting systems. For example, the Air Force has already undertaken SORTS improvements to capture pilot shortfalls more accurately, suggested as one of the potential SORTS improvements. We will continue to work to ensure these and other improvements are incorporated into SORTS reporting when it is feasible and effective to do so.
Mr. BATEMAN. GAO has recommended that DOD take steps to better fulfill the legislative reporting requirements under 10 USC 482 by providing (1) supporting data on key deficiencies and (2) specific information on planned remedial actions. DOD has concurred with GAO's recommendation. However DOD's response was not specific regarding what details will be provided in the future, such as figures on personnel or units, timelines for corrective actions, and resource requirements.
Can you tell us what kinds of details DOD will include in its upcoming reports to Congress?
Secretary FINCH. As you know, the information in the Quarterly Readiness Reports to Congress is based upon readiness assessments discussed in the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC), which meets monthly. Topics vary from our current readiness to meet the National Military Strategy to more topical issues such as personnel tempo, pilot retention, or spare parts shortages. We anticipate that in future reports we will be able to provide details such as figures on specific readiness shortfalls, the contributing factors, the key fixes need to correct the problems, the timelines for corrective actions, and the resource constraints or requirements affecting the problem.
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Mr. BATEMAN. Last year GAO testified that DOD had efforts underway to establish a ''readiness baseline'' which when completed would contain additional indicators with information on personnel, equipment, training, and joint readiness that is not available from existing DOD databases. However, DOD's current plan for incorporating the additional 19 indicators into the quarterly report to Congress will be limited to sources of information where data is already collected, such as SORTS.
What is the basis for DOD's decision to limit the scope of efforts to expand sources of readiness data?
Secretary FINCH. Several years ago, the Department initiated the readiness baseline effort to explore appropriate readiness indicators and data sources. There was no intent to create any new databases as sources for these readiness data. In fact, a core tenet of the effort was the need to validate the various databases already in existence in order to prevent the creation of additional workload on the troops in the field. This effort was a follow-on to the 1994 GAO and LMI studies on readiness indicators. Both of these studies highlighted readiness indicators, but did not provide substantive insight into which data would be useful for a strategic view of force readiness. For example, many of the indicators suggested by these studies were based on unit data maintained exclusively at the unit level, without consistency among units or across the Services. In fact, LMI recommended that many of these indicators were inappropriate for use in the strategic level monitoring of readiness.
The decision was made early in the Readiness Baseline effort that the Department should focus on existing data sources in order to prevent additional reporting requirements on the field units. At no time were unique data systems planned for this effort.
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Mr. BATEMAN. DOD's implementation plan relies on SORTS data on 4 of the additional 19 indicators to be included in the quarterly report. For example, DOD plans to report on personnel by using the personnel, or ''P'' rating in SORTS. However, the 1994 DOD funded study identified various indicators outside SORTS that measure the availability of assigned personnel and indicate the reasons why unit personnel are unavailable. As another example, DOD plans to report on the status of prepositioned equipment by reporting on C-levels reported in SORTS for prepositioned rather than their supply, or ''S'' rating.
Could you explain the rationale for these decisions?
What potential data sources outside SORTS did DOD consider for these 4 indicators?
Secretary FINCH. In order to determine the appropriate measure of personnel status, we began with a review of the LMI study. In addition to SORTS, the LMI study identified five broad groups of indicators of personnel status, all of which were maintained at the unit level and included level of detail such as ''listing of individuals by name, MOS, deployability, and reason if not available for duty.'' The LMI report further stated that ''current unit level personnel fill rates have little value beyond describing today's conditions'' and that for ''OSD purposes, personnel fill data should be aggregated to identify Service shortages.''
In a collaborative discussion with the Services, Joint Staff, and OSD, we determined that the best source for unit personnel data was the SORTS ''P'' ratings. These data provide in-depth insight into actual unit fill and can be collected efficiently and aggregated to the levels appropriate for senior level review. SORTS ''P'' levels are determined by measuring key indicators such as assigned vs. available strength, assigned vs. available senior grade leaders, and the fill of MOS (Military Occupational Specialty) qualified personnel. In short, ''P'' level is a very stringent measure that provides an indication of the skill and rank mismatches in units as well as pure personnel shortages. Our selection of SORTS ''P'' levels as the appropriate indicator is further reinforced by the LMI study that stated ''much of the information'' in their five broad groups of indicators ''is considered in developing SORTS personnel ratings.''
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As there was no earlier mention of ''status of prepositioned equipment'' in the 1994 GAO or LMI studies, we made the assumption that this indicator was designed to assess the readiness of equipment that the Department has prepositioned throughout the world. Thus, the most appropriate indicators were the overall readiness ratings of the actual equipment as reported in SORTS. The Supply, or ''S'' level, is but one sub-category of the overall readiness rating for these stocks of equipments. The overall ratings are a more stringent and accurate indicator of this equipment as it captures both the supply and condition of the equipment stock.
In determining the appropriate sources of readiness data, we considered all existing data systems in the personnel, training, and logistics areas. Through a collaborative effort of the Services, Joint Staff, and OSD, functional experts assessed databases throughout the readiness, budgeting, and programming areas to determine which source provided the best in-depth data that could be collected efficiently by all the Services, and which could provide relevant readiness information to the Department's senior leadership and Congress.
Readiness Indicators Recommended for GSORTS
Mr. BATEMAN. In your review of the readiness indicators identified by GAO and validated by the Logistics Management Institute (LMI), are there any of the indicators that you would recommend for inclusion in the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS)? If so, what are those indicators?
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General MAHER. Inclusion of additional indicators in GSORTS is not appropriate. The purpose of GSORTS is to provide commanders' assessments of the ability of operational units to perform the missions for which they are designed. Although many of the indicators recommended by LMI may provide valuable readiness information, they do not focus on unit level readiness and are already tracked in other databases or forums.
GSORTS currently contains over 450 joint and service unique data fields. While the individual areas assessed in GSORTS (Personnel, Equipment on Hand, Equipment Condition, and Training) provide a broad overview of resource areas, individual data fields provide a wealth of detail. We need to balance our need for information and the demands placed on unit commanders. Mandating additional GSORTS indicators could inadvertently increase the burden on unit commanders while duplicating reporting requirements. Finally, adding additional indicators to GSORTS is not recommended unless they are required by and have the full support of the warfighters.
General BURNETTE. The Army does not recommend adding any new indicators to SORTS. From the Army perspective, five of the indicators recommended by Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for reporting are already in the SORTS system. The remaining eight indicators are captured in established databases managed by different staff agencies. The Army has the ability to obtain the data required by the report by accessing the other databases. The Army recommends no changes. Adding additional data fields to the SORTS database will cause duplicate effort for units and staffs, will be confusing, and is unnecessary.
General STEELE. The LMI recommended indicators are not appropriate for addition to operational units SORTS reports. The level of aggregation mentioned by LMI is well above the unit, representing a Service perspective of the commodity areas. Some of the measurements are not appropriate for unit consideration such as recruit quality or recruiting shortfalls. Additionally, while several of the LMI indicators form the basis for unit ratings in supply, equipment readiness, and equipment location (deployed), these represent just that unit. Other databases accessible by Service headquarters provide the level of detail envisioned by LMI.
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The Marine Corps is always looking for ways to improve readiness measurement. This is especially important as the nation's ''force in readiness.'' While we are working with the Joint Staff and OSD to improve our readiness reporting system, the LMI indicators mentioned above are not the essential indicators upon which we should focus our units' readiness evaluations. The LMI report was not extensive, only analyzing that collection of comments to GAO from operational unit personnel as their other ''readiness indicators.'' Very few of these were common across all the Services. It is the military commander's judgment which sets the ultimate evaluation for his unit. This is why SORTS allows our commanders latitude for justifiable decisions that raise or lower their unit's readiness ratings. Measuring readiness can never be boiled down to an easy checklist of items but must remain focused on common indicators and the commander's judgment.
General GAMBLE. We reviewed the indicators and do not recommend any for inclusion in SORTS. SORTS was designed for a specific purpose—to determine, at the unit level, if the resources are available (funded, fielded, deployable/redeployable within the prescribed response time) to undertake the mission(s) for which the unit was organzied or designed. Adding additional indicators will not improve the fidelity of SORTS.
Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC)
Mr. BATEMAN. For those indicators that you feel do not belong in the readiness assessment of units within your service, can you explain why they would not be helpful in determining the true status of your units.
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General BURNETTE. The Army feels that six of the original indicators should not be included in the expanded Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC). The indicators and rationale are as follows:
(1) Deployed Equipment.—This metric is not critical for the Army. The Army deploys and tracks units/people, not equipment. Additionally, the Army is not able to meet this requirement without adding another burdensome requirement on the field force.
(2) Status of Non-Pacing Items.—The concept of Pacing Items was developed to keep visibility on those items critical to mission accomplishment. Metrics are in place to track these items. To track and report on all other equipment in a unit, such as canteens, tents, pistol belts, etc. would be of no value and would require excessive workload on field units. No metric currently exists to report on the condition of non-pacing items. The amount of data received would be massive, and at the aggregate level would be meaningless.
(3) Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) Training.—The Army does not concur with the proposal to submit a breakout of Ground and Flying hour OPTEMPO for the past Fiscal Year (FY) and future FY. This data reflects only a small percentage of the heavy forces in the Army. No other metric exists for the other heavy forces, or for the light/Special Operations Forces (SOF). Additionally, this exact information is reported through other forums to Congress.
(4) OPTEMPO Funding.—This information is reported to Congress through other forums. Additionally, this information is more a representative of fiscal policy than a readiness indicator for Army units.
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(5) Historical Data and Projected Trends.—This information is also provided to Congress through other forums. Service manpower offices provide this data to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OSD (P&R)), who in turn submit this data in the Defense Manpower Requirements Report.
(6) Morale.—Currently, no known metric exists to provide measurable, quantifiable data that is accepted as a legitimate measure for morale. The Army will continue to study this issue, but is not prepared to report at this time.
General STEEL. The Logistics Management Institute (LMI) recommended indicators are not viewed as appropriate for addition to operational units SORTS reports. The level of aggregation mentioned by LMI is well above the unit, representing a Service perspective of the commodity areas. Some of the measurements are not appropriate for unit consideration such as recruit quality or recruiting shortfalls. Additionally, while several of the LMI indicators form the basis for unit ratings in supply, equipment readiness, and equipment location (deployed), these represent just that unit. Other databases accessible by Service headquarters provide the level of detail envisioned by LMI. To better illustrate why these indicators do not belong at the unit level, some of the 19 recommended by LMI serve as examples.
The measuring of Deployed Equipment as an aggregate assessment was determined as not critical. On a daily basis, units that are forward deployed receive priority within the supply system. Thus, to look at this on a quarterly basis does not provide any additional insight. However, the status of prepositioned equipment is critical in its capacity as an enabler and will be provided, but again, this measurement does not come from an operational unit. Non-Pacing Items are not mission critical within a unit and are not specifically measured or broken out. To institute this level of detail would require additional system changes and increased workloads upon operational units. OPTEMPO Funding is a representation of overall fiscal policy, and provided through other means to Congress. In the personnel area, Historical Data and Projected Trends are also provided through other means, and Morale was not recommended in that there currently exists no total or fully quantifiable measurement for this very subjective area.
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General MAHER. From the Joint perspective, some of these indicators do provide valuable additional readiness information. They have broad readiness implications for segments of the force or individual Services and can be useful for making general assessments of specific readiness areas and trends. An example is recruiting and retention data. However, their inclusion in GSORTS is not necessarily appropriate.
The focus of GSORTS is unit level readiness and it is not designed to be a single source for readiness information. We are building a larger automated readiness assessment system to look beyond the unit level. Additional indicators, required by the warfighters, will be incorporated in to this evolving automated system, but not necessarily added to GSORTS.
General GAMBLE. We believe there are many additional indicators that are useful in determining the readiness of the Air Force. We do not believe they should be added to SORTS. SORTS was designed for a specific purpose—to determine, at the unit level, if the resources are available (funded, fielded, deployable/redeployable within the prescribed response time) to undertake the mission(s) for which the unit was organized or designed. Adding additional indicators will not improve the fidelity of SORTS.
Mr. BATEMAN. Within your respective Services, can you tell us what other readiness indicators, not listed in the legislation, you would recommend for inclusion in your readiness assessment? Would you include any of these you have identified in the GSORTS reporting system?
General MAHER. The Joint Staff is working with the Unified Commands and Services to develop a more comprehensive automated system for integrating and assessing readiness information. GSORTS is only one component of this process. Our objective is to add capabilities and indicators that the warfighters need to better assess readiness. The Joint Staff is developing this system in coordination with the Defense Information Systems Agency. Additional indicators, required by the warfighters, will be incorporated into this evolving automated system, but not necessarily added to GSORTS.
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General BURNETTE. The Army does not recommend adding any new indicators in the QRRC readiness assessment.
General STEELE. The Marine Corps wants to provide Congress with the most accurate and useful readiness data possible in the Expanded Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC). The data Congress requested increases the level of detail for the QRRC and our approach has been to ascertain what subject matter data is readily available without imposing additional requirements upon operational units. The data elements available and addressed in the DOD implementation plan comprise an accurate mid-level aggregation of Service readiness. For the present, there are no other readiness indicators readily available to recommend for inclusion to the report.
SORTS is the vehicle used by our unit commanders to tell the Commandant how well they are being resourced and managing those resources. The essential SORTS reporting requirements for personnel, equipment supply, equipment ready, and training come from specific formulas or data obtained from other indicator systems that can be cross-checked at the Service headquarters level, systems data which will be the basis for the expanded QRRC. These elements do not need to be repeated in SORTS. SORTS is a snapshot, which provides a quick macro-overview by its simple numerical ratings or allows viewing of the full report for additional detail. The ease of preparing a report must be kept to vital information if timeliness is to be maintained by unit. To this end, the addition of more indicators is not recommended. Measuring readiness at the headquarters level can never be boiled down to an easy checklist of items, acceptable to all or understood by everyone; but must remain focused on common indicators, and thoroughly evaluated when trend analysis indicates.
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General GAMBLE. The Air Force was a full partner in developing the OSD implementation plan for expanded readiness reporting and supports the recommendations therein. Readiness assessment presently involves the synthesis of a great variety of indicators and volumes of information in addition to SORTS, and requires the judgment and decision making abilities of people experienced in the interrelationships between those indicators. We do not anticipate including additional indicators within SORTS at this time.
Mr. BATEMAN. The fiscal year 98 Defense Authorization Act required the Department of Defense to submit a plan that would add additional data to the Quarterly Readiness Report. Have each of your Services had an opportunity to participate in the development of the plan? Do each of you agree with the DOD plan of implementation provided to Congress? What parts would you change?
General MAHER. The Joint Staff worked with OSD and the Services to facilitate the development of the DOD plan to provide Congress and additional readiness data requested in the FY 1998 Defense Authorization Act. During the process, each Service had the opportunity to shape the outcome of the plan. The Joint Staff and Services concurred with the DOD implementation plan as written.
General BURNETTE. The Army did participate in the plan development throughout the entire process. During the writing phase, the Office of the Secretary of Defense incorporated all changes recommended by the Army. The Army concurs with the plan as written, has no further recommendation for changes.
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General STEELE. The Services have had ample opportunity to participate in the development of the plan to include additional data in the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC). The Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Readiness' Office conducted coordination with other involved DOD sections as well as the Joint Staff and the Services to produce the additional information required by the FY98 Defense Authorization Act. The Marine Corps agrees with DOD's plan for implementation. Some details remain for resolution, but these actions will occur as we get closer to the first full report. Our collective goal is to provide the Congress with the most meaningful data possible.
As to what parts would we change in the DOD plan, at this time we do not have any recommendations. As work continues on formats for the report, some may be forthcoming to assist Congress in better understanding the readiness of the Services.
General GAMBLE. The Air Force was a full partner in the development of the DOD plan, agrees with it, and has no recommended changes at this time.
HEARING TO ASSESS READINESS OF ARMY FOLLOW-ON FORCES AND REVIEW ARMY-NATIONAL GUARD INTEGRATED DIVISIONS
House of Representatives, Committee on National Security, Military Readiness Subcommittee, Meeting Jointly with Military Personnel Subcommittee, Washington, DC, Friday, March 20, 1998.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:00 a.m. in Ft. Riley Restaurant and Event Center, 446 Seitz Road, Ft. Riley, Kansas, Hon. Herbert Bateman (chairman of the Military Readiness Subcommittee) presiding.
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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HERBERT H. BATEMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. BATEMAN. Good morning. I am Congressman Herb Bateman from the 1st District of Virginia and chairman of the Military Readiness Subcommittee of the House National Security Committee. We are very pleased to be here today for this field hearing, where I am accompanied by my good friend and colleague, Congressman Steve Buyer of Indiana, who chairs the Military Personnel Subcommittee. We also have the ranking member of my Readiness Subcommittee, Congressman Solomon Ortiz of Texas. We also have Congressman Gene Taylor of Mississippi, who is the ranking member of the Military Personnel Subcommittee. We have Congressman Paul McHale of Pennsylvania, a member of the committee. And we are also very pleased to recognize your friend and your Congressman, Congressman Jim Ryun. Jim, we are delighted to be here and in your district. I'd like to welcome everyone here today to this joint field hearing of the Military Readiness and Military Personnel Subcommittees of the House National Security Committee. This hearing is designed to focus on the Army's plans to build Active Army and National Guard integrated divisions and the readiness of Army forces designated as follow-on forces. This hearing here at Fort Riley, KS, is the third in a series of field hearings held by the Military Readiness Subcommittee. Today we are joined by our colleagues from the Military Personnel Subcommittee. We conduct these field hearings in an effort to get outside of Washington to hear from our military about the challenges they face in their day-to-day lives. Members of the National Security Committee know that getting an understanding of the efforts required to maintain the equipment, to conduct training, and to maintain a high state of readiness can best be done where it happens and may be different than the stories we hear in Washington.
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Members of the committee continue to have a growing concern over many of the issues affecting readiness, including operating tempo, increased deployments, morale, the impact of peacekeeping operations, and the increasing use of training funds for other purposes, just to name a few. We continue to hear from the leadership in the Pentagon that readiness is as high as ever and that we are ready to go to war. What is not often talked about is the tremendous effort that is required just to keep up with the pace of operations to OPTEMPO required in today's Army. I am personally concerned about the impact on an installation and the units who are left behind when units are deployed for lengthy periods of time as a result of contingencies and other operations. These units often find themselves working harder, with longer hours and fewer assets and personnel. I know that Fort Riley has provided forces to Bosnia, and I am anxious to hear about the impact on this installation and the units that were left behind. We want to hear from men and women who are actually working in the units, having to find ways to get all the work done and finding time to spend with their families.
This hearing is about two separate but related issues. The Army is making a serious effort to overcome the criticism that it focuses too much on the Active Force to the detriment of the Reserve components. General Dennis Reimer, the Chief of Staff of the Army, argues that there is only one Army, not only in name but in actuality in their preparation to fight in war. To that end, the Army has developed a plan to build two integrated Army divisions. Each division will consist of an active duty command structure and three Army National Guard enhanced brigades. One of these division headquarters will be located here at Fort Riley. We have a great interest in the Army's efforts, and we look forward to testimony from our first panel who will address this issue.
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The second issue that we will cover this morning is the readiness of the Army's forces, especially the later-on follow-on forces or deploying forces. In this time of limited budget and constrained resources, we know that there are limited resources to be distributed throughout the Army. Our interest here today is to get a better understanding of the impact these limited resources have on units who are lower in priority for receiving resources according to the Army's tiered resourcing plan. It appears to me that often the emphasis is placed on the most visible units that are the first to deploy in times of crisis. We have all seen the pictures on CNN of the 82d Airborne Division being deployed somewhere or being put on the alert because they are often thought of as being the first to go in harm's way.
However, it is my contention that a division like the 82d Airborne has a high enough priority within the Army that it will get what it needs to train its forces and maintain its equipment. I believe it is the later-deploying units, such as those represented here today at Fort Riley, and the units represented from our third panel from Fort Drum, New York, that may face the greatest readiness challenge. Knowing little of the challenges faced by these units makes me want to hear from the units themselves so that I can get a true status of their unit's training, equipment, and morale.
We are very fortunate to have three panels of witnesses who will speak to these issues today. The first panel is made up of representatives of the active component and members of the Army's National Guard, who will speak to the Army's effort to build integrated active and Army National Guard divisions. Our second panel will be made up of the members of the General Accounting Office who will report on their efforts to review the status of the Army's later-deploying units. This work was requested by the Military Readiness Subcommittee and is nearing completion. I am especially pleased to have as a third panel a selection of commanders and senior noncommissioned officers from units here at Fort Riley and from Fort Drum, NY. They represent the men and women who make up some of the later-deploying units and I look forward to their testimony and to having a dialog with them on how Congress can help to make their lives better.
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Before we get into hearing from our panels, I would like to yield to the Honorable Steve Buyer from the State of Indiana, who is the Chairman of the Military Personnel Subcommittee. And I want to thank him and the members of his subcommittee who have joined us in this field hearing today and I am pleased to recognize Congressman Buyer.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. STEVE BUYER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM INDIANA, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. BUYER. Thank you, Mr. Bateman. Today's hearing will provide us an opportunity to further explore and understand the Army's effort to address two major challenges confronting it today. The first challenge for the Army, and here I mean the total Army, being the Active Reserve and the National Guard, is to find better ways to build on the strengths of each component to produce a more integrated, and more capable, and more ready force. The rift between the active Army and the Army National Guard threatens that objective. So it encourages me to see Secretary of Defense Cohen, as well as the active and the National Guard leadership, working to find ways to cross that breach. To that end, the creation of two integrated divisions, each with an active Army Headquarters that is directly responsible for training and readiness of the Army National Guard enhanced brigades, is welcomed and a positive initiative. I am interested in helping all involved find ways to promote this and other initiatives and to remove the obstacles to further integration.
The second challenge facing the Army stems from the fact that since 1940, it has never had less manpower. Yet this small force remains frequently committed at rates that exceed by three and four times its cold war operations tempo. With so few people doing so much and with the defense requirements continually exceeding the available funding, there is a growing concern that the readiness of the force is slowly eroding. There is also some indications that the continuing requirement upon the force to do more with less is having a coercive effect on the willingness of men and women to continue to serve in the military—beginning to have retention concerns. As part of today's hearing, we will receive testimony from the General Accounting Office that I think is disturbing. It paints a picture of significant manpower shortfalls in the Army's later-deploying divisions. Such manpower shortages, in my mind, add up significantly to decreased readiness. In order to better assess the GAO findings, as well as the state of readiness in the follow-on divisions, we are using this technique of a field hearing here at Fort Riley. It is a format that both the Readiness and the Military Personnel Subcommittees have found useful in the past to avoid the so-called Washington spin on issues and hear directly from those who are in the front lines in maintaining the readiness and conducting the military missions for this Nation. For that reason, I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses, and the commanders, and the NCO's who will appear on the third panel. At this time, Mr. Chairman, if you don't mind, I would like to yield to Mr. Ryun.
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But, Jim, I am going to surprise you here. Before I do that, I want everybody to know that, yes, I am a graduate of the Citadel but I went to law school at Valparaiso. So I know that Kansas lost a heartbreaker to Rhode Island. So, Jim, if you will stand up here for me. I know that his heart tonight, since Rhode Island beat Kansas, your heart will be with Valparaiso tonight, don't you think?
[Applause. Mr. Buyer presents Mr. Ryun with a Valparaiso T-shirt.]
Mr. RYUN. Thanks.
Mr. BUYER. We now yield to the gentleman from Kansas.
Mr. RYUN. Mr. Buyer, thank you for the privilege. May I first of all say that this morning I had the privilege of seeing just briefly a little bit more about your school on ABC News and it certainly is going to be interesting to see how the tournament goes.
I want to thank all of you for coming this morning. It really speaks highly of your support for Fort Riley in your presence here. It is an honor and a pleasure for me to be here this morning and to represent the 2d District. I take great pride in showing off Fort Riley. Fort Riley has had many missions over the last 150 years. With each change, it has shown its flexibility and willingness to change missions and to serve our country wherever and whenever it is called. From frontier forts to calvary posts, to the home of the Big Red One, Fort Riley has always served with distinction. Now that Fort Riley is being asked to pioneer a new concept as the home of the active duty headquarters of a division made up of three brigades, the post is once again ready to answer its call to duty.
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The Readiness and Personnel Subcommittees have come here today to hear testimony on several very serious issues. The active component/Reserve component division is a new concept. I am looking forward to hearing the report on the progress of standing up these new divisions and how they will contribute to a seamless Army that combines the strength of the active and National Guard troops into a total force. We are also here today to hear testimony about the readiness of the military. We continue to hear alarming reports about the glossing-over of readiness, the shortfalls in personnel, and the cross-leveling of units. The readiness of our Armed Forces is a serious issue that impacts all Americans and is one that does not receive the attention that it deserves. This year's defense budget represents the 14th year of real decline. I continue to believe with many here as well as back in Congress that we are under-funding our military and that we must increase the defense budget to meet our national security needs.
I want to thank Chairman Bateman and Chairman Buyer for agreeing to hold these hearings at Fort Riley. I want to thank the members and the witnesses for traveling to America's Heartland on this pleasant day in Kansas. Yesterday when we arrived, there were many of them very concerned that they might find themselves in a rather cold setting. Some were sort of welcoming that. However, today we have given them one of our really special days in Kansas. I appreciate all the work they have done to put this hearing together, along with General McFarren, Colonel Thomas, and Colonel Peterson. We are looking forward to hearing your testimonies. Mr. Chairman, I am looking forward to an open and honest discussion this morning. Thank you.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, Congressman Ryun. Now it is my pleasure to recognize from the great State of Texas, my colleague and the ranking Democratic member of the Readiness Subcommittee, the Hon. Solomon Ortiz.
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STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to take this time to welcome and add my thanks to our distinguished witnesses for their attendance here today, and also the local and State officials who are with us today. It is so important to be stationed where you are wanted, where you like, and where you are appreciated. And I know that this is a community that really loves the military.
It has always been instructive when we get a chance to conduct hearings in the field. And today, Mr. Chairman, I expect nothing less. We recognize that you who have been entrusted with the awesome responsibility for carrying out our national military strategy have perspectives on readiness issues that we should hear. What we learn here today, along with what we have learned from other field hearings, and in Washington, will assist us in understanding just what readiness is all about. For that I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ortiz. Now it is my pleasure to recognize Congressman Gene Taylor of Mississippi, who is the ranking Democratic member of the Military Personnel Subcommittee.
STATEMENT OF HON. GENE TAYLOR, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSISSIPPI, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE
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Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Since Mr. Buyer and Mr. Ryun are comparing notes, I am a graduate of Tulane University. It saves me the trouble of reading the sports section on Sunday mornings. [Laughter.]
But, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing. I have a prepared statement, but I just want to ask our distinguished panel, when they have the opportunity, to address two things. I hear and I believe to be true that the Army is overworked. I hear and I believe to be true that the National Guard and the Reserve is underutilized. I would hope in the course of your presentations, you could tell me what the Army, the Guard, and the Reserve plan to do to address your end of it, and I would welcome your suggestions as to what Congress must do to address our end of that problem. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Taylor. And now let me introduce our first panel of witnesses. The panel consists of Gen. David Bramlett, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command; Maj. Gen. William Navas, Director, Army National Guard; Maj. Gen. Freddy E. McFarren, Commanding General, Fort Riley; Col. Roy Martin Umbarger, Commander, 76th Infantry Brigade, Indiana Army National Guard; and Brig. Gen. Nicholas P. Sipe, Commander, 218th Heavy Separate Brigade (Mechanized), South Carolina Army National Guard.
General Bramlett, we have looked forward to hearing from you, and you may proceed. Let me say for all the witnesses that we have copies of your written statements, which will be made a part of the record. You may proceed as you choose and deliver the full statement orally, summarize—it is entirely up to you. General.
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STATEMENTS OF GEN. DAVID BRAMLETT, COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY FORCES COMMAND
General BRAMLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and members of the House National Security Committee. This is an honor for me to be here, along with my colleagues to the left, to participate in this important hearing. Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned, my statement has been submitted and I will not read it. I would like to summarize some key points that I think may be helpful for us as we proceed. One, as we look at the integration of an active and National Guard Division, it is an important step in the total integration of the Army. Mr. Taylor, your comments are well made about what can we do to better optimize and leverage our Reserve components as a part of the whole. And we do believe what General Reimer said, we are one Army, and the reason we have been able to address the many demands on us as an Army is because we are using our National Guard, our Army Reserve, and the Active Army to the balance that we can best afford. And reference your comment about how might we help, as we go through the discussion today, you might think in terms of funding support. Because when we use our great Army Reserve and our great National Guard, it does cost additional moneys for those assets. And one of the reasons that we look—as we look to source, what missions and who will take them, one of the things we have to look at is that money that's extent in the Army's budget to be able to afford the call-up of these organizations. They have performed magnificently in a variety of ways. I am only going to mention briefly the active component and National Guard Division because the important part for us to have, I think, is the context of how hard we are working to integrate the total Army in what we do. Operationally, to take the most prominent operation currently is the joint guard in Bosnia. Forces Command has sent over 300 units to assist the Army in Europe in the execution of that mission. Of that 300, 75 percent of those units have come from an Army National Guard or from the Army Reserve. We have sent over 22,000 soldiers from Forces Command. Of that number, 53 percent are Reservists or Guardsmen. That figure is not well known outside this panel nor outside those that look at national security with a personal focus.
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But it is an important statement about how hard we have integrated our Army. Indeed, when that mission was first assumed, one of the first elements that went over there from this State, the State of Kansas, General Reiger, the Adjutant General of the great State, one of his elements was one of the early arrivers in Sarajevo. And in the near future, Gen. Bill Allen, who is the 89th, the Regional Support Command Army Reserve, they will be welcoming back some of those who have served here in Manhattan, KS. So it is most appropriate we are in this region as we talk about the integration operationally.
We look at the training, we look at our National Training Center. We look at our Joint Readiness Training Center and our Battle Command Training Program, and the National Guard/Army Reserve are fully a part of those. Last year at the National Training Center, we trained over 14,000 Guardsmen and Reservists in a little over a hundred units. We are looking ahead now to probably 130 units and 20,000 Guardsmen as well as Reservists to train at the National Training Center. Joint Readiness Training Center [JRTC], the figures are comparable, a little bit smaller because of the nature of the Joint Readiness Training Center.
