Segment 2 Of 2 Previous Hearing Segment(1)
SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
Page 6 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
RESERVE COMPONENT ISSUES FROM THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW
House of Representatives,
Committee on National Security,
Military Personnel Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, July 29, 1997.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Buyer [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. STEVE BUYER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM INDIANA, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. BUYER. This hearing of the National Security Subcommittee will come to order. Today's hearing is part of an extended effort by the House National Security Committee to understand the process and rationale behind the manpower, force structure, and other decisions announced in May as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review, or the QDR. With the announcement of those results, there was an explosion of criticism and analysis that ranged from the thought provoking and insightful and contradictory and confusing, so we wanted to have this hearing today.
Page 7 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
From that standpoint, that is the purpose. We ultimately have to make decisions regarding the manpower and force structure. The challenge is to cut through the profusion of the QDR criticism and to first understand the what and the why behind the QDR decisions, and second, come to reasonable judgments as to whether the QDR decisions will produce the total force that is sized and shaped to meet the military requirements of the national security strategy.
To that end, this hearing seeks to understand how the analysis of strategy, threat, resources, and missions by the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the services drove the Reserve component manpower and forces decisions of the QDR. Were these decisions to reduce Reserve component manpower more the result of strategy or were they mostly a product of a driving need to find defense savings or a blend of both?
Given the explosive reaction to the QDR recommendations regarding the Army Reserve components, particularly those of the Army National Guard, I intend to spend a significant amount of time today in an effort to understand the rationale for these decisions. I would also hope to clear up the great deal of uncertainty as to exactly what agreements were reached as part of the recent Army off-site review.
Before I introduce today's first panel, I would yield to the ranking member, Mr. Taylor, for any remarks he may wish to make.
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a statement that, if you do not mind, I would just like to enter into the record.
Page 8 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. No objection.
Mr. TAYLOR. If you do not mind, I would like to compliment you on calling this hearing. In the relatively brief time that you and I have been in Congress, we are now on our fourth Secretary of Defense. Each one has a significantly different vision from the last, but each in their decisions causes some people who had hoped to have a career in the military to lose that opportunity and sometimes what one does is completely reversed by the next, but those people who have left the service as a result of the first do not get a second chance.
I hope this committee will take a look at the recommendations of the QDR and what this panel has to say, but I would hope that we would act with a bit more than institutional memory than I have unfortunately seen since I got here to Congress.
I would also like to mention, Mr. Chairman, I regret that Ms. Debbie Lee was not allowed to testify. I do think that, given her position in the Pentagon, that it would have been very much appropriate for her to be here today. I regret that she was not allowed to testify, but you are the Chairman and that decision is yours. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Taylor can be found in the appendix on page 59.]
Mr. BUYER. Thank you. With regard to panel two, I would say to Mr. Taylor, I wanted to make sure that we had the relevant players with regard to the off-site and that was headed by Ms. Lister, not Ms. Debbie Lee.
Page 9 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Before I take testimony, it is my intention to swear all witnesses at today's hearing. I ask the witnesses on this panel to please rise and raise your right hand and I will administer an oath to all three panels today.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Thank you. Please be seated.
I understand that the first panel today will provide both the Department of Defense and the Joint Staff views on the QDR. I welcome the Honorable Edward L. Warner, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements; also Mr. William J. Lynn, the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation of the Department of Defense; and Lt. Gen. David McCloud, U.S. Air Force Director, this is the J–8, for the Force Structure, Resources and Assessments Directorate of the Joint Staff.
Secretary Warner, I understand that you will make the opening statement for all the witnesses, is that correct?
Mr. WARNER. It is, sir.
Mr. BUYER. You may proceed. We will operate today under the 5-minute rule.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD L. WARNER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR STRATEGY AND REQUIREMENTS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM J. LYNN, DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; AND LT. GEN. DAVID J. McCLOUD, DIRECTOR, FORCE STRUCTURE, RESOURCES AND ASSESSMENTS, JOINT STAFF, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Page 10 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Secretary WARNER. I, along with Bill Lynn and Dave McCloud, are pleased to be here today to speak to you about the integral role that the National Guard and Reserves play in carrying out our defense strategy and to describe to you some of the actions undertaken in the Quadrennial Defense Review with respect to the size and shape of the Reserve component forces. But to understand the QDR's decisions on National Guard and Reserve forces, let me say a few words about the broader QDR itself and the QDR process.
An analysis of the international security environment undertaken in the opening stages of the QDR concluded that between now and 2015, the United States is in a period of strategic opportunity. We anticipate that the world will remain a dangerous and uncertain place and that the United States will face a number of significant challenges, including the threat of coercion and large-scale cross-border aggression between now and 2015.
The defense strategy articulated in the QDR seeks to take advantage of this opportunity while addressing the dangers still inherent in the international environment. This strategy has three essential elements: Shaping the international security environment in ways that protect and promote U.S. national interests; responding across the full spectrum of crises in order to protect our interests, demonstrate our resolve, and reaffirm our role as a global leader; and preparing now to meet the security challenges of an uncertain future.
To ensure the success of this challenging strategy, we must draw on the integrated efforts of the entire U.S. defense team, active and Reserve forces, and civilian support personnel. In the post-cold war era, the Reserve component has remained an absolutely critical element of the total force, essential to carrying out the full spectrum of operations, from day-to-day operations that shape the environment to the smallest of the smaller-scale contingency operations, and, if necessary, in the event of major theater war. Reserve forces are a vital part of all war plans. No major operation undertaken by the Department can be successful without them.
Page 11 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
From the outset, Secretary Cohen insisted that our defense strategy drive the QDR process. Secretary Cohen and Deputy Secretary White also emphasized, however, the need for realism regarding assumptions about future resources. In particular, they stressed the need to have a fiscally responsible analysis in order to produce a timely and relevant product. We thus constrained our review of alternatives, or paths, for fulfilling the QDR strategy to those that were feasible within the projected level of defense spending over the next several years, roughly $250 billion in constant fiscal year 1998 purchasing power annually. This figure accords with the joint administration-Congressional commitment to balance the Federal budget by 2002 and the recently concluded budget agreement.
A focus of the QDR was to build a solid financial foundation for a modernization program that would reliably support the future warfighting capabilities called for in Joint Vision 2010, to fulfill the ''prepare now'' dimension of our defense strategy. Consistent with this goal and the overall strategy, the QDR rebalanced defense resources to provide a more stable and executable modernization program into the next century. At the same time, the QDR ensures that we maintain the capability and the readiness of the force in the nearer and mid-term so that we can successfully carry out our shape and respond missions.
Based on the defense strategy fiscal environment, a full spectrum assessment we did of the many demands that we face because of that strategy, we examined three paths that are described in the QDR report. After a broad debate, including consultation with senior Reserve component officials, the Department chose the path which most completely answered the QDR's fundamental challenge, to ensure U.S. Armed Forces are able to meet the demands of the strategy in the dangerous world in the near to mid-term and yet also prepare ourselves adequately and transform the force so it can do shape and respond activities out far into the future.
Page 12 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
The corresponding defense program delineated in the path required modest reductions in today's force structure. These reductions were concentrated at the tail or support rather than teeth or combat elements of our forces and they were accompanied by a commitment to fundamentally reengineer the Department's infrastructure and support activities to fund badly-needed increases in a focused, executable modernization program.
Across the Department, the QDR will reduce active end strength by about 60,000 personnel, Reserve end strength by about 55,000, and civilian personnel by some 80,000 by the end of the year 2003. These reductions preserve the critical combat capabilities of our military forces and reduce infrastructure and support activities wherever prudent and possible. In making the needed reductions to force structure, we were very sensitive to the fragile nature of our all-volunteer force.
The Reserve component force reductions are also driven by relevance to the projected security environment and our defense strategy. The strategy calls for wartime forces that are ready early in anticipation of the short preparation times likely in future conflicts. In peace, our commitments overseas call for forces that can deploy and remain for extended periods, the duration of which we probably will not know at the point in which we initiate such commitments.
In response to your concerns over Reserve reductions in the QDR, let me say that sustained Reserve component participation occurred throughout the QDR process at all levels of interaction. National Guard and Reserve senior leaders consulted regularly with the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Assistant Secretary in charge of that office, as well as with senior service representatives on the special QDR teams that were developed in each service. Reserve component officers also reviewed and made substantive changes to QDR recommendations as they became known. In particular, the Mobilization Assistant to the Director of the Joint Staff, a Reserve flag officer, was briefed periodically on force structure assessment and related issues and field grade Reserve officers participated directly in a wide range of service and Joint Staff deliberations.
Page 13 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
As I noted earlier, I cannot adequately stress how essential the Reserve component is to the successful implementation of our defense strategy. Those parts of the Reserve forces most relevant to the strategy were most certainly preserved and in many cases enhanced within the QDR. Let me summarize very briefly the changes in each of the four services.
The Marine Corps Reserves provide both peacetime and wartime augmentation to the active duty Marine Corps. Based on our experience since 1993, a reduction of about 4,200 marines in the Marine Corps Reserve is envisioned. The Marine Corps will conduct an explicit study to determine the exact nature of these reductions and any accompanying restructuring.
The QDR also calls for a modest restructuring of Naval Reserve forces, resulting in reductions of about 4,000 personnel.
The Air Force has the most integrated total force on a day-to-day basis. This is especially true of its mobility force associate units, where Reserve tanker and airlift personnel often work side by side with their active counterparts, even sharing the same aircraft. The Reserve fighter force has also been used extensively in many peacetime activities and contingency operations. However, some enhancements in this force, as well, are made, some reshuffling of the Air Defense Force within the Air Force Reserve component. Projected changes will reduce the Reserve component of the Air Force by about 700 personnel.
For the Army National Guard, the Bottom-Up Review identified a need for Army combat forces beyond the 10 active divisions in the event major theater wars proved more difficult than foreseen or unexpected circumstances arose that required additional ground forces. As a result, the Bottom-Up Review directed the creation of 15 National Guard brigades, now known as enhanced separate brigades, to be maintained at a higher level of readiness. The QDR reaffirmed the continuing need for these brigades and the program to create these ESB's [Enhanced Separate Brigades] is almost complete.
Page 14 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Reductions to the National Guard are made possible, nevertheless, by the changes in the security environment since the end of the cold war. Specifically, the QDR projects that no major power will have both the will and capacity to threaten the United States on a global scale before 2010 and potential threats after that are very uncertain. Therefore, the need for a large strategic Reserve via the National Guard divisions, the Army National Guard divisions, has declined, as was noted as well by the Commission on Roles and Missions.
In this context, the QDR reviewed potential missions for the Army National Guard divisions, taking as a starting point the QDR defense strategy and the projected security environment. An Army total analysis of support requirements in two major theater wars conducted in 1994 and 1995 revealed a large shortfall in combat support [CS] and combat service support [CSS] units. Some of these requirements could be filled by realigning existing CS and CSS units, but a significant shortfall still remained.
The Secretary of the Army determined in 1996 that 12 National Guard brigades from within the eight divisions of the Army National Guard should be converted from combat units to CS and CSS under what has been called the Army National Guard Division Redesign Program. This proposal was ultimately briefed to the Deputy Secretary and Secretary and approved. The QDR sustains this initiative and accelerates the planned completion of this conversion program by using savings from proposed reductions in Guard personnel. This conversion will greatly increase the relevance of these forces within the Army National Guard.
Taking into account the Army Reserve component's wartime responsibilities as well as State missions, the QDR determined that the strategy could be supported by a somewhat smaller Army Reserve and Army National Guard. The analysis indicated that a total Army Reserve component reduction of 45,000 personnel would be appropriate. Some of the savings from these reductions will, as I just noted, be applied to the combat support/combat service support conversion program aimed at making the remaining units more effective in carrying out their mission.
Page 15 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
When these reductions are completed, that is, the full set of reductions, the Army Reserve components will have been reduced 32 percent from cold-war levels compared with a 38-percent reduction in the Active Army end strength at the end of 2003, according to the plans developed under the QDR.
In closing, the integration of the Reserve components into the total force remains a bedrock of our defense posture and a major success story for the Department. Our defense strategy is dependent on their contribution across the full spectrum of operations in peacetime and in war. We will continue to evaluate the total force, refining the defense program where necessary and within projected available resources to ensure our ability to carry out the QDR defense strategy, that is, to be able to shape, to respond, and to prepare now for the foreseeable future.
Thank you very much. I have a longer statement that has been entered into the record, if it would, and we are prepared to answer your questions, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Warner can be found in the appendix on page 61.]
Mr. BUYER. Before I move into questions with regard to your statement, I have to open up and ask that you have a discussion. Mr. McHale and I will be seeing Secretary Cohen here at the end of the week and we were quite concerned yesterday, Dr. Warner. Yesterday, OMB, I suppose, put out some drops and hints to us that there would be a threatening Presidential veto of the 1998 Defense funding bill because it proposed an increase in military spending recommended over and above the President's budget. Among the objections was $850 million added to the Reserve, which would be the National Guard and Reserve component equipment account. The administration stated that, in fact, it was unneeded.
Page 16 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
I wanted to bring this to your attention to let Secretary Cohen know that when Mr. McHale and I come over for the meeting, obviously there is some delinkage here and perhaps Mr. Cohen's office is not speaking with whomever is making these Presidential veto threats when we, in fact, operate in good faith and worked with the administration to get these numbers and then all of a sudden to be slapped publicly by saying, all the good work for which you have done now may result in a Presidential veto. I will view it merely as a miscommunication. So, if you will help the Secretary in making sure that that gets clarified, I am sure all of this can be put to ease before we move into conference.
Secretary WARNER. I would be happy to relay your message to the Secretary.
Mr. BUYER. If you would, please relay that and we can resolve that matter.
One of the concerns I have, and let us just start here from the beginning, and that is, I want to understand who are the players. I will cover this with each of the panels because when I read all the statements, some were saying this was an inclusive process and some were saying it was not inclusive. I want to know from you, when you said that there were senior-level players, who participated in this QDR process from the Reserve components. Do you know? Does anyone have a list of these names of the individuals who participated and at what level?
General MCCLOUD. We can provide a list for you. I can assure you that when we worked with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, there was representation at all levels. This really was a complex process that started at the action officer level with majors and lieutenant colonels and commanders all the way up through flag officer rank and senior civilians.
Page 17 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
In my staff alone, in J–8, I have eight Reserve component members full-time working day in and day out. Most of those were involved in the QDR process. Up through the higher levels, when we got into the panels, the integration group, there was senior-level representation there in everything that we did.
Mr. BUYER. You can have everyone at the table.
General MCCLOUD. I understand.
Mr. BUYER. You can say that it is open and it is balanced, but if someone plays hide the ball, how open is it? Was there any of that going on with regard to the numbers?
General MCCLOUD. I do not think there was. I think that if we failed to communicate in the process and somebody felt slighted because they were left out of the process, then it is a process problem. There was not an intent to do that. We certainly tried to be inclusive.
One of the things we went into this QDR doing and attempting was to keep it an open process and that meant that everybody would play in it that needed to play in it and there was a wide range of folks at all levels that, I think, played very successfully.
So, I think the outcome was good. I think it was representative, gave this broad look. I think there was representation from not only the Guard, Reserve, but also the active side and I think it was pretty well balanced.
Page 18 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. From the Marine Corps Reserve, when all was said and done, what was their reaction? Did they feel good about what had happened or did they step forward——
General MCCLOUD. Sir, I do not think anybody felt good about taking downsizes in this whole review. If you stop and think about what we did within the fiscal bounds of the QDR, as Dr. Warner alluded to, the $250 billion in constant buying power, what we sought to do was conduct a strategy within those constraints, those fiscal constraints. We knew that we had a problem in modernization. We knew we were not paying our modernization bills like we needed to. That meant adjustments of accounts internally in every service, every component, and then adjustments to programs, modernization programs. It meant adjustment recommendations on infrastructure.
So, nobody came out of this a winner. We all tried to live within those fiscal bounds and make the tough decisions. When you make tough decisions, you are not going to have happy people.
Mr. BUYER. I guess what I should have said when I framed the question, the Marine Corps felt as though they were participants and they were players and so they walked away from the table saying, we got the best we got?
General MCCLOUD. I think they would say—I hope they would say, anyway, that——
Page 19 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. Not hope, but what they would say. Are you aware of any reaction that they may have given to you? No?
General MCCLOUD. I have not talked to them personally.
Mr. BUYER. How about from the Air Force Reserve?
General MCCLOUD. All I can tell you is in the process, they played, their voice was heard, and the end result, I did not go back and personally talk to a Reserve component person. We looked at this from a total force concept and we——
Mr. BUYER. I just am curious here about if you sit at the table and you work things out with individuals and then they walk away from the table, whether 1 week or 2 weeks later somebody comes back and has conversations with you about the product, and that is what I am just curious about is their judgment of the product now, whether they felt good about it, not good about it. They were a participant there. That is what I am just curious about.
General MCCLOUD. I personally did not get that feedback.
Mr. BUYER. All right. What about from the Air Guard? Did you get any feedback from anyone?
General MCCLOUD. When we produced the product in QDR and the recommendations out of the OSD, the Joint Staff side, those were really handed over to the services and when they are handed over to the services, we handed that information, those insights, to the experts. The experts, the services, took that information and sometimes came back and said, we have a better idea. We think we can still do the strategy within those fiscal bounds and we have a better idea. We listened. We bounced that back against a strategy and in almost every case it seemed reasonable.
Page 20 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
An example, the Air Force and the Air National Guard. The Air Force and the Air National Guard came back and said, we do have a better idea. We can take latest model F–16's out of the active inventory, shift them to the Reserve component, change the nature, change the mission of those squadrons from air defense to general purpose, and that seems reasonable. It makes those forces more relevant to the world we see ourselves living in.
Now, I did not personally go back and say to the National Guard, did you think that was a good idea, because they worked that within the service. I have to think that they came to an agreement at some point in time that that was a reasonable idea.
Mr. BUYER. That is evidence of active participation. What about the Army Guard?
General MCCLOUD. I think the Army Guard has—obviously, if you read the newspapers, there has been a dialog that has been carried out in the newspapers and I think that they are still working on that issue. That is——
Mr. BUYER. I am talking about during your process——
General MCCLOUD. During our process——
Mr. BUYER. If the Air Guard was an active participant——
Page 21 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
General MCCLOUD. Right.
Mr. BUYER [continuing]. Was the Army Guard an active participant with regard to the strategy and structure?
General MCCLOUD. They certainly were to the level that I viewed it at, that is, providing the information from the panels through the integration group, again handing that information and those insights over to the Army to work. So I would say in panel two, that is a relevant question. For the work that we did in OSD and the Joint Staff, they were represented at every meeting I went to and I think they were playing in those meetings, too.
Mr. BUYER. You see, the reason I ask you, as the J–8, that question is that there was a political stunt pulled in this town and that is to make the chief of the Guard Bureau sit at the table as part of the Joint Chiefs and part of that process was done because they were not included in a process. So that is why I am asking you that question.
There is something that must have been there or the Senate would not have acted the way they did, so I am giving you the opportunity here to clear the record. Do you believe that they were all active participants at your level?
General MCCLOUD. They certainly were at my level. The meetings I went to, whether it had been the integration group, the panels, within the Joint Requirements Oversight Council [JROC] environment, there were discussions that involved all the different components. Now, it is not just the Guard and Reserve. It is the active duty side, too, and a lot of equity is on the table. Nobody in those meetings said to me that we do not feel like we are represented.
Page 22 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. What about the Army Reserve?
General MCCLOUD. Again, I think the right people were at the table.
Mr. BUYER. Along with the other Reserve components? I could go down the line, Naval, same? All right.
Let me yield now to Mr. Taylor.
Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Kennedy has asked for the opportunity to go first so I will wait until the next Democratic spot.
Mr. BUYER. Mr. Kennedy.
Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In bringing up this issue of who participated, I was interested in getting the panel's response to the implications of these force structure changes in regard to the impact that they have on the States. Now, I do not know to what extent the States were consulted in any regard during this process with respect to the dual mission that our Guard has in the States. Knowing how much more our respective Governors are using the Guard in their States for emergencies and the like, were they consulted in this process? Was that taken into account in this process? In the chairman's questions about who was involved, that would be one of my questions, whether the State side was really heard.
Page 23 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Secretary WARNER. You will have, Mr. Kennedy—General Navas will be among the members of the next panel and in all truth, he certainly has as one of his main responsibilities to act as the intermediary and represent the Army National Guard both inward to the Pentagon and outward to the States. It is certainly my understanding that he and his staff in their involvement in the QDR continue to have that role. The specifics as to how they exercised that, I think, would be most certainly better addressed to him.
Mr. LYNN. There is one point you might add, though. It was that kind of concern that led the Secretary—it was one of the reasons that led the Secretary to ask the Army and the Guard to get together and the other Reserve components to get together in the off-site in order to take account of the whole variety of concerns, but that was one of the paramount ones, is that rather than identify specific reductions in the context of the QDR where it was difficult to take account of those State interests, that was delegated, as it were, to the off-site process where you are able to take account of that kind of issue, the point being the QDR set a general target and the details of that were to be worked out by the active Army and its Reserve components and with explicit recognition that that would take into account the concerns of individual States.
Mr. KENNEDY. Good. I hear the response and it sounds to me like you said that the broad goals and objectives were set and they were set for the QDR, but there is this off-site consideration, but that is where it falls, as a sort of an off-site consideration. It is not factored into the decisionmaking with respect to the reductions in resources for the National Guard. I mean, it did not seem to me with the OPTEMPO locally with these Governors using the Guard so much more and frequently that that was really part of the process. I mean, it was insofar as it was referenced in an off-site process of consultation——
Page 24 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. Will the gentleman yield to the chair for just a moment?
Mr. KENNEDY. Yes.
Mr. BUYER. Based off your question, I want to make sure I understand. With regard to force structure of the Guard components, I guess this would be the Army Guard, driving force structure is the Federal mission first? Is that what is usually the predicate? The war fighting requirement drives the force structure, not a State requirement? I guess maybe I should be asking General Navas, but is that my understanding? If you do not know——
Mr. LYNN. I think within the Department and within the QDR, I think that is right, but it was specifically noted in the briefings to the Secretary that there is another mission or another set of missions that are domestic and that are run by the States and those two need to be taken account of.
Mr. BUYER. As I understand, so I am clear on what Mr. Kennedy's questions are, with regard to force structure, it is the war fighting force structure, the Federal missions that drive it, yet QDR and in the statements come forward and say that you are committed to maintaining the National Guard at a sufficient strength to meet its State missions.
Secretary WARNER. We said both.
Page 25 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. Thank you.
Secretary WARNER. We say that they must be able to meet most missions.
Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. BUYER. Mr. Taylor.
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the time that remains, I yield to Mr. McHale.
Mr. BUYER. Mr. McHale is now recognized.
Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, good afternoon. I think it is important that we be candid in addressing these issues and I guess I have to begin by saying that someone is not telling me the truth. That someone is a general officer. The only question at this point is his or her identity.
Let me preface my remarks by saying that I do not support the Senate legislation. I do support the total force concept as announced by Melvin Laird back in 1971 and I think the Senate legislation recently passed would go a long way toward the destruction of that concept. It would divide our Army into component parts and do so not only informally but formally in terms of the structure of our land forces. I think it is extremely misguided legislation.
Page 26 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Having said that, and I suspect the words that I have just spoken are words with which you would probably agree, I am not at all convinced that the Guard was a full player in the drafting of the QDR, and General McCloud, I have to tell you, I am not satisfied by the responses that you gave earlier in attempting to describe the participation of the Guard in that process.
So let me ask you, this is a followup and I am going to press for an answer on this, it is a followup to a question presented to you by Mr. Buyer. Who were the general officers of the Guard who participated in the design and drafting of the QDR? You indicated in your testimony that ''When we produced the product, meaning the QDR, the meetings that I went to, the right people were at the table.'' Who were the right people and please identify the general officers from the Guard who personally participated in those meetings.
General MCCLOUD. For the Reserve component——
Mr. MCHALE. Guard officers, General.
General MCCLOUD. Major General Davidson for the Reserve component. By that, I mean the Guard and the Reserve.
Mr. MCHALE. And what service does he come from?
General MCCLOUD. He comes from U.S. Army and he is—he works for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was at the meetings at my level, again, is what I was referring to, and that was up through the panels, the integration group. He was there at the meetings and representing.
Page 27 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. MCHALE. I understand. I am not attempting to deceive you in any way. Let me put this in context. Guard officers at the general level have told me point blank that they were not participants in the process. The thrust of your earlier testimony would contradict that by implying, though not stating, that the Guard was given a full opportunity to participate. I am simply trying to find out the truth. Who were the Guard officers who participated in the design and implementation of the QDR?
General MCCLOUD. Sir, I do not know of any Guard officer at the general officer rank that participated. I do know of the one that was representing the Guard and the Reserve and that is the one that I just mentioned.
Mr. MCHALE. All right. But without debating the facts for the moment, to the best of your knowledge, no Guard general officers directly and personally participated?
General MCCLOUD. Not that I know of. Do you, Bill?
Mr. LYNN. I think you would have to know what involvement they had in the Army's process. In the QDR panels, there was General Davidson, as you said, and there was the Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs led by Ms. Lee and I know that in the preparation for those meetings, they had active discussions with Guard and Reserve officers. I could not identify the individuals. But the representation at the meeting was Ms. Lee or members of Ms. Lee's staff.
Page 28 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
The Guard and Reserve also would have participated in the service preparation of their proposals and the service preparation in the panels and for that you would have to, I think, speak with each of the individual services to get that kind of participation.
Mr. MCHALE. All I am getting to is, General, you indicated earlier that the right people were at the table——
General MCCLOUD. Right.