We are currently looking to revamp our training structure so that we integrate Guardsmen, Reservists, Active, and Department of the Army Civilians, so we optimize in leverage the capabilities and potential of these components as trainers to better prepare our Reserve components for those missions. Our 1st U.S. Corps, as we talk about an integrated division here, we might remember that we have an integrated corps that we have had for some years, headquartered at Fort Lewis, WA: an Active Duty Component Corps Headquarters with an Engineer Brigade from Missouri, the National Guard.
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We have the Corps Support Command from the Army Reserves headquartered basically in California. And the down trace, if you will, of that Corps is a mixture of Guard, Reserve, and Active. And we are currently in the active component looking at multi-component units, where we have a commander who is an active component and then we have perhaps Reserve and Guard organizations as subordinate parts of it. Why that is different is we will have a single document that identifies active Reserve or Guard within that multi-component structure.
I think that is an important context. In that context we find the active and National Guard integrated division. We are very positive about this initiative. We think it has great potential. General Navas and I have worked together with many on both components to be able to set in motion those steps and things we have to do to make it a success. Here at Fort Riley there will be a division headquarters. The enhanced separate brigades will be the 218th in South Carolina, that has had a historical relationship with this great post and the divisions that have been stationed here; and also the 30th Brigade from North Carolina and the 48th from Georgia, which will give us a heavy division initially in the training readiness oversight role, with a great potential as we realize what we have to build toward a deployable division to add to the Nation's combat capability with a merger of our active capability and our National Guard.
That in a nutshell is the context, where we are heading for this particular integrated division. I might say as a footnote, the other will be a Light Division headquartered at Fort Carson with a forward combat power [CP] at Fort Polk, LA. And tentatively we are looking at the 45th from Oklahoma, the 39th from Arkansas. And we had looked at the 76th, but I think there has been some decisions made for all the understandable reasons, and we will be looking to add a third light brigade, or whatever the National Guard in their deliberations propose, and we will look at that very carefully. We are very confident on the success of both. And I personally appreciate your interest as a panel in this initiative for America's Army, and most importantly, your support as we continue to integrate the components of our Army.
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Mr. Chairman, I look forward to your questions on this subject, as well as should you choose to ask anything of me on follow-on forces, I will be prepared to address them.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, General Bramlett. We appreciate your coming and being with us today, just as we appreciated your coming to San Diego 2 weeks ago for our field hearings there.
[The statement of General Bramlett can be found in the appendix on page 1233.]
General Navas, we look forward to hearing from you.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM A. NAVAS JR., DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
General NAVAS. Good morning, chairman and members of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be here on this beautiful day in Kansas, Mr. Ryun, and to talk to you about what I consider one of the most positive steps forward in America's Army toward integration in recent years. These integrated divisions that we are going to discuss today basically I think are going to represent the wave of the future. As you know, we have tried various combinations of Army/National Guard combat units and active headquarters over the years. Some have been more successful than others.
During the cold war years, we knew where our units would fight, who they would fight for, and we had a program in that time called Capstone that helped us tremendously. Well, in this post-cold-war era where there is a lot of uncertainty of where we are going to fight, who we are going to fight with, we need to find ways to kind of bring back the goodness of Capstone, still adapting to the realities of today. I think that the integrated division offers the best opportunity to establish that peacetime trust and mutual confidence that are so essential on building ground combat units.
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Also, as the Army evolves into future warfighting organizations, what we call the higher headquarters of a brigade is something that we don't know, whether we will have a division or something else. If that happens, I think that this first step of putting three of our integrated divisions under an active army headquarters will provide a lot of flexibility as we move into Force 21, Army after next, and whatever. So I think not only are we trying to do something to integrate and to build that trust and confidence, but perhaps we are unknowingly posturing ourselves for the future.
The Army National Guard Adjutants General have offered up to the division commander all the authority he needs to have and hold him accountable for the readiness of these units. During the initial stages of this division, we will probably find that Congress has already provided the authority we need through title 11, passed in 1992, to correct some perceived problems that we had during the mobilization of Desert Storm. If as we progress, we determine that additional authorities might be needed to effectively transition to a warfighting division, then I think we would be able to address that. But at the present time, we think we have all the authorities we need in the regulations and statutes.
It has often been said that great opportunities are a journey and not a destination. And I think that we will learn together, active/Guard, as we move through this journey to establish maybe a solid foundation for integrating the Army in the future. I look forward to your support for this opportunity and also I look forward, like General Bramlett, to your questions on any of these issues. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of General Navas can be found in the appendix on page 1243.]
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Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, General Navas. And now we are pleased to hear from Maj. Gen. Freddy E. McFarren, who commands Fort Riley. We are happy to be on your installation. Congressman Ryun made reference to the fact that this is a historic post, and indeed it is. But it brought to my mind that in the year 2009, Fort Monroe, in my district, will celebrate 400 years as the earliest fortified position in the New World. So I have been on two very historic posts in 1 week—Fort Monroe and then today at Fort Riley. General McFarren, we are pleased to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. FREDDY E. MCFARREN, COMMANDING GENERAL, FORT RILEY, KS
General MCFARREN. Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I first of all want to thank you all for coming here to Fort Riley. This is a very proud and historic post. And my message to you is that I just want to convey that I am very excited about this opportunity, and I speak for myself personally and also for this post, this installation, and the local communities. There is goodness that comes from having a division headquarters in terms of looking after forces for the preparation for training and mobilization, and for the missions that may be given to them. And so my past experience has allowed me to have some good dealings with that and an understanding of what a division headquarters can do. And I am personally very excited about that because I know the importance of the enhanced brigades to the Army force structure. And I have had the opportunity in a previous assignment to work with the 48th when I was assigned to the 24th Infantry Division. And, of course, the 218th has had a long and proud record of serving with the 1st Infantry Division and with this post. And 13 years at Fort Bragg and North Carolina, I understand about the 30th Brigade there as well. So, from a personal standpoint, I am looking forward to this because of my past experiences. But I think the key here is just the goodness that this Headquarters will bring. And along with that comes the authority and responsibility and thus the accountability that will fall upon myself and this division headquarters.
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And I am also excited about the opportunities that we may have here at Fort Riley. I have only been here for about 5 or 6 weeks, and it doesn't take long to realize that this is a very significant training facility for the U.S. Army. We can do battalion-level task force training here. We have all the simulations that we need that we can use to help develop these staffs. And then we are a very excellent deployment platform. Since Desert Storm, a lot of resources have been put here to ensure that we can deploy these forces. And so, with the combination of the training and the deployment aspect of it, and then one that might not be known outside this State is that we have a tremendous civilian workforce. The ethics and the values of this part of the country are here on this workforce. And then the support of the local communities all adds in to a very effective post. And so with the combination of what we are going to be doing for the Army, the total Army, and what we are going to be able to do here at Fort Riley, needless to say we are very excited about that. And I am personally very excited about having the opportunity to be the first division commander and I look forward to that opportunity, and I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of General McFarren can be found in the appendix on page 1246.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, General McFarren. Now, Colonel Umbarger.
STATEMENT OF COL. ROY MARTIN UMBARGER, COMMANDER, 76TH INFANTRY BRIGADE, INDIANA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
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Colonel UMBARGER. Yes, sir. I would like to thank the chairman and the members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to appear today in my capacity as the commander of the 76th Infantry Brigade (separate) to discuss with you my views on the integrated division. I would like to particularly say welcome to Mr. Buyer, being a fellow Hoosier. Good to see you, sir. I will make some comments from my text and then close with just a couple of highlights. Let me first say that I personally support the integrated division concept. I sincerely believe that the key to our success in the implementation of an effective warfighting strategy for the future must be a program in which there is greater integration and cooperation between the Active and the Reserve components. This is especially important in today's environment with the continued reduction in training dollars and critical resources.
Since 1 September 1994 when the 76th Brigade was organized as one of the 15 enhanced brigades in the Army National Guard, our command has fostered a positive climate and professional working relationship with our active component counterparts. We welcome the training support brigades, the TSB's, active component soldiers into all our units and have integrated these soldiers into our structure and team concept. We have also had an outstanding professional relationship with the 101st Airborne/Air Assault division, which is our affiliate active duty division. They have provided us with tremendous support and we have worked hand-in-hand to improve the overall readiness of the posture of the 76th Brigade.
The 76th Brigade is a very professional organization that has worked diligently to successfully accomplish all of its assigned missions. The brigade has been tasked to participate in a combat training center [CTC] exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, LA, in the year 2000. It has become very apparent to me as we actively prepare for this tremendous challenge that our training focus has never been more clear and will, as a result of this experience, substantially upgrade the readiness posture of our organization. The 76th Brigade has recently been deeply honored to have been selected to be a part of the integrated division concept. As the integrated divisions move toward resolving their many complex issues, I believe our current strategy for training and preparation for our training rotation at the JRTC will continue to be key ingredients to our future success.
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And I would just like to make a couple of comments outside of the text. I have been in the National Guard for 28 years. I started as an enlisted man and worked my way all the way up; I am very proud of that. I have worked with the active duty in a lot of ways. And I can say to all of you that after the gulf, when they implemented the JRT Program, I think that has been one of the greatest programs that Congress has ever established, where the active duty has been tasked to come in and assist us in our readiness. The folks that live in our armories, we have 41 people that are on tours with us that are all branch-qualified officers and NCO's, they have become more appreciative of what we go through as a citizen-soldier, and we too have learned so much from them, their systems and how they operate. And it gives us that network, that link to the active component. And I commend all of you for that. It is working; we are getting our money's worth out of that. And I just say as far as the integrated division, that is just a step further. That is generation next, if you will, and I think it is a great step to where we must work closer and everybody gains, and we will have a total Army. Thank you.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Colonel. And now, the anchor man of the panel, we are pleased to hear from General Sipe.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. NICHOLAS P. SIPE, COMMANDER, 218TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (MECHANIZED), SOUTH CAROLINA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
General SIPE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. South Carolina was the first State to express an interest in becoming part of this new integrated division. The major reason for this was our great experience as a roundout brigade to the 1st Infantry Division and our great experience with Fort Riley. We were clearly a part of that division and our soldiers wore the 1st Division patch with pride. Our readiness was clearly of great concern to that division commander and he approved our mission-essential task lists, our yearly training plan; he participated in our evaluation, and he really guided our training. And because of that relationship, we made vast improvements in our ability to perform our combat mission. We have continued to maintain a strong training relationship with Fort Riley, and while it is not of the same intensity as roundout, it still plays an important role in our training. We look forward to the increased participation that will come about under the integrated division. We are all part of the same Army and I see great potential benefits from being part of this new division. Thank you, sir.
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[The prepared statement of General Sipe can be found in the appendix on page 1253.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, General Sipe. I think all of us appreciate the comments you have made about the integration and the effort to more seamlessly have the active components and the Reserve/National Guard components working together. And, General Bramlett, you made reference to the large number of National Guard and Reserve personnel or units deployed to Bosnia. And I am aware, of course, that this is not the first time that we have deployed Guard and Reserve units in various contingencies. But it leads to a question. Given the nature of being in the National Guard and being a part of the Reserves, you are not a full-time soldier. You have a job, you have responsibilities to family and to business associates, employers. Are we putting a strain on Guard and Reserve personnel by using them too much?
General BRAMLETT. Sir, as I talked to my counterparts, General Navas, General Baratz, in the Guard and Reserve respectively, we are very sensitive to that stress. As we look at the size of our National Guard and the size of our Army Reserve and the distribution of units, thus far, given our national multiple strategy, the demands it places on us, we have been able to find the balance between the requirements, the availability of the Army Guard or the Army Reserve. And as I mentioned earlier in my comments, quite frankly the limitation recently has been the lack of funds to pay for those forces once we put the call in. General Navas can certainly talk to the Guard in terms of stressing, but my perception is the assets are there, particularly in the Guard divisions in general, to coin a phrase that General Navas uses that is very descriptive, the repository capabilities we have there that we can coordinate for those assets to go. I mentioned the Kansas element, this came out of—it was an acquisition battery that came out of the Kansas National Guard that went initially to Sarajevo—we needed just that capability, not the whole division, just that capability. And, ironically, we have gone through a lot of the National Guard acquisition batteries, as well as the active. So we think the capabilities are there. It is access to them and funding. I have not received reports that we are stressing it, although we are acutely aware of it. But I suspect General Navas can talk about it.
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Mr. BATEMAN. Yes, I would like to hear from General Navas on that.
General NAVAS. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Intuition will tell you that we need to watch that very closely, and we are watching it. Yet the statistics or the figures there show us that we are not close yet. And let me tell you why. We have had in the last couple of years the best recruiting and retention years in the Army National Guard. Remember, we have a volunteer force. These individuals are there because they want to do what they are doing. We have had—last year we ended up with 370,000 soldiers, when our goal was 367,000. We are coming down 5,000 this year because of the QDR cuts, but we are maintaining our strength. Our retention, which is crucial, has been—has come down from a 28 percent almost in 1965 to an 18-percent retention. So individuals not only are coming in but are staying. We are monitoring units that have been deployed to Bosnia, have been deployed to Haiti, and we haven't seen or perceived a difference in the retention rates. I watch very closely my counterparts in the Air Guard, because they are kind of like the cow bell for this. Paul Weaver, my counterpart in the Air Guard just recently, yesterday, testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee. On an average, his pilots are doing about 110 days a year out there. And he hasn't seen that trend yet. So I think they are pushing the envelope. We are not there yet.
Like General Bramlett said, we have our divisional structure that is not only strategic reserve; it is not the kind of encased in glass, ''Break in Case of World War III'' structure, but it is a repository of capabilities. Our target acquisition batteries from all the eight divisions have rotated through Bosnia. Our military police units are imbedded in those divisions. As we are able to spread the assignments in these units, I think that we can maintain and sustain perhaps a level of OPTEMPO higher than we had during the cold war. I think one key here is that we need also, as we recruit new soldiers into the Army National Guard, that they need to understand that they probably will be doing a major deployment, a major twice in their careers, perhaps in a 20-year career. They might experience about three or four times a lesser deployment for 30 days or something. And in the case of Army National Guardsmen, every couple of years they will probably be called for a couple of days of State active duty, whether it is dealing with floods or tornadoes. And I think the culture of this new Guard there, of these volunteers that we have there, understands that it is not a force in reserve in case of the big one, but that we are a full partner with our active counterparts in dealing with the challenges that we face. So we are monitoring it, but I don't see from the statistics that it is really creating. But I would defer maybe to two of our commanders here that might have a better feel for it.
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Mr. BATEMAN. Any other observations?
Colonel UMBARGER. Well, the comment that I would make, as the commander of the enhanced brigade, we have not been a part of any of those callups because we are preparing and working toward 1 October 1998 to be fully ready as far as a combat-fighting force, as a brigade to be a part of the warfight. But also in Indiana we have a division headquarters, the 38th Infantry Division there. They have had some selective units called up to go to Bosnia, particularly the target acquisition battery. My wife was part of the family support team that sent those folks off and received them back. And some of the comments were that they were all proud initially to go, and understood that. However, I would say that the continual rotation, where they would be called again to go, might begin to cause some problems within their employment area, something I would say would be a concern. But at this point, in Indiana, we have not had that many units called up.
Mr. BATEMAN. General Sipe.
General SIPE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The 218th has not been called up for other than State duty. However, we do regular climate surveys as part of our recruiting and retention effort to see why do our soldiers join, why do they get out. And the reasons our soldiers join is because they want to serve. And so, I see absolutely no problem with being called up more often than we have been in the past, but it is something that has to be monitored to ensure we don't cross that line and get to too much where they can't continue with their civilian careers. But I just don't see it as a problem at this point, sir.
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Mr. BATEMAN. Well, certainly you wouldn't find any interest if you were going to come into the Guard or the Reserve and do nothing, and have no assignment, no mission, no sense of accomplishment. That certainly is not workable. But there is such a thing as being very careful to see that you aren't overdoing it to where you don't make it possible for them to come and to serve in that context.
With that, let me now call on Mr. Buyer for any questions he may have.
Mr. BUYER. I do have several. First for the active component. Mr. Taylor opened up with a very good comment about the Active Army overworked and Reserve components underutilized. I don't mean to steal your thunder here, Mr. Taylor, but you asked a very good question, and I want to make sure you answer that with specificity and clarity. Because on Monday I was at Fort Bragg and met the new 18th Airborne Corps commander, as I told you at breakfast, and, you know, he has his own general concerns. The Army is a good listener. Congress complains that TRADOC was understaffed, and we ended up with Aberdeen and a lot of other problems in our training centers. So we made demands to plus up the training commands and we made demands on them to plus up in recruiting. Well, where do you think the Army takes them from? So they reach down into 18th Airborne Corps and they take a whole bunch of his senior NCO's, and now he is not happy, because he has got 47 percent of the requirement for Bosnia. And when I begin to look at the outlying plans for Bosnia, it appears that the active component is saying we are going to take the missions in Bosnia now because we don't think we have got the money to pay for the Reserve components. But I want you to give me your perspective on that question.
The other I have for General Navas. You say to the gentleman, you know, we have gone around and around, we have danced, we have butted heads like two rams, and at the end of 3 years, we are beginning to understand each other. And I appreciate that, and now you are just getting ready to leave. I wish you well. I really do, with all my sincerity. And I think you have come a long way in bringing the National Guard over the past year. And I congratulate you for that. Lee Hamilton, a Democrat friend of mine, Congressman of many years in Indiana, made a comment back in Indiana that it is easier to burn a barn than to build a barn. And there are a lot of people who like to burn barns out there for some reason. And we are trying to do what we can to bring this integration, and you are leading that, and I want to congratulate you for that. My question to you is explain to me the command and control aspect of how this is going to work and what are the lessons learned from the round-out brigades, so we don't go down the same road as that. And General McFarren, I want you to comment on that too.
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And the other deals with real-mission requirements. Part of the whole eight divisions and part of the criticisms which the Guard receives on the combat divisions are that you are not in the warfighting plans. And hopefully FORSCOM can comment on that. If we are going to move toward an integrated division concept, we want to make sure that these two ''E'' Brigade Commanders and the Division Commander, they understand what the real-world mission is and it is not just something on paper, that they actually are preparing for a real mission.
And last, I would like for you to give a little clarity, General Navas, on recent developments regarding Indiana. I was under the understanding that the 76th Brigade, in fact, was going to be a part of this integrated concept. These two gentlemen command two of the finest ''E'' brigades that are out there, and why we wouldn't take the 76th Brigade in Indiana and make them part of this division concept—there must have been some kind of shell game happened here. But I don't completely understand and I would like for you to explain it to me so this commander here knows what is going on. You made a comment to me on the plane ride here that Indiana received a lottery ticket. Explain to me why Indiana gave a winning lottery ticket to somebody else. So, please, whoever wants to start.
Mr. BATEMAN. General Bramlett.
General BRAMLETT. Sir, I will start with the first, which I think was overworked and specificity in the use of our Guard. When you talk 18th Airborne Corps, and to start with that, he is correct with 47 percent, because as we shift the load, that is to say the requirements in Bosnia, it came their turn. Had you talked to them perhaps 7 or 8 months ago, they wouldn't have had those figures, because, in fact Task Force 141 from here at Fort Riley, and if you would have been here, they would have said over, almost half of Fort Riley is supporting the Bosnia effort.
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So what we have done is look at our active component structure, shift it around based on the requirements and availability of the forces. Incidentally, 18th Airborne Corps also has a battalion in the Multi-National Force and observers. As we look ahead toward missions for the Guard, and this is probably a good time to talk specifically about that, we have seen and we know from experience and capabilities that the National Guard can do many of these missions if we give them adequate warning time to prepare for the missions and make sure they are funded. For example, we sent a large—well, an MFO, Multi-National Force Observer Mission, some time ago, which was 20 percent Active and 80 percent Guard. And they did a superb job. We think it could be 100 percent Guard. But we also know it will cost us about $29 million over and above our normal budget to pay. That is understandable, and we oughtn't to feel the least bit embarrassed about it. We also know that the Guard can do combat missions. We put a rifle company from the 29th Infantry, Maryland/Virginia Guard, into Bosnia to secure the Sava River Bridge. You may recall the great publicity it got. Those are National Guardsmen that are protecting that bridge today. That cost us $10.7 million to bring that Guard up to the proper level and then pay the salaries of those men who served full-time. These are just indications of what the capabilities are and the funding required. We certainly, with adequate funding, could schedule many missions that come upon—in this National Military Strategy we have. It is no longer prepare to fight the Soviets in Central Europe. It is a range of missions, regional contingencies, all the way down to disaster relief. Those that become sustained or ongoing, certainly there is room, in fact, we count on the Army Reserve and the National Guard to help us. That is why we can handle an end strength of 480,000, because we use the whole Army—the Guard and the Reserves. But I did want to give you specifically some indicators and perhaps we can talk about those later, if you wish. But those are, I think, data points for the cost, the capability, and I think the potential.
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The other ones I think you allocated to me were real-mission requirements. As we look at the world we face today, the national military strategy and the follow-on forces, which all our National Guard Combat Forces are, they will come later in the warfight. We are not sure, whether it be Southwest Asia or Northeast Asia, what their mission will be when they get there. It could be rear area security, it could be a limited objective attack, it could be follow and support. What we know to be important is if our combat formations, Active or Guard, if they can defend, they can attack, they can move to contact at the appropriate level, if they can do those three things, that is the essence of combat. If they can train to standard in those, then when they get in theater, we can give them the mission. Or, to use Task Force 141, that was right here at Fort Riley, which understands attack, defend, move to contact, when they got the mission to go to Bosnia, they then focused on theater-specific training and trained themselves into a superb peacekeeping force, deployed, performed with great distinction, and returned, and then resumed to practice Attack, Defend, Move to Contact.
So that is what we talk to our National Guard brethren in the combat formations. We say work on Attack, Defend, Move to Contact, and when you get your mission-specific requirements, then focus. Because you do those three, you can just about do anything else that comes your way.
Mr. BATEMAN. All right. General Navas.
General NAVAS. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to thank you for your kind remarks. You know, come the first of April, I have been 33 years in a uniform, and I love this Army. I have given most of my life to the Army. And I think that we are working towards making a better Army, a better Total Army. I have had a job that sometimes is thankless because I am basically the advocate for a component. And sometimes I am the one that has to tell the emperor he has no clothes. And that is not always a very popular place to be. But what I have done, I have done it in the best interests of the Army. And I hope that as I leave the Army directorate, which I will turn over to my successor on June 1, that at least we are on the way to this destination of rebuilding this barn.
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I think I can combine one answer to the three questions, because they are all very related. You talked about the mission of the divisions. The Commission on the Roles and Missions came with a conclusion that said there is a shortfall in the U.S. Army of combat support and combat service support, as envisioned by the total Army analysis of zero three, which was the first total Army analysis after the gulf war. There was about a shortage of 62,000 spaces on the units that were required—petroleum, transportation, basically the support elements. The Commission on Roles and Missions also said that there is an apparent excess combat capacity in the Army, at the end of the cold war, and it said namely eight National Guard divisions that were maintained as a strategic Reserve during the cold war. And it said also, and it was very significant, it said that the Army needs to do a better job in integrating its Reserve components, and it uses a model like a lot of people use, the way the Air Force has integrated its components. The National Guard at that time, this was about 3 years ago, we took that challenge very seriously. We got together with our 54 adjutant generals and the eight division commanders and we worked for almost 2 years, together with the Army, to come up with a solution to this problem posed by the Commission on Roles and Missions. And that solution was what we call the Army National Guard division redesign study, which basically said that 12 brigades of combat structure in the Army National Guard would be converted to more relevant required combat support and combat service support structure. The adjutant generals set a condition, which I think was a very valid condition. They said we would convert this structure as long as there is the funding available to buy the new equipment and to train these individuals, and that these units are going to be earmarked in the war plans so that they would then be able to receive resources to be trained. And that process has already commenced. We have identified in the budget for 1999 and in 2000, and 2001, $1.6 billion to convert up to three brigades of combat structure to combat service support. That is that piece. That is moving forward. Like everything in life, there is always lumps in the mashed potatoes, but we just, you know, chew through them and move on.
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Another piece of this was to deal with the integration. And that is where we thought that if we could put two divisions with active component headquarters on them to start working this integration, that would help us avoid the problems we had in the past and give ownership to that division commander, active commander, of those brigades that he eventually would fight in combat. The idea of this came because General Larry Welch, a former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, was a member of the Commission on Roles and Missions. I happened to have known General Welch and I spent many hours with him, kind of picking his brain to see how the Air Force did this. And one thing kept coming up, apparently over and over again, was that in the case of the Air National Guard, at any point of the major units in the Air National Guard, there is an active duty commander there that owns those units. But not only owns those units, but is held responsible and accountable by the Active Air Force for the readiness of those units. Now, whenever there are problems, we must fix them. The problems are not problems of willingness of our soldiers to do the job, or even the ability of our soldiers to do the job. We have a volunteer force, people who are high-quality soldiers. Wherever we have short-falls, it is basically because sometimes we don't provide the resources for those units to meet the requirements that they are expected to meet. But what we want to do is have an honest broker, someone who can say validate those requirements, make sure that those requirements are applied judiciously, and that he or she needs to stand up and say, ''These are my units, they are ready, and I am willing to go and fight with them.''
Mr. BUYER. So, by having an active duty commander as a stakeholder, we will not go down the problems of the roundout, that is what you want——
General NAVAS. Sir, this is basically our premise and that has worked very well in the Air Force.
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Mr. BUYER. All right. And has this division been assigned a real-world mission yet?
General NAVAS. No, sir. Let me——
Mr. BUYER. That is fine. And the last question before I go back to Mr. Bateman is, if you would please explain to me why one of the top ''E'' brigades in America now will not be part of this integrated division, because the commander is sitting right here.
General NAVAS. Sir, let me continue and get you there.
Mr. BUYER. All right.
General NAVAS. The issue of command and control is going to depend on what we are going to do with that division in the end state. Right now, we submitted that plan to the Army. The Secretary of the Army approved it in concept, and asked TRADOC to study how we would do this. TRADOC came with a plan and said we need to do this in phases. The first phase is basically putting these three brigades under an active headquarters and have the active headquarters provide training, readiness, and oversight. At the early stages, when we stand up this division, we don't envision deploying that unit and fighting that division as a division. Basically the division commander is going to have training, readiness, and oversight over three separate brigades that would be deployed as separate brigades in the immediate future. Alternative one, or alternative two, or three of that process is to then come up with a full-fledged warfighting division that could deploy as a division. Whether it deploys as three separate brigades under a division headquarters, or then you reconfigure that division to a standard division with a division base, a division tail, and three brigades. That is part of this process that we are going to either go to, alternative one, or alternative two. At that point, at that point is when then you see, you start dealing with the full authority, full responsibility. So, this is a transition period that we are moving towards that.
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Mr. BUYER. All right. All right. I have to ask my colleagues to indulge me for just 2 minutes, if you may. Mr. McHale and I, Mr. Taylor, this week are going to sit down and put together the Guard and Reserve package, come up with a proposal between $400 and $600 million. We are going to buy all kinds of things. Take the single channel ground and airborne radio system [SINCGARS] radios, for example. You guys want SINCGARS, don't you?
General SIPE. Absolutely.
Colonel UMBARGER. Yes, sir.
Mr. BUYER. You know what, Colonel, you are not going to get SINCGARS. I would love to buy you SINCGARS. If you are part of this integrated division, you are going to get SINCGARS (pointing to General Sipe), and you are not (pointing to Colonel Umbarger). Now, are you happy about that? Probably not. Do you know why you are not? Because as you are part of this integrated concept, you are going—we have got tiered resourcing, do we not, Generals?
[Affirmative responses.]
Mr. BUYER. Tiered resourcing. If you had stayed in with the integrated divisions, all the first line of all this equipment, you get it. Now you don't. You are going to go back under an ''as is'' type division, type concept. I am not sure what they are going to do with you. And I am going to look at you right now and you tell me why, if you know, that something has happened and transpired here over the last week, and if you know, why aren't you now part of this integrated concept?
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Colonel UMBARGER. Well, Congressman Buyer, I will tell you the best way I know how. Again, we were honored to be picked to be a part of this. Indiana is in a very unique situation. We have an ''E'' brigade and a 38th Infantry Division Headquarters. You know, we are a small State, but we are the fifth largest National Guard State, 12,300 people. We have pride with the 38th ID. It is been a part of Indiana for years with this lineage. Five years ago, 38th ID had three maneuver elements, two of those were in Indiana, the 1st Brigade and the 76th. We were picked to be an ''E'' brigade and we were very, very proud of that. Now, in this further redesign, what the Adjutant General of Indiana has found is that the 2d Brigade will go down; it will become combat service support [CSS]. That will leave Indiana with no maneuver element in our division headquarters. The adjutant general and the Governor of Indiana looked at the 76th as one of their gems, and in essence wants us back into the fold. And he is my commander in chief.
Mr. BUYER. All right. I understand. I put you in the corner. But I just want you to know that I was a strong proponent to bring the ''E'' brigade to Indiana and working with the National Guard, and I have a lot of pride in you and a lot of pride in your soldiers, and you were going to be there at the first response. And somebody didn't like that and you have been pulled out of it now. And I am not very happy about it, and I can tell by your voice you are not very happy about it, and you go to the back of the line. And I don't understand why Indiana gave up on a lottery ticket. And I don't like it when people play politics in the Army concepts. I just don't like it, never have. And I am not sure I can say any more about it. I yield back.
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Ortiz.
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Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very concerned, just like the rest of my colleagues, but I have a question for you, General Bramlett. Conversion of the combat divisions will be costly in the out years; I understand to the tune of about $600 million per year. And how confident are you that your successor will be willing to spend the money required to buy the needed equipment where there are so many other demands for the money? And throughout the hearings that we have had, whether it is in San Diego, or here, or elsewhere, or in Washington, one of the problems that we have is that, No. 1, we don't have enough personnel, enough infantrymen to field the platoon. We have a problem with spare parts. And we have been lucky in these two last crises with Iraq, that we have taken all this time to deploy, to move infantry units, to move equipment. And I hope the day will never come when we will have to make a decision within a few days. But my question is, you know—I have a series of questions, but maybe you can address the first question about the cost, whether when somebody succeeds you, are they willing to continue with this program.
General BRAMLETT. Sir, I think the commitment to the integrated division is a very real one. It is certainly not peculiar nor should be associated with me personally. I think the Army sees the potential. So I am very confident that this will continue, regardless of whether General Navas or General Bramlett are gone. I think that the merits are evident to all of us. The $600 million figure I believe is probably a figure better applied to the shortfall in Guard training requirements overall. To this date we have not—and I have been a principal in the planning as we look toward the standing up of these two integrated divisions and the training readiness oversight role—we have not submitted an amount of money that is required. So I think, I am confident that 600 million is really related to the Guard as a whole shortfall in training, if that would be helpful.
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General NAVAS. If I may, sir, the $634 million of shortfall for the Guard is not only for the Divisions. We—General Reimer asked me in November of last year what is the shortfall in the Army National Guard for your requirements. And we gave him an estimate at that time for $813 million. Now, this is not to make the Guard well. This is basically to meet our tiered resourcing, to be able to meet our defense planning guidance [DPG] standards. Because we tier our resourcing, we tier our requirements, and then we apply resources to those requirements. And right now, the Army National Guard is funded at 71 percent of its requirement, the Active Army at 80 percent, and the Army Reserve at 81. So that is—$813 million represents the delta to be able to train at the DPG level.
Inside the Army and inside the Department of Defense, for the first time in 10 years, we got $179 million added. And the Army made the readiness of the Army National Guard a major budget issue with the Department of Defense. And I went with General Reimer and Secretary West, at that time, and presented our case to Secretary Cohen. So this is really progress. Now, you don't turn budgets and programs overnight. And we got $179 million, but that still leaves me a shortage of about $634 million because I am under-funded in schools and special training. For example, in my later-deploying units in our divisions, I have only 11 percent of the money I need to send people to school. That means that I am asking NCO's to make a tough choice—either you go out there to annual training and lead your troops and set the example or you don't go to annual training because you are going to school, because if you don't go to school, you cannot get promoted. So we are asking some of our soldiers to make a very tough choice. Then when that soldier is not there because he is going to school, then the evaluators and the assisters come in and they say you are not meeting your 75 percent, or whatever, boots on the ground, because we don't have it. So we need to get out of this death spiral and that is what that $634 million is. And that is the same thing for my depot maintenance. I mean, I am funded—my depot maintenance is about 36 percent. That means that there is some maintenance that is being deferred. Base operations, I am underfunded. So this $634 million is to cover those many requirements to basically be able to keep your head above water. I have the data here; I could submit it for the record, if you so desire, sir.
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[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 1351.]
Mr. ORTIZ. Can I just have one more question? I don't want to belabor the witnesses, but—if you were to integrate like has been stated, you know, three brigades and two divisions, now, how are you going to make this election now? Are you going to be selecting those that have comfortable equipment, that train with the same equipment that the active Army trains? I mean I think that this is very, very important. Can you more or less give us some insight as to how this could be done?
General NAVAS. Yes, sir. And I appreciate your question because I was writing here a note to Mr. Buyer because I had hoped I had not given him the wrong impression that—you see, we have 15 enhanced brigades. And the 76th is still going to be an enhanced brigade. They are going to be still resourced at a higher level. What they are not going to be able to do is participate in this experiment that we think is a ground-breaking and a forward thing. But those 15 enhanced brigades are modernized and basically they are resourced at a much higher level than our divisions. We had a process, together with forces command, and selected the six brigades. In the case of the division that is going to put its flag here at Fort Riley, that was very easy, because the three States had volunteered early on. Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina had volunteered early on. And we have that, those are three heavy, one armor and two mechanized brigades. They are modernized. They have A–1's and Bradleys and they are on the priority list to get the equipment and they would be able to train. In the case of a light, initially like I mentioned earlier, and Mr. Buyer raised the issue, we looked at Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Indiana as the three lights to put the headquarters at Fort Carson. For the reasons that Colonel Umbarger mentioned; and I received recently a letter from the adjutant general and the Governor of Indiana that they prefer not to participate in that, because they would like to try to keep the brigade somehow related to the 38th Division. And remember that lineage, division flags, the relationships of these divisions to the States are very, very important. I mean, you know, you in Texas are extremely proud of the 49th Armored Division there, and justifiably so. So we found a solution, we are working with forces command, and hopefully we could find a solution here to replace the 76th early in the game by another light brigade, and move on with this concept of our integrated divisions. And then the 76th will remain as one of our 15 enhanced brigades, you know, with high—like the 155th in Mississippi, with adequate resources to maintain that level. See, what we have done with the 15 enhanced brigades is we will maintain at the end of fiscal year 1999 all 15 brigades, and we are well on our way to that. We will be sustained at personnel levels of P1, P1 in personnel, S2 in equipment—S1 in equipment and in readiness, and T3 level of training. So that within a 90-day window, they can be called up and deployed. And that is the concept and we are well on our way on that. So that is where we are. The shortfall is not only for these units, it is for the National Guard as a whole. And I will submit that for the record, Mr. Chairman.
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Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ortiz. Now, Mr. Taylor.
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, getting back to my first line of questioning. I am curious in your opinions how many Guardsmen it would take to be activated on an annual basis, either as individuals or by unit, that would make a discernible difference as far as freeing up the regular Army units from being overworked. The second question is what do you think the budget number is that Congress would have to appropriate in order to accomplish that? And I guess the third question is should this be done by units or by individual voluntary callups? And the last question, General Navas, that I would like of you is I am sure that the Guard and Reserve has given a great deal of thought as to what is the optimum amount of time as far as calling up a Guardsman or a Reservist when you consider all of the factors. It is going to take a little while to get him from a civilian mode into his job. He also has a family and an employer to consider. And there is a certain amount of cost to activating and getting that person on site. And if you could give us some idea. And again, I would hate to see Congress micromanage that, but I would like to know what your thoughts are going in. We have no choice but to micromanage funds. The other parts, I would like to hear what your plans would be if those funds were available.
General BRAMLETT. Congressman Taylor, with respect to the amount of Guardsmen required on an annual basis, first I would say it would be units, and it would be measured against the missions we could give them. It is far more profitable, and I think the National Guard would readily agree, that we look at the mission; for example, I mentioned the Multi-National Force of Observers [MFO]. As we look toward the resolution of what the Follow-on Force in Bosnia will look like, depending on the duration of that. And there are other missions that stand and have the potential to be long lasting. As we look and assess those, then certainly we can identify missions for the National Guard, give them adequate time to prepare. These great soldiers have 39 days a year to prepare. If we tell them in advance, for example, an MFO mission, I would guess perhaps a year and a half or 2 years warning that in 2000 you will have the MFO mission, then they could use those 39 days a year profitably, point toward that. We could then put the money, request the money for funding to cover that. So it is a chicken-and-the-egg issue. And I would be hesitant to give you just a figure because it would be at best a wild guess.
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Mr. TAYLOR. But if I may, General, we have got to put together a budget within the next 6 weeks. And I would much rather go with your guidance than pick a number out of the air.
General BRAMLETT. Well, sir, if I might, given that offer, I would like to take it for the record, so I could give you a more reasoned analysis of those because I would coordinate, as we would do with the bureau, and see what could you support given what we see. As you see, we are looking at follow-on missions, for example, for the attack helicopter battalions. The National Guard has 9 of them; we have 18 in the Army, well, actually 7 in the Guard, 2 in the Reserves. So there is great potential there. And it may well be we will identify one, give them time. So if I may, I certainly welcome that opportunity to comment.
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 1351.]
Mr. TAYLOR. I hope you will understand our time restraints and get it to us with that in mind.
General BRAMLETT. Sir, we will do that first thing. Absolutely.
General NAVAS. Yes, sir. I would like to answer. There are two issues here. One is the units that we have earmarked that are in war plans to be able to deploy, and this is where this tiering of resourcing comes; and basically it is a force generation model. We have units in the Army National Guard that have to be ready within zero to 30 days. These are small units that assist the Army in doing its early mission. We have units that are from zero to 60 days. These are our special forces units, which also we have a unit in Mississippi; and these are some of our artillery units, our earlier-deploying units. Then we have the units from zero to 90 days, which are our enhanced brigades. What we do there is by the tiering of resources, we provide a budget that would allow us to maintain those units, resourced and trained to meet those deployment times. And then there are those units that are 90 and beyond, or the ones that are strategic reserved that we try to maintain at a base level; in the case of our divisions, the base level is platoon proficiency. So that at least you have that level and then you can build that up. And then there are questions whether it takes anywhere from 120 days to 365 days to train a division and that is something that we haven't come to grips with, but that is basically the band. The requirement for dollars to be able to maintain those levels of resourcing is the $634 million that I have mentioned. So I think you have that number. I have testified to that number before the Senate Appropriations Committee yesterday, or day before yesterday.
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Mr. TAYLOR. General, I speak some Spanish, a little bit more English, but apparently I am not very good at either. My question was how long should a callup be for, because that is one of the first questions that I am asked when I visit with the units back home. Well, you are talking about calling us up—how long. I am asking for what you think would be an optimum amount of time.
General NAVAS. Sir, I think that—and again I hate to give you ''It all depends.'' I mean, if we have a situation like——
Mr. TAYLOR. In an ideal world.
General NAVAS. In an ideal world, if we are going to go to war, sir——
Mr. TAYLOR. No. I am talking about present situation, people extended all over the world.
General NAVAS. I would say a 6-month rotation would be ideal. Now, there are increased costs. I mean, if you do a 1-year rotation, then you cut the transportation and the mobilization costs in half. But I think a 6-month call-up would be an ideal time for a Reservist, with enough warning time. Because that is the other key, like General Bramlett said. I mean, we sometimes think that we run into problems with employers and families. And the problems we run into sometimes with employers and families is not the callup per se, but it is the compressed time of the callup. When we don't give enough warning time to this citizen soldier to take care of his family issues, his business issues, if we provide some warning time, then it is a lot easier on the family and employer. But I would say a rotation of 6 months would be ideal.
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Mr. TAYLOR. In your mind, what should that some warning time be?
General NAVAS. Sir, the more we can, the better. Sometimes the political situation does not allow for that, and that is what sometimes we have——
Mr. TAYLOR. But given today's mission, the deployments——
General NAVAS. Sir, if I could have a 6-month rotation, and I could know 6 months in advance, or even more, of the next unit that is going to back-fill that unit, that would be ideal.
General BRAMLETT. Sir, I was about to say, if I got a chance, 270 days, what it currently is, allows us to do the mission. But the reason is is we normally don't get the 6 months' opportunity to use the monthly meetings, and we could even get some extra Army Training [AT] in there. So there is merit, certainly a lot of merit, if we could, for a lot of reasons, give them a 6 months' warning order, so to speak, so they could use the interim. Then we probably could get by with a shorter period. Right now, 270 days is about right, because we have to bring them up to meet certain requirements before we can send them off to serve.
Mr. TAYLOR. General, are you in agreement with the 180-day deployment time as a reasonable amount of time?
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General BRAMLETT. Once gone.
Mr. TAYLOR. On station?
General BRAMLETT. I thought once they go to a mobilization station, if you count that, then it would be a little over 180 days.
General NAVAS. And I think we are agreeing here. I am saying a 6-month deployment within the 270 days, so you have the ramp-up and the coming back.
General BRAMLETT. I don't think that was the question.
General NAVAS. But I think a 6-month deployment would be the ideal.
Mr. TAYLOR. So your ideal total callup time would be——
General NAVAS. Sir, I would keep the 270-day callup authority that we have. In an ideal world, I would like to see a 6-month rotation, deployment, and then by doing smart things in peace-time, cutting the time it takes before and after so that we don't disrupt this individual's family, employers, and all that. And that would be in an ideal world. I think we tend to agree.
Mr. TAYLOR. Would any of the other panelists like to comment on that, particularly our two Guard commanders, since you are a little bit——
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General SIPE. I think the 6-month rotation sounds about right. And I certainly concur with the more lead time, the better, so people can work with their employers, make business arrangements they need to make. But 6 months I think we could deal with without any problem.
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Taylor. Mr. McHale.
Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, good morning. There are basically two fundamental truths that I hold to be accurate observations and that will characterize all the questions that I will present to you. The first is my passionate belief in a Total Force Army—Active, Reserve, Guard. A soldier is a soldier is a soldier. And to the maximum extent that we can take down artificial barriers between those classifications and the closer we can move to a Total Force Army, the more effective I think we are going to be. The second principle is I believe in muddy boots. I happen to think that units in the field get hard. And on live-fire training exercises, they get as hard as they can get in a peace-time environment. Let me first of all praise you, General Bramlett, you also General Navas, and General Reimer, as I have commented to him on a number of occasions during recent congressional hearings. The Army is closer to a Total Force concept today than at any time in our Nation's history. And we are dramatically closer to that ideal than we were a year ago. A year ago was a bad time. The divisions within the Army were acute. And because of your leadership, we have gone a long way toward overcoming those kinds of animosities, a lack of professional respect, and bitterness that could and has been avoided through positive leadership.
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Now, with that as kind of an opening, atta boy, I really want to praise you for the progress that has been made in the last year. Let me kind of set the scenario, that starts out on a negative tone but finishes up positively, reflecting on the integrated divisions that bring us to Fort Riley today. We came up with the concept of the enhanced readiness brigades, now the enhanced separate brigades, in the Bottom-Up Review back in 1993. We indicated that those 15 brigades were to be combat ready within 90 days of activation. I have had continuing concerns that while that has been the mission assignment, the training opportunities, particularly the live-fire and maneuver training opportunities, have not been commensurate with that wartime obligation. General Navas, in the last 5 years, how many of those 15 brigades—heavy, to the national training center [NTC] light infantry to Fort Polk—have gone to one of those two rotation exercises, live-fire exercises, since we first formulated the concept of the enhanced separate brigade? How many of the 15?
General NAVAS. Sir, we have two; one, the 48th Brigade did an NTC rotation the year before last at Fort Irwin and the 39th Brigade from Arkansas, light, did one in Fort Polk.
Mr. MCHALE. That was my understanding as well. I think it is important to emphasize, therefore, that of the 15 enhanced separate brigades, only 2 of the 15 in the last 5 years have gone either to the NTC or to Fort Polk. General Sipe, how long has it been since your Brigade has gone to the NTC?
General SIPE. Sir, we have never gone to the NTC as a brigade. One of my battalions has gone and went during the Desert Storm train-up. We are scheduled to go in the year 2000.
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Mr. MCHALE. Colonel Umbarger, how long has it been since you have been to Fort Polk as a unit?
Colonel UMBARGER. We have never been to Fort Polk as a unit; we are going in 2000.
Mr. MCHALE. All right. Now, I happen to think that is a pretty—not reflecting at all on you gentlemen—but I think that is a pretty bleak record. When you have units that are to be combat ready within 90 days of activation, and after 5 years of highlighting those units as critical force enhancements, only 2 of the 15 have gone to the NTC or have gone to Fort Polk, I think that raises a challenge. Now, what we are doing today in terms of the integrated division is one way of addressing that challenge and I want to move into that in just a moment. But, General Navas, under current scheduled rates of rotation, how often will a heavy brigade in the National Guard rotate through the NTC?
General NAVAS. Sir, approximately once every 7 years, or 8 years, the heavies, we include the armored cavalry regiment [ACR] in Tennessee.
Mr. MCHALE. Again we can pause at that point——
General NAVAS. Once every 8 years.
Mr. MCHALE. I met in Bosnia with one of the battalion commanders from Fort Riley and I asked him that same question in terms of Active Duty counterparts and he told me that an Active Duty counterpart would rotate through the NTC about once every 2 years. And so when you have Guard units going through once every 8 years and Active Duty counterparts, with the very same mission, going through once every 2 years, you inevitably create a caste system. And you call into question, at least in my mind, whether or not those Guard components are getting sufficient live fire and maneuver training. Now, that is kind of a negative picture, and I think it is one that needed to be laid out. Whatever our rhetoric and whatever the superb quality of the officers, NCO's, and enlisted personnel within the Guard, the reality is we have not been giving you enough live-fire and maneuver training, at least in my judgment. And it certainly has not been commensurate with Active Duty counterparts. Now, what I want to do is move to the integrated division. How will the integrated division address what I at least perceive to be that deficiency? If you could give me a word picture. I mean, I understand the command element and the three enhanced separate brigades coming together into that integrated force, that is terrific. I can't give you a strong enough ''atta boy'' in terms of making progress. But now for one dumb grunt, bring it back down to the level of reality. Creating that integrated division will do what in terms of enhanced opportunities for live-fire training at the brigade maneuver level. General.
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General BRAMLETT. I will answer that last question first and then I would like to go back a little bit on the frequency. First, the integrated division will have a headquarters commanded by a major general and probably 200–250 active component officers and NCO's that have a great deal of experience and will be able to work with those brigades that have no, as General Umbarger talked about, the JRTC piece, which are really detachments inside the brigades and assess their readiness to profit from that training experience.
Mr. MCHALE. I think that is great. Let me, if I may, let me guide you through this so I get the information that I need. How often will those individual separate brigades physically come to Fort Riley and how often will they send rounds down range?
General BRAMLETT. How often they will come here, we will have to look at the funding and where the location of their assets are. Currently those brigades' assets are located at Fort Stewart. So my assessment early on would be the training will take place there, of necessity, with their equipment on the ground. The live-fire parts of it will be determined by the brigade commander's assessment, working with an experienced division commander and his staff. They may fire—in fact, I looked at a proposal yesterday on how it might work. They might work themselves up to table 8 or table 12 for the tankers, or the Bradleys, in a 2-week AT period. What the integrated division will bring to bear is a wealth of experience focused on these great young soldiers in these ''E'' brigades to get the best use of their training time. My assessment——
Mr. MCHALE. What I am getting at, General, is this. And I appreciate what you are saying, and I respect it, and agree with it. But I want to make sure that a change in force structure produces enhanced training opportunities, particularly in terms of maneuver training and particularly in terms of live-fire. Are we just changing the wire diagram here, or are we in fact going to send more rounds down range with a closer integration of Active and Guard, producing more realistic training in the field?
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General BRAMLETT. I think it is going to be—the simple answer is yes. What you would like is where on the sliding scale would it fit, and quite frankly, until we realize the value added, I can't tell you that. And I would like to talk about the rotation frequency, because it is crucial. In the post-gulf-war era where we looked at our Guard structure, our combat formations, and realized where were the proficiency levels we reasonably could expect soldiers that have 39 days a year to give their country reach. The decision then, and it seems to be borne out through experience, the platoon level proficiency, if platoons can operate, be they tank or Bradley, and attack, defend, and move to contact, if we can build those pieces, and build proficiency to one standard, the Army standard, then upon mobilization, in the 90-day period we have between that and when they deploy—and they will be ready to deploy in 90 days—based on my assessment, they are ready now, plus 90 days, we will ship them to whatever theater. But platoon proficiency is a far cry from brigade proficiency, which our JRTC and NTC are. That is the dilemma. How do you reasonably close that delta when units right now work very hard to reach platoon proficiency? General Umbarger will tell you where he is now with respect to platoon proficiency, must less company, battalion, and brigade.
Mr. MCHALE. But then aren't we holding out a false promise? I agree with what you are saying, and believe me, in a combined arms environment, I understand the difference between platoon proficiency and the ability of that brigade to maneuver. But we promised not platoons in the national military strategy; we promised brigades. We promised that within 90 days of activation not that we will have proficient platoons, but that we will have brigades capable of maneuver warfare. And if we don't send them to the field as brigades, not platoons, then I think we may well deliver platoons that are combat ready, but I question whether or not within that 90-day window we will be up to the level of brigade proficiency in terms of a combined arms environment. Let me just close with this. My time is about to expire. I think it is vitally important, and we are getting to the point that I am going to encourage congressional intervention if we don't have a more frequent rotation of brigades at the maneuver level going to the field more often than once every 8 years. Either that, or you have got to go back and look the Secretary of Defense in the eye and tell him to change his annual report. Tell him he can't promise brigades within 90 days when you send them to the field once every 8 years. It is one or the other.
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Final point, if I may. I think we have moved absolutely in the right direction in terms of active advisers to the Reserve components—an excellent concept, well implemented. I think the integrated division is a very positive step, so long as it is more than just a change in the wire diagram, so long as it really does result in enhanced training proficiency. Let me suggest one final opportunity to you. All of what we have discussed so far has involved the integration of active and Reserve components, with the Reserve components providing the body of the force and the active component providing a command element. I think if we are to tear down those barriers between the various components within a service, we sometimes have to have Reserve officers and Guard officers in command billets of Active Duty forces. Now, that is a pretty strong proposal. In fact, the Marine Corps just did it. They took a superbly qualified Reserve Major General, and on an interim basis for about a 4-month period of time, put him in command of the Active Duty 3d Marine Division in the Pacific. And he did a superb job. I am suggesting to you that when you have two guys, two soldiers in the same uniform, working side by side, there is a bond of mutual respect that is built based on competence. And that after a while, a short while, you forget who is active, who is Reserve, who is Guard. So I would suggest to you that on a periodic interim basis, for limited periods of time, in order for the Active Forces to realize that there are some superb warriors within the Guard and Reserve, that highly qualified officers, a General Sipe, be brought back to Active Duty, and for a 3, 4, 5, 6-month period of time, be placed in command of an appropriate Active Duty element. I think if we begin to have that kind of professional communication, taking down that barrier between the components, a level of respect will be created that will serve us well on some future battlefield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General BRAMLETT. Congressman, if I might, that is such a crucial point, Mr. Chairman, if I may, is I mentioned the last point that Congressman McHale has, it is such a crucial point. We have realized that value. In fact, our multicomponent units, I used an example of an AC commander. We have multicomponent units that have a Reserve component commander and subordinate to him are active component units. So we have seen the very value of what you speak. We have about 11 we are looking at now, and the potential will be that there will be up to 50 of these multicomponent units, where the commander may not necessarily be an active component.
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Mr. MCHALE. I look at a general officer over there who knows something about M–1A1 tanks, and I think if he came back on Active Duty for 3 months or 6 months, and commanded an Active Duty armored unit, and did so with competence, that would be mutually beneficial for both the Active component and the Guard.
General BRAMLETT. Sir, if I may—I want to report to you that in the special forces community, we have just done that. Our Brig. Gen. John Scales, Alabama Guardsman, former commander of a Special Forces Group, is a deputy commanding general for Reserve components as a traditional Guardsman in Fort Bragg. We have a gap between General Boray and General Boykin as a commander of the Army Special Forces Command. And John Scales has been brought up on Active Duty; he has assumed command of the Total Army, Special Forces Command, for a period of 2 months, while General Boray went to the USK Center and General Boykin reports to duty. I mean, we are getting there. But this just happened last week. And this is a great opportunity and a great tribute to a qualified soldier.
Mr. MCHALE. Change the rotation schedule at the NTC, make it once every 4 years, and you are absolutely on the right azimuth. I want to commend you for the progress you have made.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Congressman McHale. And now, the very patient Congressman Ryun.
Mr. RYUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a couple of questions. The first one is to General Bramlett. One of the things that we are going to be discussing more on one of the following panels is with regard to readiness. And as you know, there are many of us that are very concerned about readiness, as well as the size of our troops. In a recent interview, General Reimer from the Army said that he has too many undermanned squads as a result of the drawdown of the Army from years ago, 620,000 to its current level. General Reimer went on to say that we haven't gotten it right 100 percent with regard to how they are continuing to draw down. Last week in his testimony at the House National Security Committee, General Reimer talked about the Army's end strength, reducing it from 495,000 to 480,000—a number you mentioned just a moment ago, which is another reduction of 15,000 troops. Now, my question is we already are deploying so often, we are seeing perhaps a lack of readiness, we are seeing fatigue in our troops. General Reimer said that he doesn't see these cuts coming from within the division. Can you tell me where they might come from?
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General BRAMLETT. Congressman, they will come from reducing the structure. As we do this reshaping from 495 to 480, we are also concurrent with that, taking our structure that heretofore has required the individuals to fill the spaces. Once the structure goes away, then we think we will have more of the end strength to fill the structure that we have. The other step we are taking is, quite frankly, focusing on recruiting. The infantrymen—you are exactly right to choose that—we have been short. In fact, here at Fort Riley, a later panel will probably talk about how their infantry strength has been increasing. A GAO report, I think, will tell you when they were here some months ago, it was I want to say 57 percent at one of the units. It is probably over 90 percent now. So we are getting the infantrymen back into the backs of the Bradleys or the light infantry. And as we look out—and it is going to take us a year or two, it is not something we can do quickly, is take that structure out and then recruit the faces we need to fill the spaces that are left. But I think it is—we have a plan to do that, and General Reimer's description is exactly where we were when he made those comments.
Mr. RYUN. I am still concerned about the quality of the troops, but I want to ask a little bit of follow-up to that on cross leveling. Won't these troop reductions further exacerbate the problem of cross leveling?
General BRAMLETT. Cross leveling, in the sense if you bring an organization up to 100 percent of its authorization, then it would have a better—I should say a bigger impact. But when you look to deploy a unit, you look for its combat capability. For example, we go to Europe and the requirement is 92 percent of authorizations. Then when you cross level, the numbers aren't as significant and you still get the combat capability. Is it exactly what you would want, 100 percent of authorization? No. Are you combat capable at the high range of readiness? Yes. And so the cross leveling, it will be—I think when Task Force 1–41 went, I think they cross leveled about 86 people for a task force of well over 1,000 folks. So I think that is an acceptable realm. They didn't bring themselves to 100 percent, I don't believe, but they brought themselves well up into their readiness. The task force we just sent to Bosnia, 6,100 soldiers, in a very short period of time, the cross leveling there again was I want to say between 50 and 60—not a significant number. So I think it speaks well for where our forces are when they are called upon, what cross leveling they do on the installation. It is something we can ignore and still be combat ready, but we have got to really work at it.
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Mr. RYUN. Mr. Chairman, if I might, I would like to ask General McFarren a question with regard to Fort Riley. As you know, it is been chosen as one of the headquarters for the new divisions. Could you comment on why you think it was chosen?
General MCFARREN. Sir, I really of course didn't play in that process, but I can only assume that one of the main reasons is because of what we have here at Fort Riley, because of the training facilities, the acreages we have. We are one of the few posts around here that can train at the battalion task force level. When I was at Fort Stewart a couple of years ago, you know, we could train at the company level. We can train at the task force level. I think also because of the deployment facilities that are here. They have been upgraded since Desert Storm. We can move a division's worth out of here in just a little over a week. And that upgrade was very significant. The training facilities in terms of our ranges, we have some very sophisticated ranges here, to include three multipurpose ranges that allow us to do the tank and the Bradley training that is fairly close to where our troops actually live and the equipment is; and it kind of makes it easier from the expense of getting your equipment to the field because the training is just right next to where the troops and the facilities are. And I just think also because of the infrastructure that is here, like I mentioned earlier, the civilian work force, the communities. It is just an absolutely great place to train. This is my first assignment to Fort Riley. I spent a lot of time at Fort Bragg and other places, and this has been a well-kept secret, at least to me, in the U.S. Army because of what is here. And the simulations is very important and that is one that I know that I will take a good look at as we start to train the enhanced brigades. I saw the before and after of the battle command training program, that is when we went into computerized equipment at the corps and division level from my experience and it was very significant. And by using the assets that we will have and the current people we have in the facilities, there is no doubt in my mind that the brigade staffs, battalion staffs, we will be able to improve that during the premobilization, which will give us more of an opportunity during postmobilization to do some of these more sophisticated missions that we have talked about. General Bramlett mentioned the three basic missions. Those three basic missions that these enhanced brigades at the platoon level are training, those are three of the same five that I have for the two large active component brigades that are here that belong to the 1st Infantry and the 1st Armored Division. Three of those medals are exactly the same, you know—Defend, Attack, and Move to Contact. So that is very basic to what we do here. So I just think there is a lot here. And maybe down the road, hopefully we will be able to bring maybe some of the units here to train. Until then, one of my main things that I have to do starting this summer is to just go visit these units, start shaking hands and see who they are, and where they train, and all their capabilities so we can start assessing how we will go about improving that level of training. And I have done a lot of live-fire in my days, I am an artilleryman. You know, I have been hit by artillery rounds during peaceful time training, especially like at Fort Bragg. And so we can do a lot of live-fire training in preparation to go to the National Training Center. There is a lot that we can do out there. And having a division headquarters with the authority will allow me to—those are my brigade commanders, and in conjunction with the adjutant general's [AG's] and all the people that play in that, I will be in more of a role of directing, and working, and mentoring, just like we do currently with the brigade commanders here. So I don't know really why Fort Riley was picked, but I look at the assets we have here and it makes sense to me.
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Mr. RYUN. Mr. Chairman, if I might, a final comment. I think one thing that is also an enhancement for Fort Riley is the tremendous community support we have from Junction City and Manhattan.
General MCFARREN. Yes, sir.
Mr. RYUN. And I know as I have talked to many that are on National Security and that are actually here testifying, they have often gone back and said, you know, it is great to be at Fort Riley because you know the community is with you and will do whatever it can to help support you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ryun. And now, Congressman Buyer would like to make a final comment.
Mr. BUYER. Let me make one final comment if I could, Mr. Chairman. Just to let you know that I am being a good listener, General Bramlett, the Army is not 480, it is 487, and that is where you want to go, and it is not necessarily we are going to let you go there.
General BRAMLETT. I understand, sir.
Mr. BUYER. To let you know I was listening. OK?
General BRAMLETT. I understand. It was not a test. [Laughter.]
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Mr. BUYER. You can take that on back. The other is, and I will be right up front with you. Congressman Ryun is one of them on the Personnel Subcommittee that he—one thing about plain spoken English, he will come to me and doesn't have the depth of a military background, but he will come to me and he will say, well, if they are complaining about openness and numbers here, and hollowness there, and at 90 percent here, and 87 percent there, how can the Army come to us and say they want to cut more personnel? To be up front with you, I don't have the plain spoken English to answer Congressman Ryun when he says that. Because it is hard. So, General Reimer then comes to me and says, well, we are going to have division redesigns, that is how we are going to do it. The Navy says we are going to have smarter ships, you know. Have they gotten smarter yet? You must not be building them smarter there in Newport News. I know you build them smarter in Newport News.
Mr. BATEMAN. As smart as the specifications permit.