Mr. MCHALE [continuing]. And I am simply trying to clarify as a matter of fact whether or not any of those people were general officers from the National Guard.
General MCCLOUD. Sir, the answer is yes and General Davidson was Guard—is Guard, not Reserve, as I had stated. But he is the advisor to the chairman for Reserve component, so he was Guard and he is Army Guard.
Mr. MCHALE. The reason why I pursue this is I have been told point-blank with considerable frustration by general officers in the National Guard, and there are not many of them, that they were not given a full and fair opportunity to participate in the process and that that frustration was a major motivation behind the consideration of the Senate legislation.
You are hearing from somebody who thinks that was an inappropriate response. I do not like the Senate legislation. I will vote against it in the House. But I am trying to determine whether or not the frustration was justified even if the response was not and I am not yet convinced that in the drafting of the QDR the National Guard was given a full and effective role.
Page 29 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
I invite any comments that you might have that would reverse that judgment, but what I am hearing is that there were representatives of the Guard who fully participated, that there were those from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs who carried that interest to the table, but I am not yet convinced that the Guard had a strong voice. Convince me.
General MCCLOUD. Sir, all I can say is that individuals and others at lesser rank were represented on the appropriate panels and meetings that we had, especially surrounding the
Mr. MCHALE. General, I thank you for your response.
My red light is on. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one other question?
Mr. BUYER. Short and tight.
Mr. MCHALE. Mr. Warner, why is the National Guard not written into any of the op plans?
Secretary WARNER. The National Guard—the Army Reserve component in the op plans—has a crucial role to play, for instance, in the enhanced separate brigades, the 15 brigades. The Army has concluded with regard to the National Guard itself that its greatest need even from the National Guard is to get more combat support and combat service support. As we successfully make the redesign conversion to the more needed service support and combat service support elements, those, like the Army Reserve combat support and combat service support, will be integrated in the war plans from the very outset.
Page 30 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. MCHALE. Mr. Warner, I understand that. I understand the separate brigades and I understand the combat service support. My question really is, why are the combat units from the eight Guard divisions not written into any of the op plans?
Secretary WARNER. Quite simply because of the time lines that are currently involved and the potential conflicts that we currently envision. Those time lines are such that the combination of the Active Forces for ground forces, for Army ground forces, backed by the separate brigades represent the first line and, if you will, second line of the likely combat.
This does not mean, by the way, that Army National Guard forces might not play a role in the event of a major theater war. Army National Guard units could be used to backfill active units that are moved from one theater to another, to sustain presence, to carry out smaller scale contingencies, if necessary. They could be used to help push out, as they say, to do the necessary mobilization and preparation, for instance, of the enhanced separate brigades.
So while it is not the case that combat forces from the Army National Guard are envisioned as going to fight the regional theater wars, they are envisioned as potentially contributing to the broader defense effort that would accompany those wars, particularly if we were confronted by two of them.
Mr. MCHALE. Inevitably, if they are not written into the op plans, there will be a challenge to the wisdom of funding their combat training. I, for one, would simply close by saying that I think it is absolutely imperative that we have a warfighting responsibility assigned to every unit that we fund. So long as we do not give them an assignment, justification for their funding is very much in doubt.
Page 31 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BUYER. I appreciate the gentleman's contribution.
I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.
Secretary Warner, I tried to jot down some numbers that you were giving in your testimony. You are projecting cutting the Reserves in the Marine Corps by 4,200, was that the number?
Secretary WARNER. I think the number is 4,100, sir. Let me get it. It is 4,200. I am sorry.
Mr. BARTLETT. Forty-two-hundred, and the Navy is approximately 4,000?
Secretary WARNER. It is around 4,100.
Mr. BARTLETT. The Navy?
Secretary WARNER. Forty-one-hundred.
Page 32 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BARTLETT. And the Air Force, around 700?
Secretary WARNER. Yes.
Mr. BARTLETT. And the Army, 45,000?
Secretary WARNER. Yes.
Mr. BARTLETT. I have gotten the total force of the Guard and Reserve. For the Army, it is about 577,000. That is the sum of the Guard and Reserve. For all the other forces put together, it is about 321,000. If I do a simple division, I find that the recommendation is to cut eight percent of the Army Reserve and Guard and to cut less than three percent of the Reserve and Guard forces in the other services.
My question is, this is not the first time that the total force has been looked at and a proper balance and I am wondering what went wrong in previous analyses that we now have to conclude that we have to cut the Army Guard and Reserve three times deeper than we cut the Guard and Reserve from the other services.
Secretary WARNER. The main issue there, sir, is, of course, this question of the Army National Guard combat divisions, the eight divisions, and the discussion we just had about their relative role. The primary justification for those combat forces has been to act as a strategic reserve, that were we to get engaged in some kind of particularly lengthy and large-scale conflict, that these elements represent yet another echelon, if you will, of available force.
Page 33 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
As I noted in my statement, it was our judgment that in light of the kind of conditions that now prevail in the post-cold war world and those we anticipate over the next 15 years or so that the need for as large a Strategic Reserve is not as great. So it was specifically related to the relevance of the various components, active and reserve, to the envisioned defense strategy that recommendations were made about cutting in both the Active Force and the Reserve Force and, for that matter, in the civilian component.
It was this reassessment of the role of the Strategic Reserve that leads us to believe that the cuts in the Army, and not all 45,000, the current envisioned distribution is, I think, 38,000 and 7,000, 38,000 in the Army National Guard and 7,000 in the Army Reserve. But the preponderance, then, came out of the Army National Guard and it had to do with the reassessment of the needs for a Strategic Reserve.
Mr. BARTLETT. Since the international situation has not changed materially in the last several years and since the Army Guard has expressed some real concerns about their presence in these negotiations, I think that it is incumbent on us to understand the rationale that results in three times the cut of the Reserve and Guard, the Army Reserve and Guard, as compared to the cut in the Reserve and Guard of the other services. Do you not think that this kind of makes the Army Guard's point that they did not have a presence at the table?
Secretary WARNER. Because I believe that there was a strong logical basis for that, I do not believe that it makes that
Mr. BARTLETT. But you would agree that people who were not privy to the details of these negotiations could look at these numbers and at the concern of the Guard and conclude that the Guard may have some basis for their concerns?
Page 34 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Secretary WARNER. With as large as the cuts that are proposed, they most certainly really, as General McCloud indicated, will have concerns, do have concerns. I believe we still sustain a quite large Army Reserve component, an Army National Guard component, and I believe we will use the off-site process to make the appropriate judgments on how to take the what I believe are justifiable reductions.
Mr. BARTLETT. If, in fact, these cuts are justified by the analyses, then I think that we need to do a better job than we have done so far in articulating this because I know that the Guard wants to be a responsible player and I am concerned about their concerns when I look at the enormous disparity in these cuts.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BUYER. Thank you.
Mr. Graham, the gentleman from South Carolina is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
For what it matters, being an Air Guardsman, I have been told by the Air Guard that they are pretty pleased. That is the information that I have gotten back. The Army is not pleased.
Tell me, The Congressional Budget Office, (CBO) says that you can save $500 million if you merge the Reserve component and the Guard component into one component in the Army. Does anybody have an opinion on that?
Page 35 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. LYNN. I have not looked specifically at the CBO numbers. There might be some savings there, but the Guard and Reserve perform quite different missions. The Guard report both a Federal mission as well as a State mission. The Reserve works solely in the Federal mode. So to combine them, you would have to either eliminate the Army Reserve, which I think you should ask the next panel, but I think the Army would have tremendous problems with it. I think that they think that the integral relationship between those components is extremely important in terms of accomplishing in particular the combat support and service support mission where the Reserve is heavily concentrated in.
Equally, I think the Guard would have—I think the States would have a problem giving up and relying entirely on the Federal side to provide assistance where the Guard now performs that role for the States. So there may be some savings, and we could take a look at that for you. You would certainly give something up in order to get that savings.
Mr. GRAHAM. Does any member of the panel support the idea of merging the two groups?
Secretary WARNER. I do not, sir.
Mr. LYNN. No, sir.
General MCCLOUD. No, sir, I do not.
Mr. GRAHAM. If that is the case, then we are going to have two different branches of the Reserve component for the Army.
Page 36 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
One thing I learned being in the Air Guard, if you are not tasked to go to war, it is hard to get the training. It is hard to get the support. It is hard to get the morale built to come and do the drills every weekend. That disturbs me greatly. It is the first I have heard of this. If we are not part of the team that goes and fights America's enemies, who reached that conclusion and tell me again why.
Secretary WARNER. The conclusion has been reached over the last several years, the last many years, as best I understand it, certainly since the end of the cold war. In the cold war period, because one envisioned at least the potential for a lengthy battle with the Soviet Union and its allies, the idea that virtually everyone might get into that one was not hard to imagine.
In the wake of the end of the cold war, with the kind of theater wars we might confront in the Persian Gulf region or on the Korean peninsula, the time lines associated with those wars and the manner in which we would intend to prosecute them are such that it makes it very difficult. That was the whole reason that we went to the enhanced separate brigade within the Reserve component, within the National Guard component, in order to get 15 brigades that would be in a position where, within 90 days after mobilization, they would be ready to be deployed and to enter into the battle.
So those brigades expressly and in an initiative that was begun under the Bottom-Up Review and is being sustained, are designed to give us an additional set of ground combat forces and they are——
Page 37 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. GRAHAM. How did that do? How did that play out in the Persian Gulf?
Secretary WARNER. That initiative came in 1993. That came a couple of years after the Persian Gulf war, sir.
Mr. GRAHAM. How many Reserve members of the Army participated in the Persian Gulf?
Secretary WARNER. I do not have those numbers. Let us be clear, by the way, that there are many, many Army Reserve component individuals and units that play integral roles in major theater wars. In the combat support/combat service support, some of them need to be deployed within the opening few weeks and they would play throughout the war. So there would be tens of thousands and perhaps even more, and many tens of thousands would most certainly play in a major theater war.
Mr. GRAHAM. When it comes time to parcel out assets, what is a good justification to make sure that the Army Guard has the most modern weapons systems to train on, given where we are at?
Secretary WARNER. We need to take the steps within the overall resources available for defense. The Army claims in their case with the first-to-fight principle, but that all elements must have, in fact, equipment and training that is appropriate for their missions.
Page 38 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you.
Mr. BUYER. I would just like to say to my colleague from South Carolina, you are asking the right questions. That is the difficulty that we are all struggling with here is if, in fact, you have a force structure that is not in a particular plan and it is not in any plan in the foreseeable future and you are going to maintain that structure, yet we are going to maintain resources on the first-to-fight categories and tiered resourcing, then you are never going to have these individuals with the right amount of equipment and you have a morale problem and then you have to begin to ask, well, if they also have some State missions, yet if the purpose of their structure is built from Federal missions and they have no Federal role, what are we doing maintaining the structure?
But there are some other questions out there that we need to explore. I would say to the gentleman, you are asking the right questions. I challenge you not to back away from that.
I now yield to the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Pickett, for 5 minutes.
Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A couple of years ago, my recollection is that there was a provision in the DOD bill asking that the Department of Defense make a study of the issue of the missions of the Guard insofar as State matters were concerned and the missions insofar as Federal matters were concerned. Do you recall whether or not that study was ever conducted or performed?
Page 39 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. LYNN. I am not familiar with the study, Mr. Pickett.
Secretary WARNER. I am not, either, sir.
Mr. PICKETT. We were also told, I recall, going back several years, that there was a synergy between the mission and size of the active duty force and the size and mission of the Reserve components, as if there was some kind of mathematical kind of relation, although we were never, to my knowledge, told just what that mysterious equation was. Can you all tell me what that is today or how these matters are determined?
Mr. LYNN. There is no magic equation, Mr. Pickett. There is, I think, a relationship in the roles and it goes back to the fundamental concept of the total force. It is one force for one mission.
The best example I can give you is the National Guard redesign, where we are trying to move the force structure that is being discussed here as not in the war plans in to move, in a collaborative way, move 12 brigades from combat structure into combat support and combat service support structure. The combat structure currently is not in the war plans. At the same time, we have shortfalls in the combat support and combat service support structure.
That rebalancing which is part of the QDR, and indeed, the reductions in the Guard that we have discussed here would, in fact, be used to pay for an acceleration of that redesign, is exactly the path we are trying to take to ensure the complete integration between all of the components in the Army.
Page 40 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. PICKETT. In the QDR, it says the following missions for the National Guard divisions, and it lists, ''provide combat support/combat service support, provide rear area security in theater, backfill in Europe and for ongoing smaller-scale contingency operations, support the rapid deployment of active units and the mobilization of the enhanced brigades, and then perform State missions.'' Has that definition of the missions of the National Guard been agreed to by the National Guard?
Mr. LYNN. I do not think it is a formal definition that has been agreed to by the National Guard, although I would suggest you ask the representatives of the next panel. It was, I think, more an informal or an analytic tool that was used to try and analyze force requirements to try and develop options and proposals in the context of the QDR and its source is really in the QDR analysis, not in an agreed statement between the Guard and the other components of the Army.
Mr. PICKETT. Secretary Warner, has there been any understanding between the active units and the Guard on this division of missions that I just enumerated?
Secretary WARNER. My sense is that they would agree that those are tasks they could fulfill. I am not sure if it is an exhaustive list. It was not negotiated as a charter between us, so I cannot state that it was that. I think it is a description of potential missions and you really ought to ask them, but I believe that it is ones that they are aware of and in different ways are prepared to undertake.
Mr. PICKETT. But if you are going to have a seamless effort on behalf of our Nation from the Reserve components and the active components, do you not need some kind of understanding as to what each one is going to be doing and how they are going to be doing it?
Page 41 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Secretary WARNER. I believe within each one of the services, in particular, which tends to, in fact, be responsible for those in detail, that there are those understandings and I think the next panel can certainly speak to those kinds of issues within the total Army.
Mr. PICKETT. You are aware that there is a certain amount of dissatisfaction with a lot of folks in the National Guard about the way this issue has been handled. What is your view of that conflict, of that lack of unanimity of opinion about how the National Guard fits into the scheme of things?
Secretary WARNER. I believe that we can do better and I believe that the Secretary and all of us are dedicated to working to enhance those relationships and to make sure that that is a more cooperative effort.
Mr. PICKETT. Is something being done to move in that direction?
Secretary WARNER. Yes. Really, it is what Mr. Lynn alluded to. The Secretary met with members of the Reserve community initially and then directed the off-site process and is most certainly directly interested in this matter.
Mr. BUYER. Thank you.
Mr. Taylor is now recognized.
Page 42 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Warner, the National Defense Panel (NDP) that was created by the QDR pointed out in their review that there is an insufficient connectivity between strategy, force structure, operational concepts, and procurement, and obviously there is a clear indication that the analysis linking these together
Secretary WARNER. I have been troubled by that statement in the NDP's report since the time it first came to my attention. I worked closely with the NDP and continue to do so since they are now in the phase where it is their turn to develop their own proposals with regard to strategy and force structure and the like as called for in the legislation of last year.
In talking to at least a few of the members, my belief is that their belief on insufficient connectivity was a disagreement on some of the particulars of the answer, of the many, many different answers in the QDR, but they chose to write a sentence that is very general in its content.
I think more they disagreed with this particular shift in the modernization program or this particular that, but they chose, in fact, to use a blanket description. I did not concur with it as a blanket description. I still do not in all sincerity believe that it is true, but I believe in that sense one should talk to Chairman Phil Odeen and his eight other independent members as to what they had in mind.
But I have been concerned by this and that is why I followed up with them and what I have consistently found, it was a disagreement with a particular sub-decision and I said, ''Gee, I wish you would have said that we agreed with the strategy,'' which they did say quite clearly, and there were certain parts of the others that we thought were not consistent with how we would have interpreted how the strategy and thrust should have been carried out, but that is not what they did.
Page 43 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. TAYLOR. I want to go to what Mr. Graham had to say and what some others have had to say and also my personal observations during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. I remember flying out at Dover AFB and the base commander meeting me at 2 o'clock in the morning just to tell me what a great job the C–141 unit out of Jackson had done. I remember getting to the Persian Gulf on July 4 and being met at the plane by Gen. Gus Paganos who proceeded for the next 4 hours to tell me what a wonderful job all the Guard units had done with regard to Supply and Services (S&S).
It does not add up to what you are trying to do. If, according to Mr. Graham, the Guard units went, they were called up, they did great, the Reserve units were not called up, and now we are going to have a rather large for S&S cut in the Guard probably in those S&S type units. So something does not add up.
I am asking a question, and this goes to Mr. Lynn. I am curious how many times the QDR Force Structure Panel met and how much of its efforts were devoted to this evaluation between the Guard and the Reserve as to who should be reduced and who should be reduced by what amount.
Mr. LYNN. The Force Structure Panel, I could not give you a number, but it met extensively. Its focus was a total force analysis and it reviewed a whole series of different proposals for addressing the strategy with different levels of force structure. The ultimate result of that was the conclusion from the Secretary that we really should not be reducing combat force structure in any substantial way and it was in that context that he went to the services and sought proposals from the services to seek ways to reduce end strength out of infrastructure, out of overhead, out of headquarters activities primarily to try to develop a shift in resources from some of the personnel and O&M accounts into the modernization accounts.
Page 44 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
As I am sure you are aware, we have had a problem the past several years where the money has eroded out of the procurement account back into the operating accounts. It was that problem we were trying to fix. We came to the conclusion out of the force structure assessment that that problem could not or should not be fixed by major reductions in the combat side of the force structure but that we needed to fix it and that the focus would have to be on infrastructure activities and overhead and headquarters activities.
In addition to that, to get to your point on the Reserve affairs, we did a separate channel look at some of the individual services. We tried to review OPTEMPO, PERSTEMPO, as well as some individual issues having to do with the Reserves, and in that context, we looked at several different options for reductions, looking at substituting Guard brigades in roles that active brigades are currently playing, to look at the National Guard division redesign and a whole variety of issues surrounding the Guard.
That panel, again, it met frequently. I would have to come back to you with an actual number, but it was a substantial number of hours went into that analysis.
Mr. TAYLOR. I would be remiss if I failed to somehow make note that I am very much disappointed in the last few years with a lack of continuity on the part of the Department of Defense planning. That involves people who are willing to serve their country who, because of the change in designation of their units, have found themselves—they might have been a great truck driver, they might have been a great mechanic, but at 55 years old, they figure they are a little too old to be jumping in and out of Bradleys. Now, a few years later, we are going to take these units that we have switched from S&S units to cavalry units back to S&S. I would be very much remiss if I did not say that shows very poor planning on the
Page 45 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Having said that, what confidence do I have that if your recommendations now are enacted, I will not be facing another panel 2 years from now that comes up with a plan that is very much 180 degrees opposed to this plan? What confidence do I have, having heard this? Dr. Warner, you said we see no real threat until the year 2010. Did you see Panama coming? Did you see Desert Storm coming? Did you see Bosnia coming?
Secretary WARNER. I said——
Mr. TAYLOR. I am just saying, you are asking us to make very drastic changes involving, in this instance, I think, 45,000 National Guardsmen when your record of continuity is pretty poor, and I am talking not you in particular but Department of Defense-wide.
Secretary WARNER. To clarify what I said for a moment about the international environment. It is a very uncertain environment. We believe it will remain a dangerous and unstable environment and we will have many challenges of the type you noted, that is, major theater war-size and certainly what we called smaller-scale contingencies, some of which can be pretty substantial undertakings. So in that area, we predict a world that will continue to be troubling and which the United States in various cases will be called upon, mostly to act in concert with others to seek to respond.
So we do see that. It was precisely that kind of environment that leads us to try to sustain a very substantial active combat force and support force and a Reserve component that can assist in meeting those challenges.
Page 46 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
All I talked about that we did not see a global peer competitor of about the magnitude we are somewhere on the world stage and that, we cannot be certain for a long period, but it looks like it will take at least, most experts believe, out to 2010 for that to really emerge. But that is the only point——
Mr. SKELTON. Would you yield on that point?
Mr. TAYLOR. Certainly.
Mr. SKELTON. Adolf Hitler took over in January 1933 and he was at war in September 1939. That is not very many years. I think what we had better be better at is having the capability on the shelf, realizing that these peer competitors can rise very, very, very quickly, and we can go down and name them, which I do not want to do in public, but this 2010 business kind of upsets me a little bit when, in truth and fact, I know and you know that that may very well come to pass far sooner than that. Thank you for yielding.
Mr. TAYLOR. One last thing, and I would merely say it for the benefit of those in the room in hopes that they could kind of solve some of this problem without congressional input. I think by their own admission the Army will tell me that they do a pretty poor job of lobbying Congress. I think by their own admission they will also tell you that second only to the U.S. Marine Corps, the Army National Guard does a wonderful job of lobbying Congress. I would think it would be in both of their best interests to mend some fences and come to this Congress with a united front for the best long-term interest of the U.S. Army and the defense of this country.
Page 47 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BUYER. Mr. Underwood is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. UNDERWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just have a brief comment in support and I will yield the time to Mr. McHale to ask a couple of follow-up questions, but I, too, want to express my personal concern. Others have mentioned it already, about the level of consultation with the National Guard and their inclusion in the process which some members of the Guard, various members of the Guard have talked to me personally about and I want to express my concern about that.
The point that not having a personal military background but having had through efforts in this committee and, of course, Mr. Taylor alluded to the fact that the National Guard are great lobbyists and so have become quite familiar with National Guard activities, particularly from back home.
The point about relevance and irrelevance and how their non-inclusion or their inclusion in operational plans affects their efforts and affects their morale and affects their effectiveness, I would certainly like to reemphasize and support the point that if you are going to field these units, that they ought to be included in operational plans and certainly they ought to be supported as such. Otherwise, it is a kind of a no-win situation and when the time comes, I do not think they are going to be of any service to this country, certainly not to the level that we expect and certainly that they could provide, given the proper support.
Page 48 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
I would like to yield to Mr. McHale.
Mr. MCHALE. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Warner, I have enormous respect for you personally and I hope you know that, and to General McCloud, let me simply indicate that what I feel toward our men and women in uniform is beyond admiration. It is genuine affection for the men and women who daily sacrifice their comfort and in war sacrifice their lives for our security, which is why the statement I am about to make is so difficult.
We have a total force Navy. We have a total force Marine Corps. We have a total force Air Force. We do not have a total force Army yet. There are those, I have to tell you, at the very highest ranks on active duty in the Army and the National Guard who have a judgment toward one another that could not be more negative. They despise one another. They
You must address that. I cannot underestimate how sharp that division is and how counterproductive it is to the concept of a total force, as announced by Melvin Laird some 26 years ago. If there are some general officers either on active duty or in the Guard who do not understand or accept the total force concept, it is time for them to move into retirement so that the rest of us as a Nation can have a single land battle force that reflects a unity of command and a commonality of purpose and commitment. I do not mean that to sound like a speech, but that is where we have to be in the not-too-distant future.
I do not believe that the active duty Army has made decisions in terms of training and equipment consistent with the principle of total force. Mr. Warner, for instance, on page five of your testimony, you talk about the importance of the enhanced separate brigades. Those brigades came into being with the Bottom-Up Review in 1993. Are you aware that of those 15 enhanced-readiness brigades, critical force enhancements, only 2 of the 15 have been through Fort Polk or the NTC since they were created? Are you aware that this year, none will go through the NTC, and are you aware that if the rotation schedule is implemented, next year, as planned, an enhanced brigade through the Guard will go through the NTC on average once every 8 years when its active duty counterpart goes through similar training once every 2 years?
Page 49 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Our rhetoric does not match our reality, and I am convinced, as was said earlier by one of my colleagues, until the Guard is written into the op plans, resourced and trained accordingly, they will be extraneous to our national defense. I would invite a comment from Mr. Warner on all of the remarks that I have made but particularly the enhanced readiness brigades. How can we say they are the cutting edge of our defense, absolutely essential in a second Major Regional Contingency (MRC), and then rotate them through the NTC once every eight years?
Secretary WARNER. I would be happy to look into those figures. I was not aware of them and the ones that you cite. As I have talked to the Army about following through on the enhanced separate brigades, I have had a sense that we were moving smartly and usefully in this direction. I will be happy to take that information and continue the dialogue on those matters.
I think that the enhanced brigades are an important addition already, will become better as we get them fully fielded. I think we will need to have adequate training. I would be happy and will talk to the Army about the plans in this regard.
Mr. MCHALE. You will find the rhetoric to be reassuring. I urge you to ask tougher questions that are factually based so that you find out that when you are told, these soldiers are a critical force enhancement, they are to be ready for deployment within 90 days of activation, we cannot fight without them, ask how often they go through the NTC. Ask when the last time occurred that any 1 of these 15 enhanced brigades even went to the field as a maneuver element. Make sure that the training and equipment matches the rhetorical assurance.
Page 50 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BUYER. Thank you.
I just have one last question before we go to the next panel. Dr. Warner, you mentioned the geostrategic environment. That is a nice word. Trying to think outside the box, and that is what I am curious. A lot of us were looking for the QDR process to be an exciting process of thinking outside the box. I was one who was very hopeful of that. I even think that perhaps even the Guard was hopeful of that because the Guard, and to include not so much just the Army Reserve but in particular the Guard, thinking of what are new roles, what are some new missions, how can we be more an active player, let us be more mirrored to the active component, let us not always be looked at as second. Well, if we need you, we will call you.
So I am curious, you have stimulated my thought when you said this new geostrategic environment, and you are right. There is this new global shift and we have to recognize and think differently. We always refer back to Desert Storm, that old cliche, you cannot fight the next war like you fought the last, and that is all true. So how do we prepare ourselves for those new peer threats that got Ike Skelton all excited about? How do we prepare for that?