Mr. BUYER. Oh, all right. At least responsive contractors. That is a tough one. So he asks me the tough questions. So I compliment you asking that question because we haven't come to the answer on that one yet. And we are going to work that in this next bill. OK? The other I want to share with Colonel Umbarger. Thanks for coming for Indiana, and I have a lot of respect for you. You are well known in the State and what you do in your leadership. And you belong on the first team; your brigade belongs on the first team. When General Mitchell offered you up for you to be part of this integrated division to work for the Active Duty Division Commander, General Navas was eager to accept, the FORSCOM Commander is well aware of what you do. And I am still dumbfounded as to why your brigade would not be able to reap the dividends and the benefits of having that. So if you could relate that back to the Governor of Indiana of my disappointment. But please with regard to your Brigade, maintain the esprit de corps for which I know that you have a reputation, and the high morale, because the FORSCOM Commander here knows. And if necessary, he will reach down and pluck you, and tap you, and use you, and assign you in the Nation's needs. Am I right?
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General BRAMLETT. Yes, sir.
Colonel UMBARGER. Yes, sir.
Mr. BUYER. All right. Thanks. My last is, General Navas, I think this is the last time that you will appear before the Personnel Subcommittee, so before I ask the audience to spread out so you can do back-flips, let me say though on behalf of the Congress, and as Representatives of these our United States, we are thankful, we are grateful, not only to you but to your family for your sacrifice and your unselfish service to our Nation. And we bid you fond farewell.
General NAVAS. Thank you.
Mr. BUYER. And I return my time.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Buyer. And that sentiment as to General Navas is something certainly that I and all the members of the panel share, and we wish you the very best in your retirement and your future endeavors.
With that, let me advise members of the panel that we will keep the record open so that if you have other questions you want to submit, they can be submitted in writing and responded to in writing for the record. And with that, we will thank this panel for being with us today. We are truly appreciative of your testimony and having the benefit of your perspectives. And we will now have a 5-minute recess in order that we can set up for the second panel. Thank you very much.
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[Recess for 5 minutes.]
Mr. BATEMAN. The subcommittee will please come to order. Our second panel for our hearing this morning at Fort Riley consists of witnesses who are Mark E. Gebicke, Director of Military Operations and Capabilities Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division of the General Accounting Office, who is accompanied by William Solis, Assistant Director of Military Operations and Capabilities Issues, and by Mr. Syd Carroll, Evaluator in Charge of the Norfolk field office. Gentlemen, we are delighted to have you. Mark, it is good to have you back for the second time before the committee this week.
STATEMENTS OF MARK E. GEBICKE, DIRECTOR, MILITARY OPERATIONS AND CAPABILITIES ISSUES, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM SOLIS, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, MILITARY OPERATIONS AND CAPABILITIES ISSUES, AND SYD CARROLL, EVALUATOR IN CHARGE, NORFOLK FIELD OFFICE, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Mr. GEBICKE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And as usual, with your permission, I will just summarize my statement and——
Mr. BATEMAN. It will be made a part of the record.
Mr. GEBICKE [continuing]. We will go from there. We are very pleased to be here to discuss the results of—actually the preliminary findings of the work that we are doing to assess the personnel status of the follow-on divisions, and we are doing that for your subcommittee, as you are aware, as we have been in close contact with your staff.
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And as you are aware, these divisions comprise about one-half of the Active Combat Force in the Army. And they are very critical to the success of the specific war plans and the national strategy, obviously. What I would like to do is just stress three areas: The extent of the personnel shortages that we found when we made the visits and talk a little about why it is or is not reflected in the readiness reports that are submitted by the units; and the factors that have contributed to the shortages that we will note and its impact on training and readiness; and then finally the Army's plans for dealing with these shortages. And I just want to mention too, Mr. Chairman, the information that we are going to give you reflects what we found when we visited these divisions, which was primarily last fall up through January of this year.
Now, as background, there are, as you are well aware, 10 active divisions in the Army—4 of them are the contingency divisions or the very early deployers, a 5th, the 2d Infantry Division, is already deployed in Korea. And those five divisions enjoy a priority when it comes to staffing in the aggregate. The other divisions, the other five, are what we call the later-deploying or the follow-on divisions, and that is basically the 1st Armored Division, and it is the 1st, the 4th, the 10th, and the 25th Infantry Divisions. And they are assigned a lower priority for resources than those first five divisions that I mentioned. Now, what we found, in a nutshell, is that when you look at the aggregate numbers, the five follow-on divisions have 93 percent of their personnel on board. And on the surface, that sounds not too bad for follow-on divisions. But you really have to look beneath that percentage to understand the true situation that exists with regard to personnel in the divisions, because the aggregate data doesn't fully reflect the extent of shortages of combat troops, technical specialists, and experienced officers that exists in those divisions. For example, the 1st Armored Division was staffed at 94 percent at the time of our visit, in the aggregate. But it had less than 85 percent of its combat support and combat service positions filled, and only 73 percent of its captains and majors. Now, a portion of each of the divisions that we visited existed only on paper, because some squads, some crews, and some platoons had either no personnel or a minimum number of personnel assigned to it. Let me give you some real specific examples here. The 10th Infantry Division—only 138 of 162 infantry squads were fully or minimally filled; and 36 of the filled squads were not qualified. At the 1st Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division here at Fort Riley, only 56 percent of the authorized dismount infantry for its Bradley Fighting Vehicles was assigned; and in the 2d Brigade, 21 of 48 infantry squads had no personnel assigned. At the 3d Brigade——
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Mr. BATEMAN. Hold on just a minute.
Mr. GEBICKE. Yes.
Mr. BATEMAN. How can you have a unit that has no people assigned? It is not a unit anymore, is it?
Mr. GEBICKE. You have no unit.
Mr. BATEMAN. Well, why do we use that terminology that you have got 21 of 48 units without people? Wouldn't it be better to say that we have got 27 units and we need 21 more?
Mr. GEBICKE. You could certainly say it that way, absolutely.
Mr. BATEMAN. OK. I just wanted to make sure I was understanding. Thank you.
Mr. GEBICKE. You got it.
Mr. BATEMAN. Go ahead.
Mr. GEBICKE. One last example: The 3d Brigade of the 1st Armored Division, also here at Fort Riley, only 16 of 116 M1A1 tanks had full crews and were qualified—16 of 116. One Armored Battalion had no crew members assigned to 14 of its 58 tanks, because they were deployed to Bosnia. In addition, the division's engineer brigade, which is in Germany, had no personnel assigned to 11 of 24 bridge teams. So, you are probably asking yourself, well, if you haven't heard this before, why is this news? I mean, why hasn't this come to us in official readiness reports? And it has to do a lot with what we talked about on Wednesday. You see the aggregate numbers and you see the overall ratings, but you have got to look beneath those percentages to really understand what the situation is in these particular divisions. And it also has to do with the reliance on the subjectivity and the objectivity of the commanders when they complete those ratings and they submit to C1, 2, 3, or 4 to take into consideration all of the factors that we talked about today. But this process itself doesn't require them to do that. It has some limitations.
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What we also found, and not to be too awfully redundant, but it is not often that the commanders actually decrease the overall ''C'' rating in their unit; that just doesn't happen too often. Let me give you one example to drive that point home. We met with one commander of an engineering battalion, and he had said that he couldn't provide sustained engineer support to the division because of deployments of some of his key personnel that had gone to Bosnia. And this created a situation where he had to cancel company and battalion level training for a 4-month period. Now, the unit reported an overall readiness of C–2 because it had over 80 percent of its personnel. However, in reality, when you look at the elements within that battalion, you found that some elements were only staffed at 33 and 55 percent of their positions filled. Despite these shortages, this commander didn't lower the rating and instead reported that he would be ready to be C–1 within 20 days. This appears highly optimistic to us. We found similar situations at other armor, infantry, and support units.
Now, what are the factors that contribute to the shortfalls? And we have heard some of them surface in the panel we had this morning. No, 1 is the Army's priority system for assigning personnel. These later-deploying divisions are really third in the pecking order for receiving personnel. Second, at the time of our visit, although we understand this has changed a little bit, there were some significant Army-wide shortages of certain types of personnel, and that is going to alleviate somewhat through bonuses and some other things that have been made available. And third and probably most importantly for these divisions is their participation in the peacekeeping operations, which is very difficult for them to both provide personnel. But you also have to recall or remember what that does to the people that are left behind. Because the people that go off and are deployed, in many cases who are selected, are your most experienced people. So what we found is that leaves the lesser experienced people back to train units, which are incomplete because folks were extracted from those units to comprise that package. The general talked about pulling 800 people together, or 1,000, and sending them over. But what we need to remember is what that does with the units and the people that are left behind. And that is very critical, because you want to keep them trained and ready to go also.
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Now, every place we went and the commanders we talked to, they were very frank. And they said that personnel shortages have clearly degraded their capability and their readiness because of the reasons that I talked about. Their squads and crews are significantly understaffed. And this is very important—they have many noncommissioned officers who are responsible for training unit personnel who have been temporarily reassigned, so they are no longer there to actually provide the training to those that need the training. And then we have situations where many personnel have been assigned as fillers for exercises and other types of operations. Then we ask ourselves, well, what is the Army going to do about it. What can they do about this? And there are some initiatives out there. But probably the most important question that needs to be asked and addressed is given the situation and the world environment we are in today, is it acceptable for us to realize that we have five combat-capable divisions, those five first-to-deploy divisions, and we have five other divisions that are less than fully combat capable. Now, some of the things that the Army is looking toward is possibly reducing the number of people that it has in its—it is called the institutional Army, those that support the others, and maybe finding ways that we can cut down on the people needed there. The 4th Infantry Division has been involved in looking at new types of technology and it is possible that down the road, using technology in the Army, might enable us to field a division with fewer people because we are able to work smarter than we have in the past. The Army right now is planning to rely on its Individual Ready Reserve, recent retirees, and new recruits to fill the shortcomings that it has in its personnel. And one of the things that we would suggest, particularly with reliance on the Individual Ready Reserve, is that that really needs to be looked at. I am not sure that that is as viable an option as it would appear on the surface, because these are folks that in many cases we don't know if we can find them, we don't know what their status is as to whether or not they are deployable, and most importantly, we are not sure if they have the right skills that we really need to fill those skills that are necessary when we deploy.
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Mr. Chairman, that is a brief summary of the work we have done to date. And Mr. Carroll and Mr. Solis have spent considerable time in the field, with not only the brigades here, but with all of the divisions I have spoken to and we would be glad to respond to any questions you or the other panel members may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gebicke can be found in the appendix on page 1255.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, and your testimony has been very helpful to us again. One of the things that we heard from you about earlier in the week was the way our military services report the status of readiness, and we get into the SORTS reports and those things. And you speak of these reports perhaps giving you an inaccurate or a distorted picture because they are aggregates. It amazes me some of the figures that you gave me. You referred to a division or to a unit as having a 94 percent personnel assigned, and yet that unit was significantly below 94 percent in combat support and service personnel; had only 73 percent of the captains and majors, who the table of organization called for; and that it had units within it which were only paper units where there were zero people. I don't understand how you get an aggregate of 94 percent. There had to be 100 and some percent on something, if you are going to end up with an aggregate of 94 percent. Can you explain that phenomenon for me?
Mr. GEBICKE. Well, if you take the last point you made about the shortage of the captains and the majors, there is an abundance, apparently, of lieutenants. And a lot of the shortage of the captains and the majors has to do with the downsizing that has taken place. There are shortages in those two officer ranks and some of those positions are being filled by lieutenants. Now, true, the lieutenants are very capable and very enthusiastic, but they just don't have the experience, quite frankly.
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Mr. BATEMAN. You are talking about my highest attained military rank.
Mr. BUYER. Be careful.
Mr. GEBICKE. And they should be generous. And it could be, and I will ask Syd to maybe help out here, it could be that some elements are in excess of 100 percent, but in the aggregate when you look at it, it is in the 93. And when you start looking at specific components, and in many cases, these components are very critical to the operation of that battalion or that brigade, it is a significant shortfall.
Mr. BATEMAN. Well, before Mr. Carroll comments, it would seem to me that if you are doing a personnel check of a unit and you have got more than 100 percent of requirements at a given position or capability, then you ought to get a negative for being in excess of what your requirements are. And so it still befuddles me how you end up with 94 percent when you have got zero somewhere, because you have got 115 percent in lieutenants. Mr. Carroll.
Mr. GEBICKE. Before Syd speaks, Mr. Chairman, one of the things you need to keep in mind is in these aggregate calculations, we are not necessarily taking into consideration people who are deployed, people who have been loaned, people who have been borrowed, people who are working outside of their MOS.
Mr. BATEMAN. All of those people you just described are counted toward being 94 percent, even though they are effectively unavailable to the unit that is being rated.
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Mr. GEBICKE. Exactly, sir. They are effectively unavailable, sir, on a daily basis. You could start out—let us just take a hypothetical unit of 100 soldiers. If they are manned in the aggregate at 90 soldiers, that would equate to a C–1 or 80 soldiers would be a C–2. What happens is you may have 80 soldiers, but it may not be 80 of the right type. For example, you may need a certain number of NCO's and a certain number of lower enlisted. They will have an abundance of the lower enlisted, but they don't have the NCO's, which makes it difficult to man the squads. But if you start out at 80 percent on any given day, they are going to be taking people out of their high-density areas and putting them in their combat-support and service-support skills, where they are very, very short. And they are working in supply rooms, they are working in motor pools, they are working administrative jobs. So they will withdraw 10 to 12 people from that 80, and even though they are trained to be infantrymen or armorers, and they should be in tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles, they will be working in the low-density combat-support and service-support areas.
On top of that, there is levies placed upon the units by higher headquarters. They take further people out of the unit to work in positions on the post, such as bus drivers, lifeguards, doing grounds-keeping, so that further reduces it.
So in the aggregate, you can have a unit that has 80 percent of the people assigned to it, but when they show up for training each day, you may only have 60 of them. And what that means is that combat vehicles go unmanned.
To give you a specific example, we visited the 2d Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division in Germany. The two maneuver battalions within that Brigade, each of the infantry battalions were authorized 24 squads for a total of 48. They were only manned for 27 squads. One of the battalions only had 16 and one of the battalions only had 11. In the aggregate, they had a number of squads report C–2, but an additional 5 squads of people on a daily basis were pulled out of those battalions to work in the type of jobs that I have just described.
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Mr. BATEMAN. Mark, you made reference to Ready Reserves and new recruits as being a part of what was going to be relied upon to accomplish missions. Would you refresh our recollections on who the Ready Reserve are and the extent to which you think having to rely upon them may present a problem?
Mr. GEBICKE. Sure. The last numbers that I saw would indicate that we have about 37,000 people in the Individual Ready Reserve. And these would be people who have recently left the military, possibly hadn't totally fulfilled their total obligation or commitment. I guess they had an 8-year commitment when they sign up, they maybe serve 4 years Active and then they will be in the IRR for the following 4 years, so clearly you have a group of people, I mean, on paper, how many of those people would you have current addresses or phone numbers for or could you track down. How long would that take to do; would they have the right skills once you locate them; would they be deployable if you can find them, and then can you do all that within, say, 90 days, which is when some of these divisions that we are talking about might need to deploy. That is the question that we have about that.
Mr. BATEMAN. The Mobilization Plan actually contemplates that x number of the positions that would be needed to be filled on mobilization would come from the Ready Reserve.
Mr. GEBICKE. Absolutely.
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Buyer.
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Mr. BUYER. Let me move this to a macro sense here for a moment, because I am trying to figure it all out. You guys have been into the field and into the weeds, so let us not get lost by the high weeds. Let us pull ourselves back out for just a moment. I started the year with a very good hearing on personnel on QDR and the NDP to get kind of an understanding. I recognized a trend line. The trend line is higher tech. I go back to the smarter ships. The Air Force does away with the A–10's to go to higher tech. I have this envisioned as if ground troops now are going to have lasers on their weapons, and cameras on their weapons, as if—you talk about information overload in technology. But I see this trend going out there. And of course you have got contractors that want to sell all kinds of things, right?
What I am trying to get at is my overall sense here is that in this quest for modernization and living under the budget constraints and the present caps, the Army wants to modernize at the sacrifice of personnel. General Bramlett was right when he said 480; that is where the Army wants to go. It is 487 right now. Even if you do the redesign, they may pick up to 3,000. But I am having difficulty answering Mr. Ryun's question, when you come and you testify about these types of shortfalls. And then I have to face this question as a nation.
Because we listen to the Chiefs, and it is interesting to listen to the Chiefs of each of the services testify and then compare it to the testimony of the CINC's, because they are the operators. They are the ones that have to have the real-world requirements, and they have their certain needs that they have to have. So, when we hear the testimony about readiness—Mr. Bateman has the Readiness Subcommittee and I have just got the personnel side, but when I hear readiness right now, I am not so certain I understand how it is being defined and used.
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When I hear, well, we are ready, I have to ask all kinds of questions now. Ready for what? For when? So when I say for what, all right, what type of contingency and where, I see the Army talking more like the Marine Corps in its deployments and light, and probably scares the Marine Corps. And then the for when is for how soon. And then I keep hearing this language about acceptable levels of risk. Well, obviously that is based on threat assessments. But I have this uncomfortable feeling inside that we are permitting history about to repeat itself in so-called moments of peace. That we can have these so-called acceptable levels of risk and have a degradation in readiness—that is what your testimony is telling me, that there is a degradation in readiness. But the generals and admirals will testify that readiness has never been stronger. Readiness compared to what? For what? What contingencies? Because the two testimonies don't match. And I would appreciate your comments based on my comments, please.
Mr. GEBICKE. The disconnect between what you just heard and what we were telling you, and what we are telling you here today, is that when you look at the aggregate, and I think that is where the General was coming from this morning, and he is saying we are ready overall, and he is basing that on some of the things we talked about Wednesday in this jammer process, and looking at the large situations. What we did is we went down to the unit level. And I think your next panel will give you far greater insight than we can give you, because they are there every day, and we only spent about a week with them in reporting this information to you. But I appreciate your concerns, and we have the same concerns. And the same questions that you ask, Mr. Buyer, really have not been answered. I mean, ready—ready for what?
Mr. BATEMAN. Let me add this. I find it extremely interesting when I talk to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and to any of the Joint Chiefs, to the Secretary of the Navy yesterday, to a panel of witnesses yesterday, each and every one says that if we don't get the supplemental appropriation of $2.2 billion to pay for the Bosnian contingency in the Southwest Pacific, then we have a disaster on our hands. The whole world and the Department of Defense is going to fall apart if a $2.2 billion supplemental appropriation is offset. And yet it is the very same people who tell us that we have never had a higher state of readiness. It seems to me that if you are going to have a disaster for lack of $2.2 billion in a supplemental appropriation, you are on the razor's edge, at best, in terms of your current state of readiness. And until they will tell the American people that we are not meeting their needs and are developing a hollow force, they are going to continue to have a hollow force because the Congress, under our budget agreement of last year, cannot add to the Defense budget this year, certainly if the President, the Commander in Chief, doesn't ask us to add to that Defense budget.
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Mr. BUYER. Mr. Gebicke, you are an asset to us because you help us develop this. And I think we are also being helpful to each of the services by guiding them to where they want to go, because they don't like commanding units that aren't at the acceptable levels, I can tell you that. So we can all be most helpful to them to help guide them where they want to go under these difficult budget moments. I yield back my time.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Buyer. Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. SOLIS. I was just going to comment very, very quickly. All the different assignments that we talked about—the peacekeeping, the assignments of folks to the different things around the bases—these are things that the soldiers willingly accept and they do. I think though when we are looking at this, we are talking about the ability to conduct combat operations. And every brigade commander will tell you, you know, they will provide the people, they will do those kinds of things, and these other missions, but they are always preparing in the back of their mind, in the forefront, for a combat mission. And that is why when we talk about these things, that is what they are talking about, when you ask the question, what are we preparing for.
Mr. BATEMAN. Very well put. Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is my understanding that resources are distributed based on the deployment timelines now. Do you believe that the follow-on divisions are unable to meet their timelines for deployment based on the tiered resourcing? And it goes to the scenario that we see in different places, you know, Korea. They have testified before our committee that in case we were to go to war, that the number of casualties would be very, very high. And now you say that we have five capable divisions and the others are not capable. Then we go into the area of sustainment. And at the same time we know that we have over 40,000 dependents who are in South Korea. So I see a bunch of problems that I worry about because these are our sons and daughters who are out there. And we are trying to provide them with the best training, the best equipment. But what I have heard this past year worries me. Maybe you can touch on some of the—I don't know where to begin because I see a huge problem out there.
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Mr. GEBICKE. Let me see if I can help you address that a little bit, because I am familiar with the Army Forces that we have in Korea. We have done extensive work in Korea and I have been over there myself on a number of occasions. The 2d Infantry Division, which is currently in Korea, is not one of the contingency divisions, but it is a forward-deployed division and it does enjoy a relatively high priority of resourcing. So because it is forward deployed, it is—I haven't seen the statistics lately, but my guess would be it is probably pretty close to 100 percent in its manning. But what you heard——
Mr. ORTIZ. But my question goes back—the casualties will be very, very high. What is next? Is it going to be another capable division, or one that is not capable to come down and support our troops who are there?
Mr. GEBICKE. And the casualties, if North Korea were to attempt to move across the DMZ, could be rather significant for that infantry division, for the simple reason that the exact amount of time is classified, but we are under the impression that we would not have a great deal of warning time if North Korea should attack South Korea. And, therefore, we won't have 6 months, like we had in Saudi Arabia, to get more support in there. So, that division is at risk should North Korea decide to attack. And I would be glad to discuss that more, maybe privately, because a lot of what I could tell you would be classified, and I wouldn't want to do that here obviously.
But I think you, and Mr. Bateman, and Mr. Buyer hit the nail right on the head, and that is ready for what. And we are not here to tell you that these five follow-on divisions are not ready today. Because in today's environment, they are probably OK. We don't need them today. But in a situation where you have an extended major regional war that goes longer than we envision, longer than the 3 or 4 months we think it is going to be, we are going to need these people. Or if we get involved in two situations nearly simultaneously, we are going to need these people.
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So when you ask the question, Mr. Buyer, ready for what, I mean, that is the question. Because if we want to stay ready for the situation we find ourselves in today, and we are willing to accept the risk that we will not be engaged in a protracted major theater war, or two major theater wars, then maybe it is a risk we are willing to assume.
Mr. ORTIZ. And one of the things, and I am pretty sure you took this into consideration, that the divisions are being redesigned with fewer personnel, that the divisions will be smaller. Now this is what they are talking about now. Was that taken into consideration when you made your study?
Mr. GEBICKE. No. Only to the extent—when we did our study, we basically looked at what the divisions were supposed to have at that particular point and time and what they had on board. But as you pointed out, one of the things you need to think about—but it is going to happen down the road, it is not going to happen tomorrow, or next month, or next year—would be the possibility that with the introduction of new technology, we may not need to have an authorized level of strength as great as it is today. And there is some experimentation that is taking place in the 4th Infantry Division, you know, and what that might yield remains to be seen.
Mr. ORTIZ. Do you think that what you have seen is more or less budget driven than readiness driven?
Mr. GEBICKE. I don't think so. I don't think so. I don't think it is budget driven. Not that we weren't told that we couldn't use more money when we were out in the field, but——
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Mr. CARROLL. Can I comment on that?
Mr. ORTIZ. Yes, please.
Mr. CARROLL. To add to that, sir, you know, we know how many people the Army has in its total Active Force structure, and basically they have made a management decision that they don't have enough people within the force structure to fully man 10 divisions. So what they have done is they have prioritized their TDA Force, their institutional force. At any given time, we have about 60 people that are in transit, in holding, in schools, that is our transients, trainees, holdees, and students [TTHS] account, and what is left over goes to the table of organizational equipment [TO&E] units. The Army has made a management decision that with regard to the Rangers, with regard to the Special Forces units, with regard to the contingency divisions, and the 2d Infantry Division in Korea, that we are going to give them a priority on manning. What is left over after all of that is taken out, then these follow-on divisions get a fair share of it.
Now, if they are expecting a five division's worth of capability to arrive, they are not going to get five divisions. Now, are these units combat-capable? Yes, they are combat-capable to do certain things. Are they fully combat-capable so that they can conduct sustained operations? According to all the commanders we talked to, no. And that is the big difference. It is the options that are available to them in executing their missions. They may not have—maybe not be able to execute all of the alternatives that they would like to because they don't have that full division worth of capability. But can they deploy and can they accomplish missions? Sure they can. So, again, you are absolutely right, sir. It is what we expect of these divisions.
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Mr. GEBICKE. If I could add one more point to that that I think is critical to understanding this whole issue, is that not only do the contingency divisions and special operations forces receive a higher aggregate level of staffing or a higher priority, but among the special forces, they also receive not only the aggregate numbers but also the specific needs that they have, so they are getting the right officers in the right MOS's. When Mr. Carroll said by the time you get down to the follow-on divisions, you are getting a fair share of what is left, it may not be exactly what you need in all cases. It is just a fair share of what is left.
Mr. ORTIZ. And then with the retention problems we are having, you know, it is going to be a very, very serious problem. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ortiz.
Let me clarify something. If I heard you correctly, you said that these problems that we have been discussing, and which you have described, are not budget driven? Explain that to me. It seems to me we are dealing with a lack of resources, both in terms of personnel and equipment. And that to me spells budget driven.
Mr. GEBICKE. Let me tell you why I don't come to that conclusion. If you look at—Mr. Carroll talked about the people who are in training, in transit, and in holding. We have 60,000 of those folks right now. If you talk about the people that are in the, what's called the institutional Army—things like Recruiting Command, I mean, many of the people in the Pentagon, we are talking about 132,000 people. Now, we have an Army right now of 487,000 people. We are only looking for 176,000 of those to be in these 10 active divisions. Now, where should your priority be? You see what I am saying? There are 487,000 people out there and we need 176,000 to fully man at 100 percent these 10 divisions. So I look at those numbers and I say with some movement, some shift—now, some of those people will need to provide combat services and combat support, there is no doubt about it, because you have got to have that in order to support, you know, your combat divisions.
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But above and beyond that, you have got another 130-some thousand that are not involved in either one of those two functions, and another 60,000 that are involved in training, transit, or holding at any particular point in time. So I do that math, Mr. Chairman, and I just have a hard time saying that it is budget driven. It seems to me that there are some priorities here and some reassignments that can—it seems more of a management issue as opposed to a budget issue—this particular issue right here.
Mr. BATEMAN. Well, in the here and now, until someone has come up with a grand design on how you can reduce the 137,000 who are not actually combatants, or the 160,000 who are not combat support people, until somebody determines how you are going to do that—and you mentioned the Recruiting Command. It sounds like, oh, that is a nice administrative function. They are not warfighters, but you darn well won't get warfighters if you are going to decimate recruiting. You have got to have those people.
Mr. GEBICKE. Critical functions, yes, sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. So, you know, there are all kinds of functions that come within this. So I don't think you can say it is not budget driven until or unless you have demonstrated that there are efficiencies that can indeed be accomplished and which will give you the assets that you need right now.
Mr. BUYER. Can I just make one quick comment?
Mr. BATEMAN. Yes, sure.
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Mr. BUYER. With brevity—I respectfully disagree with GAO. I yield back to the Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. I didn't hear that. I am sorry.
Mr. BUYER. Oh, you didn't hear that? The Chairman didn't hear that. Let me repeat that. Let me repeat that. It was brevity.
Mr. BATEMAN. For the distracted Chairman, please repeat it.
Mr. BUYER. I respectfully disagree with GAO. And I yield back.
Mr. BATEMAN. Oh, OK. I thank you for repeating that comment. Now, Mr. Taylor.
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. And I am like the others, very much alarmed by what you tell us. What I don't see, and I would like you to comment on this, is you say that better management would solve the problem. From my point of view, one of those better management schemes would be, particularly in those areas where you talk about taking units from armor, from artillery, from infantry, and having them doing support and supply type functions, since about, to the best of my recollection, about 60 percent of the Guard and Reserve work is support and supply, a very obvious answer; but maybe not the right answer. That is what I want you to comment on, would be to call up, either as individuals since you are telling me that these units that are being taken out of infantry are being piecemealed about, so in that instance, individuals would work, or as units on a much greater basis than we are doing now. What my heart tells me, and what I hear usually after a beer or two from some people, is that although the Active Force will tell me in a hearing that the Guard and Reserve can do anything, they sometimes come back later on in the evening and say, ah, those guys can't hack it.
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The Guard and Reserve tell me they can hack it. I saw after Desert Storm nothing but rave reviews of those Guard and Reserve units that had been deployed to Saudi Arabia. Unfortunately, a lot of those people, like Norman Schwarzkopf, like Gus Baganos, have retired. And what troubles me is I think maybe this generation of officer does not have the same appreciation and either doesn't want to give them the chance to prove themselves or have already made up their minds that they cannot prove themselves.
Because again, I do see, you know, the problems aren't going away. We have not only this President, but the previous President, who deployed a lot of troops to a lot of places for a lot of different reasons; and I don't see that mentality changing in the next 3 years. So I think we have to address what is, rather than what we would like it to be.
Could you comment on whether or not we should be making better use of the Guard and Reserve on both an individual basis, on a unit basis, and whether you also suspect that there are some people who don't really want to give them a chance, for whatever reason.
Mr. GEBICKE. I am not in the position to comment on the last part of your question. I just don't know that. I do think that the Guard and the Reserve can certainly provide some assistance to the Active Army. I think one of the potential solutions to the problems that we have noted here, if you don't have the personnel in the right MOS's and the places where you need them in the Active Army, that possibly the Guard and the Reserve, specifically the Guard, if you are starting to train those people in combat service, combat support, trying to move, as General Navas said earlier, three brigades from combat to combat service, combat support, that that could be part of the formula, part of the solution. I would agree with you.
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Mr. TAYLOR. Obviously I am going to take a little bit different approach. I think a great deal of this is budget driven. I hear the Active Army tell me they don't have enough. They point over to their Reserve and Guard counterparts, that they have got too much. Well, I don't see that changing either. So dealing with the situation that is, what do you think we as a Congress ought to do budgetarily to get these guardsmen and reserves back-filling these units, as you mentioned, rather than stripping active duty units of their well-trained artillerymen, infantrymen, and armor units?
What in your mind—have you come up with a number, given the world that exists today, what sort of a number should we be appropriating and designating for that purpose?