So I am curious, when you sat down with your force structure panels and whether these issues about moving from heavy divisions to light divisions was actually to respond to that, since you had a Guard general at the table. Give me some input. Did you have to think in the box because you were restrained by two MRC's and a budget or did you try to think outside the box?
Page 51 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Secretary WARNER. Let me take a shot at it. I would be happy to have my colleagues join me.
I think we did try to think across, in the box and outside of it. When we looked at the strategy and did the shape, respond, and prepare now for the future, in the shape part, we wanted to emphasize the importance that American military power makes in the general security environment
We see that shaping done by our forward deployed forces in Europe and in the Far East, by our rotationally deployed forces, by our periodically deployed for exercise type of forces. The special operations forces day to day do what they call JSET's, these small exercises in many parts of the world and help shape that environment in useful ways. There is just a host of initiatives in that.
In even those kinds of activities, we have integrated, given the kind of demands for operations and personnel tempo, we have integrated reserve forces in helping to carry out some of these types of activities. In the smaller scale contingencies, which we covered everything from noncombatant evacuations, which we have been doing about one a month for the last few, or at least preparing for one a month for about the last 4 months, and we tend to do five, six, seven of these a year. We do various other types of operations. They can be various types of peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, other kinds of limited uses of force.
In that area, the Reserve component has helped sustain our presence in areas like our activity for no-fly zones in the Persian Gulf region, our activity over Bosnia. In the peacekeeping operations, we have used the Reserve forces to do a rotation on the multinational force observers in the Sinai and we are looking for the potential use of them in other types of operations, including the one currently underway in Macedonia, where we contribute one battalion.
Page 52 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
So we looked in the force itself in and out of the box and the total force, both active and reserve. In the major theater wars, we put most of our discussion here on the roles there, the early deployers, the later deployers, the component that stands behind that in case wars go poorly and we need additional force.
We think in all three areas, in both shape and respond, the total force plays a day-to-day role and would be expected to play a role in the future. To prepare now for the future was our emphasis on trying to reshape the force, active and Reserve, to take advantage of new technologies, new operational concepts to pursue the revolution in military affairs and to support a modernization program that would provide the new technologies which, in turn, you can embody with new concepts.
Mr. BUYER. At your level, was there an endorsement, then, of this reconfiguration of the eight Guard divisions from heavy to light?
Secretary WARNER. There were a variety of things looked at about the character of the Guard, including the Guard divisions. I would have to go back in to see what the specifics are.
Mr. LYNN. There was a specific endorsement of the move of the 12 brigades that the Army had already been discussing with the Guard into the combat support and combat service support. There has also been some conversations between the Army and the Guard about moving some of the remaining combat forces more from heavy to light, but I would say that that discussion has not been concluded.
Page 53 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
If I could just add one thing, Mr. Chairman, I wanted to give you an example of thinking out of the box, and I think the best example in the QDR was in the area of asymmetrical threats. I think in that area, we did the most complete analysis that we have done of a campaign with weapons of mass destruction. We cannot really talk about the details here in open session, but we sent over a variety of materials to the committee just recently and we would be happy to follow up with briefings. I think that if your interest is in that kind of area, we would be happy to follow up in particular with a briefing on that as well as information operations, another asymmetrical threat area.
I might suggest to Mr. Skelton that our view was similar to yours in the sense that we have to be very wary of our inability to predict the future. I think in the QDR, our focus was more on these asymmetrical threats rather than the regional powers as the most likely source of an unpredictable threat, which is something of a contradiction there, but that was really our focus and hence we spent a fair amount of time there.
But again, in this series of materials we sent over to you, we did look in particular about a possibility of a regional great power reemerging and how our, in particular, our modernization program might be able to deal with that. Again, for, of course, all the members of the committee, but you might be particularly interested in taking a look at that analysis and see how that compares to your own thinking.
Mr. BUYER. The last thing I have, I do not know if I have ever met Major General Davidson or not, but he is a Reserve component adviser to the Joint Staff who happens to be a Guardsman, is that correct?
Page 54 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
General MCCLOUD. Yes, sir.
Mr. BUYER. All right. The last thing I am trying to get comfortable in my mind is even, let us just say even what we have coming out of this offsite agreement, if there are still some uncommitted force structure to the fight, it is the CINC's that determine or define the order of commitment, correct?
General MCCLOUD. Yes, sir.
Secretary WARNER. The chairman makes available to them a wide list of forces that are available and the CINC's work to work out their own plans for what they can utilize in order to conduct the campaign.
Mr. BUYER. Here is where my thinking is. I just want to share this. If, in fact, we have two MRC's, we always think that the MRC's will be that European or Middle East scenario or the Korean peninsula, but it could be another scenario, and each CINC is going to be a little bit different in their needs and their requirements. Therefore, we tell the CINC's, you get to determine the order of the commitments. You are there. You understand. We stand by, prepared to commit for what you need.
So I am trying to think about that. Some of my colleagues have said, well, if the Guard has a division that is an uncommitted force, then you write him into the ops plan. Well, that is not going to make a lot of sense. I do not like this. Over the years, we have seen that if you have an uncommitted structure, that it does not get its necessary resourcing and personnel dollars and all the equipment. Then, as Lindsey Graham said, it begins to affect morale. I compliment General Navas and others how they were able to maintain morale in units where they say, well, gee, I am here and I guess I am going to be called for State missions.
Page 55 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
So trying to figure out this balance from this standpoint has not been easy, let alone not being afraid to ask tough questions and then some people must think you are an insult to particular institutions. I am not. I am trying to figure out what the correct mix is.
So I like the idea of still permitting the CINC's to define the order of the commitments, but what I do not know is if the CINC's when they think about this defining the order of the commitments and they are turning it over to whomever, whether it is the Army or the Air Force or whomever to provide their needs, whether they are thinking about the inclusion of Guard in their missions. I do not know. I am not an expert on that stuff. You guys are more the experts on that. If you have any comment on that, let me know because I am just trying to figure it all out to deal with these force structure issues.
General MCCLOUD. Sir, the Guard and Reserve forces are heavily included in their war plans, now not specifically——
Mr. BUYER. I know. We are talking about a heavy combat division, for example.
General MCCLOUD. Right.
Mr. BUYER. Right now, I could understand why they say, no, I am not going to take a heavy combat division. I am going to take one that is an active because their training is going to take them longer to come up to speed, they do not have the equipment, they do not have that. Yes, because you did not give it to them. You cannot expect them to be C–1 if you are not going to train them to be C–1 and give them the resources to be C–1, right?
Page 56 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
General MCCLOUD. I understand.
Mr. BUYER. So we are always going to write them out of the plan. Well, I am trying to figure out how we can include them in the plan. That is why the first step is, we are going to make sure all those enhanced brigades are C–1 and we want to make sure they are in the plan.
Mr. MCHALE. Mr. Chairman, would you yield on that point for a moment?
Mr. BUYER. Sure.
Mr. MCHALE. I am not endorsing this proposal, but one of the proposals advocated that I have read in the past is that instead of having an eight division undifferentiated strategic Reserve, that we assign divisions within that Reserve specifically to the individual CINC's so that, for instance, a heavy division might be assigned to CENTCOM, thereby giving a sense of ownership and responsibility to the CINC who is most likely to employ that Reserve in the event that it is committed to battle. That is something you might want to explore and I would appreciate your comments on it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BUYER. We thank you for your testimony today and you are excused.
Page 57 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Secretary WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LYNN. Thank you.
General MCCLOUD. Thank you.
Mr. BUYER. I am pleased to welcome panel two, the Honorable Sara E. Lister, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; Gen. Ronald H. Griffith, Vice Chairman of the Chief of Staff of the Army; Maj. Gen. William Navas, Director of the Army National Guard; and Maj. Gen. Max Baratz, the Chief of the U.S. Army Reserve.
As with the other panels, it is my intention to swear all witnesses today at the hearing. I will ask the witnesses on this panel to please rise, raise your right hand, and I will administer the oath.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. BUYER. Thank you. Please be seated.
I will now open with Secretary Lister. You may proceed with your opening statement. Will everyone have an opening statement? Yes?
General GRIFFITH. We do.
Page 58 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
STATEMENT OF HON. SARA E. LISTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS
Secretary LISTER. Sir, thank you for inviting us to testify here today.
Mr. BUYER. Are you speaking for everyone?
Secretary LISTER. I am not speaking for everyone. In fact, we all have written statements. I would ask your permission to have mine made part of the record.
Mr. BUYER. All four statements will be part of the record and I would ask each of you, since we are under a time line of 5 o'clock, to summarize your testimony. Thank you.
Secretary LISTER. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am not even going to summarize my testimony. I think it is fairly clear that we believe the off-site was a success. We still have a lot of work to do. We intend to do that work and to have a positive result.
I believe all of us sitting at this table believe in the total force. It is sometimes hard work, especially where allocating scarce resources are involved, but I know everyone intends to make the off-site a success.
With that, if you do not mind, I will turn it over to General Griffith.
Page 59 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
[The prepared statement of Secretary Lister can be found in the appendix on page 68.]
STATEMENT OF GEN. RONALD H. GRIFFITH, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY
General GRIFFITH. Sir, thank you for the opportunity to be here today. Again, I have a statement that has been provided for the record. With your permission, I will use visual aids. I understand the time constraint and we will be brief, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Warner talked about the strategy. I will not belabor the points. We believe that the land forces, Army forces specifically, have a role to play in shaping the environment through engagement operations. As you well know, there is a lot of that being done today by Reserve component forces. Additionally, of course, is maintaining a capability to respond, if necessary, and that means to be capable to operate across the full spectrum of crisis and, of course, be capable of fighting and winning on any battlefield.
The preparing piece, in our view, depends largely on our ability to modernize our forces. As we look to the future, as we think about a Desert Storm or Just Cause in the next decade, we want to ensure that the forces that we deploy onto that battlefield have the same technology overmatch that were enjoyed by our forces both in Desert Storm and in Just Cause.
Sir, since the Berlin Wall came down, I think everyone knows that our Army has been very busy and I would emphasize this is all three components of the force. Twenty-seven contingency operations, the Army doing 60 percent in terms of the forces committed. Again, the three components heavily involved. We simply could not do our day-to-day operations without the support and full involvement of the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard.
Page 60 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
If you look at the total Army force, 54 percent—this is somewhat different from the other services—54 percent of the Army today is made up of the two Reserve components.
When you look at the force over time, you see these levels. At the height of the cold war in 1980, we had a total force of 1.35 million in uniform. The end fiscal year 1997 levels are shown on the right. Using a 1989 data point to follow the Berlin Wall, you see the percent that has been reduced since that time.
From the perspective of the fiscal year 1998 budget submission, we have just over $60 billion. Again, if you compare from the end of the cold war, you see the appropriations and how each of the components has been affected by the reduced resourcing.
As I said before, we have increased greatly the reliance on our Reserve components in recent years. The increases in the percentage of total obligation authority [TOA] allocated to these two components reflect their increased utilization. These figures do not include modernization dollars, which are depicted on the next slide.
The Reserve components of the Army have been modernized to unprecedented levels in the last several years. From fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 1998, $21.5 billion has gone to the modernization of these components. Modernization has been accomplished both through cascading of modern equipment from the active forces that were drawn down in the period following the fall of the Berlin Wall and additionally there is $500 million on average going into new procurement for the Reserve components each year.
Page 61 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Sir, we have cut my briefing short here. Excuse me. I am sorry. I guess we are going to go ahead.
Sir, on this slide, I would just ask you to direct your attention to the next to the last point on the slide, the first to fight. This is the approach that we use in equipping the force, so there is not an equipping by component. That is not the way that how we equip is decided. It is determined by the operational plans and by the way the forces are employed against those operational plans.
Here, I would emphasize, sir, in many cases, Reserve component forces, most specifically combat service support and combat support forces, are equipped earlier than our active forces because of their deployment within the operational plans.
The Army has developed a whole series—you asked about thinking out of the box. A lot of what we have done, unfortunately, does not get a lot of visibility, but there is a lot of out-of-the-box thinking that has been ongoing in recent years and I would tell you that the 12 brigade conversion that was talked to by the earlier panel was not the initiative of the active Army. That was an initiative put forward by the National Guard. It was an initiative that was proposed by the Adjutants General (TAG's) of the various States to address a longstanding combat support/service support shortfall and was an initiative on their part to help the Army to address this problem.
Sixty percent of the Army's artillery is now in the National Guard. That is a change from the cold war period. As we came out of Desert Storm, one of the things that we realized, that the U.S. Army did not have enough artillery capability in the force. We changed the allocation rules with regard to artillery supporting the maneuver forces and the National Guard has picked up that increased mission, and you would find in the National Guard today modernized and that modernization trend will continue. They are picking up——
Page 62 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. Excuse me, General. I do not mean to interrupt your statement, but earlier when you testified about the modernization dollars, are part of those dollars for this conversion to Army CS and CSS?
General GRIFFITH. Yes, sir. In fact, there is $850 million that we have—we had before the off-site $850 million that was designated to modernize those converting forces and there was an additional $850 million that was supplied in the QDR process and in the off-site process to bring on that transformation quicker.
We have other initiatives. Army Reserve, we have units in the Army Reserve that are shadow organizations to active Army units that would—for example, transportation units that have a very limited number of trucks that merge on mobilization with active Army transportation units to give us increased capability to use the transportation assets in the active force.
We are looking at aviation initiatives, where we are going to build partner units from the National Guard and the active Army so that we can keep combat helicopters in the fight 16, 18 hours a day as opposed to 10 or 12 hours a day, which was the situation in the Persian Gulf War.
Additionally, we have over 6,000 active Army officers and noncommissioned officers that are working directly with the Reserve components to enhance readiness and to hopefully improve our training capabilities.
Page 63 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
The QDR produced the following highlighted results on this chart. I would go, of course, to the drawdown which has been discussed in the earlier panel. The active Army will go from 495 to 480 in end strength, 45,000 from the Reserve component of the Army, and, of course, the civilian reductions as shown.
Mr. BUYER. How is that broken down?
General GRIFFITH. I beg your pardon, sir?
Mr. BUYER. How is that broken down?
General GRIFFITH. Sir, I will show you that on this chart.
Sir, in our QDR, during our off-site discussions, we brought to closure a definition of how we would take down the structure, as highlighted in black. The drawdown of the active Army by 5,000 in each of the years indicated, the U.S. Army Reserve as indicated, and the Army National Guard as indicated, which will carry us through the year 2000.
There was a commitment at the off-site to, obviously, support the 25,000 reduction that we were asked to take, but the definition of how we will take that reduction we simply could not get to in the time frame in which we had to do the off-site discussions and get back to the Secretary of Defense, but a commitment that we would continue the process. That is ongoing and it will be enabled by a series of analyses. The total Army analysis 2007 will be the time when we will conclude this, and sir, that will be completed—the total effort to bring full definition will be completed in October of 1999.
Page 64 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. And of your remaining 25,000, 4,000 out of these current Reserves and 21,000 out of the National Guard?
General GRIFFITH. Programmatically, that is the way it is shown, and I say programmatically because the program is also footnoted to say that we will use a total Army analysis to look at how to do that, sir. I would add, and other analyses to include work with the Adjutants Generals of the States.
Sir, in conclusion, the U.S. Army is an Army of three components. While there has been a lot of discussion around Washington, and certainly, sir, I agree with your notion that we need to get the rhetoric down and we need to demonstrate that we are a total Army, I will tell you, when you go to the field, you will see that there is no distinction between the components.
Having been a lot of years in the field, I can tell you, a commander does not care what component his soldiers come from. He does not care what component those units come from. As division commander in the Gulf war, I had about 6,000 Reserve component forces as a part of my division. The distinction of the components was lost the day they showed up in the assembly area.
So I think that while we certainly need to improve the relationship here in Washington and we need to show a greater sense of cooperation and maybe more openness, I can tell you, my judgment, that is not representative of what you find in the field with the soldiers and three components.
Page 65 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Sir, thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Griffith can be found in the appendix on page 75.]
Mr. BUYER. Thank you.
General Navas?
TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM A. NAVAS, JR., DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
General NAVAS. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, on behalf of the more than 367,000 men and women of the Army National Guard, thank you for the opportunity to participate today. I have prepared a statement and request that it be submitted for the record. However, I would like to make some comments and expand on that at this time.
We all live in interesting times. Some have said it is a curse. I would say that we have a golden opportunity to effect change. The Army National Guard, no different than the rest of the Department of Defense, is a force in transition. Our challenges and opportunities, however, are different.
We have come down from the cold war high water marks of 27 divisions in 1963 and 457,000 end strength in 1980 to a force of 367,000 at the end of this fiscal year with an evolving force structure as part of the 1993 off-site and most recently the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study as a result of the Commission on Roles and Missions. One of our guiding principles has been that the Guard would be a balanced force of combat, combat support, combat service support, and mirrors the Active Army.
Page 66 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
As we enter the period of post-QDR and NDP, we look forward to continuing our evolution to attain our vision for the future. Our vision is a relevant force, mission across the spectrum of contingencies, structured and resourced to accomplish its missions, capable and accessible when called, with trained citizen soldiers committed to preserving the traditions and values of service to our Nation and our communities.
Key to attaining this vision is a challenge of balancing the needs of the Army with the needs of our States, as the Guard has the unique role of serving two masters because of our dual role as the State's militia under the Governors and the primary Reserve component of the Army. This is the uniqueness of our role as a statutory channel of communication between the Department of the Army and the Governors of the several States and territories. We do not command at the National Guard Bureau. We are a hybrid between a staff element that provides advice, a major command that distributes resources and directives, and a liaison as we communicate with the States.
In working with the States and the Army, we are striving for better integration into the warfighting elements of the Army. The 15 enhanced brigades that we have talked here, Army Division Redesign Study, the personnel integration, 70 percent of the field artillery in the Army by the year 1999 are some examples of what accomplishments we have done thus far. Our ''Fort State'' concept, a device mentioned, an initiative to structure also our State area command and redesign our headquarters to facilitate the mobilization and demobilization are other examples of our ability and our willingness to change, but much lies ahead.
It is our vision to accomplish this change in harmony and as full partners of America's Army while maintaining our grassroots involvement with the American people, for after all, the Reserve components, both Guard and Reserve, are the link of the Army to the rest of the Nation.
Page 67 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Thank you again, sir, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Navas can be found in the appendix on page 93.]
Mr. BUYER. Thank you, General Navas.
General Baratz, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. MAX BARATZ, CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE
General BARATZ. Mr. Chairman, as the Chief of America's Army Reserve, a community-based force, I want to thank you very much for letting me testify today. I am going to be very brief, but I want to touch on three areas.
The first area I added as I listened intently to the first panel. In just a minute, I would like to talk to the integration in the U.S. Army and America's Army or the big Army. I would not like to leave here with the idea that we are not an integrated force. The strides made in America's Army over the last several years and particularly accelerated since Desert Shield and Storm are substantive and I think that both my colleague, General Navas, and I, and I have been in this uniform well over 40 years, would tell you that the Army of today as far as being integrated is nothing like it was 5 years ago, 10 years ago, 20 years ago, or 40 years ago. We have gone a long way to do that and we have a right to be proud of what we have done.
Page 68 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
The second thing I would tell you is that the process, the QDR, the last offsite or the first offsite or however you want to think of it, are always unpleasant processes. When you are in the downsizing business, I know of nobody that is pleased with the downsizing business. So it is not an easy activity.
The third thing I would tell you is that the Army Reserve since Desert Shield and Storm and the downfall of the wall has gone to great lengths to make itself a relevant community force and a relevant force of enablers for America's Army.
As the Chief of the Army Reserve, it is absolutely clear to me now as it was 4 years ago or 8 years ago when I came back to the Army as a deputy that you cannot stand in the status quo. This country has changed substantively in simple things like the discovery of the silicone chip in 1958 or in the business of digitalization or the information age. When the Wall came down, it was almost the same thing for the Army because it was leveraging already information and digitalization and the Army Reserve had to change.
I will use, if I can, a simple illustration of the changes that we have made, and before I do that, I will say one thing, that one of the reasons that we can make these changes is because of the legislation that this committee helped pass both in 1991 and 1993 which set up a Reserve command inside the Army of the United States and helped foster integration because I do not think these changes could have been made if we did not have a USARC which now exists in Atlanta.
The example I will use is our division's training. We came out of the cold war with 12 divisions training. All they did was initial entry training. It was absolutely obvious that as the world changed and as the geopolitical activity changes, as pointed out by the first panel, that you did not need 12 divisions that did nothing but do initial entry training. We took five divisions out completely. Seven divisions, we completely remodeled and you might want to think of them more as training formation than divisions because they average about 3,000 people, plus or minus.
Page 69 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
In those seven remaining divisions, they still have a latent individual training activity. They do 100 percent of the ROTC senior camps for the Army of the United States. They will do part of the training at the universities of ROTC for the Army of the United States and the cadet command will start and study this year at the campuses of South Carolina, Georgia Tech, and Central Florida, which will be expanded next year.
Finally, they do a system called TASS, which is the total Army school system, which interestingly enough is composed of what you would think of as six schools but what we in the Army call six brigades. Two of those schools or brigades are Army Guard, the School of Combat Arms and the School of Leadership, and the remaining four are Army Reserve.
These seven divisions did not exist 4 years ago, but you cannot stay in the status quo. We will have taken 111,000 people out of the U.S. Army Reserve, 111,000 before we start on the QDR. We will take 8,000 people out in fiscal year 1998 and then we will start on the QDR cuts.
So what I say to you today, again, is I appreciate the world has changed for the U.S. Army Reserve. Ninety-two percent of the Army Reserve is inside the warfight. Relevancy is not easy. Downsizing is not easy. But again, I think this has to be done because we are in the future. We are not in the past.
[The prepared statement of General Baratz can be found in the appendix on page 101.]
Page 70 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. We have a vote that is on. I would suggest we go for 5 minutes, as much as we can, since it just came on.
I would yield my time. I have a whole series of questions, but I will yield my time to Mr. Taylor, if he has any.
Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Skelton had asked to be recognized first, so I will agree with your decision. Why do we not just go ahead and vote and get back here.
Mr. BUYER. Let us vote and let us immediately return. We will stand in recess until we return from the vote.
[Recess.]
Mr. BUYER. We just concluded our votes. This hearing will come back into session. I know the rest of my colleagues are on their way, but I am going to go ahead and proceed with some questions so we can try to move this along and people can make it home with their families. We still have another panel yet to receive.
One thing I do have to ask you, Ms. Lister, when you chaired this, I read your statement and you were apparently surprised when the final QDR drawdown numbers were announced. However, you note that the QDR was an inclusive process. If so, how could the Adjutants General have been also surprised there in the end if this had been an inclusive process? I want to give you an opportunity to explain that.
Page 71 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Secretary LISTER. I think what I meant was that the QDR was an inclusive process in the sense that there were numerous working groups, committees, every kind of group you can imagine that was trying to help formulate positions on all the issues that the QDR was dealing with. My office was deeply involved. Obviously, General Garner was the lead for the Army with the Vice Chiefs.
Clearly, the Guard and Reserve both played a role in talking not only about missions they could perform on behalf of the total Army but also whatever—if cuts were inevitable, what kinds they could take, and there was a lot of dialog back and forth. But my perception was that the time line toward the end was very quick and people had different perceptions about how it was going to turn out and that led to the confusion which led to the offsite.
Mr. BUYER. I am not here to beat you up on a process. It is not very complimentary to the QDR process if, in fact, there was planning based on strategy and resources and all types of things were taken into account, and as Mr. McHale had noted, that you have got the one Air Force, you have got the one Navy, you have got the one Marine Corps. What the heck happened to the Army?
That is the reason for all the questions we have here on the Hill. So now the Army, the total Army, is under the microscope that it has never been before and you have Members asking questions when they have never seen or really paid much attention to it, like Mr. Graham and others that are saying, wait a minute. Perhaps it is an appropriate look under the microscope and that is why we are eager for the four of you and others to begin to solve and bridge the gaps here, because we are not happy with what we have seen about the comity.
Page 72 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
I just want to make sure I understand. Was there a signed agreement with regard to this offsite?
Secretary LISTER. There is no signed agreement. I think we still have some issues to work through. It was a very intense 2 days, I will put it that way, and we came out with agreement on a process and the rest of it are issues that remain to be resolved and will be resolved within the next couple of months. We are——
Mr. BUYER. Would you explain to us what that is? What we are trying to figure out, because we have seen so much with regard to memorandums that gets floated between the Reserves and the Guard and the active and you, who is saying what, whose interpretation of what happened, and if we are going to say that this is a floating document, we want to understand what the four corners are. What has been agreed to and what is still outstanding?
Fortunately, and this is a big question, fortunately, the committee staff here has put together kind of a chart for this. This is what the Army leadership understands. This is what the Secretariats understand. This is what the Reserves understand. This is what the Guard understands. Here is where we think there might be some differences between the two. Have you had an opportunity to see these?
Secretary LISTER. No, I have not, sir.
Mr. BUYER. You have not seen that? It appears that the parties agree that the Army Reserve will cut 3,000 in end strength by fiscal year 2000.
Page 73 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Secretary LISTER. That is correct.
Mr. BUYER. The Army Guard will cut 5,000 in fiscal year 1998 and 1999 and 7,000 in 2000.
Secretary LISTER. That is correct.
Mr. BUYER. And the remaining 25,000 to be determined by the Total Army Analysis [TTA]07 for years 2001 and 2002. Is that what General Griffith's testimony was?
Secretary LISTER. To be determined by a process which will end with the TAA07.
Mr. BUYER. So when the QDR came out and said 45,000 personnel reduction, 7,000 out of the Reserves and 38,000 out of the Guard, now we are saying, excuse me, that is not correct. What this will be now is this remaining 25,000 is to be decided out into the future so that we do not have this 21,000 from the Guard and 4,000 from the Reserves?
Secretary LISTER. What we have is agreement that how that
What I see is that the system works best when everybody is involved in hard decisions and we know that coming to the 25,000 is not easy because it is going to involve a lot of different elements of the total force.
Page 74 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. Why am I left with the impression that you put—you are right, it is not easy, but why am I left with the impression that you have put it off to yet another day? Why were you not able to come to a decision now? That is what the QDR process was about. I do not mean to be tough on you because I am also going to be tough here on General Griffith. How come we did not come to a decision now instead of putting this into the out years?
Secretary LISTER. I think we would have all liked to, but the fact of the matter is, we did not have much time. We had a deadline. And also, we all knew that the Army is still in a very important process of change and General Griffith can tell you more about that. But even as we speak, the Army is redesigning itself.
So in terms of bringing the Guard to where they have to be to make decisions about cuts, they need to know more about the Army of the future and be involved in seeing what that Army is going to be like because my belief is, and I think General Griffith shares this, the Guard and Reserve both want to be relevant and they want to be integrated. They both want what I believe the Congress wants and what the other services have achieved.
Mr. BUYER. I noted that the National Guard at the off-site proposed the process be guided by a set of 11 principles as a proposition. Was that agreed to at the off-site, General Baratz and General Griffith? Were those principles agreed to or was that just a proposition from the Guard?
General GRIFFITH. Sir, the 11 principles were put on the table at the end of the 2 days of discussions. We reviewed the principles together. I think we all agreed that those principles were ones that—and, by the way, there were not just principles from the National Guard. There were also principles presented from the Army Reserve. They said, as we work together in the future, these ought to be principles that guide our efforts. We all said, yes, those are worthy goals. We ought to do that.
Page 75 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
I must tell you, and I am probably going to be at disagreement with some folks sitting at this table with me, but I recall, I think, saying in that session, but we have also got to understand that there are fiscal constraints that we have got to take into account. So while these are goals that have great merit, we cannot disagree with them, they should guide our efforts for the future, again, from both of the Reserve components of the force, the fiscal reality may dictate we cannot achieve everything we want to achieve. We have had those experiences in the past.
We agreed that those would go to the Chief of Staff of the Army, to the Secretary of the Army, and to the Secretary of Defense. They were presented in those forums.
Mr. BUYER. So we can better understand this agreement, with regard to the uncommitted structure, whether it is the Army Reserves or the Army Guard, General Griffith, is it your understanding here that in this process that you are going to get to where you want to be? I do not want to be here in the year 2000 or 2002 talking about, well, we did not necessarily get there.
General GRIFFITH. Sir, the challenge we have is a very difficult challenge, to reach agreement on the additional 25,000, how we are going to achieve it. We were able in 2 days of very intensive and very tough work together in a very collegial mode arrive at how specifically we could do the first 20,000. Had we had another 3 days or another 5 days, we might have done just as you suggest.
But, sir, the issue which we have heard a great deal about here today and which I agree with is that we have got to work this as a total team and we have got to bring the team together and we have got to take on these very difficult challenges and we have got to come to closure.
Page 76 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. When the OSD testifies and when the Army testifies about moving Guard heavy divisions to light, tell me about what occurred from this off-site as to whether that, in fact, is going to be happening or not.
General GRIFFITH. Sir, you are looking at the individual who put the light notion on the board. For a long time, I felt like I have worked closely with the Army Reserve and Guard. I think I understand a lot about the two components. I think that we are going to have great difficulty as we look to the future maintaining—and I will tell you, in the Active Force, we are going to go to lighter forces. We are going to reduce the amount of heavy structure probably in the Active Army as we go to the new design, to the new force 21 design.
I think while we have been able to modernize the heavy forces of the Guard, and I think if you go out there and look at the Guard, you will find M–1 tanks, Abrams fighting systems, you will find mutiple launch rocket system [MLRS], you will find the Paladin and howitzer modern systems. Our ability in the next century to recapitalize those forces is going to be a challenge for us. I am not sure we can do it.
And also, as we look to the future and we think about the
However, after saying that, I must tell you that there was no agreement to make that move in this first off-site. There was agreement to bring that notion into the various forums that we intend to have as a total team in the future and to examine the merits of those proposals and to give them serious consideration. Two of the adjutants general who will appear on the next panel were in those sessions. They were certainly not rejected, but they were ones that said, yes, we need to think about that. We need to look at that. We need to consider that in the future, as they did the consideration of the division redesign that helped us to convert 12 brigades to very, very important combat support and service support structures for the future.
Page 77 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. We are sitting over here saying, all right, if there are some uncommitted forces, are people thinking, should they be given roles and missions, what are some plans outside the box, in the box? Then we hear the testimony from General Navas, we are a force in transition, let us take advantage of the opportunities, let us move the integration.
Now I have to ask whether you would embrace moving the combat divisions and from the Guard from heavy to light. Would you embrace that, and if so, how would you anticipate moving to light, or if you disagree in that movement, why is there hesitance from the Guard to move to the light divisions?
General NAVAS. Sir, the issue of the light divisions came during the off-site. General Griffith briefed it as a concept, as one way of adding relevance to the structure in the Guard.
We ought to operate on a principle that form follows function and we ought to find out what is the mission that these divisions are going to embrace as we move into the future and I think this is the reason why we said, let us pay the bill early in the end strength and then decide how we are going to pay the balance of the bill to see how the structure is shaped. So the first thing we ought to look at is, what is the mission that we are going to assign these divisions and then what is the structure that this unit will have.
Now, there are two concepts here. One is convert to light as the light division, like the 29th Division in Virginia, Maryland, and Massachusetts, and the 10th Mounted or the 25th, or lighter forces which the Army has traditionally been looking to go to lighter forces.
Page 78 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Now, there is a cost to this. I mean, we did a back of the envelope cost and it cost about $500 million to convert a heavy division to light because you have to take down equipment, pay second destination charges, retrain the soldiers, buy the new equipment for that unit.
So what we said is, these are great concepts to be studied, to be looked at, but definitely not something that we would decide and sign up for in a 2-day off-site. So that is the position that the Guard has maintained. We want to convert our structure like we did on division redesign. We are still yet to start the conversion of division redesign as part of the Commission on Roles and Missions report. Now we have the QDR. This is another option.
We need also to balance those two concepts because we are already converting 12 combat brigades from the Guard into combat support and combat service support which leaves behind x number of divisions. Which of those could be converted to a lighter configuration if there is a mission? I mean, these are all very valid concepts that we would like to explore.
Mr. BUYER. I can tell you, we are not going to be so happy nor interested in continuing the funding or the conversion of something that is uncommitted, so it is an appropriate question, General Navas, for you to ask. Should, in fact, we do a conversion if we do not know what the roles and missions are going to be? That is an appropriate question.
General NAVAS. Exactly, sir, and that is an appropriate question.
Page 79 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. And if you are not going to get the assignment of the roles and mission, then the very difficult challenge that we face here in the Congress is whether to continue funding or should we eliminate the structure for that kind of division.
Let me now yield to Mr. Skelton of Missouri for 5 minutes.
Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is rather interesting. I was together with another Member of Congress talking to our colleague, Floyd Flake, who is a minister up in New York. I asked him a couple days ago, I said, what was your sermon about on Sunday, and he told me that it was a sermon on what is past is past and what is here is now, using the analogy of Joseph forgiving his brothers and feeding them when they were hungry and the like.
All this is well and good and entertaining and interesting, ''who shot John.'' I do not really care. I want to know where we are going to go from here.
I feel very deeply that we have the finest Army in the world and the leadership is absolutely outstanding, and Sara Lister, I just cannot brag enough on you. I think what you do is wonderful.
The fact that you had an off-site, the fact that there evidently was not a clear understanding as to the results therefrom, the fact that we here in Congress can undo any off-site that there is, the fact that we have a future and we have a very difficult series of choices to keep this wonderful force that we have, keeping good people in the military with the shrinking active duty force. Not long ago there was testimony, we do not want to go any lower than 544,000. No lower than 520,000. No lower than 495,000. Now, of course, the testimony is no lower than 480,000. I promise you, you will go lower than that over my dead body, but I am afraid that is what is coming to pass.
Page 80 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
But as the military gets smaller, the active duty folks do and should realize that some of their crown jewels are the Guard and Reserve and that is what I would like to see, the Guard and Reserve acting as a total force.
Like Floyd Flake gave us the advice, let us get on with it. What is here is now and what can we do as a Congress, as a committee to make this thing work? Is there a need for
I am at a loss, and I do not want to get into the ''who shot John'' stuff. That is water under the bridge. Where do we go from here to keep this wonderful force, these tremendously fine Reserve components—and they are good—moving ahead? Ms. Lister, where do we go from here?
Secretary LISTER. I think we do not need another off-site just yet but we do need to start working intensively on how we get to the 25,000 and how we involve the adjutants general in the process. I have asked the DCSOP's and I know the vice is interested in getting started, too, and I believe that will happen. As you know, this is heavy duty program objective memorandum [POM] building time, so everybody seems to have been fully occupied, but we know this is something that has to begin soon because it will take time to determine, as General Navas says, both missions and structure issues. But I think it is very clear to the vice and myself that it has to be done.
I believe also that the Army Guard wants to be integrated, wants to be part of the solution to the PERSTEMPO problems the active Army has, so I believe we will get there. It will take time, but we will get there.
Page 81 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. SKELTON. I would like for each of you to respond to my inquiry. General?
General GRIFFITH. Yes, sir; I agree with Ms. Lister. I think we need to continue to bring the leadership together here inside the beltway and to work these very tough and sometimes contentious issues, but I want to underscore something I said earlier. When you get outside the beltway of Virginia and Maryland and you see the components of the force working together in the field, there is not that level of contentiousness that unfortunately goes on here. The force in the field is a force that is together, is working together, living together, operating together on a continuous basis, and I think we need to promote that and continue to promote that very aggressively and we will.
I think that, quite frankly, I would also like the opportunity to come over here and take whatever time any Member of the Congress can spare to talk about the initiatives that are already ongoing. I feel like that one of the things that has been lost in this is that we have some tremendous initiatives going on out there where we are actually building multicomponent units. We are building brigades that are going to have three components assigned. We are building aviation transportation units where we are going to have full integration. I would like the opportunity to come over and talk about a lot of that.
But again, I think that we are committed. I think that the discussions that we must continue that flow from the off-site, which was not an end, it was a beginning, and we have to continue with that.
Page 82 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. SKELTON. I think that in this whole scheme of things, the leaders of all of the services should understand sadly that there is a growing gap between military America and civilian America, and particularly in the Army as it grows smaller, sadly, as I say, over my dead body, but it appears the train is coming down the track, that you are going to have fewer and fewer families involved, you are going to have fewer and fewer neighbors, sons and daughters involved.
In my hometown, you are going to see the National Guard sergeant driving to and from the Army unit and that is going to be your representative in America, in small town as well as large city America. I think it would behoove the active duty, as well, to embrace them as much as possible and to recognize them for the crown jewel that they are.
General Navas, would you answer my question?
General NAVAS. Sir, I have to agree with Ms. Lister and the vice. I think that we have been working very closely in the last couple of years. I think that results of the Bottom-Up Review with the 1993 off-site, which you were briefed and you were very supportive, gave us some areas where each of the Reserve components found some niches, some core competencies that we will, the Guard, like I said in my opening statement, a balanced force of combat, combat support, and combat service support because of its mission of expanding the Army.
I think that when the Commission on Roles and Missions relooked at the Bottom-Up Review and came to the realization that there was a shortfall in combat support and combat service support and an excess combat structure in the total Army and they gave as an example a National Guard division, we came to the table. The 54 adjutants general, General Alexander, who is here, who happens to be now the President of the National Guard Association, at that time was the force structure chairman for the TAG's and he led his fellow adjutants general and the 8 division commanders in a plan that was briefed and it is what we know as division redesign where the Guard will convert 12 brigades of combat structure into combat service support.
Page 83 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Also, what it has lost is that we did other things to those definitions, and by definition, the guidance given to division redesign was at the end of the day when that process would be completed, which will take either one POM or two POM's because there is a bill to that, there is a hefty bill to that—it is almost a $4 billion bill—then, by definition, the remaining structure would have been mission relevant.
But we are not there yet. We hardly have started, and then the QDR comes along and we are still going back and revisiting the relevance of that structure. The issue here is if we do it in an open process where all come to the table, of course the world changes. The world changes constantly and we understand that in the Guard and we want to be part of that change. That is our vision, to be relevant and to embrace change.
But we need to do it basically in an inclusive process because different to the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of the Army Reserve, like I said in my opening statement, I am the channel of communication. The commanders of those units out there are the Governors of the States, the commanders in chief. The law, title 32, says that you do not take structure from those States unless the Governors agree to that. Now, we have done that very well when we dialog with the States, when we have that type of relationship and we brief and say, this is how we are going to do it. This is the time line. These are the units that we are going to backfill.
But when you compress that, like Ms. Lister said, and this was done in a very, very short period of time and you see almost a 10 percent cut across the board in the Guard, then that really created a blip in the curve of a lot of progress that has happened in the last 3, 4 years and luckily we came together and as a family we worked together on some principles on a way of dealing with the immediate
Page 84 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. Thank you, Mr. Skelton.
Mr. Bartlett, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. I have just two brief questions for General Griffith.
On page four of your written testimony, you mention, and I quote, ''The active Army today consists of ten divisions and two armored cavalry regiments with a personnel end strength of 495,000 soldiers.'' Do you actually have 495,000 soldiers today, as your statement indicates, or is your current assigned end strength 481,000, and thus you essentially cut end strength that you are unable to maintain anyhow?
General GRIFFITH. Sir, I do not know what the precise figure is today. I think we believe that with the recruiting efforts ongoing that we will end the fiscal year right about 490,000, sir. I would further say that as we came out of the cold war and we drew down the active Army from 780,000, 781,000 and 18 divisions and 3 regiments that, in fact, we kept too much structure. One of the problems that we are having in the active Army today is that we have more structure than we have manpower to fill and that, in fact, that is creating very, very tough readiness challenges as we try to meet the operations in Bosnia and other places around the world.
So, sir, to answer your question, as we go to a 480,000 Army, we are going to take out in excess of 25,000 in structure so that the manpower, the end strength of the Army, and the force structure of the Army are aligned so that we do not have the undermanning problems we have today.
Page 85 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. On page 12 of your statement, you mentioned several completed and ongoing analyses that were used in determining where personnel reductions could be achieved, including GAO and CBO reports. An April 1997 CBO report concluded that upward of $500 million a year could be saved by a merger of the two Reserve components of the Army. Did the Army consider this report in its analysis and what is your personal and professional opinion on this issue?
General GRIFFITH. Sir, if that is in my statement, I would—the merger, suggested merger?
Mr. BARTLETT. No, sir. An April 1997 CBO report concluded that upward of $500 million a year could be saved by a merger of the two Reserve components of the Army. I was just asking, did the Army consider this report in its analysis and what is your personal and professional opinion on the issue?
General GRIFFITH. Thank you, sir; I am sorry. My view, quite frankly, we have not considered it. There has been no discussion within the active Army leadership, the secretariat, the Secretary of the Army's Office, or anywhere else that I am aware of within the Pentagon, serious discussion of merging those two components.
My view is the Army Reserve and the National Guard have in some cases different missions and my personal view is it would not be wise to eliminate either of those components. Certainly, you could not eliminate the National Guard because of the missions they have in the various States and territories. So my personal view is we would not be particularly well served by that. I would be opposed to it. But I will tell you in all candor, I have not studied that proposal sufficiently to give you any in-depth answers.
Page 86 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BARTLETT. I thank you very much, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BUYER. Mr. Taylor.
Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time, if you would allow me, if you would give me 48 hours to submit any questions that I have in writing.
Mr. BUYER. No objection.
Mr. McHale is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. MCHALE. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I will take 48 hours to ask questions. [Laughter.]
Mr. BUYER. There is an objection.
Mr. MCHALE. Mr. Chairman, I thank you.
General Baratz, let me say at the outset that you do not need to be here and if anything I said earlier was misinterpreted or poorly stated on my part, I apologize. The integration between the Army Reserve and the active Army, I think, is seamless. It is a model of how it should be done. The combat support and combat service support that you provide to the active duty Army early on in a conflict is exactly the kind of integration that we hope to achieve not just within the Department of the Army but in all of our Reserve components.
Page 87 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
So the comments that I made earlier were, frankly, addressed at what is a difficult and painful division within the Department of the Army, separating the active Army from the Guard, not from the Army Reserve, so I wanted that to be clear on the record.
General Griffith, you mentioned earlier, and I think with sincere and legitimate pride, that when you served as a division commander in the Persian Gulf war, you had, in your words, 6,000 Reserve component soldiers serving under your command. I think that was an accurate statement of your prior testimony.
General GRIFFITH. Yes, sir.
Mr. MCHALE. How many of those 6,000 were combat soldiers from the National Guard?
General GRIFFITH. Sir, I do not recall. Again, once we were in the assembly area, it was of no relevance to me whatsoever from which component those units came. The medical support I had, as I recall, was for the most part, and I had two hospitals that traveled with my division, as I recall, they were Army Reserve.
Mr. MCHALE. The reason why I ask you is to the best of my knowledge, we did not use combat soldiers from the National Guard in the gulf war.
General GRIFFITH. Sir, if I might correct that, sir——
Page 88 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. MCHALE. Please.
General GRIFFITH [continuing]. I certainly considered artillery combat and——
Mr. MCHALE. Well, that is combat support. I am asking about combat.
General GRIFFITH. We had no maneuver to my knowledge, yes, sir.
Mr. MCHALE. There is a reason for that, and I am not trying to pick a fight with you here, but it is, I think, an indicative point that out of 6,000 Army Reservists and
I do not think we need to belabor that today or point out who was right or wrong in that division, but it is nonetheless, even 6 years later, a painful division of opinion between the active Army and the Guard. I would suspect that if I turned to General Navas and asked him about the combat readiness of the 48th Brigade, we could get a vigorous debate going here in the room.
The reason why I point that out is no National Guard combat forces were committed in Desert Storm. No National Guard divisions have been included in our current op plans. None of the enhanced separate brigades rotated through the NTC this year. And the National Guard redesign, which I supported—I think it was wisely presented—was underfunded by some $2 billion.
Page 89 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
If we are to believe, as I do very passionately, in the concept of a total force Army, we have to make sure that the National Guard has a warfighting responsibility in the op plans and that we train and equip those forces for the missions assigned.
So let me conclude and then invite your comment, if I may. My friend Ike Skelton said, where do we go from here? I do not know that the points that I am about to enumerate are all worthy of implementation, but I ask you to consider them and comment upon them.
No. 1, I think we have to implement the drawdown of the end strength in the National Guard as proposed in the QDR, and a figure of 21,000, though painful, is probably correct. But that decisionmaking process must incorporate the Guard's input in a meaningful way at every stage in the process.
No. 2, we should integrate every Guard division into a current op plan. There should be a warfighting mission assigned to every single Guard division.
No. 3, we should assign each division to a CINC as a theater-oriented strategic reserve.
No. 4, the enhanced separate brigades should rotate through the NTC once every 4 years, not once every 8 years as currently planned.
No. 5, we should adopt objective evaluation standards across all Army components, Active, Reserve, Guard. We should have an objective series of performance standards used to fairly evaluate all components. The Marine Corps, for instance, has the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System [McCRES] standards used for both Active and Reserve Components. Other services have done the same. It is time for the Army to come up to a single objective standard of performance that measures warfighting capability.
Page 90 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
And No. 6, I would strongly suggest that in order to build the spirit and the teamwork of a unified total force Army that periodically and for brief transitional periods of time, Guard general officers should be placed in command of active duty forces. Now, that may seem like a radical concept, but, in fact, the Marine Corps is just about to do that. A Marine Corps Reserve general will shortly take over command of the active duty Third Marine Division for a period of time of about 3 months.
It is important that we begin to build the spirit of a single total force Army and only by establishing day-to-day working professional relationships between officers who happen to be active or happen to be Reserve or happen to be Guard but who come to respect one another through daily interaction that we can achieve that total force concept.
I would invite your comment on any of those points.
General GRIFFITH. I will be happy to respond to each of those. I do not want to monopolize, but I would be happy to.
First of all, with regard to the drawdown, I think we agree. Yes, sir, we should have, and I think we have set in place the methodology and the processes to do just that. So the inclusion, I take no exception with.
Mr. MCHALE. With the Guard as a participant in a very meaningful way at every stage in the process. If the tough decisions are made, they need a voice at the table.
Page 91 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
General GRIFFITH. I agree, sir.
The issue of every Guard division into war plans, I take no exception to. Under title X, the Army provides forces, just as do the other services. The pool of forces that are developed are available to the CINC's. I would have no objection to—and, in fact, in all candor, one of the problems that we have in terms of the vulnerability of the Army's structure is the fact that we have structure that is not included in war plans. I guess also, in all candor, there are forces deployed from other components which you might even question whether you need that robust a force in some cases. I do not want to get cross-service dialog going here, but one of the things that makes the National Guard divisions vulnerable in any analysis you do by anybody is the fact that they are not called for in the war plans by the unified CINC's.
Mr. MCHALE. And that is particularly frustrating when those who write the Guard out of the op plan on a Monday come back on Tuesday and accuse them of irrelevance because they are not in the op plans. It seems to me we ought to draw down the force to a warfighting capability and then write every element of that force into a current contingency.
General GRIFFITH. Again, I would say that that is something that we quite frankly do not have control over. If the CINC's call for the forces, they will certainly be provided to the CINC's to the fullest extent of our ability to provide those forces.
Mr. BUYER. Will the panel, because I think Mr. McHale's question was very good and in great detail, would you provide a written response to his question from each of the Active, the Reserve, to include the Secretary?
Page 92 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
General GRIFFITH. Yes.
Mr. BUYER. Thank you.
I want to thank all of you for coming and providing your testimony. I will also have many questions I am going to submit for the record.
Mr. BUYER. General Navas, did you have something to add?
General NAVAS. Mr. Chairman, I want to make a point, to clarify a point that maybe was left unclarified. It was mentioned that General Davidson, a Guardsman, was in the Joint Staff. General Davidson is a National Guard officer who is assigned to the Joint Staff as a mobilization augmentee and adviser to the Director of the Joint Staff. He is, in the spirit of Goldwater-Nichols and jointness, in the Joint Staff not as a Guard officer, so he is no more the representative of the National Guard in the Joint Staff than perhaps General McCloud was the representative of the Air Force, for that matter. So I just wanted to make that clear, because apparently there was a confusion and I can provide more detail for the record.
Mr. BUYER. I also agree, though, with the spirit of Mr. Skelton. I am anxious to get on with things. I do not like part of the process and how this was handled. I do not like the inner politics. I do not like the outward politics. I do not like all the name calling. I do not care for all the rhetoric. I want to get on with it.
I want to make sure that we have a total Army force concept that works, that makes it all relevant, and if we are going to think outside the box and we get some reconfiguration of divisions for which the TAG's also agree with, General Navas, that can provide you the relevant material in cooperation with the CINC's and the CINC's put you in plans, we will be very eager to increase the personnel accounts, the O&M, the equipment that you need.
Page 93 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
But if we hold on to old structure, you begin to die under the weight of that structure because it is not going to be funded. We will not fund it and the Army does not fund it and then the inner politics continue and you have to run over here to friends that you may find either on the Senate or in the House and the divisions begin, the gaps are never narrowed, and it is not healthy as an institution.
So I am eager to move forward so that we have a total Army family, and I agree, someone made the comment that we have the greatest fighting force in the world, so let us act like it.
Thank you. I appreciate your testimony.
General Griffith, let me extend a compliment and congratulations to you. I know you are nearing the end of your tenure of your military service to this country and your Nation is grateful.
General GRIFFITH. Thank you, sir. Thank you.
Mr. BUYER. I welcome panel three. I am under great stress to have this concluded by 6 o'clock so that I can have everyone home to their families so I have no husbands or wives upset at me.
I welcome Maj. Gen. Richard Alexander, the president of the National Guard Association of the United States; Capt. Fred R. Becker, Jr., U.S. Navy, retired, Reserve Officers Association of the United States; James R. Blaker of the Science Applications International Corp.; and Mr. Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution.
Page 94 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Gentlemen, if you would please rise. Again, it is my intention to swear all witnesses of this panel today, if you will raise your right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. BUYER. Thank you. Please be seated.
Let us go ahead and proceed with Major General Alexander first. I know each of you have submitted written testimony. That will be placed in the record and I would ask each of you to summarize.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. RICHARD ALEXANDER, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES
General ALEXANDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief and I will summarize.
I thank you for this opportunity to address this committee and its members. The National Guard and the association who represents that American institution has from its inception been deeply involved in the post-cold-war national security debate. We intend to remain fully engaged in the debate in every area which it takes to ensure that the National Guard of the United States, both Army and Air, has secured its constitutional historic and rightful role in the current military structure of this Nation.