Mr. GEBICKE. I wish I had an answer for you, but I don't have a clue——
Mr. TAYLOR. Well, I am asking—would you make a recommendation. We have got, as you know, about 6 weeks to put together next year's budget. I happen to think that is the solution for the world that exists today. It may not be 5 years from now, it may not even be 2 years from now. But we budget for 1 year at a time, by law. And so that is why I am seeking some solutions. And I happen to be a great believer in the Guard and Reserve based on their experience in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. And also as Mr. Buyer pointed out, the Active Army, Active Navy are coming to us this year asking for fewer people, not more people. So given what is, I think the only solution is a much greater use of the Guard and Reserve. And I would certainly welcome a recommendation as to how much we should budget for that purpose.
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Mr. GEBICKE. We will try to do that for you, sir.
Mr. TAYLOR. And also whether you think these needs that you have pointed out would be better served by activating units, and if so, how big a unit, or by doing so on an individual basis as those people volunteer for service.
Mr. GEBICKE. We will see if we can shed some light on those two questions for you.
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you.
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix beginning on page 1351.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Let me just comment in reference to this ''Is the problem budget driven?'' One of the reasons I have to believe that it is very significantly budget driven is when General Navas, I believe it is, testifies that the budget that he deals with constitutes 36 percent of the depot maintenance requirements. That is a significant shortfall of base operations support. Every one of the services testified at a hearing within the last 10 days that their 1999 budget request was only 60 to 70 percent of the base operation support requirements. Well, you can't say that you are adequately funded and adequately resourced if you are getting only a percentage, a significantly depreciated percentage of your known identified, recognized, inventoried requirements. So there has to be a budget dimension to this which is very large.
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Mr. GEBICKE. Can I just make one comment, Mr. Chairman, because I don't want you to misconstrue my remark in response to your question. We are only talking about solving the problem that we found with personnel shortages in the follow-on divisions, the number of people. And I thought the question was will money solve that particular problem? And I don't think money is the answer to that particular problem. I think it is a management's prioritization. But I am not here to tell you that there are not other budget issues that need to be resolved in the Army. OK?
Mr. BATEMAN. Very good.
Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, if I may?
Mr. BATEMAN. Yes, Mr. Taylor.
Mr. TAYLOR. But getting back to exactly what we are talking about, the back-filling, and stripping one unit to man another, because of Bosnia or because of missions like Bosnia. If there were funds made available to activate Guard and reservists to fill the Bosnia mission, would that then be funds solving the problem—because then we could leave the active units intact to train and do the missions that they have?
Mr. CARROLL. I would like to respond to that, sir.
Mr. TAYLOR. Please.
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Mr. CARROLL. Yes, it would. And let me explain why. You know, we are telling you that there are shortages in later-deploying units and that there is a mismatch between the type and rank of people that are required and what they have. That is nothing new. There is always been shortfalls in the Army's later-deploying units. What is different about the situation now is that these shortfalls are there and they are being exacerbated by repeated deployments for peacekeeping operations. So, yes, sir, it would go a long way to help stabilize and improve the situation in the units if we could use more Reserve components.
Mr. TAYLOR. If I may, Mr. Chairman, then I am going to cut it off. I was absolutely amazed to see that the average soldier in the 1st Infantry Division was deployed 254 days out of the last year. But couldn't that also help spell those individuals by sending guardsmen and reservists to at least take some of those missions?
Mr. CARROLL. Absolutely, sir, without a doubt. And it is interesting that you should bring that up, sir. When we were in Germany and we talked with the commanders of the 1st Infantry and 1st Armor, one of the comments they left us with is that this should be an Army mission—not a 1st Infantry, 1st Armored Division mission. It should be an Army mission. And that is exactly what you are saying.
Mr. GEBICKE. Because if you think about the types of resources that we need in Bosnia, we need MP's, we need psychological operations [PSYOPS] units, civil affairs—those units are pretty prevalent in the Guard and the Reserve.
Mr. BATEMAN. Well, to add further to this, if you send your combat forces into contingency operations which are essentially peacekeeping, you are degrading their combat readiness for the warfighting skills that we really look to them and must depend upon them for. Mr. Ryun.
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Mr. RYUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to make sure that I am on record with saying that I disagree with the Government on this issue, that I do believe it is budget driven because if you have more money, you do more with personnel, you can involve more personnel, you can provide quality of life issues, housing, that sort of thing. That can be very important for our service people at this point in time. A comment and then a question. First of all, I recognize that the United States is recognized as having tremendous technological advantages so that often we think that that perhaps will be what will be our cutting edge; and yes, it seems that that will provide in many ways when we would have a conflict. And yet it really comes down to, you know, having troops on the ground and having them well qualified. I have this mental picture concerning that while we might win the tech war, if you just for a moment imagine troops coming in that are not friendly, they will have perhaps hostages tied to tanks, other military equipment, it is going to be necessary for us to have troops on the ground that are well qualified and that are also prepared. And in light of all of that and what we were discussing with the earlier panel, that General Reimer and others would like to see us cut an additional 15,000 troops, what sort of affect do you think that would have? I recognize you think we can play with the numbers and make that happen. What sort of an affect would an additional 15,000 troops being cut have upon our ability to be able to go in and successfully win a war?
Mr. GEBICKE. If you need it, all 487,000 people that we have—in other words, if you are totally engaged in two major theater wars, it would have a significant impact. So, I think you have to look back to your question, Mr. Buyer—ready for what. I mean, ready for what we are supposed to be ready for right now. Two major theater wars, it would have an impact.
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Mr. RYUN. It is my understanding that if we had a major conflict with Saddam Hussein, and let us say that North Korea decided at the same time to engage us, we wouldn't really be capable. And here we are talking about reducing the troops even further.
Mr. GEBICKE. Well, we would certainly be taxed if we had to go in two different directions at almost the same time; there is no doubt about that.
Mr. RYUN. I have one other question. We have talked about readiness and you have addressed various numbers and how those might—you know, be 73 percent ready. As Chairman Buyer said, sometimes it is hard to see the trees in the forest and it is very complicated. In your field studies, have you had any evidence that there are officers that are being pressured to mask readiness? You know, are they being pressured by anyone to sort of hide this particular issue?
Mr. GEBICKE. No, I don't think that would be true at all. I think in fact—the fact is we spoke with these individuals and they spoke honestly, and open, and relayed to us what they found their situation to be. The narrative comments that they put on their unit readiness reports, and we read those, would indicate that they understand the situation. It is more of a limitation, if you will, in how the information is recorded when it is quantified. But the qualitative information, the narrative, the comments at the bottom, we found to be very open and very candid. And the discussions we had were also very open and very candid. And I hope you will see that in the next panel that comes up here.
Mr. BATEMAN. That is good to hear.
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Mr. BUYER. A last comment on budget. I hate to labor on this. But there was such a reaction from you in reference to Mr. Taylor about, well, can't we use Guard and Reserve components to help out and assist, and you are overly excited about that. We would love that too, but that was my question to the Forces Command [FORSCOM] commander—there is a cost tailed to that. And that is what we are—the sense I am getting out of the building across the river—I am talking like we are back in D.C.—way thousands of miles from here; in the Pentagon they really are saying, well, we are going to use Active components because when we call up those Reserves and we do that, there is such a cost tailed to that, we really don't want to do that. See? And so, when I hear, well, this really isn't budget driven, this really is a management concern, money really is a driver in a lot of this, and that is why I respectfully disagreed with you. We will continue to engage with you on the issue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Buyer. Well, with that, I think we should thank our panel of witnesses. We appreciate you being with us, and let me mention that you are accompanied by Mr. Les Ward, Mr. Kevin Handley, and Mr. Jerry Winterlin, evaluators with the General Accounting Office. We appreciate their input and all the work that you do for us.
We will take a 3-minute break and await the third panel.
[Recess.]
Mr. BATEMAN. For our panel and those in the audience, let us call to order our subcommittee for purposes of hearing from our third panel. And we are delighted to have this panel before us and to be able to receive their testimony today. The panel consists of: Col. William Caldwell, commander, 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division; Command Sgt. Maj. Kenneth Lopez, 2d Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division; Col. Joseph F. H. Peterson, commander, 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division; Command Sgt. Maj. Michael Gravens, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division; Col. Bill Chamberlain, commander, 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division; Command Sgt. Maj. Terrence McWilliams, 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division; and Col. Kent D. Thomas, garrison commander at Fort Riley.
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Gentlemen, we are delighted to have you. And, Colonel Caldwell, if you would like to proceed.
STATEMENT OF COL. WILLIAM CALDWELL IV, COMMANDER, 1ST BRIGADE, 10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION U.S. ARMY
Colonel CALDWELL. OK, Mr. Chairman. What I would like to say, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, on behalf of all of us here at this table, we have each submitted prepared written statements that we would like to submit for the record.
Mr. BATEMAN. They will be received and you may proceed as you choose.
Colonel CALDWELL. Mr. Chairman, I will just sort of quickly summarize about three points, the key things that I sort of stated in my statement. One is personnel shortages. They have had the greatest impact on the overall readiness of my Brigade, Task Force Warrior. And although in the last 3 months we have seen an increase in personnel, we still have shortages, especially in the specialty skills, such as logistics, maintenance, communications. And these are further exacerbated when you then take the individual tasking requirements we receive to back fill people in places like Haiti, Bosnia, and other assortment of places across the world.
The second point I would say is for those though that I do have, they are trained and they are ready. And I think that point perhaps sometimes is missed. Although we are not up to strength, of the soldiers we have, we have organized and we are trained and ready to go to war. So, the drawback though is, I don't have any sustainability. If we go into high-intensity conflict and we start receiving casualties, we will be combat-ineffective very rapidly. But initially, we will be good.
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The second point, sir, is the reorganization of units for missions like Bosnia. I have been through that once and am preparing to go through it again. It has a major impact on unit readiness. Because of the requirements to fill them up to a certain level of strength, and then once you add on the deployment duration, I also have to start taking into consideration those who can't go. And consequently, just like the last unit I sent, I had to reorganize it by 60 percent in order to prepare it for deployment.
And then the third point I would just say is the budget restrictions will have a long-term impact on us. We are starting to feel it somewhat already in ammunition restraints. Although I still have ample to train with today, I am not convinced I will next year. And I am starting to feel it now, and I am not sure even at the end of this year that I will have—that my critical Department of Defense ammunition code [DODAC] or ammunition, that I am going to have what I need to really sustain our readiness.
And then the second piece is the quality of life that that budget affects. I know Colonel Thomas, down at the end, can talk much more eloquently than I can on that, but we are also starting to see that, too. And you just look at the amount of unfunded resource requirements that we have just within the 10th Mountain Division, and these start becoming fairly substantial. And they are not going down; they are only going up. And they have been going up and I have been watching that for the last couple of years in different command positions. That is all I have, sir.
[The prepared statement of Col. Caldwell can be found in the appendix on page 1280.]
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Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Colonel Caldwell. Command Sergeant Major Lopez.
STATEMENT OF COMMAND SGT. MAJ. KENNETH C. LOPEZ, 2D BRIGADE, 10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION, U.S. ARMY
Command Sergeant Major LOPEZ. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am Command Sergeant Major Lopez, the senior enlisted soldier in the 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division. I want to thank you for this opportunity to speak to you about America's 10th Mountain Division and the soldiers that command the brigade.
As of this month, I have worn the Army uniform for 22 years; serving this great Nation as a soldier is a truly distinct privilege and honor. The readiness of our soldiers in tactical units is paramount in winning the first battle of our next war. I have offered my candid assessment on the readiness of the 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division in my written testimony. From the foxhole perspective, the readiness of the 2d Brigade is not broken nor is the morale and professionalism of the soldiers in the command or brigade. I am confident in our skilled and versatile noncommissioned officers to train their soldiers and lead them in battle, if called to do so.
Overall, the brigade training readiness is at the necessary level of accomplishment to accomplish its wartime mission with our most recent rotation to the Joint Readiness Training Center [JRTC] in January of 1998 validating our ability to accomplish our mission-essential tasks. The observer-controller stated that the attack on Shugart-Gordon, the military operation in the urban terrain training village, was the best they had observed. The brigade rotation at the Joint Readiness Center was truly our capstone training event of the year. However, shortages of infantrymen and sergeants have the greatest negative impact on the readiness within the brigade. A number of our infantry squads are partially manned and the majority of our company antitank sections are unmanned.
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Gentlemen, after a fill of additional personnel and a short train-up period, the brigade will be fully combat ready to accomplish its wartime mission when the Nation calls. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for the opportunity to speak today.
[The prepared statement of Command Sergeant Major Lopez can be found in the appendix on page 1299.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Command Sergeant Major Lopez. Colonel Peterson.
STATEMENT OF COL. JOSEPH F.H. PETERSON, COMMANDER 3D BRIGADE, 1ST ARMORED DIVISION, U.S. ARMY
Colonel PETERSON. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It is an honor for me to appear before you today. My name is Col. Joe Peterson and I am the commander of the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division. First, I am extremely proud of my soldiers and truly believe that we are the best led, trained, and equipped Army in the world. Our soldiers are dedicated and practice daily the values of selfless service, commitment, and loyalty to country. I will summarize my comments now on personnel and training readiness and the impact that deploying a Battalion Task Force to Bosnia had on my brigade combat team. First concerning personnel readiness, overall personnel strength in the brigade is satisfactory. Shortages of certain specialty skills and grades, however, have been a challenge. Our greatest shortages are sergeants overall. Noncommissioned officer shortages have not only limited our ability to provide first-line supervisors to our junior soldiers, but also stretched our ability to maintain equipment, manage unit logistics and process personnel administration actions. Less experienced, albeit highly motivated soldiers, are filling our NCO vacancies. The diversion of combat arms soldiers to fill critical support shortfalls further complicates this problem.
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Next, on training readiness. Funding has the greatest impact on readiness locally. At Fort Riley we developed a model that attempts to relate readiness to the frequency and cost of training events. Based on this model on current funding levels, the brigade combat team is funded at a low C–2 level of readiness. Obviously personnel issues and training readiness are related. The greater the shortage of support in combat soldiers, the greater the shortage of noncommissioned officers; and the greater the personnel turbulence, the greater the requirement to train more frequently to maintain readiness.
Now, with regard to the impact that deploying and training a task force for Bosnia had on the brigade. First, we had to move a total of 92 soldiers to satisfy personnel shortfalls and requirements—82 of those came from within the brigade. Other significant issues include that we were unable to train as we would fight based on the loss of one-third of our combat power.
Second, it took the remaining soldiers of the brigade to train the task force for deployment and forced the cancellation or deferral of most of our training schedule.
Third, a large number of the deployed noncommissioned officers had to defer scheduled professional development courses. And finally, it takes about 3 months of focused combined arms training to bring a combat arms unit back to a C–2 level of proficiency after a deployment like Bosnia.
In conclusion, you can be very proud of the soldiers of the 3d Brigade Combat Team. Efficient use of resources and dedicated leaders and soldiers have allowed us to sustain our warfighting capability. Based on the fact that we are not a first-to-fight or a first-to-deploy unit, we are resourced at about the right level and are prepared to execute our wartime mission, given the anticipated training days available prior to deployment.
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Thank you for your support and this opportunity. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Peterson can be found in the appendix on page 1317.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Colonel Peterson. Next we will hear from Command Sgt. Maj. Michael Gravens.
STATEMENT OF COMMAND SGT. MAJ. MICHAEL L. GRAVENS, COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR, 1ST BRIGADE, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION, U.S. ARMY
Command Sergeant Major GRAVENS. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today and report on the readiness of the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. I would like to begin by saying that I believe that Fort Riley is a great installation on which to serve, primarily because it provides an excellent training area to train and prepare our units for deployment and possible combat. I firmly believe that the 1st Brigade is a well-led, motivated, trained, and combat-effective unit. In that we are a follow-on deploying unit, we wrestle with some of the same tough issues as do other units in our effort to maintain our readiness. As the senior NCO of the brigade, I see shortages in NCO's, shortages in critical low-density MOS's; personnel turbulence and funding as being those areas which most greatly affect our readiness as a brigade. Thank you for your support and again I look forward to this opportunity to answer any questions you may have, sir.
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[The prepared statement of Command Sergeant Major Gravens can be found in the appendix on page 1322.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Sergeant Gravens. And now, Colonel Chamberlain.
STATEMENT OF COL. EDWIN W. CHAMBERLAIN III, COMMANDER, 3D BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED)
Colonel CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I do sincerely appreciate being here today to be able to talk about my soldiers. I will report to you that the 3d Brigade Combat Team of the 4th Infantry Division is trained and ready. The Iron Brigade has sufficient soldiers, money, ammunition, vehicles to execute our training plan for this training year. My observations as it pertains to readiness is that my junior enlisted soldiers are struggling financially, so a lot of them choose not to stay. We are seeing the same thing in the NCO ranks. They are struggling; they choose not to stay. We are seeing the results of experienced NCO's leaving the service. Some of that is driven by pay; some of that is driven by job opportunity on the outside. Some of that is driven by them being sent many, many places, over and over again. There are a lot of them that are in the active component/reserve component [AC/RC], duty, away from troops, away from our troops. And there are a lot of them that are going off to Recruiting Command. Today, I am short 208 noncommissioned officers in my Brigade Combat Team out of a total of 736.
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Finally, modernization—it is not happening. We are not seeing it. And we know on the tiered readiness that we would be one of the last to see it. But if you look Army-wide, we are not modernizing, other than around the edges, since before Desert Storm. And that is a concern of not only me as a commander, but also of my soldiers. I look forward to your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Chamberlain can be found in the appendix on page 1327.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Colonel Chamberlain. And now, Command Sergeant Major McWilliams.
STATEMENT OF COMMAND SGT. MAJ. TERRENCE D. McWILLIAMS, 3D BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED), FORT CARSON, CO., U.S. ARMY
Command Sergeant Major MCWILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I really appreciate being here today. In my 21 years of continuous military service, I must say that I have had the extreme honor and privilege of serving with some of the finest men and women that this Nation has to offer. They have truly been tremendous in all their service and sacrifices that they have given. They know and understand that each day presents the possibility of life or death in what we do on a day-in/day-out basis. And that we, as leaders, take every possible step to try to prevent that loss of life or limb. We train in the harshest conditions. We take a lot of their rights away from them.
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We also train with some of the limited resources. Our equipment, as was previously stated by members of this panel, our equipment is old. I have units that are operating with 1960–1970 vintage equipment, where we are spending more time, more training time in the motor pool trying to maintain that equipment. Where if we take it out of the motor pool to train with it, we lose the training opportunity because the equipment will break down. And the parts are getting harder and harder to acquire to maintain that equipment.
Our soldiers today are very bright and they demand and want some of the best training and the best leaders that we have to offer them. But what I am seeing more and more of today in my organization in the 3d Brigade Combat Team is more lieutenants and junior enlisted soldiers with no sergeants to train them. We lack that experience of that noncommissioned officer to really show these young kids what right looks like.
I really appreciate the opportunity to be here today and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Sergeant Major McWilliams can be found in the appendix on page 1335.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much. And now for our anchor witness, Colonel Thomas, we look forward to hearing from you.
STATEMENT OF COL. KENT D. THOMAS, COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY GARRISON, FORT RILEY, KS, U.S. ARMY
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Colonel THOMAS. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I have the privilege of caring for a superb installation. One hundred thousand acres of Kansas, 71,000 acres that we can maneuver in, 23 ranges—it doesn't get any better for mounted combat soldiers than to be in the kinds of training that we have here and have the kind of ground that we have available to us to train. But I will also tell you that funding reductions are a fact of my life. Every day, every hour I wonder how we are going to pay for the things that we need to do, how we are going to care for our soldiers and their families.
Our No. 1 priority is and should be the training of those units that are going to combat and I move moneys to support that to ensure that Colonel Peterson and Command Sergeant Major Gravens have the opportunity to train those units because that is what we do for a living, is prepare our soldiers to go to war.
On the other hand, I am the city manager and I get to run the rest of the things that we do; and I struggle with doing that. I am down 15 percent from fiscal year 1996 in terms of funding, and I am going to go down another 15 percent next year. That is $10 to $12 million from 1996 and $10 to $12 million more next year. You don't keep on doing things and supporting people when you are heading south like that. So, we face a tremendous challenge in that.
We work for efficiencies. This superb civilian work force that is here and the soldiers that work with us do wonderful things in terms of efficiencies. And we will continue to look for them. And we found a bunch of those, and that is why you have watched us reduce our moneys and continue to be able to perform is because we have smart people who work hard and who make efficiencies happen and do good things with the money that you give us. But I won't tell you that budgeting is not an issue in my life and not something I think about a lot, because it is.
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Thank you very much for letting me appear today.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Thomas can be found in the appendix on page 1341.]
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Colonel Thomas. Thank all of you. Let me at the outset say that the members who are here today are very mindful of the Harris poll that recently identified the people in our military as being the most respected institution in American society. We share that view. We are very proud of the people in our military, and of you, and what you do for your country, and the caliber of the troops that you lead.
Let me ask Colonel Thomas—you are 15 percent down in your budget for running this installation this year, from the prior year?
Colonel THOMAS. Sir, I am 15 percent down from fiscal year 1996; over 2 years, the aggregate is 15 percent.
Mr. BATEMAN. And now you are expected, in the proposed budget submission for 1999, to reduce another 15 percent?
Colonel THOMAS. Sir, I am told to expect that. We don't have that data yet and don't know that.
Mr. BATEMAN. I suspect it is there because one of the things that we are being told, and many of you make reference to need for modernization of your equipment. Everywhere we go, every unit that we talk to, we hear the same complaint about the need to modernize equipment. We talk about HMMWV's that are 12 years old, and on Okinawa that you can run your arm through the holes that have rusted out. We hear, consequently, stirrings of it takes so much of our time and our capability to maintain equipment that we really ought not even to be using anymore. It ought to have been replaced and thrown away.
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It is reaching, I think, a terribly unaccepted level. All the while, we are told that we are going to modernize, starting some year down the road, because we are going to have efficiencies. You are being told in this year's budget to achieve efficiencies or savings by contracting out, privatizing functions of something like 20 percent. Don't hold me to that percentage. But an incredible percentage of budget is based on the assumption that by privatizing, contracting out, you will save x millions of dollars.
We haven't done it yet. It hasn't been demonstrated that privatizing would even save the money. But your budget is founded on the assumption that it will be done, even before it is demonstrated that it can be done and the savings have accrued. That is a monstrous way to go about budgeting if you care to get done the things that you presumably are budgeting to get done. Well, I didn't mean to make a speech. I am here to hear from you very expert witnesses.
Several of you made reference to personnel shortages and difficulties of people from your units being deployed to Bosnia, to Haiti, or to other places. How has this worked in a given unit, Colonel Caldwell? Do you deploy a unit within your brigade, or do you sort of cherry-pick people with special skills into there and to meet whatever requirements have been placed upon you?
Colonel CALDWELL. Sir, I do both.
Mr. BATEMAN. You do both?
Colonel CALDWELL. Yes, sir; right now I have a company deployed to Bosnia, have had it there for about 7 months. And I have been given a warning order to prepare for a second company deployment. In addition to that, I also have individual soldiers that have been sent throughout the world on taskings. I have a physician's assistant, a one-of-a-kind out of a battalion of 550 soldiers, who is right now in Honduras for 6 months; and those type of taskings like that.
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Mr. BATEMAN. Is that characteristic of the way it is handled in all of your units?
Command Sergeant Major LOPEZ. Yes, sir; we had 2–14 deployed to Bosnia and 2–87 deployed to Sinai last year, 6-month and 8-month rotations. What it did was for 2–14, we had to downsize two companies to fill up the two companies that they needed down there in Bosnia. So that made that battalion combat-ineffective when we did that, so the whole battalion had to go down there. Even the headquarters went back. The same thing we had to do with the 2–87 that went to the Sinai, because of our shortages.
Colonel PETERSON. Sir, relative to the task force 1–41 that we deployed to Bosnia, pretty much the Mechanized Infantry Battalion was intact and was plussed up by the 82 people within the brigade, plus the 10 from throughout Fort Riley that I mentioned. But as a part of that task force, it included about 180 MP's also from another unit on the installation. So that was a task-organized unit. But as much as possible, we try to maintain unit integrity for our deployments.
Mr. BATEMAN. Anyone else have further comments?
Colonel CHAMBERLAIN. We sent 1–12 infantry to Kuwait last year for intrinsic action, September to December. And it took four rifle companies to fill the two. That is the bad news. The good news is if we sent 1–12 out again next week, all four companies are intact. We would not have to do that. So we have gotten better over the last 6 to 8 months.
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Mr. BATEMAN. Well, you command units that presumably consist of various subunits. You send one off to Bosnia. What happens to performing the work, the mission, the task that that part of your overall unit was supposed to be performing? It doesn't get done? Or people who are left back on home station have to work harder to get the work done? Or is it some combination of not getting done, but working harder?
Colonel PETERSON. Sir, my answer to your question is ''yes.'' The bottom line is, for example, in my case, when I take one-third of my combat units and send them away—and in this case, it was 100 percent of my infantry—then I can no longer conduct combined arms maneuver. And very seldom now today in conducting those missions that General Reimer talked to you about, movement to contact, attack, and defend, will we use pure vanilla units. They will always be combined arms teams, tanks, infantries, Bradleys together. So, if I don't have the infantry, then I am not able to train as a combined arms team.
Second, they also represented, our brigades, that is Bill and mine in particular, are pretty large units, they are about 4,000 soldiers. About 800 of those soldiers come from that infantry battalion, so they represent almost 25 percent of the brigade. Now, we also have post responsibilities here and we have a thing we call RED. That is post support. So, when you take one-fourth of a unit and send it away, obviously then it takes the remainder of the brigade to cover down on those. And we reallocate those throughout the Brigade Combat Team. So, it does have an impact, significant impact.
Mr. BATEMAN. Anyone else have any observations? If not, Congressman Buyer.
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Mr. BUYER. Let me touch on a point that—Congressman Duncan Hunter chairs the Procurement Subcommittee and he is working very hard to make some advanced purchases on ammo on our emergency funding. Have you all been asked about your ammo shortages and sent those requirements back up the line? You have never been asked about your ammo shortages?
Colonel CHAMBERLAIN. I am not short ammo, sir.
Mr. BUYER. You are not short ammo?
Colonel CHAMBERLAIN. Negative.
Colonel PETERSON. Yes, sir.
Colonel CALDWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. BUYER. And you have sent those——
Colonel CALDWELL. I have just sent it to my higher headquarters. I don't know where it is going. I didn't take it all the way up, sir. I sent it up.
Mr. BUYER. That is fine. It ends up with us. I just wanted to make sure——
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Mr. BATEMAN. The bill ultimately comes to Washington.
Mr. BUYER. Yes, it comes here.
Colonel CALDWELL. We do have shortages though, sir; yes, sir.
Mr. BUYER. I am just curious. You know, sometimes we get stuff from the upper echelons, and then when you get down into the units and I ask them whether they were ever asked and it is, ''No, I was never asked.'' So, I am glad to see they actually went to the commanders and asked about your ammo shortages. You really caught my attention, though, and I am not on the Procurement Subcommittee, but I think Mr. Hunter caught a lot of our attention when he talked about the critical ammo shortage and brought that up with us. And when you said that—I think I wrote—you talked about you may not even have sufficient ammo to fire next year? Are you the one who testified to that?
Colonel CALDWELL. I didn't quite say it that way, sir. I mean——
Mr. BUYER. Oh—then tell me what it is.
Colonel CALDWELL. I am going to still fire next year. Just an example, M–203 ammunition, grenade-launched ammunition—I have none for the rest of this year. So my gunners, who are supposed to qualify every 6 months, they will not qualify anymore on that weapons system. We will no longer qualify. I am hoping that in the next fiscal year, I get that ammunition and I can qualify my gunners again. But we have no ammunition in the 10th Mountain Division to train right now on M–203 grenade launchers.
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Mr. BUYER. What about basic load?
Colonel CALDWELL. Four and one ammunition and machine-gun ammunition, we are going to be critically short of that by the end of this fiscal year. And I am concerned about whether I will have sufficient amounts to train like I would like to next year.
Mr. BUYER. Would every one of your soldiers, if required, have a basic—sufficient ammo for a basic load right now?
Colonel CALDWELL. Oh, yes, sir. For go-to-war purposes, yes, sir. We have that.
Command Sergeant Major LOPEZ. That stock is set aside.
Colonel CALDWELL. That is set aside.
Mr. BUYER. What about other training ammo are you short?
Colonel CALDWELL. The two key DODAC, the two key ammunition pieces right now are the M–203, the 4 and 1 machine-gun ammunition, M–60 machine-gun ammunition, the .50 caliber ammunition, and the mortar ammunition. Those are the four that I need more of to train with.
Now, basic qualification, yes, sir, I do; I have that to do that. I don't in the M–203 though. But I do in the other three. But basic weapons qualification doesn't equal readiness. I have to go out and do combined arms live-fire training. If I am not doing that, I am not training my soldiers for combat. And to do that, and do that effectively, I need some more ammunition.
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Mr. BUYER. What about you, Colonel Peterson?
Colonel PETERSON. Sir, I have the same problems—M–203 Mark 19, basically 40 millimeter ammunition, we are experiencing a shortfall of training ammunition, and so therefore we are not being able to qualify our gunners in their weapons systems. Fifty caliber, for some reason, also has a shortfall on it. I just came off—I have my tanks up on the ranges firing right now and we are having to monitor our use of .50 caliber ammunition very closely. There are some other things that we do internally relative to our engineer battalions in the two brigades, and we have developed some training lanes and combined arms firing exercise for them that are really currently not resourced through the standard Army training system, and we have asked for additional ammunition to support those. Whether or not that comes, I am uncertain as to what is going to happen there.
Mr. BUYER. Sergeant Major McWilliams testified that he was short 208 out of 736 NCO's.
Command Sergeant Major MCWILLIAMS. Yes, sir, my brigade command——
Colonel CHAMBERLAIN. I did, sir.
Mr. BUYER. Out of this brigade. All right. I am sorry. One of you did.
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Colonel CHAMBERLAIN. We are twins, sir, so it is OK.
Mr. BUYER. Twins?
Command Sergeant Major MCWILLIAMS. Yes, sir.
Mr. BUYER. Based on this Sergeant Major's testimony, he makes you look pretty good, Colonel.
Colonel CHAMBERLAIN. The last guy was bald, sir.
Mr. BUYER. NCO's from other brigades, how many short?