Page 95 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
During the months since the introduction of the Lieberman amendment to the publication of the QDR report, we have studied and reflected upon the issues the legislation identified as the target of the analysis. Specifically, as called for in the fiscal year 1997 Defense Authorization Act, a comprehensive discussion of the defense strategy of the United States and the force structure best suited to implement that strategy; threats examined for the purpose of review and the scenarios developed in examining such threats; the assumptions used; the effects on the force structure of preparation for and participation in peace operations and military operations other than war; the effects on the force structure of utilization of technologies anticipated being available in the year 2005; the manpower and sustainment policies required under the defense strategy to support engagement in conflicts lasting more than 120 days; the anticipated roles and missions of the Reserve components in the defense strategy and the strength, capabilities, and equipment necessary to assure that the Reserve components can capably discharge such roles and missions; the appropriate ratio of combat force to support forces; the airlift and sealift capabilities required to support the defense strategy; the forward presence, prepositioning and other anticipatory deployments necessary under the defense strategy for conflict deterrence and adequate response; and last, the extent to which resources must be shifted among two or more theaters under the defense strategy in the event of conflict in such theaters.
Every adjutant general and every Governor has a unique opportunity to compare and contrast these two services, Army and Air Force. They have very different approaches to building cohesion, trust, and consensus. The Air Force encouraged and required the participation of Reserve components during the QDR process. The active Air Force sees its Reserve components as full partners in the defense of the Nation. The Air Force treated its Reserve components as full partners in the strategic planning process underlying the QDR.
Page 96 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
I regret to admit that these processes to this degree did not occur in the entire QDR process conducted by the Army. I point out the successes of our sister service to illustrate how the total force policy looks in practice. Sadly, the Army has still a long way to go toward achieving this goal. The end strength reductions presented to the adjutants general in Oklahoma City were indicative of a hasty cut applied across the board without regard to strategy, missioning, or efficiency.
My fellow adjutants general, acting on behalf of their respective State Governors, registered our concern. As a result, Secretary Cohen's leadership ensured certain steps take place to create an atmosphere of cohesion between all components of the Army that will transcend the outcomes of the efforts and become the norm for the future. He further directed that all elements of the Army accept the notion that restructuring of the Army must be an inclusive process if we are to provide a force whose components can execute their portion of the national strategy.
In response to that directive, the Army scheduled an off-site meeting at Fort McNair. This was held 2 through 4 June 1997. The meeting was attended by the principal Army players as well as Major General Harrison of Florida representing the Adjutants General Association and myself as the Adjutant General of Ohio and as president of the National Guard Association of the United States.
As briefed at the QDR off-site, we believe the Army National Guard to be a balanced, relevant force. We agreed to disagree that the Army National Guard forces were in the uncommitted category. The QDR co-chairs did agree that the uncommitted numbers needed to be relooked. We agreed to a 17,000 end strength reduction to help the Army meet its $2 billion annual shortfall in modernization. More importantly, all parties agreed to a set of 11 principles that would establish the framework for all future decisions regarding manpower allocation.
Page 97 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
At the conclusion of the process, Major General Harrison and I were convinced we had done our best to comply with Secretary Cohen's guidance. I informed other adjutants general that we had formed a solid agreement with our active and Reserve counterparts and that we could work together.
However, it is almost 2 months later and I have yet to see a memorandum of record codifying our agreement in writing. Further, I have been reading many distressing media articles that portray the off-site agreement as simply suggestions or ideas to look at. This is not the understanding I had. In fact, the 17,000 soldier cut that we agreed to was predicated upon the adoption of these 11 principles, and I think it is important to briefly list them for the record.
One, all Army Guard forces will be resourced at C–3 level. Enforced brigades and force support units should be resourced at C–1.
Two, the uniqueness of the Army Guard will be recognized, with adequate forces provided for domestic emergencies.
Three, the Army Guard forces will be fully missioned and relevant with their lineage, heritage, and flags preserved.
Army Guard structure will mirror the active Army.
Army Guard modernization will mirror Army modernization.
Page 98 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
The process will include the Adjutants General Force Structure Committee and General Officer Steering Committee and mirror the National Guard division redesign. That is the process by which we were to move forward and determine the application of the 25,000 that was to take place by the year 2002, which is in the window of opportunity, the window expressed by the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. BUYER. General Alexander, we have those 11, if you could proceed.
General ALEXANDER. All right. These principles are important to us because as long as they are followed and adhered to, then we can be assured of thoughtful, intelligent, and methodological decision making. These are principles that the adjutants general, my association, and the leadership of the National Guard are committed to. The lack of any documentation from the Army that shows their agreement to these principles this long after makes us wonder whether these principles are committed to by the Army. In fact, if the Army does not subscribe to these principles, then I presume that everything that was decided upon at the meeting, at the off-site, is non-binding.
I am committed to resolving these issues with the leadership of the active Army and the Army Reserve and the Army Guard. We have differences of opinion. We must not let that affect our objective evaluation of the challenges we face. We all have a vested interest in working together in order to provide the best possible decision for our Nation. The American people demand and deserve our best effort.
Page 99 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
While the Army is still having difficulty defining what went on, Secretary Cohen obviously has a grasp of the agreement. In a letter dated 22 July 1997 to my Commander-in-Chief and the current Chair of the National Governors Association, Governor Voinovich, Secretary Cohen ratified the size of the initial reduction, the process in how the total Army would allocate the remaining reduction, and he acknowledged 3 of the before 11 principles. I sincerely appreciate the effort of the Secretary of Defense in having developed a better feel for what was agreed to than currently we are debating among the senior Army's leadership and the Guard.
Mr. Chairman, I commend you for these hearings. It is now time, I believe, to have the Congress become a player in bringing the Army and the Guard closer together. Thank you very much for your time.
[The prepared statement of General Alexander can be found in the appendix on page 107.]
Mr. BUYER. Thank you.
Mr. O'Hanlon.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL O'HANLON, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Mr. O'HANLON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be brief.
Page 100 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
I want to make two main points. One is to remind everyone what we already know, which is the fiscal pressure under which DOD is operating. The only reason that these painful topics have to be addressed is because of the budget pressure. I have tried to estimate the budget shortfall that existed in DOD's plans before the QDR and after and I believe it is still in excess of $10 billion a year, starting in the early years of the next decade, even if we make all the recommended cuts.
So without going into great detail, let me say I did that calculation in two ways. One is based on CBO documents from 1995 adjusted for the changes in the modernization plan that the QDR then put in place and the other is simply to take an historical budget share and say that, generally, the procurement budget has to be about a quarter of DOD's budget. That is a rule that has tended to apply pretty well. We are going to have to end this procurement holiday in the next decade and the QDR does not do it. By my calculation, the QDR only gets us up to about $52 billion a year in outlays expressed in 1998 dollar terms when we should be at $65 billion. So not to get too far in the weeds, that is just to set a context, which is that these cuts, if they are not made, other cuts are going to have to be made or we are going to have to increase the 050 top line.
To get more to the specific issue at hand, let me quickly just turn to, as I look at it, the time lines in the war plans and how the National Guard combat units are incapable, really, of playing as much of a role in those time lines as I think many would like, and it is perhaps intrinsic to the fact that maintaining a high-quality ready military is a very hard thing to do. This is, I think, the big lesson of the post-Vietnam era.
It is why you on the Hill are so focused on operations other than war, making sure the Pentagon does not do too many, because even after one of those, an active duty unit takes anywhere from 90 to 360 days to recover. There is a lot of debate about how much an active unit takes to recover. It is unrealistic to me that a Reserve unit can train up to combat potential in less time than the First Armored Division can recover from Bosnia, and we have all been very intrigued by that debate, whether it is 90 or 120 or a few more days than that, but it is a fair amount of time.
Page 101 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
The recent Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) study on the 49th Armored Division of the Texas National Guard suggested, with a lot of optimistic assumptions, I might add, that that unit might be able to be in theater 132 days after call-up. That is 60 days later
We also hope the hold phase of a future war will succeed. We cannot be confident it will always succeed. We have to sometimes be ready to get divisions three, four, and five in place quickly and I think it is unrealistic to expect a unit that would probably take anywhere from 90 to 360 days to train to play that role.
Finally, let me just say that even when we are beyond this current two MRC environment, which I certainly hope we will be some day soon, a lot of what folks who advocate the revolution in military affairs talk about and a lot of what many of us believe is that the active duty force will be very important even then because of engagement, because of the need for at least one or two unexpected contingencies in a place we cannot foresee that would require a rapid response, the need to use new technology, new concepts, new tactics and develop these.
Doing military affairs properly, I think, is a full-time business. It is very difficult. Even though the Guard combat units play an important backup role in the enhanced separate brigade formation, I think we have to keep our expectations in check as to what any unit can do in 40 days in a year to bring on the revolution in military affairs even after we are beyond this two MRC environment. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Hanlon can be found in the appendix on page 152.]
Page 102 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. Your statement is incredibly also applicable to the Air Guard. Wait until we move into modernization of those type of fighter assets and planes. That will blow your mind with procurement and acquisition costs.
Captain Becker.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN FRED R. BECKER, JR., UNITED STATES NAVY, RETIRED, RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES
Mr. BECKER. Yes, sir. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am Capt. Fred Becker, the Naval Affairs Director of the Reserve Officers Association (ROA). I am accompanied by Col. Frank Edens and Col. Clair Gilstad, ROA's Army and Air Force Directors. We are pleased to be here today to present the views of the Reserve Officers Association on the proposals of the QDR.
We have a written statement which I would like to briefly summarize, even more briefly now, and with your permission request be included in the record.
The fiscal year 1991 DOD Authorization Act expressed the sense of Congress that the role of reservists should increase, pointing to physical constraints, the need to retain quality personnel. Accordingly, they stated the United States should commit itself to the concept of the citizen soldier as the cornerstone of national defense policies for the future.
Page 103 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Congress made the following key points. The structure and strength of the Reserve components should be preserved. Equipment levels existing in the Reserve should be increased to match active duty counterparts. Selected missions of the active components should be increasingly transferred to the Reserve component. The equipment available to the units of the Reserves should be modernized. The integration of the active component and Reserve component should be promoted as a means of achieving total force policy of the Department of Defense.
We believe these make sense, even more so today as we face increasing fiscal constraints. From a business perspective, it only makes sense to be able to do more with less. Whether you pick the Army Reserve, the Air Force Reserve, the Navy, the Marine, or the Coast Guard, consider the fact they are a 20-percent multiplier at a cost of about 3 percent of the budget.
Today's Reserve is, without question, following the 1991 mandate of Congress. All the witnesses who preceded ahead of us talked about seamless integration and the fact they could not identify once the reservists hit the field the difference between the active force and the Reserve force.
With that as background, turning to the QDR, I would like to make the following key points. The question has been asked whether it was strategy or budget driven. Considering the fact it talks of balancing the budget, the need to reduce the deficit, and adds fiscal executability as one of the considerations, it is clearly budget driven. It is added despite the fact as you have noted, Mr. Chairman, that there is an increasing requirement for all kinds of contingency type operations as well as maintaining the requirement for two simultaneous major wars.
Page 104 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
It is, therefore, without question that the force will be continually strained by the apparent endless array of new missions. Given the foregoing, you must question how you can do it with at the same time making significant reductions in Reserve end strength.
Further, it is apparent that the reductions are based on the standard ''share the pain.'' It is time, however, to adopt a different approach. Carry forward the mandate of Congress as set forth 6 years ago. Adoption of the reduction of the Reserves set by the QDR would only mean as the Active force is reduced, there will be fewer Reserve billets available for those leaving active duty, resulting in a further degradation of mission capability.
In addition, it would mean the members of the Reserves, of our shrunken Reserve forces will be increasingly and repeatedly activated to support new and ever-increasing missions. These Reserve service members, their employers, and their families will reach the saturation point.
The question then is if we need a total force, which we do, is not the cost effective approach a total force that bases the cornerstone on the Reserves? We believe it is the only way to protect mission capability. In addition, it is the only way, as you have suggested, to make the military and ensure the military remains a vital part of the society.
In closing, given the budgetary constraints and the force multiplying effect of today's Reserve, as the Congress recognized in 1991, the Reserves must be recognized as a cost-effective multiplier and not as a continual fair share in force reductions. It is time to adopt a business-like approach, taking advantage of the cost leverage and tax savings provided by the citizen soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine.
Page 105 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening statement. If you or any other members of the committee have any questions, we would be happy to take them. Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Becker can be found in the appendix on page 128.]
Mr. BUYER. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Blaker, you are now recognized.
STATEMEMT OF JAMES R. BLAKER, SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
Mr. BLAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Here is the revolution in military affairs (RMA) argument. The U.S. military is in the middle of a revolution. We may call it a transformation, a transition, but you have heard all the allusions to it slip out in your discussion. There are people who believe that we should accelerate this revolution, this transformation because it is the safest course for the long term.
Acceleration of this revolution is not a technological issue. We have the technologies. What we do not have yet is the integration of the technologies into the doctrine and the structure of the active military force.
To accelerate it, you have to let the military work it out. You have to give them the technology and let them work it out. That can be done by freeing a significant portion of the active force to do so. Free them from the presence requirements and the readiness requirements that prevent them from modifying and changing, and you should do it in a joint context.
Page 106 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
There is a rumor to the effect that there is something called the vanguard force. It is a concept that was squelched during the QDR, but you will hear more of it in the future. The vanguard force is an allusion to a significant portion of the active force, up to three divisions of active Army forces, three air wings, and two carrier battle groups. They are formed under a standing joint task force to act as the vanguard to the future. That means that they have to be freed, in part, at least, from their constraints of readiness and the constraints of immediate contingency or presence requirements.
To do that, you have got to come up with some way of filling that gap and the way to do it is to rely on the Reserves. Now, this is a challenge to the way that we think about total forces. The Reserves under this concept become the repository for today's military power while portions of the active force are freed to leap ahead, and what that means is that the definition of total force as we have thought about it for almost half a century, that is that the Reserves should be, as much as possible, clones of the active force, becomes challenged.
In a way, there is a total force in this concept because both the Reserve components and the active force are working together to bring America's military power to a higher qualitative level of superiority, and we can do it because we are in a period of strategic lull, but we need the insurance.
The price of going this way, however, is to understand that we are talking about a different concept of total force, one that at least for a transition period involves the bifurcation and the tiering between the active and at least some Reserve components, but we should do this or at least we should consider it. At least, you should consider it because it offers the safest long-term prospects for America's military and it offers all sorts of new leverage for foreign policy.
Page 107 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
[The prepared statement of Mr. Blaker can be found in the appendix on page 145.]
Mr. BUYER. I appreciate your testimony.
Mr. Taylor, do you have any questions?
Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank our witnesses for being with us today. I am fairly free about now but I understand someone has a prior engagement starting around 6 o'clock, and I do not know if you are a good ballplayer or a bad ballplayer, I do not know if I am doing our side any favor by letting you go, but I am willing to let you go.
Mr. BUYER. I am sure if you have any questions, they would be more than happy to entertain them with a written question, or do I hesitate? [Laughter.]
Last time I did this, you took about 20 minutes. The gentleman whom is part of the full committee, having been here as a guest of the subcommittee, is recognized for a few minutes.
Mr. MCHALE. I love his subtlety. Mr. Buyer, I am told that you are a fine player and therefore I want to continue at length. [Laughter.]
Let me just engage Mr. O'Hanlon, if I may. Mr. O'Hanlon, I believe that the argument you have made was wonderfully stated and entirely erroneous, and I say that with as much respect as I can muster. Really, you present a very fine argument. I very strongly disagree with your conclusion.
Page 108 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
You indicated that doing military—and these are almost direct quotes from your testimony and correct me if I misquote you—you indicated that doing military affairs is a full-time business, that 40 days per year is insufficient to train for modern combat, reflecting, I think in that statement, a broad and sincere skepticism regarding the entire utility of the citizen soldier concept. I may be overstating your position, but I do not think that doing military affairs is necessarily and exclusively a full-time business. I would not be a reservist if I thought that.
Second, you say that it may take from 90 to 360 days to train a Reserve unit to combat proficiency and that, therefore, because of that time line, Reserve units are of limited utility.
And third, you look forward to the day when we would move beyond what you called a two MRC environment. Let me present to you a counter argument and invite your response.
I think that your analysis is based on at least two false assumptions. No. 1, that all future wars will be brief. I do not accept that conclusion. And No. 2, that the threat environment will diminish. When I look out into the future, particularly beyond the year 2010 and particularly
Let me just put it in context for you, if I may. I joined a Marine Reserve unit on November 28, 1990. A little more than 30 days later, on December 31, 1990, that unit deployed into a combat theater. I had previously served in the period immediately prior to that with an active duty Marine Corps unit. I came home for 30 days, joined a Reserve unit, went back to exactly the same geography, this time, the second time, with a Reserve unit. I could not see any difference whatever in the quality of the fighting men with whom I served when, at the company level and below, the Reserves were compared to the actives. There is absolutely no reason why it should take 360 days to train a Reserve unit to combat proficiency and shame on us if it does take that long a period of time.
Page 109 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
I look to the future where the threat environment goes up. I look to the possibility, fortunately one that we do not face now but may face in the future, where a conventional war may last for a considerable period of time, and if we do not want that war to take on a nuclear element—and certainly, I think, in the words of Henry Kissinger, we need the necessity of choice—I do not want to be backed into a nuclear war because we have an inadequate conventional response.
Why do you not believe that Reservists can train for the modern battlefield and fight effectively within time lines that I think are consistent maybe not with the course of a war today but with the increasing threat environment a decade from now?
Mr. O'HANLON. Thank you, Congressman. I agree with your points about what Reservists can and cannot do, so I apologize in rushing to state that I did not sufficiently emphasize I was focused on National Guard combat units of brigade size or above, and my concern is not with the inherent ability to be ready but with the time required to be ready, and——
Mr. MCHALE. Why does it take so long, in your judgment?
Mr. O'HANLON. It strikes me that warfighting as a unit especially is very hard and something that people do not——
Mr. MCHALE. Absolutely.
Page 110 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. O'HANLON [continuing]. Have any analogy within their normal civilian lives. They may be able to practice certain skills of a support or combat service support nature that then could be translated or refined fairly quickly and applied to military affairs, but not as a combat unit.
Mr. MCHALE. Is it your assumption that we are talking about combined arms warfare? For instance, in a conventional war in a jungle environment, why could not a rifle company be ready for combat within 60 days? Frankly, I think that many of our Reserve units could be ready in 30 days.
Now, if you are talking about a sophisticated combined arms environment such as the war that we fought in the Persian Gulf, I understand that it is going to take longer to come up to speed. But I still believe, having been there and witnessed Reserve proficiency, that Guard units, Marine Reserve units are more than capable of engaging in that form of very sophisticated warfare within 120 days of activation if we do our peacetime training right.
Mr. O'HANLON. That makes sense, but I also think that in most cases we are going to be very reticent as a country about getting involved in a lot of infantry combat and forest situations and we have a lot of active duty light forces today that can do these kinds of missions.
So I agree with the point, but as a prioritization for resources, I am more concerned about modernization, I am more concerned about readiness across the active duty force and I am not sure we have not sufficient light forces that we need to rely on more Reserves in that area.
Page 111 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. MCHALE. I see a peer competitor, and let me emphasize that when I cite a specific nation I am hopeful and optimistic that an adversarial relationship with China need not emerge in the years ahead. China may become, and I hope does become, an ally of the United States with a freer form of government and a more market-oriented economy.
But looking at capabilities rather than intent, I am telling you, in the year 2010, China is going to have a considerable conventional capability where if we were to become involved in a military conflict with China and assuming that conflict would not become a nuclear confrontation, the war would be bloody and long. It would not be short with a decisive outcome apparent at the beginning of hostilities. I would like to have under that circumstance a very large, robust strategic Reserve, unless we assume that such a war would inevitably be nuclear, and I am not willing to accept that assumption.
Mr. O'HANLON. I think your point is well taken and worthy of debate. As to what scenarios with China are more realistic, and I do not want to take too much of the committee's time, but two very quick things. If we do fight on the Korean peninsula and a reunified Korea against China with land forces, I cannot disagree with you. Then we are going to have put the 050 top line way up.
Second point, I think it is more realistic we would fight over seabed issues and there, modernization, naval forces,
Mr. MCHALE. In the beginning, but if the war goes on for a period of time, that strategic Reserve can be decisive. I would simply say in conclusion, Mr. O'Hanlon, and in defense—you touch a raw nerve in your candid, but I believe misguided, analysis—you really underestimate the warfighting capability of our reservists and our Guardsmen. I have said that modern warfare is not brain surgery. It is much more complicated than that. Nonetheless, I am absolutely convinced from my own experience that within a timeframe much shorter than that which you describe, our reservists and Guardsmen are combat ready, provided we give them the peacetime training that they deserve.
Page 112 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BUYER. I began to consider that the coach for the Democratic team—never mind.
Mr. MCHALE. He gave me three more questions.
Mr. BUYER. I think you are right. I just have one question for Major General Alexander. Were you in the room when I asked this question of General Griffith about these 11 principles? Were you here in the room?
General ALEXANDER. Yes; I was.
Mr. BUYER. I recall when I asked him whether or not there was an agreement in the offsite with regard to these 11 principles, my notes say that they were worthy goals but not realistic. Then in your statement, you expressed some concern as to whether they were committed to the principles. I just want to make sure——
General ALEXANDER. I left the meeting, the offsite, with the understanding that the 11 principles were agreed to. Subsequent to that, I have read accounts in the press and other locations that there was something other than an agreement and that led me to believe the commitment to other aspects of the agreement. And as I said earlier, at this point, as we speak, I have no record or document of what the final agreement was.
Page 113 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. It appears that no one does.
General ALEXANDER. Yes, sir.
Mr. BUYER. It is not in writing, and I guess it is an ongoing document but there are matters for which they have agreed to. But as I understand, the Guard proposed a process to be guided by 11 principles. Everybody thought that they were worthy goals. General Griffith testified that they were unrealistic but they are worthy goals, given the present fiscal constraints.
General ALEXANDER. That was the first I heard that, when General Griffith mentioned that.
Mr. BUYER. All right. I think it is a good idea and I stress, like many, that if you were not involved as an active player in this off-site, or you were in the offsite, but in the QDR process, that that is very concerning not only to myself but to other Members. Hopefully, as we move to these discussions about reconfiguration of the Guard, whether it is from heavy to light infantry or how you become more relevant and material to the fight, some of the propositions by Mr. McHale, that we will also be monitoring this ongoing process and you will maintain that open dialog and not permit an association to take more—I do not know how you become that family and team player if you are unwilling to work things out among the family instead of always going to the outside. Do you see what I am saying?
So as we try to foster the one family and the total Army concept, NGAUS as an association also has to say, you are right. If we want to be included in this process, we also want to be part of the family. I think it is antagonistic to the Army itself when you use outside sources to attack the Army and you go completely around the Pentagon and you go to the President. I just want to throw that out and see if you have any comment to that.
Page 114 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
General ALEXANDER. The model of working together was the division redesign. The need to exhaust all means to come to a rational decision as to what the Guard looked like was a result of the abrupt determination that we would be cut 38,000 spaces. Prior to that, there was involvement in the QDR process, but that process was abruptly terminated to garner modernization dollars and the numbers were without consultation or interaction by the components because it happened very, very quickly.
Mr. BUYER. I agree with General Navas. The Guard has a unique opportunity here to step positively into the breach.
General ALEXANDER. And we look forward to that.
Mr. BUYER. Thank you very much for your testimony.
This hearing is now concluded.
[Whereupon, at 6:09 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
"The Official Committee record contains additional material here."
Offset folios 146 to 254 Insert here
Insert offset folio 01 here
Page 115 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BUYER
Mr. BUYER. How did the DOD–JCS recommendations with regard to reserve component end strength and force structure flow from the national military strategy, missions, and resource assessments of QDR?
Secretary WARNER. The DOD recommendations are derived from our defense strategy, which was formulated during the QDR to advance U.S. interests in the current and projected security environment. We were also conscious during the review that, while our decisions would be strategy based, they would also be resource constrained. The defense strategy formed the basis for our determination of U.S. military missions and the integrated capabilities of the total force required to execute these missions. This force assessment resulted in the QDR Reserve component force recommendations. The proposed reductions reflect the QDR determination that the defense strategy can be supported by a somewhat smaller reserve component, primarily due to our assessment that we can reduce our strategic reserve.
Mr. BUYER. The QDR recommended that to carry out the national military strategy, the Department of Defense needed 1.36 million active duty personnel and .835 million Reserve component personnel. I presume that these numbers represent a position somewhere between two poles: pole 1 being what the QDR analysis showed to be the maximum number of Active and Reserve personnel needed if resources and affordability were not factors, and pole 2 being the absolute minimum number of people required to carry out the national military strategy. To help me get some perspective on how much the QDR's manpower recommendations were driven by strategy and how much by resources, what were the actual numbers for Active and Reserve component personnel associated with the two poles I just described?
Page 116 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Secretary WARNER. The Department did not determine personnel totals associated with the two poles defined, and then choose an intermediate value. After the fact, numbers can be calculated for the poles described; however the process enjoined was based on force structure needed to meet the needs of the defense strategy of shape, respond, and prepare now. In the respond category, major emphasis was placed on evaluating the fighting capabilities of the current force structure, and on force structures loosely characterized as 10, 20, and 30 percent reductions. Again personnel totals can be calculated to those force structures, and certainly the final results lie somewhere in between, but the process in the question was not the modus operandi employed by the Department to arrive at those numbers.
Mr. BUYER. The Army QDR analysis apparently determined that 7,000 Army reservists and 62,000 Army National Guardsmen were uncommitted or excess to the warfighting requirements of the national strategy. Nevertheless, the QDR and offsite only recommend reductions totaling 45,000. Why, in a resource constrained environment, does it make sense to retain the excess 24,000 personnel in the Reserve components?