Command Sergeant Major GRAVENS. Sir, we are identical. We are authorized 830 and we have 628—that is for this month. So I am short 202 for this month.
Colonel PETERSON. I am short 192 Sergeant E5's, and that is a significant shortfall that I am experiencing in the Brigade Combat Team.
Command Sergeant Major LOPEZ. Sir, we are in the same situation. I noticed the loss of the senior NCO's starting last year when the first thing we were losing senior NCO's for, for recruiting—which was already brought up at the last panel—drill sergeants, and now AC/RC.
Now, what is it is doing is to me is it is getting down there—the people that really need it, the platoons now have E–6 platoon sergeants versus E–7 platoon sergeants. Now, I personally feel the platoon sergeant is the most valuable person on the ground because he has got a young platoon leader just right out of the school, and then you have got E–6 squad leaders, so the platoon sergeant is the key person in that platoon. He is the stability of that company versus three platoon sergeants. When you take those three senior E–7's out, and now you are putting a junior E–6 in that position, there you lose your seniority there and your experience.
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And that is what we are taking away. We are taking experience away from the infantry soldiers and putting them out there in the AC/RC, recruiting, and drill sergeant. I know that is all important, but I only see my side of the house, where I feel it down here.
Command Sergeant Major MCWILLIAMS. We are having the same impact too, sir, at Fort Carson. We are working extremely hard to try to grow our own sergeants, but again, we are growing them too quickly to where they don't have that experience. I have tank crews right now that are commanded by a corporal, when it should be commanded by a staff sergeant. Because the young staff sergeants are now the platoon sergeants, if not the platoon leader, in some cases. I have companies that should have a first sergeant, E–8, as the first sergeant that have junior sergeant first classes as the first sergeant. Because the demand for the AC/RC, which I support wholeheartedly, I am getting hit quite regularly for all my senior experienced NCOs to go fill those positions, or Recruiting duty, which I understand has another great demand, but I am not seeing anything in return.
Mr. BUYER. All right. I am glad I am here to receive this testimony, Mr. Bateman. I am sure you were in the room during the first panel. I am partly to blame for your problem, because the Personnel Subcommittee, Mr. Taylor and myself, Jane Harman, Tillie Fowler, after Aberdeen broke and I was given the assignment to look at the training centers all across America, through all the services, and we conducted that review on all the issues, on sexual harassment and sexual misconduct, when I went into the training centers and I learned how all the—the complete training ratios were out of whack, lack of supervision, the same things that you are testifying, they also have other staff duty assignments and support assignments within the garrisons.
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It is interesting in the Marine Corps, Paul McHale still isn't here, but the Marine Corps made a heavy investment in training, heavy investment in training. And when the decisions came along in the drawdown, for some reason they said—they turned to TRADOC and they said, well, you have got to take just as many hits as everybody else. So TRADOC took a big hit. And then we had the lack of supervision at the same time they moved to the gender-integrated training, and we got a lot of confusion and a lot of problems.
So, I am trying to solve the whole thing, which is not easy. And one of the things I did was I didn't take the Army—well, it wasn't just me—it was Mr. Taylor and myself, and when we negotiated with the Senate, didn't take the Army down as much, and we said, no, you are going to come in and you are going to plus up the Army and we are making demands on them to bring TRADOC up and to bring recruiting up. Of course now I am getting the reaction. We make those demands and now where are they taking them from? They are taking them all from you, and at the same time, I have got to answer this guy's question. You know? And how can we continue to take down the Army when you don't have the personnel you need right now to complete your mission.
Mr. BATEMAN. I think we have been robbing Peter to pay Paul in so many instances and so many directions that it inevitably has to catch up with you.
Mr. BUYER. I really don't have a specific question. I just want to let you know that we are trying to figure this out. We are trying to be very responsive to you. And we want to be good listeners here. And I appreciate your candor with us today because you are being very helpful in the end state, and that is that your troops are ready because it means real lives on the battlefield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you. Mr. Buyer. Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My question and I would try to paint a scenario; we are supposed to fight two wars at the same time. War breaks out in Korea, war breaks out in Iraq. High casualties on both sides. And they want you to come over and support our troops that are there. Casualties are high. We want for you to be in a position to defend those that are there, but we want you to come back alive. Your family is here waiting for you and your children. And they need you down there. Can you get there on time? And once you get there, knowing that you don't have the equipment, you don't have the ammunition, you are an amputee because some of your troops have been deployed, whether it is Bosnia, Honduras, or someplace else.
Now, can you get there on time? Can you save and protect the lives who need you down there? And can you come back alive? I want you to talk to me from the heart. We want to help you; that is why we are here.
Command Sergeant Major LOPEZ. Sir, just coming out of JRTC rotation just in January, I can say right now that the 2nd Brigade Command Task Force is prepared to do that mission. But I cannot say that 3, 6, 9 months down the road, because as you know, the soldiers rotate out of the unit constantly, commanders change, and the brigade commanders change twice, I mean at least once every 2 years. So you are going to have a whole chain of command constantly changing.
Now, that will bring us to the fact of going back to JRTC, redoing training, redoing deployments. Now, can we go across the ocean and fight? Today I can say ''yes'' for the Command Task Force, today. Tomorrow, I can't give you that answer. Unless you give me or provide me personnel, like I stated in my testimony, give me the people right now to go across that ocean to fight, then we can do that.
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Now, I have faith in you and I have faith in my superiors that if we get called on a mission to do this, you would give me the personnel, you would give me the equipment for my Brigade Task Force and then we will go over there and accomplish our mission.
Mr. ORTIZ. But the way I see it now, you need the help now. When you need to be deployed, it is too late. Am I correct when I say this? I mean, you need to train your unit. You know, I want you to come back alive. And I have my son fighting down there.
Command Sergeant Major LOPEZ. Yes, sir; I truly believe in force protection and that is what we train for when we deploy. But there is a lot of contingencies out there and what we need is to continue to train. Now, like the colonel says, give me the ammo, give me the fuel, give me the resources, and we will continue to train. But I can't answer that for the panel, but I can answer for myself.
Command Sergeant Major MCWILLIAMS. Well, sir, if the 3d Brigade Combat Team had to deploy right now, today, we can get there. OK? Can we get there now? I can't say that. Now, if we had to deploy with the equipment that we currently have on hand at Fort Carson, it is going to take some time. How are we going to go? Since we are a heavy brigade, our seaport of embarkation is Beaumont, TX. So getting the equipment prepped and ready for seaworthiness, and getting it transported down to Beaumont, TX, that is going to take some time. It is probably going to take about 7 days to get it from Fort Carson to Beaumont. And then the air-flow for the troops deploying into say Kuwait, as an example, to go against the force of Iraq, we can get there.
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My two mech infantry battalions and my tank battalion, with their own equipment, with what they have right now today, I think, in my mind, in my personal opinion, we would be successful against the Iraqi Force. They are not really a force that we really should fear. I know that we would be able to decimate them if we had to fight them right now, today. My support assets, on the other hand, my engineer battalion, with their equipment, I don't think they would be capable of providing us with the engineer assets that they are designed to do because their equipment is so old. My support battalion, they will not be able to sustain the force because they don't have the right people. The fuel handlers, the truck drivers, the supply sergeants, the parts personnel, they are filled with combat arms soldiers, i.e., 19-kilo tankers, 11-mike infantrymen are doing those jobs. Their trucks, the old deuce-and-a-half, early 1960, late 1950 vintage equipment. That is what we are operating with.
My field artillery battalion will do great. They just got retro-fitted with the Paladin. So it is to sustain the force is the big concern right now. Will I be able to sustain it. Against Iraq, we would be somewhat successful. If we had to go against Korea, that is a whole 'nother story. We would not be successful. And our casualties will be extremely high.
Mr. ORTIZ. Anybody else who would like to touch on that? Colonel?
Colonel CALDWELL. Sir, the thing I would just say is if you asked the 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, to go deploy someplace to fight, you just need to understand it is really just two battalion task forces, probably, not three, because of our personnel shortages. But of the people that deploy, I have extreme confidence that we would absolutely do a superb job. I wouldn't command those soldiers if I didn't feel they were trained and ready.
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But I will tell you that there are systems out there that I wished we had on hand—the Javelin, I won't see that for another 6 or 8 years. I would love to have the Javelin today in the light infantry division. It is our best tank-killing weapons system. But again, it is the tiered approach of how we field it and it is going to be many years before we see it in the 10th Mountain Division. And there are other systems like that out there that are fielded in the Army today that are great combat systems. And if we went to war tomorrow, I hope we would have them.
And based on my experience in going to just cause or Desert Shield/Desert Storm, all the ones I have participated in in the last 6 or 8 years, when our unit gets ready to go, it is amazing what the Army does. They provide us the resources from other units to make sure that we have what we need. I mean, I haven't gone anywhere yet where they haven't done that. But it has never been a high-intensity conflict either.
And I think that is where the concern comes—high-intensity conflict, 2 MRC type approach, the 10th is going as is. And what we have is all we have got. And that does concern me that we won't have the latest that is available, that is fielded out there today and can provide even more protection for our soldiers than what we have. The Dragon Weapon System, it is been around since I came in the Army 21 years ago. I mean, it is just not a great anti-tank system. There is a lot better stuff out there today comparatively. And I wish we had it, I really do.
Mr. ORTIZ. You know, I used to be a sheriff and when they dialed 911, you had better make sure that those cars that you are driving have good tires, and gasoline, and that you are well trained, and you get there on time. Otherwise, somebody is going to die. And in this case, it is going to be our children who are out there on the front lines.
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And let me tell you one thing—I have a lot of respect for you, America has a lot of respect for you. And I just wish that the higher ups would be as candid as you are being with us and tell us what they need. And I think that this committee is willing to put the money down. But then we continue to hear conflicting stories. Hey, we can go fight right now, and we can do this, and we can do that. But then when we talk to you—and you are not the only ones—we have had hearings all over the place—and we keep hearing the same message over and over again. You all need help. And we hope that this committee, you know, we can give it to you. We want to work with you and I am glad that you are making your needs known to us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Taylor.
Mr. TAYLOR. Gentlemen, I think that I have been negligent; I fear we have all been negligent in failing to say something right off the bat, and that is we appreciate you. The ranking Democrat on the committee, Ike Skelton, when he took over the committee, I said, Ike, what is the first thing you are going to tell the troops and what is the first thing you are going to tell America about your new job, and he says, well, we are going to tell the people in uniform that we love them and we appreciate them. So since he can't be here today, I want to pass that message on for him.
The challenges that we face, and I am going to ask for your help—you know, the chairman of the Budget Committee serves on Armed Services as well. He hardly ever comes to our meetings. Both parties, I am sorry to say, both political parties, if you listen to the leadership, they never list a strong military in the top two priorities. It is a failure on both parts. And the reason I am going to enlist your help is you all have families. The kids in your units have families.
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And I really think that—and having served for 9 years, I know that the squeaky wheel gets the grease. I think that you have been too good of soldiers, I think our sailors have been too good of sailors, our airmen have been too good, our marines have been too good, in not having their voices heard that you are being shortchanged and people's lives are threatened as a result of that.
So as a Congressman who reads his mail, and I think the vast majority of them do, I would really encourage you to not only tell your family, but get the kids in your units to tell their families, this is a democracy. This is a need and it is a need that is not being fulfilled because people aren't—the people who know it best aren't speaking up. And if you feel uncomfortable writing a letter, get your mom and dad, or your brother and sister, or your kids to write a letter, your spouse.
You have heard that—I am very fortunate to be surrounded by people who look 10 years out there, and I think that is a good thing. Unfortunately, the Constitution says we can only budget for 1 year at a time. And so, we have to address what we have, we have to address the fact that the Joint Chiefs have come to us and asked for fewer soldiers; Admiral J. Johnson has come to us and asked for fewer sailors. And as you know, Congress voted the other day, and I voted the other day, to keep our troops in Bosnia, based on the great success that you all have had and the fact that every soldier I met who is over there said we ought to be there. That came as a big shock to me because I tried to keep them from going there. Given the situation that I think has been pretty well outlined from top to bottom today, how do you as Active Army officers and senior NCO's feel about the conclusions that I have come to? And If I am way off base, I hope you will tell me.
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But I think for the time being, about the best we can do for the time being, to alleviate in particular your personnel shortages and the fact that you are stripping one unit to field another, given the fact that, thank goodness, you did such a great job in convincing the Serbs, the Croatians, and the Muslims not to mess with the Americans when you went in, that the best way to solve that problem is by calling up more of the Guard and Reserve units so that your units can remain intact and train for what your tasks are. That is the conclusion I have come to, given all of the factors that we have to deal with. Tell me how far off base I am or how close to the truth I am. And I want you to speak frankly because I am going to try to make that pitch to my colleagues. I would like to hear your thoughts on that.
Colonel CHAMBERLAIN. Sir, I think you are right. Not only that, but back to the earlier question that Mr. Ortiz asked, the 2 MRC's, we cannot do it by ourselves anymore, and that is clearly evident. With two different tiers of divisions, the five that are first to go and the five that are second to go, I am convinced that the five that are second to go will get there. But they are going to have to take those 15 ''E'' Brigades and those 8 National Guard divisions for two serious MRC's and we are all going.
And I think you are absolutely right. We didn't talk about it earlier, but we have an association with the 116th Cavalry Brigade up in Idaho. We are going to the NTC in July. That was a question that was asked earlier today. And we are very proud of that organization and we have an extremely close relationship with them. And I think that is the right way to go. We pushed hard and trained hard with them over the last 2 years to get them in the door to the National Training Center, and they will do well. They are not going to beat the Op-4—frankly, very few people do—but they will do well. That is my answer to your question, sir. I think you are absolutely right.
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Colonel CALDWELL. Sir, I have to concur. I think the Guard and Reserve can easily do the mission in Bosnia now. I have trained with them for the last four or five summers in command positions, and they are damn great soldiers, they are terrific. There is no reason they can't. But it is a budget issue. I mean, it is far above my pay grade, but I mean we all know it is a money issue.
Mr. TAYLOR. No, that point has been made. I am talking about the pitch I would have to make to my colleagues is that we have to set aside the money for the activation of the Guard and Reserve, rather than pulling a little bit out of this wallet here, and a little bit out of that. And quite possibly, if it is not too far along, it might well be an issue on the supplemental. Because the President is trying to solve the funding problem for Bosnia and the other contingencies. Well, heck, let's do it up front and let's do it right.
Colonel CHAMBERLAIN. Sir, back to the question of the $2.2 billion that Mr. Bateman talked about, on the edge of readiness. The impact there for us is if the Army has to pay for it out of the operating budget, they are going to come take my training dollars for the remainder of the year, sir. I am halfway through the training year; I will cease to be ready for the last half.
Mr. BATEMAN. And Colonel Thomas will be in an even more dire situation for his base operations support funds, and real property maintenance, and all the other things that he is responsible for.
Colonel CHAMBERLAIN. Yes, sir.
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Colonel PETERSON. Sir, I have had the misfortune of having to be one of those budget guys in the Pentagon and I know what they are dealing with. The bottom line is everything is budget. I mean, that is why we have a tiered readiness system. If you ask us, the next five to go, what would we rather be able to do, I would like to get the 911 call and not have to say I have to spend between 14 and 28 days before I can put my vehicles on the ground and go fight. But given the tiered readiness system, and I think on—in my own personal opinion, our senior leaders in the military, in the Army, are doing their best to try to prepare those that must go first to be ready to go first. And we have to accept less. And I think we all understand that.
But as I started to prepare for this, I started to think, well, how could I really explain how I feel. Here is how I feel. I am on this pro football team that is going to go play in this big game. Now, of the 11 players that are on the first team, 3 of those are probably going to rotate out for some reason or another, because that is about what my turnover is in my Brigade Combat Team, about 30 percent. So, I am thinking to myself, of us on the second team, there is a bunch of us that are going to be playing out there. But we are still not training as much as the first team.
So, would I like to be more trained and ready? Absolutely. But given where we are at right now, and the tiered readiness system, I think we are doing everything with the dollars we have. Any initiative that allows us to keep more of our soldiers here so there is less turbulence and more soldiers filling turrets will obviously increase readiness, from my perspective, and increase our readiness. It is all part of this whole system. The GAO talked about the issue of soldiers in school. Well, the system that says that we need to have trained and ready soldiers is equal to having to school them to be trained and ready. Those noncommissioned officers, what makes them trained is not only experience, but they have gone to school. And we have a great process that trains our officers and noncommissioned officers.
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So just to say that, well, you have got all these soldiers in school, maybe it is a prioritization process. I would say maybe it is a little of that but it is also part of the whole system that contributes to readiness. Putting our soldiers, our great soldiers that are coming out of our units into AC/RC and into recruiting, is that important? Absolutely. How do we get our enhanced brigades more prepared? By having those guys that came out of our turret school down there train them. How do we get the best soldiers into our Army? By having those great American soldiers that left our battalions to go out there, who truly know what it means to have great soldiers in units, to be recruiting those soldiers to come into the Army.
So, it is all part of the system, from my perspective. And I don't know what part of it you can cut out. And I truly believe that it is the budget, it is the dollar. And with more of it, we can do more and we can be more ready. And I would prefer being readier, I guess is my perspective.
Mr. BATEMAN. Anything further? If not, Mr. Ryun.
Mr. RYUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Some of you may know my past life happened to involve quite a bit of running. And there were some days that I have to honestly say I wasn't very excited about going out and training. And my coach used to say to me, ''Jim, you don't have to do this—you get to do it.'' And I think that is in part what you are really saying here. You have the proper attitude, the Army has, the ''can do'' attitude. And our real responsibility is to be able to provide for you the things that you are short. You are doing all of what you are doing for the right reasons—love of country, love of national security. As we go back and regroup, we will do what we can and we thank you for your attitude.
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I do have a question for Colonel Thomas, a couple of questions. Briefly a moment ago you were talking to the chairman about being 15 percent short. In terms of real dollars, are we talking $10, $20, $30 million? What are we really discussing in terms of the shortfalls that you are experiencing?
Colonel THOMAS. $12 to $15 million, sir.
Mr. RYUN. $15 million per year or at this point cumulative?
Colonel THOMAS. $12 to $15 million next year. The cumulative part of that, we are down, in the last 2 years, in our mission funding we are down $12.2 million; we are actually up in our environmental control compliance monies, we are up $4 million in that. We are down $5.9 million in real property management, RPM. We are down $8.1 million in base ops. So the combination, 6, 8, 14, 22, 26—$26 million total down, up 4, $22 million down over the last 2 years, and I expect $12 to $15 million down next year, if indeed the forecast is correct. Again, I don't know that.
Mr. BATEMAN. Let me interject—Colonel, based upon the figures you just gave, you may be better off, believe it or not, than the overall picture of installations Department of Defense-wide.
Colonel THOMAS. Yes, sir. My environmental compliance people figured out what it is we needed to do to write the things properly, we wrote them properly, we got the money, and we are doing some great stuff with that.
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Mr. BATEMAN. Go ahead, Jim.
Mr. RYUN. I have a further question with regards to the post maneuvering area. Would you please comment on that relating to the new division and your ability to accommodate any new exercises that might be required as a result of that new division coming in.
Colonel THOMAS. Sir, you understand we are just getting the headquarters, and those brigades are training right now in their respective States. Were they to come here, I would like you to visualize a training area that is 6 miles wide and 16 miles long. You need about a 6-mile approach march for mounted units to get everything moving together as it does in approach so that when you come to the point that you want to fight, you have to make every piece of it work. If you make it shorter, then you don't have to get it all working and it is a lot easier to do it.
So, we want to make it hard on guys like Joe Peterson so that when they roll those brigades forward, that they get all the pieces working. This provides that. It is rolling terrain. Those of you that thought we were out in the parts with the wheat fields and the Wizard of Oz stuff, have seen we have got streams that cause us to have to channelize our movement, we have trees that cause us to have obstructions. You can do that great training there.
At the same time that you are doing the training up to company level, the maneuver training, you can be firing two battalions, one each, an infantry battalion on one of those multipurpose ranges and a tank battalion on the other multipurpose range. You can be conducting, because we have a very small impact area with all of the ranges around it, you can conduct individual firing all the way around it at the same time you are doing that. So, you can train an entire brigade here simultaneously, all the pieces. At the same time, you can put the battalion headquarters and the brigade headquarters into simulation.
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Because as you talk about the need, Mr. McHale talked about the need to maneuver those brigades, it is also critical that the brigade and the battalion command and control pieces understand how to make the stuff move. And simulation allows you to do it a whole lot cheaper than moving tanks around. That allows you to do that. We think that were brigades to come here and train, that in a 56-day period, we could run two National Guard brigades through an annual training period, allowing them to fire gunnery for both their Bradleys, their tanks, fire their howitzers, fire all their individual qualifications that they need to do, do up to company level maneuver training, do simulation at battalion and brigade level.
Now, that is just a thought. We think we could fit it in. But we think we could make that happen for you. It is a great post to train, a wonderful place.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you. Anything further?
Let me at this point express the appreciation of the committee to Ms. Patty Walls, who stepped in when the recorder who was going to transcribe our proceedings, for some unknown reason, didn't appear. Ms. Walls was pressed into service. She works for the Judge Advocate's office here at Fort Riley and we are very appreciative of her stepping in and transcribing our proceedings.
Well, gentlemen, we thank you very much for your testimony. It has truly been very, very helpful to us, and we have certainly benefited from the hearing. And I will just echo my opening comments to you about the degree of appreciation and respect we have for you and for the forces that you lead. We are indeed grateful.
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Colonel CALDWELL. If I could add one thing we didn't discuss. The money that we are paying our soldiers in Bosnia today is a huge morale booster. I cannot even describe it to you. Having been in Panama in 1980 and a couple of other deployments, to go down to Bosnia and visit my soldiers there and talk to them, they look at our Nation as now recognizing the contributions and the sacrifices they are making in giving them that additional pay. And I just want to pass on on behalf of all of them over there how much we thank you all for making that happen for our soldiers. I mean, for the wives, the families, and the kids back at home, it is just a huge difference, sir, and I appreciate that.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Colonel Caldwell. Let me bring up one other matter that came up in discussion with junior officers and noncommissioned officers when we were at our hearings in San Diego. Several junior officers seated at a table with me spoke of their concern and chagrin that they had significant numbers of the people in their units who were actually receiving food stamps or on some form of social service program.
Do you have that phenomena in your units?
Command Sergeant Major MCWILLIAMS. Yes, sir. I can attest to that. As you all well know, Colorado, Colorado Springs in particular, the cost of living there is extremely high. And what we pay our soldiers, they just cannot survive. My estimation is about 64 percent of our Army today is married. I am receiving young soldiers with a family of three, if not more. They cannot afford to live in Colorado Springs. They just can't afford it on what we pay them. The housing allowance alone don't even come close to covering a portion of their housing expenses in Colorado Springs. So, what does the young soldier opt for?
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It is a hard decision that they have to make, and that hard decision is I have to leave the wife and the kids home with the in-laws until I can get in the position where I am financially capable of taking care of them, or hopefully, I permament change of station [PCS] to another area where the cost of living is where I can afford to bring them. So, yes, sir, the answer to your question is ''Yes.''
Colonel CHAMBERLAIN. It is not epidemic, sir, but it is out there. And at every battalion, there is a financial NCO to help young soldiers with their pay. And they say there are a lot more who are eligible who won't take it. So, yes, sir, it is out there.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. BUYER. If I could make a closing comment, I will make it fast, Mr. Taylor. Let me thank all of you and let you know that you have got a great Congressman here representing Fort Riley because he is always bugging me. So that is a good sign. I wanted you to know that. And I am sure Mr. Bateman can back that up.
The other thing I want you to know is we are trying to move towards solutions for you. It is not easy. And we are worried about the good soldiers that are leaving. That is not a good sign. And I heard you—I came in here late and I am sorry I had to leave for a moment. The benefit packages, yes, are important. But none of you serve for the money. Right?
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Colonel CHAMBERLAIN. Sir, I do. [Laughter.]
Mr. BUYER. You do? Let me reiterate again—this sergeant major makes you look damn good.
Command Sergeant Major MCWILLIAMS. Nah, but you are absolutely correct, sir. We don't serve for the money. But what makes it hard for us to keep our experienced soldiers in is when we see the benefits of our retirees erode. Then you have to ask yourself the question. And my wife constantly asks me—I have a wife and four small children—yes, I can retire right now today, but what will I receive as part of my retirement benefits? I already know there is no health care benefits for my family. That is all out of pocket. As a retiree, I may not even receive health care benefits.
And we are seeing that every day. So the question that the soldiers are asking themselves is why do 20 years in the military when there won't be anything for me to look forward to at retirement. I might as well get out and go and work for McDonald's or someplace and get a better benefit package.
Mr. BUYER. All right.
Mr. BATEMAN. Message received.
Mr. BUYER. Message is received.
Command Sergeant Major MCWILLIAMS. That is a true statement amongst the soldiers.
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Mr. BUYER. You know, we recruit by the intangibles, people stay because of the intangibles, and then when things are forced onto soldiers, whether it is from social experimentations, to political correctness, to increased ops tempo, you don't get the funding for sourcing, increase in stress, and they go, ''I am out of here.''
Command Sergeant Major MCWILLIAMS. Exactly, sir.
Mr. BUYER. This isn't the type of Army I want to serve in. But we are listening and we are going to try to lean forward and help you. Thank you very much.
Mr. ORTIZ. Colonel Chamberlain. You have earned every penny and more. And we are proud of you.
Colonel CHAMBERLAIN. Thank you, sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you again.
[Whereupon, the subcommittee was adjourned.]
The official Committee record contains additional material here.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BATEMAN AND MR. BUYER
Army-National Guard Integrated Divisions
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Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. Integrated Divisions.—What's the End State?: Their are two views about the integrated divisions. One perspective views them as a means to enhance training and readiness, but not to be structured, equipped, manned or resourced to be prepared to deploy and fight as a division. A different perspective argues that the integrated divisions should seek to become a deployable division, capable, as an end-state, of fighting as a division. This latter view assumes that there is a requirement for additional combat divisions beyond that now envisioned in the national military strategy.
What are your views regarding the ultimate shape and mission of these two integrated divisions? Are they to be organizations for training and readiness only, or do you envision them to eventually be deployable as warfighting divisions?
General BRAMLETT. Our intent to form a training readiness oversight (TRO) division organization initially and continue to develop the concept toward a deployable division. After we have some experience with TRO organization we can better evaluate our ability to create a fully integrated deployable division. We need to be deliberate in exploring this concept and design a practical organizational structure. Our experience to date is promising.
General NAVAS. If you look at the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study that was submitted by the Adjutants General and the National Guard Bureau and approved by the Secretary of the Army, it is clear that a warfighting division was the only endstate that was ever envisioned. However, in the process of conducting the pre-implementation study that was authorized by the Secretary of the Army, TRADOC recommended that we start with a training and readiness oversight role and mature the organizations into deployable warfighting divisions at a later time. We believe that this is the right way to proceed. There are a lot of lessons that we will collectively learn over the next few years that will help insure that these divisions are successful. At endstate, the organizational design will reflect the appropriate doctrinal design for Army divisions at the time of transition. (Army XXI design or Army After Next design).
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Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. Trained and Ready for What?: If the objective of the integrated divisions is to increase the training and readiness or the enhanced brigades, such an objective presumes that the enhanced brigades have clear, unambiguous missions in the national military strategy. Do they have such missions? If so, how will the need to be prepared for those missions effect the training and readiness programs of the division? If not, how do the division and brigade commanders answer the question. ''Trained and ready for what?''
Do these enhanced brigades have unambiguous missions in the warfighting plans of the national military strategy, and how will those missions shape the training and readiness objectives for the brigades?
General BRAMLETT. The National Military Strategy and Defense planning provide for 15 enhanced separate brigades as follow-on forces and all are included in CINC operational plans. Follow-on force missions are determined by operational conditions at the time. Therefore, enhanced separate brigades train for common offensive and defensive missions to prepare for follow-on force operations.
General NAVAS. All 15 enhanced Separate Brigades appear on the Major Theater War Plans for both Northeast Asia (Korea) and Southwest Asia (the Persian Gulf area) in support of the National Military Strategy. Since the brigades appear on war plans for both theaters it complicates their ability to conduct theater-specific training, however, the Army National Guard does not consider this to be a significant handicap. Part of the versatility of their structure as enhanced Separate Brigades is that they train to be able to perform their wartime mission regardless of the theater(s) to which they may be deployed. Their eventual deployment theater has no effect on their readiness goals, which is to be ready to deploy at the highest levels of readiness within 90 days of being called into federal service. The Army National Guard expects that given sufficient post-mobilization resources, the enhanced Separate Brigades could be declared ready for deployment earlier than ninety days after mobilization. Unfortunately, real-world shortages of strategic air and sealift largely preclude their ability to be moved overseas earlier than currently planned.
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It is not yet clear how the Integrated Division concept may change this arrangement. At least initially, the Division Headquarters is not a war-time controlling headquarters but merely provides peacetime (training) oversight, and the brigades would still deploy as Separate Brigades if called. As the Integrated Division concept matures, the war-time role of the Divisions may change in accordance with Joint Chiefs of Staff direction. Regardless of change, the training and readiness goals of the Brigades will always remain focused on executing their war-time mission in accordance with their capabilities and relative strategic urgency on the war plans.
Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. How will the stationing plan impact on the training to be performed?
General BRAMLETT. Stationing will not seriously impact command and control during the training readiness oversight (TRO) phase. Forward command posts will connect the enhanced separate brigade commands with the division headquarters. Both Ft. Riley and Ft. Carson have excellent resources and infrastructure that will present additional training and stationing opportunities as we progress and gain experience with TRO training.
General NAVAS. Training for the eSBs will continue to be performed at their usual locations in most cases. The stationing of the division headquarters in the mid-west United States, will require the Commanders and Staff to travel to eSB locations on occasion for training oversight during unit training assemblies and annual training. This travel for the Central Division is significant in that it requires numerous continual trips to and from Oregon to Oklahoma and then to Arkansas and back again, which is expensive and time consuming as well. In some cases, eSB Commanders and Staff may be required to travel to the Division Headquarters for staff training exercises. The Assistant Division Commander at the Forward Headquarters of the Southeast Heavy Integrated Division located at Fort Jackson, South Carolina will be able to play a key role in the day-to-day training assistance provided to those three brigades by leveraging their geographical proximity both to Fort Jackson and to each other.