Secretary WARNER. The QDR's strategy-based force assessment fully validated the Secretary of Defense's recommendations to reduce the Army's Reserve and National Guard end strength by about 45,000. The Army must restructure and downsize Guard units to better reflect requirements for Federal and State missions and shed force structure retained from cold war requirements for a strategic hedge. Given today's regional threats, the strategic hedge can be reduced and transitioned into capabilities that have greater utility across the entire spectrum, as well as filling a longstanding void in the support structure for sustained combat operations. The Army's offsite, conducted 2–4 June 1997 and co-chaired by the Army Vice-Chief of Staff and the Assistant Secretary of the Army, manpower and Reserve affairs, produced a reduction schedule that was acceptable to the Reserve component.
Page 117 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. How did the QDR ensure that it adequately and effectively addressed reserve component issues, particularly force structure and end strength? At the Department of Defense and Joint Staff levels, how and to what degree were the leadership of the reserve components involved in the input, assessments, and decisionmaking regarding QDR recommendations?
Secretary WARNER. As you know the total force concept remains a valid construct for force employment in the Department. With total force as the framework, the QDR effectively addressed Reserve component issues by ensuring Reserve component participation was assessed along with Active Forces as we determined force requirements to support the defense strategy. For example, in the major theater war analysis and the dynamic commitment war game series, we learned Reserve component forces were essential to successful execution of the strategy across the full spectrum of operations—from small-scale contingencies to major theater wars. Our assessment validated the need to maintain the ARNG enhanced separate brigades as an important hedge against adverse circumstances in major theater wars. Additionally, the QDR endorsed the ARNG division redesign which shifts combat forces into CS/CSS forces to make them more relevant for the war fight.
In the Joint Staff, Reserve component participation exists in all directorates and the involvement is so ingrained that the Joint Staff leadership does not distinguish Active from Reserves. Additional staff support was provided to the Joint Staff by the ARNG to support the QDR. In OSD, involvement was at staff level through OSD—Reserve affairs. Additionally, through MG Davidson's office, who is the chairman's mobilization assistant and an ARNG officer, several NG bureau staff officers met with OSD and Joint Staff officers concerning force structure issues. Each service had Reserve and/or Guard officers assigned as members of their staffs as subject matter experts on a day-to-day basis. All these Reserve staff elements both within the services and through OSD—Reserve affairs—reviewed and made substantive changes to the QDR materials as they were developed.
Page 118 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Specifically:
Army: Force structure issues were coordinated through National Guard and Army Reserve staff officers in the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations directorate and the Army's Strategic Synchronization Cell. These Reserve colonels and lieutenant colonels shared in the development of the QDR product and were in contact with the National Guard Bureau for coordination. The Army formed an internal task force to support each QDR panel. Each task force had an ARNG officer member. The task forces were integrated through a quarter-deck panel that had Reserve component general officers.
Navy: Issues were coordinated through the Navy staff Assessment Division, N81. This office worked closely with the director of the Naval Reserve staff as Reserve issues arose.
Air Force: Both the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve had representatives in the air staff office tasked to work QDR issues and had representatives on several of the panels.
Marine Corps: A QDR cell was formed with representatives from all components of the Marine Corps. At least one member was a Reserve officer and subject matter experts from MARRESFOR were on call for any issues.
For the assessment process, throughout the dynamic commitment series of war games, Reserve and National Guard representatives participated, including MG Davidson.
Page 119 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
At the more senior level, OSD—Reserve Affairs—attended both the QDR integration and senior steering group meetings. Through OSD—Reserve Affairs—there was interaction with both MG Navas, director ARNG, and LTG Baca, Chief National Guard Bureau. Material presented to the Secretary of Defense directly reflected their advice on several issues.
Mr. BUYER. What guidance regarding apportionment between components did DOD–JCS provide to the services with regard to the end-strength and force structure reductions required by the QDR? Did the Joint Staff or DOD issue any instructions to any service that the military manpower reductions had to be taken from a specific component (Active, Guard, Reserve)?
Secretary WARNER. DOD did not apportion endstrength and force structure reductions to the Services during the QDR. The Secretary did provide guidance to the Department through the defense strategy. The QDR Force Structure panel conducted a Total Force mission assessment and coupled the missions to scenario timelines. This allowed a laydown of the total force across these missions. Forces which were found to be outside of CINC wartime requirements or above other peacetime and civil missions were highlighted as being less relevant to meeting the needs of our strategy.
Mr. BUYER. To what degree are the announced DOD–JCS recommendations about QDR reserve component end strength and force structure subject to change based on the recommendations of the National Defense Panel or other DOD–JCS study groups?
Secretary WARNER. The Secretary of Defense will review the recommendations of the National Defense Panel and make adjustments as appropriate. In the meantime, the Department has begun the process of implementing the QDR recommendations through our normal planning and programming processes. There are no other DOD study groups specifically designed to review QDR Reserve Component recommendations.
Page 120 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. The QDR report discussed several missions that might involve the National Guard divisions. However, two missions that were not mentioned were the use of the National Guard divisions to counter asymmetrical threats to the U.S. homeland from weapons of mass destruction and manning a national missile defense system. If the QDR process assessed the possible employment of National Guard divisions in such roles, what was the result?
Secretary WARNER. In support of the QDR, the DYNAMIC COMMITMENT War Game Series did examine asymmetrical threats to the U.S. homeland from weapons of mass destruction. The National Guard played the major role in countering the effects of these types of threats. This role included the abilities to provide rapid response from the immediate locality and to draw National Guard and Reserve assets from surrounding states. The game series also highlighted that the effects from weapons of mass destruction may spread extensively outside the immediate incident area, which may require large numbers of reserve component forces to counter the spread of effects and to address large-scale civilian concerns. Advice concerning the proper allocation of reserve component forces was provided by the game's reserve component representatives. As far as manning a national defense missile system is concerned, you are aware that under the ''3+3'' architecture the Department is still in the Research, Development, and Testing phase of the program and no manning decisions have been made yet.
Mr. BUYER. One of the criticisms of the QDR is that it did not take a fresh look at how the reserve components, especially the National Guard, might be employed in new and different ways in support of the national military strategy. Even worse, the criticism goes, the QDR accepted without challenge the conclusions of a range of previous studies that were all critical of the National Guard combat divisions (Commission on Roles and Missions, GAO, and others). The result was a QDR outcome biased against the National Guard. How do you answer such criticisms of the QDR?
Page 121 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Secretary WARNER. These previous studies all called into question the need for a large strategic reserve and recommended that this issue be studied in greater detail, and this was done in the QDR. The QDR strategy-based assessment concluded that given today's regional threats, the strategic reserve can be reduced and transitioned into capabilities that have greater utility across the entire spectrum, as in filling a long-standing void in the support structure for sustained combat operations. Additionally, in support of the QDR, the DYNAMIC COMMITMENT War Game Series brought together the Services, CINCs, and the Reserve Components as equal partners. The games were designed in accordance with the QDR defense strategy elements of Shape and Respond. The representatives from the Services and the reserve components were allowed to propose new and different ways to employ their forces in support of the strategy. Reserve Component forces were considered as trained, ''ready-to-go'' forces (C–1) and were involved in almost every operation. During the game series, Presidential Selected Reserve Callup (PSRC) was requested repeatedly and recognition was given to the large role the Reserve Component plays in fulfilling our defense strategy and to the many outstanding reserve component volunteers that serve even when PSRC is not granted.
Mr. BUYER. Army analysis during the QDR apparently determined that 7,000 Army Reservists and 62,000 Army National Guardsmen were uncommitted or excess to the CINC's warfighting requirements. Did the DOD–JCS analysis during the QDR support these conclusions? If so, why did the QDR recommend a reduction of just 45,000 Army reserve component personnel?
Secretary WARNER. The QDR's strategy-based force assessment fully validated the Secretary of Defense's recommendations to reduce selected National Guard units. The Army must restructure and downsize Guard units to better reflect requirements for Federal and State missions and shed force structure retained from Cold War requirements for a strategic reserve. Given today's regional threats, the strategic reserve can be reduced and transitioned into capabilities that have greater utility across the entire spectrum, was well as filling a long-standing void in the support structure for sustained combat operations. The QDR adjusted National Guard end strength to improve its relevance in support of the defense strategy.
Page 122 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. An assertion is being made that the QDR's decision to reduce the Army's reserve component end strength by 45,000 was driven not by strategy, but simply by the Army's need to save money. Do you agree with this assertion?
Secretary WARNER. I do not agree with that assertion. Assessments made by the Army last year as a part of the formalization of the National Guard Redesign by the Army Secretary mentioned that up to 50,000 reserve component personnel might be in excess to current needs. QDR force structure analysis also indicated that under the assumption that the United States maintains a 10 active division combat force, up to nine equivalent brigades and some of the support structure associated with these units could be in excess. The 45,000 number is consistent with both of these assessments.
Mr. BUYER. Given that the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs was a key factor that was considered during the QDR, to what extent did the Joint Staff and the Department of Defense engage in ''out of the box'' kinds of analysis with regard to assessing the ability of the reserve and National Guard to assume a broader range of new roles and missions in the national military strategy?
Secretary WARNER. The Department reviewed Reserve Component (RC) missions during the QDR, which included discussions on innovative use of Reserve and National Guard units for missions currently performed by active forces. The final analysis did not substantially change the missions anticipated for the Reserve Component. ''Out of the box'' analysis of future RC missions will be an important part of our ongoing array of vigorous activities to exploit the Revolution in Military Affairs.
Page 123 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. The QDR made new recommendations for reductions in Army reserve component end strength, but did not recommend any new reductions for reducing Army reserve component force structure. Why not?
Secretary WARNER. The QDR validated programmed changes that will change the Army's reserve component structure. The Secretary of the Army determined in 1996 that 12 National Guard brigades would be converted from combat units to Combat Support/Combat Service Support (CS/CSS) units. Because this conversion would not have been completed until FY 2013, the QDR has accelerated the CS/CSS conversion program by using some of the savings from proposed reductions in Guard personnel. This conversion is a large step toward increasing the relevance of the National Guard brigades.
Mr. BUYER. An assertion is apparently being made that the history of the National Guard divisions has shown that they have repeatedly been rated as ready to go to war in a time frame that makes them relevant to the warfight. What did the QDR analysis by the Joint Staff determine regarding the ability of the National Guard divisions to be ready to go to war in the scenarios envisioned by the QDR?
Secretary WARNER. Our analysis addressed the relative readiness of the National Guard divisions and the 15 Enhanced Separate Brigades (ESBs) in the context of the scenarios envisioned by the QDR. There is a substantial difference in the readiness between the National Guard divisions and the ESBs. Their role in the warfight was a QDR issue. In general, some but not all of the ESBs could be readied in time to contribute to the QDR scenarios. However, since the ESBs are the most ready of the National Guard units, and unit location and training facilities are a constraint, it was not considered a realistic option to augment the readiness of the National Guard divisions at the expense of either the ESBs or the active forces.
Page 124 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. I want to know from you, when you said that there were senior-level players, who participated in this QDR process from the Reserve components. Does anyone have a list of these names of the individuals who participated and at what level?
Secretary WARNER. List of Guard and Reserve participation in the QDR Force Assessment panel:
Force Assessment Panel (0–6 level): Col Oliva (ARNG) Staff Assistant to MG Davidson; LTC Ringgold (ARNG) Executive Assistant to MG Davidson; COL Rose (USAR) SOCOM QDR Team Chief; and COL Thornburg (USAR) Army's Strategic Synchronization Cell Representatives.
Additional Assessment Panels: Mr. Cancian (OSD PA&E Land Forces Div), Colonel in the USMCR, chaired the Marine Corps Additional Assessments.
J–8 Forces Division: Marine Corps Reserve officer (Lt Col Graham); Air National Guard officer (Lt Col Watkins); and Naval Reserve officers (CDRs Baszner and Lippert).
OSD Reserve Affairs: Mr. Joel Resnick, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Strategic Plans & Analysis; and Mr. Dave McGinnis, Director of Analysis.
Army, For the Individual Army Assessment: COL Veach, ARNG, from Army Strategic Synchronization Cell; LTC Barfield, ARNG, from Army War Plans; and COL Thornburg, USAR, from Army Strategic Synchronization.
Page 125 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Army, Army Integration panel ''Quarterback'' Group; BG Bilo, Deputy Army National Guard; and BG Helmly, Deputy Chief Army Reserve.
Throughout Dynamic Commitment reserve and National Guard representatives participated, including MG Davidson, Mobilization Assistant, Office of the Director of the Joint Staff and the CJCS's principal advisor on reserve component matters.
Navy: Took a Total Force approach. N81 worked closely with the Director of the Naval Reserve Staff as issues arose. Navy staff represents the active and reserve.
Air Force: Both the ANG and AFRES has representatives in the HQ/USAF office tasked to work QDR issues and had representatives on several of the panels. There was regular coordination at the General Officer level.
Marine Corps: QDR cell was formed with representatives from all components of the Marine Corps. At least one member was a reserve officer and subject matter experts from MARRESFOR were on call for any issues.
SOCOM: Colonel ROSE, USAR, Chief of the Special Operations Reserve Component Division, SOCOM.
A list of the reserve component officers involved in the DYNAMIC COMMITMENT War Game Series follows. These officers were present for all games unless noted: MG Michael Davidson (ARNG), DJS-MA, 693–6166; BG William Bilo (ARNG)(DC3 only), ARNGRC, 607–7000; BG Jas Helmly (USAR)(DC3 only), DAAR, 697–1260; COL Eric Braman (ARNG)(DC3 only), NGB ARNGRC, 607–7300; COL John Bucher (USAR), J–8/LLWAD, 695–4657; COL Mark Chmar (ANG), NGB–ZA, 695–3093; COL Willie Harris (ANG), ANG/XOX, 695–1531; COL Maurice Mayfield (ARNG), CDR, ASG, 954–5686; COL Daryl McCall (ARNG), NGB PNT, 614–3399; COL Joe Oliva (ARNG), DJS–MA, 697–1995; COL Bobby Thornburg (USAR), DACS, 697–7189; COL Malcolm Westcott (USAR), DAAR, 697–8005; LTC Charles Bruce (USAR), J–8/SAGD, 697–7592; LTC Alfred Channels (ARNG), NGB PNT, 614–3399; LTC Dan Grayson (ARNG), J–8/SAGD, 681–0867; LTC William Lee (USAR), DAAR, 697–8005; CDR Arlen Lippert (USNR), J–8/FD, 614–7954; and Mr. Ben McCulloch (USNR)(DC3 only), CNO, 695–8970.
Page 126 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. At your level, was there an endorsement, then, of this reconfiguration of the eight Guard divisions from heavy to light?
Secretary WARNER. The QDR endorsed programmed reconfiguration changes that the Secretary of the Army recommended in 1996. This reconfiguration will convert 12 National Guard brigades from combat units to combat support/combat service support (CS/CSS) units. As a result of the strategy-based assessment, the QDR has accelerated the CS/CSS Conversion program by using some of the savings from proposed reductions in Guard personnel. Aside from this recommendation, there were no discussions at my level of reconfiguring eight Guard divisions from heavy to light.
Mr. BUYER. How do the QDR recommendations with regard to the Army reserve components derive from the analysis of strategy, missions and resources developed during the QDR?
Mrs. LISTER. The QDR considered several alternatives defense postures, each of which reflects a somewhat different ''path'' toward meeting the challenges of the projected security environment. QDR assumptions were that over the next several years a series of challenges would be faced to include smaller-scale contingency operations, the threat of large-scale, cross-border aggression, the continued proliferation of advanced technologies, and variety of transactional dangers. For the purpose of fiscal planning, the QDR assumed stable annual defense budgets of roughly $250B per year in FY97 dollars. Based on these views the QDR developed and evaluated several postures along a spectrum of feasible approaches to meeting the strategy. One ''path'' placed emphasis on shaping and responding in the near and midterm, while accepting risk in preparing for an uncertain future. A second alternative emphasized repairing now for the future, while accepting greater risk in shaping and responding in the near and midterm. The third alternative, which was selected by the Department of Defense, attempts to balance risk over time by sustaining sufficiently large and capable forces to shape and respond in the near and midterm while transforming the force to meet future challenges. Department of Defense directed that across the Services the issue would not be whether to reshape forces, but how and when. QDR guidance resulted in force structure changes. Personnel end strengths will change (decrease) to reflect improvements in operational concepts, organizational arrangements and technological improvements. This methodology resulted in the QDR directing the end strength and force structure reductions of 15K AC, 45K RC, and 33.7K civilians.
Page 127 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. To what extent, and to what effect, did the Army's reserve components participate in the QDR analysis and decision making?
Mrs. LISTER. The QDR was intended to ''provide a blueprint for a strategy-based, balanced, and affordable defense program.'' The Army Reserve Components were partners in the QDR process participating in the Army's task forces by providing action officers to each. They also had representatives on the Army's Strategic Synchronization Cell to both help the cell and keep the RC leadership abreast of emerging developments throughout the QDR process.
The QDR was a complex and inclusive process. The Adjutants General role in the QDR process was worked through their representatives and through the National Guard Bureau. But by the last days before completion, the train was moving fast, and disconnects occurred within the Army family. There was a disconnect with the Adjutants General when the final draw down numbers were announced. The Adjutants were, in short, surprised. It was, indeed, a failure in communications and no-ones fault. But it was unfortunate.
Mr. BUYER. To what extent were the QDR recommendations with regard to reserve component end strength and with regard to the roles and missions the National Guard Combat divisions imposed by decisions and analysis made by the Joint Staff.
Mrs. LISTER. The QDR was a collaborative effort between the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff, with participation from the Military Services and the Commanders in Chief of the Combatant Commands. Recommendations for personnel end strength reductions in each of the Army components were initiated by the Army and not imposed by the Joint Staff or the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Army based its recommendations on a review of the National Military Strategy, requirements for Army forces and capabilities, and Total Army modernization programs.
Page 128 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. Why was an off-site process necessary to reach agreement on these reserve component issues?
Mrs. LISTER. At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, Key Army leaders came together over the period of June 2 through 4, 1997, at an ''off-site'', to review the Active Army, Civilian personnel and Reserve Component reductions mandated by the QDR and to develop a plan for implementing those reductions by fiscal year 2002 (FY 02). Represented were the Army staff, the Army Secretariat, the United States Army Reserve, the National Guard Bureau and the Adjutants General. We were a small group, intentionally so. We did not have much time, and we had a big task. The discussions took place in an atmosphere of cooperation and all participants worked hard to reach consensus.
Mr. BUYER. What agreements were reached during the off-sight process?
Mrs. LISTER. The QDR mandated that the Army draw down its active end strength from 495,000 to 480,000. The Army will implement the 15,000 Active Component reductions by reducing end strength 5,000 soldiers in each fiscal year, beginning in 1997, through and including 1999.
The QDR mandated reductions in Civilian personnel of 34,000 will be difficult, given the significant reductions the Army has already executed and planned for the future. The Army intends to draw down 17,400 additional Civilian personnel by FY 06, using a programmed reduction process. The Army must retain the balance of the 16,300 Civilian spaces (full-time equivalents, or FTEs) identified by the QDR, as well as the associated funding of $995 million, until such time as A–76 studies are completed.
Page 129 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
The off-site resulted in agreement among all components, accepted by the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff, Army, and ratified by the Secretary of Defense. The Reserve Component reductions will be completed by fiscal year 2002. The Army Reserve will reduce by 3,000 soldiers in FY 00. The Army National Guard will reduce 5,000 soldiers in FY 98 and 99 and 7,000 soldiers in FY 00. The specifics of the remaining mandated 25,000 Reserve Component reductions will be determined through a cooperative, inclusive process. This process will rely in part on Total Army Analysis 2007 (TAA07). The active army has committed to work with the Reserve Components, to include the Adjutants General, prior to TAA07, to change the configuration of Guard units as the Active Army changes—so as, as much as possible, to mirror active units. A major goal will be to restructure and re-mission the Army National Guard Divisions. The Guard divisions will become, through this process, even more relevant to national defense now—and in the 21st Century.
The Army intends to reinvest $850 million on the Army National Guard Division Redesign Process (ADRS) which will accelerate the redesign effort, eliminate much of the Army's current combat support and combat service support shortfalls, and further integrate the Active Component and Army National Guard forces. Modernization of force structure will proceed along a time-line equitable with the modernization of the Active component. Army National Guard unit conversions (under the ADRS) will increase Army National Guard Major Construction requirements to $50 million annually through FY 03.
Mr. BUYER. Is there complete agreement among the Army Secretariat, the Active Army, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard as to the details of the off-site agreement? If not, what yet has to be decided?
Page 130 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mrs. LISTER. The agreement reached by the off-site participants was a major step in implementing the QDR mandated reductions. This is only the beginning. At present, we are working on documenting the results of the Army's QDR off-site. There are issues of the Guard's ''eleven principles'' and the reduction in Army National Guard force structure that must be resolved. Because these issues can become emotional and contentious, we are moving slowly and with great deliberation. We will get there. The Army must resolve these issues to ensure that we continue on our path towards the 21st Century, a path shaped by the Army's work on the QDR.
Mr. BUYER. The QDR apparently was able to make recommendations for reductions in National Guard and Army Reserve end strength. This was, however, no effort to reduce National Guard force structure. Why?
Mrs. LISTER. The QDR report and briefings presented by the DCSOPS and Army National Guard did address force structure issues. However, during the QDR off-site the issue Army National Guard force structure reductions were not specifically addressed. The Army, including the Army National Guard, is working toward determining the appropriate force structure/end strength balance.
Mr. BUYER. The Adjutants General were apparently surprised when the final QDR draw down numbers were announced. However, you note that the QDR was an inclusive process. If so, how could the Adjutants General have been surprised? Weren't the possibility and scope of National Guard reductions discussed with the National Guard Bureau and the Army National Guard as part of the QDR process? Did the Army QDR process implicitly or explicitly provide the Adjutants General a formal role in negotiating outcomes? Was the Army Secretariat ''surprised'' when the final Army reserve component QDR draw down numbers were announced?
Page 131 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mrs. LISTER. First and foremost, we recognize that all our components, military and civilian, active and reserve, must participate as partners in any and all decisions that affect the total Army. Further, if the Army is to determine its own destiny in these times of fiscal austerity, each component must put aside parochial concerns, with a view toward building a consensus that will serve the best interests of the whole Army. We have made progress toward achieving that goal. Much work remains to be done, however; consensus must yet be achieved on many critical issues. We must continue our efforts to make each component truly a viable partner in the Total Force.
The QDR was a complex and inclusive process. The Adjutants General role in the QDR process was worked through their representatives and through the National Guard Bureau. But by the last days before completion, the train was moving fast, and disconnects occurred within the Army family. There was a disconnect with the Adjutants General when the final draw down numbers were announced. The Adjutants were, in short, surprised. It was, indeed, a failure in communications and no-ones fault. But it was unfortunate.
Mr. BUYER. Your statement says that at present the Army is still working on documenting the results of the Army's QDR off-site. Does this mean there is disagreement among the participants as to what was agreed to? If so, what are those issues? When do you expect to be able to provide this subcommittee with the ''fully documented'' results of the Army's QDR off-site process?
Mrs. LISTER. The Army senior leadership continues to work on documenting the results of the Army QDR off-site. The Army leadership intends to staff, with each of the participants, a summary of those major points of agreement obtained at the QDR off-site. While there may be issues on which each participant has a slightly different point of view, a formal staffing of the summary will provide a forum through which each participant will have the opportunity to state their position. A final determination of what was agreed on at the QDR off-site will rest with the co-chairs. It is impossible, at this time, to state a firm date by which the Army will complete a summary of the QDR off-site. When complete, a copy can be furnished to the committee.
Page 132 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. Members of Congress are being told by a variety of sources that one of the agreements reached during the off-site was that National Guard reductions agreed to during the off-site would be governed or bound by a set of 11 principles. General Navas' statement indicates that 11 such principles were proposed during the off-site, but does not indicate that any agreement was reached on that proposal. What agreement, if any, was reached at the off-site regarding whether the 11 principles proposed by the National Guard would govern the process?
Mrs. LISTER. The National Guard did propose a set of 11 principles they felt should be incorporated into the ''follow-on'' process. We agreed the principles were worthwhile goals for the Army to work toward but that resources would not be adequate to achieve all the principles. The principles were accepted as appropriate goals for the Army to work toward.
Mr. BUYER. How do the QDR recommendations with regard to the Army reserve components derive from the analysis of strategy, missions, and resources developed during the QDR?
General GRIFFITH. During the QDR, we assessed the requirements of our national military strategy by Army component, and determined that the strategy could be implemented with a somewhat smaller force. This assessment of our force structure included both operations overseas and at home in support of civil authorities. Concurrently, we assessed our near- and mid-term modernization requirements and determined that an additional three to four billion dollars were required annually, predominantly in our procurement accounts. These additional modernization investments are required to preserve overmatch in critical combat systems, to recapitalize core equipment, to achieve information dominance through full implementation of Force XXI and digitization initiatives, and to refocus our research and development efforts on true leap-ahead capabilities. These increased investments will also permit a more timely conversion of twelve combat brigades from our Army National Guard forces to combat support and combat service support capabilities, thereby addressing a long-standing Total Army shortfall in those capabilities.
Page 133 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. To what extent, and to what effect, did the Army's reserve components participate in the QDR analysis and decision making?
General GRIFFITH. Representatives from our reserve components participated in all facets of the QDR. One Colonel from the Office of the Chief of the U.S. Army Reserve and another from the Office of the Director of the Army National Guard worked daily in the Army Staff office that managed the Army's QDR participation. Officers from both reserve components also worked on each of the Army Staff task forces that supported the Dynamic Commitment wargame series and the seven QDR panels: strategy, force structure, modernization, infrastructure readiness, human resources, and intelligence and information operations. General officers from both of our reserve components attended weekly coordination meetings that were chaired by the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. Additionally, both the Chief of the U.S. Army Reserve and the Director of the Army National Guard were briefed on several occasions by the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army on the course and progress of the QDR. The effect of this inclusive process was that all pertinent information regarding our reserve components was appropriately considered during the QDR.