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Colonel UMBARGER. The current stationing plan will create some significant challenges for the new division. Specifically, the geographic distances of the brigades and division. Further, spreading the divisions into two army areas will create some challenges. However, having a Division (–) at Ft. Polk, would help facilitate each Brigade's rotation at their Combat Training Center. It can be assumed the commander of the Light Integrated Division at Fort Carson would have a mechanized or armor background due to the post being a heavy post. Further, Fort Carson is a dedicated heavy post due to the terrain and facilities already in place. Given these two facts, adjustments for light fighting would have to be made if the division headquarters is to be maintained at Fort Carson.
General SIPE. The stationing plan should have a positive impact on the training to be performed. The 218th Heavy Separate Brigade (Mechanized)'s gunnery and maneuver training during annual training should continue to take place at Ft. Stewart, Georgia. Inactive duty training will continue to take place at home station, Ft. Jackson, South Carolina, and Ft. Steward, Georgia. Annual Training at Ft. Riley, Kansas, every four years would allow us to train on maneuver at battalion task force level. Neither Ft. Jackson nor Ft. Stewart have adequate open terrain to train on maneuver above company level. Being able to train at battalion level more often that the current once every eight years will clearly enhance readiness.
I anticipate the integrated division reducing the amount of time it will take to mobilize and prepare the 218th HSB (M) for combat. The division staff will possess expertise lacking in the STARC. The division commander will bring expertise, and will help us focus on training. The division commander's assessment of our readiness will have credibility, and unnecessary repetition of tasks trained on and mastered during remobilization will be avoided.
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I do not know specifically how gaining CINCs plan on employing the 218th HSB (M), or on what specific terrain we might be employed. However, I do not see that as a problem. The 218th HSM (M)'s Mission Essential Task List is clear. I know that we must be able to: Mobilize/deploy; conduct a deliberate attack; conduct a movement to contact; conduct an area defense; and protect the force. I believe that this gives adequate focus to our training, and will allow us to be used anywhere in the world on those tasks.
Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. As enhanced brigade commanders, do your units have clear and unambiguous wartime missions? What mission essential tasks would you expect your units to be trained in peacetime to accomplish?
General SIPE. It seems to me that the most important lessons learned from previous efforts to improve combat readiness are to focus on the mission essential task list, and to maintain training emphasis on the platoon. Simulations can maintain an adequate level of command and staff training at battalion and brigade level, but well-run lanes are essential to platoon level training.
The control of training dollars and allocation of resource are significant issues. If the division commander is to be held responsible for the training of the enhanced brigades, he must be able to influence the allocation of resources. It seems to me that the Yearly Training Briefing is an opportunity for the brigade commander, division commander, and the adjutant general to sit down and agree how resources will be allocated and used during the training year. If they cannot agree, the ultimate decision must be that of the adjutant general until the unit is mobilized. After mobilization, the ultimate decision on resources would belong to the federal authorities.
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The geographic separation between Ft. Riley, Kansas and South Carolina will not adversely impact the ability of the division to achieve the overall objective of improving training and readiness. The forward element at Ft. Jackson will make the distance involved transparent. In addition, the 218th HSB (M) was a roundout brigade to the 1st Infantry Division at Ft. Riley for a number of years. This arrangement worked extremely well, and the distance caused no training problems. Training and readiness made significant improvements while operating under this arrangement.
Colonel UMBARGER. Currently the brigade has no specific wartime mission. Our current Mission Essential Task of mobilize, movement to contact, attack, defend, and force protect is sound. The key to success is defining those collective tasks which support this METL. Not all can be accomplished in pre-mobilization. One particular note is the search and attack techniques of the METL task ''movement to contact'' is key in light infantry pre-mobilization training.
Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. Statutory and Regulatory Adjustments: Given that the integrated divisions depend on a melding of different state National Guard units under federal authority, sorting out, and revising as necessary, the lines of authority, responsibility and accountability between state and federal entities is crucial. There are other areas of possible adjustment, including rating chain responsibilities, school seat allocations and priorities, military justice authority, conduct of inspections, staffing of the division headquarters, progression and promotion issues, and requirements for active duty officers to obtain commissions within states.
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As I look at the creation of these integrated divisions and the range of details that must be worked out, I come to the conclusion that the bottom-line issue is summed up by two of the questions: ''Who's in charge'' and ''what will be different about the integrated divisions that distinguishes them from the command and control of other arrangements like round-out brigades? ''
Does the active duty division commander ''command'' these brigades during peacetime, or does the state adjutant general, acting on behalf of the state governor, retain control of these units until they are Federalized? Please explain, and also comment on whether you see any additional legislation being needed to help sort out these issues?
General BRAMLETT. We have formed an integrated process action team consisting of TAG, ARNG, and FORSCOM representatives to work through these important questions and explore the core issues. While we are still working through the core issues, we do know that the division commander will be responsible for training readiness oversight in accordance with the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992, Title XI, section 1131, USC. Key will be ensuring that the active division commander has the requisite authorities consistent with being responsible and accountable for training readiness. So far, we see nothing to prevent a unified training readiness oversight command and control arrangement consistent with the obligations of existing state and federal authorities. Clearly, we are breaking new ground and I would reserve comment on the requirement for additional legislation until we have fully explored the concept of deploying the new divisional design.
General NAVAS. Although in the strictest legal and constitutional sense National Guard units are always ''commanded'' by their respective governors prior to mobilization, as a practical manner control of those units has been effectively shared by the federal and state governments for many years. The goal of the Adjutants General in proposing the formation of these two Integrated Divisions was to clearly vest responsibility for their readiness in the active duty commander who would command them in combat. In order to do that, we recognize that the lines of authority and responsibility must be reviewed and adjusted to some extent if necessary in order to insure that the division commander is appropriately empowered to accomplish our mutual goal of having him take ownership of the readiness of these units. The provisions of Title XI, the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992, will provide much of the legal authority that we think the commander should exercise. We plan to lay out his role and the way his authority will interface with that of the Adjutant General in a separate agreement executed by the parties involved in these two divisions. We expect to learn a great deal in that regard during the first few years when the division's role is limited to training and readiness oversight and then apply those lessons to the way we craft the warfighting division that we anticipate to be the endstate.
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Mr. BATEMAN and BUYER. How do the command and control issues inherent in the creation of integrated divisions differ from those created when National Guard combat brigades and battalions were assigned to active duty divisions as ''round-out'' units?
General BRAMLETT. The principal difference will be the formal authority(ies) given to the division commander commensurate with his responsibilities and accountability for training readiness. Thus far, we have determined that we need to extend the division commander's authority into the domain of inspections; employment of command, control, and communications systems; and some control over funding. Our Integrated Process Action Team (IPAT) is working to further define these areas and formalize them into a governing document.
General NAVAS. The ''round-out'' concept of pre-Operation Desert Storm (ODS) failed to develop in the manner intended as evidenced by the 48th IN (M) Brigade having never deployed to the desert. In theory, the ''round out'' concept would have allowed the ARNG unit to train and subsequently deploy with its supported active component division. While specific command and control issues became more defined after the mobilization of the three roundout brigades during ODS, the Army National Guard Brigades never developed a strong cohesive relationship with its parent Active Component division. It is the intent of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division to go well beyond the ''round out'' concept. Clearly the responsibility for the combat readiness of the brigades assigned to integrated divisions will fall on the active duty commander. The commander, in conjunction with Adjutants General of the respective states, will rely on the provisions of Title XI, the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 to provide the baseline for resolving lines of authority and specific command and control issues.
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Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. Training and Readiness: Improving the training and readiness of the enhanced brigades is the underlying objective of the integrated division. The training objectives to achieve that end, as well as the means and methods to achieve such improvement are not yet clear. However, the ability and the authority of the division commander to establish training and readiness objectives and priorities, and to enforce and measure attainment of standards are critical. Other key components have to do with the training program (National Training Center rotations, for example), equipment compatibility with the active forces, and the amount and nature of full-time support available to the enhanced brigades.
Improving the training and readiness of three brigades is a significant challenge. As the division commander, what are the most critical things that you need to achieve that objective?
[The Department of the Army did not cooperate in providing a timely response for the record.]
Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. Improving training and readiness of National Guard combat units has been a major challenge and numerous programs have been undertaken since the end of the Gulf War to achieve that goal.
Does the creation of the integrated divisions suggest that previous efforts to improve the training and readiness of National Guard combat units have not been effective?
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General BRAMLETT. All of our previous efforts have been steps toward a more integrated future. The AC/ARNG integrated division concept is a new and very positive approach.
General NAVAS. No. All 15 National Guard enhanced Separate Brigades are meeting the goals established for them in support of the National Military Strategy. The intent of creating the integrated divisions was not so much to improve the readiness of the Guard units involved but to better integrate our Army by moving to a model in which the gaining active Army commander becomes responsible in peacetime for the readiness of those Guard units that will fight under his command in wartime. The goal was to increase the visibility of readiness shortfalls in peacetime so they may be corrected in a timely manner and to increase the confidence level of warplanners in the readiness of these units. In addition, we believed that the full-time focus of the division commander and staff on the readiness of his unit could reduce the post mobilization training time required although that is not a goal of the Department of the Army at this time.
Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. If previous efforts have been effective, what's the ''value added,'' so to speak, of imposing an active duty headquarters on the brigades?
General BRAMLETT. The addition of the experience, manpower, focus, and ability to synchronize that a full time AC division headquarters brings to the equation can only help the brigades to achieve more efficiency and effectiveness in training management and execution. We also expect that the division commander and his staff can bring focus to areas that deserve exploration to enhance training. Moreover, the concept is compatible with other initiatives, such as the new integrated approach to training support.
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General NAVAS. The purpose of imposing an active duty headquarters on the brigades is to better integrate our Total Army. We're trying to remove cultural barriers and prevent unpleasant surprises upon mobilization. By putting the brigades under the active duty headquarters we seek to increase the ability of the commander to identify with the ARNG unit. This makes the active component division commander responsible for the readiness of all of his division. The commander then has a greater incentive to improve all of his unit's readiness and mobilization capability. This has worked extremely well in the Air Force with respect to Air Guard and Air Force Reserve units. This ultimately permits us to move toward a more cohesive warfighting division with ARNG units and soldiers who are relevant to our National Military Strategy.
Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. Does this indicate the presence of a model that says that all of the enhanced brigades should be assigned to active division headquarters to enable them to achieve their training and readiness objectives?
General BRAMLETT. Our experience with the TRO concept will help determine whether we have a good structure for expansion; however, the ARNG division redesign initiative also includes enhanced separate brigades under ARNG division command and control.
General NAVAS. Not necessarily. While we see great potential in moving to the Air Force model, in which the gaining active commander who will employ a Guard unit in combat is responsible for its readiness in peacetime, the creation of the Integrated Divisions is only one way to accomplish that goal. In that instance, the brigades may at some point re-organize into Division Brigades instead of Separate ones. That will leave eight National Guard remaining in the enhanced Separate Brigades configuration and one Armored Cavalry Regiment. We would probably want to leave at least some of them in the separate configuration because it provides the Army Corps a powerful weapon that can be used to weight the main effort or provide follow-on forces. However, if we do that, we need to look at ways to give the Corps Commander the same kind of ownership of the readiness of those Separate Brigades that the Integrated Division Commander will have with respect to his National Guard brigades.
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Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. Do you expect, that as a result of this initiative, the enhanced brigades will be used in support of some of the contingencies to relieve the OPTEMPO stress on active Army units?
General BRAMLETT. We look for opportunities to use effectively all our available forces. The enhanced separate brigades are no exception.
General NAVAS. Yes. I expect that the enhanced Separate Brigades of the integrated Divisions will provide units to relieve Active Component OPTEMPO stress. The enhanced Separate Brigades contain organic logistics and support elements, which make them a robust and flexible organization that is suitable for current Peacetime Engagement Operations. When tasked and appropriate resourcing is available, the enhanced Separate Brigades of the integrated Divisions would be able to respond in a manner consistent with their level of training versus time to deploy.
Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. As enhanced brigade commanders, what ''lessons learned'' from previous efforts to improve National Guard combat unit readiness and training should be applied to the integrated divisions?
Colonel UMBARGER. We have had an outstanding professional relationship with the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division, our current affiliated division. They have provided us with tremendous support as we have worked hand-in-hand to improve the Brigade's readiness. In addition, our working relationship with the Training Support Brigade (TSB) has provided a positive climate in which growth has occurred. This Training Support Brigade previously known as the Resident Training Detachment (RTD) and Resident Training Battalion (RTB) was integrated into the Brigade. Many of the soldiers did and continue to live in the communities just like our soldiers. The current soldiers of the 2d Battalion (enhanced), Training Support Brigade Harrison still live in our Indiana communities and have gained an appreciation for the Brigade's leaders and soldiers. This relationship has bridged gaps and fostered a positive AC/RC working relationship. As a result of the brigade being involved with a Combat Training Center rotation, it has become very apparent as we actively prepare for this tremendous challenge that our training focus has never been more clear. The end result, as well as the three year train-up, will substantially upgrade the readiness posture of our organization. The dividends and lessons learned from a rotation will be phenomenal and will set the stage for the future years of the Brigade's training program. However, I feel that an eight year cycle for a CTC rotation is too long for the E-Brigades. A four year cycle is more suited for continued readiness where the year after a rotation would be an ''opportunity year.'' This year can be spent in focusing on OES, NCOES, specialty training (air assault), and ODP's. Years two-three would be the ramp up years with the rotation in year four.
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Training focus should start at the squad and platoon level. However, we must strive to operate in a tactical environment with our command and control at the Brigade (Task Force) level. Staff training programs such as Brigade Warfighters, LTPs, and JANUS are excellent tools, but they cannot replicate the ''fog and friction'' of war of the Brigade operating in an FTX mode in the field. Annual training should focus on operating under similar JRTC like conditions.
Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. Funding and the Control and Allocation of Resources: The amount of funding provided, and its sufficiency for the required training and readiness objectives, is one issue. More fundamental, however, is just who controls the funding. Should the active Army division commander, who also has responsibility for running a major installation, be given all the training and readiness funding for the division's subordinate units, as usually happens in an active division? If given all the funding, should the division commander have the authority to reallocate that funding depending on the commander's determination of need and priority? Or should the state adjutant general and the enhanced brigade commander continue to control the funding?
What are your views on this very critical question?
General BRAMLETT. Responsibility, resources, and authority must be properly aligned in any situation. We have a process action team tasked with answering this fundamental question. We believe that there are acceptable ways to create dual division commander and TAG control of funding.
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General NAVAS. The active Army division commander should not be provided the training and readiness funding for the Integrated Divisions' subordinate Army National Guard units. Given that the great majority of the units' training will continue to be performed in/around the units' home station and within their respective states as well as the undetermined end state for the Integrated Division, the units' respective states should continue to control the funding. In order to ensure the resources are allocated in accordance with the training and readiness objectives/priorities for these units, there should be continuous open communication between the state Adjutant General, the Enhanced Brigade commanders, and the active Army division commanders.
Under Title XI, the associated active Army combat unit commander approves the training program of the National Guard units associated with his organization. We have discussed making the Integrated Division headquarters the Title XI associated active unit for the Guard brigades in that division. This step would enable the commander to approve the training program of the brigades as well as make him responsible for validating their requirements. Determining whether adjustments to the actual funding stream should be made is one of the tasks currently being addressed by the Implementation Process Action Team and no final decisions have been made. One of the factors that has been discussed is the Air Force/Air National Guard model which has been extremely successful in accomplishing some of the same integration goals that underlie this initiative. In the Air Guard model, all funding has continued to flow through Guard channels even though the numbered Air Force commander is responsible for the readiness of the Guard units assigned to him.
We have also looked at the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) and the positive impact on USARC unit readiness that occurred when their funding was moved from active Army channels to purely reserve ones. These two examples would suggest that it is not necessarily appropriate or even beneficial to change the funding stream for the brigades that make up the integrated divisions. Nevertheless, we are looking at all options and will insure that the division commander has the degree of influence over funding that he needs.
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Colonel UMBARGER. The State Adjutant General and the Brigade Commander must have control of their operating budget. The reasons all surround the fact that the soldiers, equipment, and training site are located within the state. The US Property and Fiscal Office within the state is designed to control those funds provided to the brigade.
Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. Will the integrated divisions, or the enhanced brigades that are part of those divisions receive a higher priority in the resource allocation chain than enhanced brigades that are not part of the divisions? If not, why not?
General BRAMLETT. Our resourcing strategy remains aligned with our National Military Strategy and Defense planning. However, we expect more effective and efficient use of limited resources allocated to these units.
General NAVAS. The funding policy for Army units is identified within The Army Plan. The Army National Guard implements that funding policy when resourcing all its units. The current Army plan for Fiscal Years 1998 through 2013 does not differentiate between the existing enhanced separate brigades or the proposed integrated divisions. The Army National Guard will continue to adhere to the existing Department of the Army funding guidance until it is changed.
Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. Geographic Remoteness of Units from Division Headquarters: All six of the enhanced brigades are located at long distances from the active duty headquarters responsible for commanding and overseeing the training and readiness of those brigades. The rationale for such a stationing plan needs to be explained. Determining whether such geographic remoteness is an inhibitor to effective command, control and training is also an objective of this hearing.
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How do you see the fact of such geographic remoteness impacting on the ability of the divisions to achieve the overall objective of improving training and readiness?
General BRAMLETT. Both division headquarters will have forward command posts with an assistant division commander. The assistant division commander will be a principal trainer in the forward command post and the peer mentor for brigade commanders. Initially during the TRO phase, these forward command posts will help link the division headquarters with the brigades and training support resources of CONUSAs. Distance should not unduly inhibit support or command relationships.
General NAVAS. While the ''geographic remoteness'' of the units that make up the six enhanced Separate Brigades that will become parts of the two Integrated Divisions complicates their ability to conduct collective training events at higher (brigade and division) levels, the spread-out nature of the ARNG is one of our many strengths. The ARNG is a community-based organization that encompasses all of America, a source of shared common purpose from which we draw great strength. The realities of demographics and the national economy require all components of the military to reach out for qualified and motivated personnel from all over the country to fill its ranks. While it would be convenient and more cost-effective to have large organizations such as the ARNG enhanced Brigades located in close physical proximity, this is not now possible, nor do we foresee it becoming so. Our resources (personnel and equipment) are spread out, but to train effectively at the collective level requires integrated training opportunities. Executing such opportunities requires resources related to travel, training sites and other facilities.
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Colonel UMBARGER. The key to this issue is the difference in U.S. Army areas (i.e. First Army and Fifth Army). Currently for the light Brigades having two brigades in 5th Army and one in the First Army area the supporting Training Support Brigades are different. All of this equates to challenges for the division headquarters in dealing with two different three star commands, FORSCOM, and the CTCs. Readiness, standards and the support required to foster growth would be adversely affected.
As JEFRE has been a tremendous success in the AC/RC relationship and the improvement of readiness in the E-Brigades, I feel the integrated division is another positive step in moving us toward a true One Army. The integration and full cooperation between active and reserve components is absolutely not optional as we train in future years to fulfill our mission, the defense of this great nation.
Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. Your testimony paints a disturbing picture of the state of personnel in the later deploying divisions, a state of unreadiness that is not reflected in current readiness reports. What specific recommendations do you have for revising the readiness reporting system to ensure a more accurate readiness picture is reported?
Mr. GEBICKE. Since 1994, we have reported on several occasions that DOD needs a more comprehensive readiness assessment system. JCS and service officials agree with us that the measures of readiness in the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) are no longer adequate in today's national security environment. Specifically, SORTS does not (1) address all the factors that JCS considers critical, (2) warn of impending decreases in readiness, and (3) provide data on joint readiness. In addition, SORTS includes subjective assessments of training proficiency.
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We have compiled a list of 26 categories containing more than 650 individual indicators, that active and reserve commands monitor in addition to SORTS, but generally do not report above the command level. Military commanders and outside defense experts agreed that many of the indicators were not only critical to a comprehensive readiness assessment at the unit level but also have some degree of predictive value regarding readiness changes within the services. Nine of the 26 broad categories pertain to personnel: deployability status, projected trends, crew manning, recruiting shortfalls, stability, tempo, borrowed manpower, crew turnover, and morale.
The Congress has also expressed concerns about readiness reporting and has included a requirement in the FY 1999 Defense Authorization Act for DOD to develop and implement a new readiness reporting system by January 15, 2000.
Mr. BATEMAN. Your statement says that Army officials believe readiness and training have been degraded. Despite this, I have not heard any Army official suggest that the degraded readiness and training exceed the levels of acceptable risk. In fact, when the service chiefs were recently asked by Rep. Skelton to rate their readiness on a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 being the highest, the Army Chief of Staff rated the Army at an 8. Based on what you saw in your report, do you agree with that assessment?
Mr. GEBICKE. Without knowing more about the criteria the Army Chief of Staff used for his assessment and the context used to define acceptable risk, I am not in a position to comment on his assessment. However, our assessment of the Army's five later deploying divisions shows that personnel and training readiness levels have declined to the point where the leaders in these units are concerned about their ability to meet assigned mission requirements.
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Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. You've heard the General Accounting Office (GAO) testimony that paints a very disturbing picture of the personnel readiness of the Army's follow-on divisions. The units that the GAO is talking about are your units. Clearly, one implication of the GAO report is that unit commanders are overstating the readiness levels of their units.
How does the personnel readiness assessment of your units match the information presented by the GAO?
Colonel CALDWELL. Generally, the GAO's personnel readiness assessment for follow-on divisions is consistent with the personnel readiness of 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry). While the brigade is ready to deploy and conduct its wartime mission, personnel shortages affect the brigade's overall readiness. Shortages of infantry sergeants and captains have a major impact on training readiness. Shortages in low-density military occupational skills such as cooks, mechanics, and technical skills, degrade the brigade's logistical, food service, maintenance, and communications capabilities. All of our company anti-tank sections are unmanned. Currently, we have begun re-forming the third squads in some platoons as our strength grows, and have trained infantrymen in the operation of our Dragon anti-tank weapon, these shortages certainly affect our sustainability in combat.
Our personnel shortfalls are further exacerbated by the requirement to send units on operational missions at 100 percent strength, with soldiers that have sufficient time remaining in their enlistment to complete the mission. For example, over 65 soldiers were reassigned from other companies within the 2d Battalion of the 22nd Infantry, in order to deploy their A Company to Bosnia at full strength. With A Company already short 34 soldiers and an additional 31 soldiers not qualifying for the 6 month deployment due to termination of service or permanent change of station, we had to significantly reorganize the battalion to man a 129 man company for the deployment. The net effect was the company deployed with 60% new personnel and the over reorganization degraded the battalion's overall combat readiness. Our 1–32 Infantry Battalion is currently reorganizing for their upcoming mission to the Sinai as part of the Multination Forces and Observers. This mission will have a larger impact on the brigade since the battalion must deploy with 529 soldiers. This will require significant reorganization and cross leveling within the brigade to deploy this battalion at the required strength.
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Additional personal issues include the Army's policy to immediately move branch qualified captains (company commanders) to Congressionally mandated positions such as to Active Component/Reserve Component duty and other critical positions. This leaves the division short of seasoned junior officers in critical staff positions at division, brigade and battalion level.
Major LOPEZ. Overall, the personnel readiness assessment presented by the GAO for follow on divisions exemplifies the personnel readiness of the 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry). The personnel that are in the brigade are trained and ready to accomplish their mission. The issue is simply the shortage of personnel, particularly E–6s through E–8s. This shortage makes operations at the platoon and lower level extremely difficult.
Major GRAVENS. The GAO testimony adequately identifies our greatest concerns, particularly in the area of low-density MOS and NCO shortages. Our readiness assessments are based on the premise that the Army will indeed fill our shortages in the correct MOS and grade prior to any actual deployment.
Colonel CHAMBERLAIN. There is very little comparison between the personnel readiness of my brigade and the GAO report. My brigade has been consistently healthier than the picture portrayed by GAO. Of note, my brigade was not looked at by GAO as part of their report. The only real similarities between the GAO report and my brigade as it currently stands are in the areas of captain and NCO shortages.
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Major MCWILLIAMS. Although the GAO did not visit my unit, there are a few similarities. Specifically, the GAO report was similar to my unit in the reported shortage of experienced NCO's. Additionally, although the brigade combat team is at almost 100% fill in the aggregate, we are still short personnel in the personnel administration, supply and maintenance specialties.
Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. Do you agree with the GAO's conclusion that the readiness reporting system is not accurately portraying the severity of the problems in you units? If so, what is not being reported and what needs to be done to ensure that the system adequately reflects what is going on?
Colonel CALDWELL. The unit status report that my brigade turns in is an accurate reflection of my unit readiness. I am personally briefed by my subordinate commanders each month and I certify the accuracy of the data. I also ensure that the narrative section of each of my subordinate unit commander's reports capture any issues that are not adequately represented by the numerical rating. I agree that the numerical rating can sometimes not reflect some readiness problems, but the commander's narrative can account for that. With leader supervision, the USR is a useful report, and works well in the Warrior Brigade.
Within the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), divisional units undergo a meticulous monthly USR turn-in process followed by a readiness briefing to the Commanding General. Detailed data is briefed ranging from training resources, unit OPTEMO, equipment shortages, and crew and squad manning. This briefing gives the division commander a clear and complete understanding of subordinate unit readiness that is used to prepare the division's readiness letter. Consolidation of readiness data occurs for the first time at division level. The division commander's readiness letter is forwarded to the XVIII Airborne Corps. As data is consolidated at each level, the aggregate data may not portray an accurate readiness picture of some individual battalions and brigades.
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Major LOPEZ. As a senior NCO, I personally do not have experience in the reporting system above the brigade and battalion level. At the brigade and battalion level, the Unit Status Report portrays an accurate picture of the 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) both subjectively and objectively. A possible problem in the system at division and higher is consolidation of information at each level. This consolidation may be painting a picture of readiness that does not accurately portray readiness of particular units at lower levels.
Major GRAVENS. I believe that the current readiness reporting system allows commanders to accurately report their unit's readiness in that it provides not only the numerical rating, but also provides the opportunity for narrative comments.
Colonel CHAMBERLAIN. I do not agree with the GAO's assessment as to the validity of the readiness reporting system. During the past year, when there was a personnel readiness problem within the brigade, the reporting system gave me the capability to clearly articulate the problem. The reporting system subsequently allowed those who control and manage resources to understand and fix the problem.
Major MCWILLIAMS. I do not agree with the GAO report that the personnel readiness reporting system does not accurately portray the severity of personnel shortages. The commander accurately reports his personnel shortages, which allows the personnel managers to fix the problem. Based on the commander's current and projected state of readiness, the personnel managers reallocate available resources to maintain a balance.
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Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. Reading the GAO report could lead one to conclude that your units—from a personnel standpoint—are hollow and unready. Do you share that conclusion? If not, why not? Do you see some relationship between the personnel status of your units and deployment time lines established for your unit?
Colonel CALDWELL. I do not share in the conclusion that the Warrior Brigade or our Army is ''hollow and unready''. The phrase ''hollow army'' was coined to described the Army of the 1970's that was plagued with personnel, equipment, and money shortages, moral and discipline problems, and drug and racial difficulties. Today's Army and the Warrior Brigade are neither hollow nor unready.
Personnel shortages, however, are my number one concern regarding unit readiness. Shortages of critical leaders, logistics personnel, and infantryman have a negative impact on the brigade's ability to conduct sustainment of its wartime mission. While the brigade can conduct its wartime mission now with its current personal shortfalls, the brigade's ability to sustain combat operations is at risk. Casualties and non-battle injuries could quickly degrade our Brigade that has a starting aggregate strength of 93 percent. Additionally, the requirement to fill units conducting peace operations at 100% strength with personnel with retrainability for 6 months has a significant impact on personnel and training readiness due to the required cross leveling of personnel.
Major LOPEZ. If the definition of ''hollow and unready'' is similar to the descriptions used to define the U.S. Army of the 1970s, I adamantly disagree with this conclusion. The personnel in the 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) are highly trained and ready to execute their wartime mission. Morale, discipline and training within the Commando Brigade are high. The shortage of personnel, particularly at the mid-grade sergeant level, affects our ability to sustain causalities in combat.
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Major GRAVENS. I believe that our units are trained and ready. Of course I would much prefer that all Army units, including ours, trained and operated on a daily basis at 100% strength. As it is, we must depend on the infusion and training of new personnel before we could deploy and fight at our full potential.
Colonel CHAMBERLAIN. I again do not agree with the conclusions drawn in the GAO report. This brigade went to the National Training Center (NTC) last July when we were at our lowest personnel readiness posture during my two years of command. We were successful at the NTC in an environment that was tougher than my experiences in Desert Storm. We could not have achieved this success if we were hollow and unready. There is a direct correlation between my personnel status and deployment time lines established for my unit. As the brigade has figured more prominently recently in possible contingency missions, my personnel strength had been increased.
Major MCWILLIAMS. I do not conclude that we are hollow and unready. My brigade has been very busy within the past 12 months with a National Training Center (NTC) rotation and a Task Force Intrinsic Action deployment to Kuwait. We executed these major training events and deployments safely and to standard, while at our lowest personnel readiness posture in the last two years. There is a definite relationship between my personnel status and the established deployment time line.
Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. The personnel readiness picture painted by the GAO is pretty alarming. As unit commanders and senior NCO's in your opinion, is personnel readiness the most difficult challenge you face, or are there other ''readiness'' challenges that give you more concern?
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Colonel CALDWELL. Yes, personnel readiness is the most difficult challenge for the brigade. The personnel readiness challenge is compounded by requirements to support peace operations such as the Multinational Forces and Observer (MFO) mission in the Sinai and Operation Joint Guard in Bosnia. These mission are extremely important and part of our national security strategy to ''Shape''. However, peace operations have a negative effect on our units combat readiness. The necessity to cross-level individuals from other units within the brigade to both fill the deploying unit to 100% strength, and replace soldiers that do not meet specific deployment criteria, has a significant cost to the units that stay behind. Additionally, individual augmentation requirements to support several missions around the world lasting several months, takes critical soldiers away from our brigade that is already short personnel.
Training readiness for deployed and stay behind units on peace operations is also a challenge. At about the 4-month mark of deployment, the deployed unit's ability to conduct collective warfighting tasks is seriously degraded. Units conducting rotations to the MFO or Bosnia will have approximately a 60% percent turnover in personal from the time of predeployment training begins through redeployment back to home station. The training readiness of a unit returning from a peace operations is seriously degraded and it takes about 4 to 6 months of extensive training and personal stabilization to get the unit up to their wartime standard.