Mr. BUYER. To what extent were the QDR recommendations with regard to reserve component end strength and with regard to the roles and missions the National Guard combat divisions imposed by decisions and analysis made by the Joint Staff?
General GRIFFITH. Recommendations for personnel end strength reductions in each of the Army components were initiated by the Army and not imposed by the Joint Staff or the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Our recommendations were based on a thorough review of the national military strategy, requirements for Army forces and capabilities, and Total Army modernization programs. Findings from analyses conducted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff were consistent with the Army's findings.
Page 134 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. Why was an off-site process necessary to reach agreement on these reserve component issues?
General GRIFFITH. The Secretary of Defense directed the Army to develop an implementation plan for the personnel end strength reductions identified in the QDR report. The explicit purpose of advisory group sessions conducted at Fort McNair from June 2–4, 1997, was to develop the implementation plan.
Mr. BUYER. What agreements were reached during the off-site process?
General GRIFFITH. The elements of the implementation plan for QDR personnel end strength reductions are reflected in a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, dated June 5, 1997, which was signed by both the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army. The memorandum defines civilian and military (active and reserve) personnel end strength reductions and the processes to determine those reductions. Regarding our reserve forces, Army Reserve component personnel end strength will be reduced by 45,000—as identified in the QDR report—with 20,000 to be reduced in fiscal year 1998 to 2000 and 25,000 in fiscal year 2001 to 2002. Funding to accelerate conversion of both U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard forces to combat support and combat service support forces will be increased by $850 million. Conversions will increase the Army National Guard's Major Construction requirements to $50 million annually through fiscal year 2003.
Mr. BUYER. Is there complete agreement among the Army Secretariat, the active Army, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard as to the details of the off-site agreement? If not, what is yet to be decided?
Page 135 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
General GRIFFITH. The June 5, 1997, memorandum signed by the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army reflects the outcome of the advisory group sessions conducted at Fort McNair, June 2–4, 1997, that included reserve component representation. The only outstanding issue is the apportionment of the remaining military personnel end strength reductions (to be achieved in fiscal years 2001 and 2002) among the U.S. Army Reserve and the Army National Guard. This process includes several actions, including Total Army Analysis 2007 which is to be completed in fiscal year 1999. In the interim, the Army has programmed the apportionment based on the analysis available to date (i.e. 4,000 from the U.S. Army Reserve and 21,000 from the Army National Guard). Subsequent changes to the apportionment will be appropriately reprogrammed.
Mr. BUYER. The QDR apparently was able to make recommendations for reductions in National Guard and Army Reserve end strength. There was however, no effort to reduce National Guard force structure. Why?
General GRIFFITH. The Secretary of Defense addressed force structure reductions in the QDR report, which states: ''The Army will also restructure its Reserve component. It will shed some combat structure that provided for strategic depth during the Cold War, but which is now excess.'' Our intent is to reduce force structure in the U.S. Army Reserve and the Army National Guard as personnel end strength is reduced. Force structure reductions will be equal to, and concurrent with, personnel end strength reductions.
Mr. BUYER. Were the QDR recommendations regarding Army reserve components budget driven, or strategy driven?
Page 136 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
General GRIFFITH. The determination of which forces and capabilities are required today and in the future was driven by our assessment of the national military strategy. The determination of how much of the identified existing excess should be eliminated, and from which component, was driven by Army readiness and modernization requirements, over anticipated resource levels, and our post-Cold War experience in implementing all aspects of the national military strategy, both at home and abroad.
Mr. BUYER. You have said that the QDR was a team effort. Do you agree with Mrs. Lister that the final QDR end strength cuts surprised the Adjutants General? If so, why should that have happened?
General GRIFFITH. I do not know what the Adjutants General were being told regarding potential personnel end strength reductions, so I do not know if they were surprised or not. However, representatives from the Army National Guard and the National Guard Bureau were aware of, and participated in, the analyses conducted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Army Staff. These analyses determined that the Army was retaining combat capabilities in the Army National Guard in excess of requirements to implement all aspects of the national military strategy.
Mr. BUYER. There has been some indications that he 45,000 cut in reserve component end strength would be allocated as follows: 7,000 in the Army Reserve, 38,000 Army National Guard. Is that allocation accurate? Was it agreed to in the off-site?
General GRIFFITH. Analysis conducted during the QDR revealed that the 45,000 reduction in Army reserve component personnel end strength should be apportioned as you indicated. The advisory group that met on June 2–4, 1997, identified how the first 20,000 of that reduction would be apportioned (and achieved in fiscal years 1998 to 2000) and established the process for determining how the remaining 25,000 reduction would be apportioned (and achieved in fiscal years 2001 and 2002).
Page 137 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. According to Mrs. Lister's statement, one of the general agreements that seems to have been reached during the off-site was to ''restructure and remission'' the National Guard divisions. Your statement indicates that restructuring National Guard divisions from armored and mechanized heavy units to light infantry units makes sense. Has the restructuring of the Army Guard divisions as light units been agreed to, or is the nature of the restructuring still to be worked out?
General GRIFFITH. No decisions have yet been made regarding the concept to lighten the force structure of some of our heavy forces in the Army National Guard to improve their utility in both federal and state missions.
Mr. BUYER. ''How do the QDR recommendations with regard to the Army reserve components derive from the analysis of strategy, missions and resources developed during the QDR?''
General NAVAS. I cannot speak to how QDR recommendations with regard to the Army reserve components were derived from the analysis of strategy, missions and resources developed during the QDR, because the Army Guard was not significantly involved at the decision making level where the recommendations were made.
Mr. BUYER. ''To what extent, and to what effect, did the Army's reserve components participate in the QDR analysis and decision making?''
General NAVAS. The Army National Guard was a willing partner in the early stages of development strategy process. The Guard participated in the many panels and discussions of strategies but was not included in critical decisions made during the General Officer Sessions and forwarded to the Joint Staff. The key to our participation was to help facilitate the intended ''strategy-based'' final product. We participated in:
Page 138 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
a. The Army's ''Task Forces'' by providing action officers to each.
b. We also had a representative on the Army's Strategic Synchronization Cell (SSC).
c. During the QDR, we offered many suggestions on how to garner efficiencies in the Total Army.
d. We were allowed to respond to some vignettes with impact statements
Mr. BUYER. ''To what extent were the QDR recommendations with regard to reserve component end strength and with regard to the roles and missions the National Guard Combat divisions imposed by decisions and analysis made by the Joint Staff?''
General NAVAS. I cannot answer how the Joint Staff considered the roles and missions of the National Guard Combat divisions. Areas of consideration that arise from a strategy-based analysis with regards to the ARNG Combat Divisions are:
a. Units to backfill the Nation's Treaty commitment, and commitments to on going SSC's.
b. Deployment timeframes of ARNG Combat Divisions.
c. Units and required capabilities necessary to respond to second near simultaneous MTW.
Page 139 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
d. ARNG Combat Divisions can in fact mobilize and deploy in a timeframe that coincides with air and sealift capability.
e. The requirement to respond asymmetric threats and quite possibly the need to respond to natural disasters.
f. How the National Military Strategy will satisfy the requirement for residual forces.
Mr. BUYER. ''Why was an Off-Site process necessary to reach agreement on these reserve component issues?''
General NAVAS. The intent of the Off-Site was to address the concerns regarding end strength reductions, the methodology used to determine those reductions, and the process to be used for future decisions. Most importantly, the Off-Site was intended to demonstrate that the Total Army had moved beyond the rationale of using proportionality as a method of applying reductions. A movement beyond proportionality was not evident in the Army's recommendation that reduction be apportioned in active component equivalents of 15K–AC, 15K–RC, and 15K civilian.
Mr. BUYER. ''What agreements were reached during the off-site process?''
General NAVAS. The specific agreements on end strength reductions were that the Active Army would be reduced by 15,000 soldiers in 5,000 soldier increments from FY 97 to FY 99. The ARNG would be reduced by 17,000 soldiers with 5,000 soldiers each in FY 98 and FY 99 and by 7,000 soldiers in FY 00, the USAR would be reduced 3,000 soldiers in FY 00. The remaining 25,000 soldier reduction in FY 01 through FY 02 would be determined through a process to begin this year that would include the results of the Total Army Analysis 2007 to be conducted in the fall of 1999. Additionally, the Off-Site participants agreed to reinvest an additional $850 million in the Army National Guard Division Redesign to accelerate the completion of the conversion timetable from FY 13 to FY 07. The group also decided to fund MCNG $50 million each year through FY 03.
Page 140 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
The National Guard proposed that the process would be guided by a set of eleven principles. These guiding principles are: (1) All Army Guard forces will be resourced at a baseline of C–3 (combat ready); Enhanced brigades and Force Support Package units are to funded at C–1 (fully combat ready); (2) The uniqueness of the Army Guard will be recognized, with adequate forces provided for domestic emergency responsibilities; (3) Army Guard forces will be fully missioned and relevant with their lineage, heritage and flags preserved; (4) Army Guard structure will mirror the active Army; (5) Army Guard modernization will mirror active Army modernization; (6) The process will include the Adjutants General Force Structure Committee and General Officer Steering Committee, and mirror the Army National Guard Division Redesign plan; (7) The civilian Army Secretariat will oversee the entire force reexamination process; (8) Division redesign & integration will be fully implemented; (9) Readiness will be basis for force assignments; (10) The Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee and Reserve Components Coordination Committee process will be revitalized; and (11) ''Speak with one voice.''
Mr. BUYER. ''Is there complete agreement among the Army Secretariat, the active Army, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard as to the details of the off-sight? If not, what is yet to be decided?''
General NAVAS. There is specific agreement on end strength reductions, they are: The Active Army would be reduced by 15,000 soldiers in 5,000 soldier increments from FY 97 to FY 99. The USAR would be reduced 3,000 soldiers in FY 00 and the ARNG would be reduced by 5,000 soldiers in FY 98 and FY 99 and by 7,000 soldiers in FY 00. The remaining 25,000 soldier reduction in FY 01 through FY 02 would be determined through a process to begin this year that would include the results of the Total Army Analysis 2007 to be conducted in the fall of 1999. Additionally, the Off-Site participants agreed to reinvest $850 million in the Army National Guard Division Redesign to accelerate the completion of the conversion timetable from FY 13 to FY 07. The group also decided to fund MCNG $50 million each year through FY 03. However, the September 9, 1997, Memorandum for Record, Subj: 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Off-Site, has reduced the 11 principles to ''goals'' and added a host of new conditions that demand a complete review.
Page 141 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. ''The QDR apparently was able to make recommendations for reductions in National Guard and Army Reserve end strength. There was, however, no effort to reduce National Guard force structure. Why?''
General NAVAS. I would like to emphasize that the QDR report did not make specific recommendations as to reductions in the National Guard and Army Reserve. The QDR report made a recommendation that the reserve components be reduced by 45,000 in end strength. Apparently the specific breakdown was made afterwards by the Senior Army Leadership without representation from the Army National Guard. Therefore, I am not able to answer why the recommendations were made about Army National Guard end strength. If included, we are more than willing to discuss all aspects of the Total Force, the appropriate roles and missions of the various components and any decisions needed to meet the mandates of the QDR procedure.
Mr. BUYER. ''Members of Congress are being told unequivocally that the National Guard was cut out of the QDR process. In fact, that is one reason why some feel legislation is needed to create a Senior National Guard Advisor on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You indicate, however that the Army National Guard was active and fully involved in the process. Can you help us understand the differences in view regarding the degree to which the Army National Guard was involved?''
General NAVAS. The clarification comes in that the Army National Guard was a willing partner during the strategy development portion of the QDR process. The Guard participated in the many panels and discussions of strategies. However, the Guard was not included in the critical General Officer Executive committee's final decision sessions that made recommendations to the Joint Staff.
Page 142 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. ''Your statement indicates that you and Army National Guard representatives fully participated in the QDR process, but that you only became aware at the end that the final QDR would include National Guard end strength cuts. What led you to believe during the QDR process that the Army National Guard would be exempt from end strength cuts? Why were the cuts at the end a surprise?''
General NAVAS. The Army National Guard was never under the impression that the Army National Guard would be exempt from end strength reductions. What we believed, is that we would be a full partner at the decision making level. We still have not seen the linkage of end strength reductions and the strategy-based analysis. It appears the apportionment of the personnel reductions were a salami slice to meet budgetary constraints. The Guard is still not clear of the validity of the reductions to meet a modernization budget issue versus a truly excess number to the needs of the Nation. The Guard still stands as the force envisioned by our founding fathers and is also the most cost effective way to provide for the common defense of the country and its interests.
The surprise was the abrupt announcement of the end strength numbers just prior to the QDR being published without representation during the final decision process. As Ms. Lister acknowledged ''The Adjutants General were, in short, surprised''. They were surprised because the Army Guard was surprised.
Mr. BUYER. Much has been said about the QDR outcomes being budget driven, not strategy driven. In fact, weren't the QDR outcomes driven by both strategy and budget considerations, with, in the case of the Army reserve components, strategy considerations validating the need for 530,000 reservists, with 45,000 reservists determined to be excess or uncommitted to a strategic requirements?
Page 143 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
General NAVAS. Certainly the QDR outcomes are both strategy and budget driven. The analysis that determined that the 45,000 reservists were excess or uncommitted was done by the ARSTAFF in preparation for the Off-Site. I believe that the apportionment of personnel reductions was based upon a ''salami slice'' of the required personnel deductions needed to meet the budget bottom line. However, because the Army National Guard was not involved in the decision making process of how strategy and budget constraints would be integrated to derive any needed reductions, it is difficult to accept that 38,000 in end strength reductions for the ARNG is correct without the basis for this decision.
Mr. BUYER. How do the QDR recommendations with regard to the Army reserve components derive from the analysis of strategy, missions and resources developed since the QDR?
General BARATZ. The Vice Chief of Staff and the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) were involved in the decision making that produced the QDR recommendations. Therefore, the Army Reserve defers to them on this question.
Mr. BUYER. To what extent, and to what effect, did the Army's reserve components participate in the QDR analysis and decision making?
General BARATZ. During the QDR, the Army Reserve participated in every functional panel as well as having a seat on the Strategic Synchronization Cell. Correspondingly, we participated in the Dynamic Commitment wargames series and the weekly General Officer coordination meetings chaired by the Army Vice Chief of Staff.
Page 144 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. To what extent were the QDR recommendations with regard to reserve component end strength and with regard to the roles and missions of the National Guard Combat divisions imposed by decisions and analysis made by the Joint Staff?
General BARATZ. The Army recommended the specific allocation of reductions based on a thorough analysis of Army forces while considering force capabilities and modernization programs. The analysis categorized 6,298 Army Reserve and 66,432 ARNG forces as uncommitted force structure. The allocation of reserve component reductions were then taken from these forces.
Mr. BUYER. Why was an off-site process necessary to reach agreement on these reserve component issues?
General BARATZ. The Secretary of Defense directed the Army to resolve the 45,000 reduction imposed on the Army's reserve components. This became necessary after several Adjutant Generals and the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) initiated a letter writing campaign to dispute the recommended ARNG 38,000 reduction.
Mr. BUYER. What agreements were reached during the off-sight process?
General BARATZ. The Army Reserve agreed to a reduction split of 3,000 for the Army Reserve and 17,000 for the Army National Guard between fiscal years 98–00. The remaining 25,000 reductions would be taken in fiscal years 01 and 02. The specifics of the remaining 4,000 Army Reserve and 21,000 ARNG reductions would be determined through a process to include Total Army Analysis 07. This process will identify the standard requirements code (SRC) and unit identification code (UIC) level of detail to meet the recommended 45,000 Army reserve component reductions.
Page 145 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. Is there complete agreement among the Army Secretariat, the active Army, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard as to the details of the off-site agreement? If not, what is yet to be decided?
General BARATZ. The specifics of the remaining 4,000 Army Reserve and 21,000 ARNG reductions is yet to be determined. The participants agreed to use several processes to include Total Army Analysis 07. It is our belief that TAA 07 will be used to identify the standard requirements code (SRC) and unit identification code (UIC) level of detail. The Army has already programmed the apportionment during the POM process. We do not support the contention that the remaining 25,000 reduction has not already been apportioned between the two reserve components. This may be in opposition to the other off-site attendees.
Mr. BUYER. The QDR apparently was able to make recommendations for reductions in National Guard and Army Reserve end strength. There was, however, no effort to reduce National Guard force structure. Why?
General BARATZ. While it is true that the QDR did not specifically recommend eliminating ARNG Combat Divisions there was not agreement between all three components that end strength would equal force structure allowance but agreement end strength cuts would equal force structure. The Army analysis categorized 6,298 Army Reserve and 66,432 ARNG forces as uncommitted force structure.
Mr. BUYER. What are your concerns about the process by which the second phase of reserve component reductions (25,000 in FY 01 and 02) will be decided?
Page 146 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
General BARATZ. The Army Reserve supports the original QDR recommendation that reduces the Army's reserve components by 45,000. The recommended apportionment is a 38,000 reduction for the ARNG and a 7,000 reduction for the Army Reserve. The Army agreed to this apportionment and decided to reduce the Army Reserve by 3,000 in FY 00 and 2,000 in FY 01 and FY 02 respectively. Corresponding, the ARNG is to reduce 17,000 through FY 00 with 10,000 reductions taken in FY 01 and the remaining 11,000 reductions in FY 02. The Army PAE has programmed these reductions during the recently completed mini-POM. It is our belief and understanding that what remains to be resolved is the standard requirements code (SRC) and unit identification code (UIC) level of detail to meet the programmed end state. The Army will use the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process to assist with this endeavor.
In consonance with the above, future reductions should be based on the following criteria: Reductions should be based on National Military Strategy and driven by TAA. The units retained should be based on relevance. The focus should be on readiness. Resources should be allocated on the First to Fight methodology. The goal should be end strength equals force structure allowance (ES=FSA). And the need for increased Active Guard Reserve full time support should be considered along with stopping military technician (MILTECH) reductions.
Mr. BUYER. The QDR, having assessed several alternative defense postures to meet its strategy objectives, adopted a defense posture that balanced ''current demands and an uncertain future.'' This balance was exemplified by the QDR decision to take modest reductions from current levels of manpower and force structure, rather than deep reductions. Given that decision, do the QDR's recommendations with regard to the reserve component reductions make sense?
Page 147 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Major General ALEXANDER. The QDR recommendations for reductions in force structure and manpower in the Army National Guard, made without any meaningful pre-decisional participation by the senior leadership of the National Guard, the Adjutants General, do not make any sense. Contrary to the strategy based decisions which Secretary of Defense Cohen publicly sought, these decisions were not based upon any identifiable strategy. The enormous potential of the presently configured Army National Guard to assume new current missions and relieve the Active Army of the OPTEMPO pressures of which it complains was not considered. Nor was the Army Guard's ability to replace higher cost Active Army units in the current war plans considered. Additionally, the recommendations did not take into account the unleveraged potential of the Combat Support and Combat Service Support units embedded in the existing combat structure to support current and wartime missions. Finally, there was no consideration of the fact that Army Guard combat units in time of conflict can be mobilized, trained and deployed to embarkation points well within the time it would take to provide ships and planes to transport Guard troops and equipment to a major theater war zone. As a result, my fellow Adjutants' General and I believe this QDR leaves America faced with two problems: (1) an Army the Nation cannot afford and (2) an Army that ''cannot win its Nation's wars''.
Mr. BUYER. From your perspective, were the QDR's reserve component reductions driven more by strategy-mission considerations, or by resource constraints?
Major General ALEXANDER. From my perspective, the QDR recommended reductions of the Army National Guard were the product of a pure numbers game driven solely by resource constraints and arbitrarily allocated between the Army's three components. There was no prior consultation with the Adjutants General and during the course of the QDR the size of the reductions being contemplated for the Army Guard varied wildly from 100,000 to 68,000 and finally to 38,000. The latter number was further reduced to 17,000 over three years at yet another ''off-site'' meeting at which only the Army Guard was required to present any military justification for its force structure and manpower. A process producing such disparate recommendations over time can only be characterized as arbitrary.
Page 148 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. The QDR, having assessed several alternative defense postures to meet its strategy objectives, adopted a defense posture that balanced ''current demands and an uncertain future.'' This balance was exemplified by the QDR decision to take modest reductions from current levels of manpower and force structure, rather than deep reductions. Given that decision, do the QDR's recommendations with regard to the reserve component reductions make sense?
Mr. BECKER. In view of the reductions that the QDR recommended for the Reserve components, it is difficult to reach any conclusion other than that the process was programmatic in the worst sense of the word, i.e., that there was a preset savings target and that the allocation of the reductions to achieve those savings was based upon the old, but apparently not yet thoroughly discredited budget philosophy of sharing the pain irrespective of how little sense the result may happen to make.
We believe that virtually the same, if not additional, savings could have been achieved by transferring other, selected missions to the Reserve components (along with their associated force structure and equipment). Such transfers would achieve significant personnel cost savings and would ensure that the mission capabilities involved are not prodigally lost to the Total Force. The rule of thumb during the QDR's deliberations should have been to transfer as many missions as possible to the Reserve components, excepting only those that demonstrably could not be performed effectively on short notice by any but active duty forces.
Properly tasked and resourced, Reserve forces are more than equal to their mobilization missions, and with the additional force structure needed to reduce operational and personnel tempo to acceptable levels, can ensure the viability of the Total Force policy that underpins our defense planning and structure. Finally, the transfer of additional forces to the Reserve component, as the Total Force downsizes, ensures the vital continued integration of our military into society.
Page 149 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. Buyer. From your perspective, were the QDR's Reserve component reductions driven more by strategy-mission considerations, or by budget constraints?
Mr. BECKER. There is no denying that budget constraints were a, if not the, major factor in the recommendations of the QDR. The QDR report itself explicitly adds ''fiscal executability'' as one of its key criteria. The most crucial operating constraint apparent in the QDR report is, however, a want of vision, a failure to embrace a bold and innovative business solution that offers a real possibility of economy and continued mission capability as we downsize. This failure of nerve is particularly puzzling since, in point of fact, the expanded use of Reserve forces as an economical hedge against emerging threats is a highly conservative and cost-effective approach to structuring the force. The services all talk a good Total Force game; isn't it time they overcame their cultural constraints and embraced the full benefits of that policy and the compensating leverage that it provides?
Mr. BUYER. The QDR, having assessed several alternative defense postures to meet its strategy objectives, adopted a defense posture that balanced ''current demands and an uncertain future.'' This balance was exemplified by the QDR decision to take modest reductions from current levels of manpower and force structure, rather than deep reductions. Given that decision, do the QDR's recommendations with regard to the reserve component reductions make sense?
Mr. BLAKER. It all depends, of course, on where you think the proper ''balance'' between the present, with its current demands, and the future, with its uncertainty, should be drawn, doesn't it? Clearly, the Pentagon's view emphasizes current demands and seeks to cope with future uncertainty by maintaining as much of the current size, structure, and character of the current active force as a flat, or declining, budget will allow. And given that notion of balance, what emerged from the QDR regarding the reserve component reductions ''makes sense.'' But if you believe, as I and others do, that the balance ought to focus more on the future, then the QDR's recommendations with regard to reserve component reductions do not make sense. For if we want to prepare for the future and meet current demands, then we should use more of the reserve components to cope with the current demands and seek faster change inside the active component. We should accelerate the American revolution in military affairs by shielding a larger portion of the active force from the demands of the present, in order to absorb the new technologies, doctrine, and organizations in revolution brings faster. This strategy leads logically to maintaining the current size of the reserve components, not reducing them. It also posits using the reserve components differently and more extensively in meeting the current demands, which have very little to do now with war fighting, and a lot to do with peace keeping and presence.
Page 150 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. From your perspective, were the QDR's reserve component reductions driven more by strategy-mission considerations, or by resource constraints?
Mr. BLAKER. Most assuredly by the prospect of resource constraints. Having spent nearly three decades inside the Pentagon working on defense policy and the Department's Planning, Programming and Budgeting System, I can assure you that serious strategy considerations and thought is hardly a player inside the Pentagon. This is not because the military and civilian officials who labor there are incapable of devising strategy or unwilling to try. It is because there has been a consensus on strategic assumptions for so long. Unfortunately, that consensus, forged during the Cold War, now happens to no longer fit with the reality of today's world. Yet, the planning structure, procedures, and culture inside the Defense Department that grew from the strong Cold War consensus now prevent new strategies from emerging.
Mr. BUYER. The QDR, having assessed several alternative defense postures to meet its strategy objectives, adopted a defense posture that balanced ''current demands and an uncertain future.'' This balance was exemplified by the QDR decision to take modest reductions from current levels of manpower and force structure, rather than deep reductions. Given that decision, do the QDR's recommendations with regard to the reserve component reductions make sense?
Mr. O'HANLON. The QDR's recommendations with regard to the component do indeed make sense given the review's overall philosophy of taking modest reductions from current levels of manpower and force structure, rather than deep reductions.
Page 151 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
As I wrote in my written testimony, although the Army reserve component is being asked to accept a relatively burdensome additional cut under the QDR, it is not suffering unduly over the whole 1990–2002 time frame. Moreover, if one takes a longer perspective, say 1980–2002, the reserve component is making out much better than the active forces.
Specifically, the QDR calls for a further 8 percent reduction in Army personnel in the Reserve and National Guard, taking their aggregate size down from about 575,000 to 530,000. That is larger than the QDR's 4 percent cut in active-duty forces, but smaller than its 11 percent planned reduction in civilian DoD employees (see Table 1). If completed as recommended, it will bring the total size of the Army reserve component down by 28 percent since 1990—still considerably less than the 36 percent cut in active Army forces since that same year.
In addition to becoming smaller, Army reservists are reorienting their mix of missions. Specifically, six Guard brigades and two divisions will be converted to much-needed support capability, reducing the Army's estimated shortfall in that area from 58,000 individuals to roughly 16,000. That will leave the Guard with 30 brigade-equivalents of combat units—down about 40 percent from the 1990 level (the active-duty Army reduced its divisional strength by 45 percent over the same period).
To round out the comparative historical perspective, it is important to note that the Army Guard and Reserves grew greatly in the 1980's. In contrast, the active duty Army grew little during that time. Thus, Army reserve component end-strength will main roughly at its 1978 level under the QDR, if the Pentagon's recommendations are accepted by Congress, whereas active-duty strength will be down more than one-third compared to that time period.
Page 152 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. BUYER. From your perspective, were the QDR's reserve component reductions driven more by strategy-mission considerations, or by resource constraints?
Mr. O'HANLON. The QDR's reserve component reductions were driven equally by strategy-mission considerations and by resource constraints. To my mind, it is impossible to determine that one set of pressures and considerations was greater than the other.
At one level, the QDR was surely a response to resource constraints, as evidenced by the fact that a pro-military secretary of defense who had only recently advocated increasing DoD's overall budget nevertheless undertook a review that made more cuts that additions. It is hard to believe that he would have wished any further cuts in the U.S. armed forces were there not significant fiscal pressures in the country as well as a mismatch between planned defense resources and anticipated defense spending requirements.
But in light of the fact that some cuts were needed, it was natural that reserve component forces—and most notably, Army National Guard combat units—would be put squarely under the budget-cutting knife. Those units have little role in current U.S. war plans, as is well known. Indeed, they should not in my view have a large role, given the desirability of defeating regional foes quickly and decisively in any future conflict.
Because of the need to minimize the amount of territory lost early in any future war against a regional foe, current U.S. war plans correctly call for deploying all ground forces to a major theater war quickly. Specifically, they call for a five-division force to be fully in place within roughly 75 days of a decision to deploy, and for roughly half that force to arrive in theater within the first month of the crisis. That means, in turn, that the last units would set sail for their destination after some 50 days. My own views is that the goal should be deploy even faster, and that DoD should purchase more fast sealift to do so.
Page 153 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
There is good reason to think that DoD cannot meet its own goal today. But it already has several remedial programs in place. In any case, the proper way to solve this problem is not to lower the goalpost (potentially allowing Guard units to be ready by the time lift would be available to carry them) but to buy more lift.
Whatever their merits and potential usefulness under other strategic circumstances, National Guard combat units—particularly at the brigade level and above—are not now poised for rapid reaction to regional crises and show little potential of being able to be rapidly deployable for such purposes.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY
Mr. THORNBERRY. Are the National Guard divisions resourced sufficiently to provide the collective training in order for us to sustain their future use?
General GRIFFITH. Our intent is to resource the eight divisions in the Army National Guard to maintain readiness standards prescribed by the Defense Planning Guidance, specifically proficiency at the individual, crew, squad, and section levels. Other units within the Army National Guard have different readiness requirements, and are resourced accordingly. We have initiated a review to more accurately define resource requirements for our Army National Guard divisions.
Mr. THORNBERRY. What combat missions do you envision for these National Guard Divisions?
Page 154 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
General GRIFFITH. Our eight divisions in the Army National Guard, as they are currently configured, are not required to implement the national military strategy, and have reduced utility to support state and territorial authorities. Following appropriate post-mobilization training that is tailored to the requirements of the anticipated mission, Army National Guard divisions would most likely be used to provide rear area security in overseas theaters, and to reinforce or relieve active forces in post-conflict occupation duties. To broaden their utility to both state and federal missions, we will convert twelve brigades in the Army National Guard from combat forces to combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) forces. These conversions will relieve much of the shortfall in our CS and CSS capabilities required to fight and win two major theater wars as outlined in our national military strategy. Once converted, these additional twelve brigades of CS and CSS forces will be an integral part of our operating force, and will be employed in combat operations as directed by the National Command Authorities.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Are these divisions a ''follow-on force'' or do they have a role as a ''contingent force?''
General GRIFFITH. Selected subordinate units within the divisions are required to implement the national military strategy and would deploy in support of combat operations. However, as entire divisions, they are not required to implement the national military strategy and are not characterized, at this time, as either follow-on forces or contingency forces.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Are the National Guard Divisions resourced sufficiently to provide collective training in order for us to sustain their future use?
Page 155 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
General NAVAS. No; the National Guard Divisions have insufficient resources to perform individual, crew and squad training. The Training Program Evaluation Group (TR PEG) accepted, in principle, the requirements generated to meet Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) directed readiness levels. The TR PEG's position was to tier funding from high to low based on the First to Fight principle. National Guard Bureau tiered the available resources to support Force Support Package (FSP) units and enhanced Separate Brigades (eSB) at 100% of requirements. The remaining funding supported Early Deployers (deploying in less than 75 days) at 17%, Later Deployers and non-TPFDD units at 13%, and new force structure at 0% in FY99 and would be ramped up to 25% of requirements by FY03. This allocation of resources provides Early Deployers with 49 miles of training, Divisions and Late Deployers with 28 miles, and activating force structure with 0 miles. The requirement to meet Individual and Crew/Squad level proficiency for divisional units requires the equivalent of 212 miles. All Active component units are resourced at C1/C2 without regard to the unit's deployment timeline. Since Baseline 6.0 the ARNG OPTEMPO has been reduced $65M in FY99 with further reduction in the outyears.
Mr. THORNBERRY. What combat mission do you envision for these National Guard Divisions?
General NAVAS. The FINAL DRAFT of the 1997 NMS contains a specific affirmation of the requirement for a modernized, trained and integrated strategic reserve force to provide the NCA with a ''hedge'' against uncertainty and the ability to expand our armed forces. NBG has asked for the addition of language to the NMS' description of the Total (Army) Force to specifically include the ARNG combat divisions as the Army's residual force. Corps and/or Theater reserve is also a good mission for the ARNG divisions. So is ''force protection'' of both in-theater forces and key CONUS assets (facilities, installations). Also, countering WMD as early responders is a good mission for the ARNG divisions (paraphrased in the NMS as a combat mission). The 1993 Bottom-Up Review assigned specific missions to those Army National Guard combat forces (22 brigades, equating to 7 1/3 divisions) not required for the two-MRC plans, all of which remain true today:
Page 156 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
a. Extended Crises (''* * * provide the basis for the rotational forces.'')
b. Peace Operations (''* * * be prepared to share the burden of conducting these operations.'')
c. Deterrent Hedge and Expansion Basis (''* * * form the basis of an expanded American force structure and serve as a deterrent to future adversarial regimes * * *'')
d. Domestic Missions (''* * * Guard and reserve force structure provides added capability to respond to external conflicts and to support civil authorities at home.'')
Mr. THORNBERRY. Are these divisions a 'follow-on force' or do they have a role as a ''contingent force''?
General NAVAS. As a ''follow-on'' force, the divisions would likely be used to expand the Army during a prolonged crisis. They would deploy to continue the fight after the active component divisions and the enhanced Separate Brigades had already deployed. This includes providing rotational forces to relieve other forces deployed ahead of them. As a ''contingent'' force, there are many missions:
a. In the dual-MRC scenario, an assumption is that the enhanced Separate Brigades would be mobilized very early after the start of any MRC. The only combat forces available in CONUS to perform the post-mobilization training for the eSBs are the ARNG divisions.
Page 157 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
b. Army warplanners have recently been documenting the need for one or more ARNG divisions to have the mission of backfilling one or more OCONUS-based active division(s) in Europe after the deployment of the active unit(s). This is known as the ''contingency trace'' role for the divisions.
c. The ARNG divisions are uniquely qualified, as demonstrated by their structure and organic command and control, to perform many domestic missions in support of civil authorities. These include disaster relief, humanitarian assistance and aid to law enforcement.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCHALE
Mr. MCHALE. I would invite a comment from Mr. Warner on all of the remarks that I have made but particularly the enhanced readiness brigades. How can we say they are the cutting edge of our defense, absolutely essential in a second MRC, and then rotate them through the NTC once every 8 years?
Secretary WARNER. I have asked the Army about the frequency of rotations of the enhanced readiness brigades through the National Training Center. You are correct, the Army currently plans rotations once every 8 years for these brigades as they become operational. Increasing the frequency of these brigades would involve tradeoffs. Assuming the Army budget will not support expanding the facility, active brigades that are currently required on timeliness sooner than we envision employing enhanced brigades would have reduced rotation frequency. Alternatives that would increase the stress on maintenance, reduce rotation duration, and replacing enhanced brigades for active units have thus far been unacceptable to the Army and the warfighting CINC's.
Page 158 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. MCHALE. I do not know that the points that I am about to enumerate are all worthy of implementation, but I ask you to consider them and comment upon them.
No. 1, I think we have to implement the drawdown of the end strength in the National Guard as proposed in the QDR, and a figure of 21,000, through painful, is probably correct. But that decisionmaking process must incorporate the Guard's input in a meaningful way at every stage in the process.
Mrs. LISTER. With regard to the drawdown, we agree that we must implement a drawdown of the end strength of the Army National Guard. We have agreed on reductions of 5,000 in fiscal year 1998, 5,000 in fiscal year 1999 and 7,000 in fiscal year 2000, for a total of 17,000. We have agreed to engage in a process to decide the remaining 25,000 QDR mandated Reserve component reductions. With regard to inclusion, we agree that we should have the Guard's input at every stage in the process. I believe we have in place the methodology and are working toward developing the processes to do just that.
Mr. MCHALE. No. 2, we should integrate every Guard division into a current op plan. There should be a warfighting mission assigned to every single Guard division.
Mrs. LISTER. With regard to including every Guard division in the warplans, we take no exception. However, the Department of the Army provides forces to the warfighting CINC's. It is something that we quite frankly do not have control over. If the CINC's call for the forces, they will certainly be provided to the CINC's to the fullest extent of our ability to provide those forces. One of the things that makes the National Guard divisions vulnerable in any analysis you do is the fact that they are not called for in war plans by the CINC's.
Page 159 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. MCHALE. No. 3, we should assign each division to a CINC as a theater-oriented strategic reserve.
Mrs. LISTER. With regard to assigning each National Guard division to a CINC as a theater-oriented strategic reserve, we can certainly look at that as part of our total army analysis process.
Mr. MCHALE. No. 4, the enhanced separate brigades should rotate through the NTC once every 4 years, not once every 8 years as currently planned.
Mrs. LISTER. With regard to rotating enhanced brigades through the National Training Center [NTC] once every 4 years, not once every 8 years as currently planned, you are right that NTC and Joint Readiness Training Center are valuable training events. However, capacity is limited as is the money. If additional rotations are committed to the enhanced brigades we would run the very real risk of pressuring maintenance downtime, shortening rotations or reducing frequency for other, higher priority units. It is not likely that the Army will receive additional funding to expand Combined Training Center [CTC] capacity nor run additional rotations. Other factors that have to be considered including the impact on employers when extra drill time is devoted to military duties. CTC rotations impose significant additional requirements on the units.
Mr. MCHALE. No. 5, we should adopt objective evaluation standards across all Army components, Active, Reserve, and Guard. We should have an objective series of performance standards used to fairly evaluate all components. The Marine Corps, for instance, has the McCress standards [ph.] used for both Active and Reserve components. Other services have done the same. It is time for the Army to come up to a single objective standard of performance that measures warfighting capability.
Page 160 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mrs. LISTER. With regard to objective standards of performance to measure warfighting capability, we largely agree. The Army is in the process of reviewing our readiness reporting with a view toward making it more objective than it is now. However, the Army does have existing standards that are the same for all components and contain substantial amounts of objective measurements. Improvements can be made, however, in the end professional judgment will still have an appropriate role.
Mr. MCHALE. And No. 6, I would strongly suggest that in order to build the spirit and the teamwork of a unified total force Army that periodically and for brief transitional periods of time, Guard general officers should be placed in command of active duty forces. Now, that may seem like a radical concept, but, in fact the Marine Corps is just about to do that. A Marine Corps Reserve general will shortly take over command of the active duty Third Marine Division for a period of time of about 3 months.
It is important that we begin to build the spirit of a single total force Army and only by establishing day-to-day working professional relationships between officers who happen to be active or happen to be Reserve or happen to be Guard but who come to respect one another through daily interaction that we can achieve that total force concept.
I would invite your comment on any of those points.
Mrs. LISTER. With regard to placing Guard general officers in command of active duty forces, we take no exception. The Army currently has a Reserve general officer who commands the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, at Fort Bragg. He commands soldiers from all three components. An Army National Guard brigadier general will be assigned as the deputy commander of the Army Service Component Command-South—renamed Army component of US CINC SOUTH. These are examples of permanent assignments that show we are moving toward integrating general officer positions more than ever. We will continue to explore ways to utilize RC general officers of both the Army Reserve and the Army Guard, whenever appropriate.
Page 161 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. MCHALE. I do not know that the points that I am about to enumerate are all worthy of implementation, but I ask you to consider them and comment upon them.
No. 1, I think we have to implement the drawdown of the end strength in the National Guard as proposed in the QDR, and a figure of 21,000, though painful, is probably correct. But that decisionmaking process must incorporate the Guard's input in a meaningful way at every stage in the process.
General GRIFFITH. With regard to the drawdown, we agree that we must implement a drawdown of the Army National Guard. We have agreed on reductions of 5,000 in fiscal year 1998 (FY 1998), 5,000 in fiscal year 1999 and 7,000 in fiscal year 2000, for a total of 17,000. We have agreed to engage in a process to decide additional reductions in fiscal year 2001 and fiscal year 2002. With regard to inclusion, we agree that we should have the Guard's input in a meaningful way at every stage in the process. I think we have set in place the methodology and the processes to do just that.
Mr. MCHALE. No. 2, we should integrate every Guard division into a current op plan. There should be a warfighting mission assigned to every single Guard division.
General GRIFFITH. With regard to including every Guard division in the war plans, we take no exception. However, the Department of the Army provides forces to the warfighting Commanders in Chief [CINC's]. It is something that we quite frankly do not have control over. If the CINC's call for the forces, they will certainly be provided to the CINC's to the fullest extent of our ability to provide those forces. One of the things that makes the National Guard divisions vulnerable in any analysis is the fact that they are not called for in war plans by the unified CINC's.
Page 162 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. MCHALE. No. 3, we should assign each division to a CINC as a theater-oriented strategic reserve.
General GRIFFITH. With regard to assigning each National Guard division to a CINC as a theater-oriented strategic reserve, we can certainly look at that as part of our total Army analysis process.
Mr. MCHALE. No. 4, the enhanced separate brigades should rotate through the NTC once every 4 years, not once every 8 years as currently planned.
General GRIFFITH. With regard to rotating the enhanced brigades through the National Training Center [NTC] once every 4 years, not once every 8 years as currently planned, you are right to think that NTC and Joint Readiness Training Center are valuable training events. But capacity is limited and so is money. Something has to give if additional rotations are committed to the enhanced brigades. We cannot add additional rotations without pressuring maintenance downtime, shortening rotations or reducing frequency for other, higher priority units. We do not think we will get any money to expand Combat Training Center [CTC] capacity nor run additional rotations. Finally, we also have to be sensitive to employer concerns about extra time devoted to military duties. The CTC rotations impose significant additional requirements on the units.
Mr. MCHALE. No. 5, we should adopt objective evaluation standards across all Army components, Active, Reserve, and Guard. We should have an objective series of performance standards used to fairly evaluate all components. The Marine Corps, for instance, has the McCress standards [ph.] used for both Active and reserve components. Other services have done the same. It is time for the Army to come up to a single objective standard of performance that measures warfighting capability.
Page 163 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
General GRIFFITH. With regard to objective standards of performance to measure warfighting capability, we largely agree. The Army is in the process of reviewing our readiness reporting with a view to making it more objective than it is now. Having said that, the existing standards are the same for all components and contain substantial amounts of objective measurement. We think we can make improvements in this area, although in the end, professional judgment will still have an appropriate role.
Mr. MCHALE. And number six, I would strongly suggest that in order to build the spirit and the teamwork of a unified total force Army that periodically and for brief transitional periods of time, Guard general officers should be placed in command of active duty forces. Now, that may seem like a radical concept, but, in fact, the Marine Corps is just about to do that. A Marine Corps Reserve general will shortly take over command of the active duty Third Marine Division for a period of time of about three months.
It is important that we begin to build the spirit of a single total force Army and only by establishing day-to-day working professional relationships between officers who happen to be active or happen to be Reserve or happen to be Guard but who come to respect one another through daily interaction that we can achieve that total force concept.
I would invite your comment on any of those points.
General GRIFFITH. With regard to placing Guard general officers in command of active duty forces, we take no exception. I would point out that our Commander, U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command at Fort Bragg is a Reserve general officer. He commands soldiers from all three components. This is not a temporary arrangement, as in the example you cite. It is the way this command is structured, and it has been this way for some time. The Army has an active duty brigadier general assigned as the chief of staff in the U.S. Army Reserve Command. In the Army Service Component Command-South (the renamed Army component of U.S. Army South), the Army has assigned an Army National Guard brigadier general as the deputy commander. These examples show that we are integrating general officer positions more than ever. We will continue to explore ways to utilize reserve component general officers of both the Army Reserve and Army National Guard, whenever appropriate.
Page 164 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. MCHALE. I do not know that the points that I am about to enumerate are all worthy of implementation, but I ask you to consider them and comment upon them.
Number one, I think we have to implement the drawdown of the end strength in the National Guard as proposed in the QDR, and a figure of 21,000, though painful, is probably correct. But that decision making process must incorporate the Guard's input in a meaningful way at every stage in the process.
General NAVAS. I want to emphasize that the Army National Guard at 367K soldiers is sized appropriately. Again, I would like to reiterate the fact that the QDR report did not make specific recommendations as to reductions in the National Guard and Army Reserve. The QDR report made a recommendation that the reserve components be reduced by 45,000 in end strength. Apparently, the specific breakdown was made later by the Senior Army Leadership without representation from the Army National Guard. Therefore, I can not comment on a correct number. However, I am in complete agreement that the Guard is required in the decision making process. The National Guard has demonstrated that the demographics and propensity of the American People to enlist in the Guard remains high. Community based citizen soldiers are our link to the future, as far as support of military activities for this country. We must maintain that connectivity between America's communities and our Nation's militia base defense force. Further reductions jeopardize the investment the American People are making to the National Guard.
Our concern is that the QDR process did not include the senior leadership of the reserve components. End-strength decisions have included the Army National guard only at the implementation stage and not at the formulation stage.
Page 165 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. MCHALE. Number two, we should integrate every Guard division into a current op plan. There should be a warfighting mission assigned to every single Guard division.
General NAVAS. I couldn't agree more with that statement. Army National Guard divisions are a vast repository of capabilities while being the Army's residual force. The efficiencies achieved by having combat forces in the Guard should free up precious resources to help speed the modernization of the Total Army.
The Army National Guard divisions are fully capable, given sufficient resources, to execute any mission assigned. Modern reserve component combat forces have proven their worth on today's modern battlefield. The Marine Corps Reserve in Operation Desert Shield/Storm is an excellent example. The key to their success was a mission to train to and the resources to do it with.
Our soldiers are as motivated and enthusiastic as any in the world. Our National Guard units have proven, time and again, their ability to be ready when called, Army Guard combat units are no exception. Given the resources and a mission, they can be ready in a time frame that makes them relevant to the warfight. The key is to have a mission for every unit and the resources to meet that mission.
Mr. MCHALE. Number three, we should assign each division to a CINC as a theater-oriented strategic reserve.
Page 166 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
General NAVAS. I refer back to my answer to the previous question regarding integrating every Guard division into a current OPLAN. It is critically important that every unit be assigned a warfighting mission.
If the strategy calls for Army National Guard divisions to be a strategic reserve for a warfighting CINC, then that should be written into the current OPLAN so that we can train to support that specific CINC. However, any warfighting assignment must be part of a well thought out overall plan designed to meet the Nation's defense needs.
Mr. MCHALE. Number four, the enhanced separate brigades should rotate through the NTC once every four years, not once every eight years as currently planned.
General NAVAS. I agree that the greater the frequency of rotations through the CTCs, the better prepared the brigades will be when called upon. An NTC rotation once every eight years is not nearly sufficient to train our brigades.
With the drawdown of the Army from its peak in the 1980's, there should be sufficient slots for Army National Guard Enhanced Separate Brigades to be added to the rotation cycle with greater frequency and resourced accordingly. Once every four years is a good fit with the Army National Guard training cycle.
Mr. MCHALE. Number five, we should adopt objective evaluation standards across all Army components, active, Reserve, Guard. We should have an objective series of performance standards used to fairly evaluate all components. The Marine Corps, for instance, has the McCress standards [ph.] used for both active and reserve components. Other services have done the same. It is time for the Army to come up to a single objective standard of performance that measures warfighting capability.
Page 167 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
General NAVAS. The evaluation standards, as they currently exist, are the same for all components. The difference of opinion hinges upon the uniform application of those standards. The current standards leave too much room for subjective opinion. This is a problem not just for the Army Guard, but for the Army and Army Reserve as well.
I would like to see a set of standards that can be evaluated on a more objective basis. Using objective evaluation criteria, I am confident that the Army National Guard can demonstrate their warfighting skills and ability to contribute measurably to the defense of the nation.
Mr. MCHALE. And number six, I would strongly suggest that in order to build the spirit and the teamwork of a unified total force Army that periodically and for brief transitional periods of time, Guard general officers should be placed in command of active duty forces. Now, that may seem like a radical concept, but, in fact, the Marine Corps is just about to do that. A Marine Corps Reserve general will shortly take over command of the active duty Third Marine Division for a period of time of about three months.
It is important that we begin to build the spirit of a single total force Army and only by establishing day-to-day working professional relationships between officers who happen to be active or happen to be Reserve or happen to be Guard but who come to respect one another through daily interaction that we can achieve that total force concept.
I would invite your comment on any of those points.
Page 168 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
General NAVAS. I support any initiative that helps foster an increased level of trust and teamwork between the components. I believe we have to look at what worked and didn't work in the past. To my knowledge, no Guard general officer has ever commanded an active unit while on Guard status in the modern Army.
I believe the key concept of a total force is to make our defense policy dependent upon a thorough integration of the three components, regulars, reserves and the National Guard. To do this we must make the reserves and National Guard relevant to the warfight. The National Guard provides linkage between the defense needs of our Nation and its individual communities. My fear is that once again in our history we are heading down a path that will have the regulars alone, without the popular support of the American people.
Mr. MCHALE. I do not know that the points that I am about to enumerate are all worthy of implementation, but I ask you to consider them and comment upon them.
Number one, I think we have to implement the drawdown of the end strength in the National Guard as proposed in the QDR, and a figure of 21,000, though painful, is probably correct. But that decision making process must incorporate the Guard's input in a meaningful way at every stage in the process.
General BARATZ. The Army Reserve supports the proposed reductions of 38,000 for the ARNG and 7,000 for the Army Reserve. These reductions have been programmed in the recent POM.
Mr. MCHALE. Number two, we should integrate every Guard division into a current op plan. There should be a warfighting mission assigned to every single Guard division.
Page 169 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Number three, we should assign each division to a CINC as a theater-oriented strategic reserve.
General BARATZ. The BUR, CORM, and now the QDR have identified the combat forces required to support our National Military Strategy. The decision to add additional combat forces or supporting forces to the supported CINCs must be driven by the respective war plans.
Mr. MCHALE. Number four, the enhanced separate brigades should rotate through the NTC once every four years, not once every eight years as currently planned.
General BARATZ. Rotating enhanced brigades through the NTC would likely enhance readiness and training effectiveness. However, the increased rotations would require additional dollar resources which can only be funded by equivalent offsets in other programs.
Mr. MCHALE. Number five, we should adopt objective evaluation standards across all Army components, active, Reserve, Guard. We should have an objective series of performance standards used to fairly evaluate all components. The Marine Corps, for instance, has the McCress standards [ph.] used for both active and reserve components. Other services have done the same. It is time for the Army to come up to a single objective standard of performance that measures warfighting capability.
General BARATZ. The Army Reserve supports objective, standardized performance evaluation standards. We believe that these standards currently exist within the Army and will continue to support any future Army initiatives in this area.
Page 170 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC Segment 2 Of 2
Mr. MCHALE. And number six, I would strongly suggest that in order to build the spirit and the teamwork of a unified total force Army that periodically and for brief transitional periods of time, Guard general officers should be placed in command of active duty forces. Now, that may seem like a radical concept, but, in fact, the Marine Corps is just about to do that. A Marine Corps Reserve general will shortly take over command of the active duty Third Marine Division for a period of time of about three months.
It is important that we begin to build the spirit of a single total force Army and only by establishing day-to-day working professional relationships between officers who happen to be active or happen to be Reserve or happen to be Guard but who come to respect one another through daily interaction that we can achieve that total force concept.
I would invite your commend on any of those points.
General BARATZ. The Army Reserve supports the total force policy. As an example, the Army is currently implementing the composite concept which combines active and reserve component soldiers and equipment into one organization. As additional opportunities become available, the Army Reserve will be a willing participant within our core competencies.