A recommendation to remedy this situation is to initiate personnel stop-loss for any unit participating in peace operations like Operation Joint Guard or the MFO. The stop-loss system will not allow soldiers in a deploying unit to permanently change stations that would greatly stabilize the personnel situation in the deploying unit. Additionally, we should recognize that most deployments in the foreseeable future will be peace and stability operations that follow-on forces like the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) will continue to be the units of choice for these types of operations. Therefore, follow-on units have the same requirement for personnel and equipment as do our early deploying forces.
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Major LOPEZ. Personnel readiness is the most difficult challenge faced by 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry). Personnel readiness affects the brigade in two ways. It makes training for and execution of mid to high intensity conflicts more difficult. It also makes supporting low intensity deployments very difficult because stay behind units are stripped to fill the deploying units to full strength.
Major GRAVENS. It is indeed the foremost issue that I, personally, wrestle with on very frequent basis. However, having said that, I must add that there are other issues that tie into the personnel aspect and that no one single issue stands alone. Closely related to that is the problem of continual personnel turbulence as our people constantly move from one priority assignment or deployment to another. Along with that is the issue of money. Having the dollars to allow for the conduct of battalion/brigade level training that we want in order to be as prepared as possible for deployment. Money to replace aging equipment is also a significant factor.
Colonel CHAMBERLAIN. Personnel readiness is not my most difficult challenge. My greatest challenge would be personnel turbulence, particularly in the NCO corps within the brigade combat team. The loss of experienced NCO's to AC/RC duty, recruiting and the training bases has had a significant impact on the brigade. It is extremely difficult to replace these experienced NCO's with more junior soldiers. It requires us to train more tasks repetitively, but the budget allocated for training does not support this. This leads directly into my other significant readiness challenge. We are required to do more training with our equipment, but the equipment gets older and more expensive to maintain every day, and our operating budgets are getting smaller every year. As the pace of equipment modernization for the Army continues to be very slow, I spend considerably more of my time on budget and maintenance issues as they relate to training and readiness than I do on personnel readiness issues.
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Major MCWILLIAMS. Personnel readiness is not the major problem; personnel turnover is the most difficult challenge. With the constant turbulence of key leaders, more specifically, the NCO's, it requires more time to train, soldiers have to readjust to the new leadership, which leads to a significant readiness challenge.
Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. We often hear of the many challenges faced by units in the field. We hear of high operations and personnel tempos, shortage of equipment and spare parts, shortages of people (both the absence of the correct skill level or the total absence of a person to fill the unit slot), lack of training funds, as well as the lack of the time to train because of the lack of officers and NCO's who are gone to participate in various exercises and contingency operations. We have heard of severe shortages in particular skill specialities like infantry and the maintenance specialties. We are told that when a unit deploys to a contingency operations, it requires a great deal of cross leveling of equipment and personnel.
What are your two or three greatest detractors to your ability to train your unit for its war fighting mission?
Colonel CALDWELL. Support taskings are the greatest detractors. About every six weeks the brigade assumes a support mission. During this time, the brigade provides support to the installation and the division with tasks ranging from burial details and parades, to range maintenance. While essential to maintain the installation, the brigade can only conduct limited collective training while in support cycle.
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Shortages of certain types of ammunition have also impacted on our basic weapons qualification and live fire training. The Army is currently short 40mm training and high explosive rounds for the M203 grenade launcher. While the brigade has enough 7.62mm linked (M60 and M240B Machine Gun), and 5.56mm (Squad Automatic Weapon) ammunition for basic qualification and marksmanship training, additional machinegun ammunition for live fire exercise would greatly enhance our training readiness.
Major LOPEZ. Currently my greatest detractor is personnel turbulence, particularly in the summer months each year. Due to the personnel shortage, job requirements for promotion, and the operational tempo, personnel rarely stay in a position more than a year. Compounding this problem is that most personnel changes occur during a four-month period each summer. This turbulence creates a ripple effect. The turbulence creates a lack of continuity in the staff and leadership positions, creating training shortfalls that decreasing readiness.
A second detractor is the shortage of NCO's in the rank of E–6 through E–8. The new requirement to staff active component personnel with the reserve component has increased this problem. This shortfall leaves key training and leadership positions either vacant or filled with less experienced personnel. To make up this shortfall, more junior NCO's must fill these positions creating a ripple effect through the command down to the lowest levels.
Major GRAVENS. Shortages of NCO's and funds.
Colonel CHAMBERLAIN. The three greatest detractors on my ability to train for my war fighting missions are personnel turbulence in the loss of experienced NCO's to other Congressionally mandated duties, shrinking command operating budgets and lack of modernization all three areas of concern are inextricably related. The loss of experienced NCO's to AC/RC duty and the training bases has had a significant impact on the brigade. It is extremely difficult to replace these experienced NCO's with more junior soldiers. It requires us to train more collective tasks repetitively, but the budget allocated for training and maintenance does not support this increase. This leads directly into my other significant training challenge. We are required to do more training with our equipment to make up for the loss of experience, but the equipment gets older and more expensive to maintain every day, and our operating budgets are getting smaller every year. As the pace of equipment modernization for the Army continues to be very slow, we spend more time and money on maintenance at the expense of training. Succinctly put: We need to train more due to the turbulence, we have less money to train and maintain, and it takes more money to train and maintain due to aging equipment.
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Major MCWILLIAMS. 1. Money: Having to divert funds from the training account to the maintenance account to repair aging equipment thereby causing commanders to modify their training plan. 2. Aging Equipment: The pace of equipment modernization continues to be slow. We have the oldest Tanks (M1A1), and by far the oldest Personnel Carriers (M113A2). The age of these fleets require us to spend more time and money keeping them operational which detracts from training.
Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. Do you believe your unit's current overall ''C'' rating accurately and completely reflects your unit's readiness?
Colonel CALDWELL. Yes, our current ''C'' rating accurately reflects our unit's readiness. By itself, however, the ''C'' rating does not completely reflect unit readiness. One must also be familiar with the rest of the USR report (including the narrative summaries) to get a complete picture of the brigade's readiness.
Major LOPEZ. Yes, this rating does accurately reflect the 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) readiness level at this time. I recommend that a unit's readiness not be assessed purely on a numerical rating. One must also read the commander's narrative to get a true picture of a unit's readiness.
Major GRAVENS. Yes I do.
Colonel CHAMBERLAIN. Yes, the brigade's current overall ''C'' rating does accurately reflect our combat readiness posture.
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Major MCWILLIAMS. I do believe that the overall ''C'' rating accurately reflects my unit's readiness.
Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. How many days would it take you to train your unit so that you were C–1 in training and ready to go fight in a Desert Storm environment?
Colonel CALDWELL. The Warrior Brigade Task Force is prepared to execute its wartime mission and could deploy within 96 hours after notification. The readiness status of the brigade does ebb and flow based on the training cycle, the personnel status, and recent events ranging from the weather to recovery from operational missions. The number of training days required for the brigade to be rated C–1 changes monthly.
Major LOPEZ. The Commando Brigade Task Force is prepared to execute its wartime mission and could deploy within 96 hours after notification. The actual number of days required to train up to a C–1 status changes from month to month; however, we are always very close to C–1.
Major GRAVENS. The average time that it would take this brigade to reach full METL proficiency is between 14 to 28 days.
Colonel CHAMBERLAIN. The 3d Brigade Combat Team would take less than 14 training days to go fight in a Desert Storm environment.
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Major MCWILLIAMS. If we were alerted today, it would take 14 days or less to be ready to go fight a Desert Storm type conflict.
Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. What are your most difficult maintenance problems? On what type of vehicle?
Colonel CALDWELL. With only two vehicle types in the brigade, the greatest maintenance problems exist with the new Light Medium Tactical Vehicle (LMTV). The vehicle has experienced numerous problems that continue to plague its readiness and usefulness. The primary concern is design related. The high center of gravity has caused numerous rollovers. To prevent this, the vehicle has been restricted to 30 mph by a recent safety of use message. Additionally, the vehicle is restricted to 12 mph on sharp curves. This simply does not meet the operational requirement and creates severe convoy problems. Additionally, the very high bed of the vehicle does not support the soldier's rapid exit that is critical in combat situations.
Major LOPEZ. Currently, the most difficult maintenance problem is maintaining the gear hub seals on M998 HMMWV wheels. Given the limited number of vehicles in the 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), it is critical to minimize maintenance problems with vehicles.
Major GRAVENS. Our M1 tanks were early production models. Although we maintain an above 90% readiness rate on our fleet, it is obtained only through exceedingly hard work and effort. Our ACES, by design, are high maintenance vehicles and require an almost herculean effort to keep operational. Our AVLBs are M60 chassis, which are just so old they are incredibly difficult to maintain.
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Colonel CHAMBERLAIN. Our most difficult maintenance problems are in turrets and on engines in our M1A1 tank fleet. These are some of the oldest tanks in the Army, and they require more money every year to maintain. We are slowly fielding the third generation tank in the Army, the M1A2, but my tanks are still first generation. Our second greatest maintenance problem is on all of our engineer equipment. The AVLB, the AVLM and the M113A2 personnel carriers are all extremely maintenance intensive, and extremely old.
Major MCWILLIAMS. My most difficult maintenance problems are with M113A2s, M88 Recovery Vehicles, M1A1 Tanks, and 2.5 Ton Trucks. The M113A2 fleet is and has become an enormous challenge to maintain. My tank battalion has the oldest M1A1 tanks in the Army. The M88A1 recovery vehicle has out lived its usefulness for recovery operations of the M1A1 tank and its successors. The 2.5 Ton Trucks are of 1960's vintage. We are spending more time in the motor pool trying to maintain aging equipment, which adversely impacts training for our wartime mission. Each year more training dollars are being spent on maintenance.
Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. How long does it take for a repair part on valid requisition to arrive in your unit?
Colonel CALDWELL. Depending on the priority the part can be ordered at, the average wait time is 6 days. The Army's new velocity management initiative has cut down on order-ship time by 20 days. Last year at this time, it was not unusual for a priority 13 part to take two to three months to be filled. Unless the part is on back order, parts arrive to the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) in 6 days. This is a tremendous success story. A part on back order is tracked individually by the 10th Mountain Division Support Command and the average wait time is 15 days.
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Major LOPEZ. Depending on the priority the part can be ordered at, the average wait time is 6–8 days. Some individual requisitions can exceed this average time by two to three months if the part is on back order from the factory.
Major GRAVENS. 9–10 days are about the average.
Colonel CHAMBERLAIN. We have made tremendous progress in this area at Fort Carson over the last year. The average time to receive a repair part is down to 9.7 days. There are several initiatives ongoing to reduce this even further by two to three more days.
Major MCWILLIAMS. Average time to receive a repair part is about nine days at Fort Carson. This is largely due to great strides in reengineering to streamline this process at Fort Carson.
Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. If you were scheduled to deploy to a Desert Storm type war: how many personnel would you need to fill out your unit? What type of equipment would need to be cross leveled from other units? How many of your assigned people would be non-deployable? How long would it take to get your unit ready to deploy?
Colonel CALDWELL. To deploy the brigade at full strength would require an additional 130 soldiers. Most of these shortages are critical positions at the junior noncommissioned officer level. The number of non-deployable soldiers is 62, and the brigade is under strength 68 soldiers. Shortages in squad radios restrict communication within our platoons and shortages of 3/4 ton trailers degrade our cargo transportation capability. Additionally, shortages of infrared aiming lights hamper our night fighting capability.
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Items needed for any real-world deployment include a night vision device for each soldier, an infrared aiming device for all small arms, the M4 Carbine to replace the M16A2, and the Javelin anti-tank missile to replace the aging Dragon anti-tank system. We would need to cross level 18 squad radios and ten 3/4 ton trailers from other units.
The Warrior Brigade is ready to deploy now, but our personnel sustainment capability in combat would be questionable.
Major LOPEZ. As of today, the 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) is short 109 soldiers. Within the next 120 days the unit is scheduled to lose another 225 soldiers with gains projected at 308 soldiers. The brigade currently has 68 soldiers who are non-deployable. The unit overall does not have equipment shortfalls, but it is not equipped with many of the latest models of equipment. Items that would be requested for any real-world deployment include the M240B machine gun, night vision devices for all soldiers, the M4 Carbine to replace all M16A2s, and the Javelin anti-tank system.
The Commando Brigade Task Force is ready to deploy now and can have lead elements on their way to the objective within 96 hours.
Major GRAVENS. This number varies regularly and is more so tied to getting the right MOS by grade, to the right empty slot. If we received 80–90 of those said personnel; we would be good for deployment. The number of non-deployables also varies on any given day. An average would be approximately 100. In regards to deployment, we want to be at full METL proficiency and need between 14–28 days.
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Colonel CHAMBERLAIN. The 3d Brigade Combat Team could deploy today with no fillers, and still execute our combat missions. To bring us to our full strength of 4320 soldiers would require a maximum 140 soldiers to backfill our non-deployables. (The exact number of non-deployables changes daily, and this is the maximum number.) The brigade would require no cross leveling of equipment. The brigade could begin deployment operations with departure of the advanced party and units moving to the railhead and airfields within 24 hours of notification. Although 14 training days would be optimal, the brigade could deploy with as few as 7 training days for a Desert Storm type scenario.
Major MCWILLIAMS. If the 3rd Brigade Combat Team were to deploy today, I would need an average of about 140 personnel to replace non-deployable soldiers to bring me to an authorized strength of 4320. We will require no cross leveling of equipment. I estimate it would take about 14 days or less for the main body of the Brigade Combat Team to be ready to start to deploy, and only 24 hours for the advance party to deploy.
Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. Although there has been a great deal of money spent in Research and Development to develop the individual soldier gear such as warm weather gear, gortex outer garments, excellent new boots, and other gear such as protective armor, we are told that none of the units represented by witnesses on the panel are scheduled to get the new gear. The committee staff has been told that the new warm boots for soldiers being deployed to Bosnia were, literally, taken from a shipment going to Korea. The same is true with regard to the new tents that have been developed for soldiers. Although the tents are available and there is a contractor that has a ''warm'' line to make more tents, DLA will only issue the old style tents, even though they are notorious for leaking. It is our understanding that these later deploying units are not high enough in the priority of equipment issue for them to get the new gear.
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Have any of your units received the new individual soldier gear that has been developed? Body armor? Gortex warm weather gear? New style Gortex boots?
Colonel CALDWELL. Soldiers in the brigade have received the new Gortex modular sleeping bag, the intermediate cold/wet boot, ghillie suit accessory kit for our snipers.
As a force package 3 unit and follow-on force, the 10th Mountain Division is one of the last units to receive new equipment fieldings. While we are not earmarked as first to deploy, the force modernization priorities, especially in individual soldiers systems, should be adjusted within the Army. The 10th Mountain Division is one of the most deployed divisions in the last five years with deployments to Kuwait, Iraq, Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, Panama, and numerous other locations around the world. The soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) have been on numerous operational missions without the benefit of having the latest equipment our nation has to offer. The division is based upon infantrymen, and the new individual soldier equipment would greatly enhance unit readiness. Equipment such as the improved rain suit, knee & elbow pads, advance protective eyewear system, ballistic shin guards, light weight body armor, 40mm grenade vest, and load carriage system are all items our soldiers need and deserve.
Major LOPEZ. Soldiers in the 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) have received the new Goretex modular sleeping bags, individual inflatable sleeping mats, ghilley suit, and the intermediate cold and wet weather boot. While we have received a small portion of the new individual soldier gear that is currently available, such as lightweight body armor and the new load carriage system, we are not the top priority for new equipment. The 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) is a follow-on force, which is the primary reason for the slow procurement of the newest equipment. This reasoning may be faulty. The 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) has been and continues to be one of the most deployed divisions in the U.S. Army. Improved individual soldier gear is greatly deserved by its soldiers.
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Major GRAVENS. We have received some Gortex gear. That's it.
Colonel CHAMBERLAIN. My soldiers have not received any of the new gear. We have had the Gortex cold weather ensemble for several years now.
Major MCWILLIAMS. No, we have not been issued any of the new equipment for soldiers.
Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. When do you expect to be issued the new style tents?
Colonel CALDWELL. There are several new style tents that are in development or in evaluation. The 2-man shelter, 3-man Lightweight Extreme Weather Shelter, and the 4-man Extreme Cold Weather Shelter are all tents that would greatly benefit our soldiers. 1st Brigade has received a limited number of the 4-man Extreme Cold Weather Tents; however, the brigade is not scheduled to receive additional tents.
Major LOPEZ. The 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) has received a limited issue of the new 4-man style tents. Outfitting the brigade with the new 2, 3, and 4-person shelters would greatly enhance the comfort and fighting capability of its soldiers.
Major GRAVENS. I do not know.
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Colonel CHAMBERLAIN. We anticipate getting the new style crew tents this fall or winter.
Major MCWILLIAMS. We expect to receive the new crew tents later this calendar year.
Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. If you could buy any two items of the new gear what would they be and why?
Colonel CALDWELL. I would buy the new body armor with load carrying system for every soldier in the brigade. We are currently using the 10-pound flack vest that offers limited protection to our soldiers and dramatically increases their individual carrying load. The second item I would buy is the Javelin anti-tank system to replace the 30-year-old Dragon anti-tank system with the Javelin. Additionally, I would buy the M4 Carbine for every light infantryman with associated night vision and night aiming devices.
Major LOPEZ. One item would be a reliable, lightweight, and durable squad level radio. It would need to have an increased range over current models. It would also need to be secure and frequency hop capable as well as being compatible with currently fielded radios.
Another item that I should purchase is latest model night vision devices for all light weapon systems in the brigade. Currently we received the new PVS–7D night vision device in April 98, and are scheduled to receive AN/PVS–10, sniper night vision sight in June 99, and the AN/PAQ–4C infrared aiming light in June 99.
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Major GRAVENS. I have limited knowledge of the latest gear available to select units. Personally, I would very much like to see our soldiers receive decent cold weather boots so that they wouldn't have to spend the personal money that they do to keep their feet warm. We should provide decent boots for them.
Colonel CHAMBERLAIN. I would buy the body armor and the boots if given a choice. Both pieces of equipment relate to survivability on the battlefield. Wounded soldiers and soldiers with bad feet due to frostbite or trench foot can't stay in the fight.
Major MCWILLIAMS. Body Armor and boots. Both pieces of equipment relate to survivability on the battlefield.
Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. How would you describe the morale of military personnel and their families, as well as civilian personnel living and working at your installation today, compared with a few years ago? What are the key factors affecting the state or changing state of morale? If you had to use just one word to describe the state of morale today, what would it be?
Colonel CALDWELL. Morale and discipline within the Warrior Brigade are outstanding. Fort Drum is a quality place to live, work, and train, serving as a readiness multiplier for units assigned to this installation. Between 1986 and 1992, 130 new buildings, 35 miles of roads, and 4,272 sets of family housing units were built at a cost of 1.3 billion dollars providing the base infrastructure for the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry). Fort Drum is the Army's most modern installation and is one of the reasons morale is so high among the soldiers, their families, and the civilian workforce assigned.
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Quality of life and taking care of soldiers and their families are a top priority of mine and the leadership on Fort Drum. Our post exchange, commissary, and morale, welfare, and recreation facilities provide soldiers, family members, and retirees first class support. Our family support system is a model for the Army, tested and refined through numerous deployments from Bosnia to Pakistan. Fort Drum's childcare center and youth services programs provide exceptional support to our family members. The Division's ''Piece of the Rock'' (Unit sponsorship of the 14 Army Community Housing Areas and 11 local communities) has also served our soldiers, families, and civilian counterpart well. This program was critical to providing humanitarian support and disaster relied during the January 1998 Ice Storm—the worst natural disaster in Northern New York in 65 years. The morale of the soldiers, family members, and civilians assigned to Fort Drum has always been high, and continues to remain so.
The one word I would use to describe the morale of the soldiers, civilians, and their family members at Fort Drum is, ''Proud''.
Major LOPEZ. Morale of our soldiers, family members, and civilians was high for the last several years and remains high today. The key factor of maintaining high morale at Fort Drum is taking care of soldiers and their families. The quality of our soldiers in 2d Brigade is as good or better than I have seen in my 22 years of service. Our morale and esprit de corps are superb, with our reenlistment rates leading the Army. The quality of life at Fort Drum and the command climate within the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) makes serving in the brigade truly pleasurable. Fort Drum's excellent facilities and morale, welfare, and recreation programs provide quality support to our soldiers and families. Our dedicated family members that volunteer in our Family Support Groups and Army Family Team Building programs have built a total ready soldier/family team within the Commando Brigade.
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I would describe the state of morale today as outstanding.
Major GRAVENS. I believe that overall, morale is good. Uncertainty about possible deployments and living in 1950's barracks are always issues when you talk to soldiers or families. We try and provide a positive atmosphere wherein we keep soldiers informed of all planned training and deployments. Regarding the aging billets, we have made an earnest effort at self-help projects as we patiently wait for eventual new billets.
Colonel CHAMBERLAIN. I would say that morale at my installation is very good for all parties and is not significantly different than it was few years ago. We have just recently won the Army Community of Excellence Award, which I feel is a clear indicator of our morale. I strongly believe, however, that future morale should be of some concern. Many of my soldiers and their families have expressed a consistent concern for what they see as shrinking or eroding pay and benefits. They are already struggling financially in a high cost of living area with minimal pay raises. They are also very concerned about retirement pay and medical coverage in the future. I would use the word ''excellent'' to describe morale today, but would caveat that word for use in the future as being dependent upon improvements in pay and benefits.
Major MCWILLIAMS. I would say that morale at Fort Carson is very positive for both the soldiers and their families and civilians. We have fostered a positive relationship with the community, and we just recently won the Army Community of Excellence Award. I am concerned, however, with the high cost of living, the shortage of affordable housing, eroding pay and benefits, and the future of retirement benefits and medical care. I would use ''Outstanding'' to describe the state of morale today, but would also say that if we continue to create the perception of ''Broken Promises'', the current state of morale will degrade.
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Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. You will be the division commander who will ultimately be responsible for the training and readiness of these three National Guard brigades. At present, the training concept for National Guard combat units is that they will strive to attain squad and platoon proficiency in peacetime. That's a level of proficiency well below what will be required of these units if they should be deployed to fight. As you look at the wartime missions and requirements of the three enhanced brigades, what do you envision that the mission essential tasks of these brigades to be? Do you envision changing or broadening that squad and platoon training focus?
[The Department of the Army did not cooperate in providing a timely response for the record.]
Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. What do you think will be the impact on the mobilization time requirement for the three enhanced brigades as result of this initiative?
Colonel UMBARGER. I see no differences in mobilization time than currently exists in the enhanced brigade training strategy which currently calls for post mob at 90 days. As the brigade has battle focused pre-mobilization training the post mobilization time will still be required to expand to additional Mission Essential Task List (METL) training to standard.
[The Department of the Army did not cooperate in providing a timely response for the record.]
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Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. A few years ago, Fort Riley was the home of the 1st Infantry Division (the Big Red One) with 14,000 soldiers authorized. Two of the division's brigades were stationed at Fort Riley, and one brigade was in Germany. However, as the division downsized and reorganized, we understand that the division's headquarters and much of its supporting assets moved to Germany—including Apache and Black Hawk battalions, general support maintenance, and military intelligence assets.
How does the shifting of so much of the divisional assets to Germany affect the ability of the remaining divisional brigade to train at Fort Riley, as well as participate in periodic rotations to the Army's National Training Center?
What additional, if any, reductions do you expect to occur in military and civilian personnel at your installations and to what extent are they related to reductions in missions and functions? What problems, if any, do you foresee?
Fort Riley is about to take on a new mission: serving as the division headquarters of three National Guard enhanced brigades. How do you assess the installations ability to support this new mission in the current resource environment?
Colonel THOMAS. The Secretary of Defense recently announced a series of reform initiatives designed to improve the Department of Defense's business practices, achieve economies and efficiencies, and free up money for modernization. The Army expects to save about 20 percent in base operating costs through A–76 outsourcing competitions. Other efficiencies are expected to occur through increased emphasis on using credit cards for small purchases, and use of electronic catalogues and electronic shopping malls for some purchases.
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Mr. BATEMAN and Mr. BUYER. Do you have the hardware and software capabilities to permit you to make use of ''total asset visibility'' (seeing a part traveling trough the distribution pipeline to the unit)? Is this an effective way of doing business for you? Are you adequately resourced to take advantage of the Secretary's desire to revolutionize your business practices through increased use of electronic commerce? What problems have you encouraged?
To what extent have you benefited from Department of the Army or DOD efforts to regionalize or consolidate various functions such as finance, personnel, and contracting?
How would you describe the downside of the regionalization and consolidation actions?
[The Department of the Army did not cooperate in providing a timely response for the record.]
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ
Details of the $634 Million Shortfall in ARNG Programs (Personnel, Surface Optempo, Real Property)
Mr. ORTIZ. Conversion of the combat divisions will be costly in the out year; I understand to the tune of about 600 million dollars per year. And how confident are you that your successor will be willing to spend the money required to buy the needed equipment where there are so many other demands for the money?
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General NAVAS. Active Guard and Reserve (AGR), personnel are currently funded at $1,316 million, a 99% funding level of the Army validated requirements. With an additional increase of $10 million, the program will be funded to 100% of programmed End Strength requirements. Failure to fund the $10 million will result in the inability to pay 160 AGR personnel (80 officers and 80 enlisted soldiers) that will result in reduced readiness levels because of diminished full time support to reserve units.
Surface Operational Tempo is currently funded at $424 million, a 59% funding level of the Army validated requirements. With an additional $110 million, the funding for the program will be increased to 75% of requirements. Funding at the increased level will fund 100% of Force Support Package units and Enhanced Separate Brigades, 80% Early Deploying unit requirements, while Later Deploying and Non-Time Phased Force Deployment units would only be funded to 50%. This program is critical to provide forces trained in their assigned wartime missions. Surface Operational Tempo provides for all readiness issues pertaining to the Army National Guard operational ground forces.
Real Property Maintenance is currently funded to $94 million or a 39% funding level of the Army validated requirements. Remaining at this funding level would provide for federally reimbursed facilities from 12% to 53% of requirements depending on the priority of the facility as determined by National Guard Bureau Metrics.
With an increase of $98 million, the program will be funded to 80% of the requirements. This will fund federally reimbursed facilities from 52% to 87% of requirements depending on the priority of the facility as determined by National Guard Bureau Metrics, $2 million in energy reduction projects, and all construction costs for the scheduled simulator fieldings. This will also allow for the Army National Guard to buy back some of the maintenance backlog for deferred maintenance.
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Depot Maintenance is currently funded to $99 million which is a 35% funding level for the total requirements, and a 53% funding level for enhanced Separate Brigades. With the addition of $94 million, the program will be funded to 67% of Army validated requirements. This will fund the enhanced Separate Brigades to 100% of requirements, and all priority commodities to 80%, e.g., combat vehicles, missiles, engineering equipment, fire support systems and communications and electronics. Divisional requirements funding will be increased from the current 6% to 24%. Current funding does not allow the Army National Guard Depot Maintenance program to sustain early deploying units' equipment readiness levels. The current funding level will increase the depot maintenance backlog.
Information and Telecommunications Support is currently funded to $61 million, 36% of the Army validated requirements. With an addition of $73 million, the program will be funded to 77% of requirements. Currently, eight Automated Information Systems and communications systems are not supported to a basic level of information infrastructure. This does not allow access to other Army systems to insure proper support for soldier pay and personnel systems management. In addition, $57 million of the $73 million will maintain Distance Learning requirements.
Miscellaneous program requirements are currently funded at $164 million which is a 62% funding level of the Army validated requirements. With an additional $75 million, the program will be funded to 90% of requirements. This will fund medical supplies and screening, supplies and services, training support for combat ready Army National Guard forces, and administrative and service wide support for multiple Army National Guard programs in order to maintain readiness objectives.
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Schools are currently funded to $81 million, which represents 39% of the Army validated requirements. Funds support training for members of early deploying units to provide them with the requisite skills to meet the rigorous deployment timeline demanded by the increased reliance on the Army National Guard. Funding for schools is tiered toward the ''First to Fight'' units. There are insufficient funds to maintain Military Occupational Specialty Qualification for the entire force. The requested $90 million increased to the schools funding will allow Force Support Package, enhanced Separate Brigades, and Early Deploying units to send 100% of required personnel to Professional Development and Military Occupational Specialty Qualification training. The remaining tiered units will be able to send 50% of required personnel to this training. This program is essential to the retention of quality personnel.
Special Training is currently funded to $28 million, which represents an 11% funding level of the Army validated requirements. The requested increase of $66 million will fully funded enhanced Separate Brigades, Opposing Forces support for Lanes Training, Combat Training Centers training, and Joint Chief of Staff exercises. It will fund 84% of operational readiness sustainment requirements such as planning, support of training exercises, preparations for operational missions, and Readiness for Mobilization Exercises. This program is critical to providing forces trained to perform their assigned wartime missions.
Bonuses are currently funded to $127 million, an 88% funding level of the Army validated requirements. With an addition of $18 million, the program will be funded to 100% of requirements. This program covers the Health Professional Bonuses, the Montgomery GI Bill, the Enlisted Recruiting Bonus, the Student Loan Repayment Program, and Separation Pay. The increased funding for this program is essential to maintain End Strength and meeting the Chief of Staff, Army's quality goals.
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR
USE AND COST OF THE RESERVE COMPONENT
Mr. TAYLOR. I am curious in your opinions how many Guardsmen it would take to be activated on an annual basis, either as individuals or by unit, that would make a discernible difference as far as freeing up the regular army units from being overworked. The second question is what do you think the budget number is that Congress would have to appropriate in order to accomplish that?
General BRAMLETT. The Army is using the Reserve Component (RC) in virtually all current operations. The unbudgeted costs resulting from the use of the RC are reflected in our supplemental request for Bosnia and Southwest Asia and in the FY99 Budget Amendment for continuing operations in Bosnia. The costs of future operations are dependent on a large number of variables such as the type of unit required, pre and post mobilization training time needed, length of the deployment, and equipment required. Each operation must be considered individually in order to provide the best package of forces considering also the time available to prepare for the mission, skills available in each component, CINC requirements, and other demands on the force. Our ability to forecast costs to use the RC will continue to be refined as the nature of our future missions becomes more evident